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In the face of World War I, for the first time in history, Great Powers had to define their stance to the
Slovenian people. The most difficult and traumatic relationship of the Slovenian people was with the
Germans. The relentlessness and doggedness of the German class in Austria (and Germany) in relation
to the Slovenian population during and at the end of World War I left little leeway for the resolution
of the national question. The same applied to Hungarians.
Austria-Hungary was averse to Slovene national demands, last but not least because Slovenes blocked
the German path to the Adriatic and the port of Trieste.
At the beginning of the 20th century the national consciousness was, on the one hand, connected with
national enthusiasm and a feeling of great peril, and, on the other hand, with strengthened Yugo
Slavism after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the belief, connected with this, that
Slovene future existed only in a national alliance with other Yugoslav nations within Austria. Yugo
Slavism also showed itself in other forms: the most radically in the case of the preporodovci
("revivalists") who saw a Yugoslav state with a single Yugoslav nation outside of Austria, and in the
proposals for "intermediate" solutions in the form of confederation. At the threshold of the war, in
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April 1913, the writer Ivan Cankar expressed his faith in a "Yugoslav federal republic", in which
Slovenes, Croats, Serbs and Bulgarians would be united, yet at the same time he also strove to
preserve Slovene language and culture. In his lecture "Slovenes and Yugoslavs" in April 1913 in
Ljubljana he also said the following words: "Let us leave Austria in its own shit - ; let us be like Mazzini
in Italy". This lecture earned him a week in prison.
Leaving aside the politically encouraged hatred towards Serbia at the onset of World War I, it can be
said that positive Yugoslav feelings were definitely present among the Slovenes at least from the
Balkan Wars onward. The leading Slovene newspapers carefully monitored the events on the
battlefields and expressed their affinity for the Serbs and Bulgarians, especially during the First Balkan
War. During the Second Balkan War Slovene newspapers took sides with the Bulgarians and were
critical of Serbia; they regretted above all the end of their former alliance. On the other hand, they
viewed Serbia as the actual and moral victor of the Balkan warfare, which further strengthened its
reputation and prestige. The liberal politician and writer Ivan Tavčar strove to strengthen the bond
with Serbia. He implored the Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić to stop making Serbian policies and
start making Yugoslav ones, which Pašić allegedly promised to do.
Even though the Slovene political and intellectual elites were forced into Yugo Slavism by a historical
necessity, they were essentially naive, had no knowledge of the cultural and other habits of the
Yugoslav nations and at the same time largely proceeded from the aspiration to form a single Yugoslav
nation. It was believed that Slovenes could not survive as an independent nation.
World War I affected Slovenes as individuals and as a nation. They died at the fronts, and in the rear,
in exile, and in internment on a mass scale. Anti-Austrian beliefs were persecuted by authorities and
numerous Slovene politicians were sent to confinement. Military Courts sentenced a few hundred
Slovenes to death. The work of parties was limited and controlled; all forms of union and labor
movement and politically unreliable organizations were forbidden. Parliamentary life died down by
1917.
In the second half of the war the national issue began coming to the foreground. Almost until the end
of the war, Slovene politicians believed in the possibility that they could solve the national issue within
Austria-Hungary. After parliamentary life was restored, Anton Korošec demanded a democratic
Yugoslav state within Austria-Hungary on behalf of the Yugoslav deputies' club in May 1917. The
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national program, called the May Declaration, triggered
a great national movement, public
manifestations and gatherings, and the collecting of signatures for the declaration.
With the Niš Declaration of the Serbian government of 7th December 1914, Serbia declared the
unification "of all of our unfree brothers, the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes" as one of the war objectives,
in addition to liberation. This statement showed intention of the expansion of Greater Serbia to the
north; nevertheless, emigrant politicians, united in the Yugoslav Committee signed the Corfu
Declaration with the Serbian government on 20th July 1917, declaring themselves for a unification of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in a common state. The latter was supposed to be a constitutional and
democratic one, under the scepter of the Karađorđević dynasty, and would comprise the entire
territory inhabited by the "three-named Yugoslav nation", i.e. the Serbian, Croatian and Slovene one.
As regards the internal structure - e.g. the issue of a constitution, federal nature etc. - it left things
unresolved.
After the last attempt to save the monarchy, written in the manifesto of Emperor Charles in October
1918, had failed, even Slovene politicians were left with no choice but to opt for a non-Austrian option.
This decision was not an easy one for the political elite. Loyalty to the monarchy was taken for granted
by all the classes for centuries; by the simple folk, the politicians and by the clergy. Slavophilia was
strong. Of the Slavic nations, the Czechs and Slovaks had the most similar culture and mentality, yet
they had decided on their own state; moreover, Austrians were in between. Slovenes had an idealized
image of Southern Slavs, especially the Serbs; in fact, they knew very little of them. The different
religions caused scruples . "How bad it will be for us if we come under an Orthodox king after leaving
a Catholic emperor!. Deus misereatur nostri!" was written by Prince Bishop Anton Bonaventura Jeglič
in November 1918. He later admitted that he saw no other option or Slovenes would have been
Germanized. The relentlessness and fanaticism of the German classes towards Slovenes did not leave
many options open. The same was true of Hungarians. Austria-Hungary was falling apart without the
will and influence of Slovenes. The Italian army exerted pressure. Austrian Germans demanded
unification with Germany, which seemed like a realistic option at the end of the war. Hungarians had
no intention of relinquishing Slovene territory. It was threatened to be chopped up into pieces.
Slovenes were a part of the defeated country, whereas Serbia was a victor.
The State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, which was founded by Austro-Hungarian Slavs on 29th
October 1918, after the monarchy had disintegrated, and which existed until 1st December, was a
short-lived and temporary solution. After a chaotic debate on 23rd and 24th November in Zagreb, the
National Council agreed to form a unified national state with a centralist order and the Karađorđević
dynasty. The Yugoslav national unification was carried out on 1st December 1918 with the
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proclamation of the Serbian heir to the throne. “Our Austro-Hungarian reality has drunkenly rolled
itself under the Karađorđević throne like an empty beer bottle into a garbage can”, was how the
Croatian writer Miroslav Krleža vividly
described this unification. The Yugoslavian option was
decidedly dependent on Serbia: Slovenians were part of a defeated country, while Serbia was the
winner. Other large countries had poor knowledge of the Slovene nation.
Up until the beginning of the war, Slovenia was not familiar to Great Britain, United States and Russia
either as a geographical or a political concept; what they knew about the Slovenes they had learned
from the work by the British historian and publicist R. W. Seaton-Watson entitled The Southern Slav
Question and the Habsburg Monarchy from 1911. Although Watson knew about the existence of the
Slovenes, he did not have a detailed knowledge about them and was never in the Slovene territory
even though he spent quite some time both in Vienna and Croatia. Focusing primarily on the Croats
and their aspirations for a state, he saw a solution to the Southern Slav question without the Slovene
territory, and believed the Croatian plans which foresaw Carniola, part of Carinthia and Styria included
in the new Yugoslav state to be unrealistic as well, since no Austrian party would consent to a plan
according to which Vienna would have no direct connection to the sea. Henry Wickham Steed, the
then foreign affairs editor of the London Times, came to a similar assessment as attested in his journal
by Bogumil Vošnjak, a member of the Yugoslav Committee, who became involved in a dispute with
him on this subject. In picturesque terms of another Committee member, the Croat Franjo Supilo, the
Slovenes were “a dead body” in the eyes of the great powers.
The first report on the Slovenes by the Foreign Office, which was written during the war and published
in 1919, contained a belief that the Slovenes have never established their own state, that they have
no national tradition of their own, and have no historical rights which they could invoke in forming
their own political system.
Similar conclusions were formed by the U.S. State Department where several studies on the Southern
Slav question as well as on various forms of the South Slavic nationality were conducted (studies by
Lansey, Puttney, a study group led by Charles Seymour, and a study by the Inquiry group). When the
realization that the existence of Austro-Hungary is not necessary came about sometime in mid-1918,
three possible solutions were formed: the first envisaged the preservation of Austro-Hungary within
the existing borders but with a liberal regime which would also acknowledge the rights of the South
Slavic nations, the second foresaw the unification of all Yugoslavs under Austro-Hungary by doing away
with the kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro (which would make no sense given the fact that they
were part of the Entente Powers), and the third anticipated the formation of the Yugoslav state as an
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independent state, but without the Slovenes (whose ties to Austria were too strong in addition to
having a language different from that of the Serbs and the Croats). All studies foresaw Trieste as
belonging “naturally” to Italy. In Puttney’s opinion, such a state would also get part of the territory,
but without the “extreme” Slovene demands (Trieste, Istria). Moreover, the Inner Austrian lands,
where the Slovenes also lived (most of them in Carniola), were regarded as the nucleus of the Habsburg
monarchy, which would make their integration in the Yugoslav state implausible. The Inquiry study
group leaned towards establishing several smaller, independent South Slavic states, but doubts arose
as to whether they would manage to withstand the German expansionism.
In principle, USA president Wilson was against secret pacts and advocated the national selfdetermination of peoples in Austria-Hungary. In practice however, the US policy was markedly
different. American representatives viewed the Slovenian people as a non-historic people, who are
not prepared to fight for national objectives and possess a notably lower culture than Italians and other
larger nations, which was very close too British view.
The Russian Tsarist Foreign Minister Sergei Dmitrievich Sazonov (an ardent Orthodox believer and
advocate of the position that the Russian Church and the State are as one) as well as the highest
Russian diplomatic circle at first had no idea about the Slovenes. Ivan Hribar, a liberal politician and a
fervent Slavophil, who travelled to St. Petersburg as many as four times prior to the war, was certain
after talking with Sazonov that he would save Trieste for the Yugoslav state. He was convinced that
Russia will take the Slovene nation under its protection, which was a completely misguided way of
thinking. Tsarist Russia had no scruples regarding sacrificing the western part of the Slovenian territory
to make Italy enter the war on the side of the Entente Powers. A few months after that discussion with
Hribar (in January 2015) tsarists ministry for foreign affairs instructed a Russian agent to convince the
Slovene politician in the Littoral region of the necessity of Italian occupation. But despite that Franjo
Supilo, a member of the London Committee, was even in April 1915 appalled with Sazonov’s ignorance
- conducting talks with Sazonov , which still revealed that the latter was not even aware that the
Slovenes existed. Sazonov (who spent 11 years as the Russian diplomatic representative at the Holy
See) felt a distinct dislike towards the Catholic Slavs, believing they lacked decision-making sovereignty
as they were led by the Pope. So, as far as the Southern Slav question was concerned, the Russian
Tsarist policy saw only a concept of an expanded Serbia with mostly Orthodox population even in
principle, with possibly another Catholic (Croatian) Slavic state. Finally, with some knowledge also
about Slovenes, Sazonov stated that Russia is not prepared to fight "even half a day longer" for them.
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The French were allied with Serbia and regarded Yugo Slavism in the light of the expansion of Serbia
and the formation of a single nation following its own example.
The English historian Arnold Toynbee was the only one to foresee, as early as 1915, the possibility of
an independent Slovenia, but as a kind of an expanded “Trieste state” whose independence would be
ensured by Europe or which would, alternatively, be included in the South Slavic state. But even
Toynbee was aware of the fact that such a solution (as well as several smaller states for that matter)
was rather utopian.
The unfavorable foreign policy conditions, demands of Great Britain and France that London treaty
must be full field, the powerlessness of Slovene politicians and the luck of interest of the new Yugoslav
authorities resulted in the fact that Italy received the western part of Slovene territory, i.e. the Littoral,
while the northern part, Carinthia, was lost at a plebiscite. Slovenes were faced with a new reality: they
were living in four countries with different political systems and all of them were based on
authoritarianism and were not in favor of Slovenes. Over one third of Slovenes remained outside their
motherland and Slovenia lost Trieste, inhabited by 57,000 Slovenes, 40% and consequently its
strongest industrial center and access to the sea. During the interwar period, the Slovenes of the
Littoral were deliberately Italianized , exposed to Fascist violence and economically oppressed. The
Slovenes in Austria were formally protected by the protective minority clauses of the Peace Treaty of
Saint-Germain, yet Austria only partially fulfilled them. After Anschluss Nazi pressure gradually began
intensify. Nationally speaking, one positive achievement after World War I was the annexation of the
outermost eastern part of the territory, Prekmurje. With the Treaty of Trianon, the Slovene Raba
Valley fell to Hungary; in accordance with the theory that Slovenes were Wends, they tried to
Hungarianize them. In this poor and backward region, Slovene language was preserved mainly with
the help of the Church.
For Slovenes the manner of uniting into a new Yugoslav state was also connected with a dilemma
about national identity. Transposed into the political language, this meant an advocacy of autonomy,
which Slovenes never achieved or of integral Yugo Slavism. Regardless of the differences and the
dissatisfaction with the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and later on the Kingdom of Yugoslavia,
Slovenes accepted new state as a necessary shield from Germanic and Romance pressure and became
culturally and economically stronger in it.
To conclude:
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After World War I, the Slovenian fate was decided in the context of (secret) international treaties,
bargains made in the framework of the Paris peace treaty, second-guessing the Slovenian national
vitality and bias against Slovenians. The incompetence of the Slovenian political elites contributed
greatly to this situation. The result was the division to four countries, whereby national empowerment
was only possible in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.