DRAFT
UN Lessons Learned Review on support to
Core Public Administration Functions
in the immediate aftermath of conflict
New York, July 2012
Table of Contents
Preface .................................................................................................................................................................. 3
Chapter 1: Objectives and methodology ................................................................................................................ 4
1.1
What is public administration and why does it matter? .......................................................................... 4
1.2
Methodology, definitions, and approach ............................................................................................... 6
Chapter 2: Lessons from the wider context ............................................................................................................ 9
2.1
Lessons from Peace Building and State-building ................................................................................... 9
2.2
Lessons from Public Administration Reform ........................................................................................ 11
2.3
Lessons from research on governance and institutional change .......................................................... 13
2.4
The ‘proper’ relationship between politics and public administration .................................................. 13
Chapter 3: Main findings and recommendations .................................................................................................. 16
3.1
The development of UN capacity for support to public administration after conflict ........................... 16
3.2
The UN’s current approach to support to CPAF ................................................................................... 19
3.3
The proposed approach ....................................................................................................................... 21
3.4
The importance of context .................................................................................................................. 24
Chapter 4: Deepening the political settlement ..................................................................................................... 26
4.1
Include consideration of CPAF in peace agreements ........................................................................... 26
4.2
Promote discussion and negotiation on the character and function of public administration ............... 27
4.3
Assist politicians, parties and other political actors to understand CPAF .............................................. 28
4.4
Assist governments to generate ‘process legitimacy’ .......................................................................... 29
4.5
Monitor labour disputes between government and state employees ................................................... 30
4.6
Promote inclusion in PA ...................................................................................................................... 30
Chapter 5: Restoring basic functionality ............................................................................................................... 32
5.1
First things first ................................................................................................................................... 32
5.2
Resist the urge to make big plans ........................................................................................................ 35
5.3
Speed up grievance redressal .............................................................................................................. 38
5.4
Promote ‘South-South’ links and inclusion in regional PA initiatives .................................................... 38
5.5
Support the restoration of local governance ........................................................................................ 40
5.6
Focus on outcomes ............................................................................................................................. 41
Chapter 6: Prioritising UN support to core public administration functions .......................................................... 44
6.1
Develop UN-wide policy on support to CPAF ....................................................................................... 44
1
6.2
Bring a ‘state-building’ framework into the UN’s approach .................................................................. 46
6.3
Improve planning for CPAF in UN operations and mandates ............................................................... 47
6.4
Improve analysis for planning and programming ................................................................................. 48
6.6
Enhance the role of CPAF in the PCNA process ................................................................................... 51
6.7
Deepen the UN’s human resource base on CPAF ................................................................................. 52
6.8
Invest in learning and training on CPAF ............................................................................................... 52
6.9
Increase and speed up funding for CPAF.............................................................................................. 54
6.9.1
The ‘Early Recovery’ Funding Window ........................................................................................ 54
6.9.2
CPAF Needs Assessment in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict ............................................... 55
6.9.3
Drawing on Transitional and Developmental Financing for CPAF Support .................................. 56
6.10
Develop co-operation with other organisations ................................................................................... 59
Chapter 7: Conclusions and next steps ................................................................................................................. 61
Annex xx
Summary of Recommendations .................................................................................................. 62
Annex xx
Inventory of UN-affiliated websites of relevance to public administration and local governance in
post-conflict situations .................................................................................................................................... 63
Annex xx
Note on governance data ............................................................................................................ 64
Annex xx
Illustrative sequencing table........................................................................................................ 66
Annex xx
CPAF in UN mission mandates .................................................................................................... 67
Annex xx
Resources ................................................................................................................................... 68
Annex xx
Suggestions for training by UN staff type and function ............................................................... 69
Annex xx
List of CPAF projects in the case study countries ..........................................................................71
Annex xx
Key organisations that have developed work on CPAF post-conflict ........................................... 81
Bibliography .................................................................................................................................................... 89
2
Preface
This report is submitted in partial fulfilment of Policy Committee decision 2009/27 which commissioned a ‘lessons
learned review of country experiences in post-conflict public administration’. That decision was in turn based on
the issues raised in the ‘Report of the Secretary-General on peace building in the immediate aftermath of conflict’
(A/63/881 – S/2009/304) in which ‘Support to restoring core government functions, in particular basic public
administration and public finance, at the national and subnational levels’ was identified as ‘recurring areas where
international assistance is frequently requested as a priority in the immediate aftermath of conflict’. 1
The objectives of this report, as specified in the ToR, are to ‘capture the experiences gained over the years on how
the UN System has addressed public administration capacity development in the early years of the post-conflict
environments’; and to provide ‘recommendations to ensure the UN system is capable of providing effective,
cohesive, integrated and strategic support to improve the capacities of post-conflict public administration at the
national and sub-national levels.’ Seven case studies were commissioned for the report. Five countries were
visited by the team (Liberia, Burundi, Timor-Lest, Guinea-Bissau and Kosovo), two countries (Sierra Leone and
Afghanistan) were covered through desk reviews. 2
As per the Policy Committee decision, this report will lay the groundwork for a series of more detailed and specific
‘how to’ guidance notes on a range of technical areas that this overall report will not have the space to go into in
sufficient depth.
The primary audience of the report is SRSGs, DSRSGs, UN Resident Coordinators, members of the UN Country
Team, UN mission political officers and civil affairs officers, and staff from all UN agencies working on support to
public administration and local government. The report is also intended to provoke debate amongst a wider
group of interested member states, policy experts and donors.
The production of the report was supervised by the UN Working Group on Public Administration. The Working
Group is chaired by UNDP3 and comprises representatives of all New York-based UN agencies interested in and
mandated to support various aspects of PA.4 Many agencies and missions in the case study countries generously
gave of their time and support.
In Chapter 1, public administration will be defined and the report’s methodology will be described. In Chapter 2
the lessons from the wider policy and practice context within which this report is situated will be laid out. Chapter
3 will lay out the core argument of report and main lessons and recommendations. Chapters 4 to 6 will describe
these in more detail. Chapter 7 will then draw some conclusions and lay out next steps. Annex xx contains all the
recommendations.
1
The other four were: support to basic safety and security, demobilization and reintegration, strengthening the rule of law and initiation of
security sector reform; support to political processes, and developing conflict-management capacity at national and subnational levels;
support to the provision of basic services and the safe and sustainable return and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees;
and support to economic revitalization, and rehabilitation of basic infrastructure.
2 The case studies have not been formally published as part of the review, but are available from UNDP on request.
3 UNDP funded the consultants, who contributed to the research and drafting of the report, and coordinated the initiative, the editing of the
mission reports and the drafting of the final report.
4
DPA, DPKO, OCHA, OHCHR, PBSO, UNCDF, UNDESA, UNDP, UNICEF, UNV and UN Women.
3
Chapter 1: Objectives and methodology
1.1
What is public administration and why does it matter?
1.
The evolution of public administration is closely linked to the development of the state; the ability to
administer territory5 is perhaps second in importance only to the ability to enforce a monopoly of legitimate
violence in the history of state-building. Service delivery as the primary function of public administration is a
comparatively recent development.6 The evolution of norms and approaches to public administration has closely
followed wider debates and developments in the role of the state, the market and democracy.7 (Indeed, public
administration is often seen as a poor relation of political science, and of political matters more generally.8) These
wider conceptual debates are reflected in the use of a range of different but similar terms, this report will continue
with the term ‘public administration’.9
2.
In terms of its function public administration can be seen as a key mechanism for the delivery of public
goods to citizens, notably economic growth and social services, or, depending on your point of view, as a key
mechanism through which state authority is extended and exercised over subjects. Not surprisingly, intergovernmental bodies such as the UN and the OECD tend to regard public administration favourably, and see
some kind of basic administrative capacity as a necessary condition for peace and development. According to the
OECD, for example:
‘A state does not exist without a minimum of administrative capacity. The key elements of an
administrative structure are a reasonably well functioning civil service and public financial management
system and the ability to raise funds, particularly through taxation. Strengthening the capacity of central
and sub-national administrative structures across all levels of government is thus essential to establishing
government presence. It is also fundamental for successful state building, in particular in new or reemerging states.’ (OECD, 2008)
3.
One of the UN’s earliest texts on public administration, from 1951, puts it thus:
‘…in practically every attempt to solve technical and economic problems, there are a number of
fundamental requirements of an administrative nature, requirements of organization, staff, budget,
5
Commonly thought of as having the unchallenged ability to both tax and impose rules on a population.
6 Van de Walle and Scott (2009)
7
See, for example, the ‘Guidance Note of the Secretary General on Democracy’ for a contemporary interpretation.
‘There is a feeling among political scientists … that academicians who profess public administration spend their time fooling with trifles’,
Martin, 1952.
9 The term ‘Public administration’ is widely used, but for many has overtones of the modernist, technical approach to development favoured
in the 1950s-70s, with alternative terms such as ‘public sector’ often favoured. ‘Public management’ is preferred by adherents of the ‘New
Public Management (NPM)’ movement of the 1990s, and more recently terms such as ‘public service’ and ‘public value’ have emerged in
reaction to that movement. The term ‘New Public management’ covers a range of the public sector reforms aimed at improving outcomes
and efficiency by introducing commercial approaches that were pursued in a number of Anglophone OECD countries from the 1980s onwards,
such as introducing greater internal competition, the creation of executive agencies, economic incentives for improved performance, greater
measurement of outputs, etc. The idea of ‘public value’ is the analogue of the desire to maximise shareholder value in the private sector. The
argument is that public services are distinctive because they are characterised by claims of rights by citizens to services that have been
authorised and funded through some democratic process.
8
4
planning and procedure. Moreover it has been discovered in one technical assistance project after
another, in fields such as agriculture, industry, mining or power, that a prior need is to provide those basic
communications and utilities which are usually considered to be government functions, those domestic
administrative measures which are most likely to originate or stimulate economic development in
individual fields, and those governmental programmes of social amelioration which will assist the people
of the nation in undertaking the arduous tasks which lie ahead. By definition this is the role of public
administration.’ (UN, 1951)
4.
However, as shall be discussed later, public administration can fulfil less obvious and more political
functions. It can provide a large source of patronage to shore up support for political leaders, through
employment it can be a form of ‘second best welfare policy’ (Shepard, 2003), and, in a number of countries it has
also been a tool for exclusion, repression, and abuse, a fact of great importance for the UN system’s deliberations
as to how best to provide support to public administration post-conflict.
5.
Two key distinctions often get lost in discussions on public administration, and it is important to clarify
them for this report:
The first is the distinction made in the public administration literature, between what the Policy
Committee refers to as the ‘core’ or ‘basic’ public administration on the one hand, and line ministry, or
service delivery, functions on the other. The World Bank describes this distinction as ‘upstream’ and
‘downstream’ functions.10 The ‘basic’ or ‘upstream’ functions – usually raising revenue, budgeting,
planning, managing human resources, etc - are a necessary ‘precursor’ to policy implementation.11 Of
particular importance for this report, the ‘core’ PA functions are essential for government ownership of
the political and development process, in particular the budgeting function; whereas government can
contract out some aspects of service delivery, it cannot do so with planning and budgeting;12
The second distinction, often confused with the first, is a distinction commonly made in the statebuilding literature between the set of ‘core’ or ‘survival’ functions that any state needs to exercise just in
order to survive, and the usually much wider suite of functions and services provided by the public
administration as a whole.13
6.
The ambiguity induced by blurring these distinctions is evident in a number of UN policy documents and
mission mandates where a variety of phrases are used with often unclear and overlapping meanings:

‘public administration’, ‘core government functions’, ‘basic public administration’, ‘key government
institutions’ (Secretary General’s report on Peace-Building ):

‘core public administration capacities’, ‘basic public administration’ (UN Policy Committee):
10
‘The public sector can be envisaged mechanically as comprising two broad parts – the upstream core ministries and central agencies
including the Ministry of Finance and the offices that support the head of government in the centre of government; and downstream sector
agencies such as education, agriculture, transport or health providers which deliver, fund and regulate services.’ (World Bank, 2011 pp1).
11 See also: ‘Governments are composed of two complementary sets of organisational structures, procedures and technology: those related to
administrative function and those related to policy implementation. The former are a precursor to the latter. The administrative functions and
their associated infrastructure involve generic staff activities such as financial management, human resources management, capital
management, and information technology management. These functions support the other managerial work of government more directly
related to running programs (functions typically referred to as policy implementation).’ (Ingraham and Donahue, 2000)
12 See e.g. ‘Getting better results from assistance to fragile states’ (ODI, 2011)
13 Different authors give different interpretations of what are ‘core’ or ‘survival’ functions and what are not, but some variation on: a monopoly
over the legitimate use of force; revenue generation; safety, security and justice; basic service delivery; and economic governance, is common.
5

‘essential administrative services' (Peace Building Fund):

‘core administrative structures‘ (UNMISET):

‘core government functionality’ (CivCap)

‘civil and social services’ (UNAMI, UNTAET):

‘critical state institutions’ (UNOTIL):

‘state authority’, ‘public institutions’ (UNAMSIL):
7.
This lack of clarity is not surprising - states are complex - but is it a significant element in the overall
challenge for the UN when providing support to public administration post-conflict. This report is focused on the
‘plumbing and wiring’ aspects of government, the ‘basic’ or ‘core’ public administration functions (henceforth
CPAF), in other words the ‘fundamental requirements of an administrative nature, requirements of organization,
staff, budget, planning and procedure’, as the UN put it in 1951, and which are a ‘precursor’ 14 to policy
implementation. What these are is elaborated below in the description of the methodology of this review.
1.2
Methodology, definitions, and approach
8.
The concept note provided the detailed methodology for the study,15 this section will give a brief
summary. Overall, the following issues were drawn from the SG's report to frame the review:

The need to focus on the challenges in the immediate aftermath of conflict (defined as within the first
two years);

The importance of seizing windows of opportunity in the early post-conflict phase;

The need for an early strategy with defined and sequenced priorities;

Core state capacities as a foundation for legitimacy and efficiency;

The need for visible peace dividends, attributable to the national authorities;

The critical role of early priority-setting grounded on a broad range of local voices; and

Concerns about systemic challenges within the UN.
9.
As discussed above, the term 'public administration’ is broad and as per the Policy Committee decision,
the team focussed on ‘core’, ‘basic’ or ‘upstream’ public administration capacities that are a ‘precursor’ 16 to policy
implementation. The team took the February 2011 Report on ‘Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict’
14 Ingraham and Donahue (2000)
15 Available from UNDP.
16 Ingraham and Donahue (2000)
6
(henceforth CivCap) as an initial guide as it builds directly on the five key areas of international support identified
in the Secretary-General’s 2009 Peace building Report. The CivCap report defines what it calls ‘core government
functionalities’ as: aid policy and coordination, anti-corruption, executive branch, legislative branch, local
governance and decentralization, public administrative reform, public financial management, and urban
planning.17 However, even this list is very broad, and the team excluded support to the legislative branch and
urban planning as not falling within the Policy Committee’s meaning of the phrase ‘core public administration
capacities’ in that they are not a necessary ‘precursor’ or ‘prior need’ to policy implementation.
10.
The working definition for ‘core government capacities’ we have adopted is twofold:
the systems and processes through which the state at national and subnational levels collects and
manages its resources (both fiscal, i.e. tax, aid, resource rents and human, i.e. the civil service) to deliver,
including internal and external administrative controls that ensure both their integrity and performance’;
and
the rules, systems and processes through which the executive at national and sub-national levels
communicates and interacts with the citizens, the private sector and the donor community to ensure
citizen participation.
11.
From this definition, and from the distinctions noted in paragraph 5 above, we have distilled the
following as being ‘core’ public administration functions:

Policy formulation and public financial management (PFM), in particular planning, budgets, and
spending; The ability to set out some kind of vision, make a plan to reach it, and raise and spend money
in executing that plan, is probably the most fundamental administrative capacity, and one which
underlies much else in government. It is of course highly political, and impossible to ‘outsource’. This in
turn requires a working PFM system.

Managing the centre of government (i.e. a president’s office, or cabinet); in many post-c0nflict
contexts, good leadership from the centre of government is key to driving change and ensuring
coherence, often as many other parts of government are weak, and operating in isolation.

Civil service management; clearly, an administration needs at least key staff in place, paid regularly, and
following instructions and procedures. In many post-conflict contexts staff will not have been paid for
months or even years, recruitment controls will often have broken down.

Local governance; often neglected by the international community, local government is often the level
of government most citizens come into contact with most of the time. It is important not only for basic
services but for many essential administrative functions such as land management.

Aid coordination; in many post-conflict contexts aid is a major part of the budget, and thus aid
coordination becomes an essential part of wider PFM, even if with unique challenges.
17 UN (2011) pp21 Table 1.
7
12.
It should be noted that this is a heterogeneous collection of activities, having little in common except for
being essential pre-conditions for policy implementation. They are but one part (albeit an important part) of the
whole of public administration, which would also involve the provision of basic safety and security, political
processes, and the delivery of basic services. They are necessary, but not sufficient, for state-building, they are
essential, but indirect, instruments for fostering legitimacy and resilience.
13.
Given these five areas, the overall research questions were defined as follows: (1) In terms of core public
administration, what can be done to support public administration and local governance functionalities in the
immediate aftermath of conflict? And (2) how did the UN achieve this, i.e. how did it respond to the needs
expressed in different contexts and attempt to plan, program and support rebuilding of public administration
capability.
14.
It is important to bear in mind what the review is not covering. In particular it did not cover the linkages
between ‘core public administration’ and service delivery, important as this is, as that would have expanded the
scale and complexity of the review much beyond the resources available and is covered by other processes. Thus,
the UN’s approach to security and the rule of law, economic development, for example, and health and education
service delivery, are not explicitly examined within the confines of this report. It is hoped however that these
some of issues may be addressed in the follow-up ‘how to’ notes.
15.
With these five topics and the two research questions, the team first developed a conceptual framework,
and then conducted seven case studies: two were desk studies (Afghanistan and Sierra Leone) and five were
visited by various members of the team and other members of the PA Working Group (Burundi, Liberia Kosovo,
Guinea-Bissau, Timor-Leste). The team also drew on lessons from a wide literature (see Chapter 2). The listing of
projects at the country-level is at Annexe xx.
16.
A final methodological note of this study concerns the time frame. This study notes that whilst rebuilding
public administration is a crucial aspect of post-conflict reconstruction, it is also one of the most ‘complex and
difficult aspects of restoring governance and rebuilding war-torn societies’.18 Progress, where achieved, has been
moved by fits and starts, achieving some objectives and falling short at others.
17.
As a result, it has been useful to think about public administration reforms in post-conflict societies in
distinct but related stages, from an immediate post-conflict reconstruction period, lasting from five to ten years,
where the government must address urgent issues of maintaining peace and security, re-establishing governance,
redeveloping society, and reintegrating society, to a transition period of an additional five to ten years, in which
the government stabilises the economy and governance structures, and the civil service moves towards
performing functions carried out in more stable political systems and societies. 19
18.
This report mostly considers issues related to the immediate post-conflict reconstruction period,
however, as every context is different these observations have direct relevance to the longer time frame.
18
19
Rondinelli, Dennis. (2006).
Ibid.
8
Chapter 2: Lessons from the wider context
19.
This chapter will briefly lay out some important lessons from the wider policy context within which this
current review is situated. This is important to ensure the review builds on lessons already learned as well as the
case studies.
20.
2.1
Lessons from three broad areas of current policy and practice are relevant;

Firstly, the relatively recent but ever-growing work on peace and state-building;

Secondly, the much more established work on public administration reform (PAR) and organisational
capacity development; and,

Thirdly, the broadly similar findings from much recent research on governance and institutional change.
Lessons from Peace Building and State-building
21.
In the last decade fragile states and their policy counterpart - peace-building and state-building20 - have
assumed ever-greater attention from actors in development, diplomacy and defence. This has been a fairly rapid
development; policy is far from ‘mature’ and there are still many disagreements in the literature. However, there
are some broad areas of consensus, and many elements of contemporary state-building and peace-building have
a direct bearing on UN support to PA. A number of recent publications draw together many of these themes and
are particularly important for this review - the CivCap report,21 the New Deal,22 the World Bank’s World
Development Review 2011, 23 and UNDP’s ‘Governance for Peace’.24
22.
Six areas of consensus important for this review are highlighted below:
23.
Firstly, there is a growing appreciation that the process of peace and state building is riddled with
conflict, violence and uncertainty over institutional structures as groups compete to establish positions of power
and legitimacy and that this uncertainty can continue well past a formal peace agreement that ends violent
conflict.25 Thus the ‘political settlement’ is key to the wider state and peace-building process.26 The
20
It should be noted that the political organs of the UN (GA/SC/PBC) continue to consider peace-building to be the overarching policy framework and have not formally embraced state-building as a key objective. By contrast, the BWI, UNDP and other UN funds and programmes
view state-building as an important endogenous aspect of peace-building and – like DAC and G7+ -- make regular use of both the terminology
and the concept of state-building.
21 UN (2011)
22 International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (2011)
23 World Bank (2011)
24 UNDP (2012)
25
Di john and Putzel (2009) and OECD (2011)
26 ‘The prospects for state building ultimately depend on the terms of the political settlement upon which the state is founded.’ OECD (2011)
pp 31. DFID (2010)
9
opportunities, and pathways, for organisational reform, including PA, will be heavily dependent on the nature and
evolution of the wider political settlement.
24.
Secondly, lack of capacity to carry out ‘core’
state functions is a key element in fragility. Building
the capacity of the state to manage, or at least
oversee, the delivery of essential public goods,
especially security and justice, is thus a key element in
contemporary peace and state-building. The capacity
of the state to deliver, or oversee, basic social services
is also widely seen to be essential not only for
development and the MDGs, but also for legitimacy
and so resilience.27 CivCap stresses the primacy of
developing local capacity. The New Deal also
emphasises the need to use government systems and
build capacity.28 Building capacity for basic
‘administrative control’ is commonly seen as essential
to wider state capacity.29
Box: xx The Political Settlement
‘The key elements of a political settlement are actors,
interests, and institutions. In most cases, it is a
coalition of powerful elite factions that make up the
key actors in a political settlement. The critical element
that holds a political settlement together is the
alignment of interests within the dominant elite
coalition, and the dynamic relationship between elite
interests and the broader array of interests in the
society. Institutions are viewed as malleable – as the
product of on-going conflict, negotiation, and
compromise among powerful groups, with the ruling
coalition shaping and controlling this process. In most
cases, power relations are fluid and dynamic, and
political settlements are constantly adapting and
subject to renegotiation and contestation. As a result,
political settlements should not be interpreted as onetime events, but rather as rolling agreements between
powerful actors.’
25.
Thirdly, there is also a growing appreciation
of the length of time it takes to establish
functioning institutions and the unrealistic timefames of much work supporting organisations postconflict. The WDR, for example, states that ‘Creating
the legitimate institutions that can prevent repeated
Parks and Cole (2010) pp viii.
violence is, in plain language, slow. It takes a
generation. Even the fastest-transforming countries have taken between 15 and 30 years to raise their
institutional performance from that of a fragile state today—Haiti, say—to that of a functioning institutionalized
state, such as Ghana.’30 Reform of PA needs to be undertaken with much longer-time frames in mind than
hitherto.
26.
Fourthly, there is a growing recognition of the importance of national ownership in the peace and
state-building process. The focus on ownership has developed in part due to the growing recognition that statebuilding is an endogenous process, the correspondingly modest role external actors can play and the dangers of
imposing outside solutions. The G7+, for example, has stated that ‘aid delivery, interventions and programs… are
often inapplicable, unsustainable, and incompatible with our in-country national agendas… [they are] often not
conducive to addressing the immediate or long-term needs of our countries and regions.’ Further to this, they
note that ‘external mandates and ideas can no longer be imposed on our countries or regions and our peoples.’ 31
27 OECD (2011)
28 The New Deal commits that ‘Recipient governments, with support from international partners, will take all reasonable measures to
strengthen their public financial management systems from the ground up and be transparent in this process. In doing so, we will build related
fiduciary and administrative capacity within country institutions at the national and local level.’
29 Ghani and Lockhart (2008)
30 World Bank (2011) pp10
31 G7+ Heads of State Consensus Statement (New York, 20 September 2010). The G7+ is an open group of countries experiencing or emerging
from conflict established in 2008 and currently comprising Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, the
10
In terms of PA CivCap argues that structures for policy management and prioritization and aid coordination and
public financial management are especially important for national ownership and require particular attention.32
27.
Fifthly, the importance of inclusion across many dimensions of peace and state-building postconflict. In terms of the political settlement, for example, recent research has highlighted the importance of
inclusive political processes if settlements are to last.33 Given the time it can take for state capacity to be built to
deliver services, what is known as ‘process legitimacy’34 is also very important, and thus ensuring that PA, in
particular local government, where most citizens engage with the state, is representative of the population and
responsive to citizen concerns is important..
28.
And finally, it is widely recognised that the source of state’s revenue can have an enormous impact on
state and institutional formation. Simply put, development assistance, and natural resources in particular, shift
accountability relationships away from political actors and their local constituents, toward donors, and external
commercial interests, making the challenge of rebuilding the state-society compact that much more difficult.35
2.2
Lessons from Public Administration Reform
29.
The work and literature on what is variously called Public Administration Reform (PAR), Public Sector
Governance, Public Sector Reform or Civil Service Reform, has a much older lineage. In developing countries it
started in earnest in the 1950s and 60s as newly independent states established new organisations for promoting
development and self-government. This period was the heyday of the view that development required strong
government leadership, and thus ‘Development Administration’ emerged as a specialist and important field of
development policy.36 Many public administrations in developing countries expanded considerably in size and
function during this period. From the 1970s on, however, after the oil price shock and the shift in a number of
countries to more neo-patrimonial37 and authoritarian political systems, many PA systems deteriorated.38 By the
1980’s much PAR was driven by the demands of structural adjustment, in particular demands for retrenchment
and scaling back the role of administration and the state in line with the prevailing wisdom. ‘Development
administration’ was increasingly discredited as an approach to public administration in developing countries.39 In
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South
Sudan, Timor-Leste, and Togo.
32 UN (2011) pp 10
33 OECD (2011) pp 11
34 An OECD report on legitimacy in fragile situations identifies four main sources of legitimacy: input or process legitimacy, which is tied to
agreed rules of procedure; output or performance legitimacy, defined in relation to the effectiveness and quality of public goods and services
(in fragile situations, security will play a central role); shared beliefs, including a sense of political community, and beliefs shaped by religion,
traditions and “charismatic” leaders; and international legitimacy, i.e. recognition of the state’s external sovereignty and legitimacy. OECD
(????)
35 IDS (2010)
36 E.g. ‘The 1950’s was a wonderful period. The ’American dream’ was the ‘World dream’ and the best quickest way to bring that dream into
reality was through the mechanism of public administration…the net result of all this enthusiastic action was that in the 1950s public
administration was a magic term and public administration experts were magicians,’ Quoted in Farazmand (2005) pp80
37 ‘With the rise of neo-patrimonial rule, the mode of governing bureaucracy shifted from the clarification, monitoring, and enforcement of
formal rules to informal rules set without transparency, and sometimes increasingly capriciously, by a country’s political leadership. The
consequence was a decline in bureaucratic performance.’ Levy and Kpundeh (2004) pp5
38 See e.g. ‘At different times from the late 1970s through the 1980s, the rot set in and a decline of the PA system in many SSA countries
became noticeable’, Adamolekun (2005).
39 Klinger (2004) pp145
11
the 1990s much PAR, at least that coming out of a number of Anglo-Saxon countries and the IFIs, was dominated
by the ideas of ‘new public management’. The growing use of budget support by donors added an extra motive
for donor engagement in reform of developing country administrative and financial systems. In the 1990’s the
emergence of ‘conflict-affected and fragile states’ meant that in a number of countries PA underwent significant
deterioration and in some cases effective collapse. However, as the case studies for this review demonstrated,
some aspects of PA are remarkably resilient.40
30.
In recent times much PAR is seen to have been disappointing. 41 The importance of effective public
sectors, and thus of PAR, for development outcomes continues to be stressed, but the overall tone of much of the
literature has become quite discouraging about the impact of PAR projects.42 There is considerable agreement in
the literature on the lessons and issues:43

Reforms require strong domestic leadership to be successful – exogenous attempts at PAR are unlikely
to be successful or sustainable.

Incremental approaches taken within reforms may be more sustainable and politically feasible.

Timing and sequencing of reforms should be major considerations when designing and planning the
implementation of PAR.

Donors should consider how they can support citizens in creating public pressure for reform.

Poor public sector performance must be addressed although there is no consensus on how to do this,
with alternative suggestions being to increase staffing levels, focus on pay reform, introduce more
performance management and support organisational change.

Donor behaviour and systems need to be adapted to provide support that is more long-term,
predictable and not entangled with perverse incentives.

And finally it is agreed that PAR has weak diagnostic tools and no globally recognised conceptual
framework, which means that reforms are often based on poor diagnostic work and are missing a robust
‘theory of change’.
40
AREU (2004)
Both the World Bank and DFID have recently conducted major reviews of their work on PAR, and the World Bank is currently developing a
new global strategy intended to address many of the challenges noted above. These new approaches focuses on improved diagnostics, and in
the Bank’s case, adopting a ‘problem-solving’ approach to removing binding constraints to effective administrative functions, together with
delivering better political economy analysis, better designs, more effective risk management, lessons learned and cross-Bank collaboration.
World Bank (2011).
42 The literature is replete with articles with such titles as ‘Why civil service reform does not work’ (Haque, 2007) or ‘Why civil service reforms
fail’ (Polidano 2001) or ‘Civil service reform in developing countries: why is it going badly’ (Shepard, 2003).
43Taken from Scott (2011)
41
12
2.3
Lessons from research on governance and institutional change
31.
In recent years a number of different researchers have critiqued the broad approach of much donor work
on governance, capacity development and organisational support.44 This too is a complex area, but there are
perhaps three main insights that are relevant to this review:45

Recognize that governance deficiencies are primarily political, especially in fragile and conflict
affected states where the ‘political settlement’ is still being negotiated. Technical deficiencies in
institutions certainly exist, but they are rooted in underlying political conditions and structures that
prevent simple fixes.

Strive for best fit rather than best practice. Much governance aid, in particular to PA, has traditionally
focused on building ‘best practice’ institutions. That is, pushing developing countries to conform to a set
of recommended practices for such institutions drawn from the experience of developed countries. Civil
service commissions and anti-corruption bodies are good examples. This approach has proved
problematic and has frequently led to the creation of the form of institutions without corresponding
function. Governance experts have increasingly embraced the idea of “best fit” rather than best practice.
Instead of importing Western models, a ‘best fit’ approach focuses on helping to support institutions that
are appropriate for the specific context in which they operate. Other ways of putting this insight are
‘swimming with the tide’ or ‘good enough governance’, ‘beginning where the country is’ and asking
‘What is there to build on?’.

Focus on solving specific problems and achieving specific outcomes, not on wider processes for
systemic reform.46
2.4
The ‘proper’ relationship between politics and public administration
32.
Discussion on the ‘proper’ relationship between politics and administration has been a mainstay of the
public administration literature for over a century.47 As has been already pointed out, politics in the immediate
aftermath of conflict is often highly partisan and conflictual, and the role and function of PA is often at the heart
of this conflict. Understanding the ‘proper’ relationship between politics and administration is thus of particular
importance for UN support to PA post-conflict.
33.
Much PAR has been underpinned by the assumption that effective state institutions are key for growth,
and that the most effective civil service is one along the lines that emerged in Western countries in the late 19th
and early 20th century, i.e. a career civil service, with political oversight but not political interference, with job
44 E.g. Moore and Unsworth (2010), Grindle, M (2011) Booth, D (2011), Carothers and De Gramont (2011)
45 Taken from Carrothers and De Gramont (2011)
46
Fritz et al (2009)
In a famous article Woodrow Wilson argued: ‘Most important to be observed is the truth already so much and so fortunately insisted upon
by our civil-service reformers; namely, that administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not political
questions. Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices.’ Wilson, W (1887).
47
13
security and a career path, recruited and promoted on technical merit as opposed to political patronage, a
hierarchical divisor of labour, and rule-based decision-making.48 This model is intended to avoid the ‘politicisation’
of administration, i.e. to reduce the ability of politicians to abuse their oversight role to pursue their own good as
opposed to the public good.49 It is also meant to ensure a long-term approach to development, promote stability,
prevent corruption, and ensure the best technical or 'scientific’ approach to problem solving. There is evidence
that, at least in more stable political and institutional environments, this model is indeed effective in terms of
growth50 and poverty reduction.51
34.
This approach is widely regarded as the best model for the ‘proper’ relationship between administration
and politics. The UN, as a global norm-setting body, has used this model in its advice to developing countries
since its inception, and much UN support to PA is focussed on promoting this model as ‘best practice’.52 The
World Bank has largely done the same, and the EU’s accession programme has also used adherence to this model
as in effect a condition for entry into what is known as ‘European administrative space’.53
35.
However, some researchers assert that the direction of causality is the other way round, arguing that a
civil service functioning as per the model above is a product of development rather than a cause.54 It is certainly
the case that many advanced industrial countries grew significantly before they had anything approaching ‘good
governance’, and many of the legal reforms that brought this civil service model into place were promulgated
quite late in their development.55 There is also wide variation in the model: the US civil service, for example has a
much higher percentage of political appointees than European administrative space would allow and relies on
other checks and balances to promote integrity and control corruption. 56
36.
There are many explanations as to why merit reforms have occurred in different times and places; why
politicians would give up patronage when it provides such obvious advantage remains a puzzle.57 But it is clear
that the process is always highly political and context dependent, takes many years, is the result of prolonged
bargaining between different groups, and is subject to reversal.58 Merit reforms have also tended to take place in
emerging market capitalist economies that have already developed a fair amount of infrastructure and have a
reasonably stable political settlement, for example, Britain and the US at the end of the 19th century, Japan’s
Meiji Restoration, some Eastern Asian and Southern European states in the 1950s-60s, or Eastern European
countries in the 1990s.59 In other words, they have rarely been done in societies having to renegotiate their
political settlement in the immediate aftermath of violent conflict.
48 Evans(2008)
49
See e.g. ‘Most dysfunctional public bureaucracies can trace their poor performance directly to the intervention of politicians who want to use
the administrative machinery for their own purposes, or prevent it from interfering in their activities.’ Fukuyama, (2009).
50 Evans and Rauch, in a well-known paper, argued that there is a relation between a country’s economic performance and the ‘Weberianness’
of its public institutions, Evans and Rauch (1999).
51 Henderson et all 2003
52 E.g. UN (1961), UNDESA (1995) pp 70
53 SIGMA
54 Chang (2003)
55 For example, it was only after the Pendleton Act in 1883 that the US federal government started recruiting its employees through a
competitive process (Chang, 2003) and then even only a proportion (Gilman, 2003). The famous Northcott-Trevelyan report that initiated the
reform of the British civil service in 1854 took over 50 years to implement.
56 Gilman (2003)
57 There is a wide literature on this question, but see, for example Geddes (1994) for one answer.
58 Evans (2008)
59 Lapuente and Nistotskaya (2009)
14
37.
It must also be recognised that arguments for rejecting the separation of politics and administration can
be made on grounds of principle, not just to protect opportunities for political patronage. Without strong political
oversight bureaucrats can be unrepresentative, can become over-mighty, resist direction by the ‘will of the
people’ through their elected representatives, or simply be unresponsive.
38.
These arguments, plus the injunctions from researchers not to blindly pursue best practice and the
transfer of institutions above, call into question the appropriateness of the promotion of the standard model in
the immediate aftermath of conflict. In the long-term it is clear that isolating parts of the bureaucracy from political
and societal pressure is important for a range of reasons; working out which, and how to do this in the short-term
after conflict, is much more complex. Arriving at a more nuanced and sophisticated understanding of the
‘proper’ relationship between politics and administration in the immediate aftermath of conflict is a key
policy challenge for the UN in its support to core public administration in these contexts.
39.
Given that whatever it is, the relationship between politics and administration is going to reflect wider
political processes, it also needs to be recognised that proposing the standard model, i.e. the separation of politics
from administration and isolating the bureaucracy from political interference, is in itself a political proposal that
will have specific consequences for the interests of different groups within a specific context, and will thus be
resisted, or supported, accordingly.
15
Chapter 3: Main findings and recommendations
40.
This chapter sets out the review’s principle findings and recommendations, in other words the core
argument of the report. It first examines the UN’s current capacity for support to PA post-conflict and then lays
out an idealized statement of the UN’s current approach. It then offers an alternative approach based on the case
studies and on the wider literature described in Chapter 2. It presents in effect a revised ‘theory of change’ for UN
support to PA. It then touches on the issue of context. Chapters 4-6 expand this overall argument and present the
detailed findings and recommendations.
3.1 The development of UN capacity for support to public administration
after conflict
41.
The UN is natural partner for support to PA in developing countries, and indeed the UN has a long history
of such support, in particular to newly independent post-colonial states and to countries emerging from conflict.60
The UN helped Libya establish an Institute of Public Administration in 1956 shortly after its independence,61and in
2012 is again discussing training the next generation of Libyan administrators with the new Transitional
Administration. The UN Programme on Public Administration was started early as 1948 and in 1951 published the
first of many texts on the topic.62 In the 1950’s supporting public administration was much more of a priority for
the UN system than it is today and was seen as being as important as economic development or social welfare.63
This is not surprising, in an age when many new member states were being built from the ground up, establishing
basic administration was naturally an important topic. The UN was a much more important partner for developing
countries than the development banks or the IMF, which came to prominence in this area the 1970s and 80s.64
42.
However, as the wider debate on development and the state has shifted from government to
governance, and as many member states have graduated from the need to build basic administration to much
more complex problems, the slightly old-fashioned idea of ‘public administration’ has to some degree been left
behind at the UN.
43.
It was not until the establishment of UNTAC in Cambodia in 1991 that the UN had experience of direct
administration. And in the tumultuous year of 1999 the UN was mandated by the Security Council to establish and
run transitional administrations in Kosovo and East Timor. The UN has since been asked by the Security Council to
perform a wide range of functions in support to CPAF in different countries.65 However, despite this, and despite
its importance as an essential ’precursor’ or ‘prior need’ to other aspects of government delivery, restoring core
public administration capacity after conflict has not received as much attention from the UN in recent years as
might be expected. Along with the rest of the international system, in the last decade the UN has paid much
60 See Annex ? for a chronology of wider UN developments relevant to PA
61 UNDESA (2008)
62 UN (1951).
63 UNDESA (2008). See also Lee Kuan Yew's memoirs for how UNDP assisted the government of Singapore in its early days.
64 See http://blog-pfm.imf.org/pfmblog/2008/12/fiscal-affair-1.html
65 See Annex ? for a full analysis of Security Council mandates and PA
16
more attention to building state capacity in the delivery of security and justice, and to social services, than to core
public administration.66 The topic received scant attention in the 2000 Brahimi report, for example, which focused
on security and justice, rule of law, and peace-keeping. And it was administrators that the UN struggled to recruit
for Kosovo and East Timor.67
44.
The predominant assumption at the time was that in the post-conflict period peace and reconciliation
would gradually lead to improvements in the quality of governance, and that core government functionalities
would be restored, either as a by-product of the stability and normality brought about by peace and improved
security, or in response ‘in due course’ to normal development assistance in favour of the public sector.
45.
However, the evidence emerging in the early 2000s from the post-conflict situations examined by this
review and from elsewhere led to a growing realization that, without direct assistance, post-conflict governance
improvements are neither guaranteed nor irreversible, and that concerted and targeted action is required, by the
UN System and others, if core government functionalities are to be restored in a timely manner in such settings. A
number of the institutional or policy initiatives taken within the UN System in the mid-2000’s sought to address
this objective in a variety of ways:

Most UN peacekeeping missions began increasingly to emphasize civil affairs support to host country
authorities (e.g. Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi), and such measures continued to evolve – to the point,
where ‘support to the restoration and extension of state authority’ was officially articulated, in 2008, as
one of the three core roles of the Civil Affairs within UN peacekeeping, first in the DPKO/DFS ‘Policy
Directive on Civil Affairs’ and soon after in the Capstone Doctrine.

When the blueprint for the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund was prepared in 2005,
the Secretary-General stressed that these new UN institutions were intended, inter alia, to ‘ensure
adequate early attention to and financing for oft-neglected issues, such as building public administration
capacity for the rule of law and the delivery of public services”.68 Accordingly, when the PBF was created
in 2006, ‘establishment or re-establishment of essential administrative services’ was one of its four
Priority Areas.

The 2005 humanitarian reform process and its focus on gaps in the international response to crises broke
new ground by including in the Global Cluster System a special cluster on ‘Early Recovery’, specifically
aimed at expanding the humanitarian agenda by ensuring that it is also ‘guided by development
principles’ in terms of both economic recovery and ‘governance recovery’.69
66 According to a recent literature review on PAR there is only a ‘slim literature on public administration in fragile states’ (Scott, 2011). A
Google search on 1.11.2011 for “service delivery in fragile states” produced 60,000 odd results’ whereas one for “public administration in fragile
states” got just 1.
67 ref
68 ‘In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all’, Report of the Secretary-General, Addendum 2 on the
Peacebuilding Commission, document A/59/2005/Add.2 dated 23 May 2005, para. 10, page 3.
69 IASC’s ‘Guidance Note on Early Recovery’ (April 2008) includes (on page 32) a “Menu of indicative early recovery activities” which lists 16
different ‘early recovery’ activities related to governance – among them (a) rehabilitation of essential government facilities (incl. material and
equipment support), (b) capacity support in technical fields such as mapping, geographical information systems (GIS), and the restoration of
Internet access, (c) measures to strengthen transparency, accountability and good governance in the recovery process, and (d) assessment of
the capacity of national and local authorities to coordinate external assistance, formulate policy, plan and resume the delivery of basic public
services.
17

A parallel process of re-thinking international development assistance to conflict-affected countries was
also initiated at this time. A World Bank/UNDP workshop on ‘Rebuilding Post-Conflict Societies : Lessons
from a Decade of Global Experience’ (New York, September 2005) paved the way for the launch in 2006
of the ‘World Bank/UNDP Statebuilding Initiative’.70 Building on the notion that current development
prescriptions used and tested in stable societies have limited relevance in conflict-affected and fragile
states, and that a new “fragile/failed states sub-discipline” with a substantially different development
paradigm was needed, this Statebuilding Initiative aimed at enhancing WB/UN cooperation at Country
Office level, especially on capacity development assistance, and to generate more empirical knowledge
and inter-agency learning in these issues.
46.
While these and other initiatives have heralded the emergence of a better understanding of the
importance of CPAF in post-conflict environments, they have not been coordinated as part of a deliberate
strategy. Instead, they represented pragmatic responses to a range of unmet needs -- largely drawing on existing
institutional assets that were created for other purposes. Furthermore, they have not augured a closer integration
of assistance to public administration and local governance in post-conflict countries, nor improved strategic
approaches to post-conflict CPAF assistance. As a result, despite its centrality to national ownership of recovery
and post-conflict transitions, support to CPAF remains fragmented.
47.
In part this lack of focus on CPAF may be due to peace-building, and not state-building, being the wider
policy frame for the UN in post-conflict contexts. As argued above, the UN has forgotten the importance of core
public administration in building state capacity and it has over the years been overtaken in this area by the World
Bank and the IMF, who are now important partners in stable contexts for many donors and governments on
issues, notably PFM. Nevertheless, the case studies conducted for this review highlight the importance of CPAF in
institutionalising the political settlement, and in particular the instrumental use of the civil service, and its payroll,
as a means to rapidly progress reintegration and reconciliation.
48.
As crucial as public administration is in implementing the government’s policies and programs, support
must be tailored to the conditions in and the needs of conflict torn societies.71 The feasibility of interventions is
limited by the social, political, economic and military conditions in the country, and conventional approaches
proposed in politically stable contexts are unlikely to be appropriate. The correct level of focus and capacity is a
matter of judgement not science, but overall the first major finding of this review is that, given the UN’s key role
in assistance post-conflict, and its natural role in support to CPAF, the current UN-wide level of focus and
capacity for supporting core public administration functions in the immediate aftermath of conflict is
insufficient, in particular in terms of policy, learning, and personnel, given the political and technical
complexity of the task, and its foundational importance in developing national ownership of the state and peacebuilding process. Recommendations on how the UN could enhance its focus and capacity are detailed in Chapter
6.
49.
A corollary of this conclusion is that UN support to CPAF needs to be more integrated through joint
programming, guidance and policy to capitalise on existing capacities. The UN system’s capacity for support to
core PA functions is not as well as developed or financed as its role in supporting political processes, security and
justice, or basic service delivery. However, cases of effective support have been field-driven and resulted from
70
Details on the WB/UN Statebuilding Initiative and the activities undertaken under its auspices are found here :
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/STRATEGIES/EXTLICUS/0,,contentMDK:22542897~menuPK:6993472~pagePK:641
71531~piPK:64171507~theSitePK:511778,00.html
71
Rondinelli, Dennis (2006)
18
integrated coordination and support to CPAF functions across the UN family, with innovation emerging from a
number of the cases studied for this review. However, closer integration of UN policy, capacities and learning at
HQ lags behind. As a result, links to other bodies, notably the World Bank, are constrained.
50.
This has occurred despite strong potential capacity at country level. The primary components of UN
capacity at the country level can be found in the civil affairs officers (CAOs) fielded by DPKO, the various projects,
and some limited financial support from the PBF. This is complemented by a large number of projects conducted
in support of core PA functions undertaken by UNDP. 72 There are also a number of UNCDF projects (on local
government), and a few by DESA and UNICEF. Some ‘line’ agencies, e.g. UNICEF and WHO, also of course
support PA capacity in their specific area of expertise. At HQ, UNDP has a limited policy, support and learning
capacity, as does DESA, UNDP also has some capacity in its regional centres. Closer integration of the technical
capacities of UNDP and political and operational capacities of DPKO in several countries has proven to be
important. Likewise joint UN programming bringing together UN agencies, has achieved substantial success in
restarting local government functions, in Kosovo and Liberia for example.
51.
However, evidence of the impact of the limited integration of UN capacities in CPAF is readily to hand.
Support to the extension and restoration of state authority given by Civil Affairs officers is very valuable, but
coordination with support provided by bilateral and multi-lateral development agencies is often ad-hoc, and
rarely do civil affairs officers possess technical expertise in areas of public administration. PBF support towards
‘establishment of essential administrative services’ can be critical, but for a variety of reasons PBF has been called
upon to provide such assistance only in a very limited number of cases. Governance recovery is in principle an
important dimension of Early Recovery, but in post-conflict situations in practice very few CPAF-related proposals
have found their way into the CAPs and HAPs, and even fewer of them have been funded. Much new conceptual
and empirical knowledge has been generated through cooperation between the World Bank and the UN on postconflict issues, but operationalization and application of this knowledge still has a long way to go.
52.
This review thus argues that part of the reconceptualization and reprioritisation of UN support to CPAF
will require a shift away from the perception of CPAF as an agency or sector specific issue, and the development
of frameworks for the effective coordination of UN wide support to CPAF, at national and local level, between
humanitarian, peacebuilding and development sectors.
3.2
The UN’s current approach to support to CPAF
53.
The UN’s current approach to support to public administration post-conflict can be summarised as
follows:

Firstly, the function of PA is to raise resources, deliver services, promote growth, and to provide a set of
rules through which citizens can interact with and influence the state and participate in or challenge
decisions that will affect them;
72 See Annexe ?? for a full project listing, and the case studies for listings of relevant projects for each country.
19

Secondly a public service with a clear political/technical distinction, merit-based recruitment, etc, is the
best way to do this. Public Administration Reform (PAR) is the way to get to develop such a public
service, and despite agreement on the political nature of PAR, it is still implemented as a largely technical
process of introducing new institutions, organisations and best practices; and

Thirdly, there is a ‘post-conflict moment’ that offers an opportunity for new political leadership,
supported by the international community, to ‘wipe the slate clean’ and bring in a range of systemic
reforms to the public service.73
54.
In other words, the best way for public administration to contribute to peace and state-building in the
short-term, and to development in the long-term, is to leverage the post-conflict moment to introduce bestpractice institutions and systems, as these will reform the public service and enable political leaders to deliver
public benefits - security and justice, economic opportunities and social services - in a way that promotes peace
and development and also fosters legitimacy and resilience. 74
55.
In effect, this approach is an updated version of the approach to development administration that has
been around since the 1950s, but applied to the post-conflict context in the last 10 years or so. Virtually all
practitioners are individually sceptical of the model as described above, but it is sustained at a system level for a
variety of reasons:

The UN’s normative function means it instinctively reaches for a ‘best practice’ solution. It finds it hard to
work with the compromises to ‘best practice’ required of a politically complex reality (this is more of a
problem for the development and human rights branches, the political and peacekeeping branches are
more comfortable with the compromises required by political reality).

Donors often push for, and offer money for, reform and ‘best practice’ approaches, as they offer the
promise of, or at least the appearance of, meaningful results within political cycles in donor countries.

UN agencies in a competitive fund-raising environment are incentivized to offer unrealistic promises of
reform to attract funding and stake out ‘turf’. They are also sensitive to criticism by NGOs, media
representatives and others who are often unforgiving towards efforts that aim at less than ‘best practice’
solutions.

Technocratically-minded CPAF professionals are professionally motivated, and to an extent judged by
their peers, on the complexity and modernity of the systems they introduce, not their suitability or
appropriateness. They want to provide, and are asked for, solutions, not options.
73
See, for example, the following assessment of Afghanistan. ‘During the reconstruction push in the past ten years, Afghanistan was often
treated as if it were an institutional tabula rasa: a country that had never been centrally governed and that could be given institutional
frameworks and procedures modelled on the latest governance fashions or based on the preferences of the various donor countries. This
resulted in a hotchpotch of laws, procedures and strategies, usually linked to short-term programs and often with little relation to previous
practices or the perceived responsibilities of the institutions.’ Afghan Analysts Network (2011). Or in relation to Kosovo and Timor-Leste:
‘International interventions in statebuilding and territorial administration perpetuated certain problematic approaches drawn from the UN
trusteeship system and colonial administration, considering post-conflict territories – such as East Timor or Kosovo – as ‘blank slates’ needing
complete re -construction of governments, economies and social systems.’ Montanaro (2009).
74 The UN is by no means alone in this approach, it perhaps reached its apogee with the assertion by US General Stanley McChrystal before the
NATO and Afghan army assault on Marjah in February 2010, when he said “We’ve got a government in a box, ready to roll in”.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/13/world/asia/13kabul.html
20

Reformist politicians and technocrats in the governments of post-conflict states want to be seen to be
modernising, both for their own interest and identity but again to access donor resources. These
technocrats are often not well linked to the real power-holders in these contexts and often have stronger
links to the international bureaucracy.
56.
It must also be acknowledged that the challenge is also simply very difficult. According to the only
available data sets for cross-country comparisons of performance on CPAF, the rate of development of CPAF in
the case-study countries has been modest, with most countries consistently at or near the bottom of the
international rankings. (See Annexe xx for the data). According to the data, some countries have made modest
but sustained progress (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi), the others made initial gains after a peace agreement, but
then slipped back (Timor Leste, Afghanistan, Kosovo). Unusually for post-conflict countries, Rwanda (not a case
study for this review but included in the tables as a comparator) has made outstanding progress.
3.3
The proposed approach
57.
Based on the case studies, and on the wider lessons set out in Chapter 2, the second major finding of the
review is that, in short, in the aftermath of conflict, the UN is trying to rush wider reforms to public
administration, and, partly as a result, is not focusing enough on restoring its basic functionality. The review
agrees that the primary function of PA is to raise resources, provide security and justice, deliver basic services, and
promote growth, while ensuring citizen participation, and that the standard model of a public service is the best
way to do this in the long-term. However, the very special circumstances of post-conflict require a very different
approach in the short to medium-term. In the immediate aftermath of conflict, the UN needs to understand and
approach public administration as much as an expression of the developing political settlement as a vehicle
for delivering public goods.
58.
Firstly, in terms of ‘rushing reform’, as laid out above, the UN’s (and many donor’s) default setting is to
propose and support often wide-ranging institutional reform in the ‘post-conflict moment’. Often aimed at
institutionalising normative standards, or improving efficiency, these approaches often do not consider the
political importance or politicisation of the public administration. However, post-conflict politics are usually highly
conflictual. There is usually a degree of peace, but not yet an established political settlement, let alone any agreed
‘rules of the political game’. There are also usually no strong institutions to mediate and contain political
competition, and most aspects of state and society are ‘politicised’. This in turn means there is rarely a consensus
vision on a development strategy or on what sort of PA is needed to implement it.
59.
The political leaderships in these contexts often resist public administration reforms, that have long-term
pay-offs, in favour of approaches that will deliver on short-term political interests, which are sometimes
dominated by simple survival, or, at best, on establishing new political and constitutional ‘rules of the game’.
Rarely in the cases studied by this review was long-term development, and thus the type of public administration
needed to deliver it, a core political issue in the immediate aftermath of conflict. Thus new or reformed PA
institutions proposed and funded by the UN and donors often simply get stuck for many years.
60.
Historically, in some countries, a national shock or emergency has provided a platform for radical change
by a determined and unified leadership. However, in many countries, and certainly in our case study countries, in
21
the immediate aftermath of conflict the political leadership is often very divided, and trust and confidence
between political decision-makers, state and society and among different social, ethnic or political groups is often
very low. The public administration may itself have been used as an instrument of oppression, exploitation or
pecuniary gain. In these contexts, it is common for new political leaders in post-conflict settings to be suspicious
of the existing PA and to want a public service in which they have confidence and that is responsive to their
political goals. This often results in the desire to make political appointments to the civil service that violate the
standard merit-based model. Electoral competition, now a universal step after conflict, can also incentivise the
abuse of the public administration for electoral advantage, not its reform.75
61.
In these contexts, it is simply unrealistic to think that the standard reform agenda is appropriate. As one
of the architects of NPM put it ‘You have to invent government before you can reinvent it’.76 Rather than
undertaking broad reforms, in post-conflict environments, public administrations must focus on the critical tasks,
in implementing often fragile peace agreements, unifying diverse political factions and taking ownership of
recovery planning and coordination.
62.
Thus, in the immediate aftermath of conflict the UN needs to approach PA as much as an expression of
the developing political settlement as a vehicle for delivering public goods. Sustaining a political settlement
over the longer-term is the UN’s overarching policy goal, as without that all else will be in vain, and the nature of
the public administration plays an important part in sustaining the political settlement over the long-term. An
important function of PA post-conflict is to serve as a forum in which questions of access, entitlement, and
accountability are negotiated and settled. Seen in this way, as much as a mechanism to deliver core government
functions, PA is also a mechanism for reconciling differing interests in core public domains – security and justice,
economic opportunity, and the management and distribution of public goods. In this sense, public administration
is an important mechanism for progressively deepening, broadening and institutionalising the political settlement
as much as it is a mechanism for delivering public goods.
63.
However, as an external actor, the UN has limited influence over this process. To be accepted and thus
effective, new rules and institutions for PA must be negotiated, they cannot be imported, or designed by
consultants. UN support to PA reform post-conflict should thus focus on facilitating the bargaining process
over the public sector between political leadership, civil servants, and citizens, not be seen as a technical
process of introducing best practice. The UN should facilitate this bargaining by providing options, not
recommendations, and lessons from other countries based on an understanding of the context, and pointing out
the pros and cons of different options based on international experience. 77
64.
For example, the UN’s response to a desire on the part of a new political leadership to introduce trusted
colleagues into the upper reaches of the civil service should not be to discourage those practices as they violate
the ‘standard model’ of merit-based recruitment, but rather to understand the motivation to ensure the PA is
responding to political direction, work with host government to ensure appointees are also technically
competent, and provide options on how this problem has been tackled in other countries.
65.
These recommendations do not entail a shift towards pragmatism, but emphasise the need to reconcile
technical principles of statebuilding with political realities required for effective peacebuildling. For example,
75
Kelsall et al (2010)
Gaebler, quoted in in Evans (2008) pp81
77 This implies a shift to the sub-discipline of comparative public administration as a source of inspiration, not so much the ‘best practice’
approach that often comes out of ‘public management’.
76
22
given the importance of inclusion to the sustainability of the political settlement, the UN also has a key role in
pushing for the expression of the political settlement in the public service to be as inclusive as possible with a
particular focus on supporting the integration of marginalised or politically excluded groups into the civil
service. This should be done, for example, through supporting the recruitment of women and excluded groups
into the civil service, and promoting wider international human rights norms on inclusion. Similarly, in order to
widen the negotiations over the nature of a country’s PA, the UN should be both using its leverage with the
political leadership to ensure civil society is at the negotiating table, and supporting civil society to formulate and
express its demands on PA.
66.
This role is as much a political role as a technical one. Understanding the history, context, and political
incentives and interests of different players, and building the relationships needed to gain access to and secure
the trust of political actors, is thus fundamental to a successful outcome for UN support to CPAF, not an optional
extra. It also requires the UN to work better together, notably in combining the political analysis and access
capacity of the mission with the technical capacity of the agencies. Based on experience to date, UN expectations
also need to very realistic, this process is likely to take many years, and UN human and financial resources need to
be configured accordingly.
67.
More detailed recommendations on how the UN can play this role are laid out in Chapter 4.
68.
In the short-term, however, in the immediate aftermath of conflict, the UN should be doing more to
provide fast, relevant, and flexible support to restoring core government functionality. A focus on
comprehensive ‘reform’ is distracting the UN from restoring and supporting the basic functionality of what
already exists, in part as what capacity does exist is often over-looked or seriously under-estimated.78 In order to
improve the functionality of security and justice, revenue raising and service delivery in the short-term the UN
needs to understand and build on what already exists, and focus on immediate solutions to policy implementation
problems, introduce new systems only where necessary, and then ensure they are as simple as possible. While
national ownership is critical, temporary solutions may include the contracting of external expertise in certain line
functions (e.g. in the area of revenue and procurement management, or financial controls). The UN needs to be
continually looking for political leaders who are ready to seize available opportunities to make iterative
improvements, nationally and especially locally, and help to restore or put in place the systems and processes to
do so, including capacity for sub-contracting, where appropriate, to non-government actors. The UN needs to
focus on solving immediate problems to delivering essential functions such as collecting revenues, priority
planning and input-based budgeting, simple procurement, and the delivery of basic services that individual
ministers are genuinely committed to, as opposed to initiating systemic reforms that are prone to get bogged
down in over-complexity and wider political competition between ministers. Hopefully, as the political settlement
solidifies, and a consensus, vision and agreement on the ‘rules of the game’ emerges, the potential for more
serious reform will open up.
69.
More detailed recommendations on how the UN can improve its impact here are laid out in Chapter 5.
70.
The implications of this approach for sequencing the functional CPAF areas the review examined is laid
out in a table in illustrative form in Annex xx.
78 Ghani and Lockhart (2008)
23
3.4
The importance of context
71.
As is now well established, an intervention needs to be built on an analysis of context. In terms of
understanding opportunities for support to PA, geography, population density, education levels and economic
development are all important. However, the evidence suggests that the key contextual factors are:79

the nature of the political settlement, in particular how unified or fragmented political authority is;

the time horizons of the political leadership (short v long); and

the pre-existing nature of state institutions and the degree to which institutions eroded during the
conflict.
72.
There is a good body of evidence that shows that the degree of concentration of political control directly
impacts political incentives for reform. In short, the more power is concentrated the more likely is substantial
reform.80
73.
It has also been increasingly understood that the scope and scale of reform is deeply influenced by the
time-horizons amongst the political leadership; i.e. the higher degree of political stability, and the longer the
expectations political leadership has as to the length of time they will remain in office, the more likely is
substantial reform.81 In many contexts the time horizon is most readily determined by the frequency of elections,
but it is often shorter and is also influenced by other variables, including the quality and cohesion of the political
settlement and the fluidity of the security environment.
74.
The strength and spread of existing state institutions will also clearly be a factor in how likely they are to
recover functionality.82 The strength of pre-existing institutions in Kosovo, for example, was clearly very different
to that in Liberia.
75.
In short, the more political authority is concentrated, the longer-term the political vision, and the more
robust the existing administration, the more that can be done to support reform of PA. Whereas the more
fragmented is political authority, and the shorter-term the political horizons, and the more degraded is
administration, the harder substantive support to reform of PA will be.
76.
These factors help explain why public administration reform in Rwanda has had such remarkable results
(see Annex xx on governance data). The political settlement after the genocide ensured a unified political
leadership, with a long-term vision. However in contexts where political authority is dispersed, or the political
settlement is still not in place and with very weak pre-existing institutions (Afghanistan, for example), the
situation has been much less positive.
77.
There are also some contexts where anything but the barest minimum of work on public administration
should not even be considered:
79 Needs some refs
80 ref
81 ref
82 Grindle (2011)
24
‘…for a rapacious, unrepresentative regime, an underpaid, deskilled, ineffective public administration is
an asset: it keeps public employees dependent for their survival on the regime’s handouts, impels their
corruption, precludes their “exit,” and turns them into reluctant accomplices. In these “kleptocracies,”
while there might perhaps be conceivable reasons for certain kinds of external involvement, assistance to
improve the government administration is a wasteful delusion.’ (Schiavo-Campo, 2000, pp 729)
78.
More importantly for this study, given the close links between support to PA and the political context,
there is a minimum of political order and commitment that needs to be in place post-conflict for any meaningful
reform to be considered. Quoting again from the UN’s first 1951 text on PA (written at a time when the UN was
supporting a number of new governments):
‘A fundamental requirement for the improvement of any system of public administration is the
attainment of government stability, public order, and the rule of law. Where civil disorder is endemic or
where changes in political control are frequent, administrative improvement is severely handicapped. For
areas where governments have been newly organised and where governmental institutions have not yet
been thoroughly established, some degree of administrative instability may in the short-run be
considered as a part of the general political development. But where, over a long period of time,
governments are not able to establish orderly political processes, administrative reforms are likely to lag,
and the prospects of permanent administrative improvement are slight.’ (UN, 1951)
79.
In 1996 the joint evaluation of the Rwanda response famously concluded that 'humanitarian action
cannot substitute for political action' a similar point can be made about support to the reform of public
administration: it can deepen, but cannot substitute for, a political settlement.
25
Chapter 4: Deepening the political settlement
80.
The second main recommendation made in Chapter 3 is that the UN needs to approach the wider PA, as
well as CPAF, as an important component in deepening the political settlement, as well as an implementer of
government policy and deliverer of public services. This makes support to CPAF a concern for the UN as a whole,
not just the development agencies.
4.1
Include consideration of CPAF in peace agreements
81.
Peace agreements increasingly contain provisions for reform of PA, though these are clearly not as
important as those on politics and security. In a study of 27 peace agreements between 1989 and 2007, provisions
directly on public administration and governance were the least common compared with those on security,
justice, economic recovery and reform and political representation. 83 However, provisions for civil service reforms,
reorganization of public administration, anticorruption strategies and policies on revenue collection mechanisms
have increased markedly over time.84
82.
Substantive structural reforms to PA are sometimes reflected in peace agreements as well: quotas for
ethnic representation, as in Burundi; provisions for local or sub-national government, e.g. the shift from a unitary
to a federal state in Nepal. This is not surprising given that abuses and injustice perpetrated through and by PA
are a common element in conflict.
83.
Setting up independent commissions under respected academics or former politicians is a common way
of postponing the details of PA reform until peace processes are on more solid ground. While these can be useful,
in many contexts they have also proved to be dumping grounds outside the political mainstream and so unable to
negotiate real change.
84.
Given the complexity and technical nature of many of the issues in PA, and the significant expense
involved in reforming or establishing new layers of government, the UN should consider supporting the parties
to a peace agreement on PA issues at the earliest possible time prior to the negotiation of the agreement
through, for example, helping them think through the consequences of different proposals for reform to
government structures or options for local government. DPA’s mediation support unit should refine and expand
its expertise in the field of governance to include also detailed know-know on CPAF and related issues.85 In some
cases, the heat and pressure of forging a peace agreement may crowd out a range of PA issues that appear to be
83
CMI (2007) pp 21
CMI (2007) pp24
85 DPA’s Mediation Support Unit (MSU) has divided its substantive agenda into 17 different thematic issues which are also being used in its
mediation training activities and as search criteria in its roster of external mediation experts. These are (a) Security, Military, Police, DDR, etc.;
(b) Constitution and Political System/Structure, Institutions; (c) Rule of Law and Administration of Justice; (d) Electoral Framework; (e)
Human Rights; (f) Women; (g) Children; (h) Minorities, Indigenous Peoples, and Other Groups; (i) Humanitarian and Refugee Issues; (j) Socioeconomic and Development; (k) Media and Information; (l) Transitional Security, Governance and Institutional Arrangements; (m)
Transitional Justice; (n) Traditional and Local Actors; (o) Statehood and Identity; (p) Implementation Mechanisms and Arrangements; and (q)
Implementing/Supporting Actors.
84
26
less urgent. But in those cases, where they have been factored in during the negotiation process (e.g. during the
Burundi peace negotiations in 1998-2000), it has had a very positive impact on the subsequent peace
implementation process. It is therefore recommended that advisory support to the parties on PA options be made
a regular and well-founded part of the UN’s menu of support to conflict-affected countries.
4.2 Promote discussion and negotiation on the character and function of
public administration
Many underlying determinants or contributory factors influence the development and performance of public
administration - societal norms, the interaction of power, politics and violence, the legitimacy of the governing
leadership. Many of these determinants are obscure and cannot easily be understood or influenced. What can be
understood and should be factored into any public administrative support as a starting point are popular
perceptions and expectations of the role of the state, the function of the public service (e.g. vis a vis the private
sector and community, in the economy, in delivering services), the scope of its presence; and how it can and
should respond to the root causes of conflict. A more practical question pertains to the size and scope of the civil
service - should this be assessed in relation to the country’s GDP, or should a different yardstick be used, given the
fact that post-conflict states are often the largest player in the economy, and responsible for driving the transition
process, and economic recovery?
85.
These are essential and strategic questions of policy that will influence and shape the way in which a
country’s administrative system develops. Effective administrative performance will only result when there is a
link between the administrative and public sphere, and when public service reflects what the population want and
expect. The UN should work with governments post-conflict to analyse empirically how the public view
public administration, and what different groups want from the state. For this it is necessary to investigate,
and not presume, how people see their state and what they want from it. UNDP’s ‘Early Warning’ reports in
Kosovo are examples of good practice here as they are based on regular perception survey data published in 28
successive issues over a period of eight years, from mid-2002 until mid-2010.86 Perception surveys and local views
on various aspects of administrative functioning e.g. levels of corruption or quality of services, are important too
and can assist the government (and the UN) in making decisions about prioritisation and trade-offs. This is as
important for legitimacy as it is for efficiency.
86.
This can clearly be a politically sensitive area, and there is currently little guidance offered to UN
leadership in the field on how to approach this issue. DPKO is doing some work to develop public perception
tools.87 Guidance should be provided to missions and UNCTs’ specifically on canvassing public attitudes to
public administration.
87.
As discussed above, it is also important for the UN to be facilitating wide discussion on public
administration reform, with the private sector for example. It is important however, that the UN to avoid
presenting solutions as this shuts down discussion and negotiation. The UN should present policy options for
discussion, not solutions. The preparation of policy options papers is good practice, as UNCDF did for local
86 http://www.kosovo.undp.org/?cid=2,40
87 DPKO
27
government reform in Timor Leste, as this allows ministers and others in leadership positions to make informed
policy decisions and it allows negotiation and discussion among the country’s political leaders based on a realistic
picture of the pros and cons of alternatives. Similarly, in order to widen discussion, the first draft of policies,
laws, regulations etc, should be in the local language, not as is sometimes the case, only final drafts, to
ensure wide consultation and comment.
4.3
Assist politicians, parties and other political actors to understand CPAF
88.
National politicians and political parties are clearly the main drivers of a peace process, and then of postconflict public administration. One of the primary ways peace processes impact on PA is that they determine who
will control it, this is most clearly and commonly demonstrated in the often protracted haggling over the
allocation of different ministries to different parties, leaders or factions. But it is a common feature post-conflict
that political leaders and parties have little or no experience of public administration. Their expectations of what
PA can and cannot do, and their knowledge of how to manage and direct PA to achieve a political programme or
manifesto pledge, is often also minimal.88 This is for a number of reasons: leaders may have recently come to
power after previously being insurgent military commanders or political activists, political parties may have been
clandestine, and shaped by the needs of armed conflict and not those of running a public administration, or based
in the diaspora who can be out of touch with local realities. During the conflict the scope for civil administration is
often limited as well, so even those within government can have limited experience of running a peacetime public
administration. It is thus common for parties and political leaders post-conflict to struggle with the transition to
civilian leadership and managing public administration.
89.
Administrative development ultimately depends on the way in which political leaders interpret their role
in government post-conflict, and, except in the relatively rare cases where a party with a long-term vision wins a
convincing victory, the evidence is that political parties and politicians, tend to have very short-term horizons.89
They rarely expect to remain long in office, and often governments in the immediate aftermath of conflict are
transitional and tasked with putting in place a constitution or elections. They thus do not often have the mandate
for reform, or the attention. These 'transitional' arrangements however can go on for some years.
90.
Frequent changes of ministerial leadership, often with short-term horizons, are thus a feature of many
post-conflict situations (e.g. the number of governments in Nepal since the CPA) in line with unstable politics
more generally. A major problem for reformist politicians then is seen in balancing competence with political
inclusion, at both ministerial and lower levels. This can have a major impact on service delivery. This is clearly not
very useful for reform processes, which the evidence shows are most likely to work with consistent long-term
political leadership.
88
Misperceptions amongst politicians about the capacity of PA and their relationship to it are common even in advanced democracies with
well-functioning PAs ‘When I was first elected, I thought it was the leader’s job to set the vision and let the system get on with implementing it.
What I came to realise was that if I waited for the system to do what I was asking of it, I would never be around long enough to see it.’ Blair, A
(2010)
89 Ref
28
91.
Working with political parties is relatively new for development agencies.90 However, there is not that
much experience in post-conflict contexts and much of the work focuses on party organisations, support to
parliaments, and not the politics of managing a public administration post-conflict. Discrete support to parties on
some aspects of policy, especially peace negotiations, does occur post-conflict.91 But, ‘the post-conflict
environment is usually not conducive to the development of political parties’ 92 and there is little experience of
support to parties involved in negotiating a peace process of managing PA. This is an area that needs to be
developed as in the early aftermath of conflict these dynamics will initially dictate outcomes. The UN should
consider partnering with reputable non-governmental institutions to provide discrete support to parties,
especially new ministers, new to government on how public administration works, what it can and can’t do,
PFM, etc.
92.
In the ‘hyper-politicised’ contexts of post-conflict it is also common for a number of civil society actors to
have close links to parties (NGOs, business associations, and regional or ethnic groups are commonly identified
with one party or another, or even if not identified with a party, are often politically active in representing the
interests of their group). The UN should consider support to non-party actors in the political arena on CPAF.
4.4
Assist governments to generate ‘process legitimacy’93
93.
If stable, effective transitions emerge from continuous processes of state-society interaction, and if
governments that identify and manage societal grievances through legitimate administrative mechanisms (at
national and local levels) are more likely to improve perceptions of their legitimacy and performance and the
prospects of a non-violent transition – then procedural legitimacy becomes particularly important. This gives
primacy to considerations of consultation, participation and grievance redressal.
94.
As an external actor, the UN’s role is to try to make the settlement and its expression in the public
service, as inclusive as possible by supporting excluded groups and facilitating and expanding the space for broadbased inclusion, and grievance redressal, while the longer-term goal of developing rule of law and formal judicial
controls is still developing. Post conflict administrative development in Burundi, and the administrative
experience post 2006 crisis in Timor-Leste show that there is room and much value in tackling structural
disadvantage, and integrating socially, politically and ethnically marginalized groups into the administration
conflict. Public appointments to address pre-existing exclusion, and the creation of specialized mechanisms to
give voice to marginalized groups in policy, planning, and administrative decision-making are proven means to
achieve this. Again, the purpose here is to strengthen, stabilize and deepen any pre-existing political settlement,
but it would help for the UN (DPKO and UNDP) to develop a set of new and innovative options for an
inclusive administrative approach. On the other hand, there will also need to be clear recognition that it will not
always be possible to achieve this. The experience in Kosovo shows ethnic harmony is not always be possible in
the short to medium term.
90 UNDP (2006), Carothers
91 ref
92 Curtis, Devon and de Zeeuw, Jeroen (2010)
93
See FN 31 for a definition of process legitimacy
29
4.5
Monitor labour disputes between government and state employees
95.
Monitoring social, political and economic divisions, and acting quickly to prevent disputes spiralling into
violent conflict, are key to effective management of risk. The review team came across several examples of a
specific form of conflict related to PA - public sector labour disputes between state employees of various kinds
and government. As pointed out above, in many post-conflict countries an important function of PA is to act as a
form of ‘second best welfare’ (Shepard, 2003).
96.
In a number of case-study countries, the general context of change and upheaval led to an escalation of
labour disputes. These quickly become linked to perceived wider socio-ethnic disparities and inequities, and, at
worst, resulted in widespread disruption of services and occasionally even violence. Where managed, i.e. in the
mediated management of a dispute in Burundi, there were positive administrative consequences in the form of an
established a process of conflict mitigation, management and resolution practices. But, where this was
overlooked - i.e. in Timor-Leste, and Kosovo - the consequences were violent, as seen in ethnically motivated
violence in Kosovo in 2004 and in Timor-Leste’s crisis of 2006. The UN needs to include a labour relations
component in its overall conflict analysis and be prepared, possibly in close consultation with the ILO, to
support countries emerging from conflict in addressing and resolving burgeoning public sector labour
disputes.
4.6
Promote inclusion in PA
97.
Domination of public employment by one group or another can contribute to exclusion and so conflict.
There is a growing body of evidence that political settlements post-conflict need to be inclusive if they are to be
sustainable. And of course there is a now widely accepted principle that public administration needs to be
representative of the society it serves. Ensuring public administration, often the biggest formal employer, is more
inclusive and representative is thus beneficial not only for conflict prevention but for more effective service
delivery.
98.
Making PA more representative is a feature of a number of political settlements. In Burundi for example,
the constitution sets out some specific percentages for different groups in different parts of the state. At
commune level for example, there is an upper limit for administrators no more than 67% for one group. And in the
public enterprises, representation must be 60% or less for Hutu and 40% or less for Tutsi. In Nepal (not a case
study for this review), the settlement [and constitution?] sets out fixed percentages in the civil service for different
ethnic groups and for women.
99.
The UN has also been called upon to support political reintegration programmes and that have installed
vetting systems, fast-tracked training opportunities, and targeted education and retraining schemes for former
combatants and their dependents so that senior and mid-level commanders and officers can participate more
directly in both military and civilian public sector posts.
30
100.
Percentages in themselves are not enough, excluded groups are often also excluded from educational
opportunities, a key barrier to state employment, and there is a need for special support to excluded groups to be
able to take up and succeed in public employment. There is also a need to ensure government can effectively
monitor the achievement of such targets, often a problem when HR data collection is weak.
Box: xx Gender and PA in Kosovo
In 2004 UNIFEM (now part of UN Women) entered into a partnership with the Prime Minister’s Advisory Office
for Good Governance (AOGG) and the Kosovo Institute for Public Administration (KIPA, the in-service training
institute attached to the Ministry of Public Services that conducts mandatory training for all Kosovo civil
servants). The goal of the partnership with AOGG and KIPA was to increase the public administration’s
capacity to integrate a gender perspective in its planning and delivery, but also to increase gender equality
within the public administration itself.
In the first phase of the training the methodology of gender analysis was covered, with a special emphasis on
the collection and analysis of sex-disaggregated data, models for formulating gender-sensitive public policies,
and budgetary planning. In 2004 and 2005 more than 200 civil servants from different Ministries and levels of
government were trained in four day sessions.
The second phase was a Training of Trainers programme with the aim of creating a pool of experts to be utilized
by KIPA in their internal training processes but also available to other government institutions and associations.
The participants represented a range of government institutions from central and local levels, as well as civil
society. The training included the methodology of gender training; understanding how to gender mainstream
the work of the public administration, how to do a gender analysis of social problems and design strategies to
address them. With the completion of this training of trainers programme KIPA was equipped with the human
and material resources to conduct gender equality trainings for civil servants on a sustainable basis. The
trainings were institutionalized as part of the standard curricula for training of civil servants.
In the third phase UNIFEM and KIPA established a mentoring programme using a smaller pool of trainers.
UNIFEM supported two senior co-trainers to mentor and coach the KIPA gender trainers. As a result, the KIPA
trainers quickly became effective trainers in their own right, requiring minimal assistance from senior gender
experts. The training gave civil servants across all sectors of government the capacity to conduct a gender
analysis of their daily work. Advanced trainings were also held for senior management on integrating gender in
strategic planning processes. These trainings reviewed mechanisms for including a gender perspective in
policies, programmes, and strategies at different levels and at different stages of policymaking.
The positive impact of the training and new curricula became clear during the planning process of the new
national development strategy carried out by civil servants. Provisions of the Kosovo Plan for Gender Equity
were integrated into the 2006-2013 Kosovo Development Strategy and Plan, which was a critical first step
toward accountability for gender equality. The successful relationship with KIPA was replicated by UNIFEM
through a subsequent agreement with the Kosovo Academy for Public Safety, Education and Development
(KAPSED) to provide technical assistance in integrating a gender perspective into KAPSED’s training curriculum
for the Kosovo Police and harmonize KAPSED policies with the Gender Equality Law.
31
Chapter 5: Restoring basic functionality
101.
The third overarching recommendation made in Chapter 3 was that the UN should increase its focus on
restoring basic functionality to core PA functions immediately after conflict.
5.1
First things first
102.
UN support for CPAF needs to start from what exists, with initial support in the immediate aftermath of
conflict aimed at stopping “institutional haemorrhaging” which can happen during a conflict and often continues
in the chaos prevailing right after peace has broken out. This can take many forms, but includes for example, the
leakage of revenue, the demoralization or marginalisation of qualified civil servants, and the erosion of confidence
in the ability of the authorities to take control, uphold law and order, and produce benefits. Typically the
immediate aftermath of conflict requires decisions to be made and resources allocated. In very basic terms this
means ensuring basic forms of recruitment, (re)-establishment of rudimentary mechanisms to pay wages, and
basic decisions about how and where to allocate resources (money and people). Critically this involves rapid
mobilisation of advisory support from the UN to the centre of government, or in the case of geographically
specific conflicts, to local government.
103.
Initial support can rapidly transition into the introduction of basic systems, to sustain meaningful
progress. Re-patching systems, and importing or capacity substitution can help to bring systems and skills not
already in place, in areas central to basic functions, for example, in customs and procurement, or revenue
management. However, in all areas, basic capacity assessments or baselines should predate investment
104.
When the time is right, and some early results have been delivered, UN support could transition to
supporting reform, as the political settlement allows and when appropriate emphasis can be given to institutional
design; and to ensuring different institutional options are considered for good fit.
105.
Successful examples of institutional development in Timor-Leste (the Ministries of Health and Social
Solidarity), Kosovo, and Liberia (the Contracts and Monopolies Commission or CMC, which later became the
Public Procurement and Contracts Commission) show that time taken to negotiate and develop home-grown
institutional solutions and link these to the particularities of the country,94 improves their chances of success. The
94
The Liberian Concessions Management Commission was mandated by Government to lead the special review of contract and concession
agreements entered into by the National Transitional Government of Liberia from 14th October 2003 through 16th January 2006. The purpose
of the review was to determine whether those contract and concession agreements entered into by the NTGL were done with transparency
and economy and to the benefit of the Government and people of Liberia. This exercise enabled the Review Committee to review 95 contract
and concession agreements and recommended that 52 of the agreements should be accepted, 16 to be renegotiated and 27 to be cancelled.
The Ministries of Health and Social Solidarity (MSS) in Timor-Leste were built from the ground up (rural health practice) and, in the case of
MSS, arose in response to a national crisis and the acute conditions of poverty and vulnerability in the country.
32
Ministry of Health in Timor-Leste is a good example as it focused on building up its capacity to deliver basic health
care first before embarking on more complex programmes.95
106.
The central message is to focus on the basics, with a view to improving over time. Doing this will require a
greater readiness on the part of the UN to accept risk, and mediate ‘best practice’ approaches with a minimum
level of acceptable practice to ensure that peace building dividends are not lost. We have seen several examples in
the country cases studies where, the UN accepted less than optimal solutions in the interests of delivering results.
For example, the UN’s experience of engaging with informal subnational networks in Kosovo to establish local
government, and a willingness to support the Timorese Government to make direct cash payments to the
internally displaced, and the wider poverty-stricken population, based on relatively crude eligibility criteria, are
examples where adopting ‘good enough’ responses to administrative problems, seems to have worked. These
were imperfect measures by any account, but they delivered immediate results to an expectant population.Initial
support was quickly followed by remedial measures to address vulnerabilities or gaps, to improve the integrity of
the end result. In Kosovo this meant convening local elections to ensure the legitimacy of locally actors, in TimorLeste UNDP facilitated a new partnership between government and the highly regarded Brazilian Poverty Centre
to make systems improvements to Timor-Leste’s cash transfer program.
107.
Another lesson is to build on success, or
‘islands of excellence’,96 and avoid ‘whole of
government’ reforms. Delivering public benefits in
one area can generate popular support and
incentivise better performance in other projects,
programmes or institutions, and early successes
should be built on. UNCDF’s pilot local development
projects, which were in effect in five of the case
study countries, are a good example of the merits of
such an approach.
Box ? Safeguarding Public Assets
In Liberia direct substitution of international advisers in
line functions in the economic ministries assisted
government to stem a tide of corruption, prevent
economic plunder, while at the same time rapidly
increasing government revenues available for budget
allocation. Similar experiences were seen in revenue
collection in Burundi and petroleum revenue
management in Timor-Leste – each of which produced
favourable results.
108.
On the other hand, the Review Team did
not come across any examples, where ‘whole of
government’ interventions seemed to work. Such approaches, have often been stymied by political fluidity and
the weakness of cross cutting systems. In many cases, wider reform agendas are stalled at the political level of
government where ministers seeking to control resources (human, physical and financial), resist centralised
initiatives, such as capacity building units. Timor-Leste’s Governance and Public Sector Management Strategy
and Burundi’s government-wide civil service reform program are telling reminders of the cost of technically
correct, whole of government reforms.
109.
Faced with these challenges, UN support for PA at an institutional level needs to be cognisant of the
impact that minister-level relationships can have in their respective ministries,; and avoid (to the extent possible)
cutting across ministerial domains of control. In these contexts, Ministry-by-ministry or sectoral approaches are
likely more capable of producing results through, for example, the deployment of international advisers in line
functions. Risks of institutional and systems atomisation should be met with measures to promote inter-agency
95
96
Ref
ref
33
policy coherence, to adopt standard-setting instruments or inter-agency partnerships to share results and lessons
learned.
110.
The lessons on the need to scale back ambitious programs and be wary of ‘whole of government’
endeavours are of particular importance to questions of accountability, particularly financial accountability. There
is a well-established body of literature that shows that many external accountability mechanisms (e.g. media,
parliament, external commissions, civil society) rarely function well in the immediate aftermath of conflict, and as
a result the UN should prioritise internal controls first, and seek to establish external oversight later.97 In
particular, it can be difficult to take a strong stand on formal, high-profile anti-corruption approaches when the
threat of violence remains prevalent, or when the transgressions are committed by leaders who are seen as
“freedom fighters” or national heroes who sacrificed their safety and comfort in the armed struggle. But even
without the threat of violence per se, post-conflict politics are often too sensitive or difficult to sanction
transgressions, citizens might have poor information about performance leaving them ill-equipped to challenge
administrative decisions or actions, or the independent judicial controls needed to help these mechanisms to
deliver are still in their infancy.98
111.
The ‘separation of powers’ is essential to modern government, but has tended to emerge following long
processes of social contestation that have led to institutional change. In the immediate aftermath of conflict,
parliament and the judiciary are typically weak and the executive tends to dominate, which suggests that internal
administrative rather than judicial controls are likely more effective mechanisms for integrity and systems control
in the initial period after conflict. For example, internal audit is a particular priority to identify systems gaps and
track money and performance, and as such is an essential building block in a wider anti-corruption strategy.
Contracting out internal audits, as was done in Timor-Leste and Kosovo, can be an effective strategy where there
is a skills shortage, and has the advantage of establishing a systems baseline, and guiding systems improvements.
It is unrealistic to construct elaborate external checks and balances to ‘control’ government when the
government’s internal capacity is weak; it is better in the initial stages to focus on developing robust internal
systems and processes to begin, and work incrementally to adjust performance through the use of tracking and
monitoring systems, as opposed to adopting external sanction-oriented controls that constrain government
activity further. This approach has the added advantage of being a lesser drain on already scarce resources.
112.
It is worthwhile mentioning at this juncture that hybrid legal rules and norms were a common feature in
some of the countries visited (e.g. in Kosovo and Timor Leste) and often led to confusion around which rules to
apply and how they function., They also suggested incompatible approaches e.g. civil service commissions versus
a general directorate of the public service, or Auditors General created in civil law systems that typically trend
more towards executive and judicial controls (i.e. High Tax and Audit Courts). Ultimately, common law and civil
law approaches are different and should not be combined, at least not until local institutions have the capacity
to navigate these hybrid terrains effectively. 99 Linked to this, it was evident that advisors (as well as the donors
that fund them) tend, inadvertently, to bring their own ways of working and legal and administrative tradition,
adding to the ambiguity and complexity of a given context. More careful and targeted recruitment of technical
97
For financial control, for example, ‘its [external audit] effectiveness depends among other things on good management controls and internal
audit within the spending entities themselves. Operational effectiveness and integrity cannot be achieved only by external scrutiny. Also,
before expending resources and staff on audits of performance and efficiency, the basic audits of compliance and financial integrity must be
strong and effective.’ Schiavo-Campo (2000) pp44.
98 IDS (2010) p41.
99 ‘Whenever the United Nations has the mandate to legislate in a country, the local legal traditions and systems should be respected. A
confusing mixture between common and civil law elements, as exists in Kosovo, should not be repeated.’ Muhremmi, (2003)
34
advisers is thus perhaps warranted with a background in the appropriate tradition, particularly in UN transitional
administrations.
113.
Capacity readiness assessments, basic skills development (e.g. numeracy and literacy programs as in
Guinea Bissau100 and Timor-Leste), the establishment of basic cash management systems (as in Liberia and
Burundi), information sharing systems (re-establishment of radio broadcasts as in Kosovo and Burundi), and
systems audits that are regular and publicly disclosed as in Timor-Leste, are ‘first things first’ approaches that all
worked well, and all assisted government to restore some basic confidence and provided the platform for more
sophisticated reforms to follow.
5.2
Resist the urge to make big plans
114.
Several of the countries visited by the Review Team (Burundi, Liberia, Timor-Leste) launched soon after
the end of conflict elaborate multi-year planning instruments and it was unclear whether the work required to
produce them was commensurate with the results that they deliver. In Sierra Leone, the scale of the country’s
development ambition was not limited to post-2002 strategic plans, but was evident even as the civil war was still
raging. By contrast the country’s subsequent ‘Agenda for Change’ (2008-12) replaced the profligate political,
security and development plans that were in place, with a single planning document, reducing the coherence and
administrative burden for the country and strengthening national ownership. 101
115.
A
number
of
interviewees
complained of the ‘inertia’ caused by these
complex planning frameworks. In Burundi, a
lessons learned review of the UNDAF II
noted that ‘the excessive number of
priorities and activities has led to a
scattering of interventions and a duplication
of efforts as well as too much focus on
symptoms rather than on structural
causes’.102 Ultimately, even here then,
striking a balance between planning and
pragmatism proved difficult.
116.
The
weakness
of
these
development planning processes is typically
down to two things:
Box x
National Priority Programs
The experience of Timor-Leste is that National Priority
Programmes have an important function in the early years after
conflict, and can be constructed using several criteria: e.g. what
it takes to meet the needs of the population; projects that are
quick to initiate and design using employment intensive
techniques; projects that are non-prejudicial to longer-term
priorities; and projects that take into account the poverty and
vulnerability profile. This is very much in-line with the ‘New Deal’
which reinforces the value of priority programs. To work,
however, they must also be grounded in a realistic time-frame,
well sequenced, and framed by agreed benchmarks and an exit
strategy. CIC recommends 1yr programmes, but 2-3 years are
perhaps more realistic given the resource and coordination
challenges that such processes imply.
100
In Guinea Bissau, among the more simple training methods adopted, reportedly with much success, was basic literacy and numeracy
training, using the Cuban method
101 Draft, ‘Review of the UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture’, p9.
102 ‘Integrated Strategy of UN Support to Burundi 2010-2014’, UNDAF-II, April 2009, p19.
35
117.
First, in the immediate aftermath of conflict political leaders are often still in conflict, and are ill-equipped
to develop the political consensus needed to agree medium-term development priorities. During this period,
political attention tends to be dedicated to establishing or consolidating the political rules of the game (usually in
the form of a new constitution), securing positions of authority, or tackling protracted political challenges.
Nowhere was this more evident than in Kosovo, where several attempts to formulate and approve a National
Development Plan ended in failure. A Kosovo Development Strategy was articulated in 2006, but poor political
buy-in and inadequate structures for implementation meant the plan was not approved and did not move
forward.103 Since then, priorities have been driven set by the EU accession plan and what is required needed to
join.
118.
Secondly, national planning frameworks often propose technical solutions that do not address some of
the most intractable political dilemmas. Guinea Bissau is one such example in which successive UNDAFs (2002;
and 2008-2012) proposed good governance and poverty reduction strategies, with a particular emphasis on
deepening public administration and local governance gains including through policy and regulatory reforms, the
introduction of civil service performance standards, when the central and intractable priority was security sector
reform and delinking the military from public sector management. 104 Rightfully the mission gave the political
challenge considerable attention, but the impact of computerizing public administrative management, and
decentralization initiatives remains to be seen. The question to be considered is – in the absence of a peace
settlement – is support for public administration and local governance premature, and if not, what practical
measures could be taken that might survive a change of leadership, or government, or resurgence of violence.
This is not a question that can be easily answered, in particular in contexts of deteriorating governance, (e.g.
Afghanistan), there were efforts that seemed fruitful and these were typically public administration diagnostics
(i.e. systems audits or civil service censuses) or interventions less reliant on formal systems (community-driven
development projects such as the NSP in Afghanistan or local development programs),. At the other end of the
spectrum, in the context of a comprehensive peace settlement or, more specifically, ‘winner-takes-all’ victory,
achieving political consensus around development priorities may be more likely, but these instances are rare and
were not evident in any of the countries visited. Donors and the UN should avoid seizing on a fragile consensus
and promoting developmental paralysis by over-prescribing the outcomes wanted - be they MDGs, UNDAFS,
PBF Strategic plans. More useful approaches are seen in those country cases where government, civil society,
other interest groups, and development partners agree a limited and discrete set of priority programmes, focus
on these in the first few years, and leave the big plans for later. Some of the better examples of this were evident
in Timor-Leste (above). The complexity demanded of plans also required the use of international consultants,
which tended to decrease national ownership and commitment.
119.
The UN has made considerable progress implementing its new integrated planning approach, and
considerable progress has been seen in the harmonisation of poverty reduction and peacebuilding strategies. The
team saw very good examples, in Burundi, and to a lesser extent Liberia (particularly at local levels through the
County Support Team). But, where integration and prioritisation looked strong, transition strategies were lacking,
and early gains risked being lost. Progress in establish sub-national governance systems in Liberia and Guinea
Bissau suffered from the lack of a clear transition strategy and many important structural gains risked being lost,
103 Heidi Tavakoli and Shkumbin Saneja, (June 2011), ‘Public Financial Management Reforms in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States:
Providing Operational Guidance for Development Practitioners’, Kosovo Case Study, p29.
104 In Guinea Bissau, the EC suspended Direct Budget Support in the wake of an attempted coup, and demanded the government complete
and publish investigations into those recent events, and restructure and reform the military – despite that attempts to reform the military in
preceding years had exacerbated violence.
36
while here again, Timor-Leste offers a good example [see Box ? above]. Another institutional challenge,
symptomatic of atomised agency roles and functions, was that Offices of the DSRSG/RC often struggled to secure
the cross-agency support needed to ensure an effective integration process. This suggests that more incentives
are needed to ensure that UN agencies see themselves as responsible to the DSRSG/RC, as well as to their own
management structures.
Box ?
Transition Planning in Timor-Leste
Timor-Leste has enjoyed several years of stability since the crisis of 2006, the role of the UN in Timor-Leste
is changing, with UN withdrawal anticipated for the end of 2012, To facilitate a smooth transition the UN
took the unprecedented step of planning the drawdown jointly with Government. The architecture
adopted to make this possible has included a High-Level Committee (HLC) co-chaired by the President and
Prime Minister, and the SRSG, which agreed seven priority areas for the drawdown, and designated
government and UNMIT focal points and working groups tasked with delivery. At this early stage,
consensus has been reached on priority needs, objectives for Government-UNMIT collaboration, actions to
be taken until December 2012, and indicative resource implications. The plan is clear, simple and easy to
follow –lightening the load on an already burdened country context. Most important the plan outlines the
prospects for operational continuity beyond 2012, giving scope for negotiations between government and
its partners.
120.
One of the primary drivers of improvements to CPAF in the immediate aftermath of conflict, and a useful
planning tool, is direct budget support; and the UN may have a role to play in helping government to shape
informed policy options and prioritise what can be accomplished. In Guinea Bissau, direct budget support, was
used to pay civil service salaries and wages, in Burundi it paved the way for direct technical substitution to
safeguard revenue collection. Given its practical function, the operating premise should be that the UN align with
and facilitate the PA dimensions of any direct budget support that is given – Timor-Leste and Guinea Bissau can
be looked to as constructive examples.
121.
The prolific and sophisticated multi-year planning frameworks demanded by the international system
tend to propose too much too soon, raise expectations and often weaken a nascent government, tying it up and
constraining its ability to act. In politically fragmented, highly unstable environments that are typically dictated by
short-term horizons, overly ambitious plans rarely achieve results. In some cases they can do more harm than
good by tying up scarce resources and crowding out the opportunity for tangible early impacts. UN-sponsored
support to post-conflict transitions showed a consistent pattern of setting high goals and expectations, and
overloaded planning systems with poverty reduction and peace-building instruments (MDGs, UNDAFs, PRSPs or
National Development and Sector Investment Strategies, Peace-building Frameworks, etc).
122.
When a country emerging from conflict reaches the point, where basic functionality in key PA institutions
has been restored and become more robust, it will be possible to move on to planning and programming with a
longer time-horizon and to rise above some of the special restraints and limitations of the immediate post-conflict
phase. Depending on the circumstances and the findings of continuous post-conflict analysis, the next step in the
37
planning and programming process could comprise an Interim PRSP, and/or a PBF Peacebuilding Strategy, and/or
a medium-term UNDAF – all prepared with a keen eye on post-conflict functionality and good-enough solutions
based on a set of critical trigger questions related to the consolidation of the host country’s PA progress.
123.
Under these circumstances, and considering this Review’s focus on the immediate aftermath of conflict,
the UN System’s should discourage the investment of scarce government and UN System manpower resources
and funds in the preparation of ambitious, multi-year and multi-sectoral development plans. The findings of the
LLR Review point to the need for a more nimble, realistic, and phased approach.
124.
At the early post-conflict stage, the priority should be quick-impact initiatives that mobilize existing
capacities around rapid restoration of basic functionality in key PA institutions, thereby making it possible for the
host government within a short-term horizon (a) to prioritize better, (b) to weigh the merits of different trade-offs
more clearly, and (c) to make difficult choices on a more solid basis.
5.3
Speed up grievance redressal
125.
For the formal justice system in particular, reform can take decades to mature and become effective.
However, less formal grievance redressal mechanisms (citizen complaints channels, mediation and dispute
resolution mechanisms, administrative solutions), need not take that long to put in place, which makes them
good interim solutions while formal systems are still developing. UN support for the Kosovo Property Agency
(KPA); and the land commissions of Burundi and Liberia are mechanisms that have done good work but, on the
whole, these options remain under-documented and therefore underutilized in other post-conflict situations. The
review recommends that the UN system familiarizes itself more thoroughly with the grievance redressal
mechanisms in the countries in which they are operating, and equips itself better to support them.
Capitalizing on the complementarities between informal dispute settlement institutions and formal justice
systems is also important and can then be used as a “bottom-up” approach where formal systems are lagging (DiJohn, 2008).
5.4
Promote ‘South-South’ links and inclusion in regional PA initiatives
126.
South-south partnerships and instruments were also important in a number of places. South African
officials were instrumental in bringing about ethnic quotas in Burundi’s peace agreement, for example. Southsouth support for CPAF should be developed.
38
Box ?
Rebuilding South Sudan’s Administrative Capacities
The functioning of the South Sudanese State depends upon the emergence of a viable state apparatus
staffed by civil servants capable of, and willing to, manage public affairs in the public interest – a
resource that is currently limited. Recognising that ‘fly-by consulting engagements’ seldom develop
sustainable capacity, and that knowledge transfer is likely best facilitated by peer-to-peer relations
between individuals from similar contexts and administrative traditions, South Sudan is currently
engaged in a regionally organised capacity building initiative.
The Initiative for Capacity Enhancement in South Sudan is a south-south based, triangularly funded
coaching and mentoring program for South Sudan’s civil service. Established by the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), it is supported by the
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and resourced with secondments of civil servants from
three of South Sudan’s neighbouring countries - Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda - who are also IGAD
members. The countries will second and place 200 civil servants to serve as immediate capacity
enhancement in key functions identified by GoSS ministries themselves. They will also work on
developing local capacity through ‘twinning’ with South Sudanese counterparts in peer-to-peer
coaching partnerships. This approach takes into account the lessons learned from decades of largely
unsuccessful technical assistance, and refocuses capacity development to address the personal
attitudes and beliefs of the individual civil servants as an integral component of transferring technical
knowledge. The initiative is an example of triangular cooperation as Norway is funding the
(comparatively small) allowances for the civil servants as well as providing project support and
management. The civil servants remain on payroll in their contributing countries for the duration of the
project, making the individual contributions one of the largest examples of in-kind South-South
assistance for post-conflict state-building to date. A study of the program in its early phases found that
the ‘sending’ governments had made substantial investments in quality assurance considering the
secondments an ‘investment’ in the stability and growth of a neighbouring country of critical
importance. The GoSS on the other hand has been in the driver’s seat throughout the process and
exhibited a high degree of national ownership over the programme. The seconded civil servants
appeared to be motivated by a genuine interest in assisting the Republic of South Sudan rather than
pursuing personal and financial benefits. The low daily allowances were, controversially, highlighted as
one of the reasons why this particular type of personalities had been attracted to the programme.
Tarp and Rosén (2012)
127.
In a number of cases, the desire to meet the standards and norms of administration set in the immediate
region exercised a powerful incentive on national governments and seems to have boosted the motivation to
reform PA. Regional partnerships have wielded considerable influence and helped to shape performance and
outcomes in critical ways, for example the East African Community in Burundi, the EU in Kosovo, or ECOWAS in
Guinea Bissau.105 The lessons in this is that the UN should be supporting regional standard setting initiatives,
105
The proposal that Burundi be held up as the 2012 good practice administration in the region has incentivised improved administrative
performance.
39
investing in development of regional good practice, fostering collective responsibilities, and sharing regional
experiences of leadership, administrative performance, centre-regional administrative management,
institutional and capacity development.
5.5
Support the restoration of local governance
128.
It is important to emphasise, that much of this analysis presented above applies to support to local
government as much as to central. Many of the interventions and much literature on the subject of local
government in recent years has been dominated by the single policy issue of decentralisation.106 The evidence on
the impact of decentralisation in terms of improving service delivery at the local level is mixed, and even more so
in terms of post-conflict. While the issue of strengthening local government is widely seen to be important in
post-conflict environments, in particular as it can improve service delivery, and promote inclusion and
accountability, both important for the sustainability of the political settlement, the specific issue of
decentralisation is more complex. In fragile and conflict affected states it is often argued that too rapid political
and fiscal decentralisation can promote conflict and even weaken the state. Furthermore, decentralisation
processes are often stalled in complex political negotiations. Given this, supporting local government should
take a long-term view, decentralisation should be debated, not assumed (the issue of local government is
often a key element of wider constitutional debate, so the UN needs to support this debate and not jump to
policy conclusions), and if pursued it should not be rushed. In most cases, in the immediate aftermath of
conflict, support to local government should start with immediate support to the basic functionality and
capacity of local government, and at most, support to administrative (i.e. de-concentration) as opposed to
full decentralisation.107
129.
The importance of restoring the capacity of local government as being key to wider peace and statebuilding was raised consistently in all the case studies, however, until recently the issue of local government has
suffered from ‘systematic neglect’ from the international community (UNDP, 2007: pp12). Local government was
seen as particularly important where regional exclusion or conflicts between the centre and the periphery were
drivers of the conflict, as in Afghanistan. As well as basic services, key functions of local government include
sometimes overlooked but important administrative service such as land management, identity papers, etc.
130.
Local governments have an important conflict mitigation potential due to their greater ability to interact
with communities and traditional authorities compared to national institutions, and have the potential to foster
political inclusion in post-conflict processes. However they can also be a particular focus for unresolved conflict
(e.g. in Kosovo).
131.
During the conflicts in Sierra-Leone, Somalia, Burundi and Timor-Leste, local governments became the
only semblance of state presence to many citizens and therefore local government leaders acting in collaboration
with traditional chiefs and clan leaders created havens of peace and access to basic services for many
communities. These localities became the pressure centres for the quest for peace and development, and active
centres for dialogue initiation.
106 Definition…
107 GSDRC (2008)
40
132.
Common problems with getting local government functioning again were lack of clarity or understanding
of the rules and responsibilities of centre and local, high levels of suspicion and lack of trust between the centre
and the local (often linked with political issues, but usually expressed as a lack of faith in the capacity of the local
by the centre), and lack of money at the local level.
133.
In the early recovery situation local government is even more vulnerable to being ‘crowded out’ than
national by international agencies. In a number of case study countries, the emergence and establishment of local
governments and governance for that matter was constrained by numerous and varied interventions by
international non-governmental organisations who competed for resources, space and legitimacy.
134.
The response to the CPAF during the peace building, recovery and development requires the
development of targeted capacity needs of the local governance system at the different phases; peace building,
recovery and development. It should be noted however that the response may depend on the circumstance of the
existing local government system.
135.
The local governance system at the recovery stage requires legitimacy and therefore must be supported
to establish a clear system of representation, a linkage with the national systems, institute processes for
consensus-building and participatory decision-making, and promote response to minority needs and institute
early initiatives for mediation and sustaining peace. The basic political, administrative and fiscal/financial capacity
should therefore be established as a critical action under the CPAF.
136.
The development stage would require that the UN should support in putting in place a long term
perspective of the local governance process. This should be captured in statutes and policies defining roles and
responsibilities, representation, expenditure assignments, fiscal powers and reporting channels. The role of the
local governments at this stage would go beyond security and basic services to include the promotion of local
economic recovery.
5.6
Focus on outcomes
137.
A number of the issues come together in a particularly important lesson for support to CPAF- focus on
outcomes, not processes. Much work on capacity-building of PA is vaguely focused on general improvements to
the system, and can result in unfocussed training or equipment provision which has little impact. As UNICEF
describes in the box below, it is important to start from the objective of delivering a specific function or service.
Alongside this is the necessary leadership, and political priority, as described above. This lesson is backed up in
the wider literature, mentioned above, that stresses the importance of a problem-solving analysis and that it is
more realistic to focus on getting particular key functions working than the whole system.108
108
Fritz el al (2009)
41
Box xx UNICEF’s approach to national capacity development in fragile settings
In 2009-12 UNICEF identified four issues with its support to government capacity. First, ad hoc activities
and outputs (trainings and work-shops), which did not develop capacity. Second, the lack of capacity
assessments to identify existing capacities. Third, the lack of CD plans that address individual and
organizational capacity gaps. And finally, the lack of exit strategies to ensure that CD leads to real transfer
of responsibilities to national actors and sustained capacities. As a result, UNICEF developed an approach
to CD programming, which is applicable in fragile settings through a lighter, simpler and outcome-oriented
process to achieve very specific humanitarian Benchmarks in a short period of time.
Perhaps most importantly, the CD for CCC approach is outcome oriented, which means the focus is on the
specific number of children benefitting from services, rather than the number of trained or skilled
professionals. For the outcome to be tangibly monitored, UNICEF together with national counterparts
prioritizes distinct Benchmarks to be met in a relatively short period of time (3 months – 1 year) and other
Benchmarks for long-term process. Then, UNICEF and national actors conduct a Rapid Capacity
Assessment for these specific Benchmarks, in which existing versus desired capacities are identified
(ensuring the development of existing systems wherever possible). Finally, UNICEF with national partners
develop a Capacity Development Plan that addresses technical capacities on individual level and
organizational capacities on institutional level (developing only technical capacities such as trained
teachers, without supporting the organizational capacities - safe buildings, textbooks, blackboards etc will
not by itself provide the children with quality education). The CD Plan identifies a clearly phased exit
strategy ensuring that increased national knowledge/skills is coupled with transfer of responsibilities. The
CD Plan is usually implemented immediately after the finalization on the CD Plan.
42
To assist countries programmes to adopt this approach, UNICEF provided resource intensive technical
support, which entails a dedicated “CD for CCC Specialist” working with each country for 1 – 2 years to
firstly facilitate the articulation of a national outcome and CD Benchmarks. Then, the CD Specialist
conducts the Capacity Assessment and supports national partners to develop the CD Plan with
immediate implementation structures for the Plan. Finally, support for the implementation and
documentation of the CD Plan is provided in real-time so that upcoming challenges are addressed
immediately. The process ensures that lessons from other countries are shared, and there is a constant
focus on knowledge transfer between countries and regions through UNICEFs regional offices.
For example, In Kenya, the outcome was identified by the Ministry of Water and Irrigation and more
than 15 NGOs and CBOs, to be: ‘Water and Environmental Sanitation Coordination effectively
coordinates water, sanitation and hygiene promotion interventions of its members in order to ensure
that 80% of emergency affected populations have access to basic water, sanitation and hygiene
services with an initial focus on 6 priority districts in Turkana county as a pilot model for sub-national
WASH coordination. The coordination will be guided by the following: 1) real time mapping of
WESCOORD coverage, 2) minimum WASH standards, 3) promotion of programming that supports
DRR and community resilience and 4) conflict sensitive programming.’ The four points listed above
were the main outputs in the CD plan, each has a specific capacity development input. Due to their
specificity and concreteness combined with the fact that they focus on a well-defined geographical
area, the plan started in Feb 2012 has been implemented in a timely manner by mid-2012.
43
Chapter 6: Prioritising UN support to core public
administration functions
138.
As argued in Chapter 3, one of the main recommendations of this review is that the UN enhances its
focus on, and capacity to, support core public administration in the earliest days after conflict; core PA functions
underpin much of the wider peace and state-building process, such as rule of law and service delivery, and are a
key component of ensuring national ownership in the longer-term. This chapter lays out in more detail how the
UN could achieve this.
6.1
Develop UN-wide policy on support to CPAF
139.
As this review demonstrates, support for CPAF is complex and difficult. However, this review also notes
that whilst critical to the effectiveness and sustainability of UN objectives and fundamental to the principle of
national ownership, it is not a sector or defined area of UN cooperation in itself. As a result, whilst work on CPAF
in post-conflict contexts is undertaken by a range of UN actors, and others, notably the World Bank, this happens
without an agreed framework for collaboration, without a mandated lead agency, and without agreed and
durable mechanisms for coordination.
140.
This means the UN tends to regard CPAF as instrumental in support of respective mandates, but not as
an end in itself; from a peacekeeping perspective, CPAF is necessary for the restoration and extension of state
authority, from a humanitarian perspective CPAF is necessary for an early recovery process that nurtures national
ownership, and from a development perspective CPAF is necessary to move beyond fragility towards the
achievement of the MDGs.
141.
However, without integrated coordination, planning or implementation mechanisms support for CPAF is
often fragmented and not sufficiently prioritised in the immediate aftermath of conflict. In many of the cases
reviewed for this study, consistent and coherent support to the development, execution and review of state policy
and functioning was neglected until major development financing and operations began several years after the
ending of a conflict, and then were managed as an agency specific project rather than a UN programme.
142.
The case studies have highlighted where early intervention on CPAF paid major dividends to fulfilment of
UN mandates. The case of integrated UN support to local government recovery through County Support Teams
and the Governance and Economic Management Programme in Liberia, for example, or the immediate
interventions in Timor and Afghanistan supporting the setting up of basic pay scales and management systems
for the civil service, highlight the importance of safeguarding and rebuilding key civil systems and capacities early
on.
44
143.
This situation is exacerbated by the fact that no operational UN agency has a mandated responsibility to
ensure that support to CPAF is provided in
Box xx County Support Teams in Liberia
the immediate aftermath of conflict, nor do
frameworks for integrated support to CPAF
In support of the Government of Liberia’s recovery efforts, the
exist.109 This review recommends that at
United Nations (UN) created an integrated mechanism to
the level of the Policy Committee, a UN
strengthen the capacity of local administration, joining the
policy framework on support to CPAF in
collective capacities, knowledge, expertise and resources of the
post-conflict environments is articulated,
UN’s peace-keeping, humanitarian and development arms.
with
country-level
implementation
entrusted to the RC/HC.
The County Support Teams (CSTs) in each county were
144.
Given the importance and nature
of support to CPAF, an unusually high
degree of cross-UN discipline is required in
terms of ensuring learning, policy and
coordination.
Ensuring
effective
implementation of this policy will require
establishing a leading institution or multiagency mechanism, within the system.
145.
The report of the Secretary
General on ‘Civilian Capacity in the
aftermath of conflict’, has requested ‘the
inter-agency working group on capacitydevelopment, chaired by the United
Nations
Development
Programme,
(UNDP), to develop, by 2012, core
principles and guidelines for better using
and developing national capacity in postconflict contexts, as well as plans for
developing concrete tools to equip field
teams to conduct capacity assessments,
design strategies and monitor results.’110
established to ensure a coherent and consolidated UN approach
to addressing county challenges, supporting Government and
building capacity of government institutions.
To further support these teams with enhancing the capacity of the
weak local administration, the UN created the CST project, which
is coordinated by UNDP and works through UNMIL Civil Affairs
staff in the 15 counties. Working closely with other UN agencies,
the project focuses on:

Restoring functionality of administrative buildings and
providing other logistical support and;

Developing capacity of county officials; and

Strengthening data/information management in the
counties.
The CST aligns itself to the objectives and plans of the
Government and puts national ownership squarely at the heart of
the initiative and provided both a framework and a common
vehicle for UN action at the local level.
146.
UNDP is further recommended within the Senior Advisory Group’s Independent Report on Civilian
Capacity on the Aftermath of Conflict, 111 as the lead agency for the core government functionality pillar, with the
World Bank leading specifically on ‘Public Administration Reform. This review recommends that a UN Global
Focal Point on support to CPAF should be agreed as soon as possible through the Civilian Capacity Steering
109
Chapter 1 highlighted that the policy position lacks clarity due to the wide range and ambiguity of language used to describe public
administration throughout the UN. The absence of common terminology, principles and guidance serves to weakens focus and de-prioritise
CPAF. Categorising state functions is far from straight- forward, but an improvement on the current situation is central to meeting demands
for the UN to improve performance in capacity development and institution building. ‘In general, the United Nations have to reconsider their
peacekeeping approach and shift from an originally military undertaking to a more administrative approach. The future peacekeepers will
need to have the profile of public administrators, accountants and lawyers rather than that of soldiers’. Muharemmi (2003).
110 UN civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, August 2011, A/66/311–S/2011/527, pp. 5.
‘Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict - Independent report of the Senior Advisory Group’, February 2011 – document
A/65/747–S/2011/85.
111
45
Group and Civilian Capacities implementation process. This review recommends that the framework for the
global focal point, including identification of existing capacities, consolidation of best practice and guidance,
confirmation of key areas of support, and responsibilities be agreed between UN system agencies and the BWI.
6.2
Bring a ‘state-building’ framework into the UN’s approach
147.
In the context of the International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, the G7+ has proposed ‘a
new deal to deliver international assistance to fragile states which generates results that are aligned with
peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives, is more transparent, flexible and effective, and strengthens (rather
than duplicates) national and local capacities and institutions.’112
148.
The UN’s wider role in peace-building and state-building is beyond the remit of this review. 113 However,
wider UN policy and approaches here impact directly on support to CPAF. Although much progress has been
made in filling the ‘statebuilding gap’ there are important lacunae in the institutional and policy landscape. There
are many reasons why these lacunae (in the form of unmet needs and unresolved complexities) continue to exist,
but two of them stand out as particularly serious within the UN system:

Both within the UN, and in the relationship between the UN system and the Bretton Woods Institutions,
there is insufficient clarity on the mandates and on the division of labour with respect to support for
conflict-affected and fragile states; and

Within the UN itself, operational and practical obstacles stand in the way of closer and more seamless
inter-agency collaboration, because the institutions involved have, in the words of the UN SecretaryGeneral, ‘different mandates, guiding principles, governance structures and financing arrangements —
and different cultures and notions of how things should be done.’ 114
149.
The UN’s support to CPAF highlights again that it will not be possible to make significant progress
towards a more coherent and effective UN system response to the pressing needs of conflict-affected and fragile
states unless these two sets of issues are addressed in a concerted manner.
150.
For the purpose of aligning the UN System’s overall policies and approaches, and integrating immediate
responses in the aftermath of conflict, to longer-term developmental responses, it is recommended that the UN
system develop a broader concept and architecture for state-building, acknowledging the growing demand
for UN support to fragile states in this area.115 The state-building concept which is in widespread use today is
112 See the Monrovia road map agreed at the second International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 15-16 June 2011, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/24/48345560.pdf.
113 Alongside the gradual evolution of UN knowledge and support to PA in recent years, a rich and new understanding is emerging about
fragile and conflict-affected contexts, in particular the centrality of the state-citizens relationship and the social contract. It includes seminal
work and contributions by the OECD/DAC, the World Bank, the G7+ and many academic institutions and think tanks. The literature on this
issue is rapidly accumulating, but what these many new insights mean in practice and what impact they have for the UN System’s current
practice (for example, for planning, anti-corruption, local governance) has not yet been fully analysed and digested. In particular, there is
tension between the UN’s norm-setting role and the reality of working in post-conflict situations.
114 The Secretary-General’s report on “Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict”, June 2009, document A/63/881 – S/2009/304,
paragraph 24.
115 This view was forcefully articulated in June 2009 by Lakhdar Brahimi : ‘the concept of state-building is becoming more and more
accepted within the international community and is actually far more apt as a description of exactly what it is that we should be trying to do in
46
explicitly an endogenous process, i.e. a country-led and country-owned effort aimed at strengthening, on their
own terms, national leadership and national capacity in the development process.
151.
The acceptability of state-building as a necessary and legitimate goal in fragile environments was clearly
demonstrated at the 2011 High-Level Aid Effectiveness Forum in Bhusan, where (a) the New Deal was endorsed
by 32 UN member states and five international organizations (including the UNDG and the World Bank), and (b)
the specific mention of the New Deal’s “Peace-building and State-building Goals” was approved by all the 160
participating countries.
6.3
Improve planning for CPAF in UN operations and mandates
152.
The role of UN missions in support to public administration is evolving, however, in general UN missions
are getting more responsibilities in this area.116 The widest-ranging responsibilities under this review have been
assigned to the UN missions in Kosovo and Timor-Leste. All other field missions play a supportive role in
administrative development with mandates focussing on capacity-building of state institutions to address causes
of conflict, on more generally on measures to ‘increase efforts to promote good governance’, usually combined
with or after assisting with the extension of state authority (see Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burundi). In Guinea-Bissau,
the focus was on capacity-building of national institutions to maintain constitutional order. In Haiti, UNSMIH was
the first mission with a mandate related to institution-building, supporting the Secretary General’s role in the
“coordination of activities by the United Nations system to promote institution-building”. MINUSTAH was
mandated to assist the Transitional Government in extending state authority, then to assist the government of
Haiti in strengthening state institutions. References specifically to support governance on the local level can be
found mostly for UNAMA and for MINUSTAH, which is mandated to support the strengthening of State
institutions “especially outside Port-au-Prince”, “at all levels” or to undertake capacity building “at the national
and local level”.
153.
Given the fact that no one UN agency possesses all the expertise, funding and manoeuvrability necessary
to address the wide spectrum of post-conflict challenges, it is important to have a mechanism that facilitates (a)
the articulation of context-specific, achievable, and system-wide objectives for each post-conflict situation and (b)
the incorporation of these objectives into an integrated planning framework which encompasses both the UN
mission and the UN Country Team agencies. Progress was made in that direction by the adoption in 2006 of the
UN Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) Guidelines,117 which were supplemented in 2008 by the
introduction of the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) applicable to conflict-affected countries with both a UN
Mission and a UNCT presence.118
post-conflict countries – building effective systems and institutions of government. Indeed, acceptance of state-building as a generic term to
describe our activities will help to concentrate international support on those very activities’, speech on “State Building in Crisis and PostConflict Countries” at the “7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government” in Vienna, June 2009.
116 See Annex ? for a comprehensive analysis of relevant mandates and language of CPAF
117 ‘United Nations Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP) Guidelines’ endorsed by the Secretary-General in June 2006 (Decision
2006/26)
118 Detailed instructions on the purpose and content of the ISF are found in paras. 24-54 of the ‘IMPP Guidelines : Role of the Field - Integrated
Planning for UN Field Presences’, endorsed by the Secretary-General in January 2010
47
154.
At present, the ISF is the only common UN framework that seeks at the strategic level to address and
plan ‘peace consolidation’ for the entire UN system. It is designed to articulate -- based on the UN system’s
current analyses and consultation processes -- a shared strategic vision, which can and will vary in depth as well as
in areas covered. The ISF is therefore a particularly important planning tool for UN support in substantive areas
that require a high level of cross-agency cooperation and coordination. Accordingly, the review recommends that
statebuilding/CPAF support be given their rightful place in the UN system’s main planning and prioritization
processes (incl. the ISF and IMPP), and that the in-country UN leadership be provided with the required
capacity and expertise to make that happen.
155.
As a corollary to a sharper focus on statebuilding/CPAF in the country-level planning context, efforts
must also be undertaken in New York to ensure that staff in DPA’s Security Council Affairs Division (SCAD) when initially drafting and when later revising mission mandates -- have ready access to expert knowledge
and advice on the essential role of statebuilding/CPAF in the overall peacebuilding process and on the UN
System’s emerging policy and growing experience on these issues.
6.4
Improve analysis for planning and programming
156.
Chapter 3 argues that the UN as a whole, i.e. not just the missions, needs to be able to conduct and apply
a wider range of political and institutional
analysis. This is not an optional extra, but
Box 3. Conflict Analysis in Guinea Bissau
essential for programming and the more
In 2006, and on the invitation of UNIOGBIS, Interpeace
advisory role the UN should be playing in
established the Voz di Paz Program to carry out country-wide
support of PA reform within the context
consultations on the root-causes of conflict. Between 2008-2009,
of the political settlement outlined above.
Voz di Paz conducted nationwide consultations with over 6,000
While the review found many examples of
Bissau-Guineans including, for the first time, members of the
good practice, overall, there are some
military and the police, who were identified by the process as
gaps in the current analytic approach
embedded at the heart of conflict dynamics. Four root causes of
where new tools are needed, where
conflict were identified: lack of effective state institutions and
existing tools should be more consistently
poor governance; poverty; poor administration of justice; and
applied, and where analysis needs to be
tribalism. Voz di Paz is one of the few organizations that have
better shared within the UN during both
been able to get close to the military, earning enough respect to
planning and programming processes.
involve the security sector in the national dialogue process. The
157.
In terms of content conflict
programme now regularly creates ‘dialogue spaces’ around
analysis is not new to the UN, especially
specific activities to facilitate rapprochement between civilians
the missions, and is seen in varying
and the military. These are proving highly effective environments
guises. Particularly good practice models
for resolving issues and conflicts at the local level…on the whole
observed by the review team included; a)
Guinea-Bissau shows clear signs of recovery and willingness to
a conflict analysis prepared in partnership
move beyond the status quo. In February 2010, Voz di Paz became
with Voz di Paz, a local entity in Guinea
a fully independent non-profit organization,
Bissau (see box xx); b) the ‘Early Warning’
Excerpt
sourced
on
23
January
2012
at:
reports series produced jointly by UNDP
http://www.interpeace.org/index.php/programmes/guineabissau,
48
and a local think-tank in Kosovo (see paragraph 84 above);119 and c) the 2006 Secretary General’s Report on
Timor-Leste to the Security Council, on the underlying causes of Timor-Leste’s 2006 crisis. Conflict analysis in
Sierra Leone identified conflict drivers - i.e. corruption, patronage and ineffective/weak public institutions - that
were then directly accounted for in UN and UN agency mission statements. 120
158.
However, UN support to PA, especially its role in institutionalising and expressing the political
settlement, requires an extension of current practice. In particular, better analysis is needed on the links
between the political process and state institutions.121 Critical factors in a political economy analysis relevant to
support to PA would include identifying who the key actors are and how the interests of key actors interact with
or influence public administrative and local governance arrangements - employment in state institutions, for
example, or the extent of delegation of powers to the local level. 122 Of particular interest for PA are questions
around which processes promote consensus and how decisions are made, as these point to how rule-based public
authority might emerge.
159.
The production of analysis, conflict and political economy analysis should be dynamic, it is not a one-off
task, and analysis should be conducted regularly to track changes over time. This will help UN staff both in the
missions and in the agencies understand how or what has caused different interests or incentives to come
together or split apart. As argued in Chapter 3, the key task in supporting core public administration functions in
the immediate aftermath of conflict is not to initiate reform of whole systems, but to rapidly identify
opportunities or bottlenecks in re-establishing basic systems functionality. The analysis need not be highly
elaborate, ‘quick and dirty’ reviews that identify interests and divisions and their links to institutions are sufficient.
This type of analysis will also assist relevant UN staff to be flexible, a key recommendation for all work in postconflict countries, and to adjust their interventions to context. These analyses, outlining the political settlement,
are crucial for the UN Country Team’s planning, specifically for the formulation of the United Nations
Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the respective agencies Country Programme Action Plans
(CPAP). It is important to avoid a burdensome approach to analysis in which it becomes an obstacle to action or
programming, but at the same time, adequate time should dedicated to enabling staff or consultants to deliver
these assessments and diagnostics as part of program and project development. The UN should develop a
protocol for the rapid collection of basic data and capacity assessment of public administration, ideally with
the involvement of the World Bank, the IMF and INCAF.123
160.
In respect of the dissemination of analysis, the political analysis currently done within DPKO/DPA is of
high quality, given the fact that it draws on a broad spectrum of insights from experienced mission analysts with
both civilian and military background and often also from Civil Affairs staff dispersed at the local level. However,
DPKO/DPA’s political analysis tends to be written largely for internal purposes (e.g. for the SRSG and for ‘Code
Cable’ use), and it is too rarely shared in a strategic and systematic manner with UN agencies in the field. Joint
DPKO/DPA and UN agency analysis is key for support to PA to ensure the institutional aspects are covered. This
will not happen by direction but requires appropriate mechanisms and incentives for collaboration. The UN needs
to improve sharing analysis between the mission and the UNCT. The RC’s office would seem to be the logical
119
Institute for Development Research “Riinvest” http://www.riinvestinstitute.org/?gjuha=en
Ref needed
121 A good example would be…..
122 Structural dimensions – for example, important historical events or legacies, dynamics of participation (i.e. who is included or excluded),
interests groups, available resources (human, physical and financial)– are all also important. The role of donors, the UN’s own role,
contribution and political economy all need to be thought of as well.
123 There is a wide literature on capacity assessment and assessment of public administration. None of it though has been adapted to the
specific demands of post-conflict public administration.
120
49
home to coordinate such functions, but UN agencies should also be challenged to integrate these diagnostics into
program and project formulation and implementation. So far as possible, emphasis should be given to producing
this work in partnership with local entities – again, both the Kosovo and Guinea Bissau experiences provide good
examples. The Secretariat and UNDG should produce joint guidance on the content, production and
distribution of UN political and institutional analysis at the country level and how to apply these to the
relevant planning processes.124
161.
The analysis conducted should start with the collection of basic information. There is often a simple
dearth of accurate basic data about public administration available to the international community: numbers and
type of employees, state-owned enterprises, location of offices, etc. There are some examples of good practice
here, such as the ‘Guide to Government’ done in Afghanistan by the World Bank and AREU’ (see box xx).125 The
UN should as standard practice compile and publish basic data on, and a description of, public administration
in all conflict-affected countries, where it is present, and ensure that this is made widely accessible to the
international community. As with the analysis, this information collection does not need to cover all elements of
the administrative structure but should at least enable the UNCT, and wider donor community, to acquire a basic
understanding of the current system and dynamics for use in the planning and programming of the UNCT.
162.
With a longer timeframe, a more detailed assessment of wider system reforms and how these might
improve or expand the political settlement should also be done. Medium-term system assessments should not be
done at the expense of identifying and responding to immediate needs. The results of this assessment should
then be fed into the wider planning processes.
Box xx: ‘A Guide to Government in Afghanistan’
The guide has three objectives: i) it seeks to provide newcomers to the administrative and political scene
in Afghanistan with a basic guide to the structures and processes of government; ii) it intends to provide
reformers with some understanding of how to work “with the grain” of the existing institutional
arrangements; and iii) it seeks to pay tribute to the remarkable people who have kept the system running
and who are now reforming it. In pursuing these objectives, the guide attempts to set out the underlying
strengths of the public sector, describing the evolution of the Afghan state, the current political context,
and the administrative and organisational components of the government. It sets out the legal basis and
organisational responsibilities for key fiscal tasks including revenue collection, budget preparation and
execution, and accounting and audit. It also describes the organisational structures in the provinces, the
way in which the staffing establishment is determined, and the structure of pay and grading. In
particular, it looks at the arrangements for service delivery in the education and health sectors.
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU 2004).
163.
There are multiple planning tools within the UN system.; specifically within the context of post-crisis, this
includes Post Conflict Needs Assessments and Transitional Results Frameworks, Integrated Mission Planning
Processes and the UNDAF (as above).
124 There are important steps underway to projects in the UN system tasked specifically with making improvements to the ways and means
by which we go about this kind of analysis. For example, UNDP is developing a Guidance Note for Institutional and Contextual Analysis (ICA),
and already has a CDA, which will soon be further elaborated (more?)] and the aim of our work here is not to reproduce that work or those
developments.
125 http://www.areu.org.af/ResearchProjectDetails.aspx?contentid=2&ParentId=2&ResearchProjectId=1&Lang=en-US
50
6.6
Enhance the role of CPAF in the PCNA process
164.
The Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) mechanism is a well-tested and codified process endorsed
and supported by a broad multi-agency coalition which brings together the UN System (represented in this
context by the UN Development Group and DOCO), the World Bank, the European Commission, the AfDB and
the AsDB. The PCNA has evolved over a period of almost a decade, starting in the early 2000s. The PCNA
methodology has been applied, in various permutations, in over ten post-conflict situations.126
165.
During the first generation of PCNAs, issues related to statebuilding and public administration were
typically addressed within the larger context of governance and capacity-building, not as a topic of special
systemic importance or particular urgency. A first step towards heightened CPAF-awareness was taken in the
wake of the joint PCNA review in 2006, when a new joint guidance note was issued on integrated recovery
planning entitled “Post Conflict Needs Assessment and Transitional Results Frameworks”.127 It incorporated
relevant recommendations of the joint review (especially taken from its Annex V entitled “State functions and
stabilization”)128 and stressed inter alia that state-building is a central objective of recovery planning, because
post-conflict countries typically have limited institutional capacity, hampering their ability to implement needed
actions. The PCNA guidance note recommended that preliminary analysis of national capacities should be part of
the pre-assessment work. It advised that capacity considerations should be built into all clusters during the
assessment process.
166.
In 2010, the UN, the WB and the EU jointly developed a practical tool kit on how to include capacity
assessment considerations in the prioritization of needs in the PCNA.129 It stresses that recovery plans should
address not only what types of services should be provided, but also who should provide them. It emphasized
that during the initial transitional years the focus may primarily be on ensuring broad national ownership and
early capacity building in core governance functions. Once a democratically elected government is in place, such
efforts will need to be accompanied by an expanded and deepened effort to increase the capacity of the state to
both coordinate and deliver services.
167.
However, from a CPAF-perspective, the PCNA approach has important drawbacks : (a) the PCNA covers
a broad multi-sectoral spectrum of post-conflict requirements in which the specific CPAF tends to be crowded out
or overshadowed by more compelling service delivery needs; (b) even after the addition of the capacity
development toolkit, the PCNA methodology still offers very little specific guidance on how to assess CPAF needs
and formulate CPAF support initiatives; and (c) it often takes several months to plan and deploy a full PCNA
mission and additional weeks, if not months, to synthesize and publish its findings.
168.
These drawbacks are important, but given the many institutional advantages offered by the broad
institutional platform of the PCNA and the larger context of post-conflict analysis which it presents, the review
concludes that the PCNA remains the best available entry point for a heightened focus on CPAF concerns in the
immediate aftermath of conflict, especially if the identified weaknesses can be remedied. Towards that end, the
review recommends that UNDP take the lead, in close cooperation with the World Bank and with DOCO, in the
126 For details on the history of PCNAs, see UNDG’s website feature on “ Past and Current Country Experiences”,
http://pcna.undg.org/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=16
127 http://www.undg.org/docs/7818/Joint-Guidance-Note-for-PCNAs-and-TRFs.doc
128 Annex V on “Statebuilding” : http://pcna.undg.org/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=14
129 The PCNA Capacity Assessment Tool : http://pcna.undg.org/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=4
51
development of a distinct module within the PCNA with direct focus on the special post-conflict CPAF needs.
Such a module would be most useful, if divided into two components:

A fast-track CPAF assessment carried out during the first few weeks of the post-conflict period, and

A more in-depth CPAF assessment as an integral part of a larger multi-sectoral PCNA assessment.
169.
This two-tier approach is suggested especially for two reasons : (a) some post-conflict situations do not
lend themselves easily to the standard PCNA approach, but nonetheless have pressing CPAF-related dimensions
(e.g. Libya in late 2011 after the fall of the Gaddafi regime), (b) since many of the sectors covered in a full-fledged
PCNA process depend on a minimum level of functionality in core government functions, it is a distinct advantage
for the larger PCNA exercise to have advance feedback of data and diagnostics from a fast-track CPAF
assessment of the ‘wiring and the plumbing’ of the Government.
6.7
Deepen the UN’s human resource base on CPAF
170.
The current expertise in the UN on support for CPAF post-conflict is thin given its importance to wider
peace and state-building, especially at HQ but also at regional levels. While there are a number of governance
advisors and political and civil affairs officers spread through the system, both at HQ and in missions/agencies,
there are few with specific CPAF expertise, and they are mainly found in UNDP and in UN DESA. Most governance
advisors or political and civil affairs officers do not have (or claim to have) the professional skills needed for
effective support to CPAF. The UN needs better access to the ‘plumbers and electricians’ of CPAF, not so much
the architects of wider reforms. There is expertise in projects at the country level, but this is dependent on project
funding; it does not constitute a permanent resource able to ensure a predictable response to CPAF in crisis
countries in terms of planning, programming , monitoring, knowledge sharing and policy development. This
review confirms the findings in the CivCap report that that overall UN capacity in terms of core PA functionality is
insufficient.130
171.
To remedy this situation and ensure reliable technical skills, two solutions need to be developed: (1)
improving the rosters on CPAF to ensure a pool of reliable, highly qualified experts in CPAF; and (2) strengthen
the UN’s internal capacity to ensure that there is a minimal pool of experts available from within the system.
6.8
Invest in learning and training on CPAF
172.
The UN’s capacity to deliver appropriate support to CPAF post-conflict depends greatly on access to
high-quality know-how and diagnostic tools.131 Within the UN itself, there is a wide range of relevant knowledge
resources covering various dimensions of the issues being examined here, but no single repository of knowledge
that provides an intellectually cohesive or operationally useful overview of relevant know-how which UN
practitioners, whether at headquarters or in field postings, need to have (another manifestation of the relative
130 Civcap p 20 35b.
131 See Annexe ?? for some resources on wider peace and state-building
52
neglect of CPAF). To acquire a comprehensive overview of all issues relevant to the UNs role in this field, a
practitioner would need to search more than a dozen UN-hosted websites (for details, see Annex ??).
173.
It is recommended that a UN-wide “Knowledge and Learning Portal” be established which can serve
as a permanent home for knowledge development and learning specifically on PA in post-conflict settings. It
would be launched for the following purposes:

As a repository/library of relevant source material/documentation on post-conflict PA and CPAF;

As a learning platform in support to orientation/training on post-conflict PA/CPAF; and

As the hub for an electronic Community of Practice on post-conflict PA/CPAF.
174.
The ownership and management arrangements for such a portal must be well chosen from the start to
ensure that it is (a) UN-wide, (b) comprehensive, (c) interactive, and (d) sustainable. It cannot be the product and
property of just one agency; it will, for practical reasons, have to be hosted by one agency, it should be managed
and populated through a collaborative mechanism, e.g. a committee of co-sponsoring agencies drawn from the
membership of the UN Working Group on Public Administration in New York. At a minimum, it would be
advisable to ensure that the following UN agencies are represented in a core group of portal co-sponsors: DPA,
DPKO/DFS, PBSO, UNDESA, UN-DOCO, UNICEF, and UNDP.
175.
This review has considered a range of options for the hosting and management of such a portal and has
concluded that there is a strong rationale for UNDP to take on the role:
(a) UNDP’s inter-agency involvement in this sector goes back to a Policy Committee decision taken in
September 2006, designating UNDP as the chair of a working group on “Public Administration, Local
Governance, Financial Transparency and Accountability” – the precursor to today’s Working Group on
Public Administration, of which UNDP also serves as chair;
(b) UNDP was proposed in the Civilian Capacity Review as the “global service provider” for the cluster on
core government functionalities, and as lead agency for four of the eight sub-clusters envisaged within
that cluster; and
(c) UNDP has specialized entities for three of the key sub-disciplines of CPAF relevance, i.e. BCPR (crisis
prevention and recovery, and crisis governance), BDP/DGG (public administration and local governance),
and BDP/CDG (capacity development). Moreover, UNDP is closely affiliated with the UN’s specialized
entity on public finance for local development, i.e. the UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF).
176.
On that basis, UNDP is comparatively well equipped to offer a cohesive solution that brings together and
integrates “under one roof” the broad spectrum of expertise required in a PA portal.
53
177.
The proposed portal will also have to be designed to support and facilitate any learning and orientation
activities which the participating UN agencies decide to arrange for relevant categories of their staff. It will have a
light staff footprint, but be extensively networked with knowledge cells in all the participating agencies and with
the major external sources of expertise on this subject. A list of relevant UN staff categories and suggestions for
their learning needs on CPAF is found at Annex xx.
6.9
Increase and speed up funding for CPAF
6.9.1
The ‘Early Recovery’ Funding Window
178.
The largest and most rapidly available source of funds in the immediate aftermath of conflict is usually
humanitarian aid, mobilized through the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) by means of Flash Appeals and
Humanitarian Action Plans (HAPs). Prior to the mid-2000s, such funding – raised primarily to save lives and reduce
human suffering - was highly unlikely to be allocated for any CPAF-related initiatives, given their longer-term time
horizon and their institution building objectives.
179.
Subsequently, the system-wide acceptance of the Early Recovery perspective -- ‘guided by
development principles’ and encompassing a range of ‘governance recovery’ measures – has paved the way for
the legitimate inclusion of CPAF-related objectives through early recovery mechanisms. So far, the Early
Recovery components in CAPs and HAPs for post-conflict have been dominated by proposals aimed at economic
recovery, while limited attention has been paid in this context to the need for ‘governance recovery’. But the
important contribution of CPAF to the overall post-conflict recovery process is gradually gaining traction, and as a
result eligible CPAF-related proposals are beginning to appear in UN humanitarian assistance efforts -- as clearly
evidenced in some recent ‘early recovery’ programmes described in UNDP’s ‘Signature Products for Crisis
Response’ and in UNICEF’s ‘Capacity Development for Humanitarian Response’ initiative. The following two
examples will serve to illustrate the relevance of the ‘early recovery’ platform to CPAF support :

Support for a country-led and country-owned resource mobilization and aid coordination function at the
earliest possible point in the recovery process, aimed at (a) strengthening the institutional capacity of the
national agency/ies overseeing international humanitarian assistance, and (b) ensuring that external aid
flows -- sooner rather than later - are properly recorded by and factored into the regular national
resource planning process.132
132
An early real-life example of such an initiative: A UNDP-sponsored proposal was included in the January 2008 Flash Appeal
for Kenya, following the outbreak of election-related violence. The project was entitled “Enhancing the emergency response
capacities of the Kenyan authorities”. Budget : US$ 500,000. Objective : Government agencies capable of coordinating the
emergency response and rapidly resuming their functions for longer-term development of the areas affected. Partners :
Government of Kenya National Disaster Operations Centre, and the Government’s Committee on Reconciliation, UN agencies
and NGOs. Beneficiaries : 250,000 displaced persons and residential populations of more than one million.
54

Support for increased local government involvement in planning and implementing humanitarian aid
activities at the local level, aimed at ensuring (a) that such aid is carried out in a country-led and countryowned manner, and (b) that some of the political credit for such assistance can be and is effectively
attributed to the local authorities to reinforce their output legitimacy.
180.
Early recovery mechanisms provide an important entry point for a limited number of activities needed to
restore core government functionalities in the immediate aftermath of conflict. It is an important source
nonetheless for a number of reasons : (a) it promotes country-led and country-owned recovery processes, based
on the early restoration of basic host government functionality; (b) it is likely to be available at the earliest stage
of the post-conflict period, often even before a formal peace process has been completed; (c) reinforcing local
leadership and leveraging local knowledge in a collaborative and inclusive manner is an important way (i) to
ensure a more effective humanitarian response and more resilient development in the longer term, and (ii) to
avoid national and local capacity being undermined by humanitarian actors in the urgency to respond and the
tight spending timeframes for humanitarian funds.
181.
Against this background, this review recommends that an inter-agency dialogue be initiated soon,
particularly involving the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator/OCHA and UNDP, aimed at ensuring (a) that in
the future relevant UN practitioners in the field will have at their disposal a certain number of ‘technical
templates’ for such CPAF-relevant ‘early recovery’ assistance that are pre-accepted as eligible for funding
from humanitarian assistance sources, and (b) that ‘governance’ and CPAF concerns are not only included in
the ‘early recovery’ segments of future CAPs and HAPs, but also backed up by proposals that are well
justified and well designed.
6.9.2
CPAF Needs Assessment in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict
182.
One of the first CPAF-related challenge facing the UN system’s senior leadership at the country level in
the immediate aftermath of conflict is to arrange for a rapid diagnostic assessment of ‘the state of the state’ so as
to be able to determine how much of the country’s existing public administration capacity has remained intact,
and to what extent its key CPAF-relevant institutions are performing their basic functions effectively under the
prevailing conditions.
183.
This diagnostic assessment should go hand in hand with the formulation of a fast-track assistance
programme designed to safeguard pre-existing CPAF capacity and to restore the CPAF functionality that was
diminished or lost during the conflict. Such a restoration programme would need to start without delay and focus
on what is likely to produce concrete results within the first 24 months, while at the same time pave the way for a
prolonged and gradual institution-building process (PAR) that is likely to last a decade or more.
184.
As discussed in section 6.6 above, the UN system has an elaborate and time-tested mechanism for PostConflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs) within the framework of which it is possible to accomplish the dual task of
undertaking both (a) a fast-track CPAF assessment during the first few weeks of the post-conflict period, and (b) a
more in-depth CPAF assessment as part of a larger and multi-sectoral PCNA.
55
185.
The larger PCNA process has well-established funding arrangements, with each participating agency
normally covering its own costs. But in the interest of speed and inclusiveness, this review recommends that the
fast-track CPAF assessment be carried out through a pre-funded multi-agency mechanism, based on a joint
project which could, for instance, be managed by UNDP (drawing on its TRAC-III resources) and include costsharing from interested bilaterals. In this way, no delays will be caused by funding issues, and it will be possible at
short notice to include some UN agencies that are particularly relevant for the CPAF agenda, but may not have
funding readily available for this purpose (e.g. UN DESA, UN Habitat, UNCDF).
186.
These two CPAF assessment exercises will need to be carefully codified in advance, based on (a) a solid
rationale, (b) a detailed description of the preparatory work to be undertaken ahead of each new CPAF
assessment mission, and (c) generic terms of reference laying out the parameters of the tasks to be accomplished
in the course of the mission. Existing PCNA guidelines and protocols will be drawn upon for inspiration in the
codification process.
187.
The UN agency participation in each rapid CPAF assessment will be context-specific and may thus
change from case to case. But it is assumed that at least DPKO, PBSO and UNDP will participate in most cases.
Considering the central role which the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have increasingly
played over the years in post-conflict recovery efforts, particularly related to macro-economic recovery, public
financial management, and public service reform, there are evident advantages in having both Bretton Woods
Institutions (BWI) included in these efforts as well. It is therefore recommended that current discussions with
the World Bank and IMF on post-conflict issues be expanded to include their joint participation or closely
synchronized involvement in the proposed CPAF assessments, so that they become an integral part of any
future inter-agency plan or protocol guiding international support for post-conflict CPAF.
188.
Once the initial CPAF assessment has taken place and the concerned country’s most immediate CPAF
support needs have been determined, the attention of the senior UN leadership at the field level will turn to
resource mobilization for the longer haul.
6.9.3
Drawing on Transitional and Developmental Financing for CPAF Support
189.
The existing multilateral aid architecture offers a range of financing options for CPAF support during the
first two years after the end of a conflict. They fall broadly within two distinct categories : (a) those that are
‘developmental’ in origin and accordingly have a prolonged time horizon, and (b) those that are conceived in a
more explicit post-conflict or peacebuilding perspective and therefore have a shorter and more ‘transitional’ time
horizon.133 One of the main CPAF challenges for the UN System at this time is to determine how to optimize its
efforts to restore core government functionality, drawing on both transitional and developmental funding at its
disposal in the most flexible and results-oriented manner.
133
In the context of ‘transition financing’, OECD/DAC defines ‘transition’ as follows : ‘A transition period spans across a broad spectrum of
activities along the path out of conflict and toward sustainable development, greater national ownership and increased state capacity. This
includes recovery and reconstruction activities that traditionally fall between the humanitarian and development categories, and securityrelated and peacebuilding activities’. Ref. ‘International Support to Post-Conflict Transition : DAC Guidance on Transition Financing - Key
messages’, March 2012 - http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/27/49372078.pdf
56
190.
CPAF-relevant UN funding sources that are ‘developmental’ in nature are more numerous, given the fact
that public administration is an old and familiar development discipline. Among the most relevant UN sources in
this category are (a) UNDP’s core funds and its Thematic Trust Funds for, respectively, Democratic Governance
and Crisis Prevention and Recovery; (b) UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) resources earmarked for local
development, (c) funding made available to UNDESA’s Division for Public Administration and Development
Management; and (d) ‘special purpose’ contributions in this sector allocated by bilateral donors to UNDP, UNCDF,
UNDESA, and others.
191.
The main challenge posed in efforts to attract funding to public administration activities in post-conflict
environments from traditional ‘development’ sources has been to substantiate that assistance for public
administration purposes is both necessary and feasible in the less-than-stable environments prevailing in the
immediate aftermath of conflict. But in the face of growing empirical evidence from institutional self-assessments
and academic research, it is now increasingly accepted that statebuilding in general and CPAF in particular are
legitimate and central ‘developmental’ objectives for UN support in the midst of the instability and uncertainties
prevailing in the immediate aftermath of conflict.
192.
Taking into account the fragmented nature of the UN System, and faced with many vestiges of the
fragmented aid architecture within the donor community, the Secretary-General’s Peacebuilding Report in 2009
made a strong appeal for ‘bold and innovative solutions’ which, -- combined with ‘a higher tolerance of risk’ -- will
‘establish flexible, rapid and predictable funding modalities in countries emerging from conflict’. 134 Those
objectives are also reflected in an in-depth study, commissioned by the Secretary-General and OECD and
published (March 2012) under the title ‘International Support to Post-Conflict Transition: Rethinking Policy,
Changing Practice’.135 It is based on extensive consultations internationally and reflects an emerging international
consensus on the steps and measures needed today to change funding arrangements and to improve the
coherence of the international responses across various policy principles and institutional mandates.
193.
The review has examined the full range of suggestions emanating from the OECD/DAC Guidance on
Transitional Financing, the New Deal, and the Civilian Capacity Review, in an effort to identify those that – over
and above their general System-wide reform objectives -- are most relevant to ensuring increased and speedier
funding for UN support to CPAF. On that basis, we wish to highlight the following factors and suggestions:
Closer Inter-agency Collaboration : The DAC Guidance on Transitional Financing emphasize that current
financing instruments ‘are fragmented and designed based on institutional mandates, rather than on the
objectives to be achieved’. New approaches and funding arrangements will need to ensure not only rapid
responses, but also ‘more serious collaboration, joint analysis and willingness to be held collectively
accountable to deliver results against agreed objectives’. This can only happen if the UN System and
others are ready to adopt ‘a collective approach across policy communities’.136 CPAF interventions
represent a striking example where ‘a collective approach across policy communities’, i.e. Delivering as
One, is critically important.
134
Peacebuilding Report, para. 77
‘International Support to Post-Conflict Transition : Rethinking Policy, Changing Practice’, published as part of OECD/DAC’s Guidelines and
Reference Series, March 2012 (91 pp.) – supplemented by a four-page summary entitled ‘International Support to Post-Conflict Transition :
DAC Guidance on Transition Financing : Key messages’, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/27/49372078.pdf
136
‘DAC Guidance on Transition Financing : Key messages’, p. 1
135
57
CPAF Sections in All Compacts: The New Deal Declaration and OECD/DAC advocate the use of transition
compacts which constitute ‘light and flexible agreements between national and international partners
(…) based on a collective agreement on key priorities and an explicit strategy for how, and from which
instruments, implementation will be financed. Compacts reduce the risk of strategic failure, improve the
focus on results, and provide realistic steps towards stronger national involvement and leadership’ – all
essential steps towards more predictable resource flows. On that basis, we recommend that all future
transition compacts include a mandatory section on measures needed to ensure effective post-conflict
CPAF.
Multi-donor Trust Funds (MDTFs): The Secretary-General’s peacebuilding report stated that ‘when
resources are channelled through such funds, they can contribute significantly to predictability and
coherence and facilitate alignment by directing funds towards a focused set of agreed priorities. If wellsupported, multi-donor trust funds and other pooled funds can be the muscle behind a common strategic
approach’.137 Moreover, it is also generally agreed that MDTFs serve to ‘significantly reduce transaction
costs for both donors and host governments’. 138 However, while CPAF support is important and catalytic
within any UN post-conflict intervention, it does not warrant a separate funding window within the UN.
Instead, it is recommended that a special CPAF module be included in all future post-conflict MDTFs
so as to provide both host governments and donors with a simple and nimble funding source for
support in this vital area.
Flexibility to direct capacity towards needs: The Civilian Capacity Review stressed the importance of the
UN leadership in the field being able to ‘use resources flexibly’, e.g. by being allowed – with ex post facto
justification – to reallocate up to 20% of resources in the budget for civilian personnel.139 In a rapidly
evolving mission context, such a mandate would give an SRSG/DSRSG important new options (e.g. by
means of Civil Affairs officers) for strengthening basic government functions at short notice.
Comparative advantage in mandate implementation: The CivCap Review stressed the principle of
comparative advantage in mandate implementation. In many situations, this implies that the UN makes
a deliberate effort to tap into local capacities, when practical and feasible, to solve pressing problems.
Beyond that, it also implies that when a UN agency or others (e.g. NGOs) have a comparative advantage
in implementing a task mandated by the Security Council, the Head of Mission should be able to direct
funds to that actor. Similarly, when a UN Mission and its field personnel have comparative advantage in
implementing a mandated task, heads of mission should be able to provide the necessary programmatic
funds from assessed contributions for them to do so. This comparative advantage principle is a welcome
development, aimed at breaking down counterproductive barriers in the current aid architecture and at
promoting the ‘unusually high degree of cross-UN discipline’ which is called for in such complex
situations (ref. para. 139 above). The Secretary-General endorsed this principle in his response to the
CivCap Review.140 The implications of this policy for the promotion of CPAF are self-evident.
137
The Peacebuilding Report, para. 78
‘Transition Financing : Building a Better Response’, published as part of OECD/DAC’s ‘Conflict and Fragility’ series, Paris
2010, p. 16
139
‘Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict - Independent report of the Senior Advisory Group’, February 2011 –
document A/65/747–S/2011/85, recommendation 14, para. 61
140
‘I shall issue appropriate guidance to heads of field missions and planners to apply the principle of comparative advantage
in recommending how to go about discharging a mandate. The use of other United Nations actors, for example, to discharge
138
58
Succession Arrangements : Finally, given the prolonged time horizon required for all support to public
administration, and the much shorter time horizon typically applied within existing post-conflict funding
windows, deliberate steps must be made to pre-plan an orderly succession of funding arrangements in
this sector. The review team recommends, therefore, that the agencies most active in post-conflict
CPAF agree to map out and codify a variety of pre-arranged ‘dove-tail’ arrangements, i.e. options
aimed at providing a realistic path for CPAF support provided in the immediate aftermath of conflict to
be followed by a second (and even third) generation of CPAF assistance which will safeguard the initial
progress made and stay the course towards longer-term consolidation of the required CPAF-related
institution building and modernization outcomes.141
6.10 Develop co-operation with other organisations
194.
The international community’s rapidly growing interest in the essential role of CPAF in the immediate
aftermath of conflict has largely been driven by a few multilateral institutions, supported both intellectually and
financially by a small number of especially interested bilateral donors. The initial upsurge of interest occurred in
the period 2005-2008 spearheaded mostly by the OECD/DAC, the World Bank, and the United Nations. More
recently, these three have been joined by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and lastly and perhaps most
importantly the G7+ group of fragile and conflict-affected countries. It is essential that the United Nations develop
further its engagement with all of them to ensure that the UN system remains able to contribute to as well as
benefit from the dynamic on-going learning process in this field. What this implies vis-à-vis each of the other
three institutions is spelled out in detail in Annex xx, below we focus on the most important. In brief:
The G7+ The G7+ is clearly a key actor for developing more effective an timely support for CPAF, and it
has included CPAF functions as one of its five state-building goals.142 The UN should consult further with
the G7+ on this agenda on, for example the post-conflict assessment framework recommended above.
The World Bank The World Bank has widely recognised strengths in PFM issues post-conflict, as well as
in other CPAF issues such as human resource management, and has been developing its work on peace
and state-building recently most notably through the WDR 2011. The World Bank though needs to work
with the UN on many issues, and it was a common issue in the case study countries that work on CPAF
needs to be better coordinated between the World Bank and the UN. This review recommends that a
working group should be established between the UN and the World Bank to work out the specifics,
based on the broader recommendations in this report and the WDR 2011, perhaps under the auspices of
the Civ Cap process.
mandated and budgeted functions for which they are well equipped, can offer practical advantages, including engagement
with an entity often present in the country or area before a mission deploys and likely to be present after the mission leaves.
Cooperative or joint planning, such as the development of an integrated strategic framework, should help to determine the
comparative advantages of United Nations actors in the field. My priority will be to strengthen the ability of United Nations
entities to plan, cooperate and work together in critical post-conflict situations’ “Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict”,
Report of the Secretary-General (document A/66/311–S/2011/527), 19 August 2011
141 This can be done in several different contexts, e.g. as part of existing multi-agency planning processes such as the PRSP, the Integrated
Strategic Framework (ISF), or the UNDAF – or as part of the multi-stakeholder ‘transition compact’ envisaged in the New Deal Declaration.
142 Peace and state building Goal 5 “Revenue & Services’ is to “manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery.”
59
The IMF The IMF until fairly recently has kept to a relatively narrow, though essential, focus on macroeconomic issues. However there are three areas where better joint working could be explored with the
UN on CPAF issues. First, the rapid CPAF needs assessment being proposed by this review would benefit
greatly from being done either jointly by these three institutions or, alternatively, in a coordinated or at
least parallel manner that will ensure synergy and multi-disciplinary response to the needs identified,
particularly related to public financial management and aid coordination. Second, the availability of
quick-disbursing support from IMF’s Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) would serve to jump-start the restoration
effort in key processes related to revenue and budget management – and also bring technical assistance
needs in this sector to the early attention of all three parties, each of which will have valuable
contributions to make in areas of comparative advantage. And third, it would be of major mutual benefit
for the UN Mission in general and for the SRSG/DSRSG in particular to remain in close contact with the
IMF, especially prior to and during IMF’s periodic Article IV Consultations with the host government. IMF
will be able to draw on the UN Mission’s understanding and insights into the political and institutional
realities in the country, while the institutional context analysis of the UN Mission will be enriched by the
IMF’s fiscal sustainability analysis.
60
Chapter 7: Conclusions and next steps
{TBC}
61
Annex xx
Summary of Recommendations
{TBC}
62
Annex xx Inventory of UN-affiliated websites of relevance to public
administration and local governance in post-conflict situations
Institution
Knowledge Resources and Locations
PBF/PBSO
The main Peacebuilding Fund/Peacebuilding Support Office’s website http://www.unpbf.org
DPA
The DPA main website’s sections on (a) Peacemaking and Conflict Prevention, and (b)
Peacebuilding : http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main
DPKO
The
main
DPKO
website
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/
DPKO/DPET
The Peacekeeping Resource Hub managed by DPKO’s Policy, Evaluation and Training Division
http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx
DFS
Independent website of the Senior Advisory Group for the “Civilian Capacity Review” hosted by
the UN Department of Field Support http://www.civcapreview.org/
UNDG/DOCO
Section on “Crisis and Post Conflict” which includes details on the Post-Conflict Needs
Assessment (PCNA) - http://www.undg.org/index.cfm?P=6
UNDP/BCPR
The “Conflict Prevention and Recovery Network” managed by the Bureau of Conflict
Prevention and Recovery : http://practices.undp.org/cpr/
UNDP/
The “Public Administration Reform and Anti-Corruption” section of UNDP’s IntraNet managed
by the Bureau of Development Policy’s Democratic Governance Group
http://practices.undp.org/pcb/index.cfm?prac=121515&tab=121660&doc=&src=121660
BDP/DGG
UNDP/
on
“United
Nations
Peacekeeping”
“Capacity Development” in UNDP’s IntraNet managed by the Capacity Development Group
within the Bureau of Development Policy :http://content.undp.org/go/topics/capacity/
BDP/CDG
UNICEF
The “Fragile States” section of the Basic Education
websitehttp://www.unicef.org/education/index_42707.html
and
Gender
UN Women
The
main
UN
Women
website’s
section
on
Peace”http://www.unifem.org/gender_issues/women_war_peace/
UNDESA
The UN Public Administration Network (UNPAN) managed by the Division for Public
Administration and Development Management : http://www.unpan.org/
UNCDF
The UN Capital Development Fund website’s section on local government :
http://www.uncdf.org/english/local_development/
“Women,
Equality
War
and
63
Annex xx
Note on governance data
There are very few data sets with which cross-country and temporal comparisons can be made on the
performance of core public administration functions for the case studies, and those that exist have numerous
methodological problems. Below are two complied by the World Bank: firstly a sub-set of the World Governance
Indicators, and secondly a sub-set of the CPIA scores.
WGI: Government Effectiveness Indicators
According to the WGI, ‘Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.’
Percentile Rank (1-100)
WGI: Government Effectiveness Indicators
All Country Comparisons
60
50
AFGHANISTAN
BURUNDI
40
GUINEA-BISSAU
30
KOSOVO
LIBERIA
20
RWANDA
10
SIERRA LEONE
TIMOR-LESTE
0
1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Subsaharan Africa
Year
64
IRAI Public Sector Management and Institutions
The IRAI public sector score is made up of sub-scores for: Property Rights & Rule-based Government, Quality of
Budget & Financial Management, Efficiency of Revenue Mobilisation, Quality of Public Admin, Transparency,
Accountability & Corruption in Public Sector
4.0
3.8
Afghanistan
3.6
Burundi
3.4
Guinea Bissau
Kosovo
3.2
Liberia
Sierra Leone
3.0
Timor Leste
2.8
Ghana
Rwanda
2.6
2.4
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
65
Annex xx
Illustrative sequencing table
The table below illustrates what this would mean for when it might be appropriate to initiate different types of
support for the different areas the team examined. Note the timing depends on an analysis of political context,
not the amount of time passed since a conflict notionally ended, the progression from column 1 to 3 has been
quick in some contexts, and others have remained in column 1 for many years.
Conflict or immediate
aftermath of conflict
Public Finance
Mgt/ACC
o Safeguarding revenue
o
o
Aid Coordination
o
o
o
Civil Service
Reform
o
o
o
o
o
Local government
o UNCDF/LDP pilots (as in
o
o
Support for the
Centre of
Government
pathway (ref: GEMAP,
Liberia; HIPC Burundi?)
(Re)-establishment of cash
mgt systems/ single
treasury account (ref:
Burundi)
Internal performance and
systems audits (TL)
Participatory prioritisation
Dual accountability Priority
Programs (ref: TL, Sth
Sudan)
Development of a few
quick to initiate programs
Recruitment of Mgrs (ref:
Liberia CEBS, Tokten, SES)
Internal Oversight Board
(Kosovo)
Salary supplements(?)
Civil Service Census
Payroll mgt
o
o
TL)
CDD (a la NSP)
Support for NGO service
delivery (grants etc.)
Radio and public
broadcasts
Use of public noticeboards,
inter-agency information
sharing
Stabilising political
settlement
Deepening political
settlement
o Support for an auditor
o Support to the
o Performance based
parliamentary budget
committee
o CSO budget
monitoring networks
o Pro poor budgeting (?)
o Gender-based budget
o Development of an
o Sector Wide Approach
o Sector budget support
o National Development
(?)
budget
MTEF
o Anti-corruption
commission
Plan
o Direct Budget Support
(SL)
o Creation of specialized
professionals with
tailored reward and
incentive structures
o Right-sizing
o HRMIS
o Merit-based
o
o
o Testing fiscal transfer
mechanisms
o UN support for a
public information
campaign
o Development of webbased information
systems
o
o
o
recruitment and
promotion scheme
Performance mgt (i.e.
performance
contracts etc>0
Salary and wage
reforms
Functional reviews
E-governance
Fiscal and political
decentralisation
o Formulation of a
communication
strategy
66
Annex xx
CPAF in UN mission mandates
The widest-ranging tasks have been assigned to missions in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, where the first task was to
actually establish an administration which was run by the Mission until authority could be gradually transferred to
national institutions once they were in place.
In Kosovo, the mission was mandated to perform basic civilian administrative functions, then to organize and
oversee the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government and to
transfer its administrative responsibilities to those provisional institutions and eventually to oversee the transfer
of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement (see op
11 of resolution 1244 (1999)). The mission in Timor-Leste was tasked with establishing an effective administration
and assist in the development of civil and social services, but then relatively quickly its mandate focused on
support and assistance for administrative structures and on capacity building for self-government, so that,
compared to Kosovo, the mandate shifted quite quickly from oversight to assistance. Only in Timor-Leste did the
Security Council mandate tasks relating to “public administration”, including through establishing an explicit
public administration component for UNTAET (see op 3 (a) of resolution 1272 (1999)).
All other field missions play a supportive role in administrative development (capacity-building of State
institutions to address causes of conflict, generally calls to “increase efforts to promote good governance”),
usually combined with or after assisting with the extension of state authority (see Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burundi).
In one case (DRC), extension of state authority was a mandated task but then only at a later stage (see op 21 (c) of
resolution 1906 (2009)). In Guinea-Bissau, the focus was on capacity-building of national institutions to maintain
constitutional order. In Haiti, UNSMIH was the first mission with a mandate related to institution-building,
supporting the Secretary General’s role in the “coordination of activities by the United Nations system to promote
institution-building”. MINUSTAH was mandated to assist the Transitional Government in extending State
authority, then to assist the government of Haiti in strengthening state institutions.
References specifically to support governance on the local level can be found mostly for UNAMA and for
MINUSTAH, which is mandated to support the strengthening of State institutions “especially outside Port-auPrince”, “at all levels” or to undertake capacity building “at the national and local level”.
Mandates relating to the support of local conflict resolution are assigned to UNIPSIL (see resolution 1829 (2008),
op 3 (a): “Providing political support to national and local efforts for identifying and resolving tensions and threats
of potential conflict; whatever the source”) and to UNOGBIS, which in 2004 was mandated “to assist in
strengthening the national mechanisms for conflict prevention during the remainder of the transitional period and
beyond”.
67
Annex xx
Resources
Outside the UN, the most comprehensive sources of know-how in this field are the following:
143
144
145

The OECD/DAC Development Cooperation Directorate’s website section on “Conflict and Fragility” 143
and two separate, but affiliated sections on (a) the “International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and
Statebuilding” 144 , and (b) the “International Network on Conflict and Fragility” (INCAF) 145 , both of
which are also hosted by OEDC on behalf of a wider group of dialogue/network participants, i.e. the G7+
group of fragile and conflict-affected countries, development partners, and international organizations.

The World Bank’s website segment on “Fragility and Conflict” managed by the Fragile and ConflictAffected Countries Group (OPCFC) within the World Bank headquarters. 146

The recently created website of the “g7+” Group of 19 Conflict-affected and Fragile States with the
headline title “Goodbye Conflict, Welcome Development”. 147
http://www.oecd.org/document/57/0,3746,en_2649_33693550_46582713_1_1_1_1,00.html
http://www.oecd.org/site/0,3407,en_21571361_43407692_1_1_1_1_1,00.html
http://www.oecd.org/document/57/0,3746,en_2649_33693550_42113657_1_1_1_1,00.html
146
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/STRATEGIES/EXTLICUS/0,,menuPK:511784~pagePK:64171540~piP
K:64171528~theSitePK:511778,00.html
147 http://www.g7plus.org/
68
Annex xx
Suggestions for training by UN staff type and function
Priority attention should be given to skill upgrading and learning for the following UN agencies/staff categories:
Agency/Staff Category
Context
SRSGs/DSRSGs
Annual/semi-annual “summits” at Montreux for in-depth confidential discussions
(organized by DOCO in consultation with DPKO/DPA)
DPA/Mediation
Unit (MSU)
Support
PA exposure for Mediation Support Standby Team, MSU staff and roster
members (positive case study : Arusha Peace Accord in Burundi)
DPA/Security
Council
Affairs Division (SCAD)
PA in UNSC mandates, with focus on staff in (a) the Security Council Secretariat
Branch, and (b) the Practices and Charter Research Branch
DPKO/DPA
Focus on political economy analysis in a PA perspective, to be aimed at Political
Affairs Officers as well as Mission staff in JMAC and JOC functions
DPKO – Civil Affairs
PA exposure for Civil Affairs Officers – with special focus on their role in
“restoration and extension of state authority” and on QIP support for national
ownership/national capacity purposes
Various
Peacekeeping
Training Centres
PA module for prospective staff in JMAC/JOC and Civil Affairs Units – organized
through the “International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres”
(IAPTC) with outreach to 90 “likeminded” institutions worldwide
PBC/PBF/PBSO
Focus on the role of PA in peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict,
especially related to “essential administrative services”, with the aim of
encouraging “demand” from the field and advertising “supply” and Identifying
catalytic PA functions with a view to providing support.
UN-DOCO
PA module to be included in : (a) Annual Induction Training for first-time UN
Resident Coordinators (organized by UNDP’s Learning Resource Centre), (b)
training workshops for UN Coordination Officers assigned to RC Units; and (c)
training for UN Strategic Planners assigned to UN Missions and UNCT member
agencies (model : Nov 2008 workshop at HQ with DPKO, DPA, PBSO, UNDP,
OCHA and others)
UN-DOCO’s Crisis
Post-Conflict Cluster
OCHA
and
PA module to be added to existing policy guidance and toolkits on the PostConflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) jointly sponsored by UNDP, WB, European
Commission and others
PA module for inclusion in pre-deployment briefings for Humanitarian
Coordinators-designate and as an Addendum to the “Humanitarian Coordinator
69
Handbook”
UNDP/BCPR
PA module for inclusion in periodic training course for UNDP Early Recovery
Advisers (ERA) and Early Recovery Cluster Coordinators (ERCC)
UNDP/BCPR
PA exposure for individuals selected for postings as UNDP Peace and
Development Adviser (30+ positions in post-conflict countries)
UNDP
PA exposure for UN programme staff involved in post-conflict project
identification and project formulation, particularly those in the fields of
governance and capacity building (to be organized possibly by the UNDP
Learning Resources Centre, e.g. through workshops, on-line courses)
UNDESA / UNPAN
Staff within UNDESA’s Division for Public Administration and Development
Management responsible for “Reconstructing Public Administration after
Conflict” (World Public Sector Report 2010); and inclusion of a training module on
post-conflict PA in the UNPAN Online Training Centre
Considering the wide variety of post-conflict PA issues which the proposed learning process needs to address,
such responsibility must be shared among a number of the UN training institutions that are suitable and available,
based on a pre-agreed division of labour. Such an approach will encourage a stronger professional engagement in
post-conflict PA across the UN system and make it possible to develop a higher degree of specialization within
each participating institution.
70
Annex xx
List of CPAF projects in the case study countries
Core
Public
Administration
Function
Project / UN Mission intervention
Year
Lead Institution
Support Project for the Civil Service Commission
2002
UNDP
Support to Civil Service Commission - Training
and Development
2004
UNDP
Women's Advancement and Equal Opportunities
in the Afghan Civil Service launched
2004
UNDP
Civil Service Leadership Development project
2005
UNDP
Capacity for the Afghan Public Service project
2007
UNDP
National Institution Building project
2010
UNDP
Making Budgets work project
2004
UNDP
Accountability and Transparency project
2007
UNDP
Afghan Aid Coordinaiton Authority and Donor
Assistance Databse (DAD) launced
2002
UNDP
Making aid and budgets work project
2007
UNDP
2002
UNAMA/UNICEF/UNDP
2006
UNAMA/UNICEF/UNDP
2009
UNAMA/UNICEF/UNDP
2010
UNDP
Support to the Centre of Government project
launched
2006
UNDP
Strengthening Statebuilding through Strategic
2008
UNDP
Afghanistan
Civil
Service
Reform
Public Financial
Management
Aid
Coordination
Local
Government
National Area-Based Development
(NABDP) Phase I launched
Project
National Area-Based Development
(NABDP) Phase II launched
Project
National Area-Based Development
(NABDP) Phase III launched
Project
Afghanistan
Sub-national
Programme Phase II launched
Central
Government
Governance
71
Core
Public
Administration
Function
Project / UN Mission intervention
Year
Lead Institution
2010
UNDP
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for
Burundi: Article 10 sets the basic institutional
framework for the public administration
2000
N/A
Joint Programme for the Consolidation of Peace
and Governance for Burundi
2007
BINUB/UNICEF/UNDP
Support for national capacity for the consolidation
of peace and democratic governance
2010
UNDP
Revitalization
of
d'Administration
2010
BINUB/UNDP
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for
Burundi: Article 10 sets the basic institutional
framework for the public administration
2000
N/A
Programme of support for good economic
governance
2002
UNDP
Programme to support reinforcement of anticorruption mechanisms (Appui au reinforcement
ds mecanismes de Lucha contre la corrupcion et
les diverses a travers malversaciones tout le pays)
2007
Peacebuilding Fund
Establishment of the National Committee on Aid
Coordination (CNCA)
2005
UNDP
Support to the Permanent Secretary of the
National Committee for Aid Coordination (SPCNCA)
2009
UNDP
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for
Burundi: Article 10 sets the basic institutional
framework for the public administration
2000
N/A
Government Communication project
National State Governance Project (NSGP)
launched
Burundi
Civil
Service
Reform
Public Financial
Management
Aid
Coordination
Local
Government
the
Ecole
Nationale
72
Core
Public
Administration
Function
Project / UN Mission intervention
Year
Lead Institution
Programme to support local communities (Cadre
d'Appui aux Communautes)
2002
UNDP
Project to support local planning and capacity of
communities
2004
UNDP
Programme of support to the Reconstruction and
Community Development in the Province of
Rutana
2006
UNDP/UNCDF
Support to improving provision of local public
services
2008
Peacebuilding Fund
2009
Peacebuilding Fund
Guinea-Bissau
Civil
Service
Reform
The programme of reform and strengthening of
capacity of civil servants
Public Financial
Management
Administrative Reform and Capacity Building
Project
2008
UNDP
Local
Government
Projet d’Appui au Développement Régional et
Local dans la région de Gabù (PADRL)
2006
UNCDF
e-governance programme (for improved public
service delivery, human resource management
and public finance
2009
UNDP
Security Sector Reform Programme
2008/2009
UNIOGBIS / UNCT / PBF
joint-programme
Establishment of Senior Public Appointments
Committee
1999 - 2001
UNMIK
General principles of Civil Service
1999 - 2001
UNMIK
Regulations of Kosovo Civil Service
1999 - 2001
UNMIK
Senior Civil Service Training Project
2002
UNDP
Public Administration in Kosovo: Situational
2002
UN DESA
Central
Government
Kosovo
Civil
Service
Reform
73
Core
Public
Administration
Function
Project / UN Mission intervention
Year
Lead Institution
2003
UNDP
Capacity Building Facility for Kosovo
2003
UNDP
Capacity Building for European integration
2006
UNDP
Public Administration Reform Strategy (PARS)
2007 - 2012
2007
UNDP
Kosovo Capacity Development Strategy
2007
UNDP
1999 - 2001
UNMIK
Establishment of the Office of the Auditor General
2002
UNMIK
Promulgation of law on Public
Management and Accountability
2003
UNMIK
Promulgation of law on Public Procurement
2004
UNMIK
Donor Coordination Unit established
2005
UNDP
Kosovo Transparency Initiative
2006
UNDP
Anti-Corruption Strategy (2009 - 2011)
2009
UNDP
Aid
Coordination
Support to Aid Effectiveness and Coordination
2008
UNDP
Local
Government
Municipal Administrative Board established
1999 - 2001
UNMIK
Local Governance Programme
2002
UNDP
2004
UNMIK
Support to Decentralization in Kosovo
2005
UNDP
Local Governance Information Network (LOGIN)
2006
UNDP
Analysis and Strategy
Public Administration
Development
Public Financial
Management
and
Responsibilities of Finance
Development outlined
Civil
and
Establishment of the Ministry
Government Administration
Services
Economic
Financial
of
Local
74
Core
Public
Administration
Function
Project / UN Mission intervention
Year
Lead Institution
Central
Government
Establishment of Kosovo Statistical Office
1999 - 2001
UNMIK
UNMIK Radio starts operating
2000
UNMIK
UNMIL Logistics support to deliver wages to civil
servants
2004
UNMIL
Civil Service Census
2005
UNDP
2006
UNDP
SES (Senior Executive Service)
2007
UNDP
Support to Governance Commission
2007
UNDP
Support to LIPA (Liberian Public Administration
Inst.)
2008
UNDP
Support to National Capacity Development
2009
UNDP
GEMAP (Governance and Economic Management
Assistance Programme)
2005
Multi-donor
(USAID
primarily) / UNDP
PFM Institute in Ministry of Finance
2007
World Bank / UNDP
National Integrity Framework for Liberia
2007
UNDP
LEITI
2008
UNDP
Support to Anti-Corruption Commission
2009
UNDP
IFMIS (Integrated Financial Management System)
2011
World Bank
Capacity Building for aid coordination
2005
UNDP
Support to LRDC (Liberia Reconstruction and
Development Comm.)
2006
UNDP
Decentralization Reform Project
2006
UNDP
Liberia
Civil
Service
Reform
TOKTEN (Transfer of
Expatriate Nationals)
Public Financial
Management
Aid
Coordination
Local
Knowledge
through
75
Core
Public
Administration
Function
Project / UN Mission intervention
Year
Lead Institution
Community-based Recovery Projects
2006
UNDP / UNCDF
CST (County Support Teams)
2006
UNMIL / UNDP
LDLD
2007
UNDP / UNCDF
CST (County Support Teams) - Phase II
2009
UNMIL / UNDP
Support to LISGIS (Liberia Inst. For Statistics and
Geo-Information Services)
2005
UNDP
LECBS (Liberia Emergency Capacity Building
Support)
2006
OSIWA / UNDP
PRS "Lift Liberia"
2008
UNDP / UNMIL
National Visioning Process
2010
UNDP
Commission on the Restructuring of the Civil
Service
2003
UNDP
Delivering Results and Accelerating Public Sector
Reform with Diaspora Resources and Experts
from the South Project
2007
UNDP
Public Sector Reform and Capacity Development
Project
2009
UNDP
Establishment of Anti-Corruption Commission
2000
UNAMSIL
Direct Budget Support for Sierra Leone
2001
DfID
Public Procurement Act
2004
UNIPSIL
Strengthening the MTEF Technical Committee for
the Enhancement of Transparency, Accountability
and Participation Project
2007
UNDP
Support to Capacity Building and Programmes of
2008
Peacebuilding Fund
Government
Central
Government
Sierra Leone
Civil
Service
Reform
Public Financial
Management
76
Core
Public
Administration
Function
Project / UN Mission intervention
Year
Lead Institution
Support to Development Partners Committee and
Development Assistance Coordination Office
(DACO)
2004
UNDP
Support to developing a National Aid Policy
2009
UNDP
Local Government Act
2004
UNAMSIL
Support to District Recovery Committees (DRCs)
and Chiefdom Recovery Committees (CRCs)
through the Transition Initiatives Fund (TIF)
Project
2004
Joint Programme - UNCT
Local
Governance
Programme
2010
UNDP / UNCDF
Support to Strategy and Policy Unit (SPU) in the
Office of the President
2008 / 2010
(Phase II)
UNDP
Support to the Development of an Independent
National Public Broadcasting Service
2009 / 2010
(Phase II)
Peacebuilding Fund
Establishment of the Public Service Commission
2000
UNTAET
Policy paper
management
2001
UNDP
Concept paper for civil service management
structure, seeking to ensure ownership by the
East Timorese Government
2002
UNTAET and UNDP
Support to Development
Government of East Timor
2002
UNDP
2002
UNDP
the National Anti-Corruption Strategy Secretariat
Aid
Coordination
Local
Government
Central
Government
and
Decentralization
Timor Leste
Civil
Service
Reform
on
civil
service
Posts
personnel
for
the
Comprehensive 10 year programme for
govenance and public sector development
prepared by the Planning Commission
77
Core
Public
Administration
Function
Project / UN Mission intervention
Year
Lead Institution
Support to the Development Posts – Phase II: The
Critical Posts
2003
UNDP
Priority areas identified where international
assistance are critical:
legal drafting, to
strengthen the legislative framework of the public
administration
2005
UNMISET
Support to the Civil Service in Timor-Leste
2006
UNDP
Support to Civil Service Reform
2007
UNDP
Regulation on the establishment of a Central
Payments Office of East Timor; public
procurement for Civil Administration; provisional
tax and customs regime; taxation system; budget
and financial management;
2000
UNTAET
Alkatiri Initiative, a review by a panel of experts,
conducted
2006
UNOTIL, UNDP, World
Bank
Office of the Inspector-General (OIG) and the Civil
Service Commission
2009
Public Service Commission re-established, and
planning for an Office of the Auditor General
2009
UNMIT
Anti-Corruption Commission established
2010
UNMIT
Aid
Coordination
National Directorate
established
2009
Local
Government
Establishment of village and sub-district
development councils for the disbursement of
funds for development activities
2000
UNTAET
Local Governance Support Programme (LGSP)
2003
UNDP / UNCDF
Support to Community Development and Local
Development Fund
2003
UNDP
Local Government Options Study, Government of
East Timor
2003
UNDP / UNCDF
Public Financial
Management
of
Aid
Effectiveness
UNTAET
78
Core
Public
Administration
Function
Central
Government
Capacity
Development
Project / UN Mission intervention
Year
Lead Institution
Local Governance Support Programme
2007
UNDP / UNCDF
Assistance for the Government on the legislative
framework for decentralization
2009
UNDP / UNCDF
Establishment of the Cabinet of the Transitional
Administration in East Timor
2000
UNTAET
Support to the National
Development Agency
2001
UNDP
Support to Co-ordination, Monitoring and
Planning Assistance for Timor-Leste National
Development Plan Implementation (COMPASS)
2003
UNDP
Support to Coordination, Monitoring and
Planning Assistance for Timor-Leste National
Development Plan Implementation (COMPASS II)
2005
UNDP
Project to support the Presidency with the
organisation of national conferences with civil
society and the political parties on the political,
economic and social development of the nation,
engage with the Timorese youth
2006
UNDP
Provision of advice to the Government on key
governance issues such as the balance of powers
between the organs of sovereignty, the need for
an
effective
parliamentary
opposition,
decentralization and local governance and the
electoral process
2007
UNMIT
Support to Coordination, Monitoring and
Planning Assistance for Timor-Leste National
Development Plan Implementation (COMPASS)
Phase III
2008
UNDP
Support to Development Advisory Services
2000
UNDP
GPSM Program Document proposed establishing
the Capacity Development and Coordination Unit
2001
UNDP
Planning
and
79
Core
Public
Administration
Function
Project / UN Mission intervention
Year
Lead Institution
National Planning and Development Agency
(NPDA) with the preparation of a 10-year
programme called the Capacity Development for
Governance and Public Sector Management
(GPSM).
2002
UNDP
Support to Institutional Capacity Building of the
Office of the Inspector General of East Timor, and
subsequently, the Government Information
Office, the Office of the advisor for Human Rights,
the Cabinet Office, the Office of the Advisor for
gender equality and the Capacity Development
Coordination Unit
2002
UNDP
Support to Capacity Development for HRM in the
Civil Service
2002
UNDP
Support to Development Advisory Services II
2003
UNDP
Institutional
Project
2004
UNDP
2008
UNDP
(CDCU)
Capacity
Development
Support
Support to Strengthening the Institutional
Capacity of the Office of the President
80
Annex xx
conflict
Key organisations that have developed work on CPAF post-
The international community’s rapidly growing interest in and focus on the essential role which capable CPAFrelevant state institutions play in the immediate aftermath of conflict has largely been driven by a small number
of multilateral institutions, supported both intellectually and financially by a small number of especially interested
bilateral donors. The initial upsurge of interest occurred in the period 2005-2008, spearheaded mostly by (a)
OECD/DAC, (b) the European Commission, (c) the World Bank, and (d) the United Nations. More recently, these
four have been joined by (d) the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and (e) the G7+ group of fragile and conflictaffected countries.
Looking ahead to the next couple of years, there is every reason to believe that these same institutions will be at
the forefront of the international community’s continuing efforts to generate additional empirical knowledge and
to articulate new policy guidance in this area. Hence, it is essential that the United Nations stay fully engaged with
all of them to ensure that the UN System remain able to contribute to as well as benefit from the dynamic ongoing learning process in this field. What this implies vis-à-vis each of the other five institutions is spelled out in
the following sections.
The G7+ Group of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries
The G7+ group of countries constitutes an indispensable ally in the UN System’s efforts to highlight the
importance of CPAF in the immediate aftermath of conflict. These countries – 19 altogether and among them six
of the seven case study countries of this review 148 -- speak with unique authority about the complexity and high
cost of fragility, and their “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States” (published at the Bhusan High-level Forum
in November 2011) represents the international community’s most articulate and most widely supported strategy
to-date to address on a broad front some of the key aspects of statebuilding (including effective CPAF) in the
immediate aftermath of conflict. The main CPAF-relevant features of that strategy are the following :
Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals : Among the New Deal’s five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
Goals (PSGs), two are directly relevant to this review : (a) Legitimate Politics, intended to “foster
inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution” (PSG-1), and (b) Revenue & Services, meant to
“manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery” (PSG-5) 149 .
PSG Monitoring Tools : The G7+ group is presently working with its international partners (including
UNDP) to design a dual set of PSG benchmarks : (a) a menu of national-level indicators from which each
country can select those that are most conducive to a context-relevant assessment of its own PSG
progress, and (b) a set of global indicators for each PSG goal that will make it possible to arrive at an
international comparison of each country’s PSG progress.
148 Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea,
Haiti, Liberia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo (the case study countries
in this review are underlined for easy identification).
149 The three other Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals are : (c) Security (establish and strengthen people’s security), (d) Justice (address
injustices and increase people’s access to justice), and (e) Economic Foundations (general employment and improve livelihoods).
81
Customized Planning Tools : As a corollary to the policy objectives embodied in the PSGs, the New Deal
also represents a commitment by the G7+ countries to design (with international partner support) several
planning tools that are customized to the particular needs of fragile and conflict-affected countries :
periodic Fragility Assessments will examine “the causes and features of fragility and sources of
resilience”, drawing upon a “fragility spectrum” which will comprise five distinct stages of
fragility and an accompanying diagnostic tool which enables each country to assess its own
fragility status in each PSG area;
based on the findings of the Fragility Assessment and consultation with civil society, each G7+
country will draw up a “one vision, one plan”, i.e. “one national vision and one plan to transition
out of fragility”; and
a formal “compact” will guide the implementation of the “one vision, one plan” approach, based
on consultations with multiple national stakeholders and the international donor community –
and it will be subjected periodically to a national/domestic review exercise as well as to an
international peer review process.
Hence, the New Deal Declaration reflects in a variety of ways some of the key experiences that have been gained
by the international community during the past five years, including many of the lessons learned captured by this
review. The New Deal views post-conflict fragility through the dual prism of peace-building and statebuilding, it is
clearly concerned with the earliest possible restoration of state capacity, and it is emphatic about the need for
country-owned and country-led diagnostic and prioritization processes, leading to one vision and one plan –
rather than to a multiplicity of over- elaborate planning instrument imported from elsewhere (ref. section 5.2
above entitled “Resist the urge to make big plans”).
Against that background, it is recommended (a) that the UN as a whole continues to engage collectively and
globally with the G7+ group and align its future policies and ‘how to’ guidance notes on support to CPAF closely
with the agenda of the New Deal; and (b) that in addition the UN Resident Coordinators and the UN Country
Teams on the ground in each of the 19 G7+ member countries be given special responsibility for supporting PSG
implementation in general while paying special attention to progress on PSG-5 (“Revenue & Services”).
The World Bank
The UN System and the World Bank have a long history of field-level cooperation in conflict-affected countries with the Bank and UN jointly typically supporting coordination of external assistance plus the formulation and
implementation of the initial post-conflict national development strategy (e.g. PRSP, UNDAF). For many years,
this cooperation relied extensively on informal arrangements, but in the course of the last decade, the relationship
has become increasingly structured and recurrent, especially around the following three objectives : (a) postconflict needs assessments; (b) thematic research and policy coordination; and (c) HQ-level institutional dialogue
and interoperability measures.
82
Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs) : The first formal joint exercise of this kind was the Iraq Post-Conflict
Needs Assessment in July-September 2003, involving both the UN, the World Bank and the IMF. After that, the
PCNA initiative evolved to become an increasingly codified methodology, endorsed and supported by a broad
multi-agency coalition comprising the World Bank, the UN (represented by the UN Development Group), the
European Commission, the AfDB and the AsDB. PCNA exercises have so far been carried out, in different
permutations, in close to one dozen other post-conflict situations, usually within the first 4-6 months after the
conflict was brought to an end.
Initially, CPAF-related issues were addressed in PCNAs within the larger context of governance and capacity
building, but over the years issues related to post-conflict statebuilding and restoration of core functions have
been given increasing attention among the diverse sectors covered by a normal PCNA exercise. However, while
there is a clear awareness among the PCNA partner institutions about the key importance of quickly restoring the
host country’s core public administration functions, the PCNA methodology does not yet incorporate detailed
guidance on CPAF (as already pointed out in section 6.6/paras. 134-136 above), nor does it explicitly accord to
CPAF the important ‘precursor’ status which they merit : without restored core PA functions, none of the other
pressing needs identified in a PCNA exercise can be effectively addressed.
In that light, the review recommends that the World Bank and UNDP jointly develop a distinct module within the
PCNA with direct focus on the special CPAF needs typically arising in the immediate aftermath of conflict. Such a
module would be most useful, if broken down into two components :
A fast-track CPAF assessment carried out during the first few weeks of the post-conflict period, and
A distinct CPAF assessment as an integral part of a larger multi-sectoral PCNA assessment.
This two-tier approach is suggested for two reasons in particular : (a) some post-conflict situations do not lend
themselves easily to the standard PCNA approach, but nonetheless have pressing CPAF-related dimension (e.g.
Libya in late 2011 after the fall of the Gaddafi regime), and (b) a full-fledged PCNA process, whenever warranted
and requested, often takes many weeks to prepare and several months to complete, and it is especially
problematic to have delays of that magnitude in the diagnosis and start-up of CPAF restoration efforts (for more
on the fast-track proposal, see below in the section on funding).
Thematic research and policy coordination : Close UN/WB cooperation on CPAF-related research and policy
development dates back to a joint workshop on “Rebuilding Post-Conflict Societies” held in New York in
September 2005 150 and the WB/UNDP “Joint Programme on Statebuilding” initiated in 2006 151 . Partially
funded by Norway, this Joint Programme has fostered research and reflection on a variety of important issues,
incl. a study on “Peace Processes and Statebuilding” (March 2007) 152 , detailed case studies on statebuilding
processes in Sierra Leone and Liberia (2008-2009), and deliberations on capacity development in pursuit of statebuilding objectives.
150 ‘Rebuilding Post-Conflict Societies: Lesson from a Decade of Global Experience’, Report on a World Bank/UNDP Workshop, 19-21st
September 2005.
151
“Peace Processes and Statebuilding: Economic and Institutional Provisions of Peace Agreements”, prepared by the Chr. Michelsen
Institute, Norway, March 2007.
152
Details on the World Bank/UNDP State Building Initiative (managed within UNDP by BCPR) are available here :
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/STRATEGIES/EXTLICUS/0,,contentMDK:22542897~menuPK:6993472~pagePK:641
71531~piPK:64171507~theSitePK:511778,00.html
83
Similar thematic cooperation also took place during the preparation of the World Development Report 2011 on
“Conflict, Security and Development” – with the UN actively involved in the reflection that preceded publication
and in the dialogue on its operationalization which is now taking place. There is also close UN/WB cooperation (as
well as OECD participation) in support of the G7+ countries’ on-going efforts to develop detailed PSG indicators
and diagnostic tools for their fragility assessments. Moreover, staff from DPKO and UNDP are currently working
with World Bank colleagues to build a toolkit for Public Sector Expenditure Reviews that are specifically focused
on the security sector – with Liberia as the first pilot country. Of equal relevance to the review is the World Bank’s
current efforts to develop a new global strategy on public administration reform focuses (as mentioned in
footnote 38 in section 2.2 above), an important part of which is focused on the special approaches needed to
design appropriate post-conflict PAR approaches.
HQ-level institutional dialogue and interoperability : The complex challenges involved in providing effective postconflict assistance to fragile states have inspired several initiatives that aim at (a) strengthening further the formal
institutional interface between the UN System and the World Bank, and (b) enhancing the practical
interoperability between them in field-level interventions. Senior HQ managers in both institutions are in close
contact through bi-annual meetings and through regular World Bank participation in conflict-relevant UN fora,
such as the Peacebulding Commission, the Senior Peacebuilding Group, and the Peacebuilding Contact Group.
Interoperability in post-conflict situations – for long a major challenge due to incompatible legal frameworks and
disconnected operational mechanisms -- has also made significant progress as a result of the approval and
signature in October 2008 of three key instruments, i.e. (a) the “United Nations-World Bank Partnership
Framework for Crisis and Post-Crisis Situations” signed by the UN Secretary-General and the World Bank President,
(b) the UNDG/World Bank “Post-Crisis Operational Annex” signed by the UNDG chair and the World Bank
Managing Director, and (c) the “Fiduciary Principles Accord” between the UN-DOCO and World Bank,
subsequently also endorsed and signed by virtually all the UNDG member agencies with operational post-conflict
roles.
The momentum for closer UN/WB post-conflict cooperation and dialogue has also been enhanced by the approval
in 2010 of a ‘UN-WB Fragility and Conflict Partnership Trust Fund’ financed by a US$ 3.0 mill. grant from the Swiss
Government. The Trust Fund aims to ‘support enhanced partnership activities between the United
Nations and World Bank with a view to achieving more effective international response in fragile
and conflict-affected environments’ and to advance ‘the various UN -WB partnership agreements in
fragile and post-conflict environments, through focused strategic interventions’. 153
The UN/WB Partnership Trust Fund supports a variety of measures aimed at facilitating closer interaction in
multiple fora. At the HQ level, a staff exchange programme supports the secondment of one senior World Bank
staff member to the DPKO/DFS team operationalizing the Civilian Capacity Review and the deployment of one
World Bank staff member within PBSO and one UNDP staff member within the World Bank’s fragile states unit
(OPCFC). There is also a grants programme for joint UN-WB projects (<$100K) with activities initially in four pilot
countries (Central African Republic, DR Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia) and more in the pipeline. Among other
tasks covered by the Trust Fund are (a) a comprehensive review and mapping of existing UN/WB partnerships in
fragile states, including those that are CPAF-relevant, (b) efforts to collect and expand the exchange of case
153
Details on this Swiss-funded Partnership Trust Fund are available at the following website address :
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/STRATEGIES/EXTLICUS/0,,contentMDK:22991180~pagePK:64171531~piPK:64171
507~theSitePK:511778,00.html
84
studies, operational guidance documents and field-focused information, and (c) shared training activities (e.g.
workshops).
Efforts are currently underway to extend and increase the resources of the Partnership Trust Fund so as to make it
possible to pursue further opportunities of UN/WB cooperation related to fragile and conflict-affected states. The
three main objectives of CPAF relevance that are to be pursued in the extension phase are as follows :
To build closer linkages on research, knowledge and learning, e.g. in the context of follow up to the WDR-2011 and related to the proposed new Hive knowledge platform to be launched by
OPCFC 154 .
To strengthening upstream, strategic cooperation in post-crisis settings.
To advance UN/WB interoperability and the use of existing agreements and tools, e.g. by facilitating
implementation by one entity of trust funds managed by the other, in post-crisis circumstances.
Overall, very significant progress has taken place during the past 6-8 years in UN/WB collaboration on support for
statebuilding and restoration of CPAF in post-conflict contexts, involving both Secretariat-based institutions such
as DPKO and PBSO and UN Funds and Programmes, particularly UNDP. Going forward, the review recommends
that the momentum for expanded collaboration be maintained and point to the ‘UN-WB Fragility and Conflict
Partnership Trust Fund’ as a suitable instrument for continued pursuit of increased interoperability and
collaboration on a CPAF-agenda inspired by WDP-2011 and the Civilian Capacity Review.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has a long history of extending emergency assistance to member
countries facing crises caused by factors unrelated to their economy. From the early 1960s to the mid-1990s, such
assistance was limited to instances of natural disasters – with funding from an Emergency Natural Disaster
Assistance (ENDA) scheme.
In 1995, a parallel Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) facility was created for the benefit of countries in
post-conflict situations – with war-torn Bosnia & Herzegovina as the first beneficiary country. In the period 19952009, a total of 27 EPCA loans were approved for 15 different post-conflict countries. Funding from EPCA was
limited to “circumstances where a member with an urgent balance of payments need is unable to develop and
implement a comprehensive economic programme because its capacity has been damaged by a conflict, but where
sufficient capacity for planning and policy implementation nevertheless exists” 155 .
During this period, IMF’s support to conflict-affected countries focused on the design of the overall strategy for
rebuilding or establishing fiscal institutions. Assessment missions were fielded to evaluate existing fiscal
institutions and procedures and identify areas requiring technical assistance. Typically, donors joined in such
missions to facilitate agreement on a common strategy of fiscal management and on funding. Subsequently,
there were often specialized follow-up missions focused on specific areas of support. In many cases, IMF also
154 http://www1.worldbank.org/operations/hive/news/2012-01/indexNew.html
155
FACTSHEET : “IMF Emergency Assistance: Supporting Recovery from Natural Disasters and Armed Conflicts”, 15 September 2011 http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/conflict.pdf
85
posted long-term advisers in such countries in support of efforts to strengthen budget formulation, budget
execution, statistics, and macro-economic management 156 .
In early 2010, the IMF created - as part of a wider reform of its concessional lending operations -- a new Rapid
Credit Facility (RCF). It replaced IMF’s previous emergency assistance schemes and offered, within a newly
established Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT), a more flexible instrument for extending quickdisbursing concessional lending (without the need for programme-based conditionality) to low-income countries
(LICs) with urgent balance of payments needs. The RCF can be accessed by countries in a wide range of
circumstances, incl. in post-conflict situations and/or emergencies related to fragility, and it offers very favourable
concessional terms (e.g. zero interest, 5½ years grace period, repayment after 10 years) 157 .
Technical advice relating to macroeconomic policies and supporting structural measures go hand in hand with
RCF funding – with particular focus on assistance to restore the government’s capacity to formulate and
implement suitable macroeconomic policies, e.g. by “rebuilding statistical capacity and establishing and
reorganizing fiscal, monetary, and exchange institutions to help restore tax and government expenditure capacity,
payment, credit, and foreign exchange operations” 158 .
As part of this new orientation, IMF’s Strategy, Policy and Review Department produced in June 2011 an internal
staff paper on “Macro-economic and Operational Challenges in Countries in Fragile Situations” which arrived inter
alia at the following conclusions :
“Engagement with the Fund has on the whole been beneficial for fragile low-income countries (LICs) :
macroeconomic policy frameworks have been strengthened; economic outcomes have improved over time;
institutional and human capacity has gradually been built up; and fifteen LICs in fragile situations have
received debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and Multilateral Debt Relief (MDRI)
Initiatives.
Nevertheless, the implementation of Fund-supported programs in fragile LICs has been bumpy, possibly
reflecting too bold reform agendas or too optimistic assessments of implementation abilities. The mode of
engagement with LICs in fragile situations has overwhelmingly been through the Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility (PRGF)/Extended Credit Facility (ECF) and conditionality in programs with fragile states has
been relatively ambitious. Such programs have been affected by frequent interruptions” 159 .
IMF has traditionally worked with its member governments either on its own – or in tandem with the World Bank
– on a comparatively “narrow” fiscal agenda. Given IMF’s institutional mandate and its long tradition of staying
away from overtly political processes such as conflict prevention and peacebuilding, this “relative isolation” of IMF
made sense. But IMF’s new post-2010 approach to fragile states points to the need for a closer and more explicit
post-conflict alliance between the UN and the two Bretton Woods institutions. There are three obvious entry
points for such a trilateral alliance :
156
157
158
159
“Rebuilding Financial Institutions in Post-Conflict Countries”, IMF Occasional Paper #247, Washington 2005
FACTSHEET “IMF Rapid Credit Facility”, 15 September 2011, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/rcf.htm
Ibid.
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/061511a.pdf
86
Entry Points for closer UN System Cooperation with IMF in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict
Rapid
CPAF
Assessment
Needs Post-conflict PFM Funding
Annual
Article
Consultations
IV
IMF-specific needs assessment Quick-disbursing support from Review of the utilization of RCF
jointly with or parallel to rapid the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) – funding combined with fiscal
CPAF needs assessment by the
sustainability analysis
Technical assistance to Central
World Bank and the UN System
Bank and Ministry of Finance
First, the rapid CPAF needs assessment being proposed by this review would benefit greatly from being done
either jointly by these three institutions or, alternatively, in a coordinated/parallel manner that will ensure synergy
and an optimal response to the needs identified, particularly related to public financial management and aid
coordination. A synchronized approach at this early stage would be welcome for several reasons : (a) it will ensure
easier access to the highest levels of the host government and a broader priority debate at the “centre of
government” level; (b) it will reduce the transaction costs for the host government, and (c) it will bring conflict
prevention/peacebuilding considerations more prominently into the design and structure of the BWI assistance
package.
Second, the availability of quick-disbursing support from IMF’s Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) would serve to jumpstart the restoration effort in key processes related to revenue and budget management – and also bring technical
assistance needs in this sector to the early attention of all three parties, each of which will have valuable
contributions to make in areas of comparative advantage.
Third, it would be of major mutual benefit for the UN Mission in general and for the SRSG/DSRSG in particular to
remain in close contact with the IMF, especially prior to and during IMF’s periodic Article IV Consultations with the
host government. IMF will be able to draw on the UN Mission’s understanding and insights into the political and
institutional realities in the country, while the institutional context analysis of the UN Mission will be enriched by
the IMF’s fiscal sustainability analysis.
The OECD/DAC and Subsidiary Bodies
For the past 5-7 years, the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD/DAC) has been at the forefront of the international community’s efforts to understand
and document the very special development conditions prevailing in fragile and conflict-affected states. In 2007, it
spearheaded the ‘Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States” which advocated “focus on
state building as the central objective” (principle no. 3). Since 2008, OECD/DAC has produced a continuous flow of
path-breaking and in-depth publications as part of its “Conflict and Fragility” series 160 , many of which have been
quoted in the context of this review.
160
http://www.oecd.org/document/15/0,3746,en_2649_33693550_45793615_1_1_1_1,00.html
87
It follows that the OECD/DAC has been and will remain a key partner in the UN System’s continuing efforts to
provide effective and well-targeted support to post-conflict CPAF. In terms of institutional formality, OECD’s
Development Assistance Committee comprising 24 member states has granted observer status to the World
Bank, the IMF, and UNDP. This status ensures that both the UN and the BWI are right at the center of the
international community’s most serious and substantive discussions about development and development
cooperation policies.
However, from an explicit CPAF perspective, it is even more important for the UN System to maintain close
intellectual and operational links with three of the OECD/DAC’s subsidiary bodies : (a) the Working Party on Aid
Effectiveness (WP-EFF), (b) the Network on Governance (GOVNET); and (c) the International Network on Conflict
and Fragility (INCAF). Each of these three fora is a major source of CPAF-related intellectual leadership and
institutional insights, and it is therefore essential for the UN System to stay actively engaged with them, seizing
the opportunities they offer for the UN System to (a) contribute its experiences to the evolving debate, (b) learn
and benefit from the insights being acquired by others, and (c) interact with the bilateral donors represented
there and work jointly with them towards viable solutions, in terms of approach and substance as well as funding.
88
Bibliography
Adamolekun, Ladipo, 2005. ‘Reorienting Public Management in Africa: Selected Issues and Some Country
Experiences’, ADB, Economic Research Working Paper, No 81.
Afghan Analysts Network, 2011. ‘The International Community's Engagement in Afghanistan beyond 2014’, AAN
Discussion Paper 03/2011.
AREU, 2004. Guide to Government in Afghanistan, Kabul,
Blair, A. , 2010. ‘Not Just Aid: How Making Government Work Can Transform Africa’, The Centre for Global
Development
Booth, David ‘Aid, Institutions and Governance: What Have We Learned?’ Development Policy Review, 2011, 29
(s1): s5-s26 Blackwell Publishing, Oxford
Carothers, Thomas and de Gramont, Dianne, 2011. ‘Aiding Governance in Developing Countries Progress Amid
Uncertainties’, Carnegie,
Chang, Ha-Joon , 2002. Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective, London, Anthem
Press
CMI, 2007. ‘Peace Processes and State-building: Economic and Institutional Provisions of Peace Agreements’,
Stockholm
Curtis, Devon and de Zeeuw, Jeroen, 2010. ‘Rebel Movements and Political Party Development in Post-Conflict
Societies – A Short Literature Review’, Program on states and security, Ralph Bunche Institute for International
Studies
DFID, 2010. ‘The Politics of Poverty: Elites, Citizens and States A Synthesis Paper Findings from ten years of
DFID-funded research on Governance and Fragile States 2001–2010’ London
Di John, Jonathan and Putzel, James, 2009. ‘Political Settlements: Issues Paper’, Governance and Social
Development Resource Centre
Evans, A., 2008. ‘Civil Service and Administrative Reform: Thematic Paper’, Background Paper to Public Sector
Reform: What Works and Why? An IEG Evaluation of World Bank Support, Washington D.C, World Bank.
Evans, Peter, and James E. Rauch,1999. ‘Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of
"Weberian" State Structures on Economic Growth.’ American Sociological Review 64 (5):748-65.
Farazmand, Ali, 2005. ‘Comparative and Development Administration: Past Present and Future’, in Handbook of
Comparative and Development Administration
Fritz, Verena, Kaiser, Kai and Levy, Brian, 2009. ‘Problem-Driven Governance and Political Economy Analysis:
Good Practice Framework’, Washington, DC: World Bank, PREM Network.
89
Fukuyama, F, 2009. ‘International Institutional Transfer’ in The Princeton Encyclopaedia of the World Economy, Eds
Reinert, K, Ramkishen, R, Princeton, pp 672
Gilman, Stuart, 2003. ‘Contemporary Institutional Arrangements for Managing Political Appointments and the
Historical Processes of Depoliticization: The Experience of the United States at the Federal Level and in Some
states’, Prepared for the World Bank International Anticorruption Conference Seoul, South Korea
Grindle, Merilee, 2011. ‘Good Enough Governance Revisited’, Development Policy Review, 29 (s1): s199-s221
Blackwell Publishing, Oxford
Geddes, Barbara, 1994. Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Ghani, Ashraf and Lockhart, Clare, 2008. Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World, OUP,
Oxford
GSDRC , 2008. ‘Decentralisation and Assistance to Sub-national Governments in Fragile Environments’ Helpdesk
Research Report, 26.11.08
Haque, N. U, 2007. ‘Why Civil Service Reforms Do Not Work’, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, PIDE
Working Paper 2007:24, Islamabad
Henderson, J, David Hulme, Hossein Jalilian and Richard Phillips, 2003. ‘Bureaucratic effects: 'Weberian' state
structures and poverty reduction’ CPRC Working Paper Number 31
IDS, 2010. ‘An upside down view of governance’, Centre for the Future State, Sussex
Ingraham, Patricia W, and Amy Kneedler Donahue. 2000. ‘Dissecting the Black Box Revisited: Characterizing
Government Management Capacity.’ In Governance and Performance: New Perspectives, ed. C. J. Heinrich and L.
E. Lynn. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press
International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and state-building, 2011, ‘A New Deal for engagement in fragile states’
Kelsall, Tim and David Booth, with Diana Cammack and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, 2010. Developmental
patrimonialism? Questioning the orthodoxy on political governance and economic progress in Africa Power and
Politics, Working Paper, No. 9 July, ODI London
Lapuente and Nistotskaya, 2009, ‘To The Short-Sighted Victor Belong The Spoils: Politics and Merit Adoption in
Russia’ in Governance, Volume 22, Issue 3, pages 431–458
Levy, Brian and Sahr Kpundeh , Eds, 2004. Building State Capacity in Africa New Approaches, Emerging Lessons
WBI
Martin, Roscoe, 1952. ‘Political science and public administration: a note on the state of the Union’, The American
Political Science Review Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 660-676
Montanaro, Lucia, 2009. ‘The Kosovo Statebuilding Conundrum: Addressing Fragility in a Contested State’ FRIDE
and International Alert Working Paper
90
Muharremi, Robert, Lulzim Peci, Leon Malazogu Verena Knaus and Teuta Murati, 2003. ‘Administration and
governance in Kosovo: lessons learned and lessons to be learned’. KIPRID, Kosovo,
Moore, M. and S. Unsworth, 2010. ‘Societies, States and Citizens: A policymaker's guide to the research of the
Centre for the Future State’ IDS: Sussex
OECD, 2008. ‘State building in situations of fragility initial findings’ OCED: Paris
OCED, 2011. ‘From power struggles to sustainable peace: Understanding political settlements’ Conflict and
Fragility series, OCED: Paris
OECD 2011.’Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance’, DAC Guidelines and
Reference Series, OECD Publishing: Paris
ODI, 2011. ‘Getting better results from assistance to fragile states’, ODI Briefing Papers 70,
UN, 2009. ‘Guidance Note of the Secretary-General on Democracy’, New York
Parks, Thomas and William Cole, 2010. ‘Political Settlements: Implications for International Development Policy
and Practice’, Occasional Paper, No. 2, The Asia Foundation
Polidano, C, 2001. ‘Why Civil Service Reforms Fail’ IDPM Public Policy and Management Working Paper No 16,
University of Manchester
Schiavo-Campo, Salvatore and Pachampet Sundaram (2000), To serve and to preserve: improving public
administration in a competitive world, ADB, Manilla
Scott, Zoë, 2011. ‘Evaluation of public sector governance reforms 2001-2011 Literature Review’, OPM, Oxford
Shepherd, Geoffrey, 2003. ‘Civil Service Reform in Developing Countries: Why Is It Going Badly?’ Paper presented
at the 11th International Anti-Corruption Conference, Seoul, Korea, May 25-28
Tarp, Kristoffer and Frederik Rosé, 2012. ‘Coaching and mentoring for capacity development’, African Security
Review, 21:1, 15-30
UN, 1951. ‘Standards and Techniques of Public Administration with Special Reference to Technical Assistance for
Under-developed Countries’ Technical Assistance Administration, Special Committee on Public Administration
Problems, New York
UN, 1961. Handbook of Public Administration: Current Concepts and practices with Special References to Developing
Countries, New York
UN, 2011. ‘Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict: Independent report of the Senior Advisory Group’
(A/65/747-S/2011/85), New York
UNDESA,1995. ‘Rethinking public administration: an overview’, New York
UNDESA ,2008. Contribution of the United Nations to the Improvement of Public Administration: A 60-Year History
United Nations, New York
91
UNDESA , 2009. ‘Report of the expert group meeting Lessons Learned in Post-Conflict State Capacity:
Reconstructing Governance and Public Administration Capacities in Post Conflict Countries’ United Nations, New
York,
UNDESA 2010. ‘Reconstructing Public Administration after Conflict: Challenges, Practices and Lessons Learned’,
World Public Sector Report, New York
UNDP, 2006. A handbook on working with political parties, New York
UNDP, 2007. Workshop on Local Government in Post-Conflict Situations: Challenges for Improving Local Decision
Making and Service Delivery Capacities, UNDP Report, Oslo, Norway, 28-29 November 2007
UNDP, 2012. ‘Governance for Peace: Securing the social contract’, UNDP: New York.
Van de Walle, S and Z Scott, 2009. ‘The Role of Public Services in State-And Nation-Building: Exploring Lessons
from European History for Fragile States’, GSDRC Research Paper
Wilson, Woodrow, 1887. ‘The study of administration’
World Bank 2011. ‘World Bank Approach to Public Sector Management 2011-2020: Better results from public
sector institutions’, Extended Working Draft for Consultation, 6 April 2011
World Bank, 2011. ‘Conflict, Security, and Development’ World Development Report 2011, World Bank:
Washington DC
92