Population Policy: Whose
Population? What Policy?
Dr. SHAE Wan-chaw
APSS, HKPolyU
25 April 2009
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
What is Population Policy?
World Trends
Why Need a Pop Policy?
Critique of Pop Policy
Sense & Nonsense in Pop
Policy
VI. A People-based Pop Policy?
I.
•
1.
2.
3.
4.
What is Population Policy?
No accepted definition (UN 1973:632). It
can be:
Explicit (stated intention), implicit
(unstated aim) or unintended.
Direct (encouraging birth control) or
indirect (compulsory education).
Punitive/coercive or facilitative/voluntary.
Domestic or international (giving/not
giving aid to other countries).
• Narrow definition: ‘all deliberate govt actions
(such as laws, regulations, & administrative
programs) intended to influence pop growth,
size, distribution, & composition.’ (Lucas
2003:1)
• A broad definition may include unintended
influences: ‘governmental actions that are
designed to alter pop events or that actually
do alter them’ (Berelson 1971:173). But this is
debatable.
• May also include population-responsive
policies (the ways that govts respond to pop
changes).
• A pop policy normally includes:
1. Size: a numerical goal &/or growth rate.
2. Composition & distribution of various
demographic variables: age, sex, race,
education level, location etc.
3. Relationship of (1) & (2) to economic, social,
political & other collective goals.
4. Assessment & deployment of various
policies/means to the achievement of (1),
(2) & (3), eg: natural increase policy,
immigration policy, education policy,
employment policy etc.
II. World Trends
• In 1927 world pop = 2 billion. 1974 ↑ to 4 b; &
in 2000 it ↑ to 6 b (2009 at 6.8 b). The UN
projected that it will reach 9.1 b by 2050. The
projected ↑(2.3 b) will come from developing
countries, which pop is expected to↑ from 5.6
b in 2009 to 7.9 b in 2050.
• India – the 1st 3rd world country to endorse an
active pop policy in 1952.
• By 2001, 92% of all countries supported
family planning programs & contraceptives,
either directly (75%) or indirectly (17%),
through NGOs.
Govt. Views on Level of Fertility (UN 2003:2):
No. of Countries (%)
Year
Too low
Satisfactory
Too high
Total
55 (37)
85 (44)
150 (100)
193 (100)
World
1976
2001
16 (11)
34 (18)
79 (53)
74 (38)
More developed countries
1976
2001
7 (21)
24 (50)
27 (79)
23 (48)
0 (0)
1 (2)
34 (100)
48 (100)
Less developed countries
1976
2001
9 (8)
10 (7)
52 (45)
51 (35)
55 (47)
84 (58)
116 (100)
145 (100)
Least developed countries
1976
2001
3 (7)
0 (0)
26 (62)
11 (22)
13 (31)
38 (78)
42 (100)
49 (100)
Govt. Policies on Level of Fertility (UN 2003:4):
No. of Countries (%)
Year
Raise
Maintain
Lower
No intervention
Total
World
1976
2001
13 (9)
26 (13)
19 (13)
19 (10)
40 (27)
86 (45)
78 (52)
62 (32)
150 (100)
193 (100)
More developed countries
1976
2001
7 (12)
15 (31)
7 (21)
4 (10)
0 (0)
1 (2)
20 (59)
28 (56)
34 (100)
48 (100)
Less developed countries
1976
2001
6 (5)
11 (8)
12 (10)
14 (10)
40 (34)
85 (59)
58 (50)
35 (24)
116 (100)
145 (100)
Least developed countries
1976
2001
1 (2)
0 (0)
2 (5)
4 (8)
6 (14)
34 (69)
33 (79)
11 (22)
42 (100)
49 (100)
• Many developing countries have an explicit
pop policy; whereas most developed ones
don’t.
• World pop growth ↓ since 1980s. The % of
countries that viewed fertility as too high
leveled off after 1996 at about 45%.
• Countries that view fertility as too high are
more likely to intervene than those that view
fertility as too low.
• In general, policies that attempted to ↑ fertility
tend to be even more ineffective than those
that attempt to ↓ fertility.
III. Why Need a Pop Policy?
• To ↑ human welfare: ‘pop & development are
interrelated: pop variables influence
development & are also influenced by them’
(World Pop Conference 1975:157, para
14c).
• It is commonly believed that:
– There is a pop problem, esp. in the 3rd
world.
– Pop ↑  economic ↓  poverty, hunger,
environmental devastation  political
unrest  threatening the West.
• According to UN, an ‘aging pop’ = one with
10% of its pop that is 60+ yrs old. In 1999,
there were 580 m people aged 60+ globally.
By 2009, it has reached 739 m (or1/9 of the
world’s population). It is projected that it will
be tripled to 2 b by 2050. Even the ‘aged pop’
is itself aging: in 2006, 13% of them (94 m)
are 80+, & it is estimated that it would reach
20% (394m) by 2050.
• It is widely believed that pop aging  greater
demand for care & ↑ health costs.
IV. Critique of Pop Policy
• There is a tendency to regard pop policy, as
based on demography, is or should be
‘scientific’.
• Pop experts often evoke the image of an
apocalypse brought on by adverse pop trends.
Salvation justifies any draconian programs
requiring sacrifice & submission.
• But pop policies have often been based on
myths & ideologies than on science &
evidence.
• But the study of human pop ≠ a natural
science. The rate of pop growth & resources
depletion cannot be predicted with accuracy
over any extended periods of time. Egs:
- Malthus (1789) was wrong. Food production
can ↑ faster than pop. World pop is at least 6x
what it was in 1800, yet there is still more
than enough food to support them. From
1961-1994 global production of food doubled.
- J. Simon & P. Ehrlich’s famous 10 yr bet in
1980 on the price of raw materials.
• Even the term ‘overpopulation’ cannot be
defined unambiguously:
- Rate of natural increase – US between
1790 & 1800 = 3%/yr, whereas that of the
49 least developed countries in 2009 is
2.3%/yr.
- Birthrate – US in the 1790s was 55 per
1000, higher than 127 national birthrate
estimates of the World Bank (1993).
- Pop density – France ＞ Indonesia, Japan
＞ India, & Singapore ＞ Bangladesh.
Monaco = the most overpopulated state.
• Dependence ratio – in 1980 Israel ＞ Sri
Lanka; & in 1990 the least overpopulated
societies in the world were HK & Singapore.
• Biologists use the term ‘carrying capacity’
to denote the maximum no. of organisms a
given environment can support. This notion
cannot easily be applied to humans as our
capacity to alter our ways of life means that
it is impossible to predict when our ability to
provide for additional people will end, if ever.
• Nor is the notion of an ‘optimum pop’ value& problem-free:
- The notion ≠ an end in itself. It should not be
isolated from other social priorities. Most
discussions focus on a narrow economic
criteria of value to the neglect of other values.
But economic development ≠ the good life.
- It assumes that the attainment of individual &
social goals are unambiguously affected by
the size & characteristics of the pop. But the
relation between pop & particular social
conditions are not easy to ascertain.
• The pop experts tend to blame the victims, ie,
that those who suffer from poverty are the ones
who have caused the problem.
• Historically, pop ↑ correlates with economic
prosperity, pop ↓ with stagnation. The last 2
centuries has witnessed a tremendous growth
both in world pop & economic growth.
• In 1971 Bangladesh won independence from
Pakistan. Both had around 66 m people
growing at 3% a yr. Both were poor, rural &
Muslim. Bangladesh started emphasising family
planning in 1976. 30 yrs later, it had a pop of
120 m whereas Pakistan had 140 m. But
Pakistan’s GDP was 2x that of Bangladesh.
• Greater pop may ↑ demand for goods &
services  stimulate technological &
agricultural innovation ↑efficiency & supply.
• But in a capitalist economy, food production is
not determined by need, but by demand.
• The true cause of world hunger ≠ overpop,
insufficient food, or famine, but poverty &
inequality.
• To assume that poverty can be eliminated by
preventing the birth of poor people is to commit
an elementary fallacy.
• All attempts to control or reduce pop often
mask racists, sexist or classist policies aimed
at controlling ‘the other’. The fear of a ‘pop
bomb’ has more to do with which babies are
being born than how many are being born.
• The prevention of 1 American birth ＝ birth of
50 Indians in terms of energy use (US has
only 5% of world pop, but emitted 30% CO2);
yet the US worry about the growth of the
Indian pop (Hofsen 1980) .
• Any pop policy inevitably touches upon the
touchy questions of :
- The rights of the living vs the unborn.
- Individual freedom vs collective good.
- Duties to society & society’s responsibilities.
- Drawing the line between ‘us’ & ‘them’.
- Tensions between the sanctity of the family,
destiny of one’s nation/race, & God’s will.
- Value of life & prospects of mankind.
‘As for “pop policy”, the sanest response is
not to have one. The only humane approach
is to let each family, in every country, choose
its own fertility rate according to its own
desires & concerns for the future…. The
alternative is tyranny & torment.’ (Lawson
2008)
V.
Sense & Nonsense in Pop Policy
• There is no question that uncontrolled pop
growth  environmental crises. But does the
West really want to ↓ fertility rate? Breastfeeding is the most effective & natural birth
control devise. However, breast-feeding is
disappearing in the West because of
concerns about body image. It has also
markedly ↓ in the periphery because of
advertising & the sales of powdered infant
formula.
• By 1980s, many countries’ budget for family
planning ＞ all other health-related services
combined. Is this sensible?
- In 1980, govt expenditure per contraceptive
user was US$68 in Ghana & $69 in Nepal;
whereas total govt expenditure on all health
programs were $20 per family in Ghana & $8
in Nepal (Eberstadt 1994).
• There’s also no evidence to suggest that
family planning programs have a direct
causal impact on fertility rate:
- In most countries, fertility ↓ was well
underway before the launching of any family
planning program (India being the
exception).
- In 1989, 63% of Turkey’s married women of
reproductive age used contraception, with a
fertility rate of 3.4 births/women. Japan’s
figures were 56% & 1.5 births/women.
• But if there is much debate surrounding the
notion of an optimum pop size, there is less
disputes as to the characteristics of an
optimum pop, esp. over the long term:
- A low level of mortality.
- A stable age & sex distribution.
- A near 0 growth rate.
- A ↓ rate of consumption & pollution.
• The problem lies in balancing these
objectives with other imperatives.
• More & more countries are facing with a set
of contradictory imperatives:
- Fiscal pressures to ↑ the no./% of working
pop either by ↑ fertility or immigration.
- Economic need for low-skilled labor &/or
high-skilled workers.
- Social need of treating (potential)
immigrants fairly & of integrating them.
- Political risk of a rising xenophobia & antiimmigrant populism.
VII. A People-based Pop Policy?
•
Central to a people-based pop policy is to
put people’s needs at the centre, to respect
their rights, to ↑ their freedom & security so
that they can make choices rationally.
• It must also contain:
1. A public philosophy of citizenship – what
rights & benefits do we wish to confer on
them, & why?
2. An articulation of relationship between pop
size, composition & growth rate to other
social & collective goals.
3. A comprehensive & coherent system of
social policies that correspond to the above
principles based on a comparative analysis
of the pros & cons of different policy options.
4. A justification of whom should we admit &
whom should be counted as citizens, & why
some are rejected: ‘Quality migrants’ &
capital investment entrants vs the principle
of family reunion (mainlanders born of HK
parents); foreign domestic ‘helpers’ vs
expatriate workers etc.
• HK did not have an pop policy until 2003.
‘香港人口政策的主要目的，……是為了致力提
高香港人口的總體素質，以達到發展香港成為
知識型經濟體系和世界級城市的目標。為此，
我們要有效處理人口老化問題， 建立積極、
健康老年的新觀念， 推動新來港人士融入社
會， 更重要的是， 確保我們的經濟能夠長遠
持續發展。我們認為， 達到這些目的， 就可
以穩步改善香港市民的生活水平。’ (人口政
策專責小組報告書，2003:vii)
• As such, it ≠ a document on pop policy but an
economic policy, & a narrow one at that.
•
-
-
In the ‘newspeak’ of the HK govt, the Report
twisted the term ‘sustainability’ to suit its
ends:
Economic sustainability = ways to ↑ our
workforce’s productivity & enhance
economic vibrancy.
Fiscal sustainability = minimizing govt
commitment & responsibility.
Social sustainability & integration = limit
new arrivals’ eligibility to public services (the
so-called ‘7-yr’ residence requirement).
• Economic development certainly has a role
to play; but it needs to be ‘de-centred’ so
that people are not treated as means for ‘the
economy’, but vice versa.