Hazardous Materials Transportation Risk
Assessment: State of the Practice
HM-12 Final Project Summary and Findings
November 30, 2012
Overview
•
The goal of HM-12 is to document the current state of the
practice for hazardous materials transportation risk
assessment and lay out a path for future efforts.
•
Specific project objectives are:
a) To identify existing tools, methodologies, approaches, and key
sources of data for assessing hazardous materials transportation
risks in the public and private sectors
b) To characterize the capabilities and limitations of each
c) To identify significant gaps and needs in the available tools and
approaches
d) To recommend paths forward
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Methodology
•
Investigate the current state of the practice of hazmat risk
assessment involved the following three steps:
1. Literature review
– Focused on documents published since 2005
– Included review of TRIS, TRB RIP, TLCat, NTIS, and ITRD
2. Stakeholder interviews
– Identified potential participants through recommendations of HM10 and HM-12 project panels and participant suggestions
– Contacted 110 organizations, including carriers, shippers, federal
and state agencies, international agencies, consulting firms,
professional associations, insurers, and research organizations
3. Stakeholder surveys
– Dispersed invitations through TRB Hazmat Committee and
stakeholder associations
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General Results
•
Investigation results indicated that hazmat transportation
risk assessment is primarily employed to address one of
nine general decision types.
•
Models for which enough information was available to allow
characterization of model data, components, and
applications are presented in the HM-12 Final Report
according to the decisions they support.
• Slide 5 lists the decision types and the models that can
support them. Slides 6-9 list some basic information about
each model.
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Results: Decisions & Supporting Models
Decision
Applicable Models Identified
Mode choice
CCPS Guidelines (multiple individual models), Anonymous
Chemical Manufacturer Framework, RADTRAN, TRAGIS
Route choice
Boston Hazmat Route Evaluation, CCPS Guidelines, Anon. Chem.
Mfr. Framework, Fedtrak, GeoCTA, IMESAFR, RADTRAN, RCRMS,
TRAGIS, UIUC Tank Car Analysis
Facility siting
CCPS Guidelines, IMESAFER
Packaging selection
CCPS Guidelines, Anon. Chem. Mfr. Framework, UIUC Tank Car
Analysis
Alternate product selection
CCPS Guidelines, Anon. Chem. Mfr. Framework
Emergency management resource
planning
GeoCTA, Pipeline Risk Management Manual, RADTRAN, TRACC,
RRAS, TSSRA
Operational changes
CCPS Guidelines, Anon. Chem. Mfr. Framework, Fedtrak, Pipeline
Risk Management Manual, TRACC
Security measure identification,
prioritization, and evaluation
CCPS Guidelines, CTRA, Fedtrak, CREATE model, “CREATE
model”, TSSRA, THTRA
Security risk situational awareness
Fedtrak, TRACC, THTRA
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Results: Models
Model
Sponsor/Developer
Description
Boston Hazmat Route
Evaluation
City of Boston
A risk-score methodology based on FMCSA guidance;
used in assessing routing alternatives
CCPS Guidelines:
Qualitative Risk
Assessment Process
Center for Chemical
Process Safety
(CCPS)
Helps chemical companies manage global transportation
risks in a consistent framework; applicable to all modes;
facilitates decisions on changes in operations
CCPS Guidelines:
Quantitative Risk
Assessment Process
CCPS
CCPS Guidelines: Risk
Prioritization Process
CCPS
CCPS Guidelines:
Security Risk
Prioritization Process
CCPS
CCPS Guidelines:
Security Vulnerability
Assessment Process
CCPS Guidelines: SemiQuantitative Risk
Assessment Process
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Helps chemical companies manage global transportation
risks in a consistent framework; a detailed, data-intensive
approach for in-depth analyses
Helps chemical companies manage global transportation
risks in a consistent framework; a high-level screening
model that produces generalized risk score outputs
Helps chemical companies manage global transportation
risks in a consistent framework; a high-level screening
model specifically focused on security risks
CCPS
Helps chemical companies manage global transportation
risks in a consistent framework; a broad, largely
qualitative security risk assessment method
CCPS
Helps chemical companies manage global transportation
risks in a consistent framework; a semi-quantitative
approach that results in risk index or risk matrix output
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Results: Models (cont.)
Model
Sponsor/Developer
Description
A process that is invoked when there is a new product,
Large Chemical /
customer, or route option; informs packaging, shipping,
Plastics Manufacturer and mode decisions; is qualitative unless risks are
perceived to be very high, then is quantitative
DHS S&T and
A comprehensive approach that includes transportation;
Chemical Terrorism Risk
Chemical Security
Assessment Process
involves probabilistic risk assessment; focuses on human
Analysis
Center
(CTRA)
effects, considering all routes of exposure
(CSAC)
Kentucky
Scores highway route safety and security risks; provides
Fedtrak
Transportation Center
real-time situational awareness on individual shipments
(KTC)
ORNL Center for
A transportation-focused, GIS-based tool for estimating
GeoCTA
Transportation
consequences to population and infrastructure in support
Analysis (CTA)
of transportation and emergency response planning
A software tool that calculates explosives risks at fixed
Institute of Makers of
IME Safety Analysis for
facilities; applicable to ports, shipper locations, safe
Risk (IMESAFR)
Explosives (IME)
havens, etc.; potential for adapting to in-transit shipments
Industry standard approach for pipeline risk assessment;
Pipeline Risk Management
Manual Risk Assessment W. Kent Muhlbauer
highly customizable; standard approach produces a
Method
failure index and indices for contributing factors
Anonymous Chemical
Manufacturer Risk
Assessment Framework
Process
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Results: Models (cont.)
Model
Sponsor/Developer
Description
RADTRAN
Department of Energy
Calculates expected consequences from incident-free or
(DOE), Sandia
accident-related transportation of radiological materials
National Labs
Rail Corridor Risk
Management System
(RCRMS)
Railroad Research
Foundation /
Association of
American Railroads
Rail industry tool for route analysis for high-hazard
shipments in compliance with HM-232E; considers safety
and security; output includes relative risk scores
Readiness and
Resiliency Assessment
System (RRAS)
ORNL Center for
Transportation
Analysis (CTA)
Assesses security risks to transportation assets and
systems; considers threats, consequences, and
mitigation factors to calculate readiness/resiliency scores
Risk-Based
Preventative
Radiological / Nuclear
Detection Resource
Allocation
National Center for
Risk and Economic
Analysis of Terrorism
Events (CREATE)
Informs decisions on placement and types of radiological
detection equipment within a highway network or at
points of entry; outputs are customizable but can include
probability of detection and failure, resources costs, etc.
TRACC
ORNL Center for
Transportation
Analysis (CTA),
Mississippi State U.
Tracks barge movement in real-time and alerts
stakeholders to potentially high risk behavior or
situations based on shipment data and historical paths
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Results: Models (cont.)
Model
Sponsor/Developer
Description
DOE, Oak Ridge
Transportation Routing
National Laboratory
Analysis GIS (TRAGIS)
(ORNL)
Compares potentially exposed populations along route
paths; can inform selection of shipment mode
Transportation Sector
Security Risk
Assessment (TSSRA)
DHS, TSA Office of
Security Capabilities
(OSC)
Supports overarching risk assessment for the
transportation sector across all modes; output includes
relative risk scores and risk equation component values
Trucking and
Hazardous Materials
Trucking Risk
Assessment (THTRA)
Department of
Homeland Security
(DHS)
A scenario-based approach combining qualitative and
quantitative methods; gauges security risks to truck
transportation and assesses current security resources
and potential upgrades or reallocations
UIUC Tank Car Risk
Analysis
University of Illinois–
Champaign Urbana
(UIUC)
Developed to inform alternative packaging (tank car)
selection and is applicable to route choice decisions;
applicable to rail and, potentially, highway-rail intermodal
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Results: Models (cont.)
•
The HM-12 Final Report presents the following information
for each of the 22 identified models:
– Applicable modes and decisions supported
– Central methodology or approach
– Key sources of data for each model component
– Model assumptions, limitations, and biases
– Outputs
– Frequency of and triggers for updates
– How and to whom results are communicated
– Strengths, weaknesses, and desired improvements
– Model availability and potential barriers to implementation
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Selected Observations
•
Industry analyses are generally very focused and have short time
frames; the opposite tends to be true for public-sector analyses.
•
Though quantitative analyses are required in some in-depth
analyses or high-risk cases, qualitative analyses may be sufficient
to produce actionable results.
•
Security-focused analyses tend to employ subject matter
elicitations or “black box” methods / data to account for a lack of
historical likelihood information.
•
Qualitative models tend to present results in the form of general
categories (e.g., high, medium, low) or as risk matrices.
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Selected Observations (cont.)
•
The majority of quantitative analyses estimate relative, rather
than absolute, risk values.
•
Quantitative models generally present results as risk indices,
either as scores for individual locations or as a device (such as an
F-N curve) that communicates indices for each possible outcome
and location.
•
Uncertainty is rarely explicitly quantified or qualified.
•
The most common approaches to addressing uncertainty are to
select conservative model parameters or to employ conservative
operational procedures or equipment.
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Gaps: Models for Decisions
•
Multi-Modal/Intermodal Risk Analyses
– Most risk assessments focus on a single mode.
•
Validation of Prior Assessments
– When hazmat risk analyses utilize the results of previous analyses, that
information is rarely subject to any type of validation.
• Comparability of Model Results
– Disparate methodologies and metrics make results from different models
incomparable.
•
Uncertainty
– While uncertainty is often acknowledged, it is rarely quantified or qualified.
•
Route Analysis Tools
– A lack of tools exists for finding alternate highway routes and for analyzing
barge shipment routes.
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Gaps: Data for Models
•
Inadequate Highway Exposure Data and Accident Rates
– There is a lack of detailed exposure data on hazmat transportation shipments by
material, packaging type, and operational parameters.
•
Conditional Probability Data
– There are a limited number of current sources for hazmat release probabilities.
•
Disparate Data Quality across Modes
– The degree of data accuracy and precision of available risk metric data tend to
be dissimilar across modes.
•
Security Assessment Credibility and Transparency
– Security models often rely on subjective judgments and proprietary information
or processes, reducing model credibility to external parties.
•
Lack of Public Vulnerability and Threat Data
– Insufficient data is a common obstacle in hazmat transportation risk assessment.
•
Validation of Supporting Data
– Available data, particularly GIS data, are often used with little or no validation.
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Gaps: Model, Data, or Results Availability
•
Formal Risk Management Process
– Anecdotal evidence suggests that many hazmat shippers and carriers do not
follow a formal risk assessment process.
•
Data Building Blocks for Assessments
– No single standard source of supporting spatial data, or implementation
guidelines for their use, exist for hazmat transportation risk analysis.
•
Lack of Awareness of Available Data, Tools, and Methods
– Hazmat transportation stakeholders are commonly unaware of the full range
of available models and datasets.
• Lack of Public Disclosure of Datasets
– The perceived need to withhold data for reasons of safety, security, or
business completion presents a barrier to comprehensive risk analyses.
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Recommendations: Model Development
a) Develop a single, common hazmat transportation risk assessment
approach, using a standard architecture, across all modes.
b) Develop a highway hazmat route risk assessment tool that considers
the FMCSA Hazardous Materials Route Registry and other state and
local truck restrictions to suggest candidate routes.
c) Develop a waterway hazmat route risk assessment tool that includes
consideration of dam and lock infrastructure restrictions.
d) Develop an approach for addressing low-probability, high-consequence
events in hazmat transportation risk models.
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Recommendations: Data Development
e) Enhance the BTS’ Commodity Flow Survey and the FHWA’s Freight Analysis
Framework to provide national-level hazmat flow data and support improved
hazmat-specific highway accident rates.
f)
Expand the results of HMCRP project HM-07, to develop conditional release
probabilities for different packaging types, with the emphasis on bulk packages.
g) Research the behavior of commercial-scale explosives to enhance modeling for
fixed facilities and eliminate the use of less-appropriate military explosives data.
h) Develop a system for calibrating the differences in similar data across modes or
other categories.
i)
Produce a guidebook describing different types of expert elicitation methods and
their applicability to the issues typically addressed in hazmat transportation risk
analyses.
j)
Research the potential methods, risks, and benefits of governmental sharing of
security-sensitive threat and vulnerability data with private sector risk assessors.
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Recommendations: Communication and
Data / Model Sharing
k) Create a framework document with specific checklists to encourage
greater adoption of risk management principles and decision making,
including the best practices from both the private and public sectors.
l) Develop a single data repository for transportation network data that
have the requisite data elements to support hazmat transportation risk
assessment.
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