Struktura i raspored moći u
međunarodnim odnosima na
početku XXI veka
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I Neka teorijska objašnjenja
II Struktura i raspored moći u
međunarodnim odnosima na početku
XXI veka
III Literatura
I Neka teorijska
objašnjenja
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“Neosporno je da je tokom istorije
međunarodna zajednica doživela mnoga
preobličavanja, te se kod mnogih teoretičara,
bez obzira na termin koji usvajaju, pojavljuje
potreba da se prikažu različita stanja, u
kojima se ona nalazila ili se može naći.
Najčešće se pri tome polazi od strukture
međunarodne zajednice i rasporeda moći u
njoj.” (Vojin Dimitrijević, Radoslav Stojanović)
Nivoi analize u međunarodnim odnosima

“Pod strukturom međunarodne zajednice
podrazumevaju se elementi te zajednice
i okolina u kojoj deluju. Elementi
međunarodne zajednice su subjekti
međunarodnih odnosa, a okolina u kojoj
deluju izražava se dejstvom činilaca koji
utiču na subjekte međunarodnih odnosa
i međunarodne zajednice u celini.” (Vojin
Dimitrijević, Radoslav Stojanović)

“Tipologija međunarodnih sistema prema
rasporedu moći ima mnogo... Od
poznatijih pojmova koji se s tim u vezi
sreću treba pomenuti sledeće:
1) Imperijalna struktura 2)
Polarizovana struktura 3)
Nepolarizovana ili difuzna struktura
1) Imperijalna struktura
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“Imperijalna struktura postoji onda
kada u međunarodnoj zajednici
preovladava jedan centar, koji ima
odlučujući uticaj na pojedine jedinice.”
(Vojin Dimitrijević, Radoslav Stojanović)
Regionalne i svetske imperije kao
primeri
2) Polarizovana struktura
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“Kad se, umesto jednog, u međunarodnoj zajednici pojavi
više centara predominantne moći, ona ima polarizovanu
strukturu. (Vojin Dimitrijević, Radoslav Stojanović)
“Ako postoje samo dva glavna centra moći, polarizovana
struktura se naziva bipolarnom.”
Hladni rat, Antička Grčka u vreme Peloponeskog rata (sa
Spartom i Atinom kao predominantnim gradovimadržavama) kao primeri
“Čim se pojavi treći pol struktura postaje multipolarna”
(Vojin Dimitrijević, Radoslav Stojanović)
Novovekovna istorija Evrope kao najbolji primer
3) Nepolarizovana ili difuzna
struktura
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“Struktura u kojoj je moć ravnomereno
raspoređena na sve subjekte (države)
naziva se nepolarizovanom ili difuznom.”
(Vojin Dimitrijević, Radoslav Stojanović)
Grčki gradovi države pre prevlasti Sparte
i Atine
Evropa pre kolonijalnih osvajanja
Struktura međunarodnog sistema
kao glavna determinanta dešavanja
u međunarodnim odnosima
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Glavni uzroci dešavanja u međunarodnim odnosima, nalaze u
strukturi medjunarodnog sistema. Struktura je pojam koji uvodi
Kenet Volc da označi ono što se apstrahovanjem može izvući iz
međunarodne politike i ona se sastoji od :
- načina organizacije vlasti (koji je u međunarodnoj politici anarhija a
u unutrašnjoj hijerarhija)
-raspodele moći u međunarodnom sistemu koja, u zavisnosti od
broja polova, odnosno, najjačih i najmoćnijih država u međunarodnom
sistemu, može biti unipolarna, bipolarna i multipolarna.
Za razliku od strukture unutrašnje politike Volc kod strukture
međunarodne politike izostavlja jednu veoma bitnu osobinu političkih
jedinica, koje cine jedan medjunarodni sistem, a to su razlike među
njima.U unutrašnjoj politici postoji razliciti organi vlasti a u
međunarodnoj politici države da bi opstale moraju da se socijalizuju (
da liče jedna na drugu i da obavljaju iste funkcije). (Kenneth N. Waltz,
Theory of International Politics)
Structure and War: Bipolar international
system as a more stabile
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The main causes of war are located in the architecture of
the international system
What matters most is the number of great powers and
how much power each controls
A system can be either bipolar or multipolar... A system
that contains an aspiring hegemon is said to be
unbalanced; a system without such a dominat state is
said to be balanced.
Four possible kind of systems: 1) Unbalanced bipolarity
2) balanced bipolarity 3) unbalanced multipolarity 4)
balanced multipolarity (John J. Mearsheimer)

Based on the relevant distribution of
power among the major states,
European history from the outbreak of
the French Revolutionary and
Napoleonic Wars in 1792 until the End of
the Cold war in 1990 can roughly divided
into seven periods:
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1) Napoleonic era I, 1792-1793, (1 year), balanced
multipolarity
2) Napoleonic era II, 1793-1815, (22 years), unbalanced
multipolarity
3) Nineteenth century, 1815-1902, (88 years) balanced
multipolarity
4) Kaiserreich era, 1903 – 1918, (16 years), unbalanced
multipolarity
5) Interwar years, 1919-1938, (20 years), balanced
multipolarity
6) Nazi era, 1939-1945, (6 years), unbalanced
multipolarity, and
7) Cold war, 1945-19902, (46 years), bipolarity

War was going on 18. 3 percent of the
time in balanced multipolarity, compared
with 2.2 percent in bipolarity and 79. 5
percent in unbalanced multipolarity
(John J. Mearsheimer)
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Raspodela moći među državama u
međunarodnom sistemu pomaže nam da
pravimo predviđanja o određenim
aspektima ponašanja država. (Džozef
Naj)
System and War: a different
view
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Na sličan način, politikolozi posmatraju strukturu međunarodnog
sistema u nameri da predvide ponašanje država i njihovu sklonost ka
ratu.
Unipolarni sistemi su skloni propadanju pošto države, u težnji da
očuvaju vlastitu nezavisnost, vode politiku ravnoteže snaga protiv
države koja ima premoć u sistemu, ili protiv hegemona, ili će neka
država čija je moć u usponu, u nekim slučajevima izazivati moć
vodeće države. U multipolarnim ili u međunarodnim sistemima koji
imaju raspršenu raspodelu moći, države će formirati saveze u cilju
ostvarenja ravnoteže snaga, ali će savezi biti fleksibilni. Ratovi se
mogu dogoditi, ali će biti relativno ograničeni u svom opsegu.
U bipolarnim sistemima, savezi postaju mnogo rigidniji, što zauzvarat
doprinosi većoj verovatnoći izbijanja sukoba širih razmera, možda čak
i svetskog rata. Neki analitičari kažu da “bipolarlni sistemi ili erodiraju ili
eksplodiraju”. Ovo se desilo u Peloponeskom ratu kada su Atina i
Sparta pojačale međusobna trvenja poštujući vlastite savezničke
obaveze. (Džozef Naj, Henri Kisindžer)
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Ovo je takođe bio slučaj u vremenu pre 1914. godine,
kada se multipolarna ravnoteža snaga u Evropi
postepeno konsolidovala u sistem dva jaka saveza, koji
su pri tome izgubili na svojoj fleksibilnosti. Predviđanja o
mogućnosti izbijanja rata zasnovana na principu
multipolarnost Vs. bipolarnost pokazala su se pogrešnim,
posle 1945. godine. Tokom Hladnog rata svet je bio
bipolaran sa dva velika igrača, Sjedinjenim Državama i
njenim sveznicima i Sovjetskim Savezom i njegovim
saveznicima. Ipak nije došlo do izbijanja sveobuhvatnog
rata tokom više od četiri decenije, pre nego što je sistem
erodirao s propadanjem Sovjetskog Saveza. Neki ljudi
tvrde da je nuklearno oružje učinilo mogućnost izbijanja
globalnog rata veoma neprivlačnim rešenjem.

“The Balance of power system did not purport
or avoid crises or even wars. When working
properly, it was meant to limit both the ability of
states to dominate others and the scope of
conflicts. Its goal was not peace so much as
stability and moderation. By definition, a
balance of power arrangement cannot satisfy
every member of the international system
completely; it works best when it keeps
dissatisfaction below the level at which the
aggrieved party will seek to overthrow
international order.”

“The International system which lasted
the longest without a major war was the
one following the Congress of Vienna. It
combined legitimacy and equilibrium,
shared values, and balance of power
diplomacy. Common values restrained
the scope of nations’ demands while
equilibrium limited the capacity to insist
on them.”
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Iz tih razloga možemo zaključiti da struktura međunarodnog
sistema može ponuditi nekakva gruba objašnjenja, ali da ni ona
ne objašnjava dovoljno sama po sebi.
Više ćemo shvatiti ako budemo išli dalje od strukture sistema, i
pozabavimo se ispitivanjem njegovog procesa, tj. pravilnog
obrasca interakcija između država. Razlikovanje između
strukture i procesa u bilo kom vremenu može biti ilustrovano uz
pomoć metafore poznate kartaroške igre - pokera. Struktura
igre pokera je u raspodeli moći, to jest koliko čipova igrači
imaju i koliko je jakih karti podeljeno. Proces se odnosi na
način na koji se igra može igrati i kakve vrste interakcija među
igračima mogu postojati (kako su pravila igre zamišljena i kako
se shvataju; da li su igrači dobri bleferi; da li poštuju pravila.

Proces međunarodog sistema je određen
pomoću tri elementa: 1) strukturom (bipolarne
strukture su sklone da proizvedu manje
fleksibilne procese), 2) kulturnim i
institucionalnim kontekstom koji okružuje
strukturu i determiniše sposobnosti država koje
one imaju za saradnju, 3) da li su države
revolucionarne ili umerene u ciljevima i
instrumentima. (Džozef Naj)
II Struktura i raspored moći
u međunarodnim odnosima
na početku XXI veka
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Kakva je raspodela moći u
međunarodnim odnosima posle Hladnog
rata?
Različita viđenja: (Unipolar World,
Multipolar World, Uni-Multipolar
World, Međuzavisnost na više nivoa,
the non-polar World, )
Unipolarity
-
Charles Crauthammer, Foreign Affairs,
Winter 1990/1991, pp. 23-33.
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Charles Crauthammer, Foreign Affairs,
Winter 1990/1991, pp. 23-33.
William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of
Unipolar World”, International Security,
Vol. 24, No. 1, Summer 1999, pp. 5 – 41.

“The most striking feature of the post-cold War
World is its unipolarity. No doubt, multipolarity
will come in time. In perhaps another
generation or so there will be great powers
coequal with the United States, and the world
will, in structure resemble the pre-World War I
era. But we are not there yet, nor will be for
decades. NOW IS THE UNIPOLAR MOMENT.

“There is today no lack of second-rank powers.
Germany and Japan are economic dynamos.
Britain and France can deploy diplomatic and
to some extent military assets. The Soviet
Union possesses several element of power –
military, diplomatic and political – but all are in
rapid decline. There is but one first – rate
power and no prospect in the immediate
future of any power to rival it.
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“The notion that economic power inevitably translates into
geopolitical influence is a materialist illusion. Economic
power is a necessary condition for great power status.
But it certainly is not sufficient, as has been made clear
by the recent behavior of Germany and Japan, which
have generally hidden under the table since the first shots
rang out in Kuwait.”
“American preeminence is based on the fact that it is the
only country with military, diplomatic, political and
economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in
whatever part of the world it chooses to involve itself.”
William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of
Unipolar World”, International
Security, Vol. 24, No. 1, Summer
1999, pp. 5 – 41.
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In this article, I advance three propositions that
undermine the emerging conventional wisdom that the
distribution of power is unstable and conflict prone.
First, the system is aunambiguosly unipolar.The
United States enjoys a much larger margin of superiority
over the next most powerful state or, indeed, all other
great powers combined than any leading state in the last
two centuries. Moreover, the United States is the first
leading state in modern international history with decisive
preponderance in all the underlying components of
power: economic, military, technological and geopolitical.
To describe this unprecedented quantitative and
qualitative concentration of power as an evanescent
“moment” is profoundly mistaken.

Second, the curent unipolarity is
prone to peace. The raw power
advantage of the United States means
that an important source of conflict in
previous systems is absent: hegemonic
rivalry over leadership of the
international system.
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Third, the current unipolarity is not only
peaceful but durable
The United States is the only Great
Power in modern history to establish a
clear lead in virtually every important
dimension of power
Multipolarity
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Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy, Simon &
Schuster, New York, 1994
Parag Khanna, Second World – Empires and
influence in New World Order, Random House,
New York, 2008
Fareed Zakaria, The Post-american World, W.
W. Norton, New York, 2008
Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian
Hemisphere – The Irresistible shift of the
Global power to the East, PublicAffairs, New
York, 2008
Henry A. Kissinger,
Diplomacy, Simon &
Schuster, New York, 1994
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“What is new about the emerging world order is that, for
the first time, the United States can neither withdraw from
the world nor dominate it…Other countries have grown
into Great Power status. The United States now faces
challenge of reaching its goals in stages, each of which is
an amalgam of American values and geopolitical
necessities. One of the few necessities is that a world
comprising several states of comparable strength
must base its order on some concept of equilibrium –
an idea with which the United States has never felt
comfortable.”
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“The international system of the twenty first century will
be marked by a seeming contradiction: on the one hand,
fragmentation; on the other, growing globalization. On the
level of the relations among states, the new order will be
more like the European state system of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries than the rigid patterns of the
Cold War. It will contain at least six major powers –
the United States, Europe, China, Japan, Russia and
probably India – as well as a multiplicity of medium
sized and smaller countries.”
Parag Khanna, Second World
– Empires and influence in
New World Order, Random
House, New York, 2008
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It is 2016, and the Hillary Clinton or John McCain or Barack
Obama administration is nearing the end of its second term.
America has pulled out of Iraq but has about 20,000 troops
in the independent state of Kurdistan, as well as warships
anchored at Bahrain and an Air Force presence in Qatar.
Afghanistan is stable; Iran is nuclear. China has absorbed
Taiwan and is steadily increasing its naval presence around
the Pacific Rim and, from the Pakistani port of Gwadar, on
the Arabian Sea.
The European Union has expanded to well over 30
members and has secure oil and gas flows from North
Africa, Russia and the Caspian Sea, as well as substantial
nuclear energy. America’s standing in the world remains in
steady decline.
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At best, America’s unipolar moment lasted through the 1990s,
but that was also a decade adrift. The post-cold-war “peace
dividend” was never converted into a global liberal order under
American leadership.
So now, rather than bestriding the globe, we are competing —
and losing — in a geopolitical marketplace alongside the
world’s other superpowers: the European Union and China.
This is geopolitics in the 21st century: the new Big Three.
Not Russia, an increasingly depopulated expanse run by
Gazprom.gov; not an incoherent Islam embroiled in internal
wars; and not India, lagging decades behind China in both
development and strategic appetite.
The Big Three make the rules — their own rules — without any
one of them dominating. And the others are left to choose their
suitors in this post-American world.

The more we appreciate the differences among the
American, European and Chinese worldviews, the
more we will see the planetary stakes of the new
global game.
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Previous eras of balance of power have been
among European powers sharing a common culture.
The cold war, too, was not truly an “East-West”
struggle; it remained essentially a contest over
Europe.
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What we have today, for the first time in history, is a
global, multicivilizational, multipolar battle.
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The Big Three are the ultimate “Frenemies.” Twenty-first-century
geopolitics will resemble nothing more than Orwell’s 1984, but instead
of three world powers (Oceania, Eurasia and Eastasia), we have three
hemispheric pan-regions, longitudinal zones dominated by America,
Europe and China.
As the early 20th-century European scholars of geopolitics realized,
because a vertically organized region contains all climatic zones yearround, each pan-region can be self-sufficient and build a power base
from which to intrude in others’ terrain.
But in a globalized and shrinking world, no geography is sacrosanct.
So in various ways, both overtly and under the radar, China and
Europe will meddle in America’s backyard, America and China will
compete for African resources in Europe’s southern periphery and
America and Europe will seek to profit from the rapid economic growth
of countries within China’s growing sphere of influence.
Globalization is the weapon of choice. The main battlefield is what I
call “the second world.”
The Swing States
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There are plenty of statistics that will still tell the story of America’s
global dominance: our military spending, our share of the global
economy and the like.
But there are statistics, and there are trends. To really understand how
quickly American power is in decline around the world, I’ve spent the
past two years traveling in some 40 countries in the five most strategic
regions of the planet — the countries of the second world.
They are not in the first-world core of the global economy, nor in
its third-world periphery. Lying alongside and between the Big
Three, second-world countries are the swing states that will
determine which of the superpowers has the upper hand for the
next generation of geopolitics.
From Venezuela to Vietnam and Morocco to Malaysia, the new reality
of global affairs is that there is not one way to win allies and influence
countries but three: America’s coalition (as in “coalition of the willing”),
Europe’s consensus and China’s consultative styles.
The geopolitical marketplace will decide which will lead the 21st
century.
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Second-world countries are distinguished from the
third world by their potential: the likelihood that they
will capitalize on a valuable commodity, a charismatic
leader or a generous patron.
Each and every second-world country matters in its own
right, for its economic, strategic or diplomatic weight, and
its decision to tilt toward the United States, the E.U. or
China has a strong influence on what others in its region
decide to do.
Will an American nuclear deal with India push Pakistan
even deeper into military dependence on China? Will the
next set of Arab monarchs lean East or West?
The second world will shape the world’s balance of
power as much as the superpowers themselves will.
Fareed Zakaria
The Post-American World,
W. W. Norton, New York,
2008
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This is not book about american decline but of rise of
the rest.
The real test for the United States is the opposite of that
faced by Britain in 1900. Britain's economic power waned
even as it managed to maintain immense political
influence around the world. The U.S. economy and
American society, in contrast, are capable of responding
to the economic pressures and competition they face.
They can adjust, adapt, and persevere.
The test for the United States is political -- and it rests not
just with the United States at large but with Washington in
particular. Can Washington adjust and adapt to a world in
which others have moved up? Can it respond to shifts in
economic requirements and political power?

The world has been one in which the United States was utterly
unrivaled for two decades. It has been, in a broader sense, a U.S.designed world since the end of World War II. But it is now in the midst
of one of history's greatest periods of change.

There have been three tectonic power shifts over the last 500
years, fundamental changes in the distribution of power that have
reshaped international life -- its politics, economics, and culture.

The first was the rise of the Western world, a process that began in
the fifteenth century and accelerated dramatically in the late eighteenth
century. It produced modernity as we know it: science and technology,
commerce and capitalism, the agricultural and industrial revolutions. It
also produced the prolonged political dominance of the nations of the
West.

The second shift, which took place in the
closing years of the nineteenth century,
was the rise of the United States. Soon after
it industrialized, the United States became the
most powerful nation since imperial Rome, and
the only one that was stronger than any likely
combination of other nations. For most of the
last century, the United States has dominated
global economics, politics, science, culture,
and ideas. For the last 20 years, that
dominance has been unrivaled, a phenomenon
unprecedented in history.

We are now living through the third great
power shift of the modern era -- the rise of
the rest. Over the past few decades, countries
all over the world have been experiencing
rates of economic growth that were once
unthinkable. Although they have had booms
and busts, the overall trend has been
vigorously forward. (This growth has been
most visible in Asia but is no longer confined to
it, which is why to call this change "the rise of
Asia" does not describe it accurately.)

The emerging international system is likely to be quite different from those that have preceded it.

A hundred years ago, there was a multipolar order run by a collection of European governments,
with constantly shifting alliances, rivalries, miscalculations, and wars.

Then came the duopoly of the Cold War, more stable in some ways, but with the superpowers
reacting and overreacting to each other's every move.

Since 1991, we have lived under a U.S. imperium, a unique, unipolar world in which the open
global economy has expanded and accelerated.

This expansion is driving the next change in the nature of the international order.
At the politico-military level, we remain in a single-superpower world. But polarity is not a binary
phenomenon. The world will not stay unipolar for decades and then suddenly, one afternoon,
become multipolar.
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On every dimension other than military power -- industrial, financial, social, cultural -- the
distribution of power is shifting, moving away from U.S. dominance. That does not mean we are
entering an anti-American world.

But we are moving into a post-American world, one defined and directed from many places and
by many people.

The United States has a window of
opportunity to shape and master the
changing global landscape, but only if it
first recognizes that the post-American
world is a reality -- and embraces and
celebrates that fact.
Kishore Mahbubani
The New Asian Hemisphere – The
Irresistible shift of the Global power
to the East, PublicAffairs, New York,
2008


THERE IS a fundamental flaw in the West's
strategic thinking. In all its analyses of global
challenges, the West assumes that it is the
source of the solutions to the world's key
problems.
In fact, however, the West is also a major
source of these problems. Unless key Western
policymakers learn to understand and deal with
this reality, the world is headed for an even
more troubled phase.

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
The West is understandably reluctant to accept that the
era of its domination is ending and that the Asian century
has come.
No civilization cedes power easily, and the West's
resistance to giving up control of key global institutions
and processes is natural.
Yet the West is engaging in an extraordinary act of selfdeception by believing that it is open to change. In fact,
the West has become the most powerful force preventing
the emergence of a new wave of history, clinging to its
privileged position in key global forums, such as the UN
Security Council, the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank, and the G-8 (the group of highly
industrialized states), and refusing to contemplate how
the West will have to adjust to the Asian century.
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Partly as a result of its growing insecurity, the West
has also become increasingly incompetent in its
handling of key global problems.
Many Western commentators can readily identify
specific failures, such as the Bush administration's
botched invasion and occupation of Iraq.
But few can see that this reflects a deeper
structural problem: the West's inability to see that
the world has entered a new era.
Stiven Majer, NDU, Washington, D. C.
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
Међународна структура и односи у
периоду после Хладног рата одумиру
и на њихово место долазе нови који
ублажавају улогу Запада. Утицај ових
промена у Европи одржаваће Косово
и целокупан регион југозападне
Европе неколико година у
нестабилном стању.
За ово постоји пет разлога.

Прво, током претходних пет година
Сједињене Државе стално су губиле моћ,
ауторитет и утицај на светској позорници.
Такозвани „униполарни тренутак”, који је
требало да опише америчку моћ после слома
Совјетског Савеза и комунизма, у стварности
није био ништа више од тренутка. Свакако да
амерички дебакл у Ираку има много везе са
слабљењем снажне америчке позиције у свету,
али на моћ Сједињених Држава такође су у
великој мери утицале и промене у Европи које
Вашингтон не може у пуној мери да држи под
контролом.

Друго, Европска унија је у извесној мери
посустала и постала несигурна када је реч о
плановима за проширење и продубљење.
Лисабонски споразум, потписан крајем прошле
године, представља покушај да се ЕУ преоријентише
и опорави после пораза уставног референдума у
Француској и Холандији. Међутим, велика површина,
различити интереси и мноштво „брзина” у данашњој
ЕУ чине да управљање, одлучивање и сличност
намера буду много компликованији – и с времена на
време – готово немогући за остваривање. Сходно
томе, све више се чини да ће ЕУ бити ограничена на
веома простран трговински и економски блок

Треће, НАТО је постао застарео. Упркос завршетку
Хладног рата – када је НАТО био неопходан за
заштиту Запада, овај савез наставио је да постоји по
инерцији и због неспособности западних лидера да се
упусте у веома напоран посао стварања система
безбедности који одговарају стварности 21. века.
Разуме се да је НАТО наставио свој живот, али је у
суштини једна шупља организација с незнатном
безбедносном наменом у свету који настаје. Највећи
тест за НАТО данас јесте Авганистан. Али, чак и тамо
он је као савез неуспешан јер има знатне проблеме у
обезбеђивању одговарајућих снага за тамошњу борбу.
Код већине европских чланица НАТО просто постоји
мало интересовања за укључење у Авганистан на
били какав значајан начин.

Четврто, Русија се с Владимиром Путином поново
појавила на светској позорници као значајна сила.
И поред тога што су односи Москве са Европом и
Сједињеним Државама често неспретни, нема сумње
да економски и политички утицај савремене Русије
расте. За разлику од периода комунизма, Русија не
представља озбиљну војну претњу, већ је јасно
постала магнет за земље и процесе који не налазе
задовољење на Западу. На пример, подршка Русије
за српски став у односу на Косово има изузетно важну
улогу за Москву као начин на који показује своје
противљење Сједињеним Државама, али, што је још
важније, као средство за представљање њене нове
силе на међународној позорници.

Коначно, све бољи односи између Русије и Турске
обећавају преоријентисање политичких,
економских и војних односа не само у приобалном
подручју Црног мора, већ потенцијално и у читавој
југоисточној Европи. Наравно, иза Русије и Турске
стоји дуг период сукоба, али оне знају и за периоде
сарадње – који потичу још од времена Ататурковог
отварања према новом Совјетском Савезу током
двадесетих година 20. века. Данас, слични интереси
између Анкаре и Москве воде ка све тешњим везама у
области трговине, безбедности и цивилне заштите у
региону Црног мора.
Запад више нема монопол
над будућношћу
.
Uni-Multipolar World

Samuel Huntington, "The Lonely
Superpower", Foreign Affairs,
March/April 1999, pp. 35-49.

DURING THE past decade global politics has changed
fundamentally in two ways. First, it has been substantially
reconfigured along cultural and civilizational lines, as I
have highlighted in the pages of this journal and
documented at length in The Clash of Civilizations and
the Remaking of World Order. Second, as argued in that
book, global politics is also always about power and the
struggle for power, and today international relations is
changing along that crucial dimension. The global
structure of power in the Cold War was basically bipolar;
the emerging structure is very different.

There is now only one superpower. But that does not mean that the
world is unipolar. A unipolar system would have one superpower, no
significant major powers, and many minor powers. As a result, the
superpower could effectively resolve important international issues
alone, and no combination of other states would have the power to
prevent it from doing so. For several centuries the classical world
under Rome, and at times East Asia under China, approximated this
model. A bipolar system like the Cold War has two superpowers, and
the relations between them are central to international politics. Each
superpower dominates a coalition of allied states and competes with
the other superpower for influence among nonaligned countries. A
multipolar system has several major powers of comparable strength
that cooperate and compete with each other in shifting patterns. A
coalition of major states is necessary to resolve important international
issues. European politics approximated this model for several
centuries.

Contemporary international politics does not fit
any of these three models. It is instead a
strange hybrid, a uni-multipolar system with
one superpower and several major powers.
The settlement of key international issues
requires action by the single superpower but
always with some combination of other major
states; the single superpower can, however,
veto action on key issues by combinations of
other states.

The United States, of course, is the sole state with preeminence in
every domain of power -- economic, military, diplomatic, ideological,
technological, and cultural -- with the reach and capabilities to promote
its interests in virtually every part of the world. At a second level are
major regional powers that are preeminent in areas of the world
without being able to extend their interests and capabilities as globally
as the United States. They include the German-French condominium
in Europe, Russia in Eurasia, China and potentially Japan in East Asia,
India in South Asia, Iran in Southwest Asia, Brazil in Latin America,
and South Africa and Nigeria in Africa. At a third level are secondary
regional powers whose interests often conflict with the more powerful
regional states. These include Britain in relation to the German-French
combination, Ukraine in relation to Russia, Japan in relation to China,
South Korea in relation to Japan, Pakistan in relation to India, Saudi
Arabia in relation to Iran, and Argentina in relation to Brazil.
Međuzavisnost na više nivoa –
Multilevel Interdependence

Joseph S. Nye, Jr, Understanding
International Conlicts, Longman, New
York, 2005, Fifth Edition

Trenutnu raspodelu moći u svetu
možemo označiti kao međuzavisnost
na više nivoa. Naime, nijedna
pojedinačna hijerarhija ne opisuje na
odgovarajući način današnju svetsku
politiku, kao što to čini ona koja je
prikazuje kao trodimenzionalnu
šahovsku tablu.

U globalnom informatičkom dobu, moć je među državama
raspodeljena po obrascu koji podseća na složenu
trodimenzionalnu šahovsku tablu, na kojoj se igra odvija i
horizontalno i vertikalno. Na vrhu šahovske table gde su
političko-vojna pitanja, vojna moć je uglavnom unipolarna
sa Sjedinjenim Državama kao jedinom supersilom, ali u sredini
table gde su ekonomska pitanja, Sjedinjene Države nisu
hegemon ili imperija, i moraju da se cenjkaju sa Evropom
sa jednakih pozicija kada Evropa deluje kao ujedinjena
celina. Na primer, povodom antimonopolskih ili pitanja koja se
odnose na privredu, one moraju naći kompromis, da bi postigle
sporazum. I na dnu table transnacionalnih odnosa koji prelaze
granice van kontrole vlada država i tako uključuju raznovrsne
aktere kao što su bankari i teroristi, moć se haotično
raspršava.
Vojna dimenzija




Today the United States is not only the world’ s foremost
economic power; it is the dominant military power as well
While America’s military economic advantages are manifold, its
military lead is simply overwhelming.
U. S. Defense expenditures in 2003 were nearly 40 percent of
the global total and almost seven times larger than that of the
number two power (China). To put it another way, U. S. Defense
spending was equal to the amount spent on defense by the
next thirteen countries combined.
The United States also spends more to keep itself in the
vanguard of military technology. The U. S. Department of
Defense now spends over 50 billion dollars annually for
“research, development, testing, and evaluation”, an amount
larger than the entire defense budget of Germany, Great Britain,
France, Russia, Japan or China
Mesto na
rang listi
Država
1
Sjedinjene Američke Države
2
Vojni budžet – u američkim dolarima
Period iz kog potiče
informacija
$ 518,100,000,000
2005 procena
Kina
$ 81,470,000,000
2005 procena
3
Francuska
$ 45,000,000,000
2005
4
Japan
$ 44,310,000,000
2005 procena
5
Velika Britanija
$ 42,836,500,000
2005 procena
6
Nemačka
$ 35,063,000,000
2003
7
Italija
$ 28,182,800,000
2003
8
Južna Koreja
$ 21,050,000,000
2005 procena
9
Indija
$ 19,040,000,000
2005 procena
Saudijska Arabija
$ 18,000,000,000
2005 procena
10


The United States deployed more than 500
000 troops in the Persian Gulf for Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm; mobilized
substantial air, ground, and naval forces in
Kosovo in 1999, and in Afghanistan in 2001;
and then deployed more than 180 000 troops
and other personnel to topple Saddam Hussein
in 2003.
Over - Sea power projection capabilities




Global Military presence
2004- roughly 250 000 soldiers, sailors and
airmen deployed in more than a hundred
countries. It has 1 000 or more troops in at
least a dozen countries, not counting the
forces currently occupying Iraq.
U. S. provides military training for personnel
from over 130 countries
Hundreds of military bases and other facilities
around the world, with an estimated
replacement value of 118 billion dollars.
Ekonomska dimenzija

U pogledu ekonomskih pitanja,
Sjedinjene Države nisu hegemon ili
imperija, i moraju da se cenjkaju sa
Evropom sa jednakih pozicija kada
Evropa deluje kao ujedinjena celina. Na
primer, povodom antimonopolskih ili
pitanja koja se odnose na privredu, one
moraju naći kompromis, da bi postigle
sporazum.
Svet
44,433,002 GDP – Nominalni
1
Evropska unija
13,446,050
2
Sjedinjene Američke Države
12,485,725
3
Japan
4,571,314
4
Nemačka
2,797,343
5
Narodna Republika Kina
2,224,811
6
Velika Britanija
2,201,473
7
Francuska
2,105,864
8
Italija
1,766,160
9
Kanada
1,130,208
10
Španija
1,126,565
11
Južna Koreja
793,070
Mesto na
rang listi
Država
GDP (prema kupovnoj moći)
Period iz kog potiče
informacija
Svet
$ 60,710,000,000,000
2005 procena
1
Sjedinjene Države
$ 12,360,000,000,000
2005 procena
2
Evropska unija
$ 12,180,000,000,000
2005 procena
3
Kina
$ 8,859,000,000,000
2005 procena
4
Japan
$ 4,018,000,000,000
2005 procena
5
Indija
$ 3,611,000,000,000
2005 procena
6
Nemačka
$ 2,504,000,000,000
2005 procena
7
Velika Britanija
$ 1,830,000,000,000
2005 procena
8
Francuska
$ 1,816,000,000,000
2005 procena
9
Italija
$ 1,698,000,000,000
2005 est
GDP po glavi stanovnika 1
Bermudska ostrva
$ 69,900
2004 procena
2
Luksemburg
$ 55,600
2005 procena
3
Ekvatorijalna Gvineja
$ 50,200
2005 procena
4
Ujedinjeni Arapski Emirati
$ 43,400
2005 procena
5
Norveška
$ 42,300
2005 procena
6
Sjedinjene Američke Države
$ 41,800
2005 procena
7
Republika Irska
$ 41,000
2005 procena
8
Ostrvo Gernsi
$ 40,000
2003 procena
9
Ostrvo Džersi
$ 40,000
2003 procena
Britanska Devičanska Ostrva
$ 38,500
2004 procena
10
Transnacionalna dimenzija

Uzmimo kao dodatak pitanjima terorizma samo nekoliko
primera; privatni akteri na globalnom tržištu kapitala
ograničavaju način na koji se kamatne stope mogu
koristiti za upravljanje američkom ekonomijom, a trgovina
droge, AIDS, migracija stanovništva, i globalno
zagrevanje koji imaju duboke društvene korene u više od
jedne zemlje, izvan su kontrole američkih vlasti. U takvoj
jednoj situaciji čini se da nema baš puno smisla koristiti
tradicionalne termine poput unipolarnost, hegemonija ili
imperija s ciljem da se opišu takvi problemi. (Džozef Naj)
Transnacionalna dimenzija

Proces globalizacije stavio je na dnevni red
međunarodnih odnosa sledeće: čak ni
najmoćnija zemlja sveta ne može se hvatati u
koštac sa njom samo sopstvenim snagamauzmite kao dokaz pitanja međunarodne
finansijske stabilnosti, globalnih klimatskih
promena, širenje infektivnih bolesti, i
transnacionalnu trgovinu drogom, kriminal i
terorističke mreže. (Džozef Naj)
Ранг листа девет територијално
највећих држава света
Место на ранг
листи
Држава
Површина у
километрима
квадратним
Свет
510, 072, 000
1.
Руска
Федерација
17, 075, 200
2.
Канада
9,984, 670
3.
САД
9, 631, 420
4.
Кина
9, 596, 960
5.
Бразил
8, 511, 965
6.
Аустралија
7, 686, 850
7.
Европска унија
3, 976, 372
8.
Индија
3, 287, 590
9.
Аргентина
2, 766, 890
Devet država sa najvećim brojem stanovnika na svetu: CIA
Worldfactbook
Mesto na rang listi
Svet
6,525,170,264
1
Kina
1,313,973,713
2
Indija
1,095,351,995
3
Evropska unija
456,953,258
4
Sjedinjene Američke
Države
298,444,215
5
Indonezija
245,452,739
6
Brazil
188,078,227
7
Pakistan
165,803,560
8
Bangladeš
147,365,352
9
Ruska Federacija
142,893,540
Mesto na
rang listi
Država
Broj novorođenih na 1000 stanovnika)
Period iz kog potiče
informacija
1
Niger
50.73
2006 procena
2
Mali
49.82
2006 procena
3
Uganda
47.35
2006 procena
4
Avganistan
46.60
2006 procena
5
Sijera Leone
45.76
2006 procena
6
Čad
45.73
2006 procena
7
Burkina Faso
45.62
2006 procena
8
Somalija
45.13
2006 procena
9
Angola
45.11
2006 procena
10
Liberija
44.77
2006 procena
Mesto na
rang listi
Država
Svet
Dokazane naftne rezerve (u barelima)
Period iz kog potiče
informacija
1,349,000,000,000
1 Januar 2002 procena
1
Saudijska Arabija
262,700,000,000
2005 procena
2
Kanada
178,900,000,000
2004 procena
3
Iran
133,300,000,000
2005 procena
4
Irak
112,500,000,000
2005 procena
5
Ujedinjeni Araoski Emirati
97,800,000,000
2005 procena
6
Kuvajt
96,500,000,000
2005 procena
7
Venecuela
75,590,000,000
2005 procena
8
Ruska Federacija
69,000,000,000
2003 procena
9
Libija
40,000,000,000
2005 procena
Mesto na
rang listi
Država
Svet
Prirodni gas- dokazane reserve (u kubnim
metrima)
Period iz kog potiče
informacija
174,600,000,000,000
1 Januar 2002
1
Ruska Federacija
47,570,000,000,000
2003
2
Iran
26,620,000,000,000
2005
3
Katar
25,770,000,000,000
2005
4
Saudijska Arabija
6,544,000,000,000
2005
5
Ujedinjeni Arapski Emirati
6,006,000,000,000
2005
6
Sjedinjene Američke Države
5,353,000,000,000
1 Januar 2002
7
Alžir
4,531,000,000,000
2005
8
Nigerija
4,502,000,000,000
2005
9
Venecuela
4,191,000,000,000
2005
“
The Age of Nonpolarity - What Will Follow
U.S. Dominance”
By Richard N. Haass
Foreign Affairs , May/June
2008

The principal characteristic of twentyfirst-century international relations is
turning out to be nonpolarity: a world
dominated not by one or two or even
several states but rather by dozens of
actors possessing and exercising
various kinds of power. This represents a
tectonic shift from the past.

In contrast to multipolarity -- which
involves several distinct poles or
concentrations of power -- a
nonpolar international system is
characterized by numerous centers
with meaningful power.

At first glance, the world today may
appear to be multipolar. The major
powers -- China, the European Union
(EU), India, Japan, Russia, and the
United States -- contain just over half the
world's people and account for 75
percent of global GDP and 80 percent of
global defense spending.




Appearances, however, can be deceiving. Today's world
differs in a fundamental way from one of classic
multipolarity: there are many more power centers, and
quite a few of these poles are not nation-states.
Indeed, one of the cardinal features of the contemporary
international system is that nation-states have lost their
monopoly on power and in some domains their
preeminence as well.
States are being challenged from above, by regional and
global organizations; from below, by militias; and from the
side, by a variety of nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and corporations.
Power is now found in many hands and in many places.






In addition to the six major world powers, there are numerous regional powers: Brazil
and, arguably, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela in Latin America; Nigeria and
South Africa in Africa; Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East;
Pakistan in South Asia; Australia, Indonesia, and South Korea in East Asia and
Oceania.
A good many organizations would be on the list of power centers, including those
that are global (the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, the World
Bank), those that are regional (the African Union, the Arab League, the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations, the EU, the Organization of American States, the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), and those that are functional (the
International Energy Agency, OPEC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the
World Health Organization).
So, too, would states within nation-states, such as California and India's Uttar
Pradesh, and cities, such as New York, São Paulo, and Shanghai.
Then there are the large global companies, including those that dominate the worlds
of energy, finance, and manufacturing.
Other entities deserving inclusion would be global media outlets (al Jazeera, the
BBC, CNN), militias (Hamas, Hezbollah, the Mahdi Army, the Taliban), political
parties, religious institutions and movements, terrorist organizations (al Qaeda), drug
cartels, and NGOs of a more benign sort (the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation,
Doctors Without Borders, Greenpeace).
Today's world is increasingly one of distributed, rather than concentrated, power.




In this world, the United States is and will long remain the largest
single aggregation of power. It spends more than $500 billion annually
on its military -- and more than $700 billion if the operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq are included -- and boasts land, air, and naval
forces that are the world's most capable.
Its economy, with a GDP of some $14 trillion, is the world's largest.
The United States is also a major source of culture (through films and
television), information, and innovation.
But the reality of American strength should not mask the relative
decline of the United States' position in the world -- and with this
relative decline in power an absolute decline in influence and
independence.
The U.S. share of global imports is already down to 15 percent.
Although U.S. GDP accounts for over 25 percent of the world's total,
this percentage is sure to decline over time given the actual and
projected differential between the United States' growth rate and those
of the Asian giants and many other countries, a large number of which
are growing at more than two or three times the rate of the United
States.



Although anti-Americanism is widespread, no great-power
rival or set of rivals has emerged to challenge the United
States. In part, this is because the disparity between the
power of the United States and that of any potential rivals
is too great.
The fact that classic great-power rivalry has not come to
pass and is unlikely to arise anytime soon is also partly a
result of the United States' behavior, which has not
stimulated such a response.
A further constraint on the emergence of great-power
rivals is that many of the other major powers are
dependent on the international system for their economic
welfare and political stability. They do not, accordingly,
want to disrupt an order that serves their national
interests

But even if great-power rivals have not emerged, Unipolarity Has Ended.
Three explanations for its demise stand out.

The first is historical. States develop; they get better at generating and
piecing together the human, financial, and technological resources that lead to
productivity and prosperity. The same holds for corporations and other
organizations. The rise of these new powers cannot be stopped. The result is
an ever larger number of actors able to exert influence regionally or globally.
A second cause is U.S. policy. To paraphrase Walt Kelly's Pogo, the postWorld War II comic hero, we have met the explanation and it is us. By both
what it has done and what it has failed to do, the United States has accelerated
the emergence of alternative power centers in the world and has weakened its
own position relative to them…The war in Iraq has also contributed to the
dilution of the United States' position in the world.
Finally, today's nonpolar world is not simply a result of the rise of other
states and organizations or of the failures and follies of U.S. policy. It is
also an inevitable consequence of globalization. Globalization has
increased the volume, velocity, and importance of cross-border flows of just
about everything, from drugs, e-mails, greenhouse gases, manufactured goods,
and people to television and radio signals, viruses (virtual and real), and
weapons.
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Nonpolarity will be difficult and dangerous. But
encouraging a greater degree of global
integration will help promote stability.
Establishing a core group of governments and
others committed to cooperative multilateralism
would be a great step forward. Call it
"concerted nonpolarity." It would not eliminate
nonpolarity, but it would help manage it and
increase the odds that the international system
will not deteriorate or disintegrate
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