Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and
Fragmentation: Trajectories of Militancy
in Kashmir and Pakistan
Paul Staniland
Department of Political Science, MIT
MacMillan Center, Yale University
United States Institute of Peace
pstan@mit.edu
“The public is the most powerful weapon and it is
on our side” - JKLF senior leader Javed Mir, 1993
Greater Kashmir
“The public is the most powerful weapon and it is
on our side” - JKLF senior leader Javed Mir, 1993
“by 1995,
“the
JKLFthe
had
JKLF
an idea,
as anbut
armed
not group
a base”
was
(interview,
no longer
Kashmir,
a
force tosummer
seriously
2009)
reckon with, although its agenda
for a free, independent Kashmir still fired the hearts
ofKashmir
Greater
many, if not most, Kashmiris” (Sikand 2002)
The Rise of Hizbul Mujahideen
“not supported by a majority of Kashmiri Muslims”
(Behera 2000)
“the most militarily well organized of all the jehadi
organizations in Pakistan and Kashmir” (Rana 2004)
Who Cares?
Effects of Insurgent Organization

Victory and defeat in civil war

Rape and mass killing

Effectiveness of counterinsurgency strategy

Success and failure in peace negotiations
Questions

How do we conceptualize and measure
cohesion?
Questions

How do we conceptualize and measure
cohesion?

How do insurgent groups build themselves in
the midst of rebellion against capable states?
Questions

How do we conceptualize and measure
cohesion?

How do insurgent groups build themselves in
the midst of rebellion against capable states?

What explains consequent variation in
insurgent cohesion across time and space?
Findings

Social networks matter more than popular support or
ideological appeal

Robust, pre-existing social structures underpin
cohesion, not mass popularity, “the people,” or hearts
and minds
Findings

Social networks matter more than popular support or
ideological appeal


Robust, pre-existing social structures underpin
cohesion, not mass popularity, “the people,” or hearts
and minds
When fighting capable states, external aid bolsters
insurgent cohesion

Resource-richness need not lead to loot-seeking and
indiscipline
Research Design

Scope - ethnic insurgent civil wars in militarily
capable, politically-resolved states

Cases - 19 significant insurgent organizations in:



Kashmir, 1988-2008
Northern Ireland, 1962-2005
Sri Lanka, 1972-2009
Research Design

Scope - ethnic insurgent civil wars in militarily
capable, politically-resolved states

Cases - 19 significant insurgent organizations in:




Sub-national comparisons


Kashmir, 1988-2008
Northern Ireland, 1962-2005
Sri Lanka, 1972-2009
Variation within the same war and society
Cross-national comparisons
Research Methods

13 months of fieldwork in N. Ireland, India,
Indian-administered Kashmir, and Sri Lanka

Interviews


130+ current and former militants, politicians,
government officials, journalists, academics,
analysts, aid workers
Written sources





Internal documents and diaries
Memoirs and oral histories
Propaganda
Journalism
History and anthropology
Defining and Measuring Cohesion

Cohesion: fighters and factions obey orders and
rarely launch splits or violent internal challenges

Focus on:



Internal Unrest: splits, feuds, coups, defiance
Internal Compliance: fighters and leaders respect orders,
peaceful leadership successions
Measurement: examine each group over time along
a variety of indicators

Frequency, Intensity, Issues, Autonomy
Existing Theories

Popular Support

Political Economy

State Policy
Explaining Insurgent Cohesion

Two key variables:
 1. Group’s social base

2. Access to external state and diaspora support
Explaining Insurgent Cohesion

Two key variables:
 1. Group’s social base


2. Access to external state and diaspora support
Distinct types of insurgent organization emerge:
 Cohesive
 State-Reliant
 Consensus-Contingent
 Factionalized
Social Bases

Pervasive “social appropriation” (McAdam et
al. 2001) of pre-existing networks
Social Bases

Pervasive “social appropriation” (McAdam et
al. 2001) of pre-existing networks

These are insurgent social bases
Social Bases

Pervasive “social appropriation” (McAdam et
al. 2001) of pre-existing networks

These are insurgent social bases

Variation in social bases:


Embeddedness of insurgent leaders within local
communities
Pre-existing social links between different leaders
Types of Insurgent Social Base

Bonding Network: robust pre-existing social
relationships between local communities and
insurgent leaders, and among leaders

Historically-rooted overlap of local and extra-local
social ties
Types of Insurgent Social Base

Bonding Network: robust pre-existing social
relationships between local communities and
insurgent leaders, and among leaders


Historically-rooted overlap of local and extra-local
social ties
Coalition Network: weak pre-existing social
relationships between local communities and
insurgent leaders, and/or among leaders
Social Bases and Organizations

Bonding Network

Social Integration
Pre-existing structures of collective action hold
together organization at the top and from below


Elite Cooperation
Local Incorporation
Social Bases and Organizations

Bonding Network

Pre-existing structures of collective action hold
together organization at the top and from below



Elite Cooperation
Local Incorporation
Coalition Network

Social Integration
Social Division
“Median voter” or mass appeal insufficient if lacking
embedded links to community and between leaders


Elite Distrust
Weak Local Incorporation
Effects of External Support
In capable-state context, external aid crucial
Effects of External Support
In capable-state context, external aid crucial

Aid leads to military
strength



High organizational
capacity
Resource
centralization
Fighters and factions
join and remain
Effects of External Support
In capable-state context, external aid crucial

Aid leads to military
strength



High organizational
capacity
Resource
centralization
Fighters and factions
join and remain

Lack of aid leads to
military weakness



Low organizational
capacity
Resource diffusion
Fighters and factions
defect and dissent
High External Aid
Bonding Network
Coalition Network
Cohesive (Durable)
High External Aid
Cohesive (Durable)
Low External Aid
Consensus-Contingent
(Intermediate)
Bonding Network
Coalition Network
High External Aid
Cohesive (Durable)
Low External Aid
Consensus-Contingent
(Intermediate)
High External Aid
State-Reliant
(Intermediate)
Bonding Network
Coalition Network
High External Aid
Cohesive (Durable)
Low External Aid
Consensus-Contingent
(Intermediate)
High External Aid
State-Reliant
(Intermediate)
Low External Aid
Factionalized (Fragile)
Bonding Network
Coalition Network
Insurgency in Kashmir

Territory divided between India
and Pakistan


Insurgency, 1988-Present


Central to India-Pakistan wars and
confrontations
~70,000 dead
Militancy has spilled out into
broader subcontinent
Major Areas of
Insurgency
Insurgents Fighting India in Kashmir

Comparative Cases:



6 indigenous Kashmiri
organizations
3 Pakistani organizations
Research




2 trips to Kashmir Valley (May
‘08 and July ‘09)
Multiple trips to New Delhi
Interviews with all sides of
conflict
Primary and secondary written
sources in English and Urdu
Two Empirical Puzzles

Highly popular JKLF was the most
fragmented, while far less politically popular
Hizb the most cohesive

Not a popularity contest
Two Empirical Puzzles

Highly popular JKLF was the most
fragmented, while far less politically popular
Hizb the most cohesive


Not a popularity contest
Pro-Pakistan groups varied in cohesion
despite common sponsorship

Not driven solely by Pakistani machinations
My Argument: Varying Social Bases

Groups structurally able to mobilize different types
of social networks/institutions in ‘88-’91
My Argument: Varying Social Bases

Groups structurally able to mobilize different types
of social networks/institutions in ‘88-’91

Groups built around coalition networks were unable
to channel and control Pakistani aid effectively


JKLF, Ikhwan, MJF [Harkat, Jaish] - despite different
popularity and ideologies - took broadly similar trajectories
Loss of aid contributed to further fragmentation
My Argument: Varying Social Bases

Groups structurally able to mobilize different types
of social networks/institutions in ‘88-’91

Groups built around coalition networks were unable
to channel and control Pakistani aid effectively



JKLF, Ikhwan, MJF [Harkat, Jaish] - despite different
popularity and ideologies - took broadly similar trajectories
Loss of aid contributed to further fragmentation
Groups built around bonding networks channeled
command and material through robust, pre-existing
social relationships

Hizbul Mujahideen [Lashkar]
Cohesive
State-reliant
Hizbul Mujahideen (90-)* JKLF (‘88-91)*
Lashkar-e-Taiba (1987-)
Ikhwan (‘91-’95)
MJF (‘89-’96)
Al-Umar (‘89-’94)
Harkat (‘80-’99)
Jaish (‘99-’01)
Consensus-Contingent Factionalized
Hizbul Mujahideen (‘89)* JKLF (‘91-’96)*
Ikhwan (‘95-98)
Jaish (‘02-)
Harkat (‘99-)
JKLF: Social Base

Structure: no routinized access to sources of
collective action in Kashmir Valley


Not linked to parties or religious authorities
Result: rapid, heterogeneous expansion


Individuals and factions merge in and out of the
JKLF at will
No pre-existing social control mechanisms
JKLF Fragmentation

Pakistani support: 1988-1990

State-reliant group that attracts recruits and
(some) compliance due to Pakistani aid
JKLF Fragmentation

Pakistani support: 1988-1990


State-reliant group that attracts recruits and
(some) compliance due to Pakistani aid
Loss of external support: 1991-1996

JKLF factionalized and internally-divided over
numerous issues


Splits (up to 20), feuds, fratricide
High popular support insufficient to hold
group together
“The JKLF had an idea, but not a base”
Interview, Srinagar, July 2009
Hizbul Mujahideen: Social Base

Non-violent Jamaat-e-Islami cadre party

Overlap (since 1940s) of:




Traditional JI families
Local party branches and schools
Ijtimas, annual congregations, intermarriage across
villages and over time
Limited popular support

“incapable of reaching out to vast numbers of
ordinary Kashmiris” (Sikand 2002)
Forging Hizb Cohesion

Jamaat network mobilizes for war in 1989
Forging Hizb Cohesion

Jamaat network mobilizes for war in 1989

High command and Shura Council dominated
by Jamaatis

Key leaders almost all JI or JI-linked by 1991
Forging Hizb Cohesion

Jamaat network mobilizes for war in 1989

High command and Shura Council dominated
by Jamaatis


Key leaders almost all JI or JI-linked by 1991
Local Jamaatis spread throughout Kashmir
as fighters, recruiters, talent spotters

Expands without fracturing
Implications and Extensions

Insurgency not about the median voter: focus
instead on social networks and institutions
Implications and Extensions

Insurgency not about the median voter: focus
instead on social networks and institutions

No simple relationship between material
variables and organizational outcomes

Beyond “greed” (and “narco-insurgency”)
Implications and Extensions

Insurgency not about the median voter: focus
instead on social networks and institutions

No simple relationship between material
variables and organizational outcomes


Beyond “greed” (and “narco-insurgency”)
Next Steps:


Expanding empirics
Studying change/evolution
Q&A
The State: Strategic Manipulator?

Reasons for skepticism:




1. Bad intelligence
2. Disconnect between military and political aims
3. State internally disorganized
State more reactive than proactive
The State: Examples

State does not drive fragmentation:




Tamil Jaffna 1980s
Kashmir rural areas, early/mid-1990s
PIRA and INLA splits from OIRA, late 60s/early
70s
State fails to fragment groups despite efforts:



PIRA in mid-1970s
Hizb until 2000
LTTE, 1972-2009 (Karuna split not exception)
External Support: Logics

Exogenous: external actors support groups for
reasons largely unrelated to their prior cohesion

Endogenous: external actors support groups for
reasons closely related to their prior cohesion

Find empirical support for exogenous logic:
sponsors support groups with same war aims even if fragmented or internally divided

Early years marked by massive uncertainty - sponsors
hedge by supporting groups with similar goals
External Support: Examples

“the role the Provisionals saw for themselves, defending
nationalists in the North and defending the British Army,
was far more in keeping with what people, especially
Irish America, understood.” Swan 2008, p. 223.

“like the Pakistan government, organizations such as the
Jamaat [of Pakistan] are highly selective in which
militants they support: basically those that share their
Islamic ideology and have the same aspirations for
Kashmir.” Malik 2002, p. 298.
Fine-Grained Measurement and Predictions
Frequency
Intensity
Autonomy Issues
Cohesive [I]
Rare
Low
Low
PoliticalMilitary
State-Reliant
[II]
Intermediate
Low
Low
Distribution
ConsensusContingent
[III]
Intermediate
High
High
PoliticalMilitary
Factionalized
[IV]
Common
High
High
Many
Extending the Empirics:
Capable state & ethnic minority rebellion






Turkey (Kurdish areas)
Iraq
(Kurdish/Shiite/Sunni)
Russia (Chechnya)
China (Tibet)
Pakistan (NWFP/Sindh)
India (Northeast/
Punjab)






Indonesia (Aceh/Dar-ul
Islam/East Timor)
Anti-Soviet/German
partisans
Algeria (1992-)
Thailand
Palestinian territories
Burma
Other Resources?


Do drugs, minerals, and other illicit flows have a
similar effect as state/diaspora aid?
Research agenda:


Two possibilities:



In India, Pakistan, and SE Asia, will examine groups with
access to mineral and drug resources
Different nature of resource flows (not top-down) may
diffuse power and authority and lead to fragmentation, or
Some groups may be able to harness these resources in a
similar manner to external aid
Initial sense: heavily dependent on state power when strong, constrains group behavior
Types of Social Base
Strong Local
Embeddedness
Weak Local
Embeddedness
Strong
Bonding Network
Leadership
Ties
Foco-ist Network
(Coalition)
Weak
Parochial Network
Leadership (Coalition)
Ties
Anomic Network
(Coalition)
Where Do Social Bases Come From?

Deeply historically-rooted



Products of complex, contingent processes of social
mobilization and state response in previous decades or
centuries
“Sticky” over time - facts on the ground by the time of a
conflict, reproduced by family and social relationships
and identities
Not endogenous to onset of conflict in question


Can be traced back decades or more prior to war
Often originally non-militant or even apolitical
Why These Scope Conditions?

Civil wars vary dramatically







Insurgent vs. Conventional
Secessionist vs. Center-seeking
Ethnic vs. Ideological
Strong state vs. Weak state
Democracy vs. Authoritarian
I focus on one common context that poses a
shared set of challenges to cohesion
Tight scope, but lays basis for cumulative
research within and across types of wars
What is Cohesion?

In this conceptualization, looks at both the
structural integrity of the group and the
commitment of individual members

Not the same as success - can contribute,
but is not a sufficient condition for victory

Focused on insurgent organizations - not the
same as “ethnic group” or “opposition
movement” cohesion
Overall Distribution of Cases
Cohesive
State-reliant
PIRA (72-05)
LTTE (83-09)
Hizb (90-)
LeT (87-)
Ikhwan
MJF
Al-Umar
EPRLF (87-90)
TELO
Jaish (99-01)
Harkat (80-99)
Consensus-Contingent
Factionalized
EPRLF (81-87)
PIRA (1969-72)
Official IRA (1962-76)
LTTE (1972-83)
Hizb (‘89)
INLA
PLOT
EROS
Ikhwan (95-)
IPLO
RIRA
Harkat (99-)
JKLF (‘88-90)
Al Jehad
JKLF (‘91-96)
Jaish (01-)
Social Ties Over Ideology


“we couldn’t disagree with a word the man [an OIRA
representative] said, all his arguments were totally right,
totally justified. The Provisionals leadership was
reactionary and Catholic, they went against what we
believed in. But we just said: ‘Yeah, but what’s my da
and ma going to say if I go home and tell them I’m
going with the Reds?’ There was a real thing about the
communist threat about that time. And family tradition
counted for a lot.” Devenport and Sharrock 1997, p. 69.
“the success of the Officials in hanging on to the Lower
Falls is more a tribute to his [Sullivan’s] personality
than to the popularity of his political message.”
Bishop and Mallie 1987, p. 146.
Guns and Money Over Ideology

Northern Ireland



Joe Cahill: “they wanted to know if we had guns for them. That
was their main concern. . . they would not give up their
allegiance to the Official IRA until they were certain they would
get weapons.” Anderson 2002, p. 188.
PIRA recruit: “I never thought of joining the Stickies [the Official
IRA]. I felt that Provies wanted to get the gear and that was
good enough for me.” Bishop and Mallie 1987, p. 153.
Kashmir


“I agreed to send some of our boys to Pakistan for training [in
JKLF camps] in handling sophisticated weapons as it would have
helped us in our plans.” Noorani in Thomas 1992, p. 263.
Ghulam Rasool Shah:”We took training from them [JKLF], but
made it clear that we stand for merging Kashmir with Pakistan.”
“Profile in Passion,” Newsline, Feb 2001, p. 34.
The Importance of External Aid




“state support has had a profound impact on the
effectiveness of many rebel movements. . . . out of the
74 post-Cold War insurgencies surveyed, state support,
we believe, played a major in initiating, sustaining,
bringing to victory, or otherwise assisting 44 of them.”
Byman et al 2001, p. xiv.
“Without the constant supply of weapons, the IRA would
be lost and the whole republican structure would quickly
break down.” Holland, p. 62.
“no militant group can operate for long [in Kashmir]
without outside funding, training and arms.” Malik 2002,
p. 298.
Lyall and Wilson III 2009, Johnston 2009, Salehyan 2009
Does External Aid Lead to Thuggery?



“the IRA’s resources, however dubiously or criminally
attained, are overwhelmingly channeled back into
mission-related activities. . . . group-oriented,
nonpecuniary, and nonegoistic motivations have been key
to both recruitment and retention.” O’Leary 2007, p. 207
“Our evidence of the rank-and-file terrorists does not
support the view that they are mindless hooligans
drawn from the unemployed and unemployable.”
Moloney 2002, p. 174 quoting British Army in 1978
Hizb “became a sophisticated political movement, not
just a bunch of gun-toting thugs” Joshi 1999, p. 86
Sri Lanka

5 major Tamil militant groups, 1972-2009:







Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO)
People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOT)
Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF)
Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS)
Extreme variation on DV
Argument:




LTTE: Cohesive (caste/regional networks + Indian, then diaspora
support)
TELO: State-reliant on India
EPRLF: intermediate case (elements of both consensuscontingent and state-reliant at different points)
PLOT and EROS: Factionalized
Jamaat-e-Islami
“the JI shows a uniform pattern: a committed, hard
core following that amounts to only a small fraction
of the population. Thus, as a political party the JI
has consistently fared poorly in electoral contests in
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Kashmir, incapable of
mustering more than a few percentage points of the
popular vote. Nonetheless, all these JI branches
have a long-standing reputation for committed
cadres and organizational acumen”
- Bose 2007
Trajectories of Militancy
Bonding Network
Coalition Network
State-reliant [II]
Significant Cohesive [I]
Disciplined and controlled Insurgent proxy armies
External
in both war and peace propped up from afar; rely
Support
“organizational weapon”
on sponsor materiel for
Minimal
External
Support
(Provisional IRA, LTTE,
Lashkar-e-Taiba)
internal control
(TELO, Jaish-eMohammed, Ikhwan)
Consensuscontingent [III]
Factionalized [IV]
Rely on norms and trust,
but weak internal coercion
and fighting power
(Official IRA, EPRLF)
Deeply divided and
fractious - split over
numerous issues
(INLA, PLOTE, IPLO)