1AC
Plan - The United States federal government should substantially curtail its domestic surveillance by
strengthening the USA FREEDOM Act to:
require use of a “specific selection term” to satisfy the “reasonable, articulable suspicion
standard”
require that information collected through “pen register or trap and trace devices” via
emergency authorizations be subject to the same procedural safeguards as non-emergency collections.
require “super minimization" procedures that delete information obtained about a person not
connected to the investigation.
Advantage 1 – privacy (short version)
Advantage 2 – Internet freedom (democracy scenario)
Advantage 3 – Humint
1NC
TPP
Obama’s all in on TPP, but PC key to bring deal itself across congressional finish line –
it’s the mother of all trade fights because its perceived as setting the new framework
for ALL FUTURE TRADE DEALS
Vinik, 15 -- Danny Vinik is a staff writer at The New Republic, New Republic, 4/8/15,
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/121476/trans-pacific-partnership-foundation-all-future-tradedeals
A theme runs through these four disagreements: They're overrated. The actual effects of the TPP are exaggerated. Labor
unions warn
about mass job losses and the Obama Administration touts the significant labor provisions in the law, but
the academic evidence largely points to small job losses or gains. The left demands a chapter on currency manipulation
while knowing that the 11 other TPP countries will never accept one without significant restrictions on
the Federal Reserve. Even for Washington, a town where every policy decisions becomes a massive
lobbying free-for-all, the TPP seems overblown. Until, that is, you consider what’s really at stake with the
TPP. "I think its larger importance is trying to establish a new framework under which global trade deals
will be done,” said Hanson. “Now that the [World Trade Organization] seems to be pretty much ineffective
as a form for negotiating new trade deals, we need a new rubric." Looked at through that lens, it makes
sense why both the unions and the Obama administration have spent so much political capital on the
TPP. If the TPP sets the framework for future trade deals, it could be a long time before unions have
the leverage again to push for a crackdown on currency manipulation. They understand, as the Obama
Administration and many interest groups do, what much of the media doesn't: The TPP isn't just a 12-country
trade deal. It's much bigger than that. When I shared this theory with Jared Bernstein, he began to rethink his position. “When
you put it that way, I kind of feel myself being pulled back into the initial title of my post,” he said. “In other words, if this is the last
big trade deal, then perhaps the absence of a currency chapter is a bigger deal than I thought.” If the TPP
could determine the course of global trade for decades to come, then each interest group has a huge
incentive to fight for every last policy concession. It explains why labor and business groups are
putting huge amounts of money into this fight. That money and the accompanying rhetoric has only
made it harder for policy journalists to cut through these complex debates. It may take decades before we
really understand the stakes of the TPP.
Freedom act passage changed the politics – any additional new surveillance limits
uniquely drains PC
Gross, 6/5 – Grant, Grant Gross covers technology and telecom policy in the U.S. government for the IDG News Service, and is based
in Washington, D.C., IDG News Service, PC World, 6/5/15, http://www.pcworld.com/article/2932337/dont-expect-major-changes-to-nsasurveillance-from-congress.html
Don't expect major changes to NSA surveillance from Congress After the U.S. Congress approved what critics
have called modest limits on the National Security Agency’s collection of domestic telephone records, many lawmakers may be
reluctant to further change the government’s surveillance programs. The Senate this week passed the USA
Freedom Act, which aims to end the NSA’s mass collection of domestic phone records, and President Barack Obama signed the bill hours
later. After that action, expect Republican leaders in both the Senate and the House of Representatives to
resist further calls for surveillance reform. That resistance is at odds with many rank-and-file lawmakers,
including many House Republicans, who want to further limit NSA programs brought to light by former agency contractor Edward Snowden.
Civil liberties groups and privacy advocates also promise to push for more changes. It may be
difficult to get “broad, sweeping
reform” through Congress, but many lawmakers seem ready to push for more changes, said Adam Eisgrau, managing director of the
office of government relations for the American Library Association. The ALA has charged the NSA surveillance programs violate the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. “Congress is not allowed to be tired of surveillance
reform unless it’s prepared to say it’s tired of the Fourth Amendment,” Eisgrau said. “The American public will not accept that.” Other
activists are less optimistic about more congressional action. “It will a long slog getting more
restraints,” J. Kirk Wiebe, a former NSA analyst and whistleblower said by email. ”The length of that journey will depend on public outcry—
that is the one thing that is hard to gauge.” With the USA Freedom Act, “elected officials have opted to reach for
low-hanging fruit,” said Bill Blunden, a cybersecurity researcher and surveillance critic. “The theater
we’ve just witnessed allows decision makers to boast to their constituents about reforming mass
surveillance while spies understand that what’s actually transpired is hardly major change.” The “actual
physical mechanisms” of surveillance programs remain largely intact. Blunden added by email. “Politicians may
dither around the periphery but they are unlikely to institute fundamental changes.”
Impact is multiple scenarios for conflict throughout asia and east asia – impact D and
thumpers don’t apply – TPP is necessary AND sufficient condition, accesses every
structural check – 11 reasons
-
Pivot
Institutions and Rules that moderate and constrain Territorial disputes and escalation
US regional leadership
Perception and credibility of US regional commitment
Perception and Regional credibility of US-Japan alliance effectiveness
Economy
Trade
Economic interdependence
Peaceful china rise and transition
Rule of law
Outweighs US military shift
Economist 14. [11-15-14 --- http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21631797-americaneeds-push-free-trade-pact-pacific-more-vigorously-americas-big-bet]
Mr Froman, the trade tsar, puts
TPP into a dauntingly ambitious context. He calls it central to America’s pivot to
Asia, a chance to show the country’s commitment to creating institutions that moderate territorial
disputes, and an opportunity to show emerging economies (meaning China) what economic rules the
global economy should follow. “At a time when there is uncertainty about the direction of the global
trading system, TPP can play a central role in setting rules of the road for a critical region in flux,” he says.
The flipside of this is that failure becomes an even bigger risk, which Mr Froman acknowledges. Perhaps in an effort to
prod a somnolent, introspective Congress into action, he makes the dramatic claim that failure could mean America “would forfeit its
seat at the centre of the global economy”. Many pundits in Washington agree that American leadership in
Asia is on the table. Michael Green of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies says TPP failure would
“undermine the impression of the United States as a Pacific power and look like an abdication of
leadership”. It would also take pressure off Japan and China to reform their economies. Mireya Solís, a
Japan expert at the Brookings Institution, says it would be a “devastating blow to the United States’
credibility”. Those views are echoed in East Asia. Mr Tay in Singapore says TPP failure would be a disaster: “If
the domestic issues of these two countries cannot be resolved, there is no sense that the US-Japan
alliance can provide any kind of steerage for the region.” Deborah Elms, head of the Singapore-based Asian Trade
Centre, suggests that so far the American pivot has manifested itself mainly as an extra 1,000 marines stationed in Australia. “Without
TPP, all the pivot amounts to is a few extra boots on the ground in Darwin,” she says. Even members of
America’s armed forces are worried. As one senior serving officer in the Pacific puts it, “the TPP unites
countries that are committed to a trade-based future, transparency and the rule of law. It is the model
that the United States and Europe have advanced versus that advanced by China. It is an opportunity to
move the arc of Chinese development, or identify it as a non-participant.”
Nuclear war
Landay 00 (Jonathan S., National Security and Intelligence Correspondent, Knight Ridder/Tribune
News Service, 3-10, Lexis)
Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But
even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a
nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the
kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in
Cold War Europe. “Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile,” said Bates Gill, director
of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. “We see the convergence of great
power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are
elements for potential disaster.” In an effort to cool the region’s tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and
National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia’s capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There
are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would
instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no
defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear
weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable
Asia, with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources, indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous
U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the
Commerce Department.
Terrorism DA
Uniqueness – Domestic surveillance successfully checks terror incidents now. Prefer
longitudinal studies.
Boot ‘13
Max Boot is a Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. In 2004, he was named by the
World Affairs Councils of America as one of "the 500 most influential people in the United States in the field of foreign policy."
In 2007, he won the Eric Breindel Award for Excellence in Opinion Journalism. From 1992 to 1994 he was an editor and writer at
the Christian Science Monitor. Boot holds a bachelor's degree in history, with high honors, from the University of California,
Berkeley and a master's degree in history from Yale University. Boot has served as an adviser to U.S. commanders in Iraq and
Afghanistan. He is the published author of Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the
Present. From the article: “Stay calm and let the NSA carry on” - LA Times – June 9th http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/09/opinion/la-oe-boot-nsa-surveillance-20130609
After 9/11, there was a widespread expectation of many more terrorist attacks on the United States. So far that hasn't
happened. We haven't escaped entirely unscathed (see Boston Marathon, bombing of), but on the whole we have been a lot safer than most
security experts, including me, expected. In light of the current controversy over the National Security Agency's monitoring of telephone calls and
emails, it is worthwhile to ask: Why is that? It is certainly not due to any change of heart among our enemies.
Radical Islamists still want to kill American infidels. But the vast majority of the time, they fail. The Heritage Foundation estimated last year that 50 terrorist attacks on the American
homeland had been foiled since 2001. Some, admittedly, failed through sheer incompetence on the part of the would-be terrorists. For instance, Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani American
jihadist, planted a car bomb in Times Square in 2010 that started smoking before exploding, thereby alerting two New Yorkers who in turn called police, who were able to defuse it. But it would be naive to adduce all of our security
more attacks would have succeeded absent the ramped-up counter-terrorism efforts
undertaken by the U.S. intelligence community, the military and law enforcement. And a large element of the intelligence community's
success lies in its use of special intelligence — that is, communications intercepts. The CIA is notoriously deficient in human intelligence — infiltrating spies into terrorist
organizations is hard to do, especially when we have so few spooks who speak Urdu, Arabic, Persian and other relevant languages. But the NSA is the best in the world at intercepting communications. That is the
most important technical advantage we have in the battle against fanatical foes who will not hesitate to
sacrifice their lives to take ours. Which brings us to the current kerfuffle over two NSA monitoring programs that have been exposed by the
Guardian and the Washington Post. One program apparently collects metadata on all telephone calls made in the United States. Another program provides access to all the
emails, videos and other data found on the servers of major Internet firms such as Google, Apple and Microsoft. At first
blush these intelligence-gathering activities raise the specter of Big Brother snooping on ordinary American citizens who might
be cheating on their spouses or bad-mouthing the president. In fact, there are considerable safeguards built into both programs to ensure
that doesn't happen. The phone-monitoring program does not allow the NSA to listen in on
conversations without a court order. All that it can do is to collect information on the time, date and
destination of phone calls. It should go without saying that it would be pretty useful to know if someone in the U.S. is calling a number in Pakistan or Yemen that is used by a terrorist organizer. As for
success to pure serendipity. Surely
the Internet-monitoring program, reportedly known as PRISM, it is apparently limited to "non-U.S. persons" who are abroad and thereby enjoy no constitutional protections. These are hardly rogue operations. Both programs were
initiated by President George W. Bush and continued by President Obama with the full knowledge and support of Congress and continuing oversight from the federal judiciary. That's why the leaders of both the House and Senate
It's possible that, like all government programs, these could be
abused — see, for example, the IRS making life tough on tea partiers. But there is no evidence of abuse so far and plenty of evidence — in the
lack of successful terrorist attacks — that these programs have been effective in disrupting terrorist plots. Granted there is something inherently
intelligence committees, Republicans and Democrats alike, have come to the defense of these activities.
creepy about Uncle Sam scooping up so much information about us. But Google, Facebook, Amazon, Twitter, Citibank and other companies know at least as much about us, because they use very similar data-mining programs to
track our online movements. They gather that information in order to sell us products, and no one seems to be overly alarmed. The NSA is gathering that information to keep us safe from terrorist attackers. Yet somehow its actions
have become a "scandal," to use a term now loosely being tossed around. The real scandal here is that the Guardian and Washington Post are compromising our national security by telling our enemies about our intelligencegathering capabilities. Their news stories reveal, for example, that only nine Internet companies share information with the NSA. This is a virtual invitation to terrorists to use other Internet outlets for searches, email, apps and all
to stop or scale back the NSA's special intelligence efforts would amount to
unilateral disarmament in a war against terrorism that is far from over.
the rest. No intelligence effort can ever keep us 100% safe, but
(Note to students: a “longitudinal study” is research carried out over an extended period of time. In this
case, several years.)
Link – curtailing surveillance boosts terror risks. That risk’s serious and
underestimated.
Lewis ‘14
James Andrew Lewis is a senior fellow and director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies in Washington, D.C., where he writes on technology, security, and the international economy. Before
joining CSIS, he worked at the US Departments of State and Commerce as a Foreign Service officer and as a member of the
Senior Executive Service. His diplomatic experience included negotiations on military basing in Asia, the Cambodia peace
process, and the five-power talks on arms transfer restraint. Lewis received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago.
“Underestimating Risk in the Surveillance Debate” - CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES - STRATEGIC
TECHNOLOGIES PROGRAM – December - http://csis.org/publication/underestimating-risk-surveillance-debate
Americans are reluctant to accept terrorism is part of their daily lives, but attacks have been planned or
attempted against American targets (usually airliners or urban areas) almost every year since 9/11. Europe faces even greater
risk, given the thousands of European Union citizens who will return hardened and radicalized from fighting in Syria and Iraq. The threat of attack is
easy to exaggerate, but that does not mean it is nonexistent. Australia’s then-attorney general said in August 2013 that
communications surveillance had stopped four “mass casualty events” since 2008. The constant planning and preparation for attack by terrorist groups is not
apparent to the public. The
dilemma in assessing risk is that it is discontinuous. There can be long periods with
no noticeable activity, only to have the apparent calm explode. The debate over how to reform
communications surveillance has discounted this risk. Communications surveillance is an essential law enforcement
and intelligence tool. There is no replacement for it. Some suggestions for alternative approaches to
surveillance, such as the idea that the National Security Agency (NSA) only track known or suspected terrorists, reflect wishful
thinking, as it is the unknown terrorist who will inflict the greatest harm.
Vigilance link - Strong intel gathering’s key to discourages initiation of BW attacks.
Pittenger ‘14
US Rep. Robert Pittenger, chair of Congressional Task Force on Terrorism, “Bipartisan bill on NSA data collection protects both
privacy and national security” - Washington Examiner, 6/9/14, http://washingtonexaminer.com/rep.-robert-pittengerbipartisan-bill-on-nsa-data-collection-protects-both-privacy-and-nationalsecurity/article/2549456?custom_click=rss&utm_campaign=Weekly+Standard+Story+Box&utm_source=weeklystandard.com&
utm_medium=referral
This February, I took
that question to a meeting of European Ambassadors at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe. During the conference, I asked three questions: 1. What is the current worldwide terrorist threat? 2. What is America’s role in addressing and mitigating this
threat? 3. What
role does intelligence data collection play in this process, given the multiple platforms for attack
including physical assets, cyber, chemical, biological, nuclear and the electric grid? Each ambassador
acknowledged the threat was greater today than before 9/11, with al Qaeda and other extreme Islamist terrorists
stronger, more sophisticated, and having a dozen or more training camps throughout the Middle East and
Africa. As to the role of the United States, they felt our efforts were primary and essential for peace and
security around the world. Regarding the intelligence-gathering, their consensus was, “We want privacy, but
we must have your intelligence.” As a European foreign minister stated to me, “Without U.S. intelligence, we are blind.” We cannot
yield to those loud but misguided voices who view the world as void of the deadly and destructive intentions of
unrelenting terrorists. The number of terrorism-related deaths worldwide doubled between 2012 and 2013, jumping from
10,000 to 20,000 in just one year. Now is not the time to stand down. Those who embrace an altruistic worldview
should remember that vigilance and strength have deterred our enemies in the past. That same
commitment is required today to defeat those who seek to destroy us and our way of life. We must make careful,
prudent use of all available technology to counter their sophisticated operations if we are to maintain our freedom and
liberties.
Bioterror attacks cause extinction
Mhyrvold ‘13
Nathan, Began college at age 14, BS and Masters from UCLA, Masters and PhD, Princeton “Strategic Terrorism: A Call to
Action,” Working Draft, The Lawfare Research Paper Series Research paper NO . 2 – 2013
As horrible as this would be, such a pandemic is by no means the worst attack one can imagine, for several reasons. First, most
of the classic
bioweapons are based on 1960s and 1970s technology because the 1972 treaty halted bioweapons
development efforts in the United States and most other Western countries. Second, the Russians, although solidly
committed to biological weapons long after the treaty deadline, were never on the cutting edge of biological research. Third and most important, the
science
and technology of molecular biology have made enormous advances, utterly transforming the field in the last
few decades. High school biology students routinely perform molecular-biology manipulations that would
have been impossible even for the best superpower-funded program back in the heyday of biologicalweapons research. The biowarfare methods of the 1960s and 1970s are now as antiquated as the
lumbering mainframe computers of that era. Tomorrow’s terrorists will have vastly more deadly bugs to
choose from. Consider this sobering development: in 2001, Australian researchers working on mousepox, a nonlethal virus that infects mice (as chickenpox
does in humans), accidentally discovered that a simple genetic modification transformed the virus.10, 11 Instead of producing mild symptoms, the new virus killed
60% of even those mice already immune to the naturally occurring strains of mousepox. The new virus, moreover, was unaffected by any existing vaccine or
antiviral drug. A team of researchers at Saint Louis University led by Mark Buller picked up on that work and, by late 2003, found a way to improve on it: Buller’s
variation on mousepox was 100% lethal, although his team of investigators also devised combination vaccine and antiviral therapies that
were partially effective in protecting animals from the engineered strain.12, 13 Another saving grace is that the genetically altered virus is no
longer contagious. Of course, it is quite possible that future tinkering with the virus will change that
property, too. Strong reasons exist to believe that the genetic modifications Buller made to mousepox would work
for other poxviruses and possibly for other classes of viruses as well. Might the same techniques allow chickenpox or another poxvirus
that infects humans to
be turned into a 100% lethal bioweapon, perhaps one that is resistant to any known antiviral therapy?
I’ve asked this question of experts many times, and no one has yet replied that such a manipulation
couldn’t be done. This case is just one example. Many more are pouring out of scientific journals and conferences every
year. Just last year, the journal Nature published a controversial study done at the University of Wisconsin–Madison in which virologists enumerated the changes
one would need to make to a highly lethal strain of bird flu to make it easily transmitted from one mammal to another.14 Biotechnology
is advancing
so rapidly that it is hard to keep track of all the new potential threats . Nor is it clear that anyone is even trying. In addition to
lethality and drug resistance, many other parameters can be played with, given that the infectious power of an
epidemic depends on many properties, including the length of the latency period during which a person is
contagious but asymptomatic. Delaying the onset of serious symptoms allows each new case to spread to more
people and thus makes the virus harder to stop. This dynamic is perhaps best illustrated by HIV , which is very
difficult to transmit compared with smallpox and many other viruses. Intimate contact is needed, and even then, the infection rate is low. The balancing
factor is that HIV can take years to progress to AIDS , which can then take many more years to kill the
victim. What makes HIV so dangerous is that infected people have lots of opportunities to infect others. This property has allowed HIV to claim more than 30
million lives so far, and approximately 34 million people are now living with this virus and facing a highly uncertain future.15 A
virus genetically
engineered to infect its host quickly, to generate symptoms slowly —say, only after weeks or months—and to spread easily
through the air or by casual contact would be vastly more devastating than HIV . It could silently penetrate
the population to unleash its deadly effects suddenly. This type of epidemic would be almost impossible to
combat because most of the infections would occur before the epidemic became obvious. A technologically
sophisticated terrorist group could develop such a virus and kill a large part of humanity with it. Indeed, terrorists
may not have to develop it themselves: some scientist may do so first and publish the details. Given the rate at which
biologists are making discoveries about viruses and the immune system, at some point in the near future,
someone may create artificial pathogens that could drive the human race to extinction. Indeed, a detailed
species-elimination plan of this nature was openly proposed in a scientific journal. The ostensible purpose of that
particular research was to suggest a way to extirpate the malaria mosquito, but similar techniques could be directed toward
humans.16 When I’ve talked to molecular biologists about this method, they are quick to point out that it is slow and easily detectable and could be fought with
biotech remedies. If you challenge them to come up with improvements to the suggested attack plan, however, they have plenty of ideas. Modern
biotechnology will soon be capable, if it is not already, of bringing about the demise of the human race— or
at least of killing a sufficient number of people to end high-tech civilization and set humanity back 1,000
years or more. That terrorist groups could achieve this level of technological sophistication may seem far-fetched, but keep in mind that it takes only a
handful of individuals to accomplish these tasks. Never has lethal power of this potency been accessible to so few, so easily. Even more dramatically than nuclear
proliferation, modern biological science has frighteningly undermined the correlation between the lethality of a weapon and its cost, a fundamentally stabilizing
mechanism throughout history. Access to extremely lethal agents—lethal enough to exterminate Homo sapiens—will be available to anybody with a solid
background in biology, terrorists included.
The Disad turns the case via rollback and new civil liberty violations. Status Quo
detection is key.
Clarke ‘13
(et al; This is the Final Report and Recommendations of The President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications
Technologies. President Obama ordered a blue-ribbon task force to review domestic surveillance. This report releases the
findings of that group. The report was headed by five experts – including Richard Alan Clarke, who is the former National
Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism for the United States. Other expert contributors
include Michael Joseph Morell, who was the deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency and served as acting director
twice in 2011 and from 2012 to 2013 and Cass Robert Sunstein, who was the Administrator of the White House Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Obama administration and is currently a Professor of Law at Harvard Law School.
“LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD” – December 12th, 2013 – Easily obtained via a google search.
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CB4QFjAA&url=https%3A%2F
2Fwww.whitehouse.gov%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fdocs%2F2013-12
12_rg_final_report.pdf&ei=Db0yVdDjKIKdNtTXgZgE&usg=AFQjCNH0S_Fo9dckL9bRarVpi4M6pq6MQ&bvm=bv.91071109,d.eXY)
The September 11 attacks were a vivid demonstration of the need for detailed information about the
activities of potential terrorists. This was so for several reasons. First, some information, which could have been useful, was
not collected and other information, which could have helped to prevent the attacks, was not shared among departments. Second, the scale of damage that 21st-century terrorists can inflict is far greater than
anything that their predecessors could have imagined. We are no longer dealing with threats from firearms and conventional explosives, but with the
possibility of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear devices and biological and chemical agents. The damage that such attacks could inflict on the nation,
measured in terms of loss of life, economic and social disruption, and the consequent sacrifice of civil liberties, is extraordinary. The events of September 11 brought this home with crystal clarity. Third, 21st-century terrorists
operate within a global communications network that enables them both to hide their existence from outsiders and to communicate with one another across continents at the speed of light. Effective safeguards against terrorist
attacks require the technological capacity to ferret out such communications in an international communications grid. Fourth, many of the international terrorists that the United States and other nations confront today cannot
realistically be deterred by the fear of punishment. The conventional means of preventing criminal conduct—the fear of capture and subsequent punishment—has relatively little role to play in combating some contemporary
terrorists. Unlike the situation during the Cold War, in which the Soviet Union was deterred from launching a nuclear strike against the United States in part by its fear of a retaliatory counterattack, the terrorist enemy in the 21stcentury is not a nation state against which the United States and its allies can retaliate with the same effectiveness. In such circumstances, detection in advance is essential in any effort to “provide for the common defence.” Fifth,
If Americans came
to believe that we are infiltrated by enemies we cannot identify and who have the power to bring death, destruction, and chaos to our lives on a massive scale, and that preventing such
attacks is beyond the capacity of our government, the quality of national life would be greatly
imperiled. Indeed, if a similar or even more devastating attack were to occur in the future, there would almost surely be an
impulse to increase the use of surveillance technology to prevent further strikes, despite the potentially corrosive
effects on individual freedom and self-governance.
the threat of massive terrorist attacks involving nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons can generate a chilling and destructive environment of fear and anxiety among our nation’s citizens.
Fund HumInt CP
Text: The USFG should substantially boost the HUMINT budget.
Solves the Aff – their only internal link to HUMINT is a resource tradeoff. We resolve
that.
Koch‘1
et al; Andrew R. Koch is the Senior Vice President for Defense and Homeland Security issues at Scribe. An expert on
communications and the media, as well as market assessments for domestic and international defense clients, he leads Scribe’s
practice in providing such services as development and implementation of strategic communications planning, media outreach
support, as well as evaluation of defense companies and related government programs. Scribe is a Strategic Advising firm.
Article Title: “Chronic HUMINT under funding blamed for security failures” - Jane’s Defence Weekly - vol. 36, no. 12, 37153, p. 4
In the aftermath of the carnage in New York and Washington DC (September 11, 2001) hundreds of questions will be asked as to how such an audacious and coordinated attack could have happened. This latest act of terrorism, although the most horrific to date, is not the first time that the US Government has been caught
unaware. Indeed the subject of 'asymmetric warfare' - the use
of terrorist methods to strike at weaknesses in the societies of western countries - has
been a worry of strategic planners in the US for most of the 1990's. One possible contributing factor to this failure of
the intelligence and security system could be the lack of resources the US has devoted to human intelligence
(HUMINT) capabilities throughout the past decade. While national technical means continued to receive high levels of
funding for surveillance satellites, signals intelligence flights and other eavesdropping technologies, human-based intelligence capabilities
have withered. Areas such as analysis, linguistic skills, cultivation of agent networks, and 'tradecraft' were all of
paramount importance during the Cold War, particularly before the advent of space-based intelligence assets, but have suffered a lack of
resources of late. This shortfall has been exacerbated by the growing demand that increased technical intelligence has placed on people who must process
the vast amounts of resulting data and prioritise it. The US intelligence community must work to close the gap between the
amount of raw intelligence it can gather and the quantity it can process, analyse, and disseminate.
Privacy
( ) Counter-bias – their epistemology’s more flawed. Excess fear of surveillance means
Aff scholarship’s MORE of an exaggeration than ours.
McDonough ‘15
(Shannon McDonough – Instructor in Social Sciences at Allen University. The author holds a B.A. in Sociology from Miami
University, Ohio and an M.A. Sociology from The University of South Carolina. This article is co-authored by Mathieu Deflem – a
Professor at the University of South Carolina in the Department of Sociology. His research areas include law, policing, terrorism,
popular culture, and sociological theory. “The Fear of Counterterrorism: Surveillance and Civil Liberties Since 9/11” – From the
Journal: Society - February 2015, Volume 52, Issue 1, pp 70-79 – obtained via the Springer database collection).
Civil liberties organizations as well as a number of academic scholars have routinely criticized post-9/11
counterterrorism initiatives as unconstitutional and major threats to civil liberties and privacy. Harmonizing with the claims from civil
liberties groups are contributions in the popular and scholarly discourse on surveillance and counterterrorism that lament the
purported negative impact of governmental policies and related surveillance and intelligence activities on personal rights and
liberties. The revelations by former security contractor Edward Snowden in June 2013 concerning alleged spying practices by the
National Security Agency (NSA) greatly reinvigorated these debates. We investigate here if there is any counter-evidence
to the alarmist statements that are often made in the popular and scholarly discourse on civil liberties and
surveillance. Against the background of academic scholarship on surveillance and criticisms from civil liberty and privacy groups, we rely on
archival sources, government documents, and media reports to examine a variety of claims made concerning civil liberties
violations by security agencies. Our analysis reveals that at least a sizeable number of claims raised against
counterterrorism practices are without objective foundation in terms of any actual violations. As an
explanation for this marked discrepancy, we suggest that, as various survey data show, there is a relatively distinct, albeit it uneven and not
entirely stable, culture of privacy and civil liberties in contemporary American society which independently
contributes to a fear of counterterrorism, rather than of terrorism. These specific cultural sensitivities bring
about an increase in the amount of civil rights allegations independent of actual violations thereof.
( ) Rights can’t be absolute – as they sometimes conflict with other “rights”. If some
rights were absolute, privacy wouldn’t be one of them.
Himma ‘7
Kenneth - Associate Professor of Philosophy, Seattle Pacific University. The author holds JD and PhD and was formerly a
Lecturer at the University of Washington in Department of Philosophy, the Information School, and the Law School. “Privacy vs.
Security: Why Privacy is Not an Absolute Value or Right”. San Diego Law Review, Vol. 44, p. 859, 2007. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=994458
It is perhaps worth noting that absolutist
conceptions are not limited to privacy rights. Some people take the position that the moral
right to life is absolute; on an absolutist conception of the right to life, it is never justified to take the life of a person—and this rules out not only the death penalty,
but the use of deadly force in defense of the lives of innocent others from a culpable attack. Many people take an absolutist view with respect to something they
call a “right to information,” holding that there should be no restrictions of any kind, including legal protection of intellectual property rights, on the free flow of
information. As this view has most famously, and idiosyncratically, been put by John Perry Barlow, “information wants to be free.”5 When it comes to rights,
absolutist talk among theorists, lawyers, and ordinary folk is not at all uncommon these days. Indeed,
some people seem to think that rights are, by
nature, absolute and hence that it is a conceptual truth that
all rights are absolute. Consider the following quote from Patrick Murphy, a Democrat
who ran for Congress in 2006: I am also very concerned about the erosion of constitutional rights and civil liberties over the past few years. I taught Constitutional
Law at West Point, and it makes me so angry to see our elected leaders in Washington—specifically the White House and the Republican leadership in Congress—
pushing policies that erode the foundation of this country. The equal protection clause of the constitution is absolute. The right to privacy is absolute. The right to
assemble is absolute. Yet time and time again, the administration has supported, and the Congressional leadership has supported nominees and policies that do not
follow the constitution. With my background, I can add to this debate. And I’m not afraid to take a stand for what’s right.6 As Murphy explains it, every right in the
Constitution is absolute and hence utterly without exception. As there is nothing in the Constitution or any legal instrument or norm that suggests or entails that
constitutional rights are absolute, it is reasonable to think that Murphy believes, as many people do, that it is part of the very meaning of having a right that it can
never justifiably be infringed. This is why debates about political issues are frequently framed in terms of whether there is some right that protects the relevant
interests; rights provide the strongest level of moral or legal protection of the relevant interests. It is certainly true that rights provide a higher level of protection
than any other considerations that are morally relevant, but it is not because rights are, by nature, absolute. Rights provide robust protection of the relevant
interests because it is a conceptual truth that the infringement of any right cannot be justified by an appeal of the desirable consequences of doing so. No matter
how many people it might make happy, it would be wrong to intentionally kill an innocent person because her right to life takes precedence over the interests of
other people in their own happiness. As Ronald Dworkin famously puts this conceptual point, rights trump consequences.7 But this conceptual truth about rights
does not imply rights are, by nature, absolute. The claim that rights trump consequences implies only that some stronger consideration than the desirable
there is some such consideration that
would justify infringing some rights. One such candidate, of course, is the existence of other more important
rights. It is commonly thought that at least some rights are commensurable and can be ranked in a hierarchy that expresses the relative weight each right in the
hierarchy has with respect to other rights. For example, one might think that the right to life is at the top of the hierarchy of
commensurable rights, and that property rights are in this hierarchy also. This would explain the common intuition that one may
use deadly force when necessary to defend innocent lives from culpable attack, but not when necessary only to defend
consequences of infringing a right can justify doing so. This latter claim leaves open the possibility that
property rights from violation. If, as seems clear from this example, it is possible for two rights to conflict and for one to outweigh the other, it follows that rights are
not, by nature, absolute. What may explain the mistaken view that rights are necessarily absolute is confusion about the relationship of various terms that flesh out
the status, origin, and contours of moral rights and obligations. For example, rights
are frequently described as “inviolable,” meaning that
a right can never be justifiably violated. This, of course, is a conceptual truth; to say that a right is violated is to say that its infringement is without justification.
But this does not imply that rights can never be justifiably infringed; a person’s right to life can be
justifiably infringed if he (they) culpably shoots at an innocent person and there is no other way to save that
person’s life except through use of lethal force in defense of his life. Rights are also thought, by nature, to be supreme, relative to some
system of norms—moral, social, or legal—in the sense that they cannot be defeated by other kinds of protections; moral rights are thought to be supreme over all
other kinds of considerations, including social and legal rights. But
this does not imply that rights are absolute because it says
nothing about the relative importance of one right to another; it simply asserts that, by nature, rights
outweigh all other relevant considerations. Supremacy and inviolability are part of the very nature of a right, but these properties do not entail
that rights are, by nature, absolute. Of course, the negation of the claim that all rights are absolute does not imply that no rights are absolute. The possibility of
conflicts between any two rights does not preclude there being one right that wins every conflict because it is absolute, and hence, without exception. A moral
pacifist, for example, takes this view of the moral right to life and holds that intentional killing of a human being is always wrong. Moreover, if there are two rights
that do not come into conflict with each other and win in conflicts with all other rights, those two rights might be absolute. One might think, for example, that the
rights to privacy and life can never conflict and that both are absolute. I
am somewhat skeptical that any right is absolute in this strong sense,
but if there are any, it will not be privacy. As we will see in more detail, privacy is commensurable with other rights, like the right to life,
which figures into the right to security. It seems clear that privacy rights and the right to life can come into conflict. For example, a psychologist
might be justified in protecting a patient’s privacy interests even though doing so includes information
that might prevent that person from committing a minor property crime of some kind, but she would not be
justified in protecting that information if the psychologist knows its disclosure is necessary to prevent a
murder. In any event, I will discuss these kinds of examples in more detail below.
( ) Assessing Utilitarian consequences are good. Putting ethics in a vacuum is morally
irresponsible.
Issac, ‘2
(Jeffery, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Dissent, Vol. 49 No. 2, Spring)
Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world one must attend to
the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that
power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold
Niebuhr, Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding
concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility.
The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that
the purity of one’s intentions does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or
refusing to make common cause with morally comprised parties may seem like the right thing, but if such tactics entail impotence,
then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters;
(2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness, it
is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics-as opposed to religion-pacifism is always a
potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and
(3)
it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the
effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may
engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in
the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important,
always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and
historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It
promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
( ) Alt cause – corporate privacy infringements are far worse and the public readily
accepts it.
Lewis ‘14
James Andrew Lewis is a senior fellow and director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies in Washington, D.C., where he writes on technology, security, and the international economy. Before
joining CSIS, he worked at the US Departments of State and Commerce as a Foreign Service officer and as a member of the
Senior Executive Service. His diplomatic experience included negotiations on military basing in Asia, the Cambodia peace
process, and the five-power talks on arms transfer restraint. Lewis received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago.
“Underestimating Risk in the Surveillance Debate” - CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES - STRATEGIC
TECHNOLOGIES PROGRAM – December - http://csis.org/publication/underestimating-risk-surveillance-debate
Some of the unhappiness created by the Edward Snowden leaks reflects the unspoken recognition that online
privacy has changed
irrevocably. The precipitous decline in privacy since the Internet was commercialized is the elephant in the
room we ignore in the surveillance debate. America’s privacy laws are both limited in scope and out of date. Although a majority of
Americans believe privacy laws are inadequate, the surveillance debate has not led to a useful discussion of privacy in the
context of changed technologies and consumer preferences. Technology is more intrusive as companies pursue revenue
growth by harvesting user data. Tracking online behavior is a preferred business model. On average, there are 16 hidden tracking
programs on every website. The growing market for “big data” to predict consumer behavior and target
advertising will further change privacy. Judging by their behavior, Internet users are willing to exchange
private data for online services. A survey in a major European country found a majority of Internet users disapproved of Google out of privacy
concerns, but more than 80 percent used Google as their search engine. The disconnect between consumer statements and
behavior reduces the chances of legislating better protections.
( ) No Privacy violation – safeguards from FISC check abuse
Branda ‘14
(et al; JOYCE R. BRANDA, Acting Assistant Attorney General, BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEES - Amicus Brief for Smith v. Obama –
before the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. “Amici” means “friend of the court” and – in this context - is legal
reference to the Reporters Committee – October 2nd - https://www.eff.org/document/governments-smith-answering-brief)
Plaintiff provides no plausible explanation for how the program could cause that distress. She does not contend that there is any reasonable likelihood that
government personnel would actually review metadata about her calls that the government may have acquired under the Section 215 program. That likelihood is
particularly remote if “[n]one of her communications relate to international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.” Pl Br. 4. Again, information
in
the Section 215 database is subject to substantial protections and limits on access imposed by orders of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Those orders do not permit indiscriminate access to or review of the
metadata; instead, there must be an advance judicial finding (or, in cases of emergency, an advance finding by government
officials and judicial approval after the fact) that a given selector is suspected of association with terrorism, and only the small
fraction of metadata responsive to queries using such suspected-terrorist selectors—that is, within two steps of the judicially approved selector—may be reviewed.
Internet Freedom
( ) New Freedom Act is sufficient to solve US’s global credibility gap.
HRW ‘15
Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human
dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. “Strengthen the USA Freedom Act” - May 19, 2015 http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/19/strengthen-usa-freedom-act
As the Senate considers the USA Freedom Act this week, policymakers should strengthen it by limiting large-scale collection of records and reinforcing transparency
and carrying court reforms further. The
Senate should also take care not to weaken the bill, and should reject any
amendments that would require companies to retain personal data for longer than is necessary for business purposes. It has been two years since the
National Security Agency (NSA) whistleblower Edward Snowden unleashed a steady stream of documents that exposed the intention by the United States and the
United Kingdom to “collect it all” in the digital age. These revelations demonstrate how unchecked surveillance can metastasize and undermine democratic
institutions if intelligence agencies are allowed to operate in the shadows, without robust legal limits and oversight. On
Representatives approved
May 13, the US House of
the USA Freedom Act of 2015 by a substantial margin. The bill represents the latest attempt by Congress to rein in
one of the surveillance programs Snowden disclosed—the NSA’s domestic bulk phone metadata collection under Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act. The House vote
followed a major rebuke to the US government by the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which ruled on May 7 that the NSA’s potentially nationwide
dragnet collection of phone records under Section 215 was unlawful. Section 215 is set to expire on June 1 unless Congress acts to extend it or to preserve specific
powers authorized under the provision, which go beyond collection of phone records. Surveillance reforms are long overdue and can be accomplished while
protecting US citizens from serious security threats. Congress and the Obama administration should end all mass surveillance programs, which unnecessarily and
disproportionately intrude on the privacy of hundreds of millions of people who are not linked to wrongdoing. But reforming US laws and reversing an increasingly
global tide of mass surveillance will not be easy. Many of the programs Snowden revealed are already deeply entrenched, with billions of dollars of infrastructure,
contracts, and personnel invested. Technological capacity to vacuum up the world’s communications has outpaced existing legal frameworks meant to protect
privacy. The Second Circuit opinion represents an improvement over current law because it establishes that domestic bulk collection of phone metadata under
Section 215 of the Patriot Act cannot continue. Section 215 allows the government to collect business records, including phone records, that are “relevant” to an
authorized investigation. The court ruled that the notion of “relevance” could not be stretched to allow intelligence agencies to gather all phone records in the US.
However, the opinion could be overturned and two other appeals courts are also considering the legality of the NSA’s bulk phone records program. The opinion also
does not address US surveillance of people not in the US. Nor does it question the underlying assumption that the US owes no privacy obligations to people outside
its territory, which makes no sense in the digital age and is inconsistent with human rights law requirements. Even if the Second Circuit opinion remains good law,
congressional action will be necessary to address surveillance programs other than Section 215—both domestic and those affecting people outside the US—and to
create more robust institutional safeguards to prevent future abuses. The courts cannot bring about reforms to increase oversight and improve institutional
oversight on their own. Human
Rights Watch has supported the USA Freedom Act because it is a modest, if
incomplete, first step down the long road to reining in the NSA excesses. Beyond ending bulk records collection, the bill would begin to reform the
secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Court, which oversees NSA surveillance, and would introduce new transparency measures to improve oversight. In
passing the bill, the House of Representatives also clarified that it intends the bill to be consistent with the Second Circuit’s ruling, so as to not weaken its findings.
The bill is no panacea and, as detailed below, would not ensure comprehensive reform. It still leaves open the possibility of
large-scale data collection practices in the US under the Patriot Act. It does not constrain surveillance under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act nor Executive
Order 12333, the primary legal authorities the government has used to justify mass surveillance of people outside US borders. And the bill does not address many
modern surveillance capabilities, from mass cable tapping to use of malware, intercepting all mobile calls in a country, and compromising the security of mobile SIM
cards and other equipment and services. Nonetheless,
passing a strong USA Freedom Act would be a long-overdue step in the
right direction. It would show that Congress is willing and able to act to protect privacy and impose oversight
over intelligence agencies in an age when technology makes ubiquitous surveillance possible. Passing this bill would also help shift the
debate in the US and globally and would distance the United States from other countries that seek to
make mass surveillance the norm. On a global level, other governments may already be emulating the
NSA’s approach, fueling an environment of impunity for mass violations of privacy. In the last year, France, Turkey,
Russia, and other countries have passed legislation to facilitate or expand large-scale surveillance. If the
USA Freedom Act passes, it would be the first time Congress has affirmatively restrained NSA activities since
the attacks of September 11. Key supporters of the bill have vowed to take up reforms to other laws next, including
Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act.
( ) Turn – US Cred bad. Others countries fill US vacuum. Plan reverses that – allows the
US to spoil privacy norms that go beyond the Aff. Better to drag the US along.
Wong ‘15
Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human
Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on
Global Internet Freedom. She conducted much of the organization’s work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular
focus on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning Committee of the Global
Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances corporate responsibility and human rights in the
technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights
in China (HRIC). There, she contributed to the organization’s work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of
expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law – From the essay: “Internet at a
Crossroads: How Government Surveillance Threatens How We Communicate” - http://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2015/essays/internet-crossroads
The Snowden revelations have launched a global debate about modern surveillance, national security, and human rights.
Privacy is now on the agenda of a range of states and international institutions for the first time. Several major UN
human rights institutions have begun to examine modern surveillance practices. In March 2014, the Human Rights Committee, an international
expert body and authoritative interpreter of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)—a global treaty to which the US is party—called on
the US to ensure all surveillance is necessary and proportionate to achieving legitimate objectives regardless of the nationality or location
of individuals who are affected. In July 2014, the UN’s top human rights official, then-High Commissioner for Human
Rights Navi Pillay, issued a groundbreaking report on privacy in the digital age that directly challenges US and UK arguments
for secret mass surveillance. Pillay notably concluded that mass surveillance was “emerging as a dangerous habit rather than an exceptional measure.” She
said unchecked snooping could harm a range of human rights, including freedom of expression and association. The onus was on governments, she said, to
demonstrate that their practices were necessary and proportionate to their security aims. In other words, spying on everyone because you can does not mean you
should. The high commissioner’s report followed sustained action from privacy advocates and a group
of countries, led by Germany and
Brazil, to press the US and UK to stop mass surveillance and safeguard the privacy of people around the world. Stepping
into the leadership vacuum, Germany and Brazil, along with Austria, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Norway, and Switzerland, led the
passage of the December 2013 UN General Assembly resolution calling for the high commissioner’s report. In the face of
inaction by the US, the UK, and their closest allies, these UN institutions have begun to lay out a principled approach to
surveillance and human rights in the digital age, grounded in widely accepted standards of international human rights
law. Several critical themes emerging from this work directly challenge the defenses of mass
surveillance: Surveillance harms a range of rights beyond privacy, including freedom of expression, association, and movement, as well as the right to
counsel. If individuals cannot go online without fear of undue monitoring, the power of digital technologies to enable rights will be deeply undermined. Journalists
cannot protect their sources, lawyers cannot ensure the confidentiality of their communications with clients, and human rights defenders cannot do their work
safely. States
have obligations to safeguard the privacy rights of users outside their borders. In our globally
networked age, it is untenable to argue that the right to privacy stops at the border while surveillance is borderless. Mass surveillance is by nature indiscriminate
and it is presumptively illegal. Article 17 of the ICCPR requires that any interference with privacy be proportionate and narrowly tailored. Just because mass
surveillance and bulk data collection might yield some information that may one day be useful, it cannot justify the invasion of everyone’s privacy. States should
recognize that privacy and other rights are harmed when they collect private data, regardless of whether that data is used. Knowing that the government can
acquire data about your communications and online activities can chill freedom of expression and association, even if the data collected is never misused. States
should impose meaningful limits on when data can be collected, as well as on how data may be used and how long it is retained. States
should increase
transparency and oversight over surveillance and intelligence gathering powers. There are legitimate reasons for secrecy when addressing
national security threats. But such powers must be subject to oversight to prevent overreach and abuse, including through judicial and parliamentary bodies. The
private sector has a responsibility to respect rights when asked to facilitate surveillance or data collection. Where Internet or telecommunications companies turn
over user data or assist with surveillance without adequate safeguards, they risk complicity in resulting violations. The Way Ahead While the Snowden controversy
has focused on the US and UK, as noted above, there is no reason to assume that other governments’ laws or practices are better. Most privacy regimes were put in
place during the Internet’s infancy, before social media or smart phones existed, and they are now falling short in providing meaningful protection for rights. And, of
course, there are those governments like Ethiopia, China, and Russia who routinely engage in abusive surveillance as a matter of policy and design. Thanks
to
Brazil and Germany, there is international momentum to develop norms and guidance and establish institutions to
ensure that privacy still has meaning in the digital age. As part of this effort in the coming months, Human Rights Watch will support the creation of a new
special rapporteur on the right to privacy at the UN Human Rights Council—an independent expert tasked with scrutinizing state surveillance practices in a
sustained and systematic way. At time of writing, however,
there is still a desire to secure buy-in from the US and UK as mass
surveillance debates play out at these international venues. The instinct to treat the US and UK with diplomatic kid gloves is not
surprising, given their technological capacity and political power. But ultimately, this approach may be counterproductive. In the short term, they
are more likely to play the role of spoilers rather than promoters of principled standards. This was
certainly true during the debate that led to the December 2013 UN General Assembly resolution on privacy in the digital
age, when the US and UK pushed, somewhat successfully, to water down the text behind the scenes, and again in
November 2014, with respect to the follow-on resolution on the same topic. Of course, we must continue to press for reforms in the
US and UK and urge these governments to extend privacy protections to those outside their borders. But we should not allow political paralysis in the
US and UK to hamper development of international privacy norms. A process of broad international engagement, including with
strategic allies, can facilitate the US and UK’s eventual acceptance and internalization of strong international standards over time. When other nations
and international institutions lead by example and establish strong human rights standards, they will bring
the US and UK along.
Alt cause - “Kill-switch” policies for a cyber-incident hurt image of US support for
internet freedom.
Fontaine ‘11
(et al; Richard Fontaine graduated summa cum laude with a B.A. in International Relations from Tulane University. He also holds
a M.A. in International Affairs from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, and he
attended Oxford University. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and has been an adjunct professor in the
Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. He is currently the President of President of the
Center for a New American Security (CNAS). “Internet Freedom A Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age” – June, 2011 http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_InternetFreedom_FontaineRogers_0.pdf)
The perception
that the U.S. government could restrict traffic over large portions of the Internet in the event of
a cyber emergency could also complicate its efforts to promote online freedom. Congress debated a bill last year that
would authorize greater government control over the U.S. digital infrastructure in the event of a nationwide cyber attack.142 Though many media reports about a
so-called Internet “kill switch” are erroneous (and a newly introduced version explicitly prohibits any government employee from shutting down the Internet), the
bill nevertheless raised concerns that such authority would undermine Internet freedom. While interpretations of the bill vary widely, an expert with the Electronic
Frontier Foundation warned, “The
president would have essentially unchecked power to determine what services can be
content can pass over the Internet in a cyber security emergency.”143 The bill’s
sponsors dispute this interpretation and note that the president’s powers could be exercised only in extreme emergencies and pursuant to limitations. The U.S.
government must establish precise, widely understood scenarios under which it could declare an emergency and the
powers it could then exercise. Failing to clearly define what constitutes a national “cyber emergency” that would
give national leaders emergency powers to restrict Internet activity could set a precedent by which authoritarian regimes justify
shutting off the Internet during their own “cyber emergency” – such as widespread anti-government protests.
connected to the Internet or even what
Again, there is a distinct difference between a presidential order to restrict some forms of Internet traffic in the face of a cyber attack on America’s critical
infrastructure and President Mubarak’s decision to shut down his nation’s Internet during the democratic revolt in Egypt. In drafting legislation intended to protect
the nation’s cyber systems and infrastructure, the
U.S. government must tread carefully and quash perceptions that it is acceptable
to use a “national cyber emergency” to trample on freedom of expression.
( ) Domestic not key. Plan can’t stop US surveillance on other countries. That’s vital to
credibility.
McCauley ‘13
Lauren McCauley, staff writer for Common Dreams. Previously, while writing for Newsweek, Lauren was nominated for the
2008 GLAAD Media Award for Digital Journalism, Common Dreams, 6-27-2013
https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/06/27-7
the international community has reacted to the disclosures with alarm. Revelations that the NSA has
been tapping the phone and internet communications of foreign individuals and governments has
spurred world leaders to denounce the global superpower as a 'hypocrite' and, in a number of instances, offer asylum or
However,
assistance to Snowden.¶ "The Prism-gate affair is itself just like a prism that reveals the true face and hypocritical conduct regarding Internet security of the country concerned," said Chinese
Ministry of National Defense Spokesperson, Colonel Yang Yujun.¶ Sir Tim Berners-Lee, one of the five individuals who is credited as being a 'father of the internet' agreed telling the London
Times newspaper that the 'insidious' spying by the United States was hypocritical in light of the US government's frequent 'policing' of other states.¶ "In the Middle East, people have been
given access to the Internet but they have been snooped on and then they have been jailed," he said. "It can be easy for people in the West to say 'oh, those nasty governments should not be
allowed access to spy.' But it's clear that developed nations are seriously spying on the Internet."¶ "It can be easy for people in the West to say 'oh, those nasty governments should not be
The dramatic international backlash is
a clear indication of the importance and severity of the leaked information and, in the interest of insuring that these revelations are not
allowed access to spy.' But it's clear that developed nations are seriously spying on the Internet." –Sir Tim Berners-Lee¶
eclipsed by more distracting headlines, below is a summary of what we know so far about the NSA's spy program.¶ Forbes columnist Andy Greenberg offers this run-down of leaked
documents published so far (bolding his own):¶ The publication of Snowden’s leaks began with a top secret order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) sent to Verizon on
behalf of the NSA, demanding the cell phone records of all of Verizon Business Network Services’ American customers for the three month period ending in July. [...]¶ In a congressional
hearing, NSA director Keith Alexander argued that the kind of surveillance of Americans’ data revealed in that Verizon order was necessary to for archiving purposes, but was rarely accessed
and only with strict oversight from Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court judges. But another secret document published by the Guardian revealed the NSA’s own rules for when it makes
broad exceptions to its foreign vs. U.S. persons distinction, accessing Americans’ data and holding onto it indefinitely. [...]¶ Another leaked slide deck revealed a software tool called Boundless
Informant, which the NSA appears to use for tracking the origin of data it collects. The leaked materials included a map produced by the program showing the frequency of data collection in
countries around the world. While Iran, Pakistan and Jordan appeared to be the most surveilled countries according to the map, it also pointed to significant data collection from the United
States.¶ A leaked executive order from President Obama shows the administration asked intelligence agencies to draw up a list of potential offensive cyberattack targets around the world. The
order, which suggests targeting “systems, processes and infrastructure” states that such offensive hacking operations “can offer unique and unconventional capabilities to advance U.S.
national objectives around the world with little or no warning to the adversary or target and with potential effects ranging from subtle to severely damaging.” [...]¶ Documents leaked to the
Guardian revealed a five-year-old British intelligence scheme to tap transatlantic fiberoptic cables to gather data. A program known as Tempora, created by the U.K.’s NSA equivalent
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) has for the last 18 months been able to store huge amounts of that raw data for up to 30 days. Much of the data is shared with the NSA.
[...]¶ Another GCHQ project revealed to the Guardian through leaked documents intercepted the communications of delegates to the G20 summit of world leaders in London in 2009. [...]¶
Snowden showed the Hong Kong newspaper the South China Morning Post documents that it said outlined extensive hacking of Chinese and Hong Kong targets by the NSA since 2009, with
61,000 targets globally and “hundreds” in China. [...]¶ The Guardian’s Glenn Greenwald has said that Snowden provided him “thousands” of documents, of which “dozens” are newsworthy.
And Snowden himself has said he’d like to expose his trove of leaks to the global media so that each country’s reporters can decide whether “U.S. network operations against their people
should be published.” So regardless of where Snowden ends up, expect more of his revelations to follow.¶ Further, on Thursday journalists Glenn Greenwald and Spencer Ackerman revealed
in a new Guardian exclusive that for ten years the US had conducted bulk collections of internet metadata, amassing information akin to 'reading one's diary' on both domestic and foreign
individuals.¶ And, in their own cataloging of 'what we know so far,' Pro Publica poses the question, "Is all of this legal?"¶ Recently leaked court orders reveal how the Department of Justice,
"through a series of legislative changes and court decisions," have evolved the parameters of the Patriot Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, enabling the expansive spy
program.¶ They write:¶ By definition, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court decides what it is legal for the NSA to do.¶ But this level of domestic surveillance wasn’t always legal, and the
NSA has been found to violate legal standards on more than one occasion. Although the NSA’s broad data collection programs appear to have started shortly after September 11, 2001, the
NSA was gradually granted authority to collect domestic information on this scale through a series of legislative changes and court decisions over the next decade. See this timeline of
loosening laws. The Director of National Intelligence says that authority for PRISM programs comes from section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Verizon metadata
collection order cites section 215 of the Patriot Act. The author of the Patriot Act disagrees that the act justifies the Verizon metadata collection program.¶ In March 2004, acting Attorney
General James Comey ordered a stop to some parts of the secret domestic surveillance programs, but President Bush signed an order re-authorizing it anyway. In response, several top Justice
Department officials threatened to resign, including Comey and FBI director Robert Mueller. Bush backed down, and the programs were at least partially suspended for several months.¶ In
2009, the Justice Department acknowledged that the NSA had collected emails and phone calls of Americans in a way that exceeded legal limitations.¶ In October 2011, the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court ruled that the NSA violated the Fourth Amendment at least once. The Justice Department has said that this ruling must remain secret, but we know it concerned
some aspect of the "minimization" rules the govern what the NSA can do with domestic communications. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court recently decided that this ruling can be
released, but Justice Department has not yet done so.¶ Civil liberties groups including the EFF and the ACLU dispute the constitutionality of these programs and have filed lawsuits to challenge
There do not appear
to be any legal restrictions on what the NSA can do with the communications of non-U.S. persons. Since a
them.¶ And regarding the aforementioned international backlash, Pro Publica responds to the question "What if I'm not American?"¶ All bets are off.
substantial fraction of the world’s Internet data passes through the United States, or its allies, the U.S. has the ability to observe and record the communications of much of the world’s
population.
The European Union has already complained to the U.S. Attorney General.
Countries don’t model U.S. policy – it’s a myth.
Moravcsik ‘5
Andrew - Professor of Government and Director of the European Union Program at Harvard University, January 31, 2005,
Newsweek, “Dream On, America,” lexis
Not long ago, the American dream was a global fantasy. Not only Americans saw themselves as a beacon unto nations. So did much of the rest of the world. East
Europeans tuned into Radio Free Europe. Chinese students erected a replica of the Statue of Liberty in Tiananmen Square. You had only to listen to George W.
Bush's Inaugural Address last week (invoking "freedom" and "liberty" 49 times) to appreciate just how deeply Americans still believe in this founding myth. For
many in the world, the president's rhetoric confirmed their worst fears of an imperial America relentlessly pursuing its narrow national interests. But the greater
danger may be a
delusional America--one that believes, despite all evidence to the contrary, that the American Dream lives
on, that America remains a model for the world, one whose mission is to spread the word. The gulf between how
Americans view themselves and how the world views them was summed up in a poll last week by the BBC. Fully 71 percent of Americans see the United States as a
source of good in the world. More than half view Bush's election as positive for global security. Other studies report that 70 percent have faith in their domestic
institutions and nearly 80 percent believe "American ideas and customs" should spread globally. Foreigners
take an entirely different view:
58 percent in the BBC poll see Bush's re-election as a threat to world peace. Among America's traditional allies, the figure is strikingly higher: 77 percent in
Germany, 64 percent in Britain and 82 percent in Turkey. Among the 1.3 billion members of the Islamic world, public support for the United States is measured in
single digits. Only Poland, the Philippines and India viewed Bush's second Inaugural positively. Tellingly, the anti-Bushism of the president's first term is giving way to
a more general anti-Americanism. A plurality of voters (the average is 70 percent) in each of the 21 countries surveyed by the BBC oppose sending any troops to
Iraq, including those in most of the countries that have done so. Only one third, disproportionately in the poorest and most dictatorial countries, would like to see
American values spread in their country. Says Doug Miller of GlobeScan, which conducted the BBC report: "President Bush has further isolated America from the
world. Unless the administration changes its approach, it will continue to erode America's good name, and hence its ability to effectively influence world affairs."
Former Brazilian president Jose Sarney expressed the sentiments of the 78 percent of his countrymen who see America as a threat: "Now that Bush has been reelected, all I can say is, God bless the rest of the world." The
truth is that Americans are living in a dream world. Not only do
others not share America's self-regard, they no longer aspire to emulate the country's social and economic
achievements. The loss of faith in the American Dream goes beyond this swaggering administration and its war in Iraq. A President Kerry would have had to
confront a similar disaffection, for it grows from the success of something America holds dear: the spread of democracy, free markets and international institutions-globalization, in a word. Countries
today have dozens of political, economic and social models to choose from. Anti-Americanism is
especially virulent in Europe and Latin America, where countries have established their own distinctive ways--none made in America. Futurologist Jeremy Rifkin, in
his recent book "The European Dream," hails an
emerging European Union based on generous social welfare, cultural diversity and respect for
international law--a model that's caught on quickly across the former nations of Eastern Europe and the Baltics. In Asia, the rise of autocratic
capitalism in China or Singapore is as much a "model" for development as America's scandal-ridden corporate culture. "First we emulate," one Chinese businessman
recently told the board of one U.S. multinational, "then we overtake."
( ) Internet freedom is not a silver bullet solution for human rights and democracy.
Wadhwa ‘13
Tarun Wadhwa is a researcher with the Hybrid Reality Institute. Formerly, he was a Research Fellow at Singularity University
and a Senior Research Associate with the Think India Foundation. He is also the author of the book: Identified: Why They Are
Getting To Know Everything About Us – which is about the global rise of digital identification systems. He holds a BA in Political
Science from George Washington University and EPD11 from Singularity University’s Graduate Studies Program in Policy, Law
and Ethics - “NSA Surveillance May Have Dealt Major Blow To Global Internet Freedom Efforts” - Forbes – 6-13-13 http://www.forbes.com/sites/tarunwadhwa/2013/06/13/with-nsa-surveillance-us-government-may-have-dealt-major-blow-toglobal-internet-freedom-efforts/
The internet has never been a perfect tool for advancing democracy and human rights. Despite the most
optimistic techno-utopian projections, the internet has yet to set us free and rid the world of dictators.
Critics have been right to warn us of the dangers of a single-minded approach — we should be careful not to
overlook the deep historical, economic, and cultural factors that shape the world we live in today. At the
same time, it is true that the internet has revolutionized the way we are able to connect with each other. We are no longer limited to our culture and geography, we
can now unite around shared interests and values.
( ) Democracy doesn’t cause peace – statistical models are wrong.
Mousseau, 12
(Michael – Professor IR Koç University, “The Democratic Peace Unraveled: It’s the Economy” International Studies Quarterly, p
1-12)
Model 2 presents new knowledge by adding the control for economic type. To capture the dyadic expectation of peace among contract-intensive nations, the variable Contract- intensive
EconomyL (CIEL) indicates the value of impersonal contracts in force per capita of the state with the lower level of CIE in the dyad; a high value of this measure indicates both states have
contract-intensive economies. As can be seen, the coefficient for CIEL ()0.80) is negative and highly significant. This corroborates that impersonal economy is a highly robust force for peace.
The coefficient for DemocracyL is now at zero. There are no other differences between Models 1 and 2, whose samples are identical, and no prior study corroborating the democratic peace
has considered contractintensive economy. Therefore, the standard econometric inference to be drawn from Model 2 is the nontrivial result that
all prior reports of
democracy as a force for peace are probably spurious, since this result is predicted and fully
accounted for by economic norms theory. CIEL and DemocracyL correlate only in the moderate range
of 0.47 (Pearson’s r), so the insignificance of democracy is not likely to be a statistical artifact of
multicollinearity. This is corroborated by the variance inflation factor for DemocracyL in Model 2 of 1.85, which is well below the usual rule-of-thumb indicator of multicollinearity
of 10 or more. Nor should readers assume most democratic dyads have both states with impersonal economies: While almost all nations with contract-intensive economies (as indicated with
the binary measure for CIE) are democratic (Polity2 > 6) (Singapore is the only long-term exception), more than half—55%—of all democratic nation-years have contract-poor economies. At
the dyadic level in this sample, this translates to 80% of democratic dyads (all dyads where DemocracyBinary6 = 1) that have at least one state with a contract-poor economy. In other words,
not only does Model 2 show no evidence of causation from democracy to peace
(as reported in Mousseau
2009), but
it also illustrates that this absence of democratic peace includes the vast majority—80%—of
democratic dyad-years over the sample period. Nor is it likely that the causal arrow is reversed—with
democracy being the ultimate cause of contract-intensive economy and peace. This is because correlations
among independent variables are not calculated in the results of multivariate regressions: Coefficients
show only the effect of each variable after the potential effects of the others are kept constant at their
mean levels. If it was democracy that caused both impersonal economy and peace, then there would be
some variance in DemocracyL remaining, after its partial correlation with CIEL is excluded, that links it directly with peace. The
positive direction of the coefficient for DemocracyL informs us that no such direct effect exists (Blalock
1979:473–474). Model 3 tests for the effect of DemocracyL if a control is added for mixed-polity dyads, as suggested by Russett (2010:201). As discussed above, to avoid problems of
mathematical endogeneity, I adopt the solution used by Mousseau, Orsun and Ungerer (2013) and measure regime difference as proposed by Werner (2000), drawing on the subcomponents
of the Polity2 regime measure. As can be seen, the coefficient for Political Distance (1.00) is positive and significant, corroborating that regime mixed dyads do indeed have more militarized
conflict than others. Yet, the inclusion of this term has no effect on the results that concern us here: CIEL ()0.85) is now even more robust, and the coefficient for DemocracyL (0.03) is above
zero.7 Model 4 replaces the continuous democracy measure with the standard binary one (Polity2 > 6), as suggested by Russett (2010:201), citing Bayer and Bernhard (2010). As can be
observed, the coefficient for CIEL ()0.83) remains negative and highly significant, while DemocracyBinary6 (0.63) is in the positive (wrong) direction. As discussed above, analyses of fatal
dispute onsets with the far stricter binary measure for democracy (Polity = 10), put forward by Dafoe (2011) in response to Mousseau (2009), yields perfect prediction (as does the prior binary
measure Both States CIE), causing quasi-complete separation and inconclusive results. Therefore, Model 5 reports the results with DemocracyBinary10 in analyses of all militarized conflicts,
not just fatal ones. As can be seen, the coefficient for DemocracyBinary10 ()0.41), while negative, is not significant. Model 6 reports the results in analyses of fatal disputes with DemocracyL
the coefficient for
DemocracyL 2 is at zero, further corroborating that even very high levels of democracy do not appear to
cause peace in analyses of fatal disputes, once consideration is given to contractintensive economy.
squared (after adding 10), which implies that the likelihood of conflict decreases more quickly toward the high values of DemocracyL. As can be seen,
Models 3, 4, and 6, which include Political Distance, were repeated (but unreported to save space) with analyses of all militarized interstate
disputes, with the democracy coefficients close to zero in every case. Therefore, the conclusions reached by Mousseau (2009) are corroborated
even with the most stringent measures of democracy, consideration of institutional distance, and across all specifications: The
democratic peace appears spurious , with contract-intensive economy being the more likely
explanation for both democracy and the democratic peace.
Humint
The haystack matters and solves BETTER than HUMINT. Turns the case.
Porter, 15
(R.C. Porter, Retired Intelligence Official with more than 33 years of experience in both the military and civilian affairs, M.S.
Middle Eastern Studies/National Security Policy Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.
One year study program, National Defense University/Industrial College of the Armed Forces — National Security Resource
Management, 1994. B.A., Criminal Justice, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge Louisiana, May, 1979, “THE DUMBING
DOWN OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE; AND, WHY METADATA, AND THE ‘HAYSTACK’ MATTER — IN COMBATING TERRORISM AND
PROTECTING THE U.S. HOMELAND – ‘YOU NEED A HAYSTACK….TO FIND A NEEDLE’”,
http://fortunascorner.com/2015/05/11/the-dumbing-down-of-u-s-intelligence-and-why-metadata-and-the-haystack-matter-incombating-terrorism-and-protecting-the-u-s-homeland-you-need-a-haystack-to-find-a-needle/, May 11, 2015, ak.)
The above is the title of an Op-Ed by Gordon Crovitz in the May 11, 2015 edition of The Wall Street Journal. Mr. Crovitz begins by noting that
“FBI Director James Comey warned last week that the American Islamists who tried to assassinate free-speech advocates at a cartoon
exhibition near Dallas, Texas…..are not alone. There are “hundreds, maybe thousands” of
potential terrorists in the U.S.
being inspired by overseas groups.” “The haystack is the entire country,” he said. “We are looking for needles; but,
increasingly the needles are unavailable to us.” “The needles will be even harder to find, if Congress
weakens the Patriot Act, by reducing the intelligence available to national security,” and law enforcement
agencies. “With the rise of the Islamic State and its global recruiting tools, intelligence agencies should be allowed to join the
“big data” revolution,” Mr. Crovitz wrote. “Edward Snowden’s data theft raised privacy alarms; but, by now — it’s clear that no
one working for the National Security Agency (NSA), leaked confidential data — other than Snowden himself,” Mr. Crovitz
correctly observes. “He evaded the 300 lawyers and compliance officers who monitor how NSA staff use data.” “POTUS Obama, last year,
recalled how the
9/11 hijackers escaped detection — because laws prohibited NSA from gathering and
connecting the dots. He explained that the Patriot Act was passed, to “address a gap identified after 911,” by
having intelligence agencies collect anonymous metadata — date, time, and duration of phone calls. But, POTUS Obama
reversed himself and now wants to gut the program,” Mr. Crovitz warns. “Instead of the NSA gathering call information,
phone companies would hold the data. With multiple, unconnected databases, the NSA would no longer be able
to access data to mine. There wouldn’t be dots to connect to threats. As for privacy, the phone
companies’ databases would be less secure than the NSA’S.” “Lawmakers will decide this month whether to extend the
Patriot Act or, to water it down. Instead, they should update it to maximize both privacy, and intelligence,” Mr. Crovitz argues. “Technology
now has the answer, if only politicians would get out of the way.” “Recent innovations in big data allow
staggering amounts of information to be collected and mined. These data deliver correlations based on an individually
anonymous basis. This work was originally done to support the chief revenue engine of the Internet — advertising. The technology generates
increasingly targeted marketing messages based on an individuals’ online activities.” “The techniques have other applications. Google used
them to become better than the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, at predicting flu outbreaks by monitoring search terms like “flu
medicine,” by location. Canadian researchers studied thousands of premature babies, and identified symptoms that precede fevers. Cities apply
predictive policing by mining online data to assign cops where they’re needed.” “The fast shift to self-driving cars is possible, because of data
transmitted among vehicles. Small drones share data that keep them from crashing into one another. A Brown University researcher discovered
how banks could use metadata about people’s cell phone usage to determine their creditworthiness.” “The
Patriot Act was written in
2001, before any of these advances. It lets the NSA keep anonymous data about who is calling whom for five years;
but, it isn’t able to apply algorithms to find suspicious patterns. Analysts may examine call logs for
suspicious links, only if there is a pre-existing “reasonable, articulable suspicion” of terrorism, or another threat to
national security. There were 170 such searches last year,” [2014]. “Before the Snowden leaks two years ago,
Intelligence agencies had planned to ask Congress to broaden their access to anonymous data — so they
could use modern tools of big data. Technology has moved far ahead, leaving intelligence -gathering
stupider,” Mr. Crovitz wrote. “A measure of how far behind the technology curve the intelligence agencies have become is that one of the
would-be cartoon killers posted a message on Twitter beforehand, with the hashtag #TexasAttack. Law enforcement [authorities] didn’t spot it
until after the attack. In contrast, algorithms for delivering advertising parse signals such as hashtags to deliver relevant ads in real time…before
the online page loads.” “In their 2013 book, “Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work, And Think,” Viktor MayerSchonberger and Kenneth Cukier describe the history of information: “As centuries passed, we opted for more information flows rather than
less, and to guard against its excesses — not primarily through censorship; but, through rules that limited the misuse of information.” In
conclusion, Mr. Crovitz writes, “Congress
should insist that the NSA ensure its data are used properly — no more Snowdens — but, also
give the agency authority to catch up to how the private sector uses data. Politicians should update the
Patriot Act by permitting the intelligence use of data to prevent terrorism.” Mapping Terror Networks: Why
Metadata And The ‘Haystack’ Matters Philip Mudd, former Deputy Director of the CIA’s Counter-Terrorism Center, and Senior
Intelligence Adviser to the FBI, [at the time his article was published], wrote an Op-Ed in the Dec. 30, 2014 Wall Street Journal noting that the
CIA, FBI, and the entire U.S. Intelligence Community and national security establishment had devoted countless hours as to “how best can [we]
clarify [and posture ourselves regarding] the blurring picture of an emerging terror conspiracy [aimed at the United States] originating overseas,
or inside the United States. “How
can we identify the key players (network/link analysis) and the broader network of
their fundraisers [enablers], radicalizers, travel facilitators and others….quickly enough so that they can’t succeed?,” as
well as protect civil liberties. “And,” Mr. Mudd adds, “how do we ensure that we’ve ‘mapped’ the network enough to
dismantle it?; or at a minimum, disrupt it?” Mr. Mudd observes, “in essence, you need a haystack — in order to
find a needle.” Last year, Federal Appeals Court Judge William H. Pauley ruled NSA metadata collection lawful; and added, “the
government needs a wide net that can isolate gossamer contacts among suspected terrorists in an
ocean of seemingly disconnected data; HUMINT is the more desirable method of collecting this kind of information — but,
gathering critical HUMINT is often difficult and time consuming,” not to mention that the Obama administration has
been great at droning terrorists; but, hasn’t added a single individual to Guantanamo Bay Prison. Dead men tell no tales. You can’t get
critical HUMIINT — if you stick your head in the sand and refuse to establish an interrogation facility for
this very purpose. Treating terrorists as criminals to be tried in a ‘normal’ court of law is absurd, counterproductive, and dangerous. As Mr.
Mudd wrote at the time, “mapping a network of people is simple in concept; but, complex in practice: find the key operators, and then find the
support group. Map a network poorly, and you may miss peripheral players who will recreate a conspiracy after the core of conspirators are
arrested. The
goal,” Mr. Mudd said, “is to eliminate the entire spider-web of conspiracy; cutting off a piece like
an arm of a starfish, is a poor second choice — the starfish’s arm — regenerates.” “Investigators also
need an historical pool of data,” Mr. Mudd argued at the time, “that they can access only when they have
information that starts with a known, or suspected conspirator — in the middle of a spider-web they don’t fully
understand,” and is missing a few corners. Who is watchers is a legitimate concern; and, a healthy skepticism about government claims for
access to even more personal data…is desirable, warranted, and needed. But, the
further and further we move away — in time
— from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack here on the U.S. homeland — the more we seem to lose the raison d’
tere for why we passed the Patriot Act in the first place. As the Intelligence Community and Law Enforcement authorities with
respect to the mass collection of phone data are allowed to atrophy and erode — our ability to ferret out and discover potential terrorist
attacks against the U.S. homeland also decay. I am not sure I know the right answer as to where the balance lied — between the protection of
civil liberties, versus the requirement to collect ‘enough’ data — that enables our intelligence and law enforcement professionals to — connect
the dots. But, I think I know one thing for sure. If
we do suffer a large-scale terrorist event here at home — on the
scale of 9/11 or worse — and, it is determined that we likely would have been able to discover this event
before hand — if we had allowed a more reasonable big data mining strata — there will be hell to pay —
and, perhaps a Patriot Act on steroids. It is easy to criticize law enforcement and intelligence agencies desires for greater authority
and flexibility in regards to the collection of data; but, how you see it — depends on where you sit. If you are charged with protecting the
American homeland, it is a very difficult balancing act — with few clear answers.
Their Johnson card assumes Resource wars– but those won’t happen.
Victor ‘8
David G,- Adjunct Senior Fellow for Science and Technology, Council on Foreign Relations; Director, Program on Energy and Sustainable
Development @ Stanford “Smoke and Mirror” http://www.nationalinterest.org/PrinterFriendly.aspx?id=16530
MY ARGUMENT is that classic resource wars—hot conflicts driven by a struggle to grab resources—are
increasingly rare. Even
where resources play a role, they are rarely the root cause of bloodshed. Rather, the root cause usually lies in
various failures of governance. That argument—in both its classic form and in its more nuanced incarnation—is hardly a straw man, as Thomas
Homer-Dixon asserts. Setting aside hyperbole, the punditry increasingly points to resources as a cause of war. And so do social scientists and
policy analysts, even with their more nuanced views. I’ve triggered this debate because conventional wisdom puts too much emphasis on
resources as a cause of conflict. Getting the story right has big implications for social scientists trying to unravel cause-and-effect and often
even larger implications for public policy. Michael Klare is right to underscore Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, the only classic resource
conflict in recent memory. That episode highlights two of the reasons why classic resource wars are becoming rare—they’re expensive
and rarely work. (And even in Kuwait’s case, many other forces also spurred the invasion. Notably, Iraq felt insecure with its only access
to the sea a narrow strip of land sandwiched between Kuwait on one side and its archenemy Iran on the other.) In the end, Saddam lost
resources on the order of $100 billion (plus his country and then his head) in his quest for Kuwait’s 1.5 million
barrels per day of combined oil and gas output. By contrast, Exxon paid $80 billion to get Mobil’s 1.7 million barrels per day of oil and gas
production—a merger that has held and flourished. As the bulging sovereign wealth funds are discovering, it is easier
to get resources through the stock exchange than the gun barrel.
Alt cause – Human intel fails for other reasons.
O’Brien, 05- President and CEO of Artemis Global Logistics & Solutions, Former Graduate Research Assistant at the Jebsen Center for
Counter Terrorism Research, Former International Trade Specialist for the Department of Commerce (James, “Trojan Horses: Using Current U.S.
Intelligence Resources To Successfully Infiltrate Islamic Terror Groups”, International Affairs Review Vol. 14 No.2 Fall 2005)//KTC
Nevertheless, it
is easier to recognize HUMINT deficiencies than to fix them. This is especially true when reconstituting
There is no quick fix in resolving this deficiency. This
reality is recognized by both policy advisors and policy-makers, who propose long-term investments in
sectors spread over several agencies that have been allowed to corrode.
intelligence reform. A 2002 Congressional Research Service report exemplifies this mindset: While U.S. policymakers are emphasizing the need
for rapid intelligence overhaul to close the HUMINT deficit, the United States is fighting a War on Terror with other countries’ unreliable eyes.
142 · International Affairs Review First
is a renewed emphasis on human agents. Signals intelligence and imagery satellites
have their uses in the counterterrorism mission, but intelligence to counter terrorism depends more on human intelligence
(HUMINT) such as spies and informers. Any renewed emphasis on human intelligence necessarily will involve a
willingness to accept risks of complicated and dangerous missions, and likely ties to disreputable individuals who may be in positions
to provide valuable information. Time and patience will be needed to train analysts in difficult skills and languages.h
Unfortunately, the “time and patience” necessary to develop these operatives is not a luxury the United
States can afford. The 9/11 Commission Report describes the rapid nature and lack of warning that defines the current security environment:
National security used to be considered by studying foreign frontiers, weighing opposing groups of states, and measuring industrial might….
Threats emerged slowly, often visibly, as weapons were forged, armies conscripted, and units trained and moved into place…. Now
threats
can emerge quickly. An organization like al Qaeda, headquartered in a country on the other side of the earth, in a region so poor that
electricity or telephones were scarce, could nonetheless scheme to wield weapons of unprecedented destructive power in the largest cities of
the United States.i Furthermore, even
if the United States succeeds in developing the types of intelligence operatives
with the skill sets desired for an effective war against Islamic extremists, the capacity to penetrate these
groups will likely never be fully achieved. The problem is that Islamic terrorist groups are highly insulated from
outside intrusion because of their family-based and/or clan-based recruitment policies: “Ethnically based terrorist groups
recruit new members personally known to them, people whose backgrounds are known and who often have family ties to
the organization. Intelligence penetration of organizations recruited this way is extremely difficult.”j Even those
organizations that do not recruit exclusively through family ties, such as al Qaeda, still employ a severe level of
vetting that places an operative’s survival in jeopardy. Regional dialects, local cultural sensitivities and “six-degrees-of-separation” within
small populations all work against an operative attempting to secure a terrorist leader’s trust. Recognizing these difficulties, Rich Trojan Horses ·
143 ard Betts summarizes this operational reality: “More
and better spies will help, but no one should expect
breakthroughs if we get them. It is close to impossible to penetrate small, disciplined, alien organizations like
Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda, and especially hard to find reliable U.S. citizens who have even a remote chance of trying.”k
Nevertheless, the intelligence community should pursue HUMINT reform that will develop operatives with penetration potential, but
accessing the inner circles of terror groups may take years to materialize, or may even be impossible. For
example, if the operative is accepted by a terror group, he may be isolated or removed from the organization’s
hierarchy, leaving the operative uninformed as to what other groups within the same organization are planning, including the
cell within which he may be operating.l Therefore, recognizing the U.S. HUMINT deficiency, the lengthy process of
comprehensive reform, the unpredictable nature of terrorism as a constant imminent threat, and the insulated
structure of terrorist groups, the United States will need to employ creative methods to collect information
without jeopardizing long-term intelligence reform. Bruce Hoffman suggests “some new, ‘out-of-the-box’ thinking that would go beyond simple
bureaucratic fixes.”m One
possibility is taking a backdoor approach to penetrating various fundamentalist
terrorist organizations. SOLUTION PROPOSED: WORK WITH THE TOOLS WE HAVE The Backdoor One backdoor ripe for exploitation is
the dependence of Islamic extremists on illicit activities and services to fund, train, and/or facilitate their operations.n The “Achilles
heel” of terror groups is their dependence on criminal or other interconnected terrorist groups to
provide certain services to them, specifically weapons and drug smuggling. The United States should exploit this
dependence and has the capacity to do The “Achilles heel” of terror groups is their dependence on criminal or other interconnected
terrorist groups to provide certain services to them, specifically weapons and drug smuggling. 144 · International Affairs Review so. This
backdoor should be envisioned just as the name connotes: an alternative entrance that is easier to sneak into than the front door. In the world
of computer programming, a backdoor is “an undocumented way of gaining access to a program, online service or an entire computer system.
The backdoor is written by the programmer who creates the code for the program. It is often only known by the programmer. A
backdoor
is a potential security risk.”o When hackers discover backdoors in software programs, they exploit them. The
U.S. intelligence community should adopt the hackers’ approach; infiltration agents should be looking
for similar types of alternative access routes.
No NSA overload – Accumulo tech solves.
Harris ‘13
(Not Scott Harris, because large data sets do sometimes overwhelm him… But Derrick Harris. Derrick in a senior writer at
Gigaom and has been a technology journalist since 2003. He has been covering cloud computing, big data and other emerging
IT trends for Gigaom since 2009. Derrick also holds a law degree from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. This evidence is also
internally quoting Adam Fuchs – a former NSA employee that was involved in software design. “Under the covers of the NSA’s
big data effort” – Gigaom - Jun. 7, 2013 - https://gigaom.com/2013/06/07/under-the-covers-of-the-nsas-big-data-effort/)
The NSA’s data collection practices have much of America — and certainly the tech community — on edge, but sources familiar with the agency’s
technology are saying the situation isn’t as bad as it seems. Yes, the agency has a lot of data and can do some powerful
analysis, but, the argument goes, there are strict limits in place around how the agency can use it and who has access.
Whether that’s good enough is still an open debate, but here’s what we know about the technology that’s underpinning all that data. The technological
linchpin to everything the NSA is doing from a data-analysis perspective is Accumulo — an open-source
database the agency built in order to store and analyze huge amounts of data. Adam Fuchs knows Accumulo well because he helped build it during a
nine-year stint with the NSA; he’s now co-founder and CTO of a company called Sqrrl that sells a commercial version of the database system. I spoke with him
earlier this week, days before news broke of the NSA collecting data from Verizon and the country’s largest web companies. The
NSA began building
Accumulo in late 2007, Fuchs said, because they were trying to do automated analysis for tracking and discovering new
terrorism suspects. “We had a set of applications that we wanted to develop and we were looking for the right infrastructure to build them on,” he said.
The problem was those technologies weren’t available. He liked what projects like HBase were doing by using Hadoop to mimic Google’s famous BigTable data
store, but it still wasn’t up to the NSA requirements around scalability, reliability or security. So, they began work on a project called CloudBase, which eventually
was renamed Accumulo. Now, Fuchs said, “It’s
operating at thousands-of-nodes scale” within the NSA’s data centers.
There are multiple instances each storing tens of petabytes (1 petabyte equals 1,000 terabyes or 1 million gigabytes) of data and it’s the backend of the agency’s
most widely used analytical capabilities. Accumulo’s
ability to handle data in a variety of formats (a characteristic called “schemaless” in database
the NSA can store data from numerous sources all within the database and add new analytic capabilities in
days or even hours. “It’s quite critical,” he added. What the NSA can and can’t do with all this data As I explained on Thursday, Accumulo is
especially adept at analyzing trillions of data points in order to build massive graphs that can detect the connections between them
and the strength of the connections. Fuchs didn’t talk about the size of the NSA’s graph, but he did say the database is designed to handle
months or years worth of information and let analysts move from query to query very fast. When you’re talking
about analyzing call records, it’s easy to see where this type of analysis would be valuable in determining how far a
suspected terrorist’s network might spread and who might be involved.
jargon) means
Big Data can handle it.
Pontius ‘14
Brandon H. Pontius. The author holds a B.S. from Louisiana State University and an M.B.A., Louisiana State University. The
author wrote this piece in partial fulfillment of a MASTER OF SCIENCE IN COMPUTER SCIENCE from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL. The thesis advisor that reviewed this piece is Mark Gondree, PhD. Gondree is a security researcher associated with the
Computer Science Dept at the Naval Postgraduate School – “INFORMATION SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR APPLICATIONS
USING APACHE ACCUMULO” - September 2014 http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/43980/14Sep_Pontius_Brandon.pdf?sequence=1
Generation of actionable intelligence from large data sets requires efficient analysis. Manual analysis of large data sets to develop these insights
is unsustainably resource intensive. In January 2014, the deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency noted, “We’re looking for needles
within haystacks while trying to define what the needle is, in an era of declining resources and increasing threats” [7]. Big
data platforms
have the storage and analytical capabilities necessary to handle large data sets. These solutions can
relieve the processing burden on human analysts and allow them to spend more time generating real
intelligence [5]. Big data analytics make information more usable, improve decision making, and lead to
more focused missions and services. For instance, geographically separated teams can access a real-time common operating picture,
diagnostic data mining can support proactive maintenance programs that prevent battlefield failures, and
data can be transformed into a common structure that allows custom queries by a distributed force composed of many communities [4], [6].
Solvency
Aff can’t solve because of circumvention. Even Original Freedom Act is not strict
enough.
Granick ‘14
Jennifer Granick is the Director of Civil Liberties at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society. Jennifer was the Civil Liberties
Director at the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Jennifer practices, speaks and writes about computer crime and security,
electronic surveillance, consumer privacy, data protection, copyright, trademark and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. From
2001 to 2007, Jennifer was Executive Director of CIS and taught Cyberlaw, Computer Crime Law, Internet intermediary liability,
and Internet law and policy. Before teaching at Stanford, Jennifer earned her law degree from University of California, Hastings
College of the Law and her undergraduate degree from the New College of the University of South Florida. “USA Freedom Act:
Oh, Well. Whatever. Nevermind.” – Just Security - May 21, 2014 http://justsecurity.org/10675/usa-freedom-act-oh-wellwhatever-nevermind/
Additionally, in December of 2013, Deputy
Attorney General James Cole testified before the Senate Judiciary
Committee that the NSA might continue its bulk collection of nearly all domestic phone call records, even if
the original USA FREEDOM ACT passed into law. As I wrote at the time, this testimony shows that the Administration
and the intelligence community believe they can do whatever they want, regardless of the laws Congress
passes, so long they can convince one of the judges appointed to the secretive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC) to agree. All they need is some legal hook they can present with a straight face.
2AC
TPP
Zero chance congress rejects TPP post fast track approval – structural factors
Stoltzfoos, 6/23 -- Rachel, Reporter @ Daily Caller, Daily Caller, 6/23/15,
http://dailycaller.com/2015/06/23/congress-secures-trade-promotion-authority-forobama/
TPA would give Congress more power to shape the trade agreement by defining specific objectives the president must work toward in a deal,
and by setting new transparency rules. But once
the president submits a deal to Congress, TPA greatly restricts the
Senate’s ability to block or complicate the deal. Any deal the president submits to Congress in the next six
years is almost guaranteed to pass, because the Senate must promptly approve or reject the deal with
no chance to amend it and little time for debate. And just 51 votes would be required for passage — a
far cry from the 61 votes required for major legislation. (RELATED: Why Are Senate Republicans So Eager To Cede Their
Trade Authority To Obama?)What do you think? Obama says he needs TPA to conclude a massive trade deal, the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, which he is currently negotiating with 11 other countries. And the Republicans who fought for the deal say TPA is key to future
free trade agreements that will benefit the U.S. economy.What do you think? Critics contend its a dangerous concession of
Senate power to a president that can’t be trusted.
Sequestration plus ISIS jack asia pivot.
Whyte and Weitz 1-29. [Leon, MA candidate @ Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy @ Tufts, Richard, Senior Fellow and
Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute, non-resident Adjunct Senior Fellow @ Center for a New American
Securitiy, "Enough to go around? Money matters complicate US strategic rebalance to Asia-Pacific" Fletcher Security Review Vol 2 No 1 -www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1455/2015_01_29_weitz_whyte.pdf]
However, U.S.
economic weaknesses and the Budget Control Act of 2011 – which mandates∂ cuts in U.S. government
as “sequestration”) – have constrained the U.S.∂ government’s ability to resource the
Rebalance adequately and meet its regional security∂ commitments.7 The sequestration process was deliberately devised
spending (known
to present the Congress∂ with an unacceptable outcome if the members failed to balance the budget through a combination∂ of tax hikes and
targeted spending cuts. But the congressional compromise has failed∂ to occur, and now sequestration
is threatening to wreck
havoc throughout the government∂ with arbitrary percentage-driven spending cuts. Complicating
matters further in the defense∂ domain are the Taliban’s resilience in Afghanistan and the stunning
emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. During the initial planning and unveiling of the
Rebalance, the∂ United States assumed it would be possible to shift more resources to Asia as it
curtailed∂ its commitments in the Middle East and South Asia,8 yet U.S. engagement in these areas is∂
steadying or growing. New challenges have also emerged in Europe due to Russian aggression∂ against
Ukraine.
Not intrinsic – logical policy maker could do both
Asia pivot and US influence resilient – TPP not key
Gill, 14 -- Bates Gill, chief executive of the US Studies Centre at the University of Sydney,
and Tom Switzer, a research associate at the US Studies Centre, The Interpreter, 3/27,
http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/03/27/Americas-Asia-Pacific-pivot-Reportsof-its-death-greatly-exaggerated.aspx
Fullilove says 'the economic element of the rebalance is in trouble.' He assumes the 'pivot' is doomed
without the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal. But the 'pivot' does not equate simply to the TPP. US
trade and investment with the region is deepening: US foreign direct investment in Asia has increased
by more than 170% since 2001, and Asian investment in the US has jumped by more than 130% in the same
period. Meanwhile, Washington has signed several bilateral regional trade deals in the past decade and is
in negotiation for a bilateral investment treaty with Beijing. Besides, even if the President fails to get Trade Promotion
Authority from congressional Democrats in a mid-term election year, there is always next year: a new congress, with more pro-trade
Republicans, is more than likely to pass fast-track authority, which would still give Obama leverage to sign and ratify the TPP. Historians since
Thucydides have observed that the rise of a new power is often accompanied by regional uncertainty and sometimes conflict. China's rise will
remain a central question for the region and for US foreign policy. But it is not inevitable that a China with 'plenty of puff', as Fullilove suggests,
will become a hegemonic force that will impose its will across the region. In the event of a severe economic downturn, something China has not
experienced in its 30-year bull run, it
is at least as likely, if not more so, that Beijing's leaders would remain
largely consumed with dealing with economic challenges at home rather than slaying dragons abroad.
This, moreover, at a time when China is surrounded by more than a dozen neighbours, few of which are
truly friendly toward Beijing. It is also widely believed China will grow old before it grows rich. But even if
Beijing can sort out its long-term demographic problems, other big challenges, namely political and
environmental, loom. Meanwhile, notwithstanding its own problems at home, the US will continue as the
predominant power, not just in education and innovation but also energy self-sufficiency. Demographic
trends, including moderately high immigration and fertility levels, also work to America's advantage. All
of this is good reason to believe that, far from pivoting away, the US is intensifying its engagement in
the region.
No link – plan goes to the bottom of the docket – passes after TPP – that’s normal
means
Zero risk of Asian war or miscalc
Bisley 14(Nick, executive director of LaTrobe Asia at LaTrobe University, It’s not 1914 all over again:
Asia is preparing to avoid war, March 10, http://theconversation.com/its-not-1914-all-over-again-asiais-preparing-to-avoid-war-22875)
One hundred years ago, Europe stumbled into an unexpected and utterly devastating war. It was unexpected for two reasons: the diplomatic
mechanisms set up after Napoleon’s defeat had kept the continent free from great power war in the 19th century, and that Europe’s
economies had become profoundly intertwined. War became possible because a rising power could not find satisfaction in the existing
international order. Chauvinistic nationalism, a complacent mindset about warfare and non-existent diplomatic efforts to reduce the risks of
conflict dragged Europe to war. For some, history seems on the cusp of a tragic repetition. China appears to have all the trappings of Kaiser
Wilhelm II’s Germany. It is a great power that is increasingly dissatisfied with the dominant order and is now able to deliver on its potential and
ambition. The US is cast as an overstretched Britain: not quite aware of its limits and overconfident of its ability to see off challengers. A
confident and nationalistic Japan is one possible catalyst for conflict. Its alliance with the US is reminiscent of the complex arrangements that
caused an assassination in Sarajevo to lead to World War One. The rumbling from North Korea, itself an ally of China, is touted as another spark
that might ignite conflict. Asia
is cast as a region as complacent about the risks of war as Europe was in its belle
époque. Analogies are an understandable way of trying to make sense of unfamiliar circumstances. In this case, however, the
historical
parallel is deeply misleading. Asia is experiencing a period of uncertainty and strategic risk unseen since the
US and China reconciled their differences in the mid-1970s. Tensions among key powers are at very high levels: Japanese
prime minister Shinzo Abe recently invoked the 1914 analogy. But there are very good reasons, notwithstanding these issues, why
Asia is not about to tumble into a great power war. China is America’s second most important trading
partner. Conversely, the US is by far the most important country with which China trades. Trade and
investment’s “golden straitjacket” is a basic reason to be optimistic. Why should this be seen as being more effective than the
high levels of interdependence between Britain and Germany before World War One? Because Beijing and Washington are not
content to rely on markets alone to keep the peace. They are acutely aware of how much they have at
stake. Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe has likened China-US tensions to relations between Britain and Germany leading up to World War
One. CSIS: Centre for Strategic & International Studies, CC BY-NC-SA Diplomatic infrastructure for peace The two powers have
established a wide range of institutional links to manage their relations. These are designed to improve the level
and quality of their communication, to lower the risks of misunderstanding spiralling out of control and to
manage the trajectory of their relationship. Every year, around 1000 officials from all ministries led by the top political figures in each country
meet under the auspices of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. The dialogue
has demonstrably improved US-China relations
to collaboration in a wide range of areas. These range from disaster relief to
humanitarian aid exercises, from joint training of Afghan diplomats to marine conservation efforts, in which Chinese law
across the policy spectrum, leading
enforcement officials are hosted on US Coast Guard vessels to enforce maritime legal regimes. Unlike the near total absence of diplomatic
engagement by Germany and Britain in the lead-up to 1914, today’s
two would-be combatants have a deep level of
interaction and practical co-operation. Just as the extensive array of common interests has led Beijing and Washington to do a lot
of bilateral work, Asian states have been busy the past 15 years. These nations have created a broad range of multilateral
institutions and mechanisms intended to improve trust, generate a sense of common cause and promote
regional prosperity. Some organisations, like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), have a high profile with its annual leaders’
meeting involving, as it often does, the common embarrassment of heads of government dressing up in national garb. Others like the ASEAN
Regional Forum and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus Process are less in the public eye. But there are more than 15 separate
multilateral bodies that have a focus on regional security concerns. All these organisations are trying to build what might be described as an
infrastructure for peace in the region. While
these mechanisms are not flawless, and many have rightly been criticised for being
long on dialogue and short on action, they have been crucial in managing specific crises and allowing countries to clearly
state their commitments and priorities. Again, this is in stark contrast to the secret diplomatic dealings in the lead-up
to 1914. Higher risks, greater caution States in Asia today are far more cautious about the way they use force than
Europeans were in 1914. A century ago, war was seen as not only a legitimate policy choice but was championed by many for its ability to
demonstrate national virtue, honour and prowess. The experiences of war in the 20th century, the legal prohibitions that states have since
created and the professionalisation of armed forces have meant that there is not the same taste for war that existed 100 years ago. Asia
is
not about to succumb to a great power war because of the existence of nuclear weapons. The
destructive power of these armaments focuses the mind of decision-makers on the consequences of using force in any
significant way. Their existence acts as a crucial moderating influence on the policies of Asia’s great and
aspirant great powers. This is not a counsel borne out of complacency – the region has very real problems, which require careful and
active management. Tensions in the East and South China Seas over tiny islands do have very significant risks
of friction and conflict escalation. A nuclear breakout in northeast Asia remains an unlikely but nonetheless real possibility, while the old flashpoints of Taiwan and Kashmir remain. The region will require a great deal of vigilance to keep the peace. But it is an awareness of this effort
that marks perhaps the final point of contrast with pre-war Europe. Asia’s statesmen and women are well aware of the challenge that confronts
them. So far we must pay them the credit of being up to that challenge and being capable of taking the necessary steps to ensure devastating
war does not return. We
live in difficult times, but Asia is not about to sleepwalk into conflict.
Plan’s popular – there’s overwhelming, bipartisan public support for reducing
surveillance – it directly affects Obama’s approval rating
Jaycox, 14 (MARK JAYCOX, Legislative Analyst for EFF, 22-2014, "Update: Polls Continue to Show
Majority of Americans Against NSA Spying", Electronic Frontier Foundation,
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/10/polls-continue-show-majority-americans-against-nsa-spying,
DA: 5-30-2015)
Update, January 2014: Polls
continue to confirm the trend. In a poll conducted in December 2013 by the Washington Post,
66% of Americans were concerned "about the collection and use of [their] personal information by the
National Security Agency." Americans aren't only concerned about the collection. A recent Pew poll found—yet again—that a
majority of Americans oppose the government's collection of phone and Internet data as a part of anti-terrorism
efforts. Since Americans are both concerned with, and opposed to, the spying, it's no surprise that they also
want reform. In a November 2013 poll by Anzalone Liszt Grove Research,1 59% of respondents noted that they wanted
surveillance reform and 63% said they wanted more oversight of the spying programs. While these polls focused on the
larger population of Americans, a Harvard University Insitute of Politics poll focusing on younger Americans (aged 18-29 years old)
reaffirmed younger Americans are both wary of the NSA's activities and that a majority do not want the
government to collect personal information about them. Shortly after the June leaks, numerous polls
asked the American people if they approved or disapproved of the NSA spying, which includes collecting
telephone records using Section 215 of the Patriot Act and collecting phone calls and emails using Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. The
answer then was a resounding no, and new polls released in August and September clearly show
Americans' increasing concern about privacy has continued. Since July, many of the polls not only confirm the
American people think the NSA's actions violates their privacy, but think the surveillance should be stopped. For instance
in an AP poll, nearly 60 percent of Americans said they oppose the NSA collecting data about their telephone and Internet usage. In another
national poll by the Washington Post and ABC News, 74 percent of respondents said the NSA's spying intrudes on their privacy rights. This
majority should come as no surprise, as we've seen a sea change in opinion polls on privacy since the Edward Snowden revelations started in
June. What's also important is that
it crosses political party lines. The Washington Post/ABC News poll found 70
percent of Democrats and 77 percent of Republicans believe the NSA’s spying programs intrude on their
privacy rights. This change is significant, showing that privacy is a bipartisan issue. In 2006, a similar question found only 50
percent of Republicans thought the government intruded on their privacy rights. Americans also continue their skepticism of the federal
government and its inability to conduct proper oversight. In a recent poll, Rasmusson—though sometimes known for push polling—revealed
that there's been a 30 percent increase in people who believe it is now more likely that the government will monitor their phone calls. Maybe
even more significant is that this skepticism carries over into whether or not Americans believe the government's claim that it "robustly
oversees" the NSA's programs. In a Huffpost/You Gov poll, 53 percent of respondents said they think "the federal courts and rules put in place
by Congress" do not provide "adequate oversight." Only 18 percent of people agreed with the statement. Americans seem to be waking up
from its surveillance state slumber as the leaks around the illegal and unconstitutional NSA spying continue. The
anger Americans—
around the NSA spying is starting to show. President Obama has seen a 14point swing in his approval and disapproval rating among voters aged 18-29 after the NSA spying. These recent
round of polls confirm that Americans are not only concerned with the fact that the spying infringes their privacy, but also that they want
the spying to stop. And this is even more so for younger Americans. Now is the time for Congress to act: join the
especially younger Americans—have
StopWatching.Us coalition.
That shields the link and builds political capital
Page, 09 – cites H.W. Brands, professor at UTA, and presidential historian who has met privately with
Obama (Susan Page, USA Today reporter, 7-20-2009, "Polls can affect president's hold on party", USA
Today, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/presidential-approval-tracker.htm, DA: 5-302015)
WASHINGTON — A
president's standing after his first six months in office doesn't forecast whether he'll have a successful four-year
term, but it does signal how much political juice he'll have for his second six months in office. That's the lesson of
history. Barack Obama, who completed six months in office Monday, has a 55% approval rating in the USA TODAY/Gallup Poll, putting him
10th among the dozen presidents who have served since World War II at this point in their tenures. That's not as bad for Obama as it may
sound: The six-month mark hasn't proved to be a particularly good indicator of how a president ultimately will fare. Two-thirds of Americans
approved of the jobs Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush were doing at six months, but both would lose their bids for re-election. And though
the younger Bush and Bill Clinton had significantly lower ratings at 180 days — Clinton had sunk to 41% approval — both won second terms.
Even so, a
president's standing at the moment is more than a matter of vanity. It affects his ability to hold the
members of his own party and persuade those on the other side to support him, at least on the
occasional issue. "Approval ratings are absolutely critical for a president achieving his agenda," says
Republican pollster Whit Ayres. For Obama, the timing of his slide in ratings is particularly unhelpful: He's intensified his push to pass health
care bills in the House and Senate before Congress leaves on its August recess. He'll press his case at a news conference at 8 p.m. Wednesday.
His overall approval rating has dropped 9 percentage points since his inauguration in January, and his disapproval rate has jumped 16 points, to
41%. Trouble at home More people disapprove than approve of Obama on four domestic issues: the economy, taxes, health care and the
federal budget deficit. He scores majority approval on handling Iraq, Afghanistan and foreign affairs. The biggest drop has been on his handling
of the economy, down 12 points since February; his disapproval is up 19 points. The most erosion has come not from Republicans or
independents but among his own Democrats. Support from conservative and moderate Democrats is down by 18 points. Another group in the
party's political base — those earning $20,000 to $50,000 a year — had a drop of 15 percentage points, to 47%. That could reflect one reason
why moderate Democratic senators and the fiscally conservative Blue Dog Democrats in the House are demanding more cost controls in the
health care plan before they'll sign on. "It's
important if a president is trying to accomplish some big stuff
legislatively," H.W. Brands, a professor at the University of Texas-Austin, says of the approval rating. He was one of
several presidential historians who sat down with Obama at a private White House dinner this month.
"Members of Congress are somewhat reluctant to tangle with a president who seems to have the backing
of the American people." At 55% overall, Obama's approval rating is a tick below that of George W. Bush at six months. It is well
above Clinton and Gerald Ford, who was hammered for his pardon of Richard Nixon. At the top of the list is Harry Truman at 82% — buoyed by
the end of World War II — followed by Lyndon Johnson, John Kennedy and Dwight Eisenhower. The fact that presidents from the 1950s and
1960s scored better than more recent ones could mean the public's assessments are getting tougher. "Mid-20th-century presidents had higher
political capital and more stable political capital than presidents of the last 20 years," says Steven Schier, a political scientist who is studying
presidential job approval since modern polling began in the 1930s. He wrote Panorama of a Presidency: How George W. Bush Acquired and
Spent His Political Capital. Schier theorizes that the difference in ratings is due to the accelerating speed with which information is
disseminated, the declining number of Americans firmly tied to a political party and a growing desire to see quick results. "There's
less
patience with presidents than there used to be," he says. What's popularity for? Savvy presidents understand
that pursuing big policies will cost them popularity, Brands says. "Presidents have to decide what their
popularity is for," he says. "Lyndon Johnson probably understood best that political popularity is a wasting asset. You had to use it when
you had it." Johnson was inaugurated after Kennedy's assassination in 1963 and then crushed Republican Barry Goldwater in the 1964
presidential race. LBJ used his high approval ratings — they didn't fall below 60% for more than two years after his inauguration — and big
majorities in the House and Senate to enact his Great Society programs. Amid growing opposition to the Vietnam War, Johnson's standing fell
so low that he decided not to seek another term. Ronald Reagan may provide a closer parallel to Obama. Both took office as the nation's
economy was in perilous times. Reagan was at 60% at six months, but his standing slipped below 50% by the end of his first year in office as the
jobless rate swelled. It would take two years and economic recovery before a majority of Americans would approve of his presidency again.
Fiat solves the link – it’s a magic wand – plan passes without debate – doesn’t expend
PC
There’s bipartisan momentum for curtailing surveillance
Weisman, 13 (Jonathan Weisman, political writer for NYT, 7-28-2013, "Momentum Builds against
N.S.A. Surveillance", New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/29/us/politics/momentumbuilds-against-nsa-surveillance.html, DA: 5-30-2015)
WASHINGTON — The movement to crack down on government surveillance started with an odd couple from Michigan,
Representatives Justin Amash, a young libertarian Republican known even to his friends as “chief wing nut,” and John Conyers Jr., an elder of
the liberal left in his 25th House term. But what began on the political fringes only a week ago has
built a momentum that even
critics say may be unstoppable, drawing support from Republican and Democratic leaders, attracting
moderates in both parties and pulling in some of the most respected voices on national security in the
House. The rapidly shifting politics were reflected clearly in the House on Wednesday, when a plan to defund the National Security Agency’s
telephone data collection program fell just seven votes short of passage. Now, after initially signaling that they were comfortable with the
scope of the N.S.A.’s collection of Americans’ phone and Internet activities, but not their content, revealed last month by Edward J. Snowden,
lawmakers are showing an increasing willingness to use legislation to curb those actions. Representatives Jim
Sensenbrenner, Republican of Wisconsin, and Zoe Lofgren, Democrat of California, have begun work on legislation in the
House Judiciary Committee to significantly rein in N.S.A. telephone surveillance. Mr. Sensenbrenner said on Friday that he
would have a bill ready when Congress returned from its August recess that would restrict phone surveillance to only those named as targets of
a federal terrorism investigation, make significant changes to the secret court that oversees such programs and give businesses like Microsoft
and Google permission to reveal their dealings before that court. “There
is a growing sense that things have really gone a-
kilter here,” Ms. Lofgren said. The sudden reconsideration of post-Sept. 11 counterterrorism policy has taken much of Washington by
surprise. As the revelations by Mr. Snowden, a former N.S.A. contractor, were gaining attention in the news media, the White House and
leaders in both parties stood united behind the programs he had unmasked. They were focused mostly on bringing the leaker to justice.
Backers of sweeping surveillance powers now say they recognize that changes are likely, and they are taking steps to make sure they maintain
control over the extent of any revisions. Leaders of the Senate Intelligence Committee met on Wednesday as the House deliberated to try to
find accommodations to growing public misgivings about the programs, said the committee’s chairwoman, Senator Dianne Feinstein, Democrat
of California. Senator Mark Udall, a Colorado Democrat and longtime critic of the N.S.A. surveillance programs, said he had taken part in serious
meetings to discuss changes. Senator Saxby Chambliss of Georgia, the ranking Republican on the panel, said, “We’re talking through it right
now.” He added, “There are a lot of ideas on the table, and it’s pretty obvious that we’ve got some uneasy folks.” Representative Mike Rogers,
a Michigan Republican and the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, has assured House colleagues that an intelligence policy bill he
plans to draft in mid-September will include new privacy safeguards. Aides familiar with his efforts said the House Intelligence Committee was
focusing on more transparency for the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which oversees data gathering, including possibly
declassifying that court’s orders, and changes to the way the surveillance data is stored. The legislation may order such data to be held by the
telecommunications companies that produce them or by an independent entity, not the government. Lawmakers say their votes to
restrain the N.S.A. reflect a gut-level concern among voters about personal privacy. “I represent a very
reasonable district in suburban Philadelphia, and my constituents are expressing a growing concern on the sweeping
amounts of data that the government is compiling,” said Representative Michael G. Fitzpatrick, a moderate Republican
who represents one of the few true swing districts left in the House and who voted on Wednesday to limit N.S.A. surveillance. Votes from the
likes of Mr. Fitzpatrick were not initially anticipated when Republican leaders chided reporters for their interest in legislation that they said
would go nowhere. As the House slowly worked its way on Wednesday toward an evening vote to curb government surveillance, even
proponents of the legislation jokingly predicted that only the “wing nuts” — the libertarians of the right, the most ardent liberals on the left —
would support the measure. Then Mr. Sensenbrenner, a Republican veteran and one of the primary authors of the post-Sept. 11 Patriot Act,
stepped to a microphone on the House floor. Never, he said, did he intend to allow the wholesale vacuuming up of domestic phone records,
nor did his legislation envision that data dragnets would go beyond specific targets of terrorism investigations. “The time has come to stop it,
and the way we stop it is to approve this amendment,” Mr. Sensenbrenner said. He had not intended to speak, and when he did, he did not say
much, just seven brief sentences. “I was able to say what needed to be said in a minute,” he said Friday. Lawmakers from both parties said the
brief speech was a pivotal moment. When the tally was final, the effort to end the N.S.A.’s programs had fallen short, 205 to 217. Supporters
included Republican leaders like Representative Cathy McMorris Rodgers of Washington and Democratic leaders like Representative James E.
Clyburn of South Carolina. Republican moderates like Mr. Fitzpatrick and Blue Dog Democrats like Representative Kurt Schrader of Oregon
joined with respected voices on national security matters like Mr. Sensenbrenner and Ms. Lofgren. Besides Ms. McMorris Rodgers,
Representative Lynn Jenkins of Kansas, another member of the Republican leadership, voted yes. On the Democratic side, the chairman of the
House Democratic Caucus, Representative Xavier Becerra of California, and his vice chairman, Representative Joseph Crowley of New York,
broke with the top two Democrats, Representatives Nancy Pelosi of California and Steny H. Hoyer of Maryland, who pressed hard for no votes.
On Friday, Ms. Pelosi, the House minority leader and a veteran of the Intelligence Committee, and Mr. Hoyer
dashed off a letter
to the president warning that even those Democrats who had stayed with him on the issue on Wednesday would
be seeking changes. That letter included the signature of Mr. Conyers, who is rallying an increasingly unified
Democratic caucus to his side, as well as 61 House Democrats who voted no on Wednesday but are now publicly signaling their
discontent. “Although some of us voted for and others against the amendment, we all agree that there are lingering questions and concerns
about the current” data collection program, the letter stated. Representative Reid Ribble of Wisconsin, a Republican who voted for the curbs
and predicted that changes to the N.S.A. surveillance programs were now unstoppable, said: “This was in many respects a vote intended to
send a message. The vote was just too strong.” Ms. Lofgren said the White House and Democratic and Republican leaders had not come to grips
with what she called “a grave sense of betrayal” that greeted Mr. Snowden’s revelations. Since the Bush administration, lawmakers had been
repeatedly assured that such indiscriminate collection of data did not exist, and that when targeting was unspecific, it was aimed at people
abroad. The movement against the N.S.A. began with the fringes of each party. Mr. Amash of Michigan began pressing for an amendment on
the annual military spending bill aimed at the N.S.A. Leaders of the Intelligence Committee argued strenuously that such an amendment was
not relevant to military spending and should be ruled out of order. But Mr. Amash, an acolyte of Ron Paul, a libertarian former congressman,
persisted and rallied support. Mr. Sensenbrenner and Ms. Lofgren said they were willing to work with the House and Senate intelligence panels
to overhaul the surveillance programs, but indicated that they did not believe those panels were ready to go far enough. “I would just hope the
Intelligence Committees will not stick their heads in the sand on this,” Mr. Sensenbrenner said.
Forcing controversial fights key to Obama’s agenda- try or die for the link turn
Dickerson 1/18 (John, Slate, Go for the Throat!,
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2013/01/barack_obama_s_second_inaugural_addre
ss_the_president_should_declare_war.single.html)
On Monday, President Obama will preside over the grand reopening of his administration. It would be altogether fitting if he stepped to the microphone, looked
down the mall, and let out a sigh: so many people expecting so much from a government that appears capable of so little. A second inaugural suggests new
beginnings, but this one is being bookended by dead-end debates. Gridlock over the fiscal cliff preceded it and gridlock over the debt limit, sequester,
and budget will follow. After the election, the
same people are in power in all the branches of government and they
don't get along. There's no indication that the president's clashes with House Republicans will end soon. Inaugural speeches
are supposed to be huge and stirring. Presidents haul our heroes onstage, from George Washington to Martin Luther King Jr. George W. Bush brought the Liberty
Bell. They use history to make greatness and achievements seem like something you can just take down from the shelf. Americans are not stuck in the rut of the
day. But this might be too much for Obama’s second inaugural address: After the last four years, how do you call the nation and its elected representatives to
common action while standing on the steps of a building where collective action goes to die? That bipartisan bag of tricks has been tried and it didn’t work. People
don’t believe it. Congress' approval rating is 14 percent, the lowest in history. In a December Gallup poll, 77 percent of those asked said the way Washington works
is doing “serious harm” to the country. The
challenge for President Obama’s speech is the challenge of his second term: how to be
great when the environment stinks. Enhancing the president’s legacy requires something more than simply the
clever application of predictable stratagems. Washington’s partisan rancor, the size of the problems facing government, and the
limited amount of time before Obama is a lame duck all point to a single conclusion: The president who
came into office speaking in lofty terms about bipartisanship and cooperation can only cement his legacy if he destroys the GOP. If he
wants to transform American politics, he must go for the throat. President Obama could, of course, resign himself to tending to the achievements of
his first term. He'd make sure health care reform is implemented, nurse the economy back to health, and put the military on a new footing after two wars. But he's
more ambitious than that. He ran for president as a one-term senator with no executive experience. In his first term, he pushed for the biggest overhaul of health
care possible because, as he told his aides, he wanted to make history. He may already have made it. There's no question that he is already a president of
consequence. But there's no sign he's content to ride out the second half of the game in the Barcalounger. He is approaching gun control, climate change, and
immigration with wide and excited eyes. He's not going for caretaker. How should the president proceed then, if he wants to be bold? The Barack Obama of the
first administration might
have approached the task by finding some Republicans to deal with and then start agreeing to
some of their votes. It's the traditional approach. Perhaps he could add a good deal more
schmoozing with lawmakers, too. That's the old way. He has abandoned that. He doesn't think it will work and he
doesn't have the time. As Obama explained in his last press conference, he thinks the Republicans are dead set on opposing
him. They cannot be unchained by schmoozing. Even if Obama were wrong about Republican
intransigence, other constraints will limit the chance for cooperation. Republican lawmakers worried
about primary challenges in 2014 are not going to be willing partners. He probably has at most 18 months before people start
dropping the lame-duck label in close proximity to his name. Obama’s only remaining option is to pulverize. Whether he succeeds in
passing legislation or not, given his ambitions, his goal should be to delegitimize his opponents. Through a series of clarifying fights over
controversial issues, he can force Republicans to either side with their coalition's most extreme elements or cause a rift in the
party that will leave it, at least temporarily, in disarray.
some of their demands in hope that he would win
History and empirics prove Obama PC irrelevant
Norman Ornstein is a long-time observer of Congress and politics. He is a contributing editor and
columnist for National Journal and The Atlantic and is an election eve analyst for BBC News. He served
as codirector of the AEI-Brookings Election Reform Project and participates in AEI's Election Watch
series. 5-8-2013 http://www.aei.org/article/politics-and-public-opinion/executive/the-myth-ofpresidential-leadership/
The theme of
presidential leadership is a venerated one in America, the subject of many biographies and an enduring mythology about great figures
rising to the occasion. The term “mythology” doesn’t mean that the stories are inaccurate; Lincoln, the wonderful Steven Spielberg movie, conveyed a real sense of that president’s remarkable
character and drive, as well as his ability to shape important events.
Every president is compared to the Lincoln leadership standard and to those set by other
presidents, and the first 100 days of every term becomes a measure of how a president is doing.¶ I have been struck by this phenomenon a lot recently, because at nearly every speech I give,
someone asks about President Obama’s failure to lead. Of course, that question has been driven largely by the media, perhaps most by Bob Woodward. When Woodward speaks, Washington
listens, and he has pushed the idea that Obama has failed in his fundamental leadership task—not building relationships with key congressional leaders the way Bill Clinton did, and not
“working his will” the way LBJ or Ronald Reagan did.¶ Now, after the failure to get the background-check bill through the Senate, other reporters and columnists have picked up on the same
theme, and I have grown increasingly frustrated with how the mythology of leadership has been spread in recent weeks. I have yelled at the television set, “Didn’t any of you ever read Richard
Neustadt’s classic Presidential Leadership? Haven’t any of you taken Politics 101 and read about the limits of presidential power in a separation-of-powers system?”¶ But the issue goes
No one schmoozed more or better with legislators in both parties than Clinton. How many
Republican votes did it get him on his signature initial priority, an economic plan? Zero in both houses. And it took eight months to get enough Democrats to limp
over the finish line. How did things work out on his health care plan? How about his impeachment in the House?¶ No one knew Congress, or the buttons to
push with every key lawmaker, better than LBJ. It worked like a charm in his famous 89th, Great Society Congress, largely because he had overwhelming majorities of his own
party in both houses. But after the awful midterms in 1966, when those swollen majorities receded, LBJ’s mastery of Congress didn’t mean
squat.¶ No one defined the agenda or negotiated more brilliantly than Reagan. Did he “work his will”? On almost
every major issue, he had to make major compromises with Democrats, including five straight years with
significant tax increases. But he was able to do it—as he was able to achieve a breakthrough on tax reform—because he had key Democrats willing to work with him and
beyond that, to a willful ignorance of history.
find those compromises.¶ For Obama, we knew from the get-go that he had no Republicans willing to work with him. As Robert Draper pointed out in his book Do Not Ask What Good We Do,
GOP leaders such as Eric Cantor and Paul Ryan determined on inauguration eve in January 2009 that they would work to keep Obama and
his congressional Democratic allies from getting any Republican votes for any of his priorities or initiatives. Schmoozing was not
going to change that.¶ Nor would arm-twisting. On the gun-control vote in the Senate, the press has focused on the four apostate Democrats
who voted against the Manchin-Toomey plan, and the unwillingness of the White House to play hardball with Democrat Mark Begich of Alaska. But even if Obama had
bludgeoned Begich and his three colleagues to vote for the plan, the Democrats would still have fallen short of the 60 votes that are now the
routine hurdle in the Senate—because 41 of 45 Republicans voted no. And as Sen. Pat Toomey, R-Pa., has said, several did so just to deny Obama a victory.¶ Indeed, the theme of
presidential arm-twisting again ignores history. Clinton once taught Sen. Richard Shelby of Alabama a lesson, cutting out jobs in Huntsville, Ala. That
key
worked well enough that Shelby switched parties, joined the Republicans, and became a reliable vote against Clinton. George W. Bush and Karl Rove decided to teach Sen. Jim Jeffords a
lesson, punishing dairy interests in Vermont. That worked even better—he switched to independent status and cost the Republicans their Senate majority.
easier than reality.
Myths are so much
Terrorism
( ) US losing the war on terror
Miller ‘15
Internally quoting Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr. - Greg Miller - Intelligence reporter for the Washington
Post; former national security correspondent for the Los Angeles Times and co-author of The Interrogators: Inside the Secret
War against al Qaeda - “In campaign against terrorism, U.S. enters period of pessimism and gloom” – Washington Post - March
7 - http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-campaign-against-terrorism-us-enters-period-of-pessimismand-gloom/2015/03/07/ca980380-c1bc-11e4-ad5c-3b8ce89f1b89_story.html
In congressional testimony recently, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr. went beyond the usual litany of threats to say that terrorism
trend lines were worse “than at any other point in history.” Maj. Gen. Michael Nagata, commander of U.S. Special Operations
forces in the Middle East, told participants on a counter-terrorism strategy call that he regarded the Islamic State as a greater menace than al-Qaeda ever was.
Speaking at a New York police terrorism conference, Michael Morell, former deputy director of the CIA, said he had come to doubt that he would live to see the end
of al-Qaeda and its spawn. “This is long term,” he said. “My children’s generation and my grandchildren’s generation will still be fighting this fight.” The
assessments reflect a pessimism that has descended on the U.S. counterterrorism community over the
past year amid a series of discouraging developments. Among them are the growth of the Islamic State, the
ongoing influx of foreign fighters into Syria, the collapse of the U.S.-backed government in Yemen and the downward spiral of
Libya’s security situation. The latest complication came Saturday, when the terrorist group Boko Haram in Nigeria carried out a series of suicide bombings and
reportedly declared its allegiance to the Islamic State. Unlike the waves of anxiety that accompanied the emergence of new terrorist plots over the past decade, the
latest shift in mood seems more deep-seated. U.S. officials depict a bewildering landscape in which al-Qaeda and the brand of Islamist militancy it inspired have not
only survived 14 years of intense counterterrorism operations but have also spread. Officials emphasize that their campaign has accomplished critical goals. In
particular, most officials and experts now see the risk of a Sept. 11-scale attack as infinitesimal, beyond the reach of al-Qaeda and its scattered affiliates. Still, the
adjusted outlook contrasts sharply with the surge of optimism that followed the killing of Osama bin Laden in
2011 and the dawn of the Arab Spring, which was initially seen as a political awakening across the Middle East that might render al-Qaeda and its archaic ideology
irrelevant. Within months of bin Laden’s death, then-Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta said he was convinced “that we’re within reach of strategically defeating alQaeda.” President Obama echoed that view in subsequent years by saying that al-Qaeda was on “a path to defeat” and, more recently, that the then-nascent
Islamic State was analogous to a junior varsity sports team. Such
upbeat characterizations have all but evaporated.
Targeted and narrow alternatives solve their link.
Wyden ‘14
(et al; This amicus brief issued by three US Senators - Ron Wyden, Mark Udall and Martin Heinrich. Wyden and Udall sat on the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and had access to the meta-data program. “BRIEF FOR AMICI CURIAE SENATOR RON
WYDEN, SENATOR MARK UDALL, AND SENATOR MARTIN HEINRICH IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, URGING REVERSAL
OF THE DISTRICT COURT” – Amicus Brief for Smith v. Obama – before the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals - Appeal
from the United States District Court District of Idaho The Honorable B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding Case No.
2:13-cv-00257-BLW – Sept 9th, 2014 – This Amicus Brief was prepared by CHARLES S. SIMS from the law firm PROSKAUER ROSE
LLP. Continues to Footnote #6 – no text omitted. Amici” means “friend of the court” and – in this context - is legal reference to
Wyden, Udall, etc. This pdf can be obtained at: https://www.eff.org/document/wyden-udall-heinrich-smith-amicus)
The government possesses a number of legal authorities with which it may obtain the call records of
suspected terrorists and those in contact with suspected terrorists. Amici have consistently argued that the bulk phone-records program needlessly tramples on Americans’
privacy rights, particularly in light of the authorities available to the government that can also be used to acquire call records of suspected terrorists and those in contact with suspected
terrorists in a targeted manner. See Press Release, Sen. Martin Heinrich, Udall, Heinrich Back Effort To End Dragnet Collection of Phone Data & Add Meaningful Oversight of Surveillance
Programs (Oct. 29, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/182XcHE; Press Release, Sen. Mark Udall, Surveillance Reform Package Ends Bulk Collection of Phone Records, Creates Constitutional Advocate for
Even the valid claims by intelligence officials about certain
useful information obtained through the bulk phone-records program fail to explain why the government could
not have simply obtained this information directly from phone companies using more calibrated legal instruments. A
number of legal authorities would have allowed the government to do so. For example, the Stored Communications Act permits the government to
obtain precisely the same call records that are now acquired through bulk collection under section 215 when they are
“relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (d). Individualized orders for phone records, as opposed to
orders authorizing bulk collection, can also be obtained under section 215. 50 U.S.C. § 1861. National security letters, which do not require a court
order, can also be used by the government to obtain call records for intelligence purposes. See 18 U.S.C. § 2709. The government can also acquire telephony
metadata on a real-time basis by obtaining orders from either regular federal courts or the FISC for the installation of pen registers or trap-and-trace devices.
Secret Court (Sept. 25, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/1bBGLku (“Udall Reform Release”).
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3122, 3125; 50 U.S.C. § 1842. And the government may also seek call records using standard criminal warrants based on probable cause. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (c)(A); Fed. R.
). The government can use many of these authorities without any more evidence than what is
currently required to use the bulk phone-records database, with less impact on the privacy interests of
innocent Americans.
Crim. P. 17(c
Our HumInt Advantage is a massive link turn
decimates effective counter-terrorism — data mining is the wrong tool.
Schneier 15 — Bruce Schneier, Chief Technology Officer for Counterpane Internet Security, Fellow at
the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, Program Fellow at the New America
Foundation's Open Technology Institute, Board Member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Advisory
Board Member of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, 2015 (“Why Mass Surveillance Can't,
Won't, And Never Has Stopped A Terrorist,” Digg — excerpt from Data and Goliath, March 24th,
Available Online at https://digg.com/2015/why-mass-surveillance-cant-wont-and-never-has-stopped-aterrorist, Accessed 07-12-2015)
The NSA repeatedly uses a connect-the-dots metaphor to justify its surveillance activities. Again and
again — after 9/11, after the Underwear Bomber, after the Boston Marathon bombings — government
is criticized for not connecting the dots.
However, this is a terribly misleading metaphor. Connecting the dots in a coloring book is easy, because
they’re all numbered and visible. In real life, the dots can only be recognized after the fact.
That doesn’t stop us from demanding to know why the authorities couldn’t connect the dots. The
warning signs left by the Fort Hood shooter, the Boston Marathon bombers, and the Isla Vista shooter
look obvious in hindsight. Nassim Taleb, an expert on risk engineering, calls this tendency the “narrative
fallacy.” Humans are natural storytellers, and the world of stories is much more tidy, predictable, and
coherent than reality. Millions of people behave strangely enough to attract the FBI’s notice, and almost
all of them are harmless. The TSA’s no-fly list has over 20,000 people on it. The Terrorist Identities
Datamart Environment, also known as the watch list, has 680,000, 40% of whom have “no recognized
terrorist group affiliation.”
Data mining is offered as the technique that will enable us to connect those dots. But while corporations
are successfully mining our personal data in order to target advertising, detect financial fraud, and
perform other tasks, three critical issues make data mining an inappropriate tool for finding terrorists.
The first, and most important, issue is error rates. For advertising, data mining can be successful even
with a large error rate, but finding terrorists requires a much higher degree of accuracy than datamining systems can possibly provide.
Data mining works best when you’re searching for a well-defined profile, when there are a reasonable
number of events per year, and when the cost of false alarms is low. Detecting credit card fraud is one
of data mining’s security success stories: all credit card companies mine their transaction databases for
spending patterns that indicate a stolen card. There are over a billion active credit cards in circulation in
the United States, and nearly 8% of those are fraudulently used each year. Many credit card thefts share
a pattern — purchases in locations not normally frequented by the cardholder, and purchases of travel,
luxury goods, and easily fenced items — and in many cases data-mining systems can minimize the losses
by preventing fraudulent transactions. The only cost of a false alarm is a phone call to the cardholder
asking her to verify a couple of her purchases.
Similarly, the IRS uses data mining to identify tax evaders, the police use it to predict crime hot spots,
and banks use it to predict loan defaults. These applications have had mixed success, based on the data
and the application, but they’re all within the scope of what data mining can accomplish.
Terrorist plots are different, mostly because whereas fraud is common, terrorist attacks are very rare.
This means that even highly accurate terrorism prediction systems will be so flooded with false alarms
that they will be useless.
The reason lies in the mathematics of detection. All detection systems have errors, and system
designers can tune them to minimize either false positives or false negatives. In a terrorist-detection
system, a false positive occurs when the system mistakenly identifies something harmless as a threat. A
false negative occurs when the system misses an actual attack. Depending on how you “tune” your
detection system, you can increase the number of false positives to assure you are less likely to miss an
attack, or you can reduce the number of false positives at the expense of missing attacks.
Because terrorist attacks are so rare, false positives completely overwhelm the system, no matter how
well you tune. And I mean completely: millions of people will be falsely accused for every real terrorist
plot the system finds, if it ever finds any.
We might be able to deal with all of the innocents being flagged by the system if the cost of false
positives were minor. Think about the full-body scanners at airports. Those alert all the time when
scanning people. But a TSA officer can easily check for a false alarm with a simple pat-down. This doesn’t
work for a more general data-based terrorism-detection system. Each alert requires a lengthy
investigation to determine whether it’s real or not. That takes time and money, and prevents
intelligence officers from doing other productive work. Or, more pithily, when you’re watching
everything, you’re not seeing anything.
The US intelligence community also likens finding a terrorist plot to looking for a needle in a haystack.
And, as former NSA director General Keith Alexander said, “you need the haystack to find the needle.”
That statement perfectly illustrates the problem with mass surveillance and bulk collection. When
you’re looking for the needle, the last thing you want to do is pile lots more hay on it. More specifically,
there is no scientific rationale for believing that adding irrelevant data about innocent people makes it
easier to find a terrorist attack, and lots of evidence that it does not. You might be adding slightly more
signal, but you’re also adding much more noise. And despite the NSA’s “collect it all” mentality, its own
documents bear this out. The military intelligence community even talks about the problem of “drinking
from a fire hose”: having so much irrelevant data that it’s impossible to find the important bits.
We saw this problem with the NSA’s eavesdropping program: the false positives overwhelmed the
system. In the years after 9/11, the NSA passed to the FBI thousands of tips per month; every one of
them turned out to be a false alarm. The cost was enormous, and ended up frustrating the FBI agents
who were obligated to investigate all the tips. We also saw this with the Suspicious Activity Reports —or
SAR — database: tens of thousands of reports, and no actual results. And all the telephone metadata
the NSA collected led to just one success: the conviction of a taxi driver who sent $8,500 to a Somali
group that posed no direct threat to the US — and that was probably trumped up so the NSA would
have better talking points in front of Congress.
The second problem with using data-mining techniques to try to uncover terrorist plots is that each
attack is unique. Who would have guessed that two pressure-cooker bombs would be delivered to the
Boston Marathon finish line in backpacks by a Boston college kid and his older brother? Each rare
individual who carries out a terrorist attack will have a disproportionate impact on the criteria used to
decide who’s a likely terrorist, leading to ineffective detection strategies.
The third problem is that the people the NSA is trying to find are wily, and they’re trying to avoid
detection. In the world of personalized marketing, the typical surveillance subject isn’t trying to hide his
activities. That is not true in a police or national security context. An adversarial relationship makes the
problem much harder, and means that most commercial big data analysis tools just don’t work. A
commercial tool can simply ignore people trying to hide and assume benign behavior on the part of
everyone else. Government data-mining techniques can’t do that, because those are the very people
they’re looking for.
Adversaries vary in the sophistication of their ability to avoid surveillance. Most criminals and terrorists
— and political dissidents, sad to say — are pretty unsavvy and make lots of mistakes. But that’s no
justification for data mining; targeted surveillance could potentially identify them just as well. The
question is whether mass surveillance performs sufficiently better than targeted surveillance to justify
its extremely high costs. Several analyses of all the NSA’s efforts indicate that it does not.
The three problems listed above cannot be fixed. Data mining is simply the wrong tool for this job,
which means that all the mass surveillance required to feed it cannot be justified. When he was NSA
director, General Keith Alexander argued that ubiquitous surveillance would have enabled the NSA to
prevent 9/11. That seems unlikely. He wasn’t able to prevent the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013,
even though one of the bombers was on the terrorist watch list and both had sloppy social media trails
— and this was after a dozen post-9/11 years of honing techniques. The NSA collected data on the
Tsarnaevs before the bombing, but hadn’t realized that it was more important than the data they
collected on millions of other people.
This point was made in the 9/11 Commission Report. That report described a failure to “connect the
dots,” which proponents of mass surveillance claim requires collection of more data. But what the
report actually said was that the intelligence community had all the information about the plot without
mass surveillance, and that the failures were the result of inadequate analysis.
Mass surveillance didn’t catch underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab in 2006, even though his
father had repeatedly warned the U.S. government that he was dangerous. And the liquid bombers
(they’re the reason governments prohibit passengers from bringing large bottles of liquids, creams, and
gels on airplanes in their carry-on luggage) were captured in 2006 in their London apartment not due to
mass surveillance but through traditional investigative police work. Whenever we learn about an NSA
success, it invariably comes from targeted surveillance rather than from mass surveillance. One analysis
showed that the FBI identifies potential terrorist plots from reports of suspicious activity, reports of
plots, and investigations of other, unrelated, crimes.
This is a critical point. Ubiquitous surveillance and data mining are not suitable tools for finding
dedicated criminals or terrorists. We taxpayers are wasting billions on mass-surveillance programs, and
not getting the security we’ve been promised. More importantly, the money we’re wasting on these
ineffective surveillance programs is not being spent on investigation, intelligence, and emergency
response: tactics that have been proven to work. The NSA's surveillance efforts have actually made us
less secure.
( ) Turn – Arab-American coop:
o mass surveillance kills law enforcement coop with US-Arab Americans –
that’s key to check terror.
Risen ‘14
(Internally quoting Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow on foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. Tom Risen is a reporter
for U.S. News & World Report. “Racial Profiling Reported in NSA, FBI Surveillance” - U.S. News & World Report - July 9, 2014 http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/07/09/racial-profiling-reported-in-nsa-fbi-surveillance)
The National Security Agency and the FBI have reportedly been overzealous trying to prevent terrorist attacks to the point
that anti-Islamic racism in those agencies led to the surveillance of prominent Muslim-Americans,
revealing a culture of racial profiling and broad latitude for spying on U.S. citizens. An NSA document leaked by
former agency contractor Edward Snowden to reporter Glenn Greenwald shows 202 Americans targeted among the approximately 7,485 email addresses
monitored between 2002 and 2008, Greenwald’s news service The Intercept reports. To monitor Americans, government agencies must first make the case to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that there is probable cause that the targets are terrorist agents, foreign spies or “are or may be” abetting sabotage,
espionage or terrorism. Despite this filter The Intercept identified five Muslim-Americans with high public profile including civil rights leaders, academics, lawyers
and a political candidate. Racial profiling of Muslims by security officers has been a controversy since the terrorist attacks of 2001 spiked fears about al-Qaida
trainees preparing more attacks. The New York Police Department has disbanded its unit that mapped New York’s Muslim communities that designated surveillance
of mosques as “terrorism enterprise investigations” after pressure from the Justice Department about aggressive monitoring by police. A 2005 FBI memo about
surveillance procedures featured in The Intercept story uses a fake name “Mohammed Raghead” for the agency staff exercise. This latest report about email
surveillance of successful Muslim-Americans is akin to “McCarthyism” that fed paranoia about communist spies during the Cold War, says Reza Aslan, a professor at
the University of California, Riverside. “The
notion that these five upstanding American citizens, all of them prominent public individuals,
represent a threat to the U.S. for no other reason than their religion is an embarrassment to the FBI and an
affront to the constitution,” Aslan says. There is a risk of radicalization among citizens Americans, evidenced by some who have gone to
fight jihads in Syria and Somalia, but mass shootings carried out by U.S. citizens of various racial backgrounds occurs much more often, says Vanda
Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow on foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. Since 1982, there have been at least 70 mass
shootings across the U.S. “We
have seen very little domestic terrorism in the U.S.,” Felbab-Brown says. This lack of
terrorism is due in part to the willingness of the Islamic community to cooperate with law enforcement
to identify possible radical threats, out of gratitude that the U.S. is a stable, secure country compared with the Middle East, she says. “ That
could go sour if law enforcement becomes too aggressive, too extreme,” she says.
o The turn’s unique – relations are low now. We also control the vital internal
link:
Ramirez ‘4
(et al; Deborah A. Ramirez, Professor of Law at Northeastern University. She holds a JD from Harvard University, "Developing
partnerships between law enforcement and American Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities: a promising practices guide"
(2004). Partnering for Prevention & Community Safety Initiative Publications. Paper 4. http://hdl.handle.net/2047/d20004127)
For all these reasons, in a post-September 11th world, it
is critical for law enforcement and the Muslim, Arab, and Sikh
communities in this country to strengthen their relationships. Historically, these relationships have not
existed in any significant way. Prior to September 11th, law enforcement primarily focused their community policing efforts on
other communities of color – Latinos, Asians, African-Americans, etc. Similarly, hate crime enforcement efforts mostly focused on crimes
against the gay community, Jews, Latinos, Asians and African-Americans. Consequently few state, local or federal law enforcement agencies
had any significant contact with the Arab, Muslim, or Sikh communities prior to September of 2001. It is the premise of the Partnering for
Prevention and Community Safety Initiative that Americans
will only truly be safe from terrorist attacks when law
enforcement agencies adopts a strategy focused on building trust and strengthening relationships with
the Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities. This paradigm is not only more consistent with our
constitutional ideals, it also represents our best hope for securing our homeland.
The 54 number has been thoroughly discredited. So has “it stopped 9/11.”
Cohn 14 — Cindy Cohn, Executive Director and former Legal Director and General Counsel of the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, holds a J.D. from the University of Michigan Law School, and Nadia
Kayyali, Activist at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, holds a J.D. from the University of CaliforniaHastings, 2014 (“The Top 5 Claims That Defenders of the NSA Have to Stop Making to Remain Credible,”
Electronic Frontier Foundation, June 2nd, Available Online at
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/06/top-5-claims-defenders-nsa-have-stop-making-remain-credible,
Accessed 07-12-2015)
1. The NSA has Stopped 54 Terrorist Attacks with Mass Spying
The discredited claim
NSA defenders have thrown out many claims about how NSA surveillance has protected us from
terrorists, including repeatedly declaring that it has thwarted 54 plots. Rep. Mike Rogers says it often.
Only weeks after the first Snowden leak, US President Barack Obama claimed: “We know of at least 50
threats that have been averted” because of the NSA’s spy powers. Former NSA Director Gen. Keith
Alexander also repeatedly claimed that those programs thwarted 54 different attacks.
Others, including former Vice President Dick Cheney have claimed that had the bulk spying programs in
place, the government could have stopped the 9/11 bombings, specifically noting that the government
needed the program to locate Khalid al Mihdhar, a hijacker who was living in San Diego.
Why it’s not credible:
These claims have been thoroughly debunked. First, the claim that the information stopped 54 terrorist
plots fell completely apart. In dramatic Congressional testimony, Sen. Leahy forced a formal retraction
from NSA Director Alexander in October, 2013:
"Would you agree that the 54 cases that keep getting cited by the administration were not all
plots, and of the 54, only 13 had some nexus to the U.S.?" Leahy said at the hearing. "Would you
agree with that, yes or no?"
"Yes," Alexander replied, without elaborating.
But that didn’t stop the apologists. We keep hearing the “54 plots” line to this day.
As for 9/11, sadly, the same is true. The government did not need additional mass collection
capabilities, like the mass phone records programs, to find al Mihdhar in San Diego. As ProPublica
noted, quoting Bob Graham, the former chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee:
U.S. intelligence agencies knew the identity of the hijacker in question, Saudi national Khalid al
Mihdhar, long before 9/11 and had the ability find him, but they failed to do so.
"There were plenty of opportunities without having to rely on this metadata system for the FBI
and intelligence agencies to have located Mihdhar," says former Senator Bob Graham, the
Florida Democrat who extensively investigated 9/11 as chairman of the Senate’s intelligence
committee.
Moreover, Peter Bergen and a team at the New America Foundation dug into the government’s claims
about plots in America, including studying over 225 individuals recruited by al Qaeda and similar groups
in the United States and charged with terrorism, and concluded:
Our review of the government’s claims about the role that NSA "bulk" surveillance of phone and
email communications records has had in keeping the United States safe from terrorism shows
that these claims are overblown and even misleading...
When backed into a corner, the government’s apologists cite the capture of Zazi, the so-called New York
subway bomber. However, in that case, the Associated Press reported that the government could have
easily stopped the plot without the NSA program, under authorities that comply with the Constitution.
Sens. Ron Wyden and Mark Udall have been saying this for a long time.
Both of the President’s hand-picked advisors on mass surveillance concur about the telephone records
collection. The President’s Review Board issued a report in which it stated “the information contributed
to terrorist investigations by the use of section 215 telephony meta-data was not essential to preventing
attacks,” The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) also issued a report in which it stated,
“we have not identified a single instance involving a threat to the United States in which [bulk collection
under Section 215 of the Patriot Act] made a concrete difference in the outcome of a counterterrorism
investigation.”
And in an amicus brief in EFF’s case First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. the NSA case, Sens. Ron
Wyden, Mark Udall, and Martin Heinrich stated that, while the administration has claimed that bulk
collection is necessary to prevent terrorism, they “have reviewed the bulk-collection program
extensively, and none of the claims appears to hold up to scrutiny.”
Even former top NSA official John Inglis admitted that the phone records program has not stopped any
terrorist attacks aimed at the US and at most, helped catch one guy who shipped about $8,000 to a
Somalian group that the US has designated as a terrorist group but that has never even remotely been
involved in any attacks aimed at the US.
( ) Bioterror risk is low and wouldn’t kill many people anyway.
Keller 13
(Rebecca, 7 March 2013, Analyst at Stratfor, “Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential,” Stratfor,
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential)
The risk of
an accidental release of H5N1 is similar to that of other infectious pathogens currently being
studied. Proper safety standards are key, of course, and experts in the field have had a year to determine
the best way to proceed, balancing safety and research benefits. Previous work with the virus was conducted at
biosafety level three out of four, which requires researchers wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure
environment. While many of these labs are part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entry or even palm scanners. There
are roughly 40 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those wishing to resume work after the ban was lifted must comply with guidelines
requiring strict national oversight and close communication and collaboration with national authorities. The
risk of release either
through accident or theft cannot be completely eliminated, but given the established parameters the
risk is minimal. The use of the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of whether a
non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute
it. Stratfor has long held the position that while terrorist organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding
biological weapons, the likelihood of a successful attack is very low. Given that the laboratory version
of H5N1 -- or any influenza virus, for that matter -- is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible
modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be refined and then
aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and
sent to freely circulate within a population. There are severe constraints that make success using either of
these methods unlikely. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological
attack is beyond the capability of most non-state actors. Even if they were able to develop a weapon,
other factors such as wind patterns and humidity can render an attack ineffective. Using a human carrier
is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to
infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile
while contagious, something that is doubtful with a serious disease like small pox. The carrier also cannot be
visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact.
Doesn’t turn case – durable fiat solves
2AC A-to “Cplan - Fund HUMINT”
( ) Perm – do both
( ) Modest amounts of data’s key. Cplan won’t solve, doesn’t cut back on data
overload.
Press ‘13
Gil - Managing Partner at gPress, a marketing, publishing, research and education consultancy. Previously held senior marketing
and research management positions at NORC, DEC and EMC. Most recently he was a Senior Director, Thought Leadership
Marketing at EMC, where he launched the Big Data conversation with the “How Much Information?” study (2000 with UC
Berkeley) and the Digital Universe study. He is also contributes on computing technology issues as a guest writer at Forbes
Magazine – “The Effectiveness Of Small Vs. Big Data Is Where The NSA Debate Should Start” – Forbes – 6-12-13 http://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2013/06/12/the-effectiveness-of-small-vs-big-data-is-where-the-nsa-debate-shouldstart/
Most of the discussion around the revelations about the data collection activities of the NSA has been about the threat to our civil rights and
the potential damage abroad to U.S. political and business interests. Relatively little
has been said, however, about the wisdom
of collecting all phone call records and lots of other data in the fight against terrorism or other threats to the United
States. Faith in the power (especially the predictive power) of more data is of course a central tenet of the religion of big data and it looks
like the NSA has been a willing convert. But not everybody agrees it’s the most effective course of action. For example,
business analytics expert Meta Brown: “The unspoken assumption here is that possessing massive quantities of data
guarantees that the government will be able to find criminals, and find them quickly, by tracing their electronic tracks. That
assumption is unrealistic. Massive quantities of data add cost and complexity to every kind of analysis, often
with no meaningful improvement in the results. Indeed, data quality problems and slow data processing are
almost certain to arise, actually hindering the work of data analysts. It is far more productive to invest
resources into thoughtful analysis of modest quantities of good quality, relevant data.”
No solvency — focus on metadata will still exist — they’ll use metadata before Humint
data.
Funding alone is not enough — divisional focus must be diverted for Humint.
Gallington 06 — Daniel Gallington, Adjunct Professor of National Security Law at the University of
Illinois, senior policy and program adviser at the George C. Marshall Institute, LL.M. from the University
of Michigan Law School, J.D. from the University of Illinois, 2006 (“What hope for HUMINT?,”
Washington Times, May 8th, accessible online at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/may/8/20060508-091537-5575r/?page=all, accessed on
6-30-15)
Assuming Mike Hayden is confirmed as the new director, basic CIA
“housecleaning” should continue — happening at the same
budgetary shifts from high-tech “remote-sensing” intelligence operations, to humanintelligence collection, the traditional CIA mission. Because the entrenched CIA senior bureaucracy remains
resistant to change, it’s also fair to ask if the CIA can improve its human-intelligence collection even if
time will be significant
we spend a lot more money on it. The answer in the shorter term — three to 10 years — is probably “no,” and whether we can do
it for the longer term is not at all clear yet. Why such a negative assessment? Looking at how we have done in the past with human intelligence
provides at least an indicator of our probable success: Our archenemy for 50 years, the Soviet Union, proved very hard to collect against using
human sources. And, for most of the Cold War we seemed oblivious to this: Many sources we used were double agents and “played us like an
organ,” as the expression goes. A
primary way to get human intelligence — pay for it — can too often become
the only way, because it is simply easier. And, we have probably paid a lot of money over the years for
bad information — much of it planted with us by double agents. Traditionally, we have been unable to
develop long-term, well-placed sources in other countries. The reason is that the time required — sometimes 20 years —
seems beyond our comprehension and the ability of our government to fund and keep secret for sustained periods. Too often, our idea
of “cover” for our agents was something your mother — let alone the KGB — could have figured out in about
30 seconds. We have the wrong kind of people doing the work: Despite being the most culturally diverse free nation in the world, we seem
to send blond-haired, blue-eyed people to do intelligence field work. They simply can’t do the mission in today’s world — however, they seem
to rise to leadership positions without difficulty. What should we do? (1) We have to take a very critical look at ourselves. This cannot be done
objectively by the CIA and the other agencies because their primary focus is on the very short term — getting more money to spend. The
president — consulting with the Intelligence Committees in Congress — should call together a group of experts, including counterintelligence
experts, and chart out a long-term HUMINT collection strategy. We should get their guidance, Congress should fund it and the president carry it
out. (2) It isn’t written in stone that the traditional HUMINT roles, missions and collection authorities of the various intelligence agencies should
stay the same. In fact, everything should be on the table and no agency should expect its traditional HUMINT mission will remain intact. On
paper at least, the new director of national intelligence (DNI) would seem empowered to direct this kind of reallocation of mission. (3) Too
often, our intelligence collections overseas are based on second- and third-hand reports, and often obtained from host or other nations’
intelligence services. As these reports are analyzed and similarities are seen and written about, it’s easy to see how we can be misled by “group
speak” reporting, mostly controlled by sources we have no way of assessing. Spying is spying: We should do more of it on our own throughout
the world and get our own, firsthand information. (4) Most HUMINT collections should be controlled centrally: Local authorities overseas —
including the U.S. ambassador in the country concerned and the regional military commander — should not, ordinarily, be “in the loop” for
such activities. (5) There has been way too much emphasis on “open source” reporting, and it’s become a crutch for a number of agencies.
Many so-called “open sources” are manipulated by those opposed to us, whether we consider them our “friends” or not. And, way too often,
“open source” reporting just means someone reading a foreign newspaper — then writing an “intelligence” report on it. Will these
recommendations work? We don’t have any choice: We
are simply not getting the critical information we need to be
responsive to the ever-broadening spectrum of threats from terrorism. And, unless we can penetrate
terrorist organizations, including their planning and financing, we’ll simply be unable to prevent more
terrorist attacks against us around the world and at home. Nevertheless, even if we do all these things — and do them
right — we may be 15 or 20 years away from developing a true “world class” HUMINT collection capability: as good, for example as some of our
key adversaries have had against us for years. But
let’s make sure we stay on task and do it right — not just fling our
money in a different direction for a few years.
Bulk domestic surveillance erodes meaningful checks on inappropriate government
officials. It spills beyond national security into many policy issues.
Brown ‘14
Bruce Brown - Counsel of Record. BRIEF OF THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND 17 MEDIA
ORGANIZATIONS AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT - The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
is an unincorporated association of reporters. The Reporters Committee has provided representation, guidance and research in
First Amendment and Freedom of Information Act litigation since 1970.Amicus Brief for Smith v. Obama – before the United
States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. “Amici” means “friend of the court” and – in this context - is legal reference to the
Reporters Committee – Sept 9th - https://www.eff.org/document/rcfp-smith-amicus-brief
In a report that former Washington Post executive editor Leonard Downie Jr. wrote for the Committee to Protect Journalists, numerous
journalists
said surveillance programs and leak prosecutions deter sources from speaking to them. Comm. To Protect Journalists, The
Obama Administration and the Press: Leak Investigations and Surveillance in Post-9/11 America 3 (Oct. 10, 2013), http://bit.ly/1c3Cnfg. In the report, Associated
Press senior managing editor Michael Oreskes commented: “There’s
no question that sources are looking over their shoulders.
Sources are more jittery and more standoffish, not just in national security reporting. A lot of skittishness is at the more routine level.” Id.
Washington Post national security reporter Rajiv Chandrasekaran said: “One of the most pernicious effects is the chilling effect
created across government on matters that are less sensitive but certainly in the public interest as a
check on government and elected officials.” Id. Discussing the NSA surveillance programs, New York Times investigative
reporter and three-time Pulitzer Prize winner David Barstow stated, “I have absolutely no doubt whatsoever that stories have
not gotten done because of this.” Jamie Schuman, The Shadows of the Spooks, The News Media and the Law, Fall 2013, at 9.
Building more accountable government – not sweeping rejecting it – is vital to check a
laundry list of existential risks.
Eckersley ‘4
Robyn, Reader/Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Melbourne, “The Green State:
Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty”, MIT Press, 2004, Google Books, pp. 3-8
While acknowledging the basis for this antipathy toward the nation- state, and the limitations of state-centric analyses of global ecological
degradation, I
seek to draw attention to the positive role that states have played, and might increasingly play, in
global and domestic politics. Writing more than twenty years ago, Hedley Bull (a proto-constructivist and leading writer in the English school)
outlined the state's positive role in world affairs, and his arguments continue to provide a powerful challenge to those who
somehow seek to "get beyond the state," as if such a move would provide a more lasting solution to the
threat of armed conflict or nuclear war, social and economic injustice, or environmental degradation.10 As
Bull argued, given that the state is here to stay whether we like it or not, then the call to get "beyond the
state is a counsel of despair, at all events if it means that we have to begin by abolishing or subverting the state,
rather than that there is a need to build upon it.""¶ In any event, rejecting the "statist frame" of world politics ought
not prohibit an inquiry into the emancipatory potential of the state as a crucial "node" in any future network
of global ecological governance. This is especially so, given that one can expect states to persist as major sites of social and
political power for at least the foreseeable future and that any green transformations of the present political order will, short of
revolution, necessarily be state-dependent. Thus, like it or not, those concerned about ecological destruction must contend with existing
institutions and, where possible, seek to "rebuild the ship while still at sea." And if states are so implicated in ecological destruction, then an
inquiry into the potential for their transformation even their modest reform into something that is at least more conducive to ecological
sustainability would seem to be compelling.¶ Of
course, it would be unhelpful to become singularly fixated on the
redesign of the state at the expense of other institutions of governance. States are not the only institutions that limit,
condition, shape, and direct political power, and it is necessary to keep in view the broader spectrum of formal and informal institutions of
governance (e.g., local, national, regional, and international) that are implicated in global environmental change. Nonetheless,
while
the state constitutes only one modality of political power, it is an especially significant one because of its
historical claims to exclusive rule over territory and peoples—as expressed in the principle of state sovereignty. As Gianfranco Poggi explains,
the political power concentrated in the state "is a momentous, pervasive, critical phenomenon. Together with other forms of social power, it
constitutes an indispensable medium for constructing and shaping larger social realities, for establishing, shaping and maintaining all broader
and more durable collectivities."12 States play, in varying degrees, significant roles in structuring life chances, in distributing wealth, privilege,
information, and risks, in upholding civil and political rights, and in securing private property rights and providing the legal/regulatory
framework for capitalism. Every one of these dimensions of state activity has, for good or ill, a significant bearing on the global environmental
crisis. Given that the
green political project is one that demands far-reaching changes to both economies and societies,
it is difficult to imagine how such changes might occur on the kind of scale that is needed without the
active support of states. While it is often observed that states are too big to deal with local ecological problems and too small to deal with
global ones, the state nonetheless holds, as Lennart Lundqvist puts it, "a unique position in the constitutive hierarchy from individuals through
villages, regions and nations all the way to global organizations. The
state is inclusive of lower political and administrative levels, and
exclusive in speaking for its whole territory and population in relation to the outside world."13 In short, it seems to me inconceivable to
advance ecological emancipation without also engaging with and seeking to transform state power.¶ Of course, not all states are democratic
states, and the green movement has long been wary of the coercive powers that all states reputedly enjoy. Coercion (and not democracy) is
also central to Max Weber's classic sociological understanding of the state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of
the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."14 Weber believed that the state could not be defined sociologically in terms of its
ends* only formally as an organization in terms of the particular means that are peculiar to it.15 Moreover his concept of legitimacy was merely
concerned with whether rules were accepted by subjects as valid (for whatever reason); he did not offer a normative theory as to the
circumstances when particular rules ought to be accepted or whether beliefs about the validity of rules were justified. Legitimacy was a
contingent fact, and in view of his understanding of politics as a struggle for power in the context of an increasingly disenchanted world,
likely to become an increasingly unstable achievement.16 In contrast to Weber, my approach to the state is explicitly normative and explicitly
concerned with the purpose of states, and the democratic basis of their legitimacy. It focuses on the limitations of liberal normative theories of
the state (and associated ideals of a just constitutional arrangement), and it proposes instead an alternative green theory that seeks to redress
the deficiencies in liberal theory. Nor is my account as bleak as Weber's. The fact that states possess a monopoly of control over the means of
coercion is a most serious matter, but it does not necessarily imply that they must have frequent recourse to that power. In any event,
whether the use of the state's coercive powers is to be deplored or welcomed turns on the purposes for which
that power is exercised, the manner in which it is exercised, and whether it is managed in public, transparent, and
accountable ways—a judgment that must be made against a background of changing problems, practices, and under- standings. The
coercive arm of the state can be used to "bust" political demonstrations and invade privacy. It can also
be used to prevent human rights abuses, curb the excesses of corporate power, and protect the environment. In short,
although the political autonomy of states is widely believed to be in decline, there are still few social institution that can match
the same degree of capacity and potential legitimacy that states have to redirect societies and economies along more ecologically
sustainable lines to address ecological problems such as global warming and pollution, the buildup of toxic and nuclear wastes and
the rapid erosion of the earth's biodiversity. States—particularly when they act collectively—have the capacity to curb the socially and
ecologically harmful consequences of capitalism. They are also more amenable to democratization than cor- porations, notwithstanding the
ascendancy of the neoliberal state in the increasingly competitive global economy. There are therefore many good reasons why green political
theorists need to think not only critically but also constructively about the state and the state system. While the state is certainly not "healthy"
at the present historical juncture, in this book I nonetheless join Poggi by offering "a timid two cheers for the old beast," at least as a potentially
more significant ally in the green cause.17
Conditionality is voter – time skew, strat skew, dispo solves your offense
Solvency
TS Circumvention
( ) Zero link – the version of the plan we wrote is designed to end a practice – not just
an authority.
( ) We get permanent fiat – any other interpretation turns debate from a “should”
question to a “will question”. Neg would always win and we’d also learn a lot less.
( ) We still solve perception. Independently, plan’s language makes circumvention far
tougher.
Shackford ‘15
Scott Shackford is an associate editor at Reason. This article is internally quoting Mark Jaycox, a legislative analyst for the
Electronic Frontier Foundation - “Is the USA Freedom Act the Best We Can Expect Right Now?” - Reason - 5/20
http://reason.com/blog/2015/05/20/is-the-usa-freedom-act-the-best-we-can-e
It doesn't appear to be easy to support the
USA Freedom Act. The Act's full real name is the "Uniting and Strengthening
America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet-Collection, and Online Monitoring
Act." Knowing the full name of the act helps explain why privacy supporters aren't shouting from the rafters over the legislation, even if they are supporting it. As
is the case with many other bills with elaborate names, the USA Freedom Act doesn't actually do what its name states. The USA Freedom Act (H.R.
2048) is Congress' response to the public revelation and the following outrage that the National Security Agency (NSA)
has been for years secretly collecting mass amounts of domestic metadata from virtually all Americans as part of its goal of sniffing out
terrorists. It has been doing so under the aegis of Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, which allows the NSA and FBI to collect all sorts of data and
records that are relevant to an ongoing investigation. But the NSA and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (FISA) Court that
oversaw approval of records collection requests took a very, very wide view of what was "relevant," and that included, among other things,
the phone records of every single American. There was an awareness among privacy experts that this was happening, but because the entire process
was classified, the ability for anybody, even members of Congress, to do much about it was limited. Then Edward
Snowden came around and released information showing how remarkably expansive the NSA surveillance actually was. This all came as a
surprise to Rep. James Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.), who introduced the PATRIOT Act in 2001. He said it was never his intent to authorize mass collection of the data of
Americans in the first place. The
USA Freedom Act, which Sensenbrenner has also sponsored, is intended to reform these
procedures. But what the USA Freedom Act actually does is fairly modest compared to the amount of
surveillance authority the NSA had claimed for itself. It will end the bulk collection of phone metadata collection under Section 215, but that's
not the only avenue by which the federal government claims authority to collect huge amounts of private information. Furthermore, right now we're seeing the
third attempt to get the act passed, and the strength
of the reforms has been watered down along the way. Indeed, some of the reforms
called for in the act (storing the telecommunications data with the companies rather than the government and requiring the government to request it) came from
former NSA Director Keith Alexander. The support of the Obama Administration has itself given some pause, due to its role in fighting lawsuits against the program
and the blatant deception of current Director of Intelligence James Clapper before the Senate about the existence of mass phone record collection. What the USA
Freedom Act is intended to do is end mass domestic data collection through Section 215, as well as in the
secretive National Security Letters, and require "specific selection terms" to limit mass records requests.
It also reforms the FISA court to designate several independent advisors to the court to help provide "legal arguments that advance the protection of individual
privacy and civil liberties," making the FISA court a slightly more adversarial place rather than the apparent rubber stamp factory it had been. It will also mandate a
declassification review process for FISA court decisions. But it's also
really hard to try to gauge the impact of the bill as written,
and that's coloring
perceptions of its value.
Making the situation more complicated is a federal court ruling that is actually
friendly to privacy reformers. On May 7, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Section 215 never actually authorized the NSA to engage in mass phone
metadata collection in the first place. The court ruled that the NSA had stretched the definition of "relevance" and "investigation" too far by scooping up pretty
much everything and storing it just in case it might be useful later. But the court also did not demand any immediate changes, partly because it knew Congress was
already working on legislation to deal with the pending sunsetting of Section 215, which expires June 1. This ruling prompted some rethinking of the USA Freedom
Act by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF). The group had previously endorsed each iteration of the act, increasingly reluctantly as it was watered down with
each session. In response to the court ruling, though, EFF withdrew its support and went neutral, calling for legislators to now strengthen the act. Mark Jaycox, a
legislative analyst for EFF who has been writing about the USA Freedom Act, still has positive things to say about it, but doesn't want Congress to settle for less than
it has to. It's the first reform of NSA surveillance since the 1970s. There should be more to it. " The
USA Freedom Act should be stronger,"
Jaycox says. "Congress should be pushing for more control for themselves and more for the public." EFF would like Congress to return
to the first iteration of the act that called for a stronger adversarial position within the FISA court, not just an adviser. They want
Congress to address other authorizations used to justify bulk metadata collection, not just Section 215 and
National Security Letters. They want better "minimization" procedures to make sure information that isn't directly
connected to an investigation is properly purged. And they want to remove an "emergency exception"
that allows the government to snoop on any "non-United States person" for 72 hours without any court authorization at all. Given that the court ruling determined
that the NSA had been operating outside of the law's intent, should we be concerned that any
attempt to partly rein in surveillance
powers without completely eliminating them will ultimately lead back to more abuse? Who gets to decide what a
"specific selection term" is? The same people who determined that every single phone record of every American was "relevant" to investigating potential terrorist
attacks on Americans? Jaycox is aware that this abuse concern helps feed the belief the
"We've
USA Freedom Act doesn't go nearly far enough.
seen the intelligence community and the administration stretch definitions," Jaycox says. "We've seen them
come up to the line and cross it completely. Section 215 is an example. I think that's where the hesitancy comes from." It's the FISA court that was supposed to
stand in the way of the NSA abusing the language, but that clearly didn't happen. Congress can legislate words to be as narrow as they like, Jaycox notes, "But at the
end of the day it's going to be a judge that's reviewing these orders." And thus, there's the push for more transparency and declassification of FISA court decisions,
in the hopes of making it more clear how the judges themselves are interpreting the law. The modest reforms weren't enough for some privacy-minded House
members like Rep. Justin Amash (R-Mich.), Rep. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.), and Rep. Jared Polis (D-Colo.). They all voted no. Amash later explained on Facebook that he
feared passing the USA Freedom Act in the wake of the court ruling would have the impact of authorizing bulk data collection rather than restricting it: "H.R. 2048
falls woefully short of reining in the mass collection of Americans' data, and it takes us a step in the wrong direction by specifically authorizing such collection in
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. Americans, and members of Congress,
should demand that Congress instead pass the
original, bipartisan version of the USA FREEDOM Act from 2013, which strengthened—not weakened—Section 215's
relevance standard to end bulk collection, while still allowing the government the flexibility it needs to
pursue genuine threats against the United States." And this morning Amash posted a letter signed by him and 58 others in the House
who voted no, explaining that their opposition to the USA Freedom Act was tha the surveillance reforms did not go far enough.
( ) Extend our Greene ev – it’s great at proving plan’s language reduces circumvention
risks.
( ) Plan restores strong language – that’s sufficient to end circumvention.
Granick ‘14
Jennifer Granick is the Director of Civil Liberties at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society. Jennifer was the Civil Liberties
Director at the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Jennifer practices, speaks and writes about computer crime and security,
electronic surveillance, consumer privacy, data protection, copyright, trademark and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. From
2001 to 2007, Jennifer was Executive Director of CIS and taught Cyberlaw, Computer Crime Law, Internet intermediary liability,
and Internet law and policy. Before teaching at Stanford, Jennifer earned her law degree from University of California, Hastings
College of the Law and her undergraduate degree from the New College of the University of South Florida. “USA Freedom Act:
Oh, Well. Whatever. Nevermind.” – Just Security - May 21, 2014 http://justsecurity.org/10675/usa-freedom-act-oh-wellwhatever-nevermind/
The initially promising USA Freedom Act could have ended the previously secret government practices of collecting
Americans’ calling records, internet transactional information and who knows what else in bulk. Today’s version would allow
broad collection to continue under the guise of reform. The initial version of the bill would have
reinforced existing statutory language requiring a showing of “relevance to an authorized investigation”
before agents can get an order requiring production of business records, dialing and routing information, and other
data, and would have added other limits to ensure massive collection would stop. It also would have implemented mild
reforms to content surveillance under section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, stopping “back door” searches for
Americans’ communications. Last week, a Managers’ Amendment watered those provisions down,
substituting new language that would allow agents to use a “specific selection term” as the “basis for production”.
The bill defined “specific selection term” as something that “uniquely describe[s] a person, entity, or
account.” Given the intelligence community’s success at getting FISA judges to reinterpret obvious language—e.g. “relevance”—in counter-intuitive ways,
people wondered what this new language might mean. There’s deep public mistrust for the intelligence community and for the FISA court, which conspired to allow
bulk collection under spurious legal justifications for years. Worse, there’s deep public mistrust for the law itself, since the intelligence community’s “nuanced”
definitions of normal words have made the public realize that they do not understand the meaning of words like “relevance”, “collection”, “bulk”, or “target”.
Privacy
TS counter bias
Their evs too generic – it says SOME claims of privacy violations are wrong – that’s obviously not true for
meta data bulk surveillance – entire 1ac proves – prefer our specific authors and warrant to their generic
indict
TS rights not absolute and utilitarianism is good
Privacy rights are absolute – its key to human uniqueness, dignity and respect
Utilitarian impact calc is biased – it artificially inflates the risk of their scenarios and justifies atrocity
No link to their offense – utilitarianism is fine, but privacy is a SIDE CONSTRAINT – the ends don’t justify
the means – that’s key to human dignity and value to life
TS alt cause
( ) Government surveillance is far worse – there’s no opt-out and government force
carries greater weight.
Fung ‘13
Brian Fung covers technology for The Washington Post, focusing on telecom, broadband and digital politics. Before joining the
Post, he was the technology correspondent for National Journal and an associate editor at the Atlantic. “Yes, there actually is a
huge difference between government and corporate surveillance” – Washington Post - November 4, 2013 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/11/04/yes-there-actually-is-a-huge-difference-betweengovernment-and-corporate-surveillance/
Yes, there
actually is a huge difference between government and corporate surveillance When it comes
to your online privacy — or what little is left of it — businesses and governments act in some pretty similar ways. They track
your credit card purchases. They mine your e-mail for information about you. They may even monitor your movements in the real world.
Corporate and government surveillance also diverge in important ways. Companies are looking to make money off of
you, while the government aims to prevent attacks that would halt that commercial activity (along with some other things). But the biggest difference
between the two has almost no relation to who's doing the surveillance and everything to do with your options in response. Last week, we
asked you whether you'd changed your online behavior as a result of this year's extended national conversation about privacy — and if so, which form of snooping
The
government also has the power to kill or imprison me which no private company has. I am a firm believer that our
annoyed you more. Looking through the responses so far, this one caught my eye: The government because I can't *choose* not to be spied on by them.
founding fathers created a system that respected individual privacy and to see it eroded by the federal government concerns me deeply. I am a strong believer in
the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th amendments. Putting aside the government's power to capture or kill, your inability
to refuse the government is
what distinguishes the NSA from even the nosiest companies on Earth. In a functioning marketplace, boycotting a company
that you dislike — for whatever reason — is fairly easy. Diners who object to eating fake meat can stop frequenting Taco Bell. Internet users
that don't like Google collecting their search terms can try duckduckgo, an anonymous search engine. By
contrast, it's nearly impossible to simply pick up your belongings and quit the United States. For most people, that
would carry some significant costs — quitting your job, for instance, or disrupting your children's education, or leaving friends and family. Those costs can be high
enough to outweigh the benefits of recovering some hard-to-measure modicum of privacy. Besides, leaving the country would ironically expose you to even greater
risk of surveillance, since you'd no longer be covered by the legal protections granted to people (even foreign terror suspects) that arrive to U.S. shores. There are
still some ways to shield yourself from the NSA. To the best of our knowledge, the government has yet to crack the encryption protocols behind Tor, the online
traffic anonymizing service. But Tor's users are also inherently the object of greater suspicion precisely because they're making efforts to cover their tracks. In
the business world, no single company owns a monopoly over your privacy. The same can't really be said
about the government.
TS safeguards check
Extend our inherency contention – safeguards don’t go nearly far enough – only plan solves
Internet Freedom
TS new freedom act solves –
its not credible, only plan restores credibility – that’s Brinkerhoff, reiss, and HRW – that
also answers their alt causes
TS US cred bad
Assumes status quo – plan shifts US policy and promotes internet freedom globally – only US can solve
globally but reducing perception of hypocracy is key – that’s Wong
( ) Outside of bulk surveillance, the US would – on balance – be a solid leader on
privacy issues.
Brown ‘14
(internally citing the internet freedom rankings of Freedom House. Freedom House is an independent watchdog organization
dedicated to the expansion of freedom around the world - Elizabeth Nolan Brown is a staff editor for Reason.com. Her writing
has also appeared places such as Time, The Week, Newsweek, Fox News, and The Dish. Brown has an M.A. in strategic
communication from American University, – “Internet Freedom Under Global Attack; Report Finds Governments Around the
World Expanded Online Control, Surveillance Last Year” - Reason - Dec. 4, 2014 - http://reason.com/blog/2014/12/04/globalinternet-freedom-report-2014)
The United States scored pretty high on the Internet freedom scale. Freedom House considers a score of
zero to 30 to represent a "free" Internet, 31-60 "partly free", and 61-100 not free. Scores were determined
by considering a set of "21 questions and nearly 100 accompanying subpoints" surrounding things such as obstacles to access
(infrastructural barriers, government blocking of specific apps or technologies), limits on content (filtering and blocking websites,
censoring online news media), and violations of user rights (surveillance, legal restrictions on online activity). America received
a score of 19, coming in just behind Australia (17), Germany (17), Canada (15), Estonia (8), and Iceland (6), and and just
ahead of France (20), Italy (22), Japan (22), Hungary (24), the U.K. (24), and South Africa (26).
TS kill switch
( ) We control the vital internal link – constant mass surveillance is a much bigger deal
than a “kill switch” bill that may never pass or even be used.
( ) Their authors exaggerate – Kill-switch fears are overblown and even privacy
advocates are fine with it.
Keen ‘11
Andrew Keen, currently a columnist. The author holds a master's degree in political science from the University of California,
Berkeley. After Berkeley, Keen taught modern history and politics at Tufts University, Northeastern University and the
University of Massachusetts Amherst. “The Death Of The Internet Has Been Greatly Exaggerated” - Tech Crunch - Nov 14, 2011
– http://techcrunch.com/2011/11/14/death-internet-exaggerated/
The news, I’m afraid, is dire. The Internet is about to be destroyed by big media. It is about be killed by two
Congressional bills – The ProtectIP and The Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) – that all-powerful big media lobbyists are now
pushing through Congress. These bills will censor the Internet, turn it into China, censor it, destroy its innovation and value. “Big media is going
nuclear against the DMCA,” thus writes the author and serial entrepreneur Ashkan Karbasfrooshan, arguing that ProtectIP and COPA will “spell the end of the
Internet as we know it.” Techcrunch’s Devin Coldeway, describing SOPA as “possibly unconstitutional” and as a “kill switch”, says it is a
“desperate power grab by a diminishing elite”. CNET columnist Molly Wood chimes in that SOPA is “brazen” and “nightmarish” and warns that it will result in a
“copyright police state”. The Obama administration is “busy in bed with Hollywood,” she warns, “cheerfully ceding your rights to the MPAA and RIAA.” Even the VCs
are worried. Union Square Ventures’ Fred Wilson, argues that “these bills were written by the content industry without any input from the technology industry”.
The problem, Wilson explains, is that “the content industry is not creating new jobs right now” and thus, by establishing a destructive legal environment for startups, SOPA and ProtectIP will supposedly “kill the golden goose to protect industries in decline.” But
there’s a problem with all this bad
news. It’s wrong. Almost entirely wrong. No, the Internet isn’t about to be destroyed by either ProtectIP
or SOPA. The technology industry has had input into the political process. Neither ProtectIP nor SOPA
are “unconstitutional” or “nuclear” options designed to kill the DMCA. The administration isn’t in bed, either literally or metaphorically, with big media
and the US government isn’t the “villain” in this story. The technology industry – notably Google, who were invited to the Congressional hearings on the legislation –
has had significant input into the political process. Most importantly, this legislation – by fighting the corrosive impact of counterfeiting and piracy on the American
marketplace – is designed to make our domestic economy stronger, protect jobs both on and offline and encourage innovation in our digital knowledge economy.
So what, exactly, are ProtectIP and SOPA? Rather than being seen as a replacement for the U.S. Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA), the genesis of these pieces
of legislation – ProtectIP being authored by the Senate and SOPA by the House – is the need for legal tools to fight primarily online criminals who operate outside of
the U.S. jurisdiction and U.S. companies who, often unwittingly, sustain them. Rogue sites legislation exists in parallel to the DMCA and is intended to stop criminal
enterprises from accessing US markets online in ways that they would never be able to do offline. Whatever one might think of some of the details of these bills (no,
they aren’t perfect, especially the sometimes sloppily written and occasionally misguided SOPA), they are designed to address a serious problem of the online
economy – foreign criminals and companies which use the Internet to sell or distribute illegal or counterfeit goods to American consumers. These companies extend
from those that sell advertising off the back of pirated movies to those selling fake drugs online. It is undeniable that rogue websites – organizations which sell
counterfeit goods or peddle stolen intellectual property – are a significant drain on the US economy. Borrowing numbers from various government and private
sector experts, it is estimated by one House committee that intellectual property theft alone costs the US economy over $100 billion per year. And as The Guardian
reported in September, in its investigation of the impact of fake drugs sales on the UK marketplace, there are almost 13,000 fake pharmacy websites – “most…
facilitated by Chinese or Russian criminal organizations”, according to the UK’s Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Authority (MHRA). Not only,
therefore, are SOPA and ProtectIP addressing a set of genuinely costly economic issues, but they’ve also – in the best Madisonian tradition of representative
democracy – assembled a broad coalition of supporters for these bills. No, neither SOPA nor ProtectIP reflect the Administration being “in bed with Hollywood.” I
talked earlier this week to Steven Tepp, the US Chamber of Commerce’s online piracy and anti-counterfeiting chief, who reminded me that the bipartisan Senate bill
had just won its 40th co-sponsor and that 350 organizations – including pharmaceutical giants like Eli Lilly and Johnson & Johnson as well as Nike, Caterpillar and
Major League Baseball – signed a September 22 letter to Congress in support of legislation against rogue sites. But this
isn’t just a legislative
initiative supported by corporations. 43 State Attorney Generals, the US Conference of Mayors, the AFL-CIO and The
National Consumer League are also in favor. And so is US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who early this month, in defense of legislation
that seeks to make it impossible for American Internet users to access criminal foreign websites, wrote that there “is no contradiction between
intellectual property rights protection and enforcement and ensuring freedom of expression on the
Internet.”
TS domestic not key
Plans sufficient – that’s above
Domestic surveillance includes meta-data of non-US citizens. US companies keep
records on non-US customers.
Roth ‘14
Kenneth Roth is the executive director of Human Rights Watch, one of the world's leading international human rights
organizations, which operates in more than 90 countries. Prior to joining Human Rights Watch in 1987, Roth served as a federal
prosecutor in New York and for the Iran-Contra investigation in Washington, DC. A graduate of Yale Law School and Brown
University, Roth has conducted numerous human rights investigations and missions around the world. He has written
extensively on a wide range of human rights abuses, devoting special attention to issues of international justice,
counterterrorism, the foreign policies of the major powers, and the work of the United Nations. “World Report 2014” - World
Report 2014 is Human Rights Watch’s 24th annual review of human rights practices around the globe. It summarizes key human
rights issues in more than 90 countries and territories worldwide, drawing on events through November 2013.
http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014
Because of the disclosures of whistleblower Edward Snowden, the
world is now aware of the virtually unchecked mass electronic
surveillance that the US government and certain allies, most notably Britain, is conducting. No one questions that national security sometimes
requires governments to use targeted surveillance after making an evidentiary showing. But the US government’s mass surveillance without
such limits has largely eradicated the right to privacy in a modern world that virtually requires electronic
communication. To justify this conduct, the US government has invoked a series of legal assumptions that do not withstand serious scrutiny, even though
most have been ratified by a secret and deferential Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that hears only the government’s arguments. For example, the
government feels free to collect metadata about potentially all phone calls in the US because, under woefully
outdated rules, no one is said to have any legitimate expectation of privacy when it comes to this information because they
share it with the phone company. Despite a huge percentage of the world’s Internet and phone
communications passing through the United States, the government has adopted the policy that nonAmericans outside the country have no recognized privacy interest in even the content of their communications. And the
government conveniently claims that the right to privacy is not implicated when it collects communications, only
when it examines them—as if it would be okay for the government to collect and store a video stream from peoples’ bedrooms so long as it purports
not watch the video until it comes up with some compelling reason.
TS No Modelling
Their evs a decade old and not specific to internet freedom – prefer wong
TS not key to democracy
Prefer fontaine – its key to cred of OVERALL us democracy promotion – it also empowers citizens in
foreign countries ACROSS THE BOARD – and allows successful challenges to authoritarianism
TS democratic peace wrong
Prefer diamond – he’s the worlds foremost expert on democracy
They dropped an independent environment extinction impact
Humint
TS Big Data matters
IT causes overload and trades off with Humint – that’s Volz and Margolis
TS no resource wars
Our Johnson ev lists multiple other internal links – such as deep animosities between countries and
hostile foreign powers
TS HumInt fails
That assumes status quo failure caused by big data
Its vital to solve the largest threats – that’s Johnson
HUMINT key to success to counter state and non-state threats.
Wilkinson ‘13
Kevin R. Wilkinson – United States Army War College. The author is a former Counterintelligence Company Commander, 205th
Military Intelligence Battalion. This thesis paper was overseen by Professor Charles D. Allen of the Department of Command
Leadership and Management. This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic
Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States
Association of Colleges and Schools – “Unparalleled Need: Human Intelligence Collectors in the United States Army” - March
2013 - http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA590270
In the twenty-first century, the role of HUMINT is more important than ever. As employed during the Cold War, a
significant portion of intelligence was collected using SIGINT and GEOINT methods. The COE assessment now discerns a hybrid threat encompassing both
conventional and asymmetric warfare, which is difficult to obtain using SIGINT and GEOINT alone. Unlike
other intelligence collection disciplines,
environmental conditions such as weather or terrain do not hinder HUMINT collectors.12 HUMINT collection played a key role
during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. OIF was initially a force-on-force ground war using traditional maneuver forces. After six months of conventional
conflict and on the verge of defeat, the Iraqi armed forces, with the assistance of insurgents, employed asymmetrical warfare. The continuation
of conventional warfare paired with the asymmetric threat created a hybrid threat. HUMINT is effective when countering a
conventional threat that consists of large signatures, such as discerning troop movement. However, it becomes invaluable when
presented with an asymmetrical threat that entails a smaller signature, such as focusing on groups of
insurgents, which other intelligence collection disciplines cannot solely collect on.
TS accumulo solves and no tradeoff
Group it
There is a tradeoff – that’s above
( ) Accumulo’s not responsive to our human intel internal link. Even if NSA can process a large quantity
of data, the quality’s low unless HUMINT’s involved.
( ) Accumulo fails – Boston Marathon proves it doesn’t find the needle.
Konkel ‘13
Frank Konkel is the editorial events editor for Government Executive Media Group and a technology journalist for its
publications. He writes about emerging technologies, privacy, cybersecurity, policy and other issues at the intersection of
government and technology. He began writing about technology at Federal Computer Week. Frank is a graduate of Michigan
State University. “NSA shows how big 'big data' can be” - FCW - Federal Computer Week is a magazine covering technology Jun 13, 2013 - http://fcw.com/articles/2013/06/13/nsa-big-data.aspx?m=1
As reported by Information Week, the NSA
relies heavily on Accumulo, "a highly distributed, massively parallel processing key/value store capable
of analyzing structured and unstructured data" to process much of its data. NSA's modified version of Accumulo, based on Google's BigTable data model,
reportedly makes it possible for the agency to analyze data for patterns while protecting personally identifiable information –
names, Social Security numbers and the like. Before news of Prism broke, NSA officials revealed a graph search it operates on top of Accumulo at a Carnegie Melon
tech conference. The graph is based on 4.4 trillion data points, which could represent phone numbers, IP addresses, locations, or calls made and to whom;
connecting those points creates a graph with more than 70 trillion edges. For a human being, that kind of visualization is impossible, but for a vast, high-end
computer system with the right big data tools and mathematical algorithms, some signals can be pulled out. Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich.), chairman of the House
Intelligence Committee, publicly stated that the government's collection of phone records thwarted a terrorist plot inside the United States "within the last few
years," and other media reports have cited anonymous intelligence insiders claiming several plots have been foiled. Needles
in endless haystacks
of data are not easy to find, and the NSA's current big data analytics methodology is far from a flawless system,
as evidenced by the April 15 Boston Marathon bombings that killed three people and injured more than 200. The bombings
were carried out by Chechen brothers Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the latter of whom was
previously interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation after the Russian Federal Security Service notified the agency in
2011 that he was a follower of radical Islam. The brothers had made threats on Twitter prior to their attack as well,
meaning several data points of suspicious behavior existed, yet no one detected a pattern in time to prevent
them from setting off bombs in a public place filled with people. "We're still in the genesis of big data, we haven't even scratched the surface yet," said big data
expert Ari Zoldan, CEO of New-York-based Quantum Networks. "In
industry."
many ways, the technology hasn't evolved yet, it's still a new