North Carolina State Laboratory of Public Health Bioterrorism and Emerging Pathogens Unit 2015 • • • • Biosafety Risk Assessments Biosecurity PAPR Biosafety Biosafety is the application of combinations of laboratory practice and procedure, laboratory facilities, and safety equipment when working with potentially infectious microorganisms. Biosafety guidelines are put into place to protect laboratorians and prevent exposures in biological laboratories. Everyone working in the laboratory is responsible for employing proper biosafety practices at all times and in all situations. Principles of Biosafety Good biosafety practices prevent occupationally acquired infections by intercepting microorganisms. This is done by: Blocking the routes of transmission by intercepting microorganisms before they can infect Breaking the “chain of infection” Reservoir of pathogen Portal of escape Proper Work Practices Transmission Protective Equipment Route of entry/infectious dose Susceptible host Incubation period Infection Immunization Treatment Surveillance Biosafety Plan Key Elements Biosafety Manual and General laboratory safety SOPs Responsibilities Identification of biohazards Entry requirements and signage Risk assessments and control of biohazards Packaging and Shipping Protocols practices Waste management Decontamination/Disinfection Emergency procedures Training program Medical Surveillance Evaluation/Drills/Auditing program and Documentation Containment Containment describes safe methods for managing infectious materials in the laboratory environment where they are being handled or maintained. Purpose: Manage infectious materials Reduce or eliminate exposure Containment = Barrier Elements: Laboratory Practice and Technique (Primary Containment) Safety Equipment (Primary Containment) Facility Design and Construction (Secondary Containment) Primary Containment (Barriers) Primary containment is provided by both good microbiological technique and the use of appropriate safety equipment. It provides protection of personnel and the immediate laboratory environment from exposure to infectious agents. Biosafety Cabinet Eye/Face Protection Safety Centrifuge Cup Lab Coat/Gown Respiratory Protection Gloves Booties Primary Containment (Barriers) Examples PPE – PAPRs, gloves, Tyvek® gowns and coveralls, booties Administrative- Immunizations, security clearance, training and supervision Engineering controls – Directional airflow, Biosafety Cabinet, entry and exit control, double-cup centrifuges, HEPA filtration SOP- Handling sharps, Decontamination, Entry and Exit procedure Biosafety Cabinet The Biosafety Cabinet is the principal device used to provide containment of infectious splashes or aerosols generated by many microbiolgical procedures. Secondary Containment (Barriers) Secondary containment (barriers) provide protection to the infectious material. It is provided by a combination of facility design and operational practices. Doors which provide controlled access to the lab Location of the lab and the location of the BSC Hand washing sinks Cleanable surfaces Laboratory Practice and Technique The most important element of containment is strict adherence to standard microbiological practices and techniques. Standard practices and procedures Common to all laboratories Special practices and procedures Address the risk of handling agents requiring increasing levels of containment Standard Microbiological Practices and Techniques Limited or restricted access to the laboratory Hand washing protocols No eating, drinking, smoking, handling contact lenses or applying cosmetics in the laboratory Use of mechanical pipetting devices – No mouth pipetting! Impervious work surfaces Waste decontamination and disposal program Insect and rodent control program Minimization of splashes and aerosols Procedures That Emit Aerosols Splashes Catalase Inoculating biochemicals or blood culture bottles Pipetting Mixing Centrifugation Grinding Vortexing Pouring Loading syringes Lasers, cell sorters Opening lyophilized cultures Flaming loops Entering or opening vessels at non-ambient pressures, fermenters, freezer vials Ways to Minimize Aerosols Pour liquids carefully Work over absorbent bench pads Use centrifuge safety cups Use sealed centrifuge rotors Use capped tubes when mixing or vortexting Use pipette aids with filters Work in BSC Facility Design and Construction The design and construction of the facility contributes to the laboratory workers’ protection, provides a barrier to protect persons outside the laboratory, and protects persons or animals in the community from infectious agents which may be accidentally released from the laboratory. Facility Design and Construction Separation of the laboratory work area from public access Availability of a decontamination facility (autoclave) Hand washing facilities Specialized ventilation systems to ensure directional airflow Air treatment systems to decontaminate or remove agents from exhaust air Controlled access zones Separate buildings or modules to isolate the laboratory Biosafety Levels Laboratories are divided into four different safety levels that basically determine the type of work that can be performed in that laboratory. Provide increasing levels of personnel and environmental protection Consist of combinations of laboratory practices and techniques, safety equipment and laboratory facilities The performance of risk assessments is necessary and mandatory. Biosafety Levels Generally, work with known agents should be conducted at the biosafety level recommended in the BMBL Section VII. When specific information is available to suggest that virulence, pathogenicity, antibiotic resistance patterns, vaccine and treatment availability, or other factors are significantly altered, stringent practices may be specified. BSL 1 Very Basic – Used when handling agents not known to cause disease in health humans • • • • • No primary barriers required Open bench top Hand washing sink Lab coats Sharps policy BSL 1 BSL 2 Lab activities involving clinical specimens, blood, other body fluids and tissues from humans or animals potentially infected with human pathogens. BSL 2 Biosafety Level 2 Risk of percutaneous injury, ingestion, mucous membrane exposure Biosafety manual in place defining any needed waste decontamination or medical surveillance policies Class I or Class II BSC or other physical containment device used for all manipulations of agents that cause splashes or aerosols of infectious materials BSL 3 Used for lab activities involving work with indigenous or exotic agents which may cause serious or potentially lethal disease as a result of exposure by the inhalation route. BSL 3 BSL-3 With BSL-3 laboratories, more emphasis is placed on primary and secondary barriers to protect personnel, the community and the environment from exposure to potentially infectious aerosols. Primary Barriers Class I or Class II BSCs or other physical containment devices used for all open manipulations of agents. Secondary Barriers Physical separation from access corridors, self-closing , double-door access, exhausted air not recirculated, negative airflow into laboratory BSL-3 Engineering Controls Entry and Exit control BSC – all manipulations of infectious materials Autoclave Eyewash available Directional Airflow HEPA filtration system Double containment centrifuges BSL-3 Decontamination of ALL waste BSL-3 PPE – protective lab clothing, gloves, respiratory protection as required by risk assessment (PAPRs) Decontamination of lab clothing before laundering. BTEP utilizes disposable PPE Baseline serum taken upon hire of all new technical employees BSL-4 Dangerous/exotic agents which pose high risk of life threatening disease, aerosol-transmitted lab infections; or related agents with unknown risk of transmission Primary hazards to personnel are respiratory exposure to infectious aerosols, mucous membrane or broken skin exposure to infectious droplets or auto inoculations Two types of BSL-4 laboratories: Cabinet = all procedures conducted in Class III BSC Suit = all procedures conducted in Class I or II BSC in combination with full-body, air supplied pressure personnel suit Raleigh BSL-3 Facility BSL-3 Entry and Exit Procedure Visitor’s Log PPE Requirements Donning and Doffing of PPE Transfer of Biohazardous Agents into the Laboratory Precautions for Sharps Gross Decontamination HVAC, Alarms, BSC, Local and Air Pressure Differential Alarms HEPA Filter Electrical System Provision of training Entry and exit procedures, including posted map of evacuation routes Proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE) Proper use of the engineering controls including the air handling system, biological safety cabinets, centrifuges and autoclave Emergency action procedures and notifications **Personnel will receive annual updates or additional training when procedural or policy changes occur. ** BSL-3 Entry procedure The BSL-3 Entry Procedure is posted at the entrances to the main entrance and each individual BSL-3 suite. Laboratory Entry Post proper sign on door – includes occupancy, types of PPE in use, maintenance, etc. Access using security measures – key fob, access key card, biometrics, key lock. When scanning for entry, all employees wishing to enter the lab must scan their card key/fob/fingerprint. Potential Risks and Hazards for Visitors Changes to the Visitor’s sign in form: • Addition of MERS and Ebola Laboratory Entry Document entry in log book – all visitors must read the precautions document and sign the Visitor’s log. Document that the visual airflow device or indicator was checked and that air is flowing properly. Don PPE located in anteroom Minimum PPE Requirements while infectious agents are not in use: Donning PPE: (i.e. Taking Temperatures, Inventory, Restocking, Maintenance Personnel, Tours, etc.) Donning order while in Sign-in Room: Bootie/shoe covers (Required for entry) Gown Gloves, single layer (Required for entry; this layer of gloves should be considered “hands” and must be worn at all times when in the BSL-3.) Protective eyewear Minimum PPE Requirements for work with infectious agents: Donning order while in Sign-in room: Bootie/shoe covers Jumpsuit, if required Gown Gloves, single layer (Required for entry; this layer of gloves should be considered “hands” and must be worn at all times when in the BSL-3). Protective eyewear Donning order while in the BSL-3 Corridor for testing not requiring PAPRs: Front closed, wrap-around gown (Required when working with agents) Second pair of gloves (Required when working with agents) Additional donning for testing requiring PAPRs: (2 people required) For all testing requiring the use of PAPRs, the jumpsuit will be donned in the sign in room. In addition, the PAPR will be donned in the common area before entering the BSL-3 corridor. • Taking temperatures, tours • Inventory, restocking, maintenance personnel, etc. , gowns • B. anthracis, Eastern Equine Encephalitis, C. burnetii, C. botulinum, Burkholderia spp., Brucella spp., F. tularensis, Y. pestis, Variola, Environmental samples, GNR Screening Panel, MERS, Ebola Tuck inner skirt into jumpsuit. This signage is posted in donning and doffing areas in the anteroom and BSL-3 suites. Doffing PPE Doffing order in isolation suites: Discard outer layer of gloves and sleeves if worn, while in BSC. Remove gown if jumpsuit is also worn. Doffing order in BSL-3 Corridor: Doff jumpsuit, if worn, and discard into biohazard bag. If no jumpsuit is worn, Doff gown and discard into biohazard bag. Remove and discard booties in a biohazard bag. Doff the inner layer of gloves. Doffing order in common area: Don clean gloves to doff PAPR unit Doff PAPR unit. (Place hood in biohazard bag and place PAPR unit in a holding bin. If reentry is required, use a new hood. If sample is negative, store one hood per laboratorian and recharge PAPR unit for reuse. Exception: Discard hood if performing Ebola testing. If sample is positive, discard hood(s), decontaminate PAPR unit(s), change PAPR filter and recharge for reuse. Remove gloves and discard into a biohazard bag. Wash hands. NOTE: Doffing PPE In accordance with the NCSLPH Exposure Control Plan, all personal protective equipment is removed immediately, or as soon as possible, if overtly contaminated and placed in an appropriately designated area or container for storage, washing, decontamination, or disposal. This includes disposal or decontamination of face and eye protection prior to reuse. Laboratory Exit Properly dispose of PPE Wash hands Exit to anteroom Complete logbook Exit Change sign BSL-3 Exit Procedure The BSL-3 Exit Procedure is posted at the entrances/exits of the main entrance and each individual BSL-3 suite. Transfer of Biohazardous Agents into a HighSecurity Laboratory No infectious agents should be transported via the public elevator. Use the freight or Specimen elevator for the transport of samples. Specimens of a suspected bioterrorism event should remain un-opened until they are inside the biological safety cabinet dedicated for this task. Infectious agents should be placed into an unbreakable, secondary container or double-bagged in a leak proof container, both of which are sealed tightly. All containers of size 250 ml or greater should be transported on a cart to the entry of the shower area. No carts shall cross the door threshold between the sign-in room and the anteroom/shower suite. Precautions for Sharps Disposable sharps are placed in sharps containers that are autoclaved when the container is two thirds full. Non-disposable sharps are placed in a hard walled container such as a metal tray for transport to the autoclave and sterilized before re-use. Gross Decontamination The appropriate method of decontamination will be based on the organisms and quantities in use. Ports in the walls of individual rooms to facilitate gross decontamination using Vaporized Hydrogen Peroxide (VHP). If gross decontamination were to occur in a BSC or BSL-3 room, a vendor would be contracted to perform VHP decontamination of those spaces. Refer to the risk assessment and Appendix P to determine the proper decontamination method. During decontamination, the laboratory may be restricted to all investigators. Responding to HVAC alarms In the case of airflow disruption or exhaust system failure: Audible alarms on actively operating Biosafety Cabinets will sound Air pressure differential alarms, both audible and visual, in individual rooms will alarm if the pressure differential becomes positive. Upon hearing the alarms, the laboratorians should assume that negative pressure has been compromised and immediately secure any biological agent being worked upon Leave the BSL-3 following proper procedures and post the “DO NOT ENTER” signage on the anteroom door. The BTEP supervisor, Laboratory Director, and appropriate maintenance personnel should be notified of the situation as soon as possible. After hours, the state capital police should be notified 919-733-3333 and they will contact the after-hours DOA maintenance administrator. BSCs and Local Alarms To ensure that local alarms sound in each isolation room in the BSL-3 when there are either airflow disruptions or exhaust system failures, BSCs will remain ON at all times. Air Pressure Differential Alarms The BSL-3 laboratory is designed for 100% single passage, unidirectional flow-through air. The exhaust air system is electronically connected to the supply air system. The fans of these systems are programmed to maintain a predetermined cfm (cubic feet per minute) flow differential to maintain the negative pressure in the BSL-3 suite in relation to the adjacent lab areas. Visual and audible alarms will indicate if the differential reaches positive pressure. If activities occur that will knowingly sound the alarm (e.g. opening the door, etc.), staff will alert other team members working in the area of the impending alarm. Otherwise, all work should safely cease and alarm investigated/assessed/documented/reported. HEPA Filters Suite Fans Filter Bank Modules Unknowns EF 3-1. 3-2 F-3*, ** 1 BT/Virology EF5-1. EF5-2 F-2 9 TB EF6-1. EF6-2 F-5 4 Iso Autopsy EF11-1. EF11-2 F-8*,** 2 Each BSL3 lab suite has two exhaust bag-in/bag-out HEPA filter housings and two exhaust fans which are located in the mechanical penthouses and roof. Each filter bank has pre-filters and HEPA filters. Some filters also include HEGA filters (this varies with each suite). The supply is not HEPA filtered. *This suite does not have redundant filter banks. ** This suite also has HEGA filters inline with the HEPA filters. Electrical Sytem Emergency Generator – 10 second delay BSCs have UPS unit to bridge gap of time ROOM NUMBERS 3916 is panel # OL3A5 and circuit # 29 3921 is panel # OL3A5 and circuit # 41 3922 is panel # OL3A5 and circuit # 17 & 3 (2 cabinets in the room) 3923 is panel # OL3A5 and circuit # 9 & 11(2 cabinets in the room) 3903 is panel # OL3A6 and circuit # 27 3904 is panel # OL3A6 and circuit # 38 3905 is panel # OL3A6 and circuit # 33 3906 is panel # OL3A6 and circuit # 19 3907 is panel # OL3A6 and circuit # 1 The cabinets are being fed from circuits OL3A5 and OL3A6. These 2 panels are themselves being fed from the distribution panel # ODL3A1 in the electrical room #3136. ODL3A1 in turn is fed from transformer #T7 in room #3136 and the transformer is fed off of switchboard A. Electronic interlock system Interlock systems control the locking of two or more doors such that if one door is open or unlocked, the remaining doors refuse access. Emergencies in the BSL3 Remember! Personal safety comes first! Fire Natural Disaster Hurricane Tornado Equipment failure PAPR BSC Loss of power Interruption of air flow Personnel shall not expose themselves to any unnecessary risks in order to comply with select agent or BSL-3 policies. Emergencies in the BSL3 Upon hearing any emergency alarm: 1. Use common sense! 2. Secure any organisms to the best of the investigator’s ability prior to leaving the BSL-3. 3. Make a best effort to remove any PPE and wash your hands. Raleigh Laboratory Emergencies Emergency Response • Dial 8-911 • Pull fire alarm located in hallway • Building operator: 3-7834 • Other numbers: 919-7333333 (State Capitol Police – 24-hour Law Enforcement presence on-site) Evacuation Route • Exit BSL-3 lab suite via exterior door. • Turn right and exit building via closest stairwell. • Upon exiting building, walk around the rear of the building towards the loading dock. • Check in with supervisor near grassy area/picnic table behind the loading dock. New - Raleigh During a fire alarm, the interlock will be engaged. This will not allow both doors to be open. If bypass is needed, press the green ‘over-ride’ button next to the door. Alternative exit emergency methods include doors in equipment room (3902 & 3919). Laboratory Risk Assessments • • • • Identify hazards Useful tools Controls to Reduce Hazards Benefits Risk Assessments A risk assessment basically involves trying to predict what might go wrong, how likely it is to go wrong and how severe the consequences would be. Risk = the chance of injury, damage, or loss Chance = the probability of something happening Hazard = something that is dangerous A risk assessment must be completed for each organism that is used in the laboratory. Pre-requisites required Before Attempting to Perform Risk Assessment Men • Qualification • Experience and Training • Attitude • Immune status • Physical handicaps Materials • Pathogens and toxins • Pathogenicity • Mode of transmission • Reagents • Containers and closures “Four Ms” Machinery • Building • Laboratory design • Facilities • Air flow (air handling) • Equipment • BSC, Fume hoods • Centrifuge cups/carriers Methods • Procedures • SOPs • Documentation When to Perform Laboratory Risk Assessments At regular intervals - at least annually Laboratory move or renovation New employee New infectious agent or new reagent New piece of equipment Changes in protocols/procedures According to the BMBL… There are things to be consider after an organism or method has been chosen. These items should be included in a biological risk assessment: Pathogenicity – disease incidence and severity, LAIs Route of transmission – inhalation, ingestion, cutaneous Agent Stability – survival over time in the environment Infectious dose – how much? Immune status? Concentration – working volume, # of infectious organisms per unit According to the BMBL… Origin – domestic or foreign in origin. Host? Availability of prophylaxis/therapeutic treatment – vaccines, antibiotics and anti-viral meds Medical Surveillance – Serum banking, monitoring employee health status, post-exposure management Experience and skill level of personnel – laboratorians, maintenance, housekeeping Useful Tools for Performing Risk Assessments Review laboratory records Injury, illness and surveillance reports Equipment maintenance records (is the equipment well maintained/inspected/certified) Inspect the laboratory Daily monitoring by employees, periodic walk-throughs and formal inspections Review published materials Equipment manuals, manufacturers’ bulletins, package inserts, scientific journals, safety manuals and guidelines Observe laboratory operations New procedures, new employees, new equipment, workflow Controls to Reduce Risk Avoid the hazard Not perform the assay or handle the agent Use alternates/surrogate organisms Procedural Controls Perform assay when less people are around Separate areas Engineering/Mechanical controls BSC Mechanical pipetting devices PPE Determine specific types(s) of PPE required (respirators) Emergency Procedures Incident/Accident response procedures Health Surveillance Benefits of Completing a Risk Assessment Effective use of resources Identification of training needs and supervision Advance planning for renovation Evaluation of procedural changes Prevention of biohazard transmission to family members of employees Ensure compliance with governmental regulations Justification for space and equipment needs Cost effective laboratory operation Evaluation of emergency plans Biosecurity • Security measures • Notify Responsible Official • Incident reporting Security Measures Entry/exit reports Card key/key fob access Video surveillance Audio detection Motion detectors Locked incubators, freezers, and refrigerators Raleigh Video Surveillance Card Key/key fob access Biometrics Audio detection Entry and exit reports Knox Box Smoke detectors (w/ alarms) Meck Raleigh Security Video surveillance of -80°C freezer Access proximity card at and biometrics (fingerprint scanner) at BSL-3 24-hour law enforcement presence Other security measures Security risk assessments Inspection of all packages to reduce the risk of an unauthorized removal of agents or information from the laboratory. Security plan – describes how the institution will handle unacceptable risks. A chain-of-command and roles and responsibilities must be clearly defined. Ensure that the plans are created, exercised and revised as needed. Notify your Responsible Official Security related incidents may occur that will warrant the notification of the Responsible Official: Loss of keys Termination of employment Loss, theft, or release of Select Agent Alteration of inventory records Unauthorized entry to the laboratory Symptoms consistent with lab-acquired infections Most common – Brucellosis and Tularemia Responsible Parties Alternate Responsible Responsible Official Official Raleigh J. Royden Saah Dr. Dee Pettit, Marion (Kristy) Osterhout Safety Officer Marion (Kristy) Osterhout Incident Response Form Nature of threat Breach discovery Details of occupational release Agent or toxin missing Actions taken to resolve the incident Determination of cause Preventive actions Evaluation of new measures Powered Air Purifying Respirator (PAPR) • • • • • • Requirements Limitations, Hazards and Risks Donning and Doffing Disinfection/storage Site specific protocols Training PAPR Motor blower draws contaminated air through a HEPA filter and blows filtered air up into the head covering. The PAPR provides respiratory protection again airborne contaminants: Dust, fumes, mists, smoke PAPRs DO NOT reduce exposure to gases or vapors The PAPR with the head cover reduces exposure by a factor of 25, PAPR with hood reduces exposure by a factor of 1000. PAPR Prior to wearing a PAPR, staff must undergo medical evaluation. The Director of the facility’s Respiratory Protection Program reviews the medical clearance questionnaire and decides if employee needs to be referred to a personal physician for clearance to wear a PAPR. Physiological stresses Pulmonary Cardiac Signs and symptoms limiting use Claustrophobia, latex allergy Cover/Hood PAPR Breathing Tube Blower / Filtration Unit (w/Airflow Indicator) Battery Charger Preparing to Wear the PAPR 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Inspect PAPR unit. Replace if cracked or warped. Check breathing tube for any cracks or tears. The tube should be flexible. Pay particular attention to the rubber o-ring gasket – replace if it is worn, cracked or no longer flexible. Attach the breathing tube to the blower/filter/battery unit by inserting the male end of the hose and turning it clockwise until it stops. Turn the power on. Check the airflow with the airflow indicator. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Check Airflow with the Airflow Indicator Turn the PAPR power on. Place the indicator in end of the hose. The indicator should float on the air coming out of the tube. Two lines on the indicator should be visible. If the test fails, do not use the unit. Perform troubleshooting. Problem Possible Causes Low airflow • • • • Battery needs changing Filter is loaded PAPR blower malfunction Breathing tube restricted Corrective Action • • • • Switch to fully charged battery Replace filter Switch to a different blower Remove restriction Let’s Change a PAPR Filter The PAPR filter and gasket should be replaced when: 1. 2. 3. 4. PAPR doesn’t pass airflow check Filter is physically damaged Water has entered the filter To comply with administrative procedures 5. Gasket is torn or damaged Let’s Change a PAPR Filter 1. Release back cover locking tabs and remove the back cover. 2. Remove the filter and filter gasket. Autoclave and dispose of the filter and gasket. 3. Remove the battery pack. Inspect the battery and the housing. Replace if damaged, cracked or no longer holds a charge. 4. Insert new filter and filter gasket. 5. Replace back cover. 6. Test PAPR using airflow indicator. PAPR Donning After all other appropriate PPE has been donned: 1. Obtain PAPR components and hood. 2. Attach PAPR to the waist, latching in the front. 3. Insert breathing tube into the PAPR unit. Twist breathing tube/air hose to secure into the unit. 4. Turn on PAPR unit. 5. Attach PAPR breathing tube to the hood. 6. Place hood over head and shoulders PAPR Doffing After all appropriate levels of PPE have been doffed: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Remove hood from head. Turn off PAPR unit. Remove breathing tube from PAPR unit. Remove PAPR unit from waist. Place tube and PAPR unit in designated area for reprossessing. Limitations Impaired lung function Communication and vision problems Fatigue Reduced work efficiency Claustrophobia Battery failure Only in atmospheres with sufficient O2 “Overbreathing” Latex allergies Risks Improper use – training must be provided and documented annually for each user. “Breakthrough” – Contaminants pass through the filtering material when organic vapors and gases cause the filter to reach capacity. “Penetration” – improper seal is created allowing aerosols or other harmful air contaminants to enter. Degradation of effectiveness – occurs when parts of the PAPR begin to deteriorate. Contamination of wearers when doffing – may occur if the PAPR is doffed improperly. PAPR Cleaning Wipe the outside surfaces with a mild solution of warm water and mild detergent. Do not clean with organic solvents. If necessary, wipe with a 10% bleach solution. PAPR hoods are disposable, but may be reused by a single user and must be cleaned between each use. PAPR Disinfection and Storage Disinfection/Storage Disinfect the PAPR after each use – 10% bleach solution Battery pack should be stored fully charged Store PAPR so that it is protected from damage, contamination, dust, sunlight, extreme temperatures, excessive moisture, and damaging chemicals. Store PAPR in a cool, dry place. References http://www.cdc.gov/OD.ohs/biosfty.bmbl5.BMBL_5th_Editio n.pdf http://www.pp.okstate.edu/ehs/HAZMAT/Biosafety_Inspect ion.PDF Richmond, Ph.D., Jonathan Y. “The 1, 2, 3’s of Biosafety Levels”. http://www.cdc.gov/OD.ohs/symp5/jyrtext.htm. Accessed 9/14/2009 http://multimedia.3M.com/mws/mediawebserver Jellison, JoAnne. “Biosafety” March 2005 Isaac, Dr. Freda; Thomas, William; Weyant, Dr. Robert. “National Select Agent Workshop”. http://www.selectagents.gov/resources/Session%201%20%RO%20Responsibilities.pdf Accessed 11/3/09 3M Occupational Health and Environmental Safety Division. “3M Air-Mate™ High Efficiency Power Air Purifying Respirator”. 2003