Biosafety, Biosecurity and PAPR Annual Training

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North Carolina State Laboratory of Public Health
Bioterrorism and Emerging Pathogens Unit
2015
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Biosafety
Risk Assessments
Biosecurity
PAPR
Biosafety

Biosafety is the application of combinations of
laboratory practice and procedure, laboratory facilities,
and safety equipment when working with potentially
infectious microorganisms. Biosafety guidelines are
put into place to protect laboratorians and prevent
exposures in biological laboratories.
Everyone working in the laboratory is responsible for
employing proper biosafety practices at all times and in
all situations.
Principles of Biosafety

Good biosafety practices prevent occupationally acquired infections by
intercepting microorganisms. This is done by:
 Blocking the routes of transmission by intercepting
microorganisms before they can infect
 Breaking the “chain of infection”
Reservoir of pathogen
Portal of escape
Proper Work Practices
Transmission
Protective Equipment
Route of entry/infectious dose
Susceptible host
Incubation period
Infection
Immunization
Treatment
Surveillance
Biosafety Plan Key
Elements

 Biosafety Manual and
 General laboratory safety
SOPs
 Responsibilities
 Identification of
biohazards
 Entry requirements and
signage
 Risk assessments and
control of biohazards
 Packaging and Shipping
Protocols
practices
 Waste management
 Decontamination/Disinfection
 Emergency procedures
 Training program
 Medical Surveillance
 Evaluation/Drills/Auditing
program and
Documentation
Containment

Containment describes safe methods for managing infectious
materials in the laboratory environment where they are
being handled or maintained.
Purpose:
 Manage infectious materials
 Reduce or eliminate exposure
 Containment = Barrier
Elements:
 Laboratory Practice and Technique (Primary Containment)
 Safety Equipment (Primary Containment)
 Facility Design and Construction (Secondary Containment)
Primary Containment
(Barriers)

Primary containment is provided by both good
microbiological technique and the use of appropriate
safety equipment. It provides protection of personnel and
the immediate laboratory environment from exposure to
infectious agents.
Biosafety Cabinet
Eye/Face Protection
Safety Centrifuge Cup
Lab Coat/Gown
Respiratory Protection
Gloves
Booties
Primary Containment
(Barriers) Examples

 PPE – PAPRs, gloves, Tyvek® gowns and coveralls,
booties
 Administrative- Immunizations, security clearance,
training and supervision
 Engineering controls – Directional airflow, Biosafety
Cabinet, entry and exit control, double-cup centrifuges,
HEPA filtration
 SOP- Handling sharps, Decontamination, Entry and Exit
procedure
Biosafety Cabinet

The Biosafety Cabinet is
the principal device used
to provide containment of
infectious splashes or
aerosols generated by
many microbiolgical
procedures.
Secondary Containment
(Barriers)

Secondary containment (barriers) provide protection to
the infectious material.
It is provided by a
combination of facility design and operational
practices.
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Doors which provide controlled access to the lab
Location of the lab and the location of the BSC
Hand washing sinks
Cleanable surfaces
Laboratory Practice and
Technique

The most important element of containment is strict
adherence to standard microbiological practices and
techniques.
 Standard practices and procedures
 Common to all laboratories
 Special practices and procedures
 Address the risk of handling agents requiring increasing
levels of containment
Standard Microbiological
Practices and Techniques

 Limited or restricted access to the laboratory
 Hand washing protocols
 No eating, drinking, smoking, handling contact lenses or
applying cosmetics in the laboratory
 Use of mechanical pipetting devices – No mouth
pipetting!
 Impervious work surfaces
 Waste decontamination and disposal program
 Insect and rodent control program
 Minimization of splashes and aerosols
Procedures That Emit
Aerosols
  Splashes
 Catalase
 Inoculating biochemicals
or blood culture bottles
 Pipetting
 Mixing
 Centrifugation
 Grinding
 Vortexing
 Pouring
 Loading syringes
 Lasers, cell sorters
 Opening lyophilized
cultures
 Flaming loops
 Entering or opening
vessels at non-ambient
pressures, fermenters,
freezer vials
Ways to Minimize
Aerosols
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 Pour liquids carefully
 Work over absorbent
bench pads
 Use centrifuge safety cups
 Use sealed centrifuge
rotors
 Use capped tubes when
mixing or vortexting
 Use pipette aids with
filters
 Work in BSC
Facility Design and
Construction

The design and construction of the facility contributes to the
laboratory workers’ protection, provides a barrier to protect
persons outside the laboratory, and protects persons or
animals in the community from infectious agents which may
be accidentally released from the laboratory.
Facility Design and
Construction

Separation of the laboratory work area from public access
Availability of a decontamination facility (autoclave)
Hand washing facilities
Specialized ventilation systems to ensure directional
airflow
 Air treatment systems to decontaminate or remove agents
from exhaust air
 Controlled access zones
 Separate buildings or modules to isolate the laboratory
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Biosafety Levels

Laboratories are divided into four different safety levels that
basically determine the type of work that can be performed
in that laboratory.
 Provide increasing levels of personnel and environmental
protection
 Consist of combinations of laboratory practices and
techniques, safety equipment and laboratory facilities
The performance of risk assessments is necessary and
mandatory.
Biosafety Levels

 Generally, work with known agents should be
conducted at the biosafety level recommended in
the BMBL Section VII.
 When specific information is available to suggest
that virulence, pathogenicity, antibiotic
resistance patterns, vaccine and treatment
availability, or other factors are significantly
altered, stringent practices may be specified.
BSL 1
Very Basic – Used when handling
agents not known to cause
disease in health humans
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No primary barriers required
Open bench top
Hand washing sink
Lab coats
Sharps policy
BSL 1
BSL 2
Lab activities involving
clinical specimens, blood,
other body fluids and tissues
from humans or animals
potentially infected with
human pathogens.
BSL 2
Biosafety Level 2

 Risk of percutaneous injury, ingestion, mucous
membrane exposure
 Biosafety manual in place defining any needed waste
decontamination or medical surveillance policies
 Class I or Class II BSC or other physical containment
device used for all manipulations of agents that
cause splashes or aerosols of infectious materials
BSL 3
Used for lab activities
involving work with
indigenous or exotic agents
which may cause serious or
potentially lethal disease as
a result of exposure by the
inhalation route.
BSL 3
BSL-3

With BSL-3 laboratories, more emphasis is placed on
primary and secondary barriers to protect personnel,
the community and the environment from exposure to
potentially infectious aerosols.
 Primary Barriers
 Class I or Class II BSCs or other physical containment
devices used for all open manipulations of agents.
 Secondary Barriers
 Physical separation from access corridors, self-closing ,
double-door access, exhausted air not recirculated,
negative airflow into laboratory
BSL-3 Engineering
Controls

 Entry and Exit control
 BSC – all manipulations of infectious materials
 Autoclave
 Eyewash available
 Directional Airflow
 HEPA filtration system
 Double containment centrifuges
BSL-3
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 Decontamination of ALL waste
 BSL-3 PPE – protective lab clothing, gloves,
respiratory protection as required by risk assessment
(PAPRs)
 Decontamination of lab clothing before laundering.
BTEP utilizes disposable PPE
 Baseline serum taken upon hire of all new technical
employees
BSL-4
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 Dangerous/exotic agents which pose high risk of life
threatening disease, aerosol-transmitted lab infections; or
related agents with unknown risk of transmission
 Primary hazards to personnel are respiratory exposure to
infectious aerosols, mucous membrane or broken skin
exposure to infectious droplets or auto inoculations
 Two types of BSL-4 laboratories:
 Cabinet = all procedures conducted in Class III BSC
 Suit = all procedures conducted in Class I or II BSC in
combination with full-body, air supplied pressure personnel
suit
Raleigh BSL-3 Facility
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 BSL-3 Entry and Exit Procedure
 Visitor’s Log
 PPE Requirements
 Donning and Doffing of PPE
 Transfer of Biohazardous Agents into the Laboratory
 Precautions for Sharps
 Gross Decontamination
 HVAC, Alarms, BSC, Local and Air Pressure Differential
Alarms
 HEPA Filter
 Electrical System
Provision of training
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 Entry and exit procedures, including posted map of
evacuation routes
 Proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE)
 Proper use of the engineering controls including the air
handling system, biological safety cabinets, centrifuges
and autoclave
 Emergency action procedures and notifications
**Personnel will receive annual updates or additional
training when procedural or policy changes occur. **
BSL-3 Entry procedure
The BSL-3 Entry Procedure is posted at the entrances to the main entrance and
each individual BSL-3 suite.
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Laboratory Entry
 Post proper sign on door
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– includes occupancy,
types of PPE in use,
maintenance, etc.
 Access using security
measures – key fob,
access key card,
biometrics, key lock.
When scanning for entry, all employees wishing to enter
the lab must scan their card key/fob/fingerprint.
Potential Risks and Hazards for Visitors
Changes to the Visitor’s sign in form:
• Addition of MERS and Ebola
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Laboratory Entry
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 Document entry in log book
– all visitors must read the
precautions document and
sign the Visitor’s log.
 Document that the visual
airflow device or indicator
was checked and that air is
flowing properly.
 Don PPE located in
anteroom
Minimum PPE Requirements while
infectious agents are not in use:

Donning PPE:
 (i.e. Taking Temperatures, Inventory, Restocking,
Maintenance Personnel, Tours, etc.)
Donning order while in Sign-in Room:
 Bootie/shoe covers (Required for entry)
 Gown
 Gloves, single layer (Required for entry; this layer of
gloves should be considered “hands” and must be worn
at all times when in the BSL-3.)
 Protective eyewear
Minimum PPE Requirements for
work with infectious agents:

Donning order while in Sign-in room:
Bootie/shoe covers
Jumpsuit, if required
Gown
Gloves, single layer (Required for entry; this layer of gloves should be
considered “hands” and must be worn at all times when in the BSL-3).
Protective eyewear
Donning order while in the BSL-3 Corridor for testing not requiring PAPRs:
Front closed, wrap-around gown (Required when working with agents)
Second pair of gloves (Required when working with agents)
Additional donning for testing requiring PAPRs: (2 people required)
For all testing requiring the use of PAPRs, the jumpsuit will be donned in
the sign in room. In addition, the PAPR will be donned in the common area
before entering the BSL-3 corridor.
• Taking temperatures, tours
• Inventory, restocking,
maintenance personnel, etc.
, gowns
• B. anthracis, Eastern Equine
Encephalitis, C. burnetii, C. botulinum,
Burkholderia spp., Brucella
spp., F. tularensis, Y. pestis,
Variola, Environmental
samples, GNR Screening Panel,
MERS, Ebola
Tuck inner skirt into jumpsuit.
This signage is posted in donning
and doffing areas in the anteroom
and BSL-3 suites.
Doffing PPE
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Doffing order in isolation suites:
 Discard outer layer of gloves and sleeves if worn, while in BSC.
 Remove gown if jumpsuit is also worn.
Doffing order in BSL-3 Corridor:
 Doff jumpsuit, if worn, and discard into biohazard bag.
 If no jumpsuit is worn,
 Doff gown and discard into biohazard bag.
 Remove and discard booties in a biohazard bag.
 Doff the inner layer of gloves.
Doffing order in common area:
 Don clean gloves to doff PAPR unit
 Doff PAPR unit. (Place hood in biohazard bag and place PAPR unit in a holding bin. If reentry is required, use a new hood.
 If sample is negative, store one hood per laboratorian and recharge PAPR unit for
reuse. Exception: Discard hood if performing Ebola testing.
 If sample is positive, discard hood(s), decontaminate PAPR unit(s), change PAPR filter
and recharge for reuse.
 Remove gloves and discard into a biohazard bag.
 Wash hands.
NOTE:
Doffing PPE

In accordance with the NCSLPH Exposure
Control Plan, all personal protective
equipment is removed immediately, or as soon
as possible, if overtly contaminated and placed
in an appropriately designated area or
container for storage, washing,
decontamination, or disposal. This includes
disposal or decontamination of face and eye
protection prior to reuse.
Laboratory Exit

Properly dispose of PPE
Wash hands
Exit to anteroom
Complete logbook
Exit
Change sign
BSL-3 Exit Procedure
The BSL-3 Exit Procedure is posted at the entrances/exits of the main entrance
and each individual BSL-3 suite.
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Transfer of Biohazardous Agents into a HighSecurity Laboratory

 No infectious agents should be transported via the public
elevator. Use the freight or Specimen elevator for the
transport of samples.
 Specimens of a suspected bioterrorism event should
remain un-opened until they are inside the biological
safety cabinet dedicated for this task.
 Infectious agents should be placed into an unbreakable,
secondary container or double-bagged in a leak proof
container, both of which are sealed tightly.
 All containers of size 250 ml or greater should be
transported on a cart to the entry of the shower area. No
carts shall cross the door threshold between the sign-in
room and the anteroom/shower suite.
Precautions for Sharps

 Disposable sharps are placed in sharps containers
that are autoclaved when the container is two thirds
full.
 Non-disposable sharps are placed in a hard walled
container such as a metal tray for transport to the
autoclave and sterilized before re-use.
Gross Decontamination

 The appropriate method of decontamination will be based
on the organisms and quantities in use.
 Ports in the walls of individual rooms to facilitate gross
decontamination using Vaporized Hydrogen Peroxide
(VHP).
 If gross decontamination were to occur in a BSC or BSL-3
room, a vendor would be contracted to perform VHP
decontamination of those spaces. Refer to the risk
assessment and Appendix P to determine the proper
decontamination method. During decontamination, the
laboratory may be restricted to all investigators.
Responding to HVAC
alarms

 In the case of airflow disruption or exhaust system failure:
 Audible alarms on actively operating Biosafety Cabinets will sound
 Air pressure differential alarms, both audible and visual, in individual
rooms will alarm if the pressure differential becomes positive.
 Upon hearing the alarms, the laboratorians should assume that negative
pressure has been compromised and immediately secure any biological
agent being worked upon
 Leave the BSL-3 following proper procedures and post the “DO NOT
ENTER” signage on the anteroom door.
 The BTEP supervisor, Laboratory Director, and appropriate maintenance
personnel should be notified of the situation as soon as possible. After
hours, the state capital police should be notified 919-733-3333 and they will
contact the after-hours DOA maintenance administrator.
BSCs and Local Alarms

To ensure that local alarms sound in each isolation room
in the BSL-3 when there are either airflow disruptions or
exhaust system failures, BSCs will remain ON at all
times.
Air Pressure Differential
Alarms

 The BSL-3 laboratory is designed for 100% single passage, unidirectional flow-through air.
 The exhaust air system is electronically connected to the supply air
system.
 The fans of these systems are programmed to maintain a
predetermined cfm (cubic feet per minute) flow differential to maintain
the negative pressure in the BSL-3 suite in relation to the adjacent lab
areas.
 Visual and audible alarms will indicate if the differential reaches
positive pressure.
 If activities occur that will knowingly sound the alarm (e.g. opening the
door, etc.), staff will alert other team members working in the area of the
impending alarm. Otherwise, all work should safely cease and alarm
investigated/assessed/documented/reported.
HEPA Filters
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Suite
Fans
Filter Bank
Modules
Unknowns
EF 3-1. 3-2
F-3*, **
1
BT/Virology
EF5-1. EF5-2
F-2
9
TB
EF6-1. EF6-2
F-5
4
Iso Autopsy
EF11-1. EF11-2
F-8*,**
2
Each BSL3 lab suite has two exhaust bag-in/bag-out HEPA filter housings and two exhaust fans
which are located in the mechanical penthouses and roof. Each filter bank has pre-filters and HEPA
filters. Some filters also include HEGA filters (this varies with each suite). The supply is not HEPA
filtered.
*This suite does not have redundant filter banks. ** This suite also has HEGA filters inline with the
HEPA filters.
Electrical Sytem

Emergency Generator – 10 second delay
BSCs have UPS unit to bridge gap of time
ROOM NUMBERS
 3916 is panel # OL3A5 and circuit # 29
 3921 is panel # OL3A5 and circuit # 41
 3922 is panel # OL3A5 and circuit # 17 & 3 (2 cabinets in the room)
 3923 is panel # OL3A5 and circuit # 9 & 11(2 cabinets in the room)
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3903 is panel # OL3A6 and circuit # 27
3904 is panel # OL3A6 and circuit # 38
3905 is panel # OL3A6 and circuit # 33
3906 is panel # OL3A6 and circuit # 19
3907 is panel # OL3A6 and circuit # 1
 The cabinets are being fed from circuits OL3A5 and OL3A6. These 2 panels are themselves
being fed from the distribution panel # ODL3A1 in the electrical room #3136. ODL3A1 in turn
is fed from transformer #T7 in room #3136 and the transformer is fed off of switchboard A.
Electronic interlock system
Interlock systems control
the locking of two or more
doors such that if one door
is open or unlocked, the
remaining doors refuse
access.
Emergencies in the BSL3

Remember! Personal safety comes first!
 Fire
 Natural Disaster
 Hurricane
 Tornado
 Equipment failure
 PAPR
 BSC
 Loss of power
 Interruption of air flow
Personnel shall not expose themselves to any unnecessary
risks in order to comply with select agent or BSL-3 policies.
Emergencies in the BSL3

Upon hearing any emergency alarm:
1. Use common sense!
2. Secure any organisms to the best of the investigator’s
ability prior to leaving the BSL-3.
3. Make a best effort to remove any PPE and wash your
hands.
Raleigh Laboratory
Emergencies
Emergency Response
• Dial 8-911
• Pull fire alarm located in
hallway
• Building operator: 3-7834
• Other numbers: 919-7333333 (State Capitol Police –
24-hour Law Enforcement
presence on-site)

Evacuation Route
• Exit BSL-3 lab suite via
exterior door.
• Turn right and exit building
via closest stairwell.
• Upon exiting building, walk
around the rear of the
building towards the loading
dock.
• Check in with supervisor
near grassy area/picnic table
behind the loading dock.
New - Raleigh
During a fire alarm, the interlock will be
engaged. This will not allow both doors to
be open. If bypass is needed, press the
green ‘over-ride’ button next to the door.
Alternative exit emergency methods
include doors in equipment room (3902 &
3919).
Laboratory Risk
Assessments
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Identify hazards
Useful tools
Controls to Reduce Hazards
Benefits
Risk Assessments

A risk assessment basically involves trying to predict what
might go wrong, how likely it is to go wrong and how severe
the consequences would be.
Risk = the chance of injury, damage, or loss
Chance = the probability of something happening
Hazard = something that is dangerous
A risk assessment must be completed for each organism that
is used in the laboratory.
Pre-requisites required Before Attempting to
Perform Risk Assessment
Men
• Qualification
• Experience and Training
• Attitude
• Immune status
• Physical handicaps
Materials
• Pathogens and toxins
• Pathogenicity
• Mode of transmission
• Reagents
• Containers and closures

“Four
Ms”
Machinery
• Building
• Laboratory design
• Facilities
• Air flow (air handling)
• Equipment
• BSC, Fume hoods
• Centrifuge cups/carriers
Methods
• Procedures
• SOPs
• Documentation
When to Perform Laboratory
Risk Assessments

 At regular intervals - at least annually
 Laboratory move or renovation
 New employee
 New infectious agent or new reagent
 New piece of equipment
 Changes in protocols/procedures
According to the BMBL…

There are things to be consider after an organism or method
has been chosen. These items should be included in a
biological risk assessment:
 Pathogenicity – disease incidence and severity, LAIs
 Route of transmission – inhalation, ingestion, cutaneous
 Agent Stability – survival over time in the environment
 Infectious dose – how much? Immune status?
 Concentration – working volume, # of infectious
organisms per unit
According to the BMBL…

 Origin – domestic or foreign in origin. Host?
 Availability of prophylaxis/therapeutic treatment –
vaccines, antibiotics and anti-viral meds
 Medical Surveillance – Serum banking, monitoring
employee health status, post-exposure management
 Experience and skill level of personnel –
laboratorians, maintenance, housekeeping
Useful Tools for Performing
Risk Assessments

 Review laboratory records
 Injury, illness and surveillance reports
 Equipment maintenance records (is the equipment well
maintained/inspected/certified)
 Inspect the laboratory
 Daily monitoring by employees, periodic walk-throughs
and formal inspections
 Review published materials
 Equipment manuals, manufacturers’ bulletins, package
inserts, scientific journals, safety manuals and guidelines
 Observe laboratory operations
 New procedures, new employees, new equipment,
workflow
Controls to Reduce Risk

 Avoid the hazard
 Not perform the assay or handle the agent
 Use alternates/surrogate organisms
 Procedural Controls
 Perform assay when less people are around
 Separate areas
 Engineering/Mechanical controls
 BSC
 Mechanical pipetting devices
 PPE
 Determine specific types(s) of PPE required (respirators)
 Emergency Procedures
 Incident/Accident response procedures
 Health Surveillance
Benefits of Completing a
Risk Assessment
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Effective use of resources
Identification of training needs and supervision
Advance planning for renovation
Evaluation of procedural changes
Prevention of biohazard transmission to family members
of employees
Ensure compliance with governmental regulations
Justification for space and equipment needs
Cost effective laboratory operation
Evaluation of emergency plans
Biosecurity

• Security measures
• Notify Responsible Official
• Incident reporting
Security Measures

 Entry/exit reports
 Card key/key fob access
 Video surveillance
 Audio detection
 Motion detectors
 Locked incubators, freezers,
and refrigerators
Raleigh
Video
Surveillance
Card Key/key
fob access
Biometrics
Audio detection
Entry and exit
reports
Knox Box
Smoke
detectors (w/
alarms)
Meck
Raleigh Security

 Video surveillance of -80°C freezer
 Access proximity card at and biometrics (fingerprint
scanner) at BSL-3
 24-hour law enforcement presence
Other security measures

 Security risk assessments
 Inspection of all packages to reduce the risk of an
unauthorized removal of agents or information from the
laboratory.
 Security plan – describes how the institution will handle
unacceptable risks. A chain-of-command and roles and
responsibilities must be clearly defined. Ensure that the
plans are created, exercised and revised as needed.
Notify your Responsible
Official

Security related incidents may occur that will warrant the
notification of the Responsible Official:
 Loss of keys
 Termination of employment
 Loss, theft, or release of Select Agent
 Alteration of inventory records
 Unauthorized entry to the laboratory
 Symptoms consistent with lab-acquired infections
 Most common – Brucellosis and Tularemia
Responsible Parties
Alternate
Responsible
Responsible
Official
Official
Raleigh
J. Royden Saah
Dr. Dee Pettit,
Marion (Kristy)
Osterhout
Safety
Officer
Marion (Kristy)
Osterhout
Incident Response Form

 Nature of threat
 Breach discovery
 Details of occupational release
 Agent or toxin missing
 Actions taken to resolve the incident
 Determination of cause
 Preventive actions
 Evaluation of new measures
Powered Air Purifying
Respirator (PAPR)
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•
•
•
•
•

Requirements
Limitations, Hazards and Risks
Donning and Doffing
Disinfection/storage
Site specific protocols
Training
PAPR

 Motor blower draws contaminated air through a HEPA
filter and blows filtered air up into the head covering. The
PAPR provides respiratory protection again airborne
contaminants:
 Dust, fumes, mists, smoke
 PAPRs DO NOT reduce exposure to gases or vapors
 The PAPR with the head cover reduces exposure by a
factor of 25, PAPR with hood reduces exposure by a factor
of 1000.
PAPR

Prior to wearing a PAPR, staff must undergo medical
evaluation. The Director of the facility’s Respiratory
Protection Program reviews the medical clearance
questionnaire and decides if employee needs to be
referred to a personal physician for clearance to wear a
PAPR.
 Physiological stresses
 Pulmonary
 Cardiac
 Signs and symptoms limiting use
 Claustrophobia, latex allergy
Cover/Hood
PAPR

Breathing
Tube
Blower /
Filtration Unit
(w/Airflow Indicator)
Battery
Charger
Preparing to Wear the
PAPR

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Inspect PAPR unit. Replace if cracked or warped.
Check breathing tube for any cracks or tears. The tube
should be flexible. Pay particular attention to the rubber
o-ring gasket – replace if it is worn, cracked or no longer
flexible.
Attach the breathing tube to the blower/filter/battery
unit by inserting the male end of the hose and turning it
clockwise until it stops.
Turn the power on.
Check the airflow with the airflow indicator.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Check Airflow with the
Airflow Indicator

Turn the PAPR power on.
Place the indicator in end of the hose.
The indicator should float on the air coming out of the tube.
Two lines on the indicator should be visible.
If the test fails, do not use the unit. Perform troubleshooting.
Problem
Possible Causes
Low airflow
•
•
•
•
Battery needs
changing
Filter is loaded
PAPR blower
malfunction
Breathing tube
restricted
Corrective Action
•
•
•
•
Switch to fully
charged battery
Replace filter
Switch to a
different blower
Remove
restriction
Let’s Change a PAPR
Filter

The PAPR filter and gasket should be replaced
when:
1.
2.
3.
4.
PAPR doesn’t pass airflow check
Filter is physically damaged
Water has entered the filter
To comply with administrative
procedures
5. Gasket is torn or damaged
Let’s Change a PAPR
Filter

1. Release back cover locking tabs and remove the
back cover.
2. Remove the filter and filter gasket. Autoclave
and dispose of the filter and gasket.
3. Remove the battery pack. Inspect the battery and
the housing. Replace if damaged, cracked or no
longer holds a charge.
4. Insert new filter and filter gasket.
5. Replace back cover.
6. Test PAPR using airflow indicator.
PAPR Donning

 After all other appropriate PPE has been donned:
1. Obtain PAPR components and hood.
2. Attach PAPR to the waist, latching in the front.
3. Insert breathing tube into the PAPR unit. Twist
breathing tube/air hose to secure into the unit.
4. Turn on PAPR unit.
5. Attach PAPR breathing tube to the hood.
6. Place hood over head and shoulders
PAPR Doffing

 After all appropriate levels of PPE have been doffed:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Remove hood from head.
Turn off PAPR unit.
Remove breathing tube from PAPR unit.
Remove PAPR unit from waist.
Place tube and PAPR unit in designated area for reprossessing.
Limitations

 Impaired lung function
 Communication and vision problems
 Fatigue
 Reduced work efficiency
 Claustrophobia
 Battery failure
 Only in atmospheres with sufficient O2
 “Overbreathing”
 Latex allergies
Risks

 Improper use – training must be provided and
documented annually for each user.
 “Breakthrough” – Contaminants pass through the filtering
material when organic vapors and gases cause the filter to
reach capacity.
 “Penetration” – improper seal is created allowing aerosols
or other harmful air contaminants to enter.
 Degradation of effectiveness – occurs when parts of the
PAPR begin to deteriorate.
 Contamination of wearers when doffing – may occur if the
PAPR is doffed improperly.
PAPR Cleaning

 Wipe the outside surfaces with a mild solution of
warm water and mild detergent. Do not clean with
organic solvents.
 If necessary, wipe with a 10% bleach solution.
 PAPR hoods are disposable, but may be reused by a
single user and must be cleaned between each use.
PAPR Disinfection and
Storage

 Disinfection/Storage
 Disinfect the PAPR after each use – 10% bleach
solution
 Battery pack should be stored fully charged
 Store PAPR so that it is protected from damage,
contamination, dust, sunlight, extreme temperatures,
excessive moisture, and damaging chemicals.
 Store PAPR in a cool, dry place.
References
 http://www.cdc.gov/OD.ohs/biosfty.bmbl5.BMBL_5th_Editio
n.pdf

 http://www.pp.okstate.edu/ehs/HAZMAT/Biosafety_Inspect





ion.PDF
Richmond, Ph.D., Jonathan Y. “The 1, 2, 3’s of Biosafety
Levels”. http://www.cdc.gov/OD.ohs/symp5/jyrtext.htm.
Accessed 9/14/2009
http://multimedia.3M.com/mws/mediawebserver
Jellison, JoAnne. “Biosafety” March 2005
Isaac, Dr. Freda; Thomas, William; Weyant, Dr. Robert.
“National Select Agent Workshop”.
http://www.selectagents.gov/resources/Session%201%20%RO%20Responsibilities.pdf Accessed 11/3/09
3M Occupational Health and Environmental Safety Division.
“3M Air-Mate™ High Efficiency Power Air Purifying
Respirator”. 2003
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