Improving
teaching and
learning
through
effective
incentives
What Can We Learn
from Education
Reforms in Latin
America?
Emiliana Vegas and
Ilana Umansky
The World Bank
Motivation
Teacher costs represent the largest share
of educational expenditure
Teachers play a key role in school quality
and student learning
Attracting and retaining qualified
teachers, and motivating them to do the
best work they can, is arguably the most
important education challenge
Components of the study
Theoretical and empirical review of
literature on teacher incentives
Empirical analysis/update of relative
teacher salaries in 17 Latin American
countries
7 case studies/evaluations of education
reforms affecting teachers
Qualitative case studies in Chile and Peru
of the political economy of teacher
incentive reforms
Research team
Brazil
Nora Gordon, U.C. San Diego, and Emiliana Vegas, World Bank
Chile
Alejandra Mizala and Pilar Romaguera, Universidad de Chile
Mexico
Patrick McEwan, Wellesley College, and Lucrecia Santibáñez,
RAND Corporation
Bolivia
Miguel Urquiola, Universidad de Columbia, and Emiliana
Vegas, World Bank
El Salvador
Yasuyuki Sawada and Andrew Ballard Ragatz, University of
Tokyo
Honduras
Emanuela Di Gropello, World Bank, and Jeffrey H. Marshall,
Sapere.org
Nicaragua
Caroline E. Parker, Harvard Graduate School of Education
Analysis of Teacher Pay in
Latin America
Werner Hernani-Limarino, Universidad of Pennsylvania
Literature Review
Ilana Umansky, World Bank
Political Economy
Luis Crouch, World Bank
Defining teaching quality
What makes a teacher effective?
In this study, we take the view that
effective teachers are those whose
students are learning, as measured by
assessments of student achievement.
Two cases of performancebased teacher incentive reforms
Chile’s Sistema Nacional de
Evaluación de Desempeño de los
Establecimientos Educacionales
(SNED)
Mexico’s Carrera Magisterial (CM)
Characteristics of teacher incentive
programs: SNED in Chile
Introduced in 1996
Group-based incentive, awarded to highestperforming schools serving 25 percent of
enrollment in each region
School performance is measured by
student test scores, taking into account
absolute scores and learning progress, as
well as characteristics of the student
population in each school
90% of the SNED bonus is divided among
all teachers in the winning school
It represents between 5 and 7% of an
annual salary
Characteristics of teacher incentive
programs: CM in Mexico
Introduced in 1996
Group-based incentive, awarded to highestperforming schools serving 25 percent of
enrollment in each region
School performance is measured by
student test scores, taking into account
absolute scores and learning progress, as
well as characteristics of the student
population in each school
90% of the SNED bonus is divided among
all teachers in the winning school
It represents between 5 and 7% of an
annual salary
Chile: Analysis of teacher pay
Research
questions
Data used Methods
Initial
Results
1.
Household survey
OLS regression
data
GLS with school
ME
fixed effects
administrative
Qualitative data
data
analysis
National student
assessment data
(SIMCE)
Own surveys of
teacher and
principals’
perceptions of
performancebased pay
Teachers’ average
salaries rose 156% in
1990-2002
Compressed teacher
salary structure;
experience main
determinant
Quality of entrants
into teacher education
programs increased
Some positive
effects of SNED on
student performance
Strong support for
performance-based
pay among principals &
teachers
2.
3.
What is the
relative level &
structure of
teacher
salaries?
What is the
impact of
incentives on
teacher
quality?
What is the
impact of the
SNED on
student
achievement?
Mexico: Carrera Magisterial
Research
question
Do the CM
incentives
induce
teachers to
improve their
students’
test scores?
Data used Methods
Initial
Results
CM
administrative
data, including
student, school
and teacher
variables
No evidence that
teachers improve
their outcomes
when they face
stronger
incentives
Regression
discontinuity
Differences-indifferences
Teacher salary structure v. salary
structure of other workers
Salary
Other workers
Teachers
Experience or education
Decomposition of teacher pay
100%
90%
Base pay/years of
service
Education
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
Difficult conditions
Administration
Individual incentives
20%
10%
0%
Master teacher
SNED
Chile
Bolivia
Sources: Cox (2003) and Urquiola and Vegas (2005)
Estimated impact on student
achievement of SNED and CM
Chile: SNED
México: Carrera Magisterial
Preliminary evidence of a
No program impact on
cumulative positive impact
teaching quality.
on the student
Teachers who face the
achievement in schools
greatest incentives (who
with relatively high
would earn salary
probabilities of winning
increases if their
the award.
students have high test
scores) do not tend to
have students with higher
achievement.
What factors may explain the relatively
weak impact of performance-based pay
teacher incentive programs?
In CM, few teachers face a real possibility
of winning
The magnitude of the SNED bonus may be
too small to merit the extra effort
The incentive may only be weakly related
to teaching quality and effort
The political context and especially
teachers unions play an important role in
the design and implementation of teacher
incentive reforms
Improving
teaching and
learning
through
effective
incentives
What Can We Learn
from Education
Reforms in Latin
America?
Emiliana Vegas and
Ilana Umansky
The World Bank