The Economic Value of Intellectual Property Rights Professor Derek Bosworth Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia Melbourne University Coverage of the presentation • • • • • Components of value Counterfeiting and infringement Borrowing against assets Distribution of values/risk in investment Conclusions Components of value Components of value: private • Value of the underlying IP an invention may have value without IPRs e.g. “protection” by being first to market • Value of the IPR to the company value of the IPR is the difference in value of the IP with and without IPR protection the value of IP would be severely eroded in the absence of IPRs incentive to invent or maintain quality would be severely undermined Components of value: public • Positive impact of IPRs on dynamic welfare, i.e. creativity (i.e. incentive to invent, incentive to maintain or increase product quality, etc.) accessing high technology of others ability to licence/cross licence • Negative impact of IPRs on static welfare, i.e. higher prices for goods Effects of IPRs on value: inventions • Inventions expensive to produce cheap to reproduce? • Investments in R&D not recouped in absence of IPRs • As expenditure on R&D cannot be recouped, there is no incentive to invest • Countries such as China introduced IPRs in order to access foreign technology Effects of IPRs on value: trade marks • Trade names and brand value expensive to build cheap to reproduce (counterfeit/pirate) • Investments in advertising, R&D, etc. not recouped • Perceived product quality is undermined by counterfeit goods • Incentives to maintain or improve quality are affected by counterfeit goods Counterfeiting and infringement • Counterfeiting and piracy relate to the actions of one company in attempting to pass-off their goods (or services) as those of another company. Software Information Industry Piracy Study, 1999 Western Europe Eastern Europe North America Latin America Asia Pacific Middle East Africa Total - worldwide Piracy (%) 34 70 26 59 47 63 56 36 Revenue loss 3,629,371 505,213 3,631,212 1,127,639 2,791,531 284,445 193,747 12,163,159 Drivers of (Cross-border) Counterfeiting • Market size population brand popularity income and income distribution • Distance physical cultural language technological distance (ability to produce accurate replicas, including marks) • Unit costs labour costs capital costs • IPR and costs of protection (risks to originator/counterfeiter) IPR regime (weak, moderate, strong) extent and efficiency of policing Origin of Counterfeits in EU (% cases) Thai Czech USA China Turkey Poland HK Other Food … 0 10 0 10 20 20 0 40 Perfume.. 0 0 8 0 13 2 0 77 Clothes… 28 29 0 7 11 4 0 22 Electrical.. 4 0 5 16 0 0 25 50 Computer. 5 0 8 18 0 0 27 43 CD, DVD. 56 0 0 0 0 2 3 40 Watches 14 8 37 5 0 9 10 17 Toys & games… 14 0 19 24 0 0 19 25 Other… 4 0 30 19 8 10 6 23 26 15 10 8 6 5 4 25 Total Patent Infringement Damages Patent owner $ (m) Litton 1200.0 Honeywell (US, large) Polaroid 873.2 Eastman Kodak 253.0 Nintendo (Japan, large) Smith International 204.0 Hughes Tool (US, medium) (US, large) (US, large) 1995 1991 (US, large) (US, small) Honeywell Year (US, large) (US, large) Alpex Computer Infringer 166.0 Minolta (Japan, large) 1994 1986 1994 Borrowing against assets Intangible assets as collateral • In some firms/sectors intangibles significantly exceed the value of tangibles • Borrowing against tangible assets disadvantages firms with higher proportions of intangibles • Knowledge-based firms need to borrow against intangible assets • Such firms must account for their intangibles protect their intangibles using IPRs police their intangibles and punish IPR infringers Borrowing against IP Borrower Borden Disney Liggitt Chemical Company Calvin Klein GE Capital Fashion Company News Corporation Nestle David Bowe IP Trade marks Copyrights Trade marks Patents Trade marks Trade marks Trade marks Copyright Trade marks Copyrights $ (m) 480 400 150 100 58 n/a 100 260 n/a 55 Date 1991 1992 1992 1994 1993 1995 1996 1996 1996 1997 Distribution of values Distribution of values • All the empirical literature points to a highly-skewed distribution of values of IP/IPRs Most IP is worth little if anything But a small proportion of IP is extremely valuable • This result is consistent with (though not proof of) the risks of investments in IP Basic R&D is a highly risky activity New product launches are highly risky Identifying value distribution of patents • Main methods: patent renewal information patent citation information surveys of commercial value • Consistent findings: most patent lives are short/relatively few very long lived most patents receive very few citations/very small proportion receive a large number of citations surveys show only a very tiny proportion of patents are worth large amounts/most are worth little if anything Example of a highly cited patent • • • • Bristol-Myers Squibb patent 4105776 Invented by Ondetti and Cuslunan granted in 1978 cited 165 times from the date of its issue in 1978 through September 1995 • single most highly cited patent issued in 1978, out of 70,590 patents issued in that year – 101 times by later Bristol-Myers Squibb patents – 16 times by American Home Products patents – 48 times by patents assigned to 20 other companies or inventors