Discussant’s commentary on ‘In Search of Consensus: The Role of Accounting in the
Definition and Reproduction of Dominant Interests’ by Anne-Laure Farjaudon
(Université Paris-Dauphine) and Jérémy Morales (ESCP Europe)
Discussant : Helen Oakes (Keele University)
The paper is concerned with studying the links between accounting and the manufacture of
consensus in order to improve understanding of the mechanisms by which powerful actors
secure their influence and consolidate their positions. The paper takes the form of a case
study of an international consumer goods company which explores intersections between
accounting and marketing arising from an increasing emphasis on shareholder value and the
introduction of brand valuation. The initial research question was whether modifications to
international accounting regulations had repercussions for management tools and the
management of brands. It was found that the accounting population used accounting to
undermine the symbolic resources of the marketing population, changing the structures of
capital distribution and sources of symbolic capital accumulation and reproducing the
conditions for its domination. It is claimed that this did not trigger any conflict or resistance
from the marketing population because the symbolic domination was masked by a discourse
of consensus. Although previous studies have analysed how accountants compete with other
organisational groups (e.g. Armstrong, 1985; Ezzamel and Burns, 2005), it is suggested that
they do not address the consequences of intersections between fields of knowledge for the
production of symbolic domination patterns and the reproduction of power asymmetries.
The paper begins by discussing the role of consensus. Consensus is seen as a powerful tool
of management that can create both the appearance of rationality and the impression that
there is no alternative. Through its links with rationality, consensus can appear as an
inevitable compromise even though certain groups are imposing their interests on others.
Thus compromise can be seen as an example of Bourdieu’s (1976, 1980) symbolic violence
or Burawoy’s (1979) manufacture of consent. It is argued that consensus creates as sense of
disinterestedness and neutrality in which accounting can be implicated. Furthermore,
accounting can present financial matters as shared and collective and can change the
distribution of power in ways that may be unclear to participants, thus tending to negate
resistance.
Section 2 draws on previous literature to discuss accounting, symbolic violence and the
reproduction of dominant interests. This section develops some of the sophisticated roles of
accounting. It describes how accounting, as a system of classification, exerts symbolic
violence by establishing a language that favours dominant representations. For example,
accounting specifies what can be documented and what can be ignored (Oakes et al.,1998).
The authors (p. 4) observe that accounting is ‘a technology of distinction that defines the
criteria for establishing value and judgement.’ Power structures are defined by struggles over
criteria of legitimacy (Suddaby et al., 2007, p. 345) and accounting is seen as implicated in
this process. Dominating groups can define what may be converted into symbolic capital and
designate the distinction criteria that suit their own interests. For example, by setting specific
distinction criteria and translating other forms of capital into monetary values, accounting
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exerts symbolic power and redefines domination patterns (Everett, 2002, p. 60). Symbolic
capital transforms specific private interests (of dominant groups) into “collective interests”
that get perceived as “universal” (Bourdieu, 1977, 1980, 1994) and consensual.
The authors draw on Whittle and Mueller (2011) to argue that stakes and accounts gain
legitimacy when perceived as “out-there” or beyond self-interest and it is possible to defend a
position and discredit others by presenting their position as interested whilst your own
position is presented as neutral, part of the consensus and legitimate. The authors note that
Bourdieu does not regard interests as the driving power or an external force, because they are
neither stable nor predefined but rather get constructed and designated through struggles for
symbolic power. Drawing on Whittle and Mueller (2011, p. 416) they argue that “interests
and motives should be viewed as a topic for analysis rather than a resource for explanation”.
From a Bourdieusian perspective, the authors argue that by designating consensual stakes and
legitimate instruments for use in symbolic struggles, accounting shapes the perceptions of
what is reasonable, or not, so that the dominant groups’ habitus appears better suited for
capital accumulation than others.
Section 3 describes the empirical study. 46 interviews were conducted between 2004 and
2007 at Globalmarket Group, an international consumer goods company. Globalmarket
France consists of three divisions based on broad product line categories. Each division
encompasses multiple “business units.” A single business unit relates to one brand or a set of
brands that belong to the same product category. Business units in turn comprise business
teams that gather representatives from marketing, sales, finance and logistics functions. The
organisational structure and marketing is brand oriented. From 2000 to 2004 the number of
brands was rationalised from 2000 to 400. The brand concept shaped the perceptions of
employees of their business. Most interviewees also mentioned spontaneously that
Globalmarket was oriented toward a “culture of consensus” particularly visible through the
‘business teams’ organisation. Marketing and operational managers were well versed in
management accounting. Physical proximity to marketers helped accountants to not only
understand marketing matters but also offer their own viewpoint on marketing matters.
Management accountants used the situation to influence others’ decisions and secure their
powerful positions:
...yes, the accountant can be someone who is much more proactive; leading
with ideas, he is present from the design phase until completion, on all
fronts...yes, [the management accountant] is a special member of the team
who really offers a lot of support. (Fabienne, management accountant)
The authors note that the accountant’s view above illustrates the ambiguity inherent in the
“business partner” role and the hidden symbolic power of pedagogical work. The discourse
of consensus masks asymmetrical positions of power in the company, where management
accountants actually enjoy considerable authority and influence.
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Everyone presents his or her issues...But it is rare...I’d say it’s rare not to
follow an accountant’s advice....Because what counts in the end is the cash.
(Fabienne, management accountant)
The “common interest” was presented not as brand building but as share price growing,
because management accountants put forward a common objective that is financial and then
relegated marketing matters as means to achieve it. This stake attribution and definition of
common interests can be related to an “out-there-ness” strategy (Whittle and Mueller, 2011):
We all have the same role. We are here to help increase the share price and
the dividend payout. (Bernard, divisional Director of Management
Accounting)
The quote above evokes symbolic violence. Accounting had become increasingly important
as noted by the brand analyst.
the starting point is the consumer; we quickly move onto financial
considerations afterwards. It’s something that has happened slowly but
surely with increasingly strong competition, tougher markets and
increasingly demanding shareholders, which means we have profit goals to
comply with and, overall, it’s the only thing that Globalmarket looks at.
(Dominique, brand analyst)
The authors observe that participants did not perceive the increasing influence of accounting
as a modification of symbolic capital definitions, nor did they see that new strategies of
accumulation had been rendered thinkable while several older ones became unthinkable.
Accounting’s power to change positions, stakes and access thus was not perceived by those
subjected to it. There were a few critiques of management accountants’ short-term
perspective that was deemed to arise from a focus on what is measurable.
The sale and acquisition of brands of high value made the accountants aware that brand
valuation was important. A consultancy firm was employed to value the brands. According
to the authors, the externality and reputation of the consultancy firm combined with the
production of dense reports with complex calculations made the valuation appear technical,
neutral and legitimate. The adoption of IFRS on brand valuation (even before it was
compulsory in Europe in 2005) was seen by several management accountants as allowing the
business to take a more strategic and more informed view about brand performance with a
view to enhancing shareholder value. Since the IFRS, accountants had to construct business
plans for brand acquisitions, working closely with marketers. The internal auditor observed:
...it will probably force people in marketing to take the financial aspect into greater account.
(Karl, internal auditor)
Accounting became a shared language and accountants saw their role as dominant:
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What is required of me is to have a more global view of things...And for
that, well, sales doesn’t necessarily have all the data and nor does
marketing, etc. (Mathias, divisional Director of Management Accounting)
One management accountant stated that management accountants had become arbiters,
whose influence could be justified by their neutrality. Impairment tests and business plans
forced managers and accountants to use the metrics of financial brand value. According to
the IFRS, only the acquired brands should be recorded as assets on the balance sheet, though
the management accountants lobbied for valuing all brands as part of management
information. Brand valuation translated specialised vocabularies into one consensual set of
categories, shared representations and language. Marketing vocabularies such as market
share, brand personality, brand recognition, attachment to the brand and perceived quality
were presented as specialised, and accounting was presented as the only neutral objective
measure. Accountants’ habitus thus became better suited to the accumulation of symbolic
capital within the company than the habitus of marketing and sales officers. In addition,
accountant’s strategies were perceived as more “natural” and legitimate; they exercised
symbolic violence to secure their position and reproduce their domination.
Most non-accounting managers asserted that they had not been affected by the accounting
change. When asked about how to value brands, they talked about marketing measurements
(e.g., market shares, brand personality etc.). Sometimes, they specified that these elements
influenced the financial value of brands. Some non-accounting managers felt that the IFRs
had led to “asking the right questions”, for example, regarding the effectiveness of particular
promotions. This favoured rational decision making. Previous forms of brand evaluation
were regarded as incorrect. The changes were generally considered “really healthy”
producing a consensus discourse. Non-accounting managers misrecognised the symbolic
domination exerted by accountants and they participated in the process of undermining their
own capital. In Bourdieu’s (1980) terms, the field’s agents chose to play the game and
pursue stakes specific to that field demonstrating illusio (Bourdieu, 1980).
Strengths of the paper include the application and integration of concepts from Bourdieu and
the rich and insightful analysis of some of the data. It contributes to our understanding of the
roles of accounting and forms of accounting colonization. The specific focus of the study
could be made clearer at the outset. Links with other related accounting literature could be
further developed to underscore the implications of the study. An explanation of the choice
of Bourdieu’s theoretical framework would help the reader to understand the underpinning
methodology. The suggestion that there is no resistance to accounting colonisation from
marketers is contradicted by some of the evidence, and this theme could be explored. More
evidence of the following would add weight to the interpretation:
1. The importance of marketing concepts prior to the ascendancy of accounting.
2. The prioritisation by marketers of the discourse of maximising shareholder value.
3. The acceptance by marketers of accounting concepts in brand valuation and business
planning.
4. The dominance of accountants within the organisation.
The authors (p. 4) state that ‘Language and symbolic systems are instruments of not only
knowledge and communication but also domination.’ However, accounting can also be used
as a tool of resistance.
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