October 6, 2010
The Failure of Song Airlines Vol. 1, Issue 1, Page 1
Product
Founded: April 2003
Terminated: April 2006
Fleet Size: 47 planes
Destinations: 17 American & Caribbean cities
Parent Company: Delta Air Lines, Inc.
Flysong.com
McCown Bridges
Dr. Augie Grant
Principles of Marketing Management
MKTG 701
October 6, 2010
Failure Paper
Song Airlines was developed by Delta Air Lines, Inc. as a low-cost
airline. By October 2003, Delta planned to have 144 single-class
flights operated by Song daily, using Boeing 757 airplanes (Delta
Airlines Annual Report, 2003). Song’s objectives were to “raise brand
awareness, increase awareness of what makes Song unique (the
choices and fun), increase load factors (percentage of seats filled) in
new and existing markets, increase online bookings through
flysong.com” (Osterman, 2007). Landor Associates in New York
created the brand name and the design of the planes’ interiors and
airport environments. Song Airlines was comprised of 47 Boeing
757, which held 199 seats each. The outside of each plane was
painted with lime-green designs and the Song logo. One plane was
painted with pink designs to support the BCRF Organization. Song
Airlines incorporated satellite television as onboard entertainment, a
first for Delta Air Lines, Inc. Video games, MP3 programming and
pay-per-view movies were also offered as entertainment (“Delta’s
Song to Add Video Games to Flight,” 2005). Song was a leader in
innovative entertainment and offered services that, in that time,
were not standard on flights but went above and beyond standard
airline amenities. Flight attendant uniforms were designed by Kate
Spade. Customer experiences include positive feedback from the
friendly crew, which Song did not interview but rather auditioned
(The Persuaders, 2004). The flight safety video was also humorous
and the entire flight, from bright green décor to the Kate Spade
uniforms of the flight attendants and better entertainment,
endeavored to give flyers a break from the dreary, dull flight
experiences of their past. Through Song, Delta embarked on their
mission to recreate air travel with low-cost alternatives, directly
competing with carriers such as JetBlue and Southwest (The
Persuaders, 2004).
Positioning
Song had 17 destinations in the United States and the Caribbean,
mostly catering to vacationers going south to Florida or the
Caribbean. Song wanted to create an emotional bond with
customers, and “Delta broke off a team of their best marketers and
told them to start from scratch. Delta is old-fashioned air travel and
Song is their way of persuading us that they can compete with hip
low-cost carriers like Jet Blue” (The Persuaders, 2004). Song tickets
were only available on the website, flysong.com.
The Failure of Song Airlines
Vol. 1, Issue 1, Page 2
October 6, 2010
Map of 17
Song
destinations
Price
Song had a cost per seat-mile of eight cents, which was
an average cost for low-cost carriers, but 20 percent less
than Delta’s cost (Beals, Tucker and Vick, 2003). Low-cost
was supposed to be the key point of the airline, but Song
did not advertise it as its primary attribute.
In fact, the pricing section on the airline’s website was
vague. It explained that, “Pretty much, the earlier you
purchase your ticket, the less you’re going to pay.” The
laid-back language told potential customers that flexible
travel dates could help them save money and that Webonly fares were sometimes cheaper, which encouraged
customers to buy their tickets from flysong.com.
However, the pricing section of the website didn’t
promise the lowest fares like all other low-fare websites,
but instead again advertised “The Song Experience: Relax.
Watch TV. Play games. The choice is always yours”
(flysong.com, Internet Archives).
While Song was able to compete with Jet Blue and Southwest
along price margins, Song failed in their attempt to make a
profit comparable to the other low-cost carriers because of
its choice of aircraft. Song used Boeing 757, which was much
larger than the 737s used by JetBlue. Song decided that they
could make more money using the 757 if all of its seats were
filled. However, when the seats were not filled to capacity,
Song could not make as much profit as the carriers flying
737s. Also, because the planes were bigger, it took longer to
turn the planes around, which contributed to Song’s not
reaching its potential profitability (“This Bird Won’t Fly!,”
2002).
October 6, 2010
The Failure of Song AirlinesVol. 1, Issue 1, Page 3
Promotion
Song introduced creative marketing to the airline industry,
but even creative marketing sometimes isn’t enough –
especially when consumers aren’t sure what is being sold.
Andy Spade, co-founder of successful Kate Spade was hired
to create advertisements for Song. His idea was to create a
culture for the airlines, not just a commercial. He wanted to
express a whimsical nature with which the target audience
could connect. The problem was that these creative
commercials didn’t feature planes or even travelers, and the
commercials consumed one-third of Song’s $12 million
advertising budget (The Persuaders, 2004).
Although some Song employee’s did argue that Song should
focus its advertising on the key point of low fares, Spade
insisted on advertising for the emotion, the culture, the
experience (The Persuaders, 2004): Song’s food commercial
advertised its use of organic food on every flight:
http://vimeo.com/5722003 (Yurshansky, 2009). Another
Song promotional video says, “The revolution begins now,”
and discusses revolutionizing the airline industry. It tells its
listeners that they can all say that they were a part of the
airline revolution:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJYPvBnhz8A (“Song
Airlines Promotional Video”). Another commercial shows
Song agents marketing consumers through unusual means:
consumers board a bus that takes them around a city (San
Francisco or New York) and teaches them about Song
Airlines: http://vimeo.com/6726572 (“Guerrilla marketing,
Premium Distribution”). “A combination of air travel and
lifestyle brand, Song advertisements emphasized style,
health and entertainment… If we didn’t already know that
everyday low-fares refer to the cost of airline tickets, we’d
have no way of knowing we’d just seen an advertisement for
an airline.” (Deming, 2007). The choice to target emotions
instead of the practical low-fare point is risky. Bob Garfield,
columnist at Advertising Age, said, “Someone once wrote a
book called Advertising for Myself. That’s what advertising
is: it’s advertising for the guys who are creating it far more
than it is for the guys who are paying for it. They’re trying to
win awards, they’re trying to make more money… they’re
trying to make up for the fact that they’re in advertising and
not directing films or doing stand-up comedy or not painting
paintings or doing whatever they’d prefer to be doing, I
guarantee you. And the consequence is a lot of advertising
is very extravagant in its look or very clever and entertaining
and funny, but which doesn’t do the thing that advertising is
supposed to which is make you want to buy the good or
service that is being advertised” (The Persuaders, 2004).
Garfield added, “Most of the people who’ve tried to make
emotional connections with consumers over the years have
failed…have gone down in flames” (The Persuaders, 2004).
Another creative idea to market Song was the pop-up store; in
2003, “Song in the City” was opened in New York for nine weeks to
feature the food, entertainment and atmosphere found in Song
flights (“Song in the City, 9-Week Lifespan Store”). Another Song
concept store was opened in Boston, but visitors weren’t sure if the
store was a travel agency or an airline, and if the concept is blurry,
visitors walk away with no persuasion to use the product (The
Persuaders, 2004).
Song was also promoted on the television show, The Apprentice
(“Song Brings Unique In-Air Experience to NYC with SoHo Concept
Store”), and print, radio, billboard and television ads all were
designed to direct consumers to the website, flysong.com
(Osterman, 2007). The Song culture, intended to create brand
identity, encouraged people to say, “That’s so Song” instead of
“That’s so cool.” Advertisements for Song included phrases that
read, “Founded by optimists, built by believers” and “We are not an
airline, we are Song.” Men dressed in green full-body suits walked
through the streets of Boston carrying Song TVs, creating confusion
(The Persuaders, 2004).
Song did succeed in creating a solid brand identity: 35 percent of
those sampled recognized Song’s advertisements, but only 15
percent knew that the advertisements were for Song, a low-fare
airlines (The Persuaders, 2004). Song was creative and perhaps
they did break through the clutter of American advertisements, but
the problem with the marketing of Song was that most consumers
did not know what was being advertised. Confusion abounded in
the advertisements for Song, as no airline or traveler was
mentioned or seen through most of the advertising. Spade wanted
to appeal to emotions, and perhaps he succeeded, but the goal of
obtaining customers wasn’t reached because the commercials,
though leaving a mark on one’s emotions, didn’t reach the
consumer in a way that persuaded him to use Song as an airlines.
October 6, 2010
The Failure of Song AirlinesVol. 1, Issue 1, Page 4
Packaging
Song had similar problems with its packaging as it did with its
promotion. Just as consumers weren’t sure what the green
group walking through the streets of Boston meant, people
weren’t sure what the logo “Song” with the swish meant
either. Song hardly ever put “Airlines” after its name and
expected consumers to know it was an airline, which wasn’t
the case. Song packaged itself beautifully, but didn’t
successfully relay the message of what exactly it was.
The website, flysong.com
(http://web.archive.org/web/20040616053936/www.flysong.
com/home/index.jsp) allowed a visitor to choose departure
and arrival dates, with a little girl and a star wand encouraging
the visitor to “Let yourself fly.” The website goes along with
the idea of culture and wishful dreaming, mentioning the
Song Experience (“individuality – wrapped in joy” [Osterman,
2007]) and encouraging the visitor to think of the Song
airplane as “your living room, just 30,000 feet in the air.” The
website also boasted about the style of the flight and the
taste of the food. Only in one place did it mention the lowcost, and even then it’s not very noticeable or direct.
“In an industry where long lines, delays and bad food have
become the norm for the travel experience, consumer
research showed that most people find the experience of
flying impersonal and akin to riding in a cattle car.” Song
endeavored to make the customer experience more exciting
and whimsical: “From ticket jackets to menu cards, even to
onboard games for the kids…[Song] creat[ed] new products
and branded merchandise to completely surround passengers
with Song’s joyful experiences” (Osterman, 2007).
Song decided to begin with a focus group and improve on the
things mentioned in the meetings such as food and
entertainment (The Persuaders, 2004). “The service itself was
unique among airlines. It boasted terrific in-flight
entertainment system, offered organic meals…and
comfortable leather seats. The airline even developed a pink
martini, with 20 percent of the proceeds going to the Avon
Breast Cancer Crusade” (Deming, 2007).
Consumers
“The story of Song Airlines is a good example of focusing
too heavily on a core customer” (Deming, 2007). Song
targeted a small group of consumers: a very specific group
of women.
“The ‘discount diva’ was an upwardly mobile, professional
woman between the ages of 35 and 54, who makes the
majority of travel decisions and arrangements in her
family. What she wanted was a return to style in travel,
but at an affordable price and with family-friendly
amenities” (Deming, 2007).
Song’s target woman, who they named Carrie, had three
children, a husband, an SUV and sports car, shop[ed] at
Target and like[d] People magazine” (The Persuaders,
2004). Song wanted to form a connection with women
that they felt other airlines lacked.
Although this seems like a great target audience and
specific enough to get their attention, targeting such a
small group of people is leaving out the majority of
consumers. Even with specifically targeting that
demographic, not all women who fit that description
would be interested in Song, so their target market is cut
even more. Song should have focused on a broader target
market, perhaps including businessmen who had to fly
often for their jobs.
“Let Yourself
Fly”
The Failure of Song Airlines
October 6, 2010
Vol. 1, Issue 1, Page 5
Competition
Song’s major competition were the other low-fare carriers, Jet Blue, Southwest and AirTran. In some ways, Song was
successful in competing, but in other ways it was a tremendous failure.
In many ways, Song and Jet Blue resembled each other enormously. “Both used nontraditional brand and marketing
approaches to attract customers. Both buil[t] much of their in-flight customer experiences around advanced seat-back
entertainment systems. Both boast[ed] novel cleaning and turnaround processes that get their planes back in the air
much faster” (Davenport, Leibold and Voelpel, 2006).
Song was successful when it placed a chauffer in the baggage claim area of Jet Blue’s New York to Los Angeles route,
holding a sign saying, “If you’d flown on Song, you’d be in LA by now.” It seemed to work: Song quickly caught up with Jet
Blue and they excelled their goal of reaching 70 percent brand awareness and attained 80 percent, with a 37 percent
increase in online bookings (Osterman, 2007).
However, the marketing of Jet Blue eventually overcame Song’s marketing schemes. Jet Blue bought the front cover of
the newspaper Boston Herald and created an ad that looked like front page news. Many people thought that Jet Blue
must be successful because it had made headlines, when, in fact, it was only an ad (The Persuaders, 2004).
Song wasn’t able to withstand marketing competition from Jet Blue because it couldn’t compete dollar for dollar against
the low-fare carrier giant. Instead of succeeding through its use of guerrilla marketing, Song eventually wasn’t able to
compete at all with the other low-fare carriers.
Song Stopped Singing
Song flew its last flight on April 30, 2006 from Las Vegas, Nev. to Orlando, Fla. Delta’s chief executive, Gerald Grinstein,
said, "It was a great learning experience and it gave us the chance to test ideas and to bring them over" (Maynard,
2005). In the end, Song just wasn’t strong enough to withstand the competition from other low-fare carriers such as Jet
Blue. The marketing strategies weren’t capable of appealing to enough consumers to maintain a profit in the three
years that Song was in the air. “Why did Song stop singing? Song could never deliver on its brand promise. The food,
entertainment and overall service were all good, but its core customer was not a real person; it was a marketing
Frankenstein, an amalgamation of market research” (Deming, 2007).
Perhaps if Song had tried another marketing approach, one that highlighted the low-fares instead of the organic food
and entertainment offerings, Song would have been more successful and could have continued to merrily chirp, “Let
Yourself Fly.”
Farewell Song: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o9norz4Um5k
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