PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA
MOZAMBIQUE
By
André Thomashausen1
Abstract
Mozambique is a case both of the failure of diplomacy in preventing a severe internal conflict, and of the
success, eventually, of diplomacy in ending that very conflict. In the 1980ies, when the war raged on
throughout Mozambique, the concept of preventive diplomacy was still in its infancy. Most nations, in the
context of a world wide opposition against apartheid, were eager to show solidarity with the beleaguered
Frelimo government. The American State Department’s so-called Gersoni report in 1987 was the
culmination of a policy of denial and demonisation of the insurgents. It demonstrably contributed to the
escalation of the conflict. In 1989, over 50.000 foreign troops were engaged in anti-guerrilla operations in
Mozambique, and more than 2 million refugees had fled the country. This is when Kenya’s Permanent
Secretary for Foreign Affairs Bethuel Kiplagat took the initiative to engage the parties in what can only
be described as a model case of modern conflicts resolution diplomacy. The paper by André
Thomashausen is the first to acknowledge that the resulting General Peace Accord of October 1992, was
brought about by an African diplomatic initiative, and that both the World Bank and the IMF were
positively engaged in support of this diplomacy. The Mozambique process is one of the very few conflict
settlements in Africa that has stood the test of time. It can only be hoped that future diplomatic efforts in
other parts of Africa will find more inspiration in the Mozambican example than has been the case up to
present.
1. A State built on war
Mozambique became an independent state on 25 June 1975, after a prolonged and
divisive anti-colonial war, fought by the Mozambique Liberation Movement (Frente de
Libertação de Mozambique - Frelimo).2 The independence agreement concluded at
Lusaka on 7 September 1974 between Portugal and Frelimo, was basically a surrender
protocol. It simply provided that all sovereign power would be transferred
unconditionally on to Frelimo. No provision was made for elections or any other
procedure that could have allowed for a debate and choice by the people of their future
system of government.3
On independence, Frelimo was a relatively small vanguard organisation with just over
10.000 members.4 The leadership and most civilian or “intellectual” members had been
recruited predominantly from the Shangaan people South of the Save river, whilst the
actual fighting force consisted mostly of guerrillas from the Maconde in the far North.5 To
take over the administration in some 220 administrative districts in 10 provinces,
covering 771,000 square kilometres and stretching North to South over a distance of
1.965 Km, comprising 23 main groups of people with distinct ethnic, cultural and
language affinities, most of whom resented the idea of a Shangaan government, became a
new type of war-like challenge. For a better understanding of the Mozambique conflict, it
Thomashausen: Preventive Diplomacy in Mozambique
is important to demonstrate how Frelimo, extended its guerrilla strategy into the postindependence era, and ruled by politics of exclusion.
The political blue print of Frelimo was spelt out in the new constitution of Mozambique
which entered into force on the date of independence, 25 June 1975.6 Its art. 73 recorded
that the independence constitution had been "approved by acclamation" by the Central
Committee of Frelimo on 20 June 1975. Likewise, the first 210 deputies of the national
"People's Assembly" were all appointed by the party, or ex officio members, in terms of
art. 37 of the Constitution. Art. 47 determined that the President of the party Frelimo
was ex officio the State President. Art. 30 proclaimed that it was the paramount duty of
every citizen to "defend the country and the Revolution", whilst art. 2 defined
Mozambique as a "People's Republic", where "all power shall be exercised by the organs
of the People's Power, and shall vest in the workers and peasants, united and guided by
Frelimo".
Although the Constitution did not specifically provide for a soviet model of political
representation, it was exactly that which Frelimo set about to implement. All levels of
government, from the local to the national level were to be controlled by "soviet"
councils, as the basis for an entire system of indirectly elected "Assemblies", referred to
only vaguely in art. 43 of the Constitution. In practice, however, and thereby repeating
the mistake that was made by Lenin in the Soviet Union in the 1920ies, Frelimo never
fully implemented the system of local and municipal soviet councils and People's
Assemblies indirectly elected from the base to the top. The first local, district and
provincial assemblies were elected two years after independence, in 1977. For alleged
technical reasons, the Council of Ministers decided that the national People's Assembly
would not be elected by and respond to, the then 11 Provincial Assemblies, but rather by
way of a single list of candidates, presented to the voters throughout the country. The
voters only had the choice to either vote for the list, or to reject it entirely.
This was sanctioned by the Elections Act of 1 September 1977.7 It gave the Frelimo
organisation the sole right to nominate candidates (art. 16 (2)). Moreover, a mandate
could be revoked at any time. In terms of art. 14 (a), the validity of a mandate depended,
at all times, upon the satisfaction of Frelimo that the person elected had "never identified
with colonialism, with the schemes and intrigues of imperialism and of reactionaries".
Having ensured the complete exclusion of any dissident forces at all levels of the
legislative and executive organs of the state, only the judicial power remained to be
neutralised. The first Act regulating the administration of justice was dated 16 August
1975.8 The Act introduced two important changes. In the first instance, any private
exercise of advocacy was prohibited so that attorneys/advocates9 were allowed to
exercise their profession only as public servants, and furthermore, all provisions demanding that a person be represented by an attorney/advocate were declared null and void.
Secondly, all courts were ordered to establish ex officio the true facts in any case, thereby
relieving all parties from any burden of proof, and, moreover, allowing the courts to
declare any procedural or formal defects or impediments in any case to be of no legal
consequence.
In a further step, the Elections Act of 1997 included a provision whereby the provisions
regarding candidates and deputies were made applicable to the appointment of all judges,
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and the competency to appoint and dismiss judges was reserved to the various levels of
People's Assemblies (art. 52 (2) Elections Act).
An amendment of the constitution on 15 August 197810 provided further, in a new art.
69 that the Supreme People’s Court (Tribunal Supremo Popular – TPS) was "subordinate
to the People’s Assembly [parliament]"; that it was the duty of the courts "to educate the
citizens" and to "establish just and harmonious social relations" (art 72); and that the TPS
must guarantee that the courts administer justice "in the interests of the Mozambique
People" (art. 72). Based on these provisions, a new Act on the Judiciary of 2 December
1978, 11 introduced officially the concept of "People’s Justice". The most important
changes were:
(1)
judges were elected by the various political assemblies (People"s Assemblies) for
the same term of office as the Assemblies;
(2)
the TPS became vested with a binding supervisory and directory power over any
inferior court;
(3)
the courts were to "create favorable conditions for the progress of the
revolution" and to be "a weapon permanently pointed at the class-enemy, the
reactionaries, traitors, economical saboteurs, scrupulous exploiters, criminals,
bandits and vagrants" (preamble, par 9 and 10);
(4)
new forms of punishment for minor offenses were introduced, such as "public
criticism", "forfeiture of rights which have been abused", "rendering of services
to the public", and "reparation of damages"; and
(5)
prosecutors were given the overall duty of "defending the interests of the Party
[FRELIMO]."
The reform (or rather the destruction) of the judiciary was completed a year later, in
1979, with the establishment of the Military Revolutionary Tribunal and the passing of
Act 2/79, a new Internal Security Act which provided for the death penalty basically for
anyone suspected of supporting any kind of opposition politics.12 Severe penalties with
up to 30 years imprisonment were introduced for the new crimes of "agitator" (art. 35),
"spreading of rumours" (art. 36), "tribalism, regionalism, racism, and divisionism" (art.
37), "offending the honour of the State President and leaders of the Party" (arts. 38, 39),
and "illegal emigration" (art. 42). Not to report any of the internal security crimes in itself
was made a crime punishable with between 2 to 8 years imprisonment (art. 8). The Act
even explicitly removed any right of appeal, even in the case of the death sentence
(art.3).13 The new Military Revolutionary Tribunal, established by Act 3/79 of 29 March
1979, was given exclusive jurisdiction over all internal security offences in terms of Act
2/79 and was composed of 5 “judges” appointed ad hoc for each trial, by the Minister of
Defence. Ar 13(2) of Act 3/79 stipulated that the accused alone was responsible for
submitting any evidence in his defence, including for the summonsing of any witnesses,
meaning that assistance by the court and official authorities in this regard was denied. Art
19(2) allowed the Tribunal to sentence an accused for offences that he has not been
charged with, while Art. 6 ordered that a death sentence had to be executed within 5 days
after the passing of judgment.14
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Act No. 1/83 16 March 1983, and Act 5/83 of 31 March 1983 introduced retrospective
amendments of the Internal Security Act (Act No. 2/79). 15 Thus public flogging of
offenders was now legally sanctioned, and the death penalty was extended to apply to
preparatory acts of rebellion, any acts of “terrorism”, any acts designed towards the
manufacturing or passing on of any "materials, substances or instruments" which may be
used for acts of “terrorism”, any crimes of 'sabotage' and any acts of "agitators"
committed in conjunction with others. Le Monde at the time reported that one of the first
applications of the new amendment had been the sentencing to death of Mr Goolam
Naby charged with 'sabotage' having sold prawns on the 'black market'.16 Under cover of
what can only be described as a complete degeneration of any concept of law, the
Frelimo one party state established Mozambique’s notorious 're-education' camps, where
already in 1977 over 100.000 political dissidents were denied even the most basic human
right, namely the right to live.17
Frelimo’s exclusionary paranoia triggered 4 main determinants of the internal conflict
that was unfolding: First, the exodus of over 200.000 mostly critically skilled
Mozambicans of European (Portuguese) descent; secondly, a growing political dissent
amongst the urban middle class; thirdly the boycott and later sabotage of central
government policies by the traditional leadership in the interior; and fourthly, the
collapse of the national economy.
The clash with tradition in Mozambique was a deliberate choice of Frelimo. At its very
first meeting, the day after the Mozambique independence celebrations, the new Council
of Ministers had decided on 26 July 1975 that all powers and authority of the chiefs, i.e.
the entire system of regedorias was abolished with immediate effect.18 According to art 72
of the Constitution, the decision had the full force and effect of an Act of Parliament.
The former functions of the chiefs and chiefs' councils were de facto taken over by the
new "mobilization units" (grupos dinamizadores), i.e. ad hoc assemblies of local people,
convened at irregular intervals by Frelimo commissars, for the purposes of mobilizing
local understanding and support for Frelimo's revolutionary programme. The translation
of this programme into practical revolutionary acts, such as the “taking over” of local
general dealers' stores, or the dispensing of sentences of "popular justice" against the
former colonialists or other "enemies of the people",19 coupled with forced villagisation
and kolkhoz farming ventures, made sure that the deposed and dispossessed, but
particularly the traditional leaders, elders, and spiritualists conspired to resist Frelimo's
authority. They did exactly what Frelimo had thought them to do during the liberation
war. They established parallel authorities.20
At the same time the Mozambique’s completely nationalised economy had reached
breaking point. Within 5 years after independence, cashew nut and cotton production
had fallen to 45% of their 1973 levels, rice was at 37%, corn at 54%, and the importation
of goods had risen to 232%.21 By 1983, statistics showed even more devastating effects:
cashew production had all but collapsed and was at 2.6% of its 1973 level, rice at 27%
and the fish and shrimps industry had dropped to 24.8% of its 1973 output. Whilst the
national currency, the Metical was fixed at 40 Metical for 1 US$, the black market rate
was 50 times the official rate in December 1985, at 2000 : 1.22
In its international relations, Frelimo had opted during the first years of independence
for an unequivocal alignment with the Soviet bloc and an inflexible hostility towards the
Western powers, from the banishing of the coca cola soft drinks, to a massive military
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build up that was irritating South Africa and NATO, who at the time still had genuine
concerns about the safety of the Cape of Good Hope sea route. However, regular
celebrations of international socialist solidarity could not make up for some fundamental
differences. When Frelimo decided in a reform of the Mozambique Constitution in 1978
to proclaimed itself, the “vanguard party that is the principal agent of transformation of
our society, in the process of building the material and ideological foundations for
entering socialism”, Africa specialists in the socialist mother country, the Soviet Union
reasoned that the Mozambique revolution was nowhere near the stage for “entering
socialism” and had actually become an embarrassing example of ill-conceived policies
and abhorrent levels of maladministration and misdirection.23 As Maputo continued to
insist on its right to find an “own road to socialism”, relations worsened and in 1981 the
Soviet Union resolved to turn down formally a request for admission of Mozambique as
a full member of the Eastern European trade bloc, COMECON.
2. Constructive Engagement
In response to an increasingly disillusioned relationship with the Soviet Bloc,
Mozambique’s President Samora Machel convinced the Central Committee of Frelimo in
August 1982 that the insurgency which had gripped the entire country and disrupted all
internal transport links, could not be won without Western support.24 Having dispatched
his then Minister of Foreign Affairs for the second time to Washington D.C., in order to
also sound out the World Bank and the IMF, Machel finally announced his willingness to
“convert” from socialism during his new year’s reception for the diplomatic corps, on 8
January 1983. His proposition was directed at the ambassadors of the five permanent
members of the Security Council, to convince their governments to come to the rescue
of his economically and politically beleaguered government. The offer to “convert” was
based on the fundamental assumption that only the USA would be able to persuade
South Africa, and with it the insurgent movement Renamo in Mozambique, to allow
Frelimo to continue to govern and develop what they believed was theirs alone, the
newly independent country Mozambique.
Secretary of State Chester Crocker did not waste any time in arguing the correctness of
Frelimo’s strategic assumption. From him, Machel had offered the US a unique
opportunity to break a vital link out of the stranglehold around South African that had
been laid by what was then known as the Frontline States. He took up Machel’s
invitation immediately and arrived for talks with Machel in Maputo on 13 January 1983,
two years after Machel had summarily expelled of 4 US diplomats from Maputo, on
charges of espionage. Machel wanted Mozambique to be admitted to the IMF and World
Bank, and South Africa to cease supporting Renamo. Crocker was enthusiastic at the
prospect of gaining a new ally in Southern Africa, for his attempts at defusing the
ongoing proxy war of the superpowers in Angola, and in order to reduce the perceptions
of a soviet expansionist threat, in Pretoria.25 Moreover, in one of those singularly odd
twists of history, President Reagan’s daughter Maureen had become an ardent admirer of
Machel, and a passionate advocate for the right of Mozambique to live in peace and
prosper.
Machel made sure in April 1983 that Frelimo’s Fourth Party Congress would lend
credibility to his offer to convert. The Party Congress resolved to reverse the
collectivisation measures in the agrarian sector, and to support family farming again; to
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refurbish and prioritise basic consumer product industries, such as clothing and tools; to
allow and encourage private investments in the export industries; and to adopt a new
policy of peaceful co-existence and peaceful cooperation with all countries in Southern
Africa. In one simple sentence, Mozambique had decided to give up its role as the
advance formation in the regional coalition of nations determined to liberate South
Africa from its apartheid regime, and was instead going to try and avoid the complete
collapse of all state authority.
Machel was invited to visit the US and several capital cities in Europe to explain
Frelimo’s “new economic policy”. Mrs Thatcher in England felt particularly inspired and
arranged for a luncheon hosted by the Queen, who was made to invest Samora Machel as
a Knight of the Grand Commander of the Distinguished Order of Saint Michel and Saint
George.26 As Joseph Hanlon remarked, “the way down the road required by the IMF”
had begun.27 Before getting there, however, a particularly bitter medicine was awaiting
Machel. On his return from Europe, he was confronted with the first concept papers for
an agreement with the apartheid regime in Pretoria, whereby Mozambique would be
forced to give up all support for the South African liberation movement, the African
National Congress, and to even help Pretoria in their merciless prosecution of the ANC,
by co-operating in a bi-national security commission. In return, Pretoria would “drop”
the Renamo insurgents in Mozambique. Disguised in diplomatic terms and somewhat
misleadingly labelled a “Non-Aggression Pact” the shameful document was signed on 16
March 1994 at a small border town between South Africa and Mozambique and became
known as the “Nkomati-Accord”. To insult to injury, South African Foreign Minister
Roelof Botha bragged about in the diplomatic community that he had arranged and paid
for the ceremonial uniforms of Machel and his presidential guard at the signing
ceremony.28
Mozambique duly fulfilled its part by surrendering to the South Africans whatever secrets
of the ANC they knew, and by deporting whatever ANC carders they could find. Europe
and the US arranged duly arranged for the accession of Mozambique to the Bretton
Woods agreements, the European Common Market Lomé Convention, and the granting
of a generous debt rescheduling agreement in October 1984. In the meantime, South
African State President was able to enjoy official receptions in most European capitals
and was welcomed in Lisbon with a traditional 21 canon salute, as if the United Nations
has never declared apartheid an international crime against humanity.
The only part of the Nkomati deal that did not happen was the surrender of the Renamo
rebels in Mozambique. South Africa had promised to deliver something over which they
had long before lost control, and this small detail had conveniently escaped the attention
of everyone else involved. As a consequence, the “Magic of Nkomati” was lost in 1985,
following several failed attempts at coercing Renamo representatives into accepting a
general amnesty and otherwise abandon the main political goal that they had been
thought and trained to live for, i.e. general multi-party elections under international
supervision.29
In the meantime, an advance team from the IMF had completed its report entitled
“Preliminary Remarks of the IMF Consultation Mission to Mozambique”, proposing a
drastic devaluation of the national currency, the gradual but rapid abolishing of price
controls, the drastic reduction of the public service deficits, the strengthening of the role
and independence of the National Bank for the pursuit of policies aimed at achieving a
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balance of payments. However, an end to the civil war in Mozambique was considered a
pre-condition to the successful adoption of any Economic Rehabilitation Programme.30
For Machel it was clear that not even as the most draconian dictator, would he be able to
survive economic measures as were being proposed by the IMF team, unless peace could
be brought to the country at the same time. In an act of desperation, on 13 December
1985 he appealed to the Pope to mediate between the government and Renamo, and at
the same time asked Bishop D. Jaime Gonçalves, a relative of Renamo President’s wife
Rosaria, to explore the possibilities of initiating secret peace negotiations, without the
involvement of any other government or military officials, and without the involvement
of any foreign powers.31 However, Gonçalves had no true access to the rebels and did
not enjoy the confidence of anyone within Renamo. Ill-informed, once again, by his own
intelligence and their many expensive liaison sessions with their American, British, and
South African counterparts, Machel had asked the wrong Church for help. Afonso
Dhlakama, the legendary leader of the Renamo guerrilla had in fact become a born again
Christian, and trusted only, and depended for his outside contacts, on a missionary from
Malawi, known only as Father Joseph.32
As Machel failed to deliver the core promise of the Nkomati deal, so his actual authority
declined. He had returned essentially empty-handed from his state visit to Washington in
September 1995, a victim of successful Renamo lobbying in the US Congress, where any
aid to Mozambique had been made conditional upon the holding of free elections in
Mozambique in 1986, the reduction of the numbers of East-European advisors, and
specific measures to improve the protection of human rights.33 As his appeal to the
Catholic Church in December 1985 could not halt the continuing string of embarrassing
military defeats, and whilst negotiations for the eventual IMF sponsored economic
adjustment programme were deliberately being drawn out by the government, statistics
revealed an alarming figure of over 4 million Mozambicans being threatened by
starvation, .34 whilst general “soviet” electiosn were being prepared without participation
of any opposition parties for end of August 1986. In October 1986 the media speculated
about Renamo attacks in the midst of the capital city Maputo and an impending
possibility of a surrender of the government.35 In a last attempt at enlisting the help that
had not been forthcoming from his newly found Western friends, Machel met in Lusaka,
Zambia on 16 October 1986 with a military and security delegation from Zimbabwe. On
his return flight, the plane carrying President Machel and his delegation crashed under
mysterious circumstances, after having strayed of course into South African airspace.
With Samora Machel’s death, the period of diplomatic constructive engagement ended. 36
3. Escalating the war in the name of peace
Machel’s successor, Frelimo’s former head of security Joaquim Chissano, was well known
and liked in Washington and London, from his visits back in 1981, when on “secret
missions”, he had brought the good news that Mozambique was ready to convert from
Albanian type socialism to a free market supporter of American diplomacy in Southern
Africa. 5 years later, his image as a soft spoken und seemingly modest professional
diplomat (he held the foreign affairs portfolio under Machel) proved invaluable. He
displayed some astonishingly detailed knowledge about how Machel’s plane might have
been induced to stray off course, by the South African military who had probably been
acting in defiance of their own political masters. A further polarisation in Southern
Africa, targeting the South African government, was the last thing that the US and Great
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Britain wanted to see happening, at a time when Namibian independence and initial
transition contacts and negotiations with South Africa were at stake. Chissano graciously
offered to co-operate with a civil aviation inquiry that would be led by South Africa, the
US and the UK, and also pave the way for the overdue implementation of the IMF’s
structural adjustment program, on condition that the US and the UK would lend him
decisive support in finally winning the war against the Renamo rebels in his country.
The UK agreed to an increase of Zimbabwean military support up to the deployment of
40.000 men in Mozambique, and Chester Crocker promised to help win global public
opinion support for the war against the Mozambican “armed bandits”. Crocker at the
time was rather desperate to gain renewed access to the MPLA in Angola through the
good offices of Frelimo.37 With the help of the Zimbabwe Defence Force and British
support, two classic anti-guerrilla strategies were implemented immediately: Large scale
aerial bombardments targeting the civilian population suspected of supporting rebel
forces, and “special operations” typical of the days of the Rhodesian war.
The “special operations” consisted of the employment of so-called Pseudo units that
were trained and equipped to pose as Renamo guerrillas. The pseudos attacked villages
and settlements and in the process committed horrendous acts of cruelty and
barbarism.38 These were duly documented and then extensively reported by the state
controlled radio and TV stations and printed media as “massacres” committed by the
guerrilla. Western and journalists were given extensive briefings, and only few noticed
that they were never given true access to the sites of alleged massacres, and that a new
massacre would be routinely reported, before any more questions could be asked about
the preceding one.39 In any event, journalists and diplomats were not allowed to travel
beyond a 30-kilometre radius of the capital city for the usual “security reasons”. The
inextinguishable need of the Western media for sensational and absurd extremes was
nourished with the gory details of Renamo’s alleged practices of genital and other
mutilation, and eventually even cannibalism.40
The aerial bombardments, in the meantime, passed by unnoticed. The refugee stream of
finally over 2 million people that they provoked could easily be blamed on the alleged
atrocities committed by Renamo. A US State Department Report, entitled Summary of
Mozambican Refugee Accounts of
Principally Conflict-Related Experiences in
Mozambique, was released to the media in Washington D.C. in April 1987, containing
the extraordinary submission that at least 100.000 civilians had been killed by Renamo,
and that these killings had provoked one the largest refugee catastrophes in Southern
Africa ever. The 26 page report became better known by the name of his commissioned
author as the Gersony Report and coined the accusation that Renamo had become the
“Khmer Rouge of Africa”.41 According to Chester Crocker’s Deputy Roy Stacey, the
Gersoni report revealed “one of the most brutal holocausts against ordinary human
beings since World War II.”42
Gersoni had arrived at the figure of 100.000 civilians allegedly murdered by Renamo by a
very simple but surprisingly effective methodological manipulation. During a brief visit to
Southern Africa, Gersoni had interviewed some 80 refugees in a number of refugee
camps, asking them through an interpreter to tell him how many people they had
witnessed being killed. The numbers so obtained were extrapolated arriving at the magic
figure of 100.000. To add a bit of colouring to the “statistics”, the report pretended to
narrate some particularly wild details about sexual abuses allegedly committed by
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Renamo soldiers and officers who seemed to all share a perverted need to rape infant
girls and turn them into sex slaves. The fact that the US Embassy in Maputo had full
knowledge that the interpreter (a local employee of USAID) was actually an agent
working for the notorious State Security Secretariate SNASP43 who incidentally also and
at all times maintained a strong presence in the refugee camps, never caused anyone to be
too concerned, nor did the selection of the refugees that were questioned, and the
credibility of their answers. Instead, it was left to ex-BBC journalist Joseph Hanlon to
conveniently add a nought to Gersoni’s figure, and dedicate an entire book to what he
made out to be 1 million civilians killed by Renamo.44
The demonisation of Renamo as the “Khmer Rouge” of Africa also relied on exploiting
the ambiguities of Renamo’s relations with pre-independence Rhodesia and apartheid
South Africa. In his memoires the former Rhodesian intelligence chief Ken Flowers alleged
that Renamo had originally been set up as a sabotage unit of the then Rhodesian secret
service. To substantiate the claim, Flowers refered to a document purporting to be the
reprint of an original file memorandum. However, when tested incidentally in a court
case in London in 1991, involving the refusal of Lloyds’ underwriters to accept an
insurance claim of the Zimbabwe Oil Company for losses sustained as a result of the
destruction of an oil pipeline running across Mozambique, the purported Ken Flowers
document, signed somewhat dramatically “Top Secret, Director General CIO, April
1974” was quickly revealed as a crude fabrication. Allegedly signed in April 1974, it refers
to events that occurred but five years later.45
In hindsight, the unscholarly bias of the Gersoni report and similar publications46 is
confirmed by the election results both in 1994 and then again in 1999. In both elections,
the same people that had been branded the “Khmer Rouge of Africa” secured near
victory, despite United Nations evidence that in 1994 numerous irregularities had
disadvantaged Renamo, whilst in respect of the 1999 elections, even the Mozambique
government admitted that the results from close on 1,000 polling stations, representing
approximately 10% of the votes, were never counted. The risk that intimidation in
former Renamo strongholds could have contributed to the near victories of their
candidates can be discarded. No accusations of intimidation by Renamo were ever made,
not even by the government.47
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A realistic estimate of the numbers of victims that lost their lives directly as a result of
military rebel action would put that figure at somewhere around 50,000, instead of one
million. Evidently, the total number of indirect victims of the destruction of all essential
infrastructure in Mozambique over a period of one and a half decades of civil war can
easily be estimated to be 20 times that number. The truth is that it will be impossible to
ever arrive at precise figures. This is borne out by the still scarce number of honest
writings on the tragedy of the conflict in Mozambique. The book by Geffray, La Cause
des Armes au Mozambique, published in 1990,48 was the first serious social science
contribution to the understanding that the civil war in that country was a war of
conflicting political identities that required each other to justify their own existence.49 A
decade later, a few more titles became available that shed light on this war of identities
that tore Mozambique apart. First and foremost João Cabrita’s Mozambique – the Tortous
Road to Democracy,50 as well as Pires and Capstick’s Winds of Havoc,51 and most recently
Naidu’s short piece entitled “Mozambique: A Lasting Peace?”52 and last but not least the
article by Schafer in African Affairs titled “Guerrillas and Violence in the War in
Mozambique”.53
The emerging post-conflict consensus is that the human and humanitarian tragedy which
occurred in Mozambique during the first term of office of President Chissano (19871994) must be attributed mostly to the policy of deliberate demonisation and
deligitimisation of the insurgency in that country, which was essentially the achievement
of Western diplomacy. Far from having even attempted at bringing about any kind of
“preventive diplomacy”, the foreign policy of the US and UK in that era did their utmost
to fuel and exacerbate the war in Mozambique, simply for lack of a better policy to
promote their perceived strategic interest in a post apartheid South Africa.
4. The IMF to the rescue
The first IMF structural adjustment program for Mozambique was implemented in
January 1987 under the label of PRE – Programa de Rehabilitação Economica. The main
results were the devaluation of the national currency metical by approximately 1/16th of its
originally fixed value, over a period of 2 years; the reduction of government subsidies to
parastatals from 33% in 1986 to a mere 7% of the national budget in 1988; likewise the
reduction of consumer price subsidisations from 6% in 1986 to 2% of the national
budget in 1988; and, finally the commencement of a drawn out programme of
privatisation of state owned (formerly nationalised) enterprises. At the same time, price
controls were successfully abolished, and government spending was generally redirected
from consumption to investment.
Even though the original condition of a cessation of the civil war had not prevailed, the
government managed to survive politically the first adjustment programme, and
President Chissano had gained further international credibility.54 Even more important
were the own dynamics created by the “structural” reforms. There was no way back, and
the continuation of the structural adjustment policy, with continued “blood transfusions”
in the shape of monetary assistance from the international donor community, acting in
support of the IMF and World Bank, had become unavoidable. It was at this juncture
that true leverage for preventative diplomacy and change became available, for the first
time since Mozambique had declared independence in 1975.
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Already the first assessments of the Programa de Rehabilitação Economica (PRE) in 1988
emphasized that the consolidation of the economic reforms would have to make a
renewed effort at addressing internal security and stability. 55 The subsequent second
IMF “Policy Framework Paper” for Mozambique of November 1990 made it clear that
substantial political reforms and progress in direction of a negotiated internal settlement
with Renamo would determine the degree to which future aid and assistance would be
made available, forecasting a total amount in excess of 1 billion US dollar in direct aid to
be made available for 1991, amounting in effect to approximately 90% of the total GDP
of Mozambique.56
With an economy that was now dependent to a degree of 90% of its total GPD on
foreign aid, Chissano responded positively, by agreeing to a first exchange of position
papers of “bullet points” with the Renamo rebels in July 1989, in Nairobi, whilst at the
same time he obtained from the Fifth Frelimo Party Congress an all important
endorsement for a fundamental constitutional reform, whereby Mozambique would
adopt a multi party democracy and for the first time directly elect its members of
parliament as well as the State President. The “new deal” was passed by the existing
parliament as the new Mozambique Constitution of November 1990 and was intended to
deal in anticipation with most of the political demands that the Renamo rebel movement
had been lobbying for, by allowing for free and fair multi-party elections. On this basis,
the IMF and the international donor community, acting in unison through their annual
so-called “Club of Paris” meetings moved forward, whilst Chissano was for the first time
seriously threatened by a wave of industry wide strikes, in January 1990, and an
attempted military coup in June 1991. What followed, over a period of 16 months was a
delicate balancing act between regular working meetings of the IMF and World Bank
with Mozambican diplomats and economists, and the overall total of 11 “negotiation
rounds” in Rome, Italy, between the government and Renamo delegations, leading up to
the General Peace Accord of 4 October 1992.
5. The African Peace Initiative
How peace was eventually attained in Mozambique, remains unanswered by most
scholars. One unsatisfactory explanation offered, is that Mozambique was a “unique
case” or simply that good fortunes guided the peace process. 57 In one case, even a revival
of the old conspiracy theories can be found, where it is suggested that “hidden hands”
had paid off the rebels and “bought” peace in Mozambique.58
Besides the obvious systemic changes at the onset of the 1990s, such as the demise of the
Soviet Union and the disappearance of a bi-polar structure in international relations,
more research needs to be dedicated to what brought about the actual events during the
two years of negotiations, from 1990 to 1992.59 Hopefully, the materials of the
negotiations will be made accessible to researchers in the near future.60 The questions
that could lead to a more rational understanding of the process, beyond its
characterisation as having been “unique” are: where did the draft documents originate,
for no less than 11 protocols making up the 1992 Peace accord? Were negotiations based
on proposals tabled either by the government or by Renamo or by the hosts of the
meetings, or by some or all of them? What were the internal reporting and decision
making procedures of the parties? How communications were organised, and how was
the privacy of such communications safeguarded? Did parallel channels and levels of
negotiations exist? How did they operate?
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Thomashausen: Preventive Diplomacy in Mozambique
Most probably, the answers to these questions would also help clarify what circumstances
brought about the fundamental shift in attitudes of the conflicting parties towards the
conflict itself. The commonly made assumption that the collapse of the apartheid regime
in Pretoria brought about the change in attitudes of Renamo, is not conclusive, as the
South African government had actually “switched sides” to very actively support the
Frelimo government as early as 1986.
A first contribution to this research may be the suggestion that the Mozambique Peace
Accord to a very large extent originated in the drafts and proposals submitted by
Renamo. The submission can be easily verified by an analysis of the original Renamo
draft proposals tabled during the negotiations with text of the protocols signed that
eventually made up the Mozambique Peace Accord. The original Renamo proposals
consists of approximately 75% of the text of the signed Accord. The signed Peace
Accord often follows the text of the Renamo proposals word-by-word. This curiously
overlooked factor is a key to the deeper understanding of the Mozambican peace
process.
The question that follows on the above observation is obviously how it was possible that
a most isolated, unknown and obviously unskilled rebel leadership, as was the case of
Renamo in 1989, could have become empowered to interact in that successful manner,
which in turn gave them the confidence to persist and continue in a protracted and
involved process of negotiations, in an essentially hostile international environment, and
under continued military pressure at home, where only a partial cease fire for the narrow
defined transport route from Beira to Zimbabe, the “Beira Corridor” had been put into
place.
The answer can be found in the mostly overlooked fact that in 1988 for the first time, a
high ranking foreign affairs official from Kenya undertook the arduous journey to meet
the leadership of Renamo in the Mozambique interior. The then Permanent Secretary to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kenya, Bethuel Kiplagat had braved the Shire River
and adjacent swamps on foot and by night, and walked for days to finally become the
one outsider” that would have succeeded in establishing a direct and unadulterated
contact with the Renamo leadership. Knowing traditional African political perceptions,
he accepted that the personal risk and sacrifice were the basis upon which he could
establish his bona fide and expect to be taken seriously and to be respected, by a rebel
leadership that had only experienced rejection and demonisation from politicians outside
their own and narrowly confined world.61 Bethuel Kiplagat’s first visit to the
Mozambique interior was the beginning of an all important engagement of Renamo in a
process of negotiations. The vehicle for the negotiations was subsequently found in the
equally important Association of Saint Egidio (also sometimes referred to as a “catholic
lay community”) who on request of the Vatican and with the endorsement of the Italian
government eventually agreed to host the various negotiation “rounds”. Throughout the
negotiations, however, the constant point of reference for the Renamo leadership was
the Kenyan Permanent Secretary. This is where the confidence had been built that was
capable of sustaining the inevitable pressures and derailments of an extended and highly
contested process of negotiations.
Kenya pursued its supporting preventive diplomacy with utmost discretion, so as not to
provoke the jealousy or distrust of the many professional peace makers from Europe and
the USA who did not fail to crowd the observer seats during the actual negotiations in
Rome. It may be that Kenya at the time was anxious to reduce the level of influence in
the region exercised by Zimbabwe’s new president, Robert Mugabe. The fact remains
that Kenya at the time was the only influential country in the region that had remained
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Thomashausen: Preventive Diplomacy in Mozambique
sufficiently unattached and equally distant from all the parties that had become involved
in the conflict in Mozambique. It was ideally placed to offer the leadership of Renamo
technical, logistical and negotiation skills support, without thereby driving the
Mozambican delegation away from the process. In supplying such support, and by
gaining the trust of the leadership of Renamo, Kenya also acquired the leverage that
would become crucial in ensuring the ultimate success of the negotiations. The
interpretation offered by some authors, that the “Kenyan mediation” had “failed” once
Rome instead of Nairobi had been chosen for the actual negotiations could not be
further from the truth.62
The particularity of the negotiations process and the resulting Peace Accord of 4
October 1994 is that the Agreement actually consists of a solemn re-affirmation of 11
prior Agreements, each recorded and signed in a separate Protocol, namely, (in
chronological order):63
(1)
the Joint Communiqué (to initiate negotiations) of 10 July 1990;
(2)
the Agreement (on partial withdrawal of Zimbabwean troops setting up
the International Verification Commission - COMIVE) of 1 December
1990;
(3)
Protocol No. I (on Basic Principles) of 18 October 1991;
(4)
Protocol No. II (on Establishment and Recognition of Political Parties)
of 13 November 1991;
(5)
Protocol No. III (on Principles of the Electoral Act) of 12 March 1992;
(6)
the Declaration (on humanitarian assistance) of 16 July 1992;
(7)
the Joint Declaration (on the Conclusion of the Peace Process) of 7
August 1992;
(8)
Protocol No. IV (on Military Matters) of 4 October 1992;
(9)
Protocol No. V (Guarantees) of 4 October 1992;
(10)
Protocol No. VI (Cease Fire) of 4 October 1992; and
(11)
Protocol No. VII (on Donor's Conference) of 4 October 1992.
It must be emphasised that each of the 11 documents was entered into and signed as a
separate agreement, before proceeding with discussions of the next protocol. This
approach made it virtually impossible to “come back” to issues that had already been
“signed off”, thus building the entire accord, step by step. Finally, all 11 single
agreements were re-confirmed and re-signed as a comprehensive “accord”, totalling
more than fifty pages in print.
The essential and particular features were:

the Accord consisted of and concluded a total of 11 separate protocolagreements concluded between the parties over a period of 27 months of
negotiations;
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Thomashausen: Preventive Diplomacy in Mozambique

the Accord addressed the causes and issues of the conflict first, and as a basis for
the implementation of a general cease fire, rather than as a consequence of a cease
fire agreement;

the Accord was the result of negotiations which always took place in a foreign
and neutral country, without cessation of hostilities between the parties to the
conflict, and until the very last stage, in the absence of any direct, top level
contacts between them;

the hosts for the negotiations and official mediators were a non-governmental
organisation, the association of Saint Egidio, which operated under the auspices
of the Italian government;

the mediators and the negotiating teams successfully discouraged any substantial
media coverage of the negotiations process;

South Africa, believed to be intimately involved in the Mozambique conflict,
originally as a supporter of Renamo, and later as the closest ally of the Frelimo
government, was excluded from the negotiations and the resulting Peace Accord;

the Accord adhered to the style and tradition of international agreements and
assigned to the United Nations (UN) and the participating foreign countries not
only an observer or verification mission, but also provided for their active
involvement as guarantors of the implementation of the agreements. Powers to
“control and supervise” the peace process was thus transferred to the UN on the
consent of the parties.

the protocol on elections guaranteed in considerable detail all basic political
human rights, i.e. freedom of the press and access to the media, freedom of
association, expression and political activity, freedom of movement and of
residence, the right of free return of refugees, and the right to vote. With respect
to the acutal elections, the agreement provided for national elections for a directly
elected national Assembly, in accordance with the principle of proportional
representation, and a directly elected President, under the supervision of a
National Elections Commission. The minimum percentage of votes for a party to
obtain seats was set at "a minimum of 5%, and a maximum of 20%", whilst the
number of signatures required for a candidature to the office of the President was
set at 10.000;

the protocol on military matters provided for complete demobilisation of all
existing forces and simultaneously (i.e. on the basis of reciprocity) for the joint
recruitment and establishment of a much smaller and entirely new Mozambique
Defence Force, consisting of professional (non-conscript) soldiers only, with a
maximum troop strength of 30.000. The Command of the new force would,
during the transitional period, vest in a joint High Command consisting of one
Frelimo and one Renamo general, who would operate under a special
Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force. The
withdrawal of all foreign troops was to commence with the entry into force of
the Peace Accord, and all private and irregular forces were to be immediately
disbanded. The Intelligence Services and Police Forces would continue to operate
under the direct supervision and control of specific mixed Commissions;

the protocol on guarantees provided a timetable for the elections; the
establishment of the Supervision and Monitoring Commission and its SubCommissions; specific and precise guarantees in respect of the implementation of
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all undertakings in the various protocols; a guarantee of non-interference with
those authorities and administrative structures set up by Renamo in areas and
zones controlled by it, and the undertaking by the government to promulgate the
entire Peace Accord as binding law in Mozambique, which was to prevail over
any other laws contrary to its provisions;

the protocol on the actual cease fire provided time tables and stipulated details of
the implementation of the cease fire, demilitarization, mine-clearing operations,
separation and concentration of forces, and liberation of war prisoners;

finally, a protocol on a future donor conference contained the undertakings of
the parties and the mediators to co-operate for the holding of a donor
conference, which was designed to substantially benefit the political parties and
ensure the financing of fair and free elections.
The main Commission set up by the Accord was the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission
(CSC).64 Under the CSC, the following additional commissions were set up: the Joint
Commission for the Formation of the Mozambique Defence Force (CCFADM);65 the
Cease-Fire Commission (CCF);66 the Commission for the Reintegration of Demobilised
Defence Force Staff - Reintegration Commission (CORE);67 the National Information
Commission (COMINFO); the National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL); and
the National Elections Commission (CNE). South Africa was accepted to act as an
observer in only on one of the sub-commissions, namely CORE.
The overall picture of the Peace Accords is that of a carefully elaborated blueprint for the
complete democratisation of what used to be a socialist and one-party State, to be
implemented not just under the watchful eyes of the UN or some otherwise composed
group of international “observers”, but rather to be “supervised and controlled” by the
United Nations.
Two other documents that were signed by the parties and did not become part of the
General Peace Accord were the Protocol on the Agenda for the Peace Talks of 28 May
1991, and the Agreed Minutes to Amend the 1991 Protocol on the Agenda, of 19 June
1992. Both documents are crucial to the understanding of how Renamo became
accepted as an equal negotiating partner, and how the perceived identities of both
conflict parties began to change.
The Protocol on the Agreed Agenda for the negotiations of 28 May 1991 serves as a
reminder that nearly a whole year of preliminary contacts were needed to agree on the
agenda for the negotiations. The agreement on an agenda was very difficult to conclude
because the Government was clinging to its perception that the civil war was the cause
and the root of all problems. Meanwhile, Renamo refused to give up its view that the
civil war was the consequence of several much more complex issues, such as the absence
of legitimate and democratic leadership and economic freedom in Mozambique.
Renamo won the first round on the issue of the agenda. Reversing common scholarly
wisdom, the agenda agreed upon in May 1991 put the signing of a cease fire agreement
last, to allow for the conclusion first of a series of protocol agreements on the
implementation of minimum standards of human rights and freedoms: the freedom of
political parties and democratic fundamental rights; multi-party elections; etc. Putting the
issue of a cease fire last had its own compelling logic. Why should the parties to a conflict
cease fighting? Only two rational motives can be put forward. Either because the
fortunes of war have turned and it may be more advantageous to suspend fighting, rather
than to carry on losing on the battlefield until one is forced to do so. Or, because a more
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Thomashausen: Preventive Diplomacy in Mozambique
realistic (peaceful) alternative way of attaining one’s goals is perceived to exist. Thus,
Renamo was interested only in discussing substantive issues, and let the outcome of
those proceedings determine whether it would be worth their while to eventually agree to
a cessation of hostilities or not. Reversibly, Frelimo was less concerned with attaining any
particular aims or goals, but simply with engaging the “enemy” on a non-military front, in
a diplomatic and purely political forum, where they believed they had a distinct
advantage.
The run-up to the eventual Agreement on the Agenda had been a so-called 12-Point Plan
from President Chissano. Essentially, the plan consisted of an offer of a general amnesty
in return for an otherwise unconditional cease fire. To everyone’s surprise, Renamo did
not reject the proposal outright but replied by suggesting that, as a first condition for the
initiation of negotiations through the good offices of the clergy, foreign, but mainly
Zimbabwean troops, should be withdrawn from Mozambique.68
By introducing the new element of foreign troops being deployed in an internal conflict,
Renamo managed to redefine the parameters of their communication with the
international community and the government to their advantage. By subsequently
showing diplomatic flexibility on the issue of the 40,000 odd foreign troops in
Mozambique, who were mostly Zimbabwean operating with British support, Renamo
actually managed to apply indirect leverage on Frelimo. The core issue had shifted from
allegations of the most serious crimes against humanity to that of a foreign army being
unfairly deployed, with the support of a major Western nation, in an internal conflict. To
extend this leverage over Frelimo, Renamo readily reduced its demand for an outright
withdrawal of foreign troops to a confinement of a limited number of units in three
strategic Beira and Limpopo transport corridors which would not be attacked by
Renamo. That is, on condition that the troops thus confined would be permanently
verified and monitored by an International Verification Commission. An agreement to
that effect, and the establishment of the international commission to supervise the
confinement, were achieved on 1 December 1990. The Commission, COMIVE,
composed of the representatives of no less than 8 countries, including the USA and the
then still existing USSR, with Italy holding the chair. It drastically redefined and
internationalised the conflict.
Renamo’s immediate gain was its advancement to a status of an equal party in an
international agreement. The agreement curtailed the status of Mozambique as a
sovereign nation, and documented a new dimension to the conflict in Mozambique. The
mere conclusion and implementation of the Agreement on the confinement of the
Zimbabwean troops alerted the international community to the fact that the civil war in
Mozambique could not possibly be just a 'security' problem.
At the outset of the peace talks, Frelimo did not believe that a peace agreement would be
concluded. For the negotiating team of the government, the meetings in Rome signified a
new opportunity to win yet another battle in the never-ending spiral of political
avantgarde and liberation strategies, as they would proudly announce in the government
controlled media. Within their analytical framework, the negotiating process was the
weapon that would finally unmask the “enemy” as a “bunch of uneducated boys and
opportunists from the interior”. Renamo, as well as the mediators, readily reinforced this
perception of the government’s team, as it gave the process a chance to gain momentum,
engage observers and win international support.69 Besides the new hopes to gain an
advantage over Renamo at the negotiating table, Frelimo was compelled to engage in the
negotiating process as a result of its increasingly total dependency on the continuation of
the IMF administered structural adjustment programmes, already discussed above.
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Thomashausen: Preventive Diplomacy in Mozambique
The motivation of the Renamo leadership, on the other hand, to engage in a negotiated
approach to the conflict resulted from a perceived need by their leadership to gain moral
and international recognition. To prove the Gersoni report wrong, was a favourite theme
for discussion with guests and visitors in the largest of President Dhlakama’s huts in
central Mozambique, proudly referred to as the “conference hall”. The desire to brake
through the wall of international condemnation was reinforced by the terrible effects of
one of Mozambique’s longest and most severe drought periods, from 1988 until
1994,during which humanitarian relief was prevented by the government from reaching
rebel-held territory. Vast areas and several million people had been cut off from the reach
of the government and international relief efforts, and their local chiefs were turning to
the leaders of Renamo for help. Empty-handed, Renamo was losing its hold and feared
being rejected by the people who could not longer sustain themselves, let alone the
comparatively large number of up to 30.000 rebel soldiers. Moreover, Renamo President
Afonso Dhlakama and his generals had come to conclude that with Frelimo’s continuing
capability to carry out air strikes, they would never be able to take any large cities by
force, because the population thus “liberated” would very quickly turn against the
“liberators”, if their arrival would be seen to bring upon them air raids and large numbers
of victims of the inevitable bombing campaigns. This painful experience had been made
again and again in the small district towns inland, since the war had escalated after the
assassination of the first Frelimo President Samora Machel, in 1986.70 By 1988, the
situation often referred to as the “mutually hurting stalemate” had been reached in
Mozambique.
The fact that military strategies had become secondary in relation to the process of
negotiations, by the time the first three protocols had been agreed upon in mid 1992, did
not mean that the hatred of the parties for each other and their determination to attain
their goals and achieve an exclusionary victory had become in any way diluted. Until
Protocol IV on military matters was circulated to diplomats by Renamo on the last days
of May in 1992, the government’s delegation never actually took the negotiations too
seriously convinced that eventually their military would manage to overrun the hide-out
of the rebels, possibly when their returning delegation would lead them to it.71 When the
government’s team eventually discovered that they had become entangled in a web of
principles and aims, signed away and accepted in the first three protocols as well as an
equal number of declarations, and that a military victory was definitely not forthcoming,
it was too late to reverse the peace process. Each declaration and each protocol
contained the hidden blueprint for the next. The anticipation of a future that hit Frelimo
like a sudden vision from a capitalist hell was: comprehensive human rights guarantees,
including political and economic freedoms, multi-party democracy, free and fair
elections, and parliamentary and public accountability of the future government.
The only option left for Frelimo at that stage was to stall negotiations on the last main
protocol, on military matters, and to blame Renamo for a lack of progress. However,
Renamo's original option for a small and purely professional army had been prediscussed with the UK and United States governments and had won their support
beforehand. The world powers failed to see any sense in the Frelimo Government's
instance on maintaining an underfunded and unsustainable defence force with just under
100.000 badly trained and badly equipped men. Moreover, Renamo's proposed command
structure, which originally would have given the generals of the new Defence Force vast
powers during the transition period, appealed to the Government's own generals.
At this stage, the Government seems to have panicked, convinced that it would not
survive the signing of the final accord and subsequent free and supervised elections.
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Thomashausen: Preventive Diplomacy in Mozambique
President Chissano suddenly insisted to meet Dhlakama in Rome, and talked him into
signing a joint declaration on 7 August 1992, committing each other to ensure that all
agenda matters would be concluded and agreed upon by 1 October 1992, so as to allow
for a cease fire to become effective on that date. The Government successfully created
the impression in the media and amongst the diplomats that the meeting had, in fact,
produced a firm agreement on a ceasefire that would enter into force on 1 October 1992.
At the same time, the Government's team in Rome was instructed to forestall progress,
and not to agree on any one of the outstanding matters, so that on 1st October it would
become possible to accuse Renamo of breaching their undertaking and break off the
negotiations.
Negotiations in Rome entered their most difficult phase as the government delegation
became destructive and simply blocked every issue, often submitting ridiculous
proposals, such as the proposition that the future defence force should consist of
250.000 conscripts, on the basis that the government at that time had 125.000 men under
arms and that Renamo should try and match that figure, if they wished to be treated as
an equal party. In the first days of September, the mediators threatened to give up, and
informed Chissano and Dhlakama accordingly. This coincided with South Africa
suddenly emerging on the scene, by insisting on a visit by Dhlakama to Pretoria. In
Pretoria a number of National Party consultants and advisors were tasked to convince
Dhlakama to agree to a new and parallel South African mediation effort, aimed at
overcoming the “Rome deadlock” and at establishing in Mozambique a "government of
national unity" without the “need for elections”. This would have sidelined and aborted
the Rome process, and with it the process of democratisation in Mozambique. An
unscheduled and secret meeting between Dhlakama and the ANC Deputy Secretary of
International Relations, Stan Mabizela, at Shell House in Johannesburg, and a subsequent
telephone call between Dhlakama and Nelson Mandela, encouraged Dhlakama not to
compromise on the attainment of democracy as a basis for peace in Mozambique.
Dhlakama left Pretoria determined not to be drawn into the conspiracy between the last
of the old power brokers in South Africa and their newly won Frelimo allies in
Mozambique. An aftertaste of the deterioration of relations with Renamo’s old allies in
Pretoria could be felt when Dhlakama, immediately after the eventual signing of the
Peace Accord in Rome, on 4 October 1992, stated to a Portuguese newspaper that the
South African Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. R. Botha, who had claimed that he had
saved the peace accord, "was a notorious liar".72 Subsequently, it was chiefly due to
Renamo's resistance that South Africa was not accepted as one of the observer nations at
the main Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) for the implementation of the
Peace Accord.
Following the short lived and ill-fated attempt of apartheid South Africa to come to the
rescue of their newly found partners in Frelimo, the conclusion of the peace negotiations
in Rome became inevitable. Chissano was virtually forced by the major powers to agree
to a further meeting with Dhlakama, this time in Gabarone, on 18 September 1992.
During several hours under four eyes, Chissano finally conceded agreement on all
remaining issues, except for the precise formulation of the agreement on noninterference by the government, during the transition period, with the administrative
authorities and structures in Renamo controlled areas.
The negotiating and supporting teams were given the virtually impossible task of
finalizing all documents for signature by 1 October 1992. An added difficulty was that a
satellite telephone system, designed to work on a 110 Volt power supply was put in place
at the last hour in Gorongoza, where the only available generators produced 220 Volt
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Thomashausen: Preventive Diplomacy in Mozambique
current. Communications became a potentially fatal obstacle. The final drafting had to be
completed in Rome, which delayed the signing by four days, until 4 October 1992. The
media generally speculated that Dhlakama was reluctant to attend. Nothing could have
been further from the truth. The peace process had become irreversible, and acquired a
life of its own, supported by multiple layers and levels of diplomatic and often personal
leverages. The important lesson to retain from these events is that the ultimate success,
namely the quality and truthfulness of the accord is owed to the relentless and patient
intervention of African diplomacy, and the delicate application of an equally complex and
old principle of collective decision making in Africa, which is the principle of inclusivity.
Renamo had been read-admitted in the midst of its greater family, and had been offered
the chance of again becoming part of the integral concept of Mozambican politics.
What was left to do, under both the watchful and distrusting and often interfering eyes of
both the IMF and World Bank, as well as the United Nations UNOMOZ peacekeeping
operation, was the decontamination of the political discourse, the patient management of
post conflict sentiments of frustration and revenge and of ensuring sufficient degrees of
social re-integration of former combatants.
The proud achievement of the Mozambique Peace Accord is that it has held firm for 10
years already. As proof of its transformation success the Accord has established the only
parliamentary democracy in Africa that is sustained by a well-balanced system of political
parties, where the opposition holds nearly half the seats in Parliament, and thus actually
has a realistic chance of becoming “the majority of tomorrow”.73
19
Mozambique Government’s “12 Principles” for Peace
( President Chissano on 17 July 1989)
1. We are faced with an operation of destabilisation which should not be confused
with a struggle between two parties.
2. The operation has been mounted through brutal acts of terrorism which provoke
immense suffering falling, above all, on the population and their property.
Hundreds of thousands of people have already died. Many economic and social
infrastructures in the country have been destroyed or paralysed, impeding the
normal life of citizens and turning millions of people into displaced persons.
3. The aim is to put an end to this inhuman situation. The first action should be to
stop all terrorist and bandit actions.
4. Afterwards, conditions should be created for all Mozambican citizens to lead
normal lives in such a way that they can participate on the one hand in the
political, economic, social and cultural life of the country, and on the other in the
discussion and definition of the policies which will guide the country in each of
these aspects (political, economic, social and cultural).
5. These policies are established by national consensus, formulated through a
process of consultation and debate with the people or social groups involved.
The principal laws relating to land, health and education were approved after
consultation with the people. The on-going revision of the constitution has been
taking place through a debate which aims at introducing factors of democratic
participation in the working of the State. Religious institutions are being
consulted in the process of the preparation of legislation on religious liberties.
6. Dialogue will aim at clarifying these positions and giving guarantees of
participation in it to all individuals, including those who until then had been
involved in violent actions of destabilisation.
7. This participation and enjoyment of rights applies immediately to the processes
which are already underway regarding the affirmation of the principles defined in
the Constitution in relation to: the protection of individual and collective
liberties; the protection of human rights; the protection of democratic rights.
8. Individual and social liberties, such as freedom of worship, freedom of
expression and freedom of assembly, are guaranteed. They should not be used
against the general interests of the nation. They should be not used to destroy
national unity, national independence and the integrity of persons and property.
They should not be used to propagate tribalism, racism, regionalism or any form
of divisionism or sectarianism. They should not be used for the preparation or
perpetration of acts punishable by law, such as robbery, assassination or
aggression. They cannot be used for the preparation or perpetration of violent
acts against the State and the Constitution, such as secessionist movements or
coups d’etat.
9. Policy or constitutional changes or revisions, or changes or revisions to the
principal laws of the country, where in many cases debate or consultation with
citizens has already occurred or is in process, can be brought and should be
brought about only through the ample participation of all citizens.
10. It is unacceptable for a group to use intimidation or violence to impose
themselves on the whole society. It is anti-democratic to alter the constitution
and principal laws of the country through the violence of a group.
11. The normalisation of life and the integration of those until now involved in
violent actions of destabilisation implies, in a general way, their participation in
economic and social life through suitable ways agreed by them, and guaranteed
by the government.
12. The acceptance of these principles could lead to a dialogue about the modalities
for ending violence, establishing peace and normalising life for all in the country.
Thomashausen: Preventive Diplomacy in Mozambique
Resistência Nacional Moçambicana - Renamo
(Mozambique National Resistance)
1.
Since 1964, the people of Mozambique have been dying every day as victims of
war.
2.
It is thus imperative that all true nationalists and those committed to peace,
whether they belong to a political organisation or not, should join all their efforts,
so as to mobilize all means at their disposal for the seeking of a truly Mozambican and African solution, which may bring about lasting peace and stability.
3.
The Mozambique people require freedom. It is in freedom that peace, stability,
prosperity, and the respect as well as the dignity of the person will progress.
4.
The principle must prevail that the sovereignty must lie with the people, and that
the people have an inalienable right to elect their leaders, who must serve the
people's expectations and respect its historic traditions.
5.
RENAMO is a political force acting in the political realm of Mozambique. Any
solution conducive to peace must take into consideration this reality, as well as
the tradition, culture, stage of development and the realities of the present times.
6.
It is not the intention of RENAMO to change the existing order in Mozambique
by the force of arms. The armed struggle serves soley as the last recourse of
defense of the people against the denial of its rights and against its oppression.
7.
RENAMO shall never consent to the use of military force for the imposition of a
particular leadership or political options which are contrary to the wishes of the
people.
8.
Nothing can be gained, by any of the parties involved in this conflict, with the
continuation of this war. Soley the suffering of the people will be seen to increase
day by day.
9.
The verbal attacks of an affronting nature must cease, both by those whom we
fight, and those external forces who directly or indirectly have a concern in the
matter. We must concentrate on the future, and not the past.
10.
The propaganda directed against RENAMO will not change the political and
military reality in Mozambique nor will it be conducive to national reconciliation.
11.
The presence of foreign forces invited by FRELIMO did not bring peace and
well being to the Mozambique people. We of RENAMO consider this presence
to constitute an obstacle to peace, apart from being an offense to our dignity and
an infringement of our national sovereignty and independence.
12.
For the resolution of the present conflict, RENAMO bears in mind all
neighbouring countries and any other nations who have concerns in the region.
13.
RENAMO undertakes in public that it shall undertake everything within its
powers to allow the present process of negotiations to continue and to ultimately
bring about peace.
14.
RENAMO defends uncompromisingly the people who are the reason of its
struggle and existence. RENAMO opposes any act that violates the people's
physical and moral integrity, such as massacres, looting, etc.
15.
RENAMO is a guerrilla force whose survival depends solely on the people, and,
therefore, by nature it opposes any acts of atrocities which would endanger the
lives of the population, who is the reason of its existence.
16.
RENAMO endeavours: genuine negotiations which will bring about national
reconciliation without losers or winners; followed by constitutional reform; to
unite all forces for the building of a new Mozambique, where our national fellowship will be confirmed by the free exchange of ideas and consensus; a new
Mozambique where an armed struggle will never again be the last and only
recourse for the solution of our differences.
Nairobi, 15 August 1989
21
1
About the Author: Prof Thomashausen is professor of international law at the University of South
Africa in Pretoria, and also Director of the Institute of Foreign and Comparative Law, at the same
University. He is an admitted Attorney at the Bar of Frankfurt am Main in Germany, and holds the
degree of doctor iuris of the Christian Albrechts University in Kiel, Germany. He is also a sworn
translator of the Supreme Court of South Africa, in German, English, French and Portuguese.
Prof Thomashausen has produced over 70 academic and general publications and papers read at
national and international conferences. He has also delivered over 1.200 expert opinions on private and
public international law, as well as comparative and constitutional law. He acted as legal consultant for
the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (1984-1986), the establishment of the transitional Government of
National Unity in Namibia (1984), as facilitator in the Rome Peace Negotiations for Mozambique
(1989-1992), and as Special Advisor to the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (1993-1994). He is the chairman of the Editorial Board of
the South African law journal with the widest international circulation, the Comparative and
International Law Journal of Southern Africa (CILSA). He also serves on the editorial boards of several
law publications and is a member of several learned societies, including the Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Völkerrecht.
2
On the independence generally and the subsequent developments, see for a brief overview: R.
Pélissier, "Mozambique", in: Africa South of the Sahara, 1986, p 673 - 691.
3
See text in F. Ribeiro de Mello, Dossier 2a República, vol 1, Lisboa 1975, p 260; on the agreement
see: J. Jardim, Mozambique Terra Queimada, Lisboa 1976.
4
Neil Bruce, “Portugal’s African Wars”, in: vol 34 (March 1973) Conflict Studies, p 19.
J M. Cabrita, Mozambique – The Tourtuous Road to Democracy, Palgrave New York 200, p. 18-23,
46-50
5
6
Boletim da República (BdR) Ia Série, No 1 of 25-06-1975.
7
"Lei Eleitoral", Lei 1/77; Boletim da República, No 101 (Supl) of 1-09-77; later amended by Lei 5/86
of 25-07-1986; Boletim da República, No 30 (2. Supl) of 26-07-86.
8
Decreto-Lei No 4/75 of 16-08-1975, BdR No 24, p 23; see also D Joseph, "Zur Rechtsentwicklung in
der Volksrepublik Mozambique", in: 5/81 Staat und Recht (Berlin East), p 443 et seq p. 447.
9
Portuguese law and in line with the Portuguese tradition, Mozambique, does not have a split Bar.
10
See above note 5.
11
Lei No 12/78, BdR No 144, p. 469.
12
BdR No 25/79.
13
See note 27 above.
14
See the summary sentencing to death by firing squad of 4 accused in one short court session, without
any hearing of evidence and simply on the grounds of the charges made by the prosecution, as reported
in the daily newspaper Noticias of 16 February 1981, pp 3-4.
15
Lei 1/83 of 16-03-83; BdR No 11/83. Error! Main Document Only. BdR No 13/83 (Suppl)); see
also Le Monde - Edition Internationale of 1-06-1983, p 1; Hanlon, Mozambique: The Revolution under
Fire, London 1984, p 244.
16
17
Le Monde, supra.
Dia (Lisbon) 28 March 1977, p 16. See also the detailed account in J M Cabrita, supra, pp. 94-103.
Further references in: W Finnegan, A Complicated War: The Harrowing of Mozambique, Berkeley 1992, 121123; D Hoile, Mozambique: a nation in crisis, London 1989, 36-40 JH Mittelman, The Dialectic of National
Thomashausen: Preventive Diplomacy in Mozambique
Autonomy and Global Participation: Alternatives to Conventional Strategies of Development Mozambique Experience, V (1979-80) Alternatives, p. 321; Die Welt of 28-09-1977 and 12-09-1978;
Der Spiegel no 13/1977, p. 170; An interesting historic essay is the brave attempt by a faithful East
German Marxist-Leninist to explain and praise Frelimo’s legal instruments of repression: D. Joseph, “Zur
Rechtsentwicklung in der Volksrepublik Moçambique”, in: 5/81 Staat und Recht, 441-449
18
M Guadagni, Il Diritto in Mozambico, Trento 1989, 175.
19
See A Sachs, Principles of revolutionary Justice, London 1979, 49; A. Thomashausen, “The
Influence of Constitutional Change on Local Government: Lessons learned in Mozambique”, in: WJL
Adlem, WJ Van Wyk, EJ van der Westhuizen, CA Theunissen, eds, Local Government in Transition in
South Africa: A Comparative Perspective, Pretoria, Unisa 1992, pp85-96 (91-93).
On the strategy and power of “parallel authorities” see the original authority: V. I. Lenin, “A Dual
Power”, Pravda No 28, 22 April 1917 (Selected Works, vol II, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1947, pp
23/23).
20
21
J F Pavia, Moçambique e as Instituições de Bretton Woods, Lisboa (Vega) 2000, p 67.
22
See Expresso (Lisbon, Portugal), 28 Dec 1985, pp 1 and 20.
23
Amendment of the 1975 Constitution by Act No. 11/78 of 15 August 1978, Diário da República No.
97, 351. See on the ideological spat between Maputo and Moscow: A & B Isaacman, Mozambique
from Colonialism to Revolution, Colorado 1983, 121-123; 184.
24
H Abrahamsson & A Nilsson, Moçambique em Transição, Maputo, ISRI 1994, p. 65.
C A Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, New York, Norton, 1992, p 239.
26
Pretoria News, 22 Oct 1983, p 1.
27
J Hanlon, Mozambique: Who calls the shots? London, Currey 1991, p. 114.
28
Pretoria News 26 March 1984, p 14.
29
On the expansion and details of the Renamo guerrilla see: A. Thomashausen, “The Mozambique
National Resistence”, in CJ Maritz, ed, Weerstandsbewegings in Suider-Afrika, Potchefstoom
(PUCHO) 1987, pp. 29-65 and A. Thomashausen, "The National Resistance of Mozambique", in: 13
(1983) Africa Insight No. 2, pp 125-129.
30
Pavia, op cit, 68.
31
Sunday Times, 15. Dec 1985, p 8; Pavia, op cit, p 40;
32
His story is told by his wife, Ellie, in: Ellie Hein, Beyond the Shadow, Dallas, Christ for the Nations,
2000.
33
Understandably annoyed, Chester Crocker referred to these as “a series of harassing conditions”. See
Crocker, op cit, p 247.
34
Business Day 23 July 1987, p 5.
35
Sunday Times, 12 Dec 1986, p. 2.
25
36
From the abundance of writings and comments see what appears to be one of the least biased
summaries in: Cabrita, op cit, pp. 239-242. Most recently, and based on statements of two former KGB
operatives, it has been suggested that the crash was the result of several combined acts of sabotage
carried out by the KGB with the assistance of high ranking Frelimo politicians, including possibly
Joaquim Chissano. See O. Cabral, “KGB promoveu morte de Machel com conivência de quadros da
Frelimo”, in: Imparcial (Maputo) 23 Oct 2002.
37
The linkage between conceding propaganda favours to Frelimo in return for support for US proposals
in respect of Angola is somewhat bashfully admitted to in Chester Crocker, High Noon, New York and
London, 1992, pp 238-239, 249 and 458 and was confirmed to me in a conversation with Professor
Crocker at Georgetown University on 5 July 1994. See also H Andersson, Mozambique – A War
against the People, London Macmillan1992, p. 194.
38
One of the mercenaries who used to work for the British security company DSL has recently
published some of his nightmarish recollections from his assassination assignments in Mozambique on
the Internet, see: Dan Hallock, Bloody Hell, http://www.warishell.com/warishell/ stories/andy.htm.
23
Thomashausen: Preventive Diplomacy in Mozambique
The propagandistic origin of the reports of “massacres” is most recently confirmed in Pavia, op cit,
p. 32. US Ambassador to Mozambique, Melissa Wells, remarked to the author during an unforgettable
diner at La Madleine in Pretoria on 23 February 1990 that she became suspicious for the first time
when it took the Frelimo government over three weeks to allow her and her military attaché access to
the village of Homoine, where a most spectacular “massacre” of 386 people had allegedly been
committed by Renamo on 18 July 1987. When Mrs Wells and her staff were finally allowed to go, after
repeated and finally formal requests to visit the site, they found what Mrs Wells described as
“something of a Hollywood movie stage, where skulls were neatly lined up on the shelves in the town’s
general store”.
Interestingly, Renamo’s demands that the Homoine “massacre” be investigated by the Red Cross or
any other impartial international team of specialists with full access and co-operation by Renamo was
never taken up and simply overlooked by a media.
40
“BA’s comem bebés e violam sepulturas” (Armed Bandits eat babys and recently buried corpses), in:
Notícias 13 October 1987, 8. One Western author particularly fascinated with the details of torture and
slaughter cooked up by the many outlets for Frelimo’s propaganda is K B Wilson, “Cults of Violence
and Counter-Violence in Mozambique”, in: 18 (3) Journal of Southern African Studies (1992), 531582.
41
See for instance S Barber, “Renamo accused of genocide in Mozambique”, in: Business Day 26
April 1988, page 10. The actual text of the report was never made available generally, probably to limit
the risk of critical scrutiny.
42
Quoted from AWEPAA, Mozambique’s Unnatural Disaster Persists, Amsterdam 1989, 14.
43
This was admitted to me by Ambassador Wells, see note 9 above. Incidentally, Chester Crocker in
the aftermath conceded that the there was little to be proud of in respect of the Gersoni Report.
Apparently anticipating that Crocker would not have accepted the report and authorised it for
publication, Gersoni leaked advanced copies to the media before the report reached Chester Crocker’s
office. This made it impossible for the State Department to still scrutinise Gersoni’s data and possibly
request improvements, in particular regarding the scientific basis of Gersoni’s “sampling” methods (my
conversation with Professor Crocker at Georgetown University on 5 July 1994). It would have been
interesting to investigate, however, what had motivated Gersoni, a trusted friend of Elliot Abrams, then
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, to sell himself out to Frelimo.
44
J Hanlon, Mozambique – Who calls the shots?, supra, chapter 3 (“One Million Dead”).
45
K Flowers, Serving Secretly, London 1987, 300-302 and National Oil Company of Zimbabwe
(Private) Ltd and Others v Nicholas Collwyn Sturge [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 281 Q.B. (Comm.Ct).
46
For instance the so-called Minter Report: W. Minter, The Mozambique National Resistance
(Renamo) as Described by Ex-participants, Research Report. Ford Foundation 1989. Another example
is Andersson, op cit (note 37), at p 164, where, speaking of the period following the 1994 elections
and the outlook for development and democracy in Mozambique, that author writes: ”That confusion
and continued belief that gaining power is paramount dominates the feeling inside Renamo, is born out
by the report of an advisor to Dhlakama, who says that the leader is uncertain as to whether he should
take the democratic route, or whether he should continue to fight.” The footnote for this statement
reads: “André Thomashausen, December 1990”. Clearly, this author could not have pronounced
himself in “December 1990” about the state of mind of Dhlakama and the sentiments within Renamo in
1995. Another example of Andersson’s extraordinary visionary powers is her account on p 129, where
she makes the narrates that she could see the Indian Ocean at the shores of Nampula Province whilst
standing on the mountains near the small Malawian border town of Mulanje, thus “surveying the miles
of Mozambican unrest”. A “survey” of a map of the region which would have revealed to her that the
shortest and direct line distance from Mulanje to the coast of Nampula is 600 kilometres, far beyond
the possible maximum reach of any human vision (due to the curvature of our planet Earth …).
47 In 1994, Renamo obtained 112 out of a total of 250 seats in Parliament and a simple majority in the 5
most populated provinces, out of a total of 10. In 1999, they scored 117 seats and the majority of votes
in 6 of the 10 provinces. In both elections, exceptionally high percentages of votes (when compared
with the national average) were declared invalid in the provinces where Renamo won, resulting in an
overall bias in favour of the government candidates. In terms of percentages of the total of all voters
registered in the voters lists, in both elections, the government candidates failed to secure a majority.
See for the election results see http://www.mozambique.mz/governo/eleicoes/finais.htm. See also final
report for the 1999 elections of the Carter Center at http://www.cartercenter.org/REPORTS
39
24
Thomashausen: Preventive Diplomacy in Mozambique
mozamfinal.pdf; and the factually very detailed and interesting election special in AWEPA – European
Parlamentarians for Africa, Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin Issue 24 (28 December 1999),
available online at http://www.mozambique.mz/awepa/ eawep24/ eawepa24.htm.
48 Christian Geffray, La Cause des Armes au Mozambique, Paris Credu-Karthala 1990.
49 F. Weissmann, “Mozambique: La Guerre du Ventre”, in: F Jean & J-G Rufin, Economie des Guerres
Civiles, Paris 1996, pp 168 – 190 (179). See also: D. Hoile, Mozambique resistance and freedom – A
case for reasessment. London 1994, and by the same author the most helpful political chronology of
Mozambique: Mozambique 1962-1993: A Political Chronology, London 1994.
50 J Cabrita, op cit.
51 A Serras Pires & Fiona C Capstick, The Winds of Havoc, St. Martin, New York, 2001.
52 S. Naidu, Mozambique: A Lasting Peace?, SAIIA Country Profile No 4, Johannesburg 2001 .
53 “Guerrillas and Violence in the War in Mozambique: De-Socialization or Re-Socialization?”, in:
African Affairs, 2001 vol 100, Issue 399, pp. 215-237. See also: Linda M. Heywood, “Towards an
understanding of modern political ideology in Africa: the case of the Ovimbundu of Angola”, in: 36 (1)
1998, The Journal of Modern African Studies, pp 139-167.
54
See Pavia, op cit, p. 70-72.
55
AIM, ed, A Study of the Results of the First Year of the Government’s Economic Recovery
Programme, Maputo AIM, 1988.
56
Pavia, op cit, pp. 84-88.
57 See for instance: Pamela L. Reed, “The Politics of Reconciliation: The United Nations Operation in
Mozambique”, in: William J Durch, ed., UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the civil wars of the
1990s, New York, 1996, 275-310; Richard Synge, UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94. Washington
D.C. 1997; Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices,
Washington D.C. 1994. Even the inevitable “Blue Book” of the United Nations about Mozambique
(after all, one of only very few successful peacekeeping missions in Africa) fails to capture the decisive
events, attempting instead to attribute each and every success during the 2 year long mission to Mr
Boutros Boutros-Ghali personally (The United Nations and Mozambique, Blue Book Series Vol. V).
58 This particularly ingenious theory has been recently advanced by Alex Vines, “The Business of
Peace: ‘Tiny’ Rowland, Financial Incentives”, in: 1998 Accord, 1-11 (http://www.cr.org/cr/acc_moz/vines.htm).
59 Noteable exceptions are: Dirk Salmons, “Probing the Successful Application of Leverage in support
of Mozambique’s Quest for Peace”, Paper prepared for the Roundtable Meeting on “Applying
Leverage: Lessons from the United Nations Operations in Mozambique and Eastern Slavonia”, Centre
for the Study of International Organisation NYU School of Law and Woodrow Wilson School of
Princeton University, Oct 8, 1999; J M Turner, “A Comunidade Internacional e o Processo Eleitoral em
Moçambique”, in: B Mazula, ed, Mozambique Eleições Democracia e Desenvolvimento, Maputo 1995,
pp 643-671; Thania Paffenholz, Konflikttransformation durch Vermittlung, M. Grünewald, Mainz
1998; Andrea E Ostheimer, Demokratisierungsprozesse in den lusophonen Staaten Afrikas, Hamburg
1999; M Cahen, “’Dhlakama é maningue nice’ An Atypical Former Guerrilla in the Mozambican
Electoral Campaign”, in: 1998 (38) Transformation, 1- 48.
60 The Association of Saint Egidio (also sometimes referred to as a “catholic lay community”) who
hosted the meetings of the negotiating teams in Rome and who probably holds the most comprehensive
collection of materials has so far failed to transfer these archives to Mozambique. Instead they
published their own and somewhat selective account of the mediation process in R. Morozzo della
Rocca, Mozambico – Dalla guerra alla pace, Milano 1994.
61
See the account in E Hein, op cit (note32), pp 161 et seq. Also: B Kiplagat, “The African Role in
Conflict Management and Resolution”, in: D R Smock & C A Crocker, eds, African Conflict
Resolution – The U.S. Role in Peacemaking, Washington DC USIPP 1995, pp. 27-38.
62
S Chang & S Venâncio, War and Peace in Mozambique, New York St, Martins, 1998, p 27. See also
Hume, op cit who seems to actually believe that the US State Department could claim to have been the
main contributor to the success of the Mozambique peace accord.
63 For the official English text of the “Rome Accord” see: United Nations Security Council, Document
S/24635, 8 October 1992. The Portuguese text is gazetted in Mozambique as Act 13/92 of 14 October
1992 (BR No 42, 1. Suplemento) and is available at http://www.lexmoc.com.
64
The CSC, was composed as follows:
25
Thomashausen: Preventive Diplomacy in Mozambique
Chairman:
Observers:
Government:
UN Special Representative Mr Aldo Ajello (Italian)
Representatives from the OAU, Italy, France, UK, USA and Portugal
Ministers A Guebuza, T Hunguana, J Kachamila, A Salomão, Gen S Mutmike, Majs
S de Lima and J Marepo
Renamo:
Secretaries R Domingos, J de Castro, A Vietor, L Maome, Brig J Malagueta.
65 Chair as for CSC. Observers: Portugal, France and UK. Government: Gen T Dai. Renamo: Gen M Negunhamo.
66 Composition: Chairman and Observers as for CSC, but additionally representatives from Botswana, Nigeria and
Egypt. Government: Brig A Malunga. Renamo: Gen H Morais.
67 Chair and Observers as CSC, but in addition representatives of Norway, Spain, Netherlands, Germany, Sweden,
Switzerland, South Africa, Denmark and the EC.
68 The government proposal, known as the “12 Points” and Renamo’s reply in “16 Points” make fascinating
reading, 10 years on. As the documents are not easily obtainable, they are reprinted at the end.
69 Dirk Salomons has aptly described this process in the context of his analysis of changing leverage relations. See
note 22 above.
70
Some grim first hand accounts and images of life behind the battle lines can be found in: E. Hein, Mozambique,
Beyond the Shadow, Christ for the Nations, Dallas – Taxas (U.S.A.) 2000.
71 This was indeed noticed (but hardly understood) by Hall, supra, 216.
72 Expresso 8-10-92.
73 In the words of my late academic promoter Werner Kaltefeiter: “Die institutionalisierte Hoffnung der
Unzufriedenen”, see: W Kaltefleiter, Vorspiel zum Wechsel – Eine Analyse der Bundestagswahl 1976, Berlin 1977,
246 et seq.
26