Safelite Auto (B) Incentive Compensation Chapter 15 In-Class Principal-Agent Incentive Model In-Class Student Presentations Safelite Glass • Did PPP succeed? • What were the problems with PPP? • Should management proceed with the introduction of PPP or even a modified PPP? • What were the consequences of the switch from wage rates to piece rates for: – – – – – Turnover Recruitment Productivity Product Quality Total Labor Costs Safelite Glass • 600 small auto-glass repair centers • 1994 – pay for performance introduced – Hourly wages = f(base salary, glass installed) – Minimum base salary = $11/hr – Must install defectives without pay • Benefits – 36% increase in installed glass/day • Improved productivity per worker • Better workers stay – Decrease in turnover • Costs – Operating: 9% increase in pay/employee – Investment: not high; info system could handle • Net effect – Increase in profits • Source: E. Lazear, “Performance Pay and Productivity,” The American Economic Review, Dec. 2000 Basic principal-agent model • Effort not directly observable – use proxy – “post contractual asymmetric information” • Outside risk factor – Could work hard but not all measured => Compensation contract – tie incentive pay to proxy to motivate effort – Include base pay to reduce risk bearing Basic principal-agent model Worker’s output: Q=e+, ~(0,2) – output depends on effort and a random element Profit=(e+)-W – profit is output minus cost of worker Comp. Contract: W=W0+Q, 0 1 – compensation has a fixed component and an element linked to output • Solution – Firm sets Wo and b – Worker maximizes E(U)=E(W-e2) – Worker chooses effort e* = ab/2 – Effort increases with b Basic principal-agent model Risk If replace some base pay with variable compensation More variability in pay; increased risk Must give higher expected compensation (“compensating differential”) Compensating Differential for Bearing Risk: 3 Jobs • $100,000 with 100% certainty • 0 $200,000 50% of the time 50% of the time • 50,000 $150,000 50% of the time 50% of the time Specific principal-agent model a=$100 u=+$800 with probability 0.50; -$800 with probability 0.50; =0.2 W0=$800 Q=e+ W=W0+Q, 0 1 Estimating unknown productivity • Choosing incentive pay rate requires firm to know productivity (a) – E.g. choose b to elicit effort since e*=ab/2 • Time and motion studies – dysfunctional behavior • Past performance – ratchet effect – Lincoln Electric’s Concern about the ratchet effect Measurement costs • Measurement of evaluation criteria is costly – – – – – – Accounting system Data entry time & personnel Supervisor observation Record keeping Accuracy check Training Opportunism • Gaming – Unethical efforts to alter performance measurements (e.g. Q) – Unintended consequences • I.e. the typist at Lincoln Electric • Evaluation system should be set up to detect &/or reduce the likelihood of opportunism Subjective performance evaluation • Why? Some tasks difficult to measure but should be rewarded • Subjective evaluation methods – Standard rating scales – Goal-based systems • Problems – Supervisor shirking – forced distribution – influence costs • Navy Officer Evaluation System Relative performance evaluation • Measures performance relative to other employees or other firms – E.g. 20% commission on individual sales over average for department – E.g. Bonus earned if market share increases are higher than competitors’ • Benefits – Can lower compensating differential by sifting out outside effects (m) from effort • Alternative: use subjective component to adjust for outside effects – Elicits high competitiveness Relative performance evaluation • Costs – – – – – dysfunctional competitiveness jobs not always identical data across firms hard to obtain group has incentive to punish “rate busters” incentive to hire less competent workers Combining performance measures • Few job performance measures are purely objective or subjective • Both types can be inaccurate – increasing inaccuracy of either places greater weight on other – inaccuracies increase employee risk • Both can induce dysfunctional behaviors Looking Forward • December 6, 7, or 9: Performance Evaluation – Chapters 16 and 17 – Prepare Arthur Anderson Case (ch. 17) • Course Project Due • December 13, 14, or 16: Final Exam – Blackboard: Past Exam Exams – Open book, open notes – Remember to bring a calculator and all course materials