e-Voting
Status Quo Germany
Open Rights Group: Taking the lid off e-Voting
London, 08/02/2007
Ulrich Wiesner
08.02.2006
e-Voting: Status Quo Germany
ulrichwiesner.de
Germany: Voting Computers
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Permitted since 1999
Only certified vendor is Nedap
 Sold 600 computers to City of
Cologne in 1998
 Other cities joined since then:
Dortmund, Neuss, Cottbus,
Koblenz
 Covering 2’000 of 80’000 ballot
offices

Hamburg decided to introduce
Digital Pen in 10/2005
 Based on Anoto Technology
 Prototype tested in 2005
 Vendor selected in 01/2007
(Windows based system)
 IBM Germany announced to
develop a roll-in/roll-out offering
(embedded Linux and Java)
 Adds 1600 ballot offices at once
Circle size represents number of
ballot offices using computers
08.02.2006
e-Voting: Status Quo Germany
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Digital Pen
08.02.2006
e-Voting: Status Quo Germany
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2D dot pattern, 90 dpi
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Dots are offset in 4 directions (up,
down, left, right)
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Pattern of 6x6 dots provide
coordinates for pen,
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Addresses* 436 squares of
2x2mm2 e.g. 20’000x20’000 km2
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*)Anoto refers to 60M km2
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Digital Pen

Pen with embedded scanner
 Paper contains dot pattern acting as a 2D bar code
 Pen recognises coordinates where it writes
 Electronic representation of marked areas is uploaded to computer and joined
with electronic voting form
 Paper ballot is put in ballot box
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At end of election:
 Computer classifies electronic votes
 Ambiguously marked scans are presented to officials
 Classified votes are counted by computer
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Inherent paper trail
Kick-starts the re-count discussion
 Is it acceptable to only count a random sample?
 Which sample size is required?
 How does a recount needs to be organised?
 Hamburg plans to count paper ballots in 1.5% of the ballot offices. No recounts
after first election.
08.02.2006
e-Voting: Status Quo Germany
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Germany: e-Counting
 Manual capture of paper ballots
 Barcode scanner (code next to chosen option on ballot paper)
 PC based entering via keyboard
 4 eye principle
 Used in local elections only
 Lacking appropriate legal basis
 No certification process
 Southern Germany
 Baden-Würtemberg, Bayern, Hessen
08.02.2006
e-Voting: Status Quo Germany
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Germany: Opposition
 Little media coverage other than modernisation euphoria
 But detailled and frequent reports by Richard Sietmann in major
computer magazine (c’t)
 Other media picking up since Q4/2006
 Election scrutiny
 2005 Bundestag election challenged because of use of Nedaps
 Violating election principles transparency and audit-ability
 Turned down in December 2006
 Next step is constitutional court
 2006 Cottbus major election challenged
 Turned down immediately
 2006 On-line petition against voting computers
 Filed by Tobias Hahn, Berlin, Signed by 45’000+ people
 Pending with petition committee of the Bundestag
 Chaos Computer Club, Berlin
 Involved in Nedap-Hack
 Active campaign supporting petition and scrutiny
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e-Voting: Status Quo Germany
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Issues / To does
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No national campaign
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Digital pen adds new quality
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Technology requires research
Security needs to be analysed
Paper trail verification issues need to be understood
Available knowledge on recounts need to be applied to German electoral system
Lack of awareness
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Do we need one? Should it be European or national?
Can existing organisations pick up?
How can we maintain non-partisan character of the issue?
Many Politicians and Journalists still unaware of e-Voting and related issues
Vendors still gets away with aim to provide the modern approach to elections
Discussion needs to leave the IT corner
Efficiency of electoral systems?
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Does participation require more complex electoral systems and more frequent polls?
Might/will drive purchase of e-Voting technology
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e-Voting: Status Quo Germany
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Questions and Answers
http://ulrichwiesner.de
08.02.2006
e-Voting: Status Quo Germany
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Germany: Election Organisation
 Election Organisation
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National Electoral Act and Electoral Code provide framework
National elections are supervised by Ministry of Interior
Execution is with municipalities
Costs are refunded to municipalities by a lump sum per voter
 Use of technology
 Ministry of Interior is regulator (authorisation)
 Municipalities are free in decision if and what to use within regulatory
framework
 Voter registration
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Law enforces that citizens register their residence with the municipality
Voter register is prepared by municipality from residence register
No requirement for voters to enrol in register
No central registers for residence or voters on federal or state level
Process is relatively incident free
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e-Voting: Status Quo Germany
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Germany: Electoral System
 National Parliament
 2 votes: One for regional candidate, one for party in federal state
 Parliaments of Federal States
 Typically 2 votes (candidate and party) or just one vote (party)
 Regional Elections
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County, Municipality, (Major)
System varies from state to state
Often similar systems to national level
Some states have complex electoral systems
 E.g. Frankfurt: One vote for each seat (85) in the Council
 Absentee voting
 Via mail on request
08.02.2006
e-Voting: Status Quo Germany
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Germany: Remote e-voting
 Late 1990‘s
 Significant effort in research, projects W.I.E.N, VoteRemote
 05/2002:
 Minister of the Interior announces remote e-Voting for 2006 or 2010
 10/2002
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Parliament discusses remote e-Voting: supported by all 5 parties
Perception that Germany is “behind”
New channel in addition to ballot office and mail
Hope that higher turnout can be achieved using internet voting
Debate is focussed on if internet voting should be used to vote more
often (supported by Labour and Greens, opposed by Conservatives)
 Since 2004
 Ministry of Interior considers internet voting to be appropriate for nonpolitical elections only
 Main concern is that secrecy of the vote can not be enforced
08.02.2006
e-Voting: Status Quo Germany
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Black box voting
Hypothesis:
 Every electronic voting system
violates at least one of the
three procedural election
principles: Secrecy,
Transparency, Verifiability
Vote
Vote
Black Box
Voting Computer
Votes
Vote
 Every electronic voting system
requires trust into vendor and
operators
Secret?
Transparent?
Verifiable?
 Trust is inappropriate measure
to ensure election integrity
08.02.2006
e-Voting: Status Quo Germany
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Election Principles
 Verifiability, transparency and secrecy
ensure that elections are free, fair and general
se
cre
t
free
equal
general
in public
08.02.2006
auditable
e-Voting: Status Quo Germany
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2005 Election Scrutiny
 Bundestag election, September 19th, 2005
 Four e-Voting related complaints filed with scrutiny committee of the
parliament
 Federal Ministry of the Interior replied in May 2006:
No evidence of tampering, threads are hypothetical”
Elections are still transparent and verifiable using Nedaps
Nedaps can not be hacked because source code is private
Manipulation is pointless because Nedaps are configured just before
election and hackers can’t know which party is on which button
 Election integrity is ensured by procedural framework
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 Bundestag rejected complaints on December 14th, 2006
 Mainly follows arguments of Ministry of the Interior
 Next step is Constitutional Court
 To be filed by 14/02/2007
08.02.2006
e-Voting: Status Quo Germany
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Legal framework
Constitution (Grundgesetz)
Art. 20
Democatric (transparent, in public)
Art. 41
Auditable, verifiable
Parliament, 2/3
§35
Use of voting machines is permitted
Parliament
§67
Result is determined immediately
after close of ballot
Administration
Art. 38
General, free, equal, secret
Electoral Act (Bundeswahlgesetz)
§10
Election committees act in public
§31
Ballot is conducted in public
Electoral Code (Bundeswahlordnung)
§54
Ballot is conducted and result
determined in public
§56
Secrecy of ballot is mandatory
Voting Machine Code (Bundeswahlgeräteverordnung)
§1
Use of voting machines requires
licence by Ministry of Interior

§2
Licence requires
technical certification
§4
Permission is required for use in
elections
Administration
Transparency and verifiability is substantial part of legal framework, but not
repeated in context of e-Voting
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Upcoming Elections
 Germany
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No major computer based elections in 2007
Spring 2008 – Hessen and Nordrhein-Westfalen (Nedap)
Spring 2008 – Hamburg (Digital Pen)
Spring 2009 – European Parliament (Digital Pen?, Nedap)
Autum 2009 – Bundestag (Digital Pen?, Nedap)
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e-Voting: Status Quo Germany
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