We do not need food, we are not starving to death. We are being
persecuted and we prefer to be hungry for a week than not to sleep every
night, in fear of being beaten, raped or killed
-
1
Internally Displaced Yugoslavian1
Cohen, Roberta in Davies, Sara E. & Glanville, Luke (ed.). (2010). Page: 37
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... 4
List of Acronyms ....................................................................................................................... 5
1 The Problem of Displacement ................................................................................................ 6
1.1 Internally Displaced People ............................................................................................ 6
1.1.1 Displacement in Numbers ............................................................................................ 8
1.1.2 Human Rights for All? ................................................................................................. 9
1.1.3 The Will of States and the International Responsibility ............................................ 11
1.1.4 Responsibility to Protect ............................................................................................ 12
1.1.5 Interference in a Sovereign State ............................................................................... 14
1.1.6 Research Area ............................................................................................................ 15
1.1.6.1 Problem Formulation .......................................................................................... 16
1.2 Methods......................................................................................................................... 16
1.2.1 Pit-falls and Limitations ........................................................................................ 16
1.2.2 Interview ................................................................................................................ 17
2. Humanitarian Interventions ................................................................................................. 18
2.1 What is a Humanitarian Intervention? .......................................................................... 18
2.2 International Relations Theory ...................................................................................... 18
2.2.1 Liberalism .............................................................................................................. 19
2.2.2. Realism ................................................................................................................. 20
2.2.3 The English School ................................................................................................ 21
2.3 International Relations Theory and Humanitarian Intervention.................................... 22
2.3.1 Limits of Sovereignty ............................................................................................ 22
2.3.2 Objections to Humanitarian Intervention .............................................................. 23
2.3.3 The Solidarist Approach ........................................................................................ 25
2.3.4 Solidarist Critique of the Realist Approach ........................................................... 26
2.3.5 Summary ................................................................................................................ 27
2.4 United Nations Security Council .................................................................................. 27
2.4.1 Intervention in Somalia.......................................................................................... 28
2.4.2 Crisis in Sudan ....................................................................................................... 29
2.4.3 Summary ................................................................................................................ 32
3 Theory of Protection and Practice of Intervention ............................................................... 33
3.1 Why US an UN aborted Somalia .................................................................................. 33
3.2 Why an Intervention in Sudan can be Justified ............................................................. 34
3.3 Selectivity on Humanitarian Grounds or to Spread Liberal Peace? .............................. 35
2
3.4 When to Intervene ......................................................................................................... 36
3.5 R2P as an Ideal or Emerging Norm .............................................................................. 37
4. Trying Different Means ...................................................................................................... 39
4.1 Before Intervention ....................................................................................................... 39
4.1.1. Diplomacy and Sanctions ..................................................................................... 39
4.1.2. Military Measures and No-fly Zones .................................................................... 40
4.1.3. The International Criminal Court ......................................................................... 41
4.1.4 Summary ................................................................................................................ 42
4.2 R2P for IDPs ................................................................................................................. 42
4.2.1 Revolution or Evolution? ....................................................................................... 43
4.2.2 Implementing R2P to IDP protection .................................................................... 44
4.3 The Humanitarian Perspective ...................................................................................... 46
5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 49
5.1 The Realist Conclusion ................................................................................................. 49
5.2 The Solidarist Conclusion ............................................................................................. 50
5.3 Back to Reality .............................................................................................................. 50
5.4 Questions for Further Research ..................................................................................... 51
6 Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 52
7 Appendix .............................................................................................................................. 57
3
ABSTRACT
This report seeks to highlight prospects for and problems in relation to Responsibility to
Protect (R2P), humanitarian intervention, and internally displaced people (IDPs) in states that
are unwilling to protect them. The starting point for the discussion is in international relations
theory, with a focus on realism and solidarism, and examples of international interference in
Somalia and Sudan. IDP protection is discussed in relation to R2P and the consequences of
humanitarian intervention followed by an assessment of other means of interference. It is
concluded that the theoretical perspective from which the problem is regarded, is determining
in on how the prospect of R2P is seen, but in any case there is little sign that the perception of
sovereignty is changing. Furthermore, it is concluded that R2P does not contribute with
anything new in relation to making states accountable of their responsibility to protect IDPs.
4
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AU – African Union
AMIS – African Union Mission in Sudan
CCPDC – Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflicts
ICC – International Criminal Court
ICISS – International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty
IDMC – International Displacement Monitoring Center
IDP - Internally Displaced People
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRC – Norwegian Refugee Council
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA – UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PDD 25 – Presidential Decision Directive 25
R2P – Responsibility to Protect
UN – United Nations
UNAMID – African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITAF – United Task Force
UNOSOM I – United Nation Operation in Somalia I
UNOSOM II - United Nation Operation in Somalia I
UNSC – United Nations Security Council
US – United States
5
1 THE PROBLEM OF DISPLACEMENT
The natural consequence of conflict, war and natural disasters is for the affected people to
take refuge and seek safety. The atrocities that happened during the Second World War made
the International community recognize that they had a responsibility to protect those who
were being prosecuted by their own government. Hence a number of international
conventions describing the rights of the individual were made. One of them is the UN
Refugee Convention of 1951, securing an international responsibility was formulated and
basic rights were given to refugees. With this convention, a definition of a refugee was made,
stressing the importance of having crossed an internationally recognized boarder in search of
refuge. The majority of forcibly displaced people never cross borders, thus the definition
divides fleeing people into two groups: refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs). 2 This
division becomes important when placing the responsibility to protect those who are
uprooted. The refugee convention clarifies that receiving states must never send a refugee
back if there is a well-founded fear of persecution, but IDPs are still forced to claim rights and
protection with their own state – also in cases where the state is unable or unwilling to fulfill
these rights, e.g. during civil war or disasters. However, a new norm may be emerging in the
UN, indicating that there is an international responsibility to secure human rights for all. This
has come to be known as Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The question is whether or not this
can be regarded as a new hope for IDPs to seek protection.
In the following chapter the problem of protecting IDPs within their home state will be
identified, and the background for the specific research area about IDPs and R2P will be
described.
1.1 INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE
The United Nations began to talk about and recognize IDPs as a special group of concern in
the 1990’s, primarily based on the writings of former Representative of the UN SecretaryGeneral on Internally Displaced Persons, Francis Deng. Since, the debate on when a person
should be considered an IDP has been ongoing. There has been a common agreement of
internal displacement are always involuntary and takes place within national borders, but the
width of the further definition has been an issue. On one side, the view has been that the
definition should cover only the groups of people who are displaced as a consequence of
2
The Refugee Conventions also sets down other criteria to the definition, but the basic demand of
having crossed a boarder needs to be fulfilled in order to be considered as a refugee, and is therefore
the first criteria that will make the division between IDPs and refugees.
6
conflict, violence or persecution but still residing within the country of origin3. This definition
is the equivalent of the UN Refugee Convention’s definition of a refugee,4 but with the issue
of border crossing as the major difference. On the other side, the view has been that the
definition should go broader and include all kinds of involuntary movement, such as famines
and natural disaster, as displacement. While this discussion is still ongoing, we can talk about
a general consensus on the definition provided in the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement from 1998:
“… internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have
been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual
residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed
conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or
natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally
recognized state border.” 5
This definition is broad, and focus on involuntary displacement at all levels. Not mentioned in
the definition, but specifically pointed out in Principle 6.c. is development-induced
displacement, i.e. forced displacement as a consequence of development projects such as dam
building and deforestation. The reason for having the broad definition is that while the
situation that initiates the displacement might vary, the situation that IDPs are in is the same.
In most cases, this entails encampment, poverty, a lack of proper shelter, sanitation and
education facilities, and in many cases it will also result in discrimination and marginalization
because the IDPs form a minority group in the new area of settlement. Data collected by
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), a part of the Norwegian Refugee Council
(NRC), showed that IDPs in many countries experienced physical violations such as sexual
violence, abduction, forced relocation, and arbitrary arrest. Also, children are at greater risk of
being recruited to armed groups. The lack of security in IDP camps or settlements also
reduced the possibility of assistance reaching them because humanitarian workers are being
attacked. In 2010 many attacks were recorded in e.g. Darfur in Sudan, Yemen, Somalia and
Columbia.6 Generally, the conditions for many IDPs are similar to, or worse than conditions
in many refugee camps. Therefore, it is necessary to take extra measurements to protect this
group, than the general civilian population.
3
Mooney, Erin. (2001). Page: 1.
UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. (1951). Article 1.
5
UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. (1998). Page: 5.
6
IDMC. (2011). Page: 9-10.
4
7
1.1.1 DISPLACEMENT IN NUMBERS
According to IDMC7 there were 27.5 million IDPs due to armed conflict, general violence or
other human rights violations by the end of 2010. Of these 11.1 million are displaced in
Africa, leaving this as the most affected region. In comparison, Latin America have the
second largest number of IDPs: 5,4 million. This is mainly due to the armed conflict between
government forces and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia in Columbia, which has
resulted in as many as 5,2 million IDPs. The region with the lowest figure is Europe and
Central Asia with 2.5 million IDPs together.
Even though a large number of IDPs are able to return to their home area every year,
at least 2.1 million in 2010, the number of IDPs worldwide has been steadily rising. In 1997,
there were around 17 million IDPs. In the same period, the number of refugees has been more
or less the constant, fluctuating between 13-16 million. From 2009 to 2010 the number of
IDPs has increased with 400.000. Africa is the only region where the number of IDPs has
decreased, with 500.000 in total. Even in spite of new large displacements in Sudan, the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Somaila. Africa was also the region that made the most
progress in 2010 in addressing the needs of IDPs through legal mechanisms. By the end of
2010 Uganda, Sierra Leone, Chad and the Central African Republic had ratified the African
Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs in Africa, and several other
countries had begun the ratification process.
The map below shows the total division of IDPs in the world, by December 2010.
The countries marked in dark grey are the countries where IDMC have registered IDPs. Not
surprisingly, the most affected countries are in the developing world, suffering from poverty,
natural disasters and conflict.
7
All statistical data in this section is taken from IDMC 2011.
8
1.1.2 HUMAN RIGHTS FOR ALL?
In the late 17th century the natural right of people was used in the US Declaration of
independence, where the right of the individual to be protected from the sates is emphasised.
Today, Kantian philosophy has come to influence the concept of human rights, from a natural
right to possess protection from the state to natural rights as innate moral rights for people to
be treated humanely.8 Since then there have been number of conventions ratified with the goal
of preserving individual human rights, like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(1948), Convention on the prevention on Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), the
Refugee Convention (1951), Convention of the Rights of Children (1989), Convention of
Rights for Migrant Workers (1990), Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(2006), to name a few. Still, no international convention has been made to cover the rights of
IDPs. However, AU has taken steps towards institutionalising IDP rights with the African
Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa
(2009).
It is stated in the opening words of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of the freedom, justice and peace in the
world”9 Thus emphasizing the belief based on natural law that all are born equal and have
equal rights.
8
9
Battersby, Paul & Siracusa, Joseph, M. (2009). Page: 146-148.
UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (1948). Preamble.
9
Based on this belief in equality for all, it could be criticized why IDPs should be
considered a group that requires special attention or concern. The fear could be that in
countries affected by poverty and conflict, all civilians are vulnerable, and by focussing on
one group, one might deprive the rest of the community from the help and assistance they are
entitled to.10 However, it is a generally accepted fact, that “equality in fact may involve the
necessity of different treatment on order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium
between different situations”.11
The broad definition of IDPs emphasizes that a large group should be given special
attention as a group of concern. However, being covered by the definition does not give them
any specific rights. IDPs are still within national borders the responsibility of their protection
lies with the government, due to their status as a sovereign state. The Guiding Principles on
Internal Displacement were made to emphasize the state’s responsibility to protect IDPs and
work for their human rights to be fulfilled, but have no legal binding power. They might seem
equivalent to the refugee convention, but cannot be considered as such. It provides a
definition of IDPs, guidelines for treatment of IDPs, and emphasize that human rights are
eligible to them as well. But not being a signed convention it can only be considered “a
normative framework for addressing the problem”.12 This stresses the crucial, legal difference
between refugees and IDPs, because The Guiding Principles only stress the fact that the state
has the primary responsibility for protecting IDPs but does not hold them accountable.
Furthermore, there is no international organization that has the designated mandate to take
action and responsibility when states are unable or unwilling to provide assistance and
protection, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has the mandate to
secure and provide protection for refugees. Previously, the UN Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration, a predecessor for UNCHR, was responsible for the protection of both IDPs
and refugees, but during the Cold War borders “became sacrosanct and concepts of noninterference overrode most efforts to protect people inside their countries”. 13 UNHCR still
perceives IDPs as a group of concern, but without the consent of the governing state, they are
unable to operate within a country and provide assistance.
10
Mooney, Erin. (2001). Page: 19.
Mooney, Erin. (2001). Page: 19.
12
Mooney, Erin. (2001). Page: 1.
13
Cohen, Roberta in Davies, Sara E. & Glanville, Luke (ed.). (2010). Page: 36.
11
10
1.1.3 THE WILL OF STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
In displacement situations where states are willing, but not able to fulfill their responsibility
they can accept humanitarian assistance from one or more of the many humanitarian
organizations willing to act in critical situations. The humanitarian assistance should be seen
only as aid-giving as stressed in Principle 25.2 of The Guiding Principles:
International humanitarian organisations and other appropriate actors have
the right to offer their services in support of the internally displaced. Such an
offer shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act or an interference in a State’s
internal affairs and shall be considered in good faith.
However, it is not in all cases the state is willing to protect its IDPs, and accept the offer of
humanitarian assistance agencies. In cases of conflict where the state is fighting against a
certain part of the population, e.g. because of ethnicity or political affiliation, they have no
interest in letting international actors help and protect what can be seen as ‘the enemy of the
state’. The current situation in Darfur, Sudan is an example of this. It is by now a known fact
that the Sudanese government is working with, and through, the Arabic Janjaweed militias,
known for their brutal attacks and genocide like killings of ethnic and religious minorities.14
At the same time, the Sudanese government has recently suspended the humanitarian relief
organizations Catholic Relief Service and Médicins du Monde, and continues to restrict
humanitarian aid. 15 The ongoing conflict has let to the forced internal and external
displacement of millions. Consequently there are now 4.8 million IDPs in Sudan,16 which is
the highest number in Africa.
Assumingly, the case of unwilling states is primarily seen in relation to conflictinduced displacement, but has also been seen in relation to natural crisis, e.g. after the cyclone
Nargis in Myanmar 17 or the North Korean famine in the 1990’s. 18 However, in any case
where the state is not willing to help its IDPs, any action – humanitarian or not – can be seen
as an interference.
14
Human Rights Watch. (April 22th, 2002).
Amnesty International. (2011). Page: 2.
16
IDMC. (2010) – NB: the figure is made before the independence of South Sudan.
17
After Nargis the government of Myanmar did not provide sufficient assistance and protection to the
affected population, and rejected international humanitarian assistance for three weeks. See: Amnesty
International, 2008.
18
The North Korean famine begun in the beginning of the 1990’s, and killed about 1 million people. It
was not until 1995 that the North Korean government made an appeal to the international community,
and only in1998 they gave WFP permission to operate in some parts of the country. See: Amnesty
International, 2010.
15
11
1.1.4 RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
Traditionally, it has been unheard of that states would even comment on other states’ internal
affairs due to the Westphalian system of sovereignty, but an increasing focus on human
security have changed the way states act on domestic policies in relation to human rights
offences.19 Also, the lessons learned by the genocides in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia in
the 90´s have left the international community with the acknowledgement of a shared
responsibility and has had effect on how to view intervention.20 These debates have lead to
the initiation of the “Responsibility to Protect”.
Responsibility to protect or R2P can be used as a concept, principle or emerging
norm, and is usually referred to as such. Governments tend to use R2P as a concept, meaning
that it is considered an idea that still requires further development to become an actual,
integrated norm that will guide in deciding possible course of action. 21 The root of the
concept comes from the idea of Sovereignty as Responsibility, which was given new life by
primarily by Francis Deng. He highlight the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to
protect their people, and the importance of encouraging and enabling states to bear that
responsibility. The second root comes from the debate on humanitarian intervention in
Kosovo sparked by NATO in 1999.22
In the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome document it is declared that the member
states should help and encourage states responsibilities in providing protection to their
citizens - therefore also IDPs - and thereby help them carry out their responsibility as a
sovereign state. It was also noted in the Summit that the international community should be
willing to take collective measures on a case-by-case basis in order to respond to states failing
to protect, rather than being obliged to act. 23 The notion that with sovereignty come
responsibility is not new. During the Cold War freedom from outside interferences was
accepted as an important issue to withstand, but at the same time the international community
declared that states have the duty to protect and defend all human rights and freedom within
their own territories. The notion that the international community has a right to secure that
states fulfill its responsibility is not new either.24
The international community has since the end of World War II felt a certain
responsibility to protect the citizens of the world against genocides. At the UN General
19
ICISS. (2001). Page: 15.
ICISS. (2001). Page: 1.
21
Bellamy, Alex J. (2009). Page: 4-5.
22
Bellamy, Alex J. (2009). Page: 33.
23
Glanville, Luke in Davies, Sara E. & Glanville, Luke (ed.). (2010). Page: 190.
24
Glanville, Luke in Davies, Sara E. & Glanville, Luke (ed.). (2010). Page: 186.
20
12
Assembly late 1948 the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime and
Genocide declared to prevent and punish for genocides, which would be undertaken by
international laws. Over the years the belief emerged that states were responsible legally,
morally and politically, to act in case of genocides. But the international community came
under a test to hold those obligations they had imposed on themselves in the ethnic cleansing
in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia. It is a known fact that the lack of action failed to save
many lives. “The world” was ashamed and many state leaders publicly apologized and
acknowledged the fact that some reform had to be done.25 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan
wrote in The Economist in 1999:
States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their
peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty—by
which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in
the charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties—has been
enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights.
When we read the charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its
aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse
them.26
Annan is addressing the dilemma between sovereignty and human rights offences, and the
importance of protecting individuals rather than standing by when human rights are being
violated out of respect to states sovereignty. This is the traditional conception of sovereignty
that it is given to a government by the people, and therefore includes both rights and
responsibility. It should therefore be the right and responsibility of the international
community to protect individuals from unjust behavior if states are failing to uphold their
responsibility against their own population. 27
A lot of the debate on R2P has been on whether the international community,
organizations and actors have the right or responsibility to intervene in human rights
violations or not. The focus has been on encouraging and helping states protect their citizens,
but how do states or international organizations interfere when a state fails to protect its
citizens?
25
Glanville, Luke in Davies, Sara E. & Glanville, Luke (ed.). (2010). Page: 188-189.
Annan, Kofi. (1999).
27
Glanville, Luke in Davies, Sara E. & Glanville, Luke (ed.). (2010). Page: 188-189.
26
13
1.1.5 INTERFERENCE IN A SOVEREIGN STATE
In situations where human security and human rights of a population are being threatened
coercive or non-coercive interference from external actors might be vital in order to prevent
further displacement and disaster. The Report of the International Commission of Intervention
and States Sovereignty (ICISS) from 2001 on Responsibility to Protect is concerned about the
issue of actions taken against states without their consent. Also, there is a focus on the
controversial interventions to which we refer from now on as humanitarian intervention,
meaning military coercive action with a proclaimed humanitarian aim. 28 Most likely
humanitarian intervention will be a reaction to severe human rights offences, but the term
R2P goes beyond the sole reaction and addresses the importance of preventing and
rebuilding:
The responsibility to protect means not just the “responsibility to react,”
but the “responsibility to prevent” and the “responsibility to rebuild” as
well. It directs our attention to the costs and results of action versus no
action, and provides conceptual, normative and operational linkages
between assistance, intervention and reconstruction.29
In the report it is stated that full on military interventions should be avoided and that
coercive non-military measures should always be examined first. Political, economic and
military sanctions can be used as way of preventing and reacting to human rights and human
security offences. Although non-military interventions are preferable, it must be taken care
that e.g. the sanctions do not do more harm than good. This can be the danger with economic
sanctions in particular, and the risk is harming vulnerable groups rather than sanctioning the
active players in the conflict. In order to decrease the impact on innocent bystanders the
effective monitoring is vital, which has unfortunately in many sanction operations not been
the case. This does not mean the non-military interferences are ineffective, but any external
interference with internal affairs will affect not only policymakers, but can affect entire
populations.30
If military interventions are to be used as a responsibility to react it has to be only in
extreme and exceptional cases. The primary precautionary principle is based on the Catholic
Just War Tradition. It is used to justify intervention if there is a need for human protection to
avert large-scale loss of life, or/and ethnic cleansing. In the decision making about whether to
intervene or not it is said to be a “just cause” when one or both of these conditions are
28
ICISS. (2001). Page: 8-9.
ICISS. (2001). Page: 17.
30
ICISS. (2001). Page: 29-31.
29
14
present.31 Other decision-making criteria, is that military action has to be last resort. Also it
has to be with the right intention in order to try to prevent human suffering; it has to have
proportional means in a way that scale, duration and intensity of the military intervention are
to be held at minimum necessity. There has to be a reasonable prospects or chance of success
in preventing further suffering and last but not least prior to any military intervention the
United Nations Security Council should be in all cases asked for authorization, this is referred
in the ICISS Report as the right authority.32 In the report, these are called the six criteria for
military intervention.
1.1.6 RESEARCH AREA
In principle, the international focus on human rights protection and the legitimization of
international interference in internal matters could bring new hope to millions of IDPs that are
caught in the legal vacuum between sovereign states not living up to their responsibility, and
the human rights convention. The fear of sanctions and military interventions might push
states to fulfill their responsibility, and if they do not, R2P now serves as a framework that
secures international response to human rights offences. Or what?
In spite of the many current situations where civilians are persecuted and deprived of
human rights, the sanctions and military actions in Libya has been the only example of a
humanitarian, coercive interference, since R2P was introduced in 2005. Humanitarian
interventions are not a new phenomenon, but R2P provides a normative framework for
intervening, stressing that intervention “implies an evaluation of the issues from the point of
view of those seeking or needing support, rather than those who may be considering
intervention”33. This might be good news to a large part of the 27 million IDPs, living in
states where governments are unwilling to protect them, but seen in a realist perspective, an
event where states should overlook their own interest seem unlikely. However, the ICISS
justifies humanitarian intervention on the basis of extreme measures, defined an situations
where states have made it clear that they are unwilling to provide protection for their
population, and there are evidence on large loss of life or ethnic cleansing. This justification
might lead to stronger reactions from external actors to human rights violation, and might
change the scope of humanitarian interventions.
31
ICISS. (2001). Page: 31-32.
ICISS. (2001). Page: 35–37.
33
World Federalist Movement – Institute for Global Policy. (2001). Page: 3.
32
15
The aim of this report is to make a theoretical discussion of how R2P can, or cannot,
change the scope for humanitarian intervention in order to protect IDPs in cases where states
are unwilling to protect them.
1.1.6.1 PROBLEM FORMULATION
How can Responsibility to Protect be seen as a factor for changing the scope of humanitarian
intervention, and in relation to protecting IDPs in situations where states are unwilling to
provide the required protection?
1.2 METHODS
The aim of this report is to highlight the prospects and problems in relation to R2P,
humanitarian intervention and IDPs. The aim is not to make a clear-cut prediction about the
future landscape of humanitarian interventions in states that are unwilling to protect IDPs, but
merely make a conjecture on how R2P will, or will not, influence how external states will
engage in the coming assistance and protection of IDPs. To assess the three links of the
problem formulation, the question has been divided into different parts. In the first part the
focus is on the relationship between humanitarian intervention and R2P. State action and
humanitarian intervention is discussed in relation to different theories of international
relations. The theoretical discussion is mainly based on Nicolas Wheeler’s analysis of
humanitarian intervention, and then discussed in relation to concrete examples from Somalia
and Sudan. In the second part of the report, the issue of IDPs are discussed in relation to
humanitarian intervention. Some of the other means of protection forwarded in R2P are
discussed as a method to protect IDPs in states that are unwilling to provide protection
themselves. Because the aim is not to identify any truths or suggestions on how to solve the
problem of IDPs, the research design is built as an interaction between analysis and
discussion in order to assess the problem from different angles.
1.2.1 PIT-FALLS AND LIMITATIONS
A large part of the data used to describe the examples and discuss intervention in the report,
derives from official UN documents and resolutions. Consequently the political discourses of
those documents are inherited in the analysis. We try to diversify the perspective by including
a humanitarian angle in the end, through an interview with Lisbeth Pilegaard.
16
We acknowledge that the focus on the military, coercive aspect of R2P, and the focus
on states in the international community overlook aspects that could be relevant to the
discussion of how R2P can promote IDP protection. If the focus had been on those coercive
means that are not a direct intervention, the conclusion would probably be different because
humanitarian intervention is emphasized as a last resort. We have tried to address this by
briefly discussing these measures in Chapter 4 of the report.
In the discussion we do criticize and question the concept of humanitarian
intervention, but not the motivation behind R2P, but regard it at what it claims to be: an
initiative to frame a new norm that identifies a responsibility, which sometimes supersedes
sovereignty. In doing so, we might overlook issues of how R2P can for example be
understood as a new form of neo-imperialism, or as a tool to cement the west as a cultural
hegemony through the promotion of western based values as democracy and human rights.
1.2.2 INTERVIEW
Our subject for the interview, Lisbeth Pilegaard, has professional experience with
humanitarian work and IDP assistance. She has, amongst other engagements, worked as
Country Director at the Danish Refugee Council and as Regional Resident Representative at
NRC in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. The aim of the interview was to get an alternative
perspective on the discussion. Therefore, the actual interview was conducted as a
conversation, with a few questions that were answered as the conversation went along. We
were curious to what issues the interviewee would consider important to address, and
therefore we let her lead the direction in which the conversation was going. Because the
interview was only explorative and not used as data or an object of analysis, we chose not to
transcribe the entire conversation, but just the quotations used in the report. The full-length
interview is added as an appendix to the report on a CD.
17
2. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS
The following chapter will explain humanitarian interventions, discuss the concept from
different theoretical perspectives, and give examples of humanitarian interventions in a
historical perspective. The theoretical framework will be based on an analysis by Nicholas
Wheeler and his discussion of how humanitarian intervention can be seen in the light of
realism and the English School (pluralism and solidarism). Firstly, it will provide a definition
for how the concept is used in the following discussion.
2.1 WHAT IS A HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION?
The concept of humanitarian intervention does not have one clear-cut definition, and scholars
tend to use it to explain different forms of armed or non-armed coercive interference in the
internal matters of another state. It can also be regarded as a highly political term, used by
states to justify interventions. In this report, we take a starting point in the definition put
forward by J. L. Holzgrefe.34 Holzgrefe emphasizes that humanitarian intervention is threat or
use of force by one or more states aimed at protecting human rights and violations against
humanity without the consent of the state that is subject for the application of force. In this
report, the focus is on intervention, seen as an armed military act. Thus, the definition of
humanitarian intervention as used in this report is as follows:
Humanitarian intervention is one or more state’s use of military force
across state borders, with a proclaimed aim of prevention or protection
from widespread, and grave violations of basic human rights, without the
consent of the state where force is applied.
Thus, other coercive measures, such as sanctions and military peacekeeping missions
imposed in cooperation with the host state are not covered by this definition. The fact that a
humanitarian intervention is initiated to end grave violations of human rights, and does not
have an element of self-defense, means that without the authorization of the UN Security
Council a humanitarian intervention can be seen as a violation against the Chapter VII of the
UN Charter. For example, this was the case with NATO’s invention of Kosovo in 1999.
2.2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
In order to understand the nature and controversy of humanitarian intervention we must first
determine how the states act either as individuals in an anarchical system or players in a rulegoverned society. To understand this, we must turn to theories of international relations. The
34
Holzgrefe, J. L in Holzgrefe, J. L. & Keohane, K.O. (ed.). (2003). Page: 18.
18
aim is not to determine who is right, but to examine how states interact and perceive the limits
of their responsibility and sovereignty according to the different theories. Seemingly, the
international system is based on numerous sets of international and regional charters and
conventions, determining the rights of human beings in different situations, the rules of war,
the international order of states, etc. Most of these are being kept, even without an
international enforcement machinery.
Originally, theory of international relations is divided into two main theoretical
blocks: Liberalism and Realism. Later, The English School has developed as a merger
between the two other theories. These three, will be described very briefly in the following
paragraphs to give a basic understanding of the ideas that they build upon, before they are
related to humanitarian intervention.
2.2.1 LIBERALISM
Liberalism is a broad theory concerned with the liberation of the individual in all aspects of
life, including economy, politics and moral. In this very brief caption of liberalism, focus will
be on how liberalists have dealt with issues of war, peace and democracy. Generally, liberals
believe in the good and goodwill on mankind, and thereby also states. According to liberals,
there exists a self-evident value system among states that are committed to maintain harmony
and co-operation. 35 Consequently, states are focused on the common good for the
international system, and therefore war is irrational and unlikely. The wars that have occurred
between nations “were created by militaristic and undemocratic governments for their own
vested interest.”36 Looking at the wars that are ongoing today, one could seemingly disqualify
this statement just through the notion that many states that have initiated wars are democratic.
However, Michael W. Doyle explains this by arguing that “democracies maintain a healthy
appetite for conflicts with authoritarian states”, and John Rawls by saying that democratic
states are less inclined to go to war, but will do so on the grounds of self-defense or intervene
to protect human rights. 37
The reason for states to engage in war is to spread democracy, and thereby diminish
the change of war in the future, due to the spread of liberal peace.
In a restatement of Kant's argument that a 'pacific federation' (foedus
pacificum) can be built by expanding the number of states with democratic
35
Burchill, Scott. (2005). Page: 160.
Burchill, Scott. (2005). Page: 112.
37
Burchill, Scott. (2005). Page: 114.
36
19
constitutions, Doyle claims that liberal-democracies are unique in their
ability and willingness to establish peaceful relations between
themselves.38
The belief is thus that liberal democracies are in nature peaceful, and therefore they have no
reason to doubt each other’s legitimacy and motives and can exist in peace.
2.2.2. REALISM
The realist tradition evolved as a critique of Liberalism, or as E. H. Carr has termed it: liberal
utopianism, due to the comforting but unrealistic belief in the goodness of mankind. The
critique is mainly based on the writings of Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz. The aim
was, as the name implies, to describe the world as it is, and not as how it should be.
According to realists “the international realm is characterized by conflict, suspicion and
competition between nation-states, a logic which thwarts the realisation of alternative world
orders.”39 Therefore, it has been called a pessimist theoretical tradition, and is simultaneously
seen as the dominant tradition.40
Realism is divided into traditional, and structural-/neo-realism. Both branches
dissociate from the belief that there is an overarching authority that determines state’s
behavior, and consequently see the international realm as anarchical. However, there are
differences in how they perceive state’s motives to act. Morgenthau belongs to the traditional
realism that describes how states act as individuals, with actions equal to those of a perceived
universal human nature: based on self-interest. In this context the concept of self-interest is
defined in terms of power. The concept of power is not static, and will change over time. At
times economic power will be crucial, and at other times, military or cultural power will be
decisive.
This means that states have what Morgenthau called a 'limitless lust for
power' and are always on the lookout for opportunities to dominate their
rivals: a commitment absolute rather than relative power, which is both
insatiable and an end in itself.41
Waltz, founder of neo-realism, develops the notion that states are acting as human beings,
primarily to gain power, and claims that they are seeking security, which can be gained by
relative power.
38
Burchill, Scott. (2005). Page: 113.
Burchill, Scott. (2005). Page: 32.
40
Underhill, Geoffrey in Stobbs, Richard & Underhill, Geoffrey R. D. (ed.). (2006). Page: 8
41
Burchill, Scott. (2005). Page: 36.
39
20
States cannot be anthropomorphised: they don't have aggressive
personalities or an innate need to dominate others, as Morgenthau claims,
but are driven to maximize their relative power because it is the best way
they can secure their survival in an anarchical world.42
So, whether it is due to a natural desire to exercise power over others, or a means to secure
national security, realists generally assume that states act to peruse their own good, and
therefore disregard the existence of a “cosmopolitan ethic”, that motivates states to
occasionally act in a way that betters the conditions of the whole of humanity.43
2.2.3 THE ENGLISH SCHOOL
The English School came about as a reaction to the realist notion of the international anarchy,
which adherents of The English School see as inherently dangerous. Instead, they emphasis
the existence of an international society has evolved out of a shared acknowledgement by
states that order needs to be preserved through an international system.44 However, there are
different perceptions of the extent to which states can co-operate in spite of cultural
differences. Therefore, The English School is divided between a pluralist and a socialist
approach.
The pluralists adhere to the belief the states are inherently different in terms of culture
and interest. They are build on different value and justice systems, and therefore states “can
only co-operate for the purpose of maintaining their independence and international order
more generally”.45 The solidarist approach is closer related to liberalism and focuses more on
the interest of the individual and humanity in general, which is more important than
maintaining state sovereignty. Solidarists therefore think “states are capable of co-operating
well beyond the basic requirements of co-existence, exhibiting a solidarity which privileges
international law and co-operation above states sovereignty”.46
So within The English School there are differences regarding the extent to which states
agree and can co-operate, but also a general belief in a common interest among states that
covers the need for international rules to maintain peace in the international society.
42
Burchill, Scott. (2005). Page: 46.
Burchill, Scott. (2005). Page: 62.
44
Burchill, Scott. (2005). Page: 153.
45
Burchill, Scott. (2005). Page: 171.
46
Burchill, Scott. (2005). Page: 172.
43
21
2.3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION
The basis of the realist argument is that states do not do anything that does not benefit
themselves, so when it comes to complying with international law, realists would argue that
“governments pursue their own interests while paying lip service to the rules”.47 This means
that states use language to justify their actions in accordance with the rules, and can always
find good arguments for why these actions can be justified. Currently, issues of security and
urgency seem to be the overarching argument that legitimizes the use of extraordinary
measures and stepping outside the norms.48 On the other side, Hedley Bull, belonging to the
English School of International Relations, argues that the mere fact that states feel obliged to
justify their actions must mean that they see themselves as bound by a common set of rules,
and must therefore be part of a rule-governed society. Related to Pierre Bourdieu’s
understanding of the nature of the international society, he criticizes further that the notion of
states being socialized into a set of predispositions are not questioned within realist theory,
and find it surprising how states “so often judge it in their own interest to conform to [the
rules].” 49 However, realists will argue that this process of legitimizing their actions is to
maintain good relations to other states and avoid sanctions. So, whether it be due to a fear of
sanctions and protection of self-interests or a shared agreement of an international code of
conduct, rules or norms, is indeed something that states need to comply with to the extent that
their actions can be justified.
2.3.1 LIMITS OF SOVEREIGNTY
When talking about IDPs, interferences and interventions, one issue is constantly surfacing as
a limitation for action: sovereignty. As explained in the introduction the international order is
constructed as a Westphalian system, centralizing sovereignty as the core base for how states
interact. However, sovereignty is – like borders – constructed. It is not something that exists
in the way that we can see it or touch it, but it exists because all participate in a shared
understanding, acceptance and compliance of this system. Non-intervention is perceived as
the backbone to uphold this system. Thus, humanitarian intervention is controversial because
it clearly violates the rule of sovereignty. In this relation, the limits of sovereignty must be
discussed. As previously explained, humanitarian interventions are not a new invention, but
there have been several examples of intervention with proclaimed humanitarian motives that
has been legitimized. Either through the authorization of the Security Council, or in time
47
Wheeler, Nicholas J. (2000). Page: 23.
See: Wæver, Ole in Lipschutz Ronnie D. (ed.). (1995). Page: 8-20.
49
Wheeler, Nicholas J. (2000). Page: 24.
48
22
accepted as humanitarian. The legitimization is based on an understanding that the
intervention was or would be necessary to end unacceptable human rights violations. As
Henry Shue argues, sovereignty is not a “right to do wrong” within the territory of the state in
question, but sovereignty comes with responsibility.50 However, there are many cases, both
current and historical, where wrongs have happened without response from the international
community. Thus it seems there is a list of wrongs that sovereigns are free to do without the
risk of interference from outsiders. The question then remains, what are the limits of
sovereignty, and can they change?
Shue argues that the scope for sovereignty does change, but through general norm
change, hence, a change in the shared construction of sovereignty:
But one can say, (1) this (e.g. the extirpation of minorities) is so very
wrong that even sovereigns should be understood in future not to be free to
get away with it; and (2) once this is generally understood among
sovereigns to be outside the scope of sovereignty, sovereigns ought not,
according to the now-tightened rules of sovereignty, to do it in the future.
In other words, this action has now been removed from the list of wrongs
that even they are free to commit.51
This means that the limits of sovereignty exist do to a shared agreement of what can be
accepted. These limits can be redefined over time, normally as a response to actions that has
already happened, e.g. Holocaust or genocide in Rwanda. R2P can be seen as defining the list
of unacceptable wrongs that creates the limits of sovereignty and legitimizes states to react if
these wrong are committed. However, the precondition for this to actually happen is that
states have a moral interest in keeping rights of strangers upheld. The idea of malleable
international norms is also challenged by realists, who claim that because states only act on
self-interest, fundamental changes in the structure of the international realm are unlikely, even
if they are needed.52
2.3.2 OBJECTIONS TO HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
There are several critiques directed at the practice of humanitarian intervention. As a branch
of the English School, Pluralists are concerned with the rules that govern the international
society, and the absence of a common agreement on when a humanitarian intervention can be
legitimized. The absence of rules will result in states acting on their own moral beliefs and
definition of justice. This is problematic because states have conflicting understandings of
50
Shue, Henry in Welsh, Jennifer M. (ed.), (2006). Page: 12.
Shue, Henry in Welsh, Jennifer M. (ed.), (2006). Page: 12.
52
Burchill, Scott. (2005). Page: 32.
51
23
what is just and unjust. Therefore, humanitarian intervention will always be “based on the
predilections of those with the power to carry it out.”53 According to pluralists, people are
therefore better served in a system that prohibits humanitarian intervention, rather than
accepting it in the absence of shared principles that should direct a right to intervene.
Realists suggest several objections to the practice of humanitarian intervention.
Wheeler has formulated these in the four following points.54 The objections are rooted in the
foundation of realist thought, that states always act in terms of power, so to enhance their
national self-interest. The first criticism is, that because of this, an event where a state is
acting on the basis of other citizen’s interest or protection is unlikely, and a proclaimed
humanitarian intervention can thus only cloak the protection of own interests or powerseeking. A further legitimization of intervention will result in states manipulating the rules to
serve their own interest by “paying lip service to the rules” as explained above. Consequently,
humanitarian interventions will be a tool for the strong to use against the week.55
The second criticism is that the risk of loosing soldiers and the significant economic
loss that are related to interventions are valued higher than the well being of strangers.
Therefore, vital interests have to be at stake before an intervention is likely. So the hope for a
humanitarian intervention in a realist world will be in a case where the promotion of national
interest and security coincide with defending human rights.
Thirdly, the issue of selectivity comes into place. An important question related to
humanitarian intervention has always been where and when to intervene. Why intervene in
Libya but not in Sudan or Syria? Again, the realists will explain this with the issue of selfinterest as a central factor in decision-making. Humanitarian intervention will only be made
in the cases where a humanitarian crisis coincides with loss of vital interests. Consequently,
the international community will overlook a number of cases, because interference will serve
them no benefit.
The fourth realist objection is the normative version of the second objection,
concerning the risk of the lives of soldiers to save strangers. The argument here is that
governments have no business in doing so, and ‘[state] leaders and public do not have moral
duties to stop ‘barbarities beyond borders’.”56 The moral responsibility of preventing a state
of doing evil towards its citizens lies only with these citizens and their political leaders.
53
Wheeler, Nicholas J. (2000). Page: 29.
Wheeler, Nicholas J. (2000). Page: 29-31.
55
Wheeler, Nicholas J. (2000). Page: 30.
56
Wheeler, Nicholas J. (2000). Page: 31.
54
24
Wheeler is opposing to these criticisms, arguing that if the claim that states would
never intervene primarily on the basis of humanitarian reasons, the question of casualties
should never arise. But it does arise and become an important factor in policy-making, as
previous examples of interventions have shown. Among these is the United States’
intervention in Somalia in 1993, which will be explained and discussed later. The fact that
loss of life has changed the strategy of war, Wheeler argues, must mean that the initial
motivation for intervention must have been humanitarian. Had it been to protect vital selfinterest, this would have been more important than the loss of a few lives. Based on the
assumption that states do have moral obligations beyond their own territory, he asserts a
solidarist approach to legitimize humanitarian intervention.
2.3.3 THE SOLIDARIST APPROACH
The basis of the solidarist approach to humanitarian intervention is that states do have moral
obligations to save strangers, and interventions with a humanitarian motive can be justified.
As a constructivist theory, solidarism questions sovereignty as a static norm. As argued
above, sovereignty does have limits that are defined by moral rights and wrongs. States that
exercise mass violations of human rights will, according to solidarists, consequently lose their
right to be protected by the rule of sovereignty and non-intervention and other states are
morally entitled to intervene.57 As a branch of the English School, solidarism adhere to the
belief that the acts of states are governed by international law and norms. Therefore,
solidarists are concerned with establishing a shared agreement of the legitimization of human
intervention.
Wheeler, who is himself a proclaimed solidarist, is concerned with the legitimization
of humanitarian intervention, and suggests some criteria that should be fulfilled in order for
an intervention to count as humanitarian. He recognizes that in the past no humanitarian
intervention has fulfilled all his criteria, but argues that as long as an intervention can be
justified in relation to these criteria, it is enough. When reading through Wheelers threshold
and the further criteria, it becomes clear that they are based on the same as R2P. Rooted in the
Just War Tradition, emphasizing the principle of proportionality, the use of peaceful remedies
over force, and the focus on ‘extreme cases’ an initiator for intervention. However, the events
that are perceived as extreme are discussed critically. He argues that peaceful remedies can be
inefficient and take too long to prevent or stop human rights violations in time. It is argued
that a supreme humanitarian crisis cannot be determined in numbers of lives lost or people
57
Wheeler, Nicholas J. (2000). Page: 38.
25
displaced, since this measure is too arbitrary. When the crisis has already happened, it might
be too late, and there will be no help for the people who are already killed or displaced.
Instead a “supreme humanitarian emergency” can be identified when “the only hope of saving
lives depends on outsiders coming to the rescue”.
Another criterion for an intervention to be humanitarian is the outcome. This is a
difficult criterion to fulfill, because the outcome can only be evaluated in retrospect, and even
then is it difficult, because one cannot know what would have happened if there had not been
a use of force. Consequently, the state has to rest on the belief that an intervention will have a
humanitarian outcome. Recognizing that an intervention will in nature have some negative
implications, success is defined as a situation that has generally done more good than harm,
the intervention has rescued the victims of oppression, and human rights are being
protected.58 But because this is so difficult to predict, Wheeler argues that as long as a state’s
motive can be justified in humanitarian terms, and the states has done everything in their
power to ensure that their actions and motives correlate, then even an intervention that fails
and have primarily negative consequences can be accepted as humanitarian.
2.3.4 SOLIDARIST CRITIQUE OF THE REALIST APPROACH
One of the major differences between realist and solidarist approaches to humanitarian
interventions is the different focus on how to determine if an intervention is humanitarian or
not. Because realists do not believe that motives of states can be primarily humanitarian, they
perceive these as a hindrance. On the other hand, solidarists argue that the focus on states is a
“flawed methodology”59 because the outcome of an intervention for the people who are being
deprived of rights, is most important in determining whether the intervention is humanitarian
or not. Therefore, solidarists places the outcome for human beings in the centre of their
analysis, while realists place the state and their motives.
Based on the divergence in focus, solidarists direct three points of critique towards
the realist objections to humanitarian interventions.60 The first point is in relation to the realist
argument that states will abuse the legitimization of humanitarian intervention to pursue an
ulterior motive that promotes self-interest. Solidarists recognize that this can be a valid
argument, but see it only as a problem in the event that the ulterior motive undermines the
stated humanitarian motive. So, if the intervention still benefits the people of concern, abuse
cannot be an objection. Secondly, a critique is directed at the fact that realists ignore that
58
Wheeler, Nicholas J. (2000). Page: 37.
Wheeler, Nicholas J. (2000). Page: 38.
60
Wheeler, Nicholas J. (2000). Page: 39-40.
59
26
states can actually recognize that they have a moral responsibility. This is central to the
disagreement between the two theories, because where realists ignore the fact that morality
goes beyond sovereignty, solidarists see it as a precondition. The final point is also relating to
the justification of intervention. Where realist argue that rules and norms can be manipulated,
solidarists argue the existence of a framework that actions need to be defined within, is also
limiting their actions. So as long as states accept that actions need to be justified, the
objection is not valid.
2.3.5 SUMMARY
When examining the different perspectives on humanitarian intervention, it becomes clear
that R2P is based on a solidarist perception of state responsibility. This means that moral
responsibility supersedes the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention. A precondition for
this is that states actually recognize that they are responsible not only for their own citizens,
but also non-citizens, and agrees to risk lives of soldier and loss of financial resources to save
strangers. A problem occurs if states are not willing to do so, and intentions never evolve to
action. Realists will argue that this is the case, because states act on the grounds of selfinterest, and therefore R2P will only be used to legitimize intervention that will primarily
benefit the intervening party.
The fact that R2P has been accepted by all UN member states might indicate that
states are willing to accept this new responsibility-norm, but in order to make intentions a
reality, the practice of international responsibility must fully emerge as a norm. To do so, a
vast majority of states must engage in a change of practice, and accept that sovereignty is not
a given.
2.4 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) consists of five permanent member states (P5)
with a right to veto – China, Russia, France, United Kingdom and USA – and 10 nonpermanent members elected by the general assembly for a two-year term. It is the
responsibility of UNSC to maintain international peace and security, so in cases where the
UN has interfered in a country’s internal affairs, it has been authorized by the council. The
power of the UN Security Council is primary set out in Chapter VII of the United Nation
Charter. Here UNSC is given the power to maintain peace and “shall determine the existence
27
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression“61 in order to „maintain or
restore international peace and security.“62 In order to do so, the council may decide what
measures to use that can be military or non-military, and may call upon member states to help
in such cases by using sanctions. If the sanctions are proven inadequate the Security Council
may use “air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace
and security”,63 which means authorizing intervention.
2.4.1 INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA
In the 1990´s there were frequently arising the questions on whether or not external actor
should interfere in states internal affairs. Since 1991 there have been nine interventions on
states sovereignty that ultimately lead to humanitarian interventions with or without the
explicit authorizations of the UN Security Council. They were Northern Iraq (1991), Bosnia
and Herzegovina (1992-1995), Somalia (1992-1993), Rwanda (1994), Haiti (1994), Albania
(1997), Sierra Leone (1997-2000), Kosovo (1998-1999), East Timor (1999). The numbers in
the brackets are the years when UNSC resolutions addressed the matters.64
In April 1992 the Security Council established the United Nation Operation in
Somalia I (UNOSOM I) in order to respond to the severe situation caused by civil war and
famine. In December 1992 the operation was showing little progress, therefore the council
called on all member states to provide military forces or additional contributions to be able to
react to the humanitarian tragedy occurring.65 As a result of this request, The United Task
Force (UNITAF) was established and the United States offered to lead the operation and was
to use all necessary means to provide secure environment for humanitarian aid and restore
peace and stability. Although the operation showed some progress and secured the delivery of
humanitarian assistance effectively, there was an increased danger for UN personnel and
agencies.66 Also had the United State restricted the mandate of UNITAF by preventing them
in disarming Somalia factions and would therefore not been able to create peace and
stability. 67 Therefore UNOSOM II took over UNITAF in March 1993 and would try to
complete its original tasks in Somalia.68
61
The Charter of United Nations: Chapter VII, Article 39.
The Charter of United Nations: Chapter VII, Article 39.
63
The Charter of United Nations: Chapter VII, Article 41.
64
Roberts, Adam Sir in Welsh, Jennifer M. (ed.), (2006). Page: 81.
65
Department of Public Information, United Nations. (1997).
66
Department of Public Information, United Nations. (1997).
67
Raisin, Joanne & Ramsbotham in Humanitarian Studies Unit. (ed.). (2001). Page.: 148-149
68
Department of Public Information, United Nations. (1997).
62
28
These operations had proven quite problematic and would continue to be so. The
death of 18 US Rangers in October 1993 (Black Hawk Down) was a causality that the US
could not bear and ultimately lead to their withdrawal from the UNOSOM II in March 1994.
Later, because of number of violent attacks on United Nations soldiers lead to the mission
being totally aborted a year later in March 1995 while the crisis continued in Somalia. The
United States is said to have had a huge influence on how the operation turned out in Somalia.
Because the nation was still recovering after the Cold War the public is said to have had
difficulties understanding why to engage in a crisis of no direct relevance for them. 69
The aftermath of the operation changed the United States’ view on peace operations.
After the failure of the international community in Somalia, Bill Clinton’s administration
started drafting a Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operation. In May 1994 the
president signed the Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) establishing the new foreign
affairs policy. Looking through the policy it becomes evident that the goal is to limit United
States participation in multilateral peace operations.70
Peace operations are not and cannot be the centerpiece of U.S. foreign
policy. However, as the policy states, properly conceived and wellexecuted peace operations can be a useful element in serving America's
interests. The directive prescribes a number of specific steps; to improve
U.S. and UN manaqement of UN peace operations in order to ensure that
use of such operations is selective and more effective.71
Restriction to participate in future UN peace operations can be seen as a result of the failed
intervention in Somalia. It can be concluded that US felt they had the right to intervene, but
not necessarily the responsibility to do so. The consequences were seen in relation to national
interests, as is obvious in the PDD 25, and would prove to have more than just domestic
effects. It could have affected the Security Council, and thereby the decision not to react to
the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda, which had started a month before Clinton signed the new
policy.
2.4.2 CRISIS IN SUDAN
One of the recent humanitarian crises that require the attention of the international community
is the situations in Sudan – especially in the Darfur region which is a large region in the west
with borders to Libya, Chad, Central African Republic and South-Sudan. Darfur is an
69
Raisin, Joanne & Ramsbotham in Humanitarian Studies Unit. (ed.). (2001). Page: 148-149
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. (May 5 th, 1994).
71
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. (May 5 th, 1994).
70
29
enormous region with area of approximately the same size as France. 72 In 2003 violent
conflicts erupted and led to number of serious human rights and humanitarian law violations,
which are still occurring today. The crisis consists of armed conflicts, ethnic cleansing,
famine, forced displacement, hunger and diseases.73 UN Human Rights Commission was in
April 2004 issued to find fact about the atrocities in Darfur and came back with facts showing
that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed militias were disregarding the principles of
human rights and humanitarian laws.74 In order to respond to the crisis UNSC has issued
number of Resolutions where it condemns “all acts of violence and violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law by all parties and expressing its utmost concern at the
consequences of the prolonged conflict for the civilian population of Sudan, including
women, children, refugees and internally displaced persons”. 75 As in all resolutions
addressing critical matters, Resolution 1547 from June 2004 shows UNSC’s concern and
willingness to authorize peace operation, but emphasizes the importance of sovereignty, in
this case Sudan’s. In the ICISS report from 2001 on “Responsibility to Protect” it is argued
that state sovereignty equals state responsibility to its people and the role of the UNSC would
be to help countries execute that responsibility, but many countries were reluctant to force
Sudan to live up to its responsibility. In the debate on resolution 1547, Pakistan for example
argued that Sudan was an important member of the international community and by being
member of the United Nation and African Union (AU) gave them the right, invested in the
UN Charter, to its sovereignty and political independence.76
At the same time as the African Union was discussing the possibility of sending a
small force to Darfur, in July 2004, the Sudanese government refused to receive help and
strongly resisted all resolutions that suggested dispatching international force to the country
and threatened to use force against peacekeeping operations. Sudanese government was
clearly unwilling to address the human suffering occurring in their country and not showing
any will of responding to the sanctions threatened in the council’s Resolution 1556. 77 African
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) wanted to obtain broad civilian protection mandate in
Darfur which Sudanese government refused. A compromise was made with the Sudanese
government which gave the AMIS troops permission to protect civilians who were under
imminent threat and within the area, but stressing that the responsibility of the civilian
72
Office of the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator. (September 25 th, 2010).
Udombana, Nsongurua J. (November, 2005). Page: 1150.
74
Bellamy, Alex J. (September, 2005). Page: 41.
75
UN Security Council (November 19th, 2004). Resolution 1574.
76
Bellamy, Alex J. (2005). Page: 41.
77
„Resolution 1556 gave the government thirty days to disarm the Janjaweed and punish human rights
abusers, threatening economic santions if it failed to do so. For some, such as China and Pakistan, the
resolution went too far; for others, it did not go far enough.“ (Bellamy, Alex J. Page 43)
73
30
population was theirs. The operation was criticized for not being effective enough, and was
said to be failing in reaching its primary goals, preventing further crisis and protecting the
displaced.78
UNSC has been reluctant in many cases to authorize humanitarian intervention
without the consent of host state, and was slowly coming to the consensus that the
responsibility to protect the displaced in Sudan was primary the responsibility of the
Sudanese government in cooperation with the AU. Many states were reluctant to react,
because of Sudanese sovereignty, but on the other side Romania and the Philippines were
arguing in the line of the ICISS report, claiming that the Council should take responsibility
and take a more active approach. US were also trying to push for stronger measures and were
continuously pointing to the facts that the government and its allies are violating international
humanitarian laws in Darfur which have to be responded to. It could have acted like it did in
Kosovo and Iraq and take the lead in guiding the council to react to the situation in Darfur but
have chosen to pursue a consensus within the council. 79 As a result of the alleged
humanitarian intervention in Iraq, United States as well as its ally United Kingdom “appeared
to recognize that their diminished credibility as norm carriers would make it harder for them
to take a lead in building a council consensus on action.”80
In Resolutions 1593 from 2005 the Security Council referred the case of Darfur to the
International Criminal Court (ICC) which later issued an arrest warrant on Sudanese President
Omar al-Bashir, in March 2009 on charges on war crimes and crimes against humanity. On
12th of July a year later the issued another arrest warrant on the president, on the offences of
committing genocides in Darfur.
Government protected Janjaweed militia leader, Ali
Kushayb, is also charged with for violations of international humanitarian law.81 The charges
on al-Bashir have been widely criticized by AU.
Today, AU and UN have established a peacekeeping mission in Sudan with the
adoption of Resolution 1769 in July 2007. This mission is called African Union/United
Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), and is a large peacekeeping operation with a
core mandate to the protect civilians, provide security to humanitarian assistance, and to
promote human rights and rule of law. 82
78
Bellamy, Alex J. (2005). Page: 44.
Bellamy, Alex J. (2005). Page: 46-47.
80
Bellamy, Alex J. (2005). Page: 51.
81
Human Rights Watch. (July 13th, 2010).
82
African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur.
79
31
2.4.3 SUMMARY
UNSC could use the World Summit Document Outcome in authorizing actions in “extreme
cases” and “large loss of life” like in Somalia and Sudan. But it seems that the political will is
missing, although Rumania and the Philippines have used R2P to stress the international
responsibility for the people in Darfur. Other nations like Pakistan, Russia and China83 have
withheld the fact that the government of Sudan has the right to sovereignty, and have thereby
opposed to any form of sanctions, let alone intervention.
UNSC took responsibility in responding to the atrocities in Somalia in 1993 to 1995,
but the intervention did not fulfill its objectives. The humanitarian crisis and genocide in
Darfur has not yet caused humanitarian intervention authorized by UNSC. But what does the
emerging norm R2P then bring to the table? Will a normative framework contribute to a
change in effective reactions to humanitarian emergencies through humanitarian
interventions? According to the ICISS report, “there is no better or more appropriate body
than the United Nations Security Council to authorize military intervention for human
protection purposes. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of
authority, but to make the Security Council work better than it has.”
In the following chapter, the examples above will be used to discuss the theory
behind R2P.
83
Bellamy, Alex J. (2005). Page: 41
32
3 THEORY OF PROTECTION AND PRACTICE OF
INTERVENTION
Looking through the examples of Somalia and Sudan, the thought that there is a discrepancy
between the theories behind R2P and state’s practice of intervention comes to mind. This is
rooted in the fact that on one hand a precondition for R2P is that states feel they do have a
moral responsibility to protect citizens of other states, and thus go beyond the rules of
sovereignty. On the other hand, the withdrawal from Somalia followed by PDD 25 and the
reluctance by the UNSC to make more than symbolic actions in Darfur in spite of the
acknowledged brutality of the situation, suggest the opposite. In the following discussion this
argument will be developed further by discussing the theories described above in relation to
these examples. Also, the consequences of the claimed discrepancy for the future
development and emergence of R2P as a norm will be discussed. Based on the relatively few
examples, the aim is not to determine theoretical truths about state’s real motives, but to
highlight some of the issues and different viewpoints related to the application of R2P, in
order to discuss the emergence of R2P to an actual norm.
3.1 WHY US AN UN ABORTED SOMALIA
The UNITAF intervention authorized by the Security Council, lead by US forces was aborted
shortly after it was initiated, just close to a year after. The events that lead to the withdrawal
of the mission, first by the US and then followed by other members involved in the mission
would have an effect on the way US responded to future peace operations. In this short time
of trying to secure the environment for humanitarian aid and restore peace and stability in
Somalia, US restricted its forces mandate in the mission that prevented its forces from
disarming Somalia factions, which might have been a way to protect its soldiers.
The fact that loss of soldiers turned out to be a determining factor in the withdrawal,
proves the realist argument that states will not sacrifice their own soldier to save civilians of
other countries, because the relatively low number of casualties outweighed the proclaimed
humanitarian aim of the operation. Still, the initial decision to intervene seems to be based on
moral grounds. The basic argument of realists is that the reason for states to intervene in other
countries’ affairs and participate in international humanitarian intervention would be to
enhance national self-interest. If this is correct, both the US and UNSC would not have
aborted the mission that quickly because, like Wheeler argues, if countries motive for
intervening is out of national interest the issue of human casualty should not arise, because
the gain of a completed mission would be valued higher than the loss of soldiers. If national
interest were the motive behind US participation in Somalia, those interests would be more
33
important than the loss of few soldiers. Therefore the operations seem to have been based on
humanitarian grounds, indicating that states do not only act upon self-interests, but also act on
the basis of moral obligations, to the extent that the sacrifice is not too high.
After the failed humanitarian intervention in Somalia, it was decided that the US
would in future peace operation only act if the operation has an element of national interests,
as stated in PDD 25. Meaning that although the motivation to intervene into Somalia was
assumingly based on the humanitarian motive of saving the people of Somalia, it ultimately
resulted in a change of strategy, which clearly undermines the R2P ideal of an intervention
happening with the underlying interest of “those seeking or needing support, rather than those
who may be considering intervention”84
3.2 WHY AN INTERVENTION IN SUDAN CAN BE JUSTIFIED
As argued, sovereignty can be seen as a responsibility rather that a right that states have. A
viewpoint raised by former U.N. Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Francis
Deng. This now emerging understanding, was taken further in the R2P report, where UNSC is
said to be the right authority to issue humanitarian interventions in exceptional and
extraordinary measures and if large scale loss of life and/or large scale of ethnic cleansing
occurring to human beings that justifies military intervention.85
Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war,
insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is
unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non intervention
yields to the international responsibility to protect.86
The situation in Darfur can be said to fulfill these criteria, which should make it a justifiable
aim of a humanitarian intervention. Pushing the argument even further, it can be said that
UNSC has referred the case to ICC resulting in arrest warrant being issued for the President,
Omar al-Bashir, and the Janjaweed leader, Ali Kushayb, with the charge of war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide, and therefore UNSC must be fully aware of the
critical stance of the situation. However, within UNSC the debate about possible intervention
seems to have stopped by countries, like Pakistan, Russia and China, who withstand that to
the belief that sovereignty is a right that should always be protected. Consequently, It seems
that the debate on whether or not to intervene stops on the fundamental disagreement on
whether the responsibility to protect strangers supersedes the right to sovereignty. In
World Federalist Movement – Institute for Global Policy. (2001). Page: 3.
ICISS. (2001). Page: XII.
86
ICISS. (2001). Page: XI.
84
85
34
resolutions concerning the situations in Darfur, the only countries that recognized their
responsibility to protect the people of Darfur were Rumania and the Philippines, but this has
not affected the outcome.
3.3 SELECTIVITY ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS OR TO SPREAD LIBERAL
PEACE?
The decision not to intervene in Darfur exemplifies what realists describe as selectivity. States
and UN do not have the capacity or will to react to all critical situations and crises. Therefore,
a selection process must take place, and the question that remains is on what basis is this
decision made.
The first armed humanitarian intervention authorized with a specific reference to the
responsibility to protect, was in Libya in 2011 as a response to the fear of a coming massacre
on civilians and rebels. The argument to use “all necessary means” in order to protect
civilians is well in line with R2P ideal of morality beyond borders, but evil voices in the
realist camp have suggested that the invention in Libya came with ulterior motives. The
question whether Libya as an oil-nation played a part in decision-making has been raised, and
some has questioned if French President Sarkozy’s eagerness to intervene, was as motivated
by the hopes of changing negative opinion polls for himself, like it happened for Thatcher
after the Falklands war, as he felt obliged to safe civil Libyans.87 Furthermore, several realist
scholars has warned about romanticizing the invention in Libya as a humanitarian mission to
end state violence, but also a highly political intervention, being a part of a large neo-liberal
peace-building project, with the aim of securing the hegemonic status of the West. 88 This
concern is primarily based on the concern that many humanitarian interventions aim at a
regime change, because the acclaimed enemy is a government unwilling to protect its
population, and therefore the only solution is to get rid of the “problem”. It has been criticised
that within the discourse of R2P, it seems the only suitable regime to protect the interest of a
population is a democratic one, and to force regime changed can therefore be seen in line with
the western democratization of the world.89
In July 2011, resolution 1996 was adopted unanimously by the UNSC, and authorized
the use of “all necessary means” in order to assist the Government of South Sudan in
“fulfilling its responsibility to protect civilians, in compliance with international
87
Joseph, Sarah. (March 27th, 2011).
Glover, Nicholas. (September 27th, 2011).
89
Bellamy, Alex, J. (September 27th, 2011).
88
35
humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law.” 90 This is the second time there has been a
direct reference to R2P in a UNSC resolution, authorizing “all necessary means.” However,
no state has directly intervened yet; either because it does not have interest in doing so or
because it does not see the need for using force to maintain peace.
This could point to the fact that there is not being pushed for an intervention in Sudan
because the situation is not urgent in the same way the intervention in Libya was, and the way
a potential crises in South Sudan would be. The situation in Darfur is prolonged, many have
already been killed, and millions are already displaced. The UNAMID peacekeeping
operation from 2007 is trying to prevent further damage, and it might be assessed that a
humanitarian intervention will not have a favorable outcome for the people in Darfur because
it will not change the situation in a positive way. In that case, the decision is based on a valid,
humanitarian foundation, in a solidarist view. On the other hand, it could be interpreted as
because there is no acclaimed democratic alternative to the current government in Sudan, and
therefore little chance of winning them over in the liberal peace project, the proclaimed power
holders has no interest in intervening. No matter what, UNSC initially failed to prevent or
react when the crisis was at its most serious stage in 2003 when the Janjaweed attacks and
mass killing were at its height. Instead about 14 months past before the matter was raised in
UNSC and, a further five years and eight months before UN peacekeepers were deployed.91
3.4 WHEN TO INTERVENE
Another important question is when to intervene. Within the R2P Framework it should as far
as possible be avoided to use military interventions, and emphasis is put on building state’s
capacity to withstand internal crises as a preferred form of prevention for e.g. displacement.
However, in situations where countries are unwilling to let external actors assist in improving
its capacity to protect their people the act of peacefully preventing proves difficult, even
impossible. Situations can evolve into actual humanitarian crises, with loss of human life as a
consequence. As Wheeler argues, the deciding factor on when to intervene cannot be numbers
of deaths or displaced, because the reaction will come too late, and not benefit the people of
concern. Therefore, intervention before the actual crisis has occurred, can be seen as a method
of prevention, even though it is generally agreed that, if possible, peaceful solutions should
always be used. Wheeler argues that the intervention can be justified in supreme humanitarian
emergencies, defined as:
90
91
UN Security Council (July 8th, 2011). Resolution 1996.
Orchard, Phil in Davies, Sara & Glanville, Luke. (ed.), (2010). Page: 123.
36
… extraordinary situations where civilians in another state are in imminent
danger of losing their life of facing appalling hardship, and where
indigenous forces cannot be relied upon to end these violations of human
rights92
To return to the example of Darfur, there has already been a large loss of life as a
consequence of the actions of indigenous forces, to use Wheeler’s term. An intervention can
therefore be seen as inefficient because evil has already been committed. On the other hand,
the current UNSC action does not change the status quo, but merely prevents the situations
from becoming worse. Therefore a full intervention against the government with regime
change as a overall aim, can be justified as a mean to create the basis for a sustainable
reconstruction of a society with the ability and will to fulfill its responsibility to protect its
population in compliance with international law, as it is the proclaimed aim in the resolution
for UNSC action in South Sudan.
3.5 R2P AS AN IDEAL OR EMERGING NORM
The discussion suggests that state action can be interpreted in different ways, depending on
what theoretical glasses one wear. However, R2P as a concept must be recognized in
international politics, whether it is use as an empty word or an emerging norm. Solidarists
will argue that the intervention in Libya and the UNSC authorization to use all necessary
measures in South Sudan indicates that states discourse is in a transitioning state. R2P is the
beginning of a discourse change, and consequently a norm change in the international
community. As more and more states will start to apply the discourse of R2P, it will change
the limits of what is internationally accepted within the limits of sovereignty, and
consequently become an integrated part of how states act. Therefore, the scope for
humanitarian intervention will change. Contrary, following the realist perception, R2P will
remain nothing more than a document and a declaration of intent to form a romantic image of
states as moral actors, due to the discrepancy between the solidarist precondition of state
morality and states real intentions. States have interfered and intervened before, the fact that
they now have a different framework to justify their actions does not change the fact that
states are selfish actors.
92
Wheeler, Nicholas. (2000). Page: 50.
37
Consequently, it is difficult to make anything but theoretically based conjectures on
how humanitarian intervention will be used in the future. Thomas G. Weiss, however, argues
that the outcome of the operation in Libya will be determining for how humanitarian
intervention will be used in the future: “if the operation fares well, the norm will be
strengthened. If it goes poorly, future decision-making about its implementation may be even
more problematic than in the past.”93 Furthermore, he reminds us that the success of a new
norm cannot be measured within decades, but centuries.
93
Thomas, Weiss G. (August 31th, 2011).
38
4. TRYING DIFFERENT MEANS
So far, the discussion has evolved around the possibility of using humanitarian intervention,
thereby indicating that this is the preferred solution to protect IDPs in states that are unwilling
to fulfill its protection responsibility. But as argued, this should only be seen as a last resort.
In the following we will discuss whether humanitarian intervention is a preferable option
when it comes to providing protection for IDPs or rescuing people from their own
governments. There are some straight forward arguments that can be used to explain how
IDPs can benefit for intervention. The most obvious one is concerning possibility for a regime
change. If the reason for displacement is due to prosecution or a government policy of ethnic
cleansing, a regime change will help IDPs by simply getting rid of the problem. For this to be
successful there needs to be a better governmental alternative, and capacity to rebuild
structures in order to make resettlement possible. However, based on previous examples of
failed humanitarian interventions, it can be questioned whether they are at all desirable. In
spite of the comforting sound of anything humanitarian, an intervention will inevitably cause
loss of lives, it is extremely costly for the intervening states, and can cost the lives of their
soldiers. Consequently, other means to pressure states to fulfill their protection responsibility
should be considered before turning straight to intervention.
4.1 BEFORE INTERVENTION
In R2P it is stated that intervention should always be used as a last resort, when other peaceful
means have proven to be insufficient. These peaceful means are non-coercive or diplomatic
solutions to a given problem. However, non-military interference does not equal non-coercive
interference. There is a list of non-military, but coercive, means that can be used to put
pressure on states, such as sanctions. Generally, all non-coercive means are dependent on the
consent and cooperation of the governing states, i.e. military protection of aid-delivery. So if
a government is not willing to cooperate with e.g. peacekeeping forces, coercive means can
become necessary to put pressure on states. In the following, some of the coercive means that
can be used to influence states will be discussed in relation to IDP protection.
4.1.1. DIPLOMACY AND SANCTIONS
Generally, diplomacy is an unproblematic and widely used method. Diplomacy can be used
as an important tool to prevent a potential crisis, to better the conditions and rights for IDPs
by pressuring governments to change policies, or to mediate between two struggling parties in
peace negotiations. In relation to the problems of IDPs, diplomacy is limited by being an
39
intra-state communication. In many conflicts causing IDPs, non-state actors and insurgent
groups play and increasingly large role, but is out of diplomatic reach. 94 In these cases,
diplomacy can be used to pressure governments to fight against insurgent groups, or accept
assistance from outside. In order for diplomacy to be effective, it must be well coordinated,
multilateral, and connected with other means, such as sanctions.95
Sanctions, restrictions on economic flows and trade, are primarily used for three
overall policy purposes: “to signal international concern of the offending state (and, by
example, to others), to punish a state’s behavior, and to serve as an important precursor to
stronger actions, including, if necessary, the use of force.”96 At the same time it is heavily
criticized for being slow or even completely ineffective, a symbolic gesture to avoid taking
the necessary action and a method that penalizes innocent civilians rather than responsible
state actors. If this is true, IDPs will most likely be the most affected group by the sanctions,
as they are the most marginalized and vulnerable group. However, by judging on the frequent
use of sanctions, it seems to be a method that governments around the world have faith in.
The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (CCPDC) recognizes the
drawbacks of sanctions, but argues that if they are used as part of a broader influence strategy
and are carefully monitored and planned, they can be used to put maximum pressure on
offending states. Furthermore, CCPDC describes “targeted sanctions” to direct the requested
consequences at the policy makers responsible for the crisis. This includes “freezing leaders’
assets or denying them access to hard cash”.97 This can only be done if several nations are
willing to work together to detect cash flows. CCPDC recognize how intrusive targeted
sanctions are, and should therefore be thoroughly considered before being used. Targeted
sanctions are not specifically mentioned in R2P.
4.1.2. MILITARY MEASURES AND NO-FLY ZONES
Military forces can be used for other operations than intervention. Traditionally, international
military forces have been used after a cease-fire to maintain peace, or to secure delivery of aid
and humanitarian assistance. The implementation of peacekeeping forces has to happen with
consent of the host state. If a state is not willing to let international peacekeeping forces
operate in their territory, UNSC can advocate to convincing states to change their policy, as it
happened with UNAMID in Darfur. Otherwise, UNSC can use force to create “safe areas” or
94
CCPDC (1997). Page: 49
CCPDC (1997). Page: 52
96
CCPDC (1997). Page: 52
97
CCPDC (1997). Page: 55
95
40
“safe havens” where civilians can seek safety. This can be used to protect IDPs from attacks,
and be deterrent in the way that it send a signal that UNSC is concerned about the situation,
and is willing to act if conflict escalades. The method has come to be known as an
authorization under “Chapter VI and a half” because it is in the grey-zone between giving a
full mandate to military intervention under Chapter VII, but using peacekeeping forces for a
mission that require use of threat and force.98 In that way, it is just on the edge of being an
actual intervention.
Another method that is just in between a real intervention is the implementation of
no-fly zones. The aim is to protect civilians from air strikes by prohibiting any aircraft that
does not have a sole humanitarian purpose, to fly over the territory. It is controversial because
it normally entails more than the mere prohibition of planes flying over a specific territory. As
US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said in a congressional hearing:
Let's just call a spade a spade. A no-fly zone begins with an attack on
Libya to destroy the air defenses ... and then you can fly planes around the
country and not worry about our guys being shot down.99
So even though a no-fly zone not directly perceived as intervention, it is highly coercive and
can involve armed attack on a state. Therefore, it also has the risk of harming civilians. An
important thing to take into account when discussing no-fly zones is that it is logically only
relevant to use in cases where there actually is an air force to enable. This means that in the
many situations where insurgents cause conflicts, a no-fly zone is unusable because these
rarely have an air force.
4.1.3. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
In the Guiding Principles the importance of making states recognize their responsibility to
protect IDPs is emphasized as one of the most important issues in IDP protection. A way to
do that could be holding states accountable of their actions through ICC. This can serve two
purposes. Firstly, referring a case to ICC is a symbolic act showing that the international
community condemns certain actions, and the UNSC is watching the situation. Secondly, it
can make other states aware of what actions are not accepted, and maybe prevent them from
committing the same crimes in the future.
The gap in relation to ICC is in respect to the Rome Statute Art. 4: “The Court may
exercise its functions and powers, as provided in this Statute, on the territory of any State
98
99
CCPDC (1997). Page: 61.
Reuters. (March 2nd, 2011).
41
Party and, by special agreement, on the territory of any other State.” This that arrest warrants
can only be carried out on the territory of countries that have signed the Statute. Sudan has
un-signed the statute, and consequently al-Bashir has to be arrested on the territory of a State
Party, in order for him to be handed over to the ICC. It seems unlikely that this will be done
as long as he is President, partly because AU countries have opposed to his prosecution and
called on UNSC to defer the decision to prosecute al-Bashir under Article 16 of the Rome
Statute, stating that UNSC can postpone any investigation or prosecution for up to 12
months.100 In general, an arrest of a party in a conflict could potentially complicate peace
negotiations, rather than dampen conflict and protect civilians. So, while the symbolic act of
referring a case to ICC can have positive implications for IDPs in the long run, and can
potentially hold states accountable, it will not better the situation for existing IDPs.
4.1.4 SUMMARY
Conclusively, it can be said that there is a list of coercive means that does not involve
intervention, which can possibly be used to protect IDPs when sates are unwilling to fulfill
their protection responsibility. These are shown to be more or less effective when it comes to
immediate protection of IDPs. The question then is how IDPs are included in R2P and if they
can benefit from the potential normative change in state behavior.
4.2 R2P FOR IDPS
According to scholars such as Roberta Cohen, R2P has to a large extent developed from
“efforts to design an international system to protect IDPs”. 101 And it should not go by
unnoticed that the works of Francis Deng has played a large part in evolving the concept of
R2P by formulating the concept of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ with regards to
international responsibility to protection of IDPs and furthermore did important work in
formulating the Guiding Principles for IDPs. 102 R2P was adopted at the World Summit in
2005, based on the ICISS report from 2001. In paragraphs 138 – 139 in the World Summit
document, world leaders agree that they have a responsibility to protect their own people and
should be prepared to take collective action when other states were failing to fulfill their
responsibility.103 However, it makes no mentioning of IDP as a special group of concern who
can benefit from R2P in practice. However, in “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect”
100
AU Decision Adopted During the 17th African Union Summit. (2010). Page: 2-3.
Cohen, Roberta in Davies, Sara E. & Glanville, Luke (ed.). (2010). Page: 35.
102
Davies, Sara E. & Glanville, Luke (ed.). (2010). Page: 206.
103
UN Implementing the responsibility to protect. (2009). Page: 1.
101
42
from 2009 General Secretary of UN, Ban Ki-moon, noted that refugees and internally
displaced persons were of high concern to R2P and that its goal was to react to that group of
people.104
4.2.1 REVOLUTION OR EVOLUTION?
Indeed, while R2P as a catch-phrase is a recent addition to the international
lexicon, in terms of international law, it is neither novel nor radical. Rather,
its normative roots run deep.105
With this statement, Erin Mooney underlines that neither the framework R2P nor the moral
code of sovereignty as responsibility offers any revolutionary perspectives to protection of
IDPs or vulnerable groups in general. The illegality and international condemnation of
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing, have been stated in
international conventions for more than 60 years, and has recently been reaffirmed with the
ratification and implementation of the 1998 Rome statute of the International Criminal Court,
which was implemented in 2002. Furthermore, the right to intervention “in respect of grave
circumstances” is stated in Constitutive Act of the African Union, article 4h from 2002. 106
Also, the specific rights of IDPs, and moral framework for reacting to the issue, are written in
The Guiding Principles from 1998, and therefore constitute a normative framework,
specifically with reference to IDPs.
This could lead to the thought that R2P is nothing more than old wine in new bottles.
But, Erin Mooney argues that even though R2P builds upon existing rules, and even lacks a
specific mentioning of IDPs – the obvious result of genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity and ethnic cleansing – it helps to rebuild on the concept of sovereignty as
responsibility by setting out expectations to the individual states and in particular the
UNSC.107 Based on this, R2P is being presented as a norm that can potentially alleviate the
main obstacle in assisting and protecting IDPs in states that are unwilling to do so, this being
sovereignty. This is done by contributing to the evolution of the term, and the way it is
perceived.
Even though it can be argued that R2P and The Guiding Principles overlap in e.g.
their perceptions of sovereignty and a state’s responsibility to protect its own population,
there are still several points where R2P does not point out the specific protection needs of
104
Davies, Sara E. & Glanville, Luke (ed.). (2010). Page: 205.
Mooney, Erin in Davies, Sara E. & Glanville, Luke (ed.). (2010). Page: 63.
106
Grave circumstance is referred to as genocide, War crimes and crimes against humanity.
107
Mooney, Erin in Davies, Sara E. & Glanville, Luke (ed.). (2010). Page: 77.
105
43
IDPs. The World Summit Outcome Document specifically limits R2P to the four specified
crimes, displacement situations can occur in relation to other events, i.e. natural disaster and
famine. In these situations states can still be unwilling to assist the IDPs, and therefore fail to
comply with the protection responsibility. As described in the introduction, the situations in
Myanmar in 2006 and North Korea in the beginning of the 1990’s are examples of this.
The fact that R2P is another normative framework without any legally binding power
is not a problem, because “main protection gaps are due to a lack not of legal standards but of
their implementation”. 108 In principle IDP rights are already identified in international
conventions and in humanitarian law, but the mere situation of being displaced indicates that
states are not protecting these rights for the specific group. R2P emphasizes the responsibility
to prevent humanitarian crises, and should therefore put pressure on states to try and avert or
attenuate the situations that force people into displacement, or at least alleviate the suffering
that many displaced are victims of, due to the vulnerable situation. If operationalized, R2P
can do a great difference for IDPs, the question remaining is just who, and how should do
this. R2P fails in pointing out this responsibility when sovereigns refuse.
It can be argued that R2P as a normative framework that focus on civilians in general
does not contribute with anything new that existing international law does not already cover.
In the specific situations of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic
cleansing, R2P might be used as a preventive measure to stop further displacement. In
relation to making states accountable or creating an effective protection regime to which IDPs
can turn, when their own states are unwilling to protect them, R2P adds nothing new.
4.2.2 IMPLEMENTING R2P TO IDP PROTECTION
In order to optimize IDPs protection, R2P could be improved in number of ways. Roberta
Cohen suggests a way forward to make R2P more effective in assisting IDPs by clarifying the
role of the R2P document in relation to IDP protection. She emphasizes that possible
operations in the name of R2P should have the initial strategy of protecting the internally
displaced. Internally displaced have been shown to be a vulnerable group that is more likely
than the general populations to suffer from physical attacks, diseases, sexual violence and
abductions.109 The notion that R2P means first and foremost military intervention must be
dispelled. Prevention should rebuild states capacity to protect its own citizens and should
continue to be the main goal of R2P. By applying R2P to situations where the concept is used
108
109
Mooney, Erin in Davies, Sara E. & Glanville, Luke (ed.). (2010). Page: 68.
Cohen, Roberta in Davies, Sara E. & Glanville, Luke (ed.). (2010). Page: 50-51.
44
in non-military intervention it could lead to the focus on humanitarian assistance and conflict
prevention and that could have a positive effect on the concept, and possibly lead to further
effectiveness of the use of the term. R2P should go beyond the emergency phase, but also try
to provide sustainable solutions, because between half and three quarters of refugees and
IDPs find themselves in displacement situations for at least 5 years.110 In these steps towards
improving the concept Cohen is clearly concerned about the preventing and rebuilding, if
intervention of any kind the main goal should be to immediately protect IDPs.
Another step in preventing further displacement is, when using R2P in an operation to
protect IDPs, the will to reinforce the national responsibility to protect IDPs must be included.
Therefore, The Guiding Principles must be part of the R2P strategy and the UN system should
promote the implementation of the Guiding Principles in R2P situations. Cohen mentions
how Walter Kalin suggests that focusing on the Principles strengthens IDP associations and
help civil society organizations in making their governments accountable for their actions.
Support should be given if regional organizations want to develop a framework based on the
Principles 111 like African Union has done by adopting Convention on Protecting and
Assisting IDPs in 2009. 112 Forty-six African countries adopted the convention while 17
nations representatives signed it but he Convention is still to be ratified by at least 15
countries to be able to make it an officially valid conventions. UNHCR António Guterres told
the press after the confernece that „this represents the concept of ´responsibility to protect’ in
action. It demonstrates the national sovereignty is fully compatible with the responsibility to
protect.” Guterres said that the convention was a reminder that individual states were the ones
who bear the responsibility and if states were failing the collective Africa had established that
they had the responsibility to act.113
Cohen emphasizes the importance of negotiating with insurgent groups to reach IDPs.
She suggests that dialogue with insurgents should be encouraged as a way of reaching
displaced, because these are often under the control of non-state military groups. In his report
Implementing Responsibility to Protect” Ban Ki-Moon calls for military assistance to help
governments deal with armed insurgent groups, but does not suggest any direct measures for
dealing with the insurgents themselves, e.g. in the form of dialogue.114 Use of military force
should therefore be prevented through the use of dialogue.
110
Cohen, Roberta in Davies, Sara E. & Glanville, Luke (ed.). (2010). Page: 52-56.
Cohen, Roberta in Davies, Sara E. & Glanville, Luke (ed.). (2010). Page: 52-53.
112
The UN Refugee Agency. (October 13th, 2009).
113
The UN Refugee Agency. (October 13th, 2009).
114
Cohen, Roberta in Davies, Sara E. & Glanville, Luke (ed.). (2010). Page: 55.
111
45
In order to address the IDP protection effectively when R2P is applied it is very
important to have strong international organizations and regional institutions that can be
relied upon. As the situation is today there is no institutionalized mandate for who should
foresee IDP issues when governments fail to do so. There is the Representative of the UN
Secretary–General for the Human Rights of IDPs, but this is just one person, relied upon to
raise awareness and to promote the Guiding principles. In 2005 an agreement was signed in
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) on divide the responsibility
within UN organizations to address the matters of IDPs. UNCHR took the lead coordinating
role. However, if the gap between refugees and IDP protection in the agency persists the UN
might have to look at the possibilities of creating a new office for IDPs in order to ensure
their protection. Although, Cohen does not directly suggest this, but rather just acknowledges
the possibility, others have raised this question if special organization for IDPs were a
possibility. Kok-Chor Tan suggests the answer is to institutionalize the concept of R2P, which
would require a duty to protect by a certain state or international agencies. This would mean
that the actors assigned the task of protecting IDPs for example, were at least morally bound
to react to a certain situation
4.3 THE HUMANITARIAN PERSPECTIVE
In this report, the focus has primarily been on the evolution of R2P and humanitarian
intervention in relation to IDP protection, from the perspective of theorists and UN. However,
Cohen, Deng, and others have addressed the important role that neutral non-state actors play
in IDP protection and development. To get a different perspective on the issues, we will
diversify the discussion by briefly including a humanitarian perspective, through an interview
with former employee at NRC Lisbeth Pilegaard.
Western governments, and UN’s failure to react too many of the conflicts in the
developing world in the late 80´s provided a platform for number of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) to be an active international humanitarian actor in conflict zones,
sometimes the only actor. 115 NGOs are as different as they are many, and work towards
different goals. Some might seek to promote social and economic development or respect for
human rights and monitor possible human rights abuses. Others provide emergency
humanitarian relief or encourage peace negotiation by pushing for non-violent conflict
resolutions.116 In relation to bettering the conditions for IDPs many NGOs are advocating to
promote government and public awareness, to build a consciousness about the humanitarian
115
116
Stoddard, Abby Macrae, Johanna and Harmer, Adele (ed.). (2003). Page: 25.
Anderson, Mary. (1996).
46
values.117 Most of the humanitarian work that relief organization such as NRC is working
with is aimed at optimizing the conditions for displaced through care and maintenance. The
focus is on establishing a decent living and provides access to food, shelter, sanitation, legal
counseling and education for children. 118 Humanitarian NGOs are working on the ground
with the specific needs of IDP, and might consequently have a different perspective on how to
address the issue of IDP protection and humanitarian intervention, than politicians have.
To answer the question of how humanitarian NGOs respond to the issue of
humanitarian intervention Lisbeth Pilegaard is very clear:
… humanitarian intervention itself is a wording that we do not except in
the humanitarian world … Because you can’t have a humanitarian
intervention in one sentence it’s contradictory in itself, intervention will
always be violent and can never be humanitarian. It is used as a political
phrase by politicians.119
Thereby she argues that military intervention can never be humanitarian because it is in its
nature a violent, military act that will affect, even kill, civilians. Therefore it should be called
what it is: a military invasion, and a political – not humanitarian – decision to intervene. This
can be linked to the often-raised dilemma that intervention equals war, and war will increase,
rather that decrease, displacement and suffering. She acknowledges that one can talk of a
military intervention to avoid further disaster, and can maybe be legitimized because “the cost
of life from the intervention might be less than the cost of life from the local people”.120 But
due to its violent nature, intervention is never humanitarian, because it violates the
humanitarian principles. Furthermore, the humanitarian grounds of pervious proclaimed
humanitarian interventions, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, are questioned, and she thereby
adhere to the realist perception that intervention is primarily based on self-interest.
If we wanted to intervene because of humanitarian grounds, we should
have intervened in North Korea long, long time. If there are anyone
suffering in this world, it is the poor North Koreans. Has it any strategic
interest? No! Will we ever intervene? No!121
In relation to how R2P can potentially be a useful tool to assist IDPs, Pilegaard argues
that it could, in principle, be used as a gap filling function or a compensation tool, when states
fail to live up to their own responsibility to protect its IDP. 122 The Guiding Principles already
117
Stoddard, Abby Macrae, Johanna and Harmer, Adele (ed.). (2003). Page: 30.
See: Norwegian Refugee Council.
119
Pilegaard, Lisbeth. Interview: 08:10.
120
Pilegaard, Lisbeth. Interview: 12:08.
121
Pilegaard, Lisbeth. Interview: 24:40.
122
Pilegaard, Lisbeth. Interview: 00:30
118
47
exist to point out government’s responsibility to - in Lisbeth’s words - keep watering their
own garden, while R2P suggest that if they fail to do so, the international community will do
it for them. In that respect, there is a risk that R2P can undermine state’s responsibility.123
Currently, many IDPs are being protected and assisted by international organizations such as
UNCHR and different NGOs, because the state does not have the capacity or will to take the
responsibility of protecting them. Pilegaard describes this as “the paradigm between practice
an principles”,124 in principle it is the states’ responsibility to protect their population, which
should not be undermined or changed with R2P, but in reality, many NGOs and other external
actors try to compensate for the state’s who fails to fulfill the responsibility.
This compensation can be criticized for potentially prolonging a conflict, because by
neutrally helping to provide a service that a government is in principle responsible for,
nothing is done to change status quo. Mary Anderson, who has written on how humanitarian
aid can increase the severity of conflicts, deepens this critique. She acknowledge that
humanitarian NGOs have done much good, but, takes a rather critical approach on
humanitarian NGOs and looks into how they “often becomes intertwined with the forces that
drive the conflicts that prompted the aid in the first place.”125 She argues that it can fail to
acknowledge the political aspect of their work, which can contribute to conflict. For example
it can happen that NGOs aid is stolen and redistributed to the military factions, taxing the
NGOs for being able to deliver aid could benefit those who are responsible for the conflicts
and selectivity in the way of choosing a certain group over others can fuel ethnic conflicts.
Anderson is not arguing against humanitarian aid, but stresses that it is important that
humanitarian NGOs are aware of these pitfalls, and although the main reason for providing
relief is that it is urgent, it does not mean that they are independent from political implications
which can affect civilians.126 On the other hand, former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali:
NGOs are needed to “embarrass governments and international secretariats to do their job.” 127
So, instead of prolonging conflict, the embarrassment of needing help form outside can
motivate governments to act on their responsibility to protect.
123
Pilegaard, Lisbeth. Interview: 06:58
Pilegaard, Lisbeth. Interview: 04:20
125
Anderson, Mary. (1996).
126
Anderson, Mary. (1996).
127
Cohen, Roberta & Deng, Francis M. (1998). Page: 211.
124
48
5 CONCLUSION
In the introduction it has been stressed that the problem concerning IDPs is that they on one
hand are in a vulnerable situation as forcibly displaced, but on the other hand have to seek
protection with the sovereign government that might not be able or unwilling to protect them.
In most cases the government will be willing to accept assistance from external actors as
humanitarian NGOs and UNHCR, but if the government is unwilling to co-operate the
situation can become critical, because there is still no organization that has the official
mandate to assist IDPs. Furthermore, the basic features of R2P were described as a normative
framework that emphasizes sovereignty as a responsibility, and not a right. If a state fails to
fulfill this responsibility towards its citizens, other states have a right and a responsibility to
prevent or react to a crisis and potentially rebuild after a crisis has happened. In extreme cases
of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing humanitarian
intervention can be justified. However, states should always pursue non-coercive and nonmilitary solutions before they resort to intervention. These components lead to the problem
formulation of “How can Responsibility to Protect be seen as a factor for changing the scope
of humanitarian interventions, and in relation to protecting IDPs in cases where states are
unwilling to provide the required protection?”
To address this, R2P and humanitarian intervention were discussed in relation to
examples from Somalia and Sudan and theories of international relations, mainly realism and
solidarism. It became clear that there are two ways to see this relation, depending on which
theory is used to analyze the question. Therefore, there are two possible conclusions.
5.1 THE REALIST CONCLUSION
State’s actions should always be analyzed in terms of self-interest. Therefore, the mere notion
of a humanitarian intervention cannot exist, because states will never act on humanitarian
grounds. R2P can therefore only be seen as either a declaration of intent, to make states seem
more humanitarian, or a political framework that can be used to legitimize illegitimate
interventions. The proclaimed humanitarian interventions in the past have in reality been
cloak for serving national interest or to enforce liberal democracy. The example of the UN
and US intervention in Somalia proves this point, because the mission was aborted when the
relative loss became too high. The case of Sudan further proves this point, because no
initiatives for intervention have been made, in spite of obvious crimes against humanity and
genocide. So, when it comes to the protection of IDPs states will only react if it coincides
with national interest, and where the gain is relatively higher than the potential loss related to
49
intervention. R2P will not change this in any way because it does only exist as a document,
and not in reality.
5.2 THE SOLIDARIST CONCLUSION
The international realm is a rule governed society. This is maintained through a common
interest and will to co-operate across borders to maintain peace. Sovereignty exists because
there is a common understanding and practice of its existence. However, individuals are more
important than states, and as moral beings states therefore adhere to the belief that protection
of human rights is an issue that supersedes sovereignty. R2P is seen as a norm-changing
framework that will eventually change the limits of what can be accepted within sovereignty,
and therefore also the scope for humanitarian intervention. A norm change does not happen
overnight, but as a consequence of lessons learned, after humanitarian disasters that have
been witnessed. R2P furthermore change the scope for intervention by creating specific
framework that states can use to legitimize intervention. Intervention can be legitimized if it
has the aim of protecting individuals, even if it is before an actual crisis has begun, or if the
intervention fails. The important thing is that the intervention was initially thought to do more
good than harm for the suffering population. R2P is needed as a shared agreement for when
intervention is legitimized, to keep states from doing illegitimate interventions.
The example from Somalia shows that intervention can be humanitarian, had it not
been, the pursuit of national interest would have weighted higher that the loss of 18 soldiers.
The reluctance to intervene in Sudan can be explained by the fact that UNSC has made the
assessment that at this point, an intervention will do more harm than good, and therefore it is
better to maintain immediate protection with the use of peacekeepers. Then it should also be
noted that R2P view and the norm has not fully emerged yet, when it becomes an integrated
part of states policies, we will see more humanitarian interventions.
5.3 BACK TO REALITY
Nothing is one-sided, and there are plenty of counterarguments to both these conclusions,
which have been forwarded in the discussion. By relying strictly on one theory, there is the
danger of theorizing reality. Therefore, the aim has never been to identify truth, but to suggest
how R2P can be perceived in different ways. However, there are a few general conclusions
that can be made on the basis of the discussions made in the report.
Humanitarian intervention has always been, and continues to be, seen as last resort in
extreme cases. R2P does not change or challenge this, but merely stresses the right to use
50
humanitarian interventions in these cases. Peaceful means that should be used before
resorting to intervention are also a part of R2P, but many of these are relying on the consent
and co-operation of the host state. The main problem for IDPs in states where governments
are unwilling to protect them is that they are caught in a void between the system of
sovereignty and the unwilling states. R2P does not change this. A change in the common
perception of sovereignty could therefore possible be helpful to IDPs because they could
alternatively rely on the protection from other states. However, the examples described in the
report show little sign that this is happening, and sovereignty still seem to be a highly
regarded issue in international relations. Still, it must remain that the most important issue
when it comes to protecting IDPs is to make states acknowledge their responsibility to protect
their own populations, and therefore act on it. R2P does not contribute with any new aspects
of making a clear system of accountability for IDP protection, and can therefore not be used
in this regard. The Guiding Principles should consequently still be regarded as the primary
framework for assisting IDPs.
5.4 QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Many issues have been discussed and many questions have been raised, but there are still
many aspects of the future prospects of R2P that could be studied further. One is the
perspective of NGOs and humanitarian organizations, that discussion is introduced in the end
of this report. But the issue of what role humanitarian NGOs play in conflicts as a challenge
to sovereignty, and how the humanitarian principles can have negative effects on peace
negotiation could be an interesting angle to take up in relations to IDP protection. In that
relation one could look at the concrete methods that are used, and how these affect the
situation for IDPs and government’s will to protect. Could R2P possibly be used to reinforce
the Guiding Principle in advocacy?
A totally different, but relevant, approach in relation to the development and
integration of R2P could be to do a discourse analysis of how R2P is being used in
international politics, and whether this has changed since the adaptation of R2P in 2005.
Furthermore, this potential change in discourse could be compared to actual changes in
international or domestic politics, to see if a discourse change would actually amount into
action. If this is the case, will it then affect the situation for IDPs? This could be assessed both
quantitatively by looking at e.g. the increase or decrease in the number of IDPs or people
being resettled, where political change has happened, and qualitatively by interviewing IDPs
to see is they feel their conditions have changed.
51
6 BIBLIOGRAPHY
-
African Union (July 1st, 2010). Decision Adopted During the 17th African
Union Summit. Available at:
http://www.au.int/en/summit/sites/default/files/17th%20_SUMMIT__DECISIONS_DECLARATIONS_and_RESOLUTIONS__eng%20FINAL.pdf
-
African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur. UNAMID
Background. Available at:
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/background.shtml
-
Amnesty International. (June 5th, 2008). Myanmar Briefing, Human Rights
Concerns a Month after Cyclone Nargis.
-
Amnesty International. (March 3th, 2011). Sudan: No end to Impunity for
Human Rights Violations in Darfur.
-
Amnesty International. (July, 2010). The Crumbling State of Health Care in
North Korea. London, United Kingdom: Publication Amnesty International
Publication.
-
Anderson, Mary. (1996). Summary of Humanitarian NGOs in Conflict
Intervention by Glaser, Tanya. Original article by Anderson published in
Managing Global Chaos, eds. Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson and Pamela
Aall, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996) pp.
343-354.
-
Annan, Kofi A. (September 18th, 1999). Two Concepts of Sovereignty. The
Economist. Available at:
http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/kaecon.html
-
Battersby, P. & Siracusa, J, M. (2009). Globalization and Human Security.
United States: Rowman and Littlefield Pulishers, INC.
52
-
Bellamy, Alex J. (September, 2005). Responsibility to Protect or Trojan
Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq. Ethics
& International Affairs, Volume 19, Issue 2. Page: 31-53.
-
Bellamy, Alex J. (2009). Responsibility to Protect: the Global Effort to End
Mass Atrocities. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity Press.
-
Bellamy, Alex, J. (September 27th, 2011). The Responsibility to Protect and
the Problem of Regime Change. Available at: http://www.eir.info/?author=1001
-
Burchill, Scott. (2005). The National Interest in International Relations
Theory. Houndmills, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillian.
-
CCPDC - Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. (1997).
Preventing Deadly Conflict.. New York, United States: Garnegie Corporation
of New York.
-
Cohen, Roberta & Deng, Francis M. (1998). Masses in flight. The Global
Crisis of Internal Displacement. Washington, D.C., United States: Brookings
Institution Press.
-
Davies, Sara E. & Glanville, Luke (ed.). (2010). Protecting the Displaced.
Leiden, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
-
Department of Public Information, United Nations. (March 21th, 1997).
United Nations Operation in Somalia I. Available at:
http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm
-
Glover, Nicholas. (September 27th, 2011). A critique of the theory and
practice of R2P. Available at: http://www.e-ir.info/?p=14315
-
Holzgrefe, J. L. & Keohane, K.O. (ed.). (2003). Humanitarian Intervention:
Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas. Cambridge, United Kingdom:
Cambridge University Press.
-
Human Rights Watch. (April 22th, 2002). Sudan: Government and Militias Conspire
in Darfur Killings. Human Rights Watch. Available at:
53
http://www.hrw.org/news/2004/04/22/sudan-government-and-militiasconspire-darfur-killings
-
Human Rights Watch. (July 13th, 2010). Sudan: ICC Warrant for Al-Bashir
on Genocide. Human Rights Watch. Available at:
http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/07/13/sudan-icc-warrant-al-Bashir-genocide
-
IDMC - Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. (2010). Internal
Displacement, Global Overview of Trends and Development in 2010. Geneve,
Switzerland: IDMC.
-
ICISS – International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.
(2001). Responsibility to Protect. Ottawa, Canada: The International
Development Research Centre.
-
Joseph, Sarah. (March 27th, 2011). The Dilemma of Humanitarian
Intervention. Available at: http://www.e-ir.info/?p=7810
-
Lipschutz, Ronnie D. (ed.). (1995). On Security. New York, United States:
Columbia University Press.
-
Macrae, Johanna and Harmer, Adele (ed.). (2003). Humanitarian action and
´global war on terror´: a review of trends and issues. London, United
Kingdom: Humanitarian Policy Group Overseas Development Institute.
-
Mooney, Erin. (2001). The Concept of Internaal Displacement and the Case
for Internally Displaced Person as a Category of Concern. Refugee Survey
Quarterly, Volume 24. Page: 9-26.
-
Norwegian Refugee Council, Programme. Available at:
http://www.nrc.no/?aid=9160705
-
Office of the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator. (September 25th,
2010). Key facts and figures for Sudan with a focus on Darfur. Available at:
http://www.unsudanig.org/docs/darfur_fact_sheet_v22_5.pdf
-
Organization of African Unity. Constitutive Act of the African Union. July 1st
1998. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4937e0142.html
54
-
Pilegaard, Lisbeth. Interview. (December 12th, 2011). The interview is added
in full length as appendix.
-
Raisin, Joanne & Ramsbotham in Humanitarian Studies Unit. (ed.). (2001).
Reflections on Humanitarian Action. London, United Kingdom: Pluto Press.
-
Reuters. (March 2nd, 2011). No-fly Zone for Libya would require attack:
Gates. Reuters. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/02/uslibya-usa-pentagon-idUSTRE7214EX20110302
-
Stubbs, Richard & Underhill, Geoffrey R.D. (ed.). (2006). Political Economy
and the Changing Global Order. United Kingdom. Oxford University Press.
-
Thomas, Weiss G. (August 31th, 2011). Whither R2P? Available at:
http://www.e-ir.info/?p=13421
-
Udombana, Nsongurua J. (November, 2005). When Neutrality is a Sin: The
Darfur Crisis and the Crisis of Humanitarian Intervention in Sudan. Human
Rights Quartly, Volume 27, Number 4. Page: 1149-1199.
-
United Nations. The Charter of United Nations and Statute of the
International Court of Justice: June 26th, 1948. Available at:
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/
-
UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. July
28th 1951. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137. Available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3be01b964.html
-
UN General Assembly, Implementing the responsibility to protect: report of
the Secretary-General, January 12th, 2009. (A/63/677). Available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4989924d2.html
-
UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. December
10th 1948. (217 A (III)) Available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3712c.html
55
-
UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement. July 22th 1998. (E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2). Available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3c3da07f7.html
-
The UN Refugee Agency. (October 13th, 2009). African Union Adopts Major
Convention to Protect and Assist the Internally Displaced. The UN Refugee
Agency. Available at: http://unhcr.org/4ae1e09d9.html
-
UN Security Council. (December 3rd, 1992). Resolution 794. (S/RES/794).
-
UN Security Council (November 19th, 2004). Resolution 1574. (S/RES/1574).
-
UN Security Council (July 8th, 2011). Resolution 1996. (S/RES/1996)
-
Welsh, Jennifer M. (ed.). (2006). Humanitarian Intervention and International
Relations. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University press.
-
Wheeler, Nicholas J. (2000). Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in
International Society. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
-
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. (May 5th, 1994). Statement
by the Press Secretary. President Clinton Signs New Peacekeeping Policy.
Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm
-
World Federalist Movement – Institute for Global Policy. (2001).
Responsibility to Protect –Engaging Civil Society. New York, United States:
World Federalist Movement – Institute for Global Policy.
56
7 APPENDIX
CD: Interview with Lisbeth Pilegaard
57