SNFI 2011
[Russian Relations]
[Oddo/Maycock]
Russian Relations Disad
1NC Shell ...................................................................................................................................................... 3
1NC Shell ...................................................................................................................................................... 4
US/Russia Relations High Now .................................................................................................................... 5
US/Russia Relations High Now .................................................................................................................... 6
US/Russia Relations High Now .................................................................................................................... 7
US/Russia Relations High Now .................................................................................................................... 8
US/Russia Relations High Now .................................................................................................................... 9
US/Russia Relations High Now .................................................................................................................. 10
AT: START uniqueness overwhelms link .................................................................................................. 11
Military Development Links ....................................................................................................................... 12
Military Development Links ....................................................................................................................... 13
Military Development Links ....................................................................................................................... 14
Space cooperation links .............................................................................................................................. 15
Space cooperation links .............................................................................................................................. 16
US/Russia Relations Good-Terrorism ........................................................................................................ 17
US/Russia Relations Good-Terrorism ........................................................................................................ 18
US/Russia Relations Good-Terrorism ........................................................................................................ 19
US/Russia Relations Good-Iran .................................................................................................................. 21
US/Russia Relations Good-Hegemony ....................................................................................................... 22
US/Russia Relations Good-US/Russia war................................................................................................. 23
US/Russia Relations Good-US/Russia war................................................................................................. 24
US/Russia Relations-Other ......................................................................................................................... 25
US/Russia Relations-Other ......................................................................................................................... 26
US/Russia Relations-Other ......................................................................................................................... 27
US/Russia Relations-Other ......................................................................................................................... 28
US/Russia Relations-Other ......................................................................................................................... 29
US/Russia Relations-Other ......................................................................................................................... 30
US/Russia Relations-Other ......................................................................................................................... 31
US/Russia Relations-Other ......................................................................................................................... 32
US/Russia Relations-Other ......................................................................................................................... 33
US/Russia Relations-Other ......................................................................................................................... 34
AT: Space Race/Weaponization Inevitable ................................................................................................ 36
AT: Space Race/Weaponization Inevitable ................................................................................................ 37
Space Race/Weaponization Inevitable ........................................................................................................ 38
AT: Other .................................................................................................................................................... 39
1
SNFI 2011
[Russian Relations]
[Oddo/Maycock]
AFF: Relations resilient .............................................................................................................................. 40
AFF: Relations low ..................................................................................................................................... 41
AFF: Relations low ..................................................................................................................................... 42
AFF: Relations low ..................................................................................................................................... 43
AFF: Relations low ..................................................................................................................................... 44
AFF: Relations low ..................................................................................................................................... 45
AFF: Relations low ..................................................................................................................................... 46
AT: Terrorism impact ................................................................................................................................. 47
AT: Proliferation impact ............................................................................................................................. 48
AT: Proliferation impact ............................................................................................................................. 49
Aff: Weaponization Inevitable .................................................................................................................... 50
Aff: Weaponization Inevitable .................................................................................................................... 51
Aff: Weaponization Inevitable .................................................................................................................... 52
Aff: Weaponization Inevitable .................................................................................................................... 53
2
SNFI 2011
[Russian Relations]
[Oddo/Maycock]
1NC SHELL
A. Uniqueness: U.S. and Russia on good terms now
Buckley, Neil, Lex Columnist of London Office at The Financial Times. Mr. Buckley served as Moscow Bureau
Chief at The Financial Times Limited, 2011, Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7cf18c82-9623-11e08256-00144feab49a.html#axzz1TQJFDvOZ.
The sight of a relaxed President Dmitry Medvedev chatting over hamburgers with his US counterpart Barack
Obama on a visit to the US last year was a sign of just how much relations between the two countries have
warmed in the past three years.
A more tangible sign of the improvement since the US “reset” of relations, and Moscow’s shift to a more
pragmatic foreign policy, was Moscow’s abstention at the UN Security Council in March on a motion allowing
western intervention in Libya. In days gone by, it might have been expected to exercise its veto.
That was the latest in a series of concrete advances. These have included: the new Start treaty on reducing
strategic nuclear weapons; Russian backing for a UN resolution tightening sanctions on Iran; and a deal
permitting Nato shipments to Afghanistan across Russian territory.
Cliff Kupchan, a director of Eurasia Group, the political risk consultancy, and a former state department official in
the Clinton era, says the turnround in Russian relations is “one of the signature accomplishments of the Obama
administration”. He says: “If you look at this in the sense of ‘Are we better off now than we were three years
ago?’, there is only one way to answer the question.”
B. Link: Plan collapses US-Russia relations
Krepon – 2003 [President emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center, is the author of Space Assurance or Space
Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space with Christopher Clary, Cooperative Threat Reduction, Missile
Defense, and the Nuclear Future and editor of Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia [Henry L. Stimson Center,
Space Assurance or Space Dominance?, htpp://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/spacebook.pdf,
6/24/11]
U.S. initiatives to “seize” the high ground of space are likely to be countered by asymmetric and
unconventional warfare strategies carried out by far weaker states—in space and to a greater extent on Earth.
In addition, U.S. initiatives associated with space dominance would likely alienate longstanding allies, as well
as China and Russia, whose assistance is required to effectively counter terrorism and proliferation, the two
most pressing national security concerns of this decade. No U.S. ally has expressed support for space warfare
initiatives. To the contrary, U.S. initiatives to weaponize space would likely corrode bilateral relations and
coalition-building efforts. Instead, the initiation of preemptive or preventive warfare in space by the United States
based on assertions of an imminent threat—or a threat that cannot be ameliorated in other ways—is likely to be met
with deep and widespread skepticism abroad.
3
SNFI 2011
[Russian Relations]
[Oddo/Maycock]
1NC SHELL
C. Impact: 1. Positive U.S. relations with Russia are mutually beneficial in areas including
terrorism, instability in the Middle East and energy security
Thomas, Graham, Served as a special assistant to the President and senior director for Russia at the National Security
Council, 2008, U.S. –“Russia Relations: Facing Reality Pragmatically”
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080717_graham_u.s.russia.pdf
In this uncertain world, the United States and Russia are not strategic rivals, and neither poses a strategic threat to the
other (despite some overwrought Russian rhetoric to the contrary), in contrast to the situation during the Cold War. Rather, they
share a set of common strategic challenges. Russia, by virtue of its geographic location, and the United States, by virtue of its
global role, must build new relationships with a Europe that is expanding and deepening; they both must find a way to cope
with the growing instability in the Middle East, the challenge to energy security that implies, and, at least for Russia, the
threat that that instability will infect Russia’s southern reaches; and they both must manage relations with a rising China.
In addition, both countries must deal with the dark side of globalization, and both have a keen interest in the role and
effectiveness of the institutions of global governance, such as the United Nations and the G-8, the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund.Common challenges, however, are not the same as common interests. And there are deep differences in the way the United States and Russia
think of global order (consider, for example, the role of democracy or the United Nations). But the question each country needs to ask is how important the other is to its achieving its own
For example: Given their standing as the world’s two leading nuclear powers, the United States and Russia are
each indispensable to dealing with the problems of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear terrorism, and
strategic stability. The United States, as the world’s largest energy consumer, and Russia, as the largest producer of
hydrocarbons, are essential to any discussion of energy security and energy’s future.
strategic goals.
Global economic dynamics and transfers of wealth will require bringing Russia, along with China, India, and others, into a more central role in managing the global economy, a service long
performed by Europe and the United States.
In East Asia, to create a favorable new equilibrium, Russia has an interest in a strong power—that is, the United States—acting as a moderating influence on China, and the United States has no
interest in a weakening Russian presence in Siberia and the Russian Far East, regions rich in the natural resources that fuel modern economies.
In the Middle East, both the United States and Russia have levers that could help promote stability, if the two countries were working in concert, or fuel conflict, if they were not. In Europe,
Russian energy is critical to economic well-being, and the United States remains essential to security and stability. On
a range of other issues—for example, civil
nuclear energy, pandemic diseases, climate change—each country is capable of making a major contribution, given the
vast scientific talent of each. In the former Soviet space, both countries will be critical to building lasting security and
economic structures.In short, the United States and Russia are better off working together rather than at cross purposes,
managing the inevitable differences rather than magnifying them, as is too often the case today.
2. A souring of U.S. and Russian relations leads to nuclear war and extinction
Ira Helfand, emergency physician from Northampton, Massachusetts, and John Pastore, Rhode Island Democratic Party
Politician, 09, U.S.-Russia nuclear war still a threat, projo.com
President Obama and Russian President Dimitri Medvedev are scheduled to Wednesday in London during the G-20
summit. They must not let the current economic crisis keep them from focusing on one of the greatest threats confronting
humanity: the danger of nuclear war. Since the end of the Cold War, many have acted as though the danger of nuclear war has
ended. It has not. There remain in the world more than 20,000 nuclear weapons. Alarmingly, more than 2,000 of these weapons
in the U.S. and Russian arsenals remain on ready-alert status, commonly known as hair-trigger alert. They can be fired within
five minutes and reach targets in the other country 30 minutes later. Just one of these weapons can destroy a city. A war
involving a substantial number would cause devastation on a scale unprecedented in human history. A study conducted by
Physicians for Social Responsibility in 2002 showed that if only 500 of the Russian weapons on high alert exploded over our
cities, 100 million Americans would die in the first 30 minutes. An attack of this magnitude also would destroy the entire
economic, communications and transportation infrastructure on which we all depend. Those who survived the initial
attack would inhabit a nightmare landscape with huge swaths of the country blanketed with radioactive fallout and
epidemic diseases rampant. They would have no food, no fuel, no electricity, no medicine, and certainly no organized
health care. In the following months it is likely the vast majority of the U.S. population would die. Recent studies by the
eminent climatologists Toon and Robock have shown that such a war would have a huge and immediate impact on climate
worldwide. If all of the warheads in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals were drawn into the conflict, the firestorms
they caused would loft 180 million tons of soot and debris into the upper atmosphere — blotting out the sun.
Temperatures across the globe would fall an average of 18 degrees Fahrenheit to levels not seen on earth since the depth
of the last ice age, 18,000 years ago. Agriculture would stop, eco-systems would collapse, and many species, including
perhaps our own, would become extinct.
4
SNFI 2011
[Russian Relations]
[Oddo/Maycock]
US/RUSSIA RELATIONS HIGH NOW
Russia is currently seeking arms reduction with the US
US State Department, 2010. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf>
Statement of the Russian Federation Concerning Missile Defense
The Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for the Further Reduction
and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed at Prague on April 8, 2010, may be effective and viable only in
conditions where there is no qualitative or quantitative build-up in the missile defense system capabilities of the
United States of America. Consequently, the extraordinary events referred to in Article XIV of the Treaty also
include a build-up in the missile defense system capabilities of the United States of America such that it would give
rise to a threat to the strategic nuclear force potential of the Russian Federation.
The new elections in Russia provide an opportunity to rehabilitate relations with the US
Jeffrey Mankoff, postdoctoral fellow in security studies at Yale University and an adjunct fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations, March 4 2008, “A chance to mend relations with Russia”, The Boston Globe, accessed online at
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2008/03/04/a_chance_to_mend_relations_with_
russia/
The charade of Russia's presidential elections is now past, and to no one's surprise, Sunday's plebiscite ratified the
Kremlin's choice of Dmitry Medvedev to succeed Vladmir Putin. Medvedev's victory provides an opportunity to
turn the page on a difficult chapter in relations between Russia and the United States, and the Bush administration
needs to reach out to Medvedev in the early stages of his presidency if it wants to reverse the dangerous downturn in
relations with Moscow.
After a period of great optimism following Russia's decision to aid the United States in the war on terror, USRussian relations have gone into an apparent free fall during Putin's second term as president. The principal reason
for this downturn has to do with the increasingly aggressive tone of Russian diplomacy. Flush with cash from its oil
and gas, the Kremlin has increasingly rejected Western leadership and sought to assert itself internationally in ways
that have often been damaging to American and Western interests.
The result has been a series of clashes between Moscow and Washington over everything from energy sales to the
fate of arms control agreements, to Russia's involvement in Iran's nuclear program. As the dominant figure in all
aspects of Russian governance, Putin bears much of the responsibility for turning Russia down the path of
confrontation. In Medvedev's current position as first deputy prime minister, meanwhile, his responsibilities have
been mostly in the field of social welfare. Still, to the extent he has spoken about foreign affairs, Medvedev has
mostly said the right things.
Though he serves as chairman of the board of the gas monopoly Gazprom, Medvedev has called for opening Russia
to outside investment. In a major speech to the All-Russian Civic Forum in late January, Medvedev said Russia
needed to focus on promoting internal development rather than engaging in foreign adventures. While Putin in
recent years devoted much effort to castigating the United States as a disruptive force, Medvedev has struck a more
optimistic tone, arguing recently that Russia and the United States share common values that will force them to
cooperate.
There is much US leaders can do to promote greater cooperation with President Medvedev's Russia. Washington can
send a signal that it is open to renewing the relationship by abandoning the outdated Jackson-Vanik Amendment,
adopted in 1974 to pressure Moscow into allowing Soviet Jews to leave for Israel. It can announce that it is willing
to open negotiations about its placement of missile interceptor stations in Poland and the Czech Republic. It can
signal its long-term commitment to preserving the existing arms control regime, which includes extending the
START-I agreement and negotiating new rounds of verifiable mutual reductions. Each of these developments would
be desirable in any case; announcing them now would allow the United States to signal its interest in improved
relations while putting the ball in Moscow's court.
Sadly, the United States has done little to challenge widespread Russian perceptions that it adheres to a double
standard in dealing with Moscow. It praises Pakistan's authoritarian president, Pervez Musharraf, while criticizing
Putin's Russia for undermining democracy. Washington also supported the independence of Kosovo from Russia's
ally Serbia, but rejects calls for the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from United States ally Georgia.
The belief that the United States will never take Russia's interests into account has helped Putin build support for his
more confrontational policy toward the West. Medvedev bears little responsibility for that policy. He at least appears
open to reconsidering it. The United States could help by sending signals that it is willing to listen to him.
5
SNFI 2011
[Russian Relations]
[Oddo/Maycock]
US/RUSSIA RELATIONS HIGH NOW
United States and Russian relations are improving
Dmitry V. Suslov, Deputy Director for Research at the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, 2010, “U.S. –
Russia relations after the new START treaty”, http://en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20100518/159060786.html
The U.S.-Russia relationship has clearly overcome the hostility prevalent in the waning days of the Bush presidency.
The atmosphere has greatly improved. The two countries now take a realistic approach toward their bilateral
relations and are trying to foster cooperation where it is possible and where their national interests are aligned. Both
sides now have the political will to maintain a positive relationship, as evidenced by the creation of the U.S.-Russia
Bilateral Presidential Commission, which consists of 16 working groups dealing with a range of issues. That is not
to say, however, that U.S.-Russia relations have matured into a stable partnership.
Obama and Medvedev are on good terms therefore increasing U.S. Russian relations
Aimee Kilgman, Foreign Policy Examiner, June 21, 2011, “Russian president Medvedev would like to see
Obama re-elected in 2012”, http://www.examiner.com/foreign-policy-in-national/russian-president-medvedevwould-like-to-see-obama-re-elected-20`12
In an interview yesterday with the Financial Times, the Russian president credited Barack Obama for the
improvement in relations between Russia and the United States. He told his audience that he would like to see him
re-elected in 2012 more so than any other person. Not only are relations between the two countries improved, but
Medvedev claims to have a great friendship with Obama, and that he is also a great working partner. He also
stressed that if another person (read Republican here) were to take the helm in the US that it would change the
political landscape between the two countries. In a related article, Medvedev expressed his feelings for Obama:
'Working with President Obama seems to me easy, because he is a good listener who is not steeped in
misconceptions. (...) He holds to all of his commitments, whether it be the START Treaty (Treaty of nuclear arms
reduction, ie) or the WTO.' He added that Obama deserved high marks just for having been able to get the START
Treaty signed in spite of a number of difficulties. It is an understatement to say that Medvedev is not fond of
Obama's Republican opponents.
Russia US Relations Good- START Treaty Proves
US State Department. 2010. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf>
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON
MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
Believing that global challenges and threats require new approaches to interaction across the whole range of
their strategic relations,
Working therefore to forge a new strategic relationship based on mutual trust, openness, predictability, and
cooperation,
Desiring to bring their respective nuclear postures into alignment with this new relationship, and endeavoring
to reduce further the role and importance of nuclear weapons,
Committed to the fulfillment of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and to the achievement of the historic goal of freeing humanity from the nuclear
threat,
Expressing strong support for on-going global efforts in non-proliferation,
Seeking to preserve continuity in, and provide new impetus to, the step-by-stepprocess of reducing and
limiting nuclear arms while maintaining the safety and security of their nuclear arsenals, and with a view to
expanding this process in the future, including to a multilateral approach,
Guided by the principle of indivisible security and convinced that measures for the reduction and limitation of
strategic offensive arms and the other obligations set forth in this Treaty will enhance predictability and stability,
and thus the security of both Parties,
6
SNFI 2011
[Russian Relations]
[Oddo/Maycock]
US/RUSSIA RELATIONS HIGH NOW
Russian-American relations are stable after Soviet Union breakup
Andrei Bysritsky head of Political Journalism at the National Research University Higher School of Economics,
June 22, 2011, “Another Re-Set In Russian American Relations”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andreibystritsky/another-reset-in-russiana_b_882481.html
It's been just about twenty years since the fall of the Iron Curtain and during that period the United States and Russia
have continued to increase cooperation. Russia currently provides supply routes through Russia to the U.S. military
in Afghanistan. Other advances in cooperation include nuclear non-proliferation, space exploration, drug interdiction
and counter-terrorism efforts. Our opposing perspectives and interests have matured over time into mutual respect
for differences based on geopolitical interests rather than ideologies, similar to that of the U.S. and France, where
two partners come to the table with different perspectives and with an understanding of historical and cultural
differences. Our panel discussion did not gloss over the fact that our two countries have different cultural and
political approaches. However, our focus was on how best to present the Russian perspective to an American
audience and hopefully to reach a large audience through online streaming options. The goal of the discussion was
not to persuade as much as to provide context for understanding the audience.
Good advice could be sought from panelist Rüdiger Lenz, former Bureau Chief of the German Radio service in the
U.S. Deutsche Welle, who suggested "it is also important to find where you differ, and where you differ you should
look for a dialogue, and this dialogue can be critical, but dialogue is dialogue, dialogue is better than not talking to
each other."
Negative events between United States and Russia has led to better relations
Alexei Fenenko. Leading Research Fellow, Institute of International Security Studies of RAS, Russian Academy of
Sciences. June 2011. “The Cyclical Nature of Russian-American Relations”. Rianovosti.
http://en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20110621/164739508.html
There is nothing special or unusual about the current difficulties. Over the past twenty years, both Russia and the United States have experienced
several cycles of convergence and divergence in their bilateral relations. It seems that Moscow and Washington are doomed to repeat these cycles
time and again. Such changes in bilateral relations are no mere coincidence. Russia and the United States base their relations on mutual nuclear
deterrence. The material and technical foundations for Russian-American relations differ little from those underpinning the Soviet-American
relations of the 1980s. Thus, these cycles of Russian-American rapprochement are due to two factors. First comes the desire to consistently
reduce aging nuclear systems so that during disarmament neither party risked destroying the military-strategic parity. Second, the reaction to a
major military-political crisis after which the parties seek to reduce confrontation and update the rules of conduct in the military-political sphere.
After confronting these tasks, Russia and the United States returned to a state of low intensity confrontation. The first rapprochement cycle was
observed in the early 1990s. Yeltsin’s government needed U.S. support in recognizing Russia within the 1991 borders of the RSFSR. Boris
Yeltsin also needed U.S. assistance in addressing the problem of the Soviet “nuclear legacy” and taking on the Supreme Council. The
administrations of George Bush Senior and Bill Clinton were willing to help the Kremlin solve these problems. However, the Americans
demanded major strategic concessions from Russia in return, outlined in START-III: making the elimination of heavy intercontinental ballistic
missiles a priority. The parties reached an unofficial compromise: U.S. recognition of the Russian leadership in exchange for the rapid decrease in
Russia’s strategic nuclear forces (SNF). However, the stronger Russian state institutions became, the weaker the impetus to the rapprochement. In
autumn 1994, Russia refused to ratify the original version of START-II and declared NATO’s eastward expansion unacceptable. The United
States adopted the concept of “mutually assured safety” (January 1995) under which Russia’s democratic reforms qualified as inseparable from
continued armament reduction. The “Overview of U.S. nuclear policy” in 1994 also confirmed that America deemed Russian strategic nuclear
forces a priority threat. The crises that unfolded during the late 1990s in Iran and Yugoslavia were, like NATO expansion, the logical results of a
restoration of the old approach to Soviet-American relations. It was actually the events of 1994, not 2000, that in fact predetermined the
subsequent development of Russian-American relations. The second cycle of Russian-American rapprochement was also rooted in strategic
considerations. In 2000 START-II and the ABM Treaty collapsed. Both Washington and Moscow were faced with the problem of their agreed
decommissioning of nuclear systems dating back to the 1970s. These events pushed presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush to reach a
strategic compromise at a meeting in Crawford (12 November 2001). The United States agreed to sign a new Strategic Offensive Reductions
Treaty (SORT), and Russia did not object to Washington’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Instead of the ABM Treaty, the parties signed the
Moscow Declaration on May 24, 2002, under which the United States pledged to consult with Russia on all issues pertaining to missile defense
deployment. However, after the “compromise at Crawford,” the agenda for Russian-American rapprochement was exhausted. The disputes
between Moscow and Washington over Iraq, Iran, Georgia, Ukraine and Beslan, which had been gathering steam since 2003, necessitated a
return to the traditional format for Russian-American relations. At the Bratislava meeting (February 24, 2005) President Vladimir Putin refused to
accept George W. Bush’s suggestion of including issues of fissile material safety in the agenda. Since then, the “rapprochement” between Russia
and the U.S. has reached a dead end, including at the official level
7
SNFI 2011
[Russian Relations]
[Oddo/Maycock]
US/RUSSIA RELATIONS HIGH NOW
New START treaty means relations between U.S. and Russia are good
Associated Press, 11, US-Russia nuclear arms treaty takes effect, foxnews.com
A new U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control treaty went into effect Saturday, securing a key foreign policy goal of
President Barack Obama and raising hopes among officials on both sides that it will provide the impetus for
Moscow and Washington to negotiate further reductions. "The treaty marks significant progress toward President
Obama's vision of a world without nuclear weapons," U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said after
exchanging ratification papers with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on the sidelines of an international
security conference in Munich. "Partnership with Russia is vital to our continued progress and to all that we hope to
accomplish," she said. "We must build the habits of cooperation that let us rise above our differences to address
urgent matters of global security together." The New START treaty — the first major revamping of nuclear
disarmament deals since the late Cold War era — was approved by the U.S. Senate in December after a bruising
fight during which Obama pressed strongly for its passage. Russia ratified the deal last month.
Russia's Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov suggested that the two countries could build upon the new treaty in
other areas, saying that "coordinated efforts" were needed in missile defense, and that Moscow also was willing to
talk about tactical nuclear weapon reductions. "We are ready to discuss this very complex topic in the framework of
a comprehensive approach to strategic stability," he said. He also stressed that any "hypothetical" negotiations on
tactical nuclear weapons "must take into consideration not only Russia's or the U.S. nuclear arsenal but weapons
systems of all nuclear and threshold" states. The 10-year New START treaty, which can be extended by another five
years, is a cornerstone of Obama's efforts to "reset" U.S. relations with Russia, and Clinton called it a "milestone in
our strategic partnership." "When it comes to the button that has worried us the most over the years — the one that
would unleash nuclear destruction — today we take another step to ensure it will never be pushed," Clinton told
reporters after the treaty went into effect. Lavrov said the treaty is in the national interests of both Russia and the
United States. "Both Russia and the U.S. share responsibility for security in the whole world," he said through a
translator. The treaty builds on the original START, or Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, initially proposed by thenU.S. President Ronald Reagan, which went into effect in 1994. The conclusion of the New START treaty comes the
day before the 100th anniversary of Reagan's birth. New START, negotiated last year, limits each side to 1,550
strategic warheads, down from 2,200. It limits the number of deployed strategic launchers and heavy bombers to
700. The pact also re-establishes a monitoring system that ended in December 2009 with the expiration of an earlier
arms deal. Russia and the U.S. have the right to conduct onsite inspections beginning 60 days from the agreement
going into effect Saturday. The two countries have seven years to meet the treaty's central limits.
Looking ahead, Clinton said the U.S. is in talks with Russia about how the two countries can further work together
to address issues that affect their common security, while maintaining strategic stability. Suggestions include joint
analysis, joint exercises, and sharing of early warning data that could form the basis for a cooperative missile
defense system, Clinton said. She said she also would talk with Lavrov about "further arms control issues, including
non-strategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons and our ongoing work to revive, strengthen and modernize the
regime on conventional forces." German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle said New START's conclusion
marked "a very significant day for disarmament" and offered encouragement to pursue further progress. "I
particularly welcome the fact that the U.S. secretary of state now also wants to bring the issue of nonstrategic
nuclear weapons into the talks," Westerwelle said. He hopes to secure the eventual removal of the remaining U.S.
nuclear weapons stationed in Germany. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said the treaty "adds significant
impetus to the hard-won momentum achieved in recent years." "I believe that the entry into force of the New
START treaty will inspire further action toward creating a safer and more secure world for all," he said in a
statement. "I encourage the Russian Federation and the United States to continue their efforts to identify and carry
forward the next steps, together with other nuclear-weapon states, in this historic endeavor of pursuing a nuclear
weapon free world." Lavrov called New START "a product of the understanding that unilateral approaches to
security are counterproductive." "The principles of equality, parity, equal and indivisible security ... form a solid
basis for today's Russian-American interaction in a range of areas," Lavrov said."The treaty that enters into force
today will enhance international stability."
8
SNFI 2011
[Russian Relations]
[Oddo/Maycock]
US/RUSSIA RELATIONS HIGH NOW
Ties between U.S. and Russia are good in status quo
Victor Yenikeev, political observer, 10, Russia and the US: good relations are good for both, http://english.ruvr.ru
President Barack Obama believes that good relations between Moscow and Washington meet the US national
interests, and the country will make every effort to boost bilateral ties with Russia. The announcement was made by
the White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs during a press-briefing on Tuesday.
Mr. Gibbs commented on US plans towards Russia when asked to explain why the recent spy scandal would not
harm the relations with Moscow in anyway. The mere fact that this question was asked proves that there are still
quite a lot of people overseas who still view Russia as a hostile country. But they seem to be unaware that none of
the twelve Russians deported from the US were not charged with espionage. Both the US Department of Justice and
the CIA admitted that the suspects had not leaked any classified information as they simply did not have access to it.
I’d like to emphasize that among those who were deported several people had lived in the US for about 10 years, all
that time watched by the special services.
I have no doubt that Moscow-if wanted- could have reacted symmetrically to the scandal since it is quite clear that
the US has never stopped its intelligence activities in Russia. The head of the Russian Duma Foreign Affairs
Committee, Konstantin Kosachev, thinks that the ‘spy scandal’ was a kind of a test which both countries have
passed successfully.
The Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has repeatedly stressed the need for friendly relations with the US for the
sake of a positive global political climate. That is why it is necessary to ratify the new strategic arms reduction treaty
signed by the two presidents on 8 April in Prague. This will certainly give a new impulse to a ‘reset’ in Russia-US
relations. The two countries share huge potential in fighting terrorism, extremist, drug trafficking, and also in
handling regional conflicts all across the world. So, it would be unwise to spoil the improving relations because of
the spy scandal which resembles a storm in a teacup.
Russia and U.S. show continuous efforts to strengthen their relations
Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, July 13 2011, “Remarks With Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey
Lavrov After their Meeting”, U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/07/168478.htm#
Let me begin by saying that the past two and a half years has been a time of great strides in the relationship between
our countries. We have signed a historic arms control treaty and opened a vital new land and air supply route to
Afghanistan. We are cooperating on addressing Iran’s nuclear threat, working to coordinate our diplomatic approach
to Libya, consulting closely on the changes unfolding in the Middle East. Across the world, we are not only working
bilaterally but multilaterally on so many important issues, from counterterrorism to nonproliferation. Our challenge
now is to continue and maintain the momentum in order to deliver more results for both of our people. To that end,
Minister Lavrov and I discussed missile defense cooperation. I believe we do have an opportunity to address
common challenges in a way that makes Russians, Europeans, and Americans safer, and we are committed to
working with both Russia and our NATO allies to do so. We also, of course, discussed the broader range of issues
on which we are cooperating beyond security and arms control. For example, we strongly support Russia’s
accession to the World Trade Organization. Russia’s membership would allow us to increase trade and deepen our
economic ties. This is a high priority, and a priority for President Obama and the Administration. It’s part of our
broader global effort to promote a rules-based system of economic competition. We also discussed the increasing
emphasis within Russia on democracy, and we obviously, as I have said many times, as our two presidents have
discussed, support the rights of Russian civil society to assemble and speak freely, of Russian journalists and
bloggers to monitor and report on official actions, and of lawyers and judges to work independently to uphold the
rule of law.
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US/RUSSIA RELATIONS HIGH NOW
U.S. and Russian leaders have expressed their willingness to work together
Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, July 13 2011, “Remarks With Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey
Lavrov After their Meeting”, U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/07/168478.htm#
We have considered the current priority issues in our relationship, including the situation with – I hope that we will
be concluding the process of Russia’s accession to the WTO. And just recently here in Washington, Minister of
Economy of Russia Elvira Nabiullina, was here, and during her meeting with President Obama today in the White
House, we have fully agreed on the necessity to conclude all the necessary formalities. We have all the
opportunities to do so, and as far as I understood today, there is the political will from the United States, and now
experts must be working and they must use the political impulse and translate it into practical agreements on paper.
We have paid a lot of attention to strategic stability, and we see that the agreement is being followed closely, is
being executed, and the mechanism is functioning quite effectively. This is a bilateral consultative committee which
has made a number of practical steps that are being stipulated by the agreement. And we also discussed the
importance of mutually acceptable solutions on missile defense. We have noted that President Obama has confirmed
his readiness to reach understanding – together with Mr. Medvedev to reach an understanding of common policy
and creating strong political framework that will let us to start practical cooperation in this important sphere. And I
would like to also highlight the fact that today, we have signed a number of very important agreements. First of all, I
would like to note the agreement on adoption issues. Our negotiating teams have been working very effectively.
This was the Russian Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Education and Science, and Ombudsman for the Rights of
Children Mr. Astakhov, who is today present here. And I think that we will be going towards implementing this
agreement, and this will help us get rid of the irritants that have been emerging quite rightfully in the public opinion
connected to the destiny of Russian children who were adopted in America. We are very grateful to our American
partners for helping us to reach this agreement.
U.S. – Russia relations good now
William, Perry, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor at Stanford
University, with a joint appointment in the School of Engineering and the Institute for International Studies, where
he is codirector of the Preventive Defense Project, a research collaboration of Stanford and Harvard Universities,
and Brent, Scowcroft, Brent Scowcroft has served as the National Security Advisor to both Presidents Gerald
Ford and George H.W. Bush. From 1982 to 1989, he was Vice Chairman of Kissinger Associates, Inc., an
international consulting firm. In this capacity, he advised and assisted a wide range of U.S. and foreign corporate
leaders on global joint venture opportunities, strategic planning, and risk assessment, 2009, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons
policy” U.S.-Russia arms control agreements have been invaluable in help- ing stabilize strategic relations,
developing a shared understanding of activities involving nuclear weapons, and lending predictability to reductions
in American and Russian strategic nuclear forces. Both sides have expressed interest in renewing arms control
negotiations. The Task Force welcomes the opportunity to renew arms control talks and approves of a U.S.-Russia
dialogue toward deeper reductions in their arsenals.
Russia is seeking more space cooperation with the US
Andy Pazstor, staff reporter, May 19 2010, “Russia seeks cooperation with the US in the space effort” The Wall
Street Journal, accessed online at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704912004575252842393481092.html
Russian leaders are trying to use the current thaw in relations with the U.S. to enhance cooperation in space, pushing
for joint exploration efforts extending past the life of the international space station. Russian Deputy Prime Minister
Sergei Ivanov spoke over the weekend with Charles Bolden, head of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, and gave the Kremlin's strongest indication to date that it wants to team with the U.S. to explore
more deeply into the solar system. In a speech and brief interview Monday, Mr. Ivanov said the time is right for the
two countries to share financial and engineering resources on possible ventures that would be launched past 2020
and travel beyond low-earth orbit. The two countries already collaborate extensively on the space station, an
international consortium that includes Russia, the U.S. and several other countries. The station, which operates in
low-earth orbit, is slated to continue for at least another decade.
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AT: START UNIQUENESS OVERWHELMS LINK
Not true, START has not alleviated the level of mistrust between the U.S. and Russia
Dmitry V. Suslov, Deputy Director for Research at the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, 2010, “U.S. –
Russia relations after the new START treaty”, http://en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20100518/159060786.html
First, the level of mutual trust is still very low (as demonstrated by the talks on the New START treaty and the U.S.
plans to deploy missile defense systems in eastern Europe). Second, the main obstacles in their relations remain; the
sides have put off dealing with them, which will result in growing antagonism in the future. Third, the agenda for
U.S.-Russia relations is very limited and rooted in the sides’ desire to achieve other, more important foreign policy
goals rather than the desire to promote a stable relationship. Moreover, the adoption of the New START treaty has
greatly reduced the positive potential of the bilateral agenda, which is dominated by military problems.
START does not solve relations, it puts them at the brink
Max Boot, leading military historian and foreign policy analyst, 2010, “New START Treaty: Much Ado About
Nothing”, http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2010/11/17/new-start-treaty-much-ado-about-nothing/
The START I agreement cut deployed strategic nuclear weapons on both sides roughly 50 percent, from between
10,000 and 12,000 down to 6,000. The never-ratified (but generally abided-by) START II Treaty cut forces by
another 50 percent, down to between 3,000 and 3,500. The 2002 Moscow Treaty made further deep cuts, bringing
each side down to between 1,700 and 2,200. And New START? It would bring the number on both sides down to
1,550. The final figure of 1,550 warheads is plenty big enough to maintain America’s nuclear deterrence; actually,
we will have more than that because for the purposes of the treaty B-2 and B-52, bombers are counted as one
“warhead” even though they can carry dozens of nuclear warheads. Opponents of the treaty throw out all sorts of
other objections, arguing that it would constrict the development of missile defenses or non-nuclear missiles; but no
such prohibition is to be found in the language of the treaty. Let me be clear. I do not buy the Obama
administration’s rationales for the treaty. Administration officials cite the need to “reset” relations with Russian and
to take a step toward the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. I very much doubt that this treaty will do
anything substantial to achieve either goal. We are likely to continue clashing with Russia diplomatically as long as
it remains an authoritarian state. As for the quixotic goal of eliminating nuclear weapons: Suffice it to say,
reductions in the American arsenal are not going to encourage North Korea or Iran to give up their nuclear
programs. But nor will relatively modest reductions in our nuclear forces prevent us from vaporizing Iran or North
Korea, should they use nuclear weapons against us or our allies.
Flaws in START limit its chance of sustaining good US/Russia relations
Paul Koshik, staff reporter,2011, “Russia-US Relations and the New START”. Foreign Policy Journal,
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/04/07/russia-us-relations-and-the-new-start/
Firstly, this treaty doesn’t anyhow limit nuclear arsenals of the US allies. Meanwhile, NATO members France and
Great Britain have approximately 460 nuclear warheads on strategic carriers today. Secondly, despite any obvious
common sense, this treaty considers one heavy bomber as a one nuclear warhead. However, the most widely used
American heavy bomber B-52H can carry 20 cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. Thus, having maintained about
100 such bombers in service, the US can load them with the maximum of 2000 warheads, formally not violating the
treaty restrictions. In this case the total number of the US strategic warheads, delivered in one flight, can reach 3500
and that is more than twice as large as Russia’s strategic nuclear potential restricted by the New START Treaty is.
Thirdly, the treaty doesn’t anyhow limit breakout nuclear potential. To comply with the treaty restrictions, one
should just remove a number of warheads from the missiles. At the same time, again despite any common sense, the
platforms, meant for greater number of warheads, can remain on the missiles, and removed warheads could be
stored anywhere, even near the carriers. For this reason, the number of warheads on American missiles “Minuteman3″ and “Trident III” could reach nearly 4000, and that is two and a half times more than the treaty allows. Fourthly,
the treaty doesn’t anyhow limit the development of The US missile defense system. Russia’s statement concerning
missile defense system, made when concluding the treaty, doesn’t legally commit the USA to anything. Meanwhile
the USA continues to deploy missile defense system. Fifthly, the treaty doesn’t anyhow limit the number of
seaborne long-range cruise missiles and doesn’t consider them as a strategic weapon. Meanwhile, The US has been
constantly increasing the number of cruise missiles in its naval forces for 30 years. According to the experts’
estimations, from 2800 to 3600 “Tomahawk” missiles are constantly present on board American ships and
submarines. Together with ships and submarines fully loaded with Tomahawk” missiles, the strike potential of the
American navy can reach 10 thousand cruise missiles, which is 20 times more than the Russian navy has.
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MILITARY DEVELOPMENT LINKS
Russia Views U.S. as an International Coercer
Demitri Tenin, Deputy Director, Carnegie Mascow Center. December 2008. <
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/thinking_strategically_russia.pdf>
The brief war in the Caucasus—resulting from Mikheil Saakashvili’s assault on South Ossetia, which provoked
Moscow’s massive response— has suddenly put Russia back onto the United States’ radar screen after a long
absence. The specter of a renewed Cold War–style confrontation haunts many minds. But this analogy is wrong, and
not just because most people would recoil from it. Today there is no ideological context, no Iron Curtain, and no
central Washington–Moscow relationship for either capital, not to speak of the rest of the world. In other words,
Georgia is no Germany, and Russia is no Soviet Union. Moreover, the global economy forms a world market, the
Internet knows no borders, and people cross borders in ever-greater numbers. But to repudiate the Cold War parallel
is not to minimize the problem. Relations between America and Russia are indeed very bad—and potentially
dangerous— but in a different way.
The principal potential danger is the absence of rules for the relationship. As Russia has risen from its 1990s
state of abject impotence, it has emulated the United States and its allies in using force. Russia has been particularly
stung by the U.S. refusal to recognize the post-Soviet space as Moscow’s backyard. Moscow’s 2008 military
campaign against Georgia borrowed a page from NATO’s 1999 operation against Serbia, and an- other from the
2007–2008 Western recognition of Kosovo, in the face of Belgrade’s protests. To deflect U.S. criticism of Moscow
wanting to effect “regime change” in Tbilisi, the Russian ambassador quipped that regime change was not a notion
invented by Moscow. And the Kremlin closely studied the 2003–2005 “color revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and
Kyrgyzstan, which it saw as U.S. geopolitical advances into the post-Soviet space. One day, it hopes to re- turn the
compliment.
In a speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Vladimir Putin complained that America respected no
borders and sought to impose its law and order around the world. A year later, Russia took the crucial step of
recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s independence from Georgia. Then Russian warships watched warily as
the U.S. Navy unloaded humanitarian supplies in Georgian ports. Soon, two Russian Air Force bombers flew to
Venezuela for training over the Caribbean. The Russian Navy sailed to South America in the fall.
Moscow is sending a message to Washington: Stop your geopolitical harassment, or we will follow suit.
Now, U.S. global hegemony is directly challenged by Russia’s regional great power ambitions. In the absence of
agreed-on rules, each party has drawn its own redlines whose crossing would trigger direct action; for Russia, these
include attacks on its forces and citizens, U.S. military bases in the CIS countries, and NATO enlargement to
Ukraine and Georgia.
This new situation is inherently unstable because of the two players’ disparities. Russia’s gross domestic
product is a dozen times smaller than that of the United States, and the Russian defense budget is a puny 4 percent of
America’s. Moscow has virtually no allies; China would do nothing that might impair its steady rise. But
Washington has largely repaired relations with Europe and found a new friend in India. Few in the United States
would see Russia as a worthy opponent rather than a petro-state with an antique arsenal. For their part, the Russians
see the United States as having passed its prime in global dominance, and they discount the relevance of the United
States’ overextended military might in this age of asymmetrical warfare and continued nuclear deterrence. Thus,
when both sides see each other as weak and getting no stronger, they might even take reckless steps.
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MILITARY DEVELOPMENT LINKS
The U.S. and Russia are cooperating on military systems, plan’s lack of consultation kills
relations
Yevgeny Shestakov, author, 2011, “Russia – NATO relations have already experienced a reset”,
http://rbth.ru/articles/2011/03/24/russia-nato_relations_have_already_experienced_a_reset_12606.html
In the security field, the principle of a Russia-U.S. partnership based on cooperation countering common challenges
and threats is absolutely the right one. The key is identifying and agreeing on what we see as common challenges
and threats and then developing and implementing concrete cooperative measures to address them. Frankly, I think
we are making considerable progress in this direction, although admittedly it has come in fits and starts over the past
two decades as the Russia-U.S. bilateral relationship has been fairly volatile. On the military side, we have
experienced excellent progress in the past two years—starting from the low point of the aftermath of the war in
Georgia in August 2008, when nearly all cooperation was suspended. Probably the most significant area from the
standpoint of Washington has been the expanded cooperation on the transit of supplies through and over Russia to
our military forces in Afghanistan. But the military-military relationship has been expanding in a number of other
areas, and certainly one important channel is the Bilateral Presidential Commission’s Working Group on Military
Cooperation chaired by Admiral [Mike] Mullen and General [Nikolai] Makarov.
Unilateral US militarization of space will result in Russian retaliation
NY TIMES, author not given, September 27, 2007, “Russia issues warning on space-based weapons”
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/27/world/europe/27iht-russia.4.7662417.html
The chief of Russia's space forces said Thursday that the nation would have to retaliate if others deployed weapons
in space - a stern warning to the United States. While Colonel General Vladimir Popovkin did not name any specific
country, he was clearly referring to U.S. plans for space-based weapons, which the Kremlin has vociferously
opposed. "We don't want to wage a war in space, we don't want to gain dominance in space, but we won't allow any
other nation to dominate space," Popovkin said in televised remarks. "If any country deploys weapons in space then
the laws of warfare are such that retaliatory weapons are certain to appear." President Vladimir Putin has criticized
U.S. plans for space-based weapons, saying they could trigger a new arms race. When China tested an anti-satellite
missile in January, Putin said that the move was a response to U.S. plans for space-based weapons. Russia and China
have strongly pushed for an international agreement banning space weapons, but their proposals have been stymied
by the United States. "It's necessary to legalize the game rules in space," Popovkin said. He warned that the
complexity of space weapons could trigger a war. Satellites may fail on technical reasons, but their owner could
think they were incapacitated by an enemy and could be tempted to retaliate, he said. "If that happens, a nation
might ask a legitimate question: could it be the beginning of an effort to deafen and blind it."
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Russia and China opposed to U.S. militarization of space
Pavel Podvig, Pavel Podvig is an affiliate and former research associate at the Center for International Security and
Cooperation at Stanford University. Before coming to Stanford in 2004, he worked at the Center for Arms Control
Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT), which was the first independent research
organization in Russia dedicated to analysis of technical issues related to arms control and disarmament. In Moscow,
Podvig was the leader of a major research project and the editor of the book Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (MIT
Press, 2001), and Hui Zhang, Hui Zhang is a Senior Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in
the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of
Government. Hui Zhang is leading a research initiative on China's nuclear policies for the Project on Managing the
Atom in the Kennedy School of Government. His researches include verification techniques of nuclear arms control,
the control of fissile material, nuclear terrorism, China's nuclear policy, nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation,
policy of nuclear fuel cycle and reprocessing, 2010, Russian and Chinese responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space
http://www.amacad.org/publications/militarySpace.aspx
In recent years, Russia and China have urged the negotiation of an international treaty to prevent an arms race in
outer space. The United States has responded by insisting that existing treaties and rules governing the use of space
are sufficient. The standoff has produced a six-year deadlock in Geneva at the United Nations Conference on
Disarmament, but the parties have not been inactive. Russia and China have much to lose if the United States were
to pursue the space weapons programs laid out in its military planning documents. This makes probable the eventual
formulation of responses that are adverse to a broad range of U.S. interests in space. The Chinese anti-satellite test in
January 2007 was prelude to an unfolding drama in which the main act is still subject to revision. If the United
States continues to pursue the weaponization of space, how will China and Russia respond, and what will the
broader implications for international security be?
Russia and China not Seeking to Militarize Space
Michael Krepon, is Co-Founder and President of Emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a non-profit institution
that seeks to promote pragmatic steps to enhance international security February 14, 2008.
,<http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/russia-and-china-propose-a-treaty-banning-space-weapons-while-thepentagon-plans-an-asat-test-/>
States would be obligated under the Russian and Chinese draft treaty to "undertake not to place in orbit around the
Earth any objects carrying any kind of weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, and not to station
such weapons in outer space in any other manner; not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space
objects; not to assist or encourage other states, groups of states or international organizations" from carrying out
prohibited activities. The draft treaty defines a space weapon as "any device placed in outer space, based on any
physical principle, specially produced or converted to eliminate, damage or disrupt normal function of objects in
outer space." The draft treaty proposes that "measures of verification of compliance with the Treaty may be the
subject of an additional protocol." In contrast, the draft treaty mandates an additional protocol setting up an
executive authority to deal with questions of compliance.
Space Weaponization Leads to Nuclear Proliferation
Swedish Physicians Against Nuclear Weapons, Sweedish Peace and Arbitration Society, 2008.
http://laromkarnvapen.slmk.org/ENG/Dokument/International_law/Int%20law%20space.pdf
Space weaponization would seriously disrupt the arms control and disarmament process. US ground- and sea- based
missile defenses have already increased tensions with Russia. The deployment of US space-based missile defenses
will likely cause Russia as well as the United States (in response to Russia), to make smaller and smaller reductions
of their nuclear arsenals. China would likely build more warheads to maintain its nuclear deterrent, which could in
turn encourage India and then Pakistan to follow suit (1). The disamament efforts had problems during the Bush jr.
administration, including missile defence programs in Europe and the Georgia battle, and many expected a revitalization with the
Obama administration. But still the programs seem to survive (2).
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SPACE COOPERATION LINKS
The US and Russia must cooperate to advance in space
Andy Pazstor, staff reporter, May 19 2010, “Russia seeks cooperation with the US in the space effort” The Wall
Street Journal, accessed online at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704912004575252842393481092.html
Both countries need increasing international support to advance in space. With the U.S. space-shuttle fleet slated for
retirement next year and Congress and the White House at loggerheads over its replacement, NASA will be entirely
dependent on Russian rockets and capsules to get astronauts to the space station for the next several years. Russia's
space ambitions, meanwhile, require outside financial support. In his speech to a meeting organized by the Nixon
Center, a foreign-policy group, on Monday, Mr. Ivanov pointedly referred to the immense cost of space exploration.
The Obama administration has also opened the door for enhanced space cooperation, and Kremlin officials appear
persuaded the time is right to begin talks about new ventures. Mr. Ivanov said in the speech that "I firmly believe
that all our cooperation in space" so far "should bring more and more fruits." Although he didn't mention details, Mr.
Ivanov said that "it's time to look beyond" low-earth orbit.
U.S. space cooperation may be impossible due to Bush administrations choices
Houston Journal Of International Law, 06, Incremental steps for achieving space security: the need for a
new way of thinking to enhance the legal regime for space, http://www.entrepreneur.com
In light of all these factors muddying the waters of the space security debate, the largest yet most overlooked
problem in the space security dilemma is the inadequacy of the current international legal regime for space. The
Bush Administration has already demonstrated its resolve by officially withdrawing from the thirty-year old AntiBallistic Missile Treaty (ABM), (12) which leaves the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) (13) as the primary current
legal bar on space weaporization. (14) Over the course of his final term, President Bush is likely to pursue space
weapons with even greater intensity for both missile defense and anti-satellite mechanisms (ASAT). (15) Indeed, the
future of space security will depend greatly on how effectively the weaknesses of the current legal regime are
addressed (16) and on whether the United States and the international community can set aside their differences and
come together in an effort to strengthen the current legal regime. If they cannot, outer space will become even more
susceptible to the exploitation of these space stakeholders and their need to protect and promote their space interests.
Consequently, the purposes of this Article are: (1) to identify the glaring holes in the current legal regime for space
and how they came about; (2) to understand the major impediments to achieving progress in strengthening the
regime; and finally, (3) to suggest incremental steps of strengthening the legal regime with the end goal of
enhancing space security.
START Treaty still allows proliferation of spy satellites- Russia/US may not trust one
another
Jason D. Wood, Author for World Politics Review. December 13, 2010.
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7300/the-u-s-russia-space-relationship-and-future-space-security
While much has been said about the overall merits of the New START agreement,
comparatively little attention has focused on the treaty's Article 10. This relatively short but telling passage borrows
decades-old language reinforcing both the United States' and Russia's mutual obligations regarding "national
technical means" (NTM) of treaty monitoring and verification -- diplomatic speak for spy satellites. Article 10
obligates both parties to use NTM in accordance with the principles of international law, to refrain from
concealment measures intended to impede NTM verification of compliance, and, most importantly, not to interfere
with each other's NTM.
The nod to NTM protection hints at two issues that have strategic implications far beyond arms control.
Specifically, will the future U.S.-Russia space relationship be adversarial or cooperative? Perhaps more importantly,
what are the greatest threats to vital U.S. and Russian national-security space assets going forward? ...
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SPACE COOPERATION LINKS
Russia Has Proven to be a Useful Ally-Putin’s Actions Prove
Deborah Welch Larson, Professor of Political Science at UCLA, Alexei Shevchenko, Professor of Foreign
Affairs at UCLA. 2010. <muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.4.larson.pdf>
Putin’s Creative Diplomacy
Given the stunning decline in Russia’s international standing in the 1990s, President Vladimir Putin’s principal
foreign policy goal was to restore Russia’s great power status. Putin’s strategy exhibited social creativity in its
efforts to achieve great power status through partnership with the United States. In his 1999 programmatic
statement, “Russia at the Turn of the Millennium,” Putin stressed that “Russia was and will remain a great power.”
For the first time in 200–300 years, Russia was in danger of falling to the second or third level of states. To remove
this threat, Putin asserted, Russians had to “strain all intellectual, physical, and moral forces of the nation.” To deal
with Russia’s identity crisis, Putin combined czarist and Soviet symbols, adopting the czarist double-headed eagle as
the national symbol and the Soviet national anthem (with new lyrics) while giving increased support to the Russian
Orthodox Church. His positive reframing of what were previously viewed as negative characteristics is a social
creativity tactic, designed to enhance national pride and self-esteem.
Terrorist attacks against the United States provided Putin with an extraordinary opportunity to reframe Russia’s
identity and to align with the United States, demonstrating that Russia was an indispensable player. In his September
11, 2001, call to Bush (the first from a foreign leader), Putin expressed condolences and assured the U.S. president
that Russia would not respond to the U.S. heightened state of alert. Bush and Putin declared their relationship a
“strategic partnership.” Russia’s cooperation with the United States in the war on terror was valuable and extensive,
including sharing political and military intelligence about international terrorists, allowing U.S. planes to fly over
Russian territory, acquiescing to U.S. military bases in Central Asia, participating in international search and rescue
missions, and providing increased assistance to an anti-Taliban force in Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance. Russian
cooperation cannot be explained away as adaptation to U.S. hegemony, because most Russian political elites had
recommended to Putin that Russia remain passive or neutral in the U.S. war on terror. The Russian defense minister
and chief of staff were strongly opposed to a U.S. military presence in Central Asia, part of Russia’s traditional
sphere of in.uence.
In addition to accepting U.S. bases in Central Asia, Putin made several unilateral concessions indicating that the
geopolitical rivalry between the United States and Russia was over, evidence that he was following a social
creativity strategy. He withdrew from a large Russian electronic intelligence gathering and military base in Cuba and
a naval base in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. Putin reacted mildly to the U.S. withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile
treaty—one of the few remaining symbols of Russian equality—calling it a “mistake” because it would hurt arms
control, not because it would damage Russian security. Putin adopted a softer position toward admission of the
Baltic states to NATO. He accepted the creation of the NATO-Russia Council as a vehicle for cooperation, although
it did not give Russia a vote. Finally, he accepted a strategic arms reduction treaty that allowed the United States to
store dismantled warheads.
In return, Putin expected Russia to be treated as an equal partner with the United States in reshaping
international security regimes.In a speech before the German Bundestag in late September 2001, Putin argued that
existing security structures could not cope with new threats such as terrorism. Putin believed that the only viable
alternative was a concert of great powers, similar to the Concert of Europe. Before the 2001 November U.S.-Russia
summit, Putin privately compared his relationship with Bush to that between Franklin Roosevelt and Winston
Churchill during World War II.
U.S.-Russian cooperation is needed to avert a nuclear terrorist attack
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, no author given, 2011,
"First Joint U.S.-Russia Assessment of Nuclear Terror Threat" found at
“belfercenter.k’sg.harvard.edu/project/62/usrussia_initiative_to_prevent_nuclear_terrorism.html?page_id=246”
The first joint threat assessment by experts from the world’s two major nuclear powers (US and Russia) concludes: “If current approaches toward
eliminating the threat are not replaced with a sense of urgency and resolve, the question will become not if but when, and on what scale, the first
act of nuclear terrorism occurs.” The study recommends measures to tighten security over existing nuclear weapons and the nuclear materials
terrorists would need to make a crude nuclear bomb, along with expanded police and intelligence cooperation to interdict nuclear smuggling and
stop terrorist nuclear plots. The report also calls for improved protection of nuclear facilities that might be sabotaged, and of radiological
materials that might be used in a dirty bomb.
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US/RUSSIA RELATIONS GOOD-TERRORISM
U.S. – Russia relations solve terror and WMD proliferation
Robert Wexler, Committee on International Relations and president of the Washington-based S. Daniel Abraham
Center for Middle East Peace and member of the U.S. House of Representatives, 2003 “RUSSIA’S TRANSITION
TO DEMOCRACY AND U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS: UNFINISHED BUSINESS”,
http://democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/108/89668.PDF
Mr. Chairman, it is incredibly important that we pursue a robust policy of engagement with Moscow despite recent
setbacks and differences over Iraq. It was obvious during the Bush-Putin summit this past weekend that the United
States and Russia have many issues of mutual concern that must be addressed in concert by both nations, including
the converging threat of international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as bringing
stability to post-war Iraq. Neither nation can afford to ignore each other’s concerns or allow insecurities and past
history to dictate current relations, especially as the threat of nuclear proliferation in North Korea and Iran grows.
Russia, which has failed to date to join the United States in unequivocally calling for North Korea and Iran to
‘‘completely, verifiably and irreversibly end its nuclear programs,’’ is endangering its own security and
undermining Russia’s effort to grow closer to the West.
A unified alliance between U.S. and Russia is key to solve terror and nuclear ambitions
Robert Wexler, Committee on International Relations and president of the Washington-based S. Daniel Abraham
Center for Middle East Peace and member of the U.S. House of Representatives, 2003 “RUSSIA’S TRANSITION
TO DEMOCRACY AND U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS: UNFINISHED BUSINESS”,
http://democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/108/89668.PDF
Mr. Chairman, the pretty picture painted by the media of President Bush and President Putin at their most recent
summit cannot hide real tensions and differences that exist between Washington and Moscow. The illusion of the
Bush-Putin relationship cannot cover up for a United States-Russian policy that has de-emphasized human rights
and ignored Russia’s democratic backsliding in re-turn for mutual support in the war against terror. President Bush’s
silence on these issues is deafening and gives a green light to those individuals in the Kremlin who wish to move
Russia along an authoritarian path. Over the next several months, United States-Russian relations will be severely
tested as efforts to stabilize and democratize Iraq move forward, counter-terrorism efforts continue and international
efforts to address the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran come to a head. The convergence of these issues
which greatly affect the security in the United States and Russia, must be met with a unified response by both
nations.
Terrorists can acquire nuclear technology possible from Russia
Matthew Bunn, Associate professor at Harvard, 02, COMBATING TERRORISM: PREVENTING NUCLEAR
TERRORISM, www.iraqwatch.com
Early this month the International Institute for Strategic Studies issued an assessment of Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction programs. The report concluded Saddam Hussein's nuclear program probably needs several years to
produce enough fissile material for a weapon, but if Iraq were to acquire enough enriched uranium from foreign
sources, Saddam could have the bomb in a matter of months. That chilling scenario leads us to ask where would
Iraq, Al-Qaeda or Hezbollah go shopping for the missing core of their malevolent atomic aspirations? How can the
threat of nuclear terrorism be reduced? As we will hear today from witness experts in nuclear programs and
nonproliferation efforts, a global radiological bazaar has opened for business since the demise of the Soviet Union.
The International Atomic Energy Agency has reported 17 confirmed incidents since 1993 involving diversion of
plutonium or highly enriched uranium. Some of that material has never been recovered. research reactors in 58
nations generate weapons grade uranium kept under security arrangements ranging from adequate to appalling. To
be sure, acquiring or building a nuclear device involves complex, technical challenges and requires more visible
infrastructure than terrorists generally prefer. But the growing public record of attempts by Osama bin Laden and
others to purchase fissile fuel and other radiological material demonstrates a determination we dare not
underestimate or dismiss. The threat also lurks here at home where nuclear weapons labs, civilian generating
facilities and even medical waste storage sites stand as tempting targets for those seeking to spread radioactive
terror.
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Iraq has a program that may result in the building of nuclear weapons in the Middle East
Matthew Bunn, Associate professor at Harvard, 02, COMBATING TERRORISM: PREVENTING NUCLEAR
TERRORISM, www.iraqwatch.com
The Iraqi Program actually, the Institute for Strategic Studies of London, did a good study of the Iraqi nuclear
weapons program. It did declare, like the inspectors did, that Iraq do possess a working design for a nuclear weapon.
It has all the components needed for a nuclear weapon except for the fissile core, the nuclear core. Iraq has a
program, a larger program to produce fissile materials locally. Iraq has local resources for natural uranium
production from its phosphates. It's already delivered to the inspectors 160 tons produced locally from natural
resources. It has its own uranium stockpile right now. The Germans estimate something like 10 tons of natural
uranium, 1.3 tons of slightly enriched uranium. The institute states that Iraq, if it has fissile material right now,
acquired this through black market or other means, it could produce a nuclear weapon within months. The estimate
is correct but I think it misses the point in one aspect and that is, Iraq program is more serious than this. This is a
program that's meant to produce an arsenal of nuclear weapons, not just one. One nuclear weapon will not provide
the regime with the deterrents it needs to stay in power long enough and to be protected in such a way that it could
menace its neighbors, be the bully of the region, do whatever Saddam wants to do. He already invaded two
countries, two of his neighbors and if he wants to continue on this path, he needs a much more credible deterrent
than just one nuclear weapon because if he tests that, he loses. The Iraqi program is meant to produce enriched
uranium to bomb grade and it has two technologies to do that, already resolved all the bottlenecks in these
technologies. One was provided to them by the German scientist, Karl Schaab who already was on trial in Germany
and because of the complicity of the German government in allowing him to go ahead and supply us with the
technology needed for uranium enrichment, the judge was sympathetic and only sentenced him only to time served.
So actually the only man caught smuggling nuclear technology in the weapon area to Iraq is out of jail now and
actually served no serious jail time. He was sentenced to time served plus something like $32,000 in fines.What we
have in Iraq is really a program that, put together, it could in two to three years produce fissile material enough -- I
estimate it could be, in two years operational and in three years it would have enough nuclear material for two to
three nuclear weapons. I didn't say Iraq has right now nuclear weapons. The London Times misquoted, the reporter
misquoted my statement and when I sent a correction he said it was too late for the print, for the issue to come out.
The Iraq -- the timeframe I stated earlier in my testimony to Congress, to the Senate, is that in two to three years I
expect Iraq will have enough equipment put together to produce enough material for nuclear weapons. The
inspectors right now -- the issue of inspectors going back in -- the inspectors were in Iraq, they did dismantle most
of Iraq's nuclear infrastructure. The remaining issue in disarmament in Iraq is not just equipment and facilities. What
is needed is really the whole infrastructure there that makes weapons be dismantled: that includes scientists and
knowledge base. Nothing on that was done by the inspectors.
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US/RUSSIA RELATIONS GOOD-TERRORISM
Danger may be imminent for terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons
Matthew Bunn, Associate professor at Harvard, 02, COMBATING TERRORISM: PREVENTING NUCLEAR
TERRORISM, www.iraqwatch.com
My message today is quite simple, that I believe the danger is real, I believe the danger is urgent, but I believe there
are things that the United States can and should be doing to reduce that danger to a very low level and that Congress
has a key role in doing that. In my prepared statement I have 15 specific recommendations. I won't burden you with
more than five in my opening remarks. Since September 11 we've been hearing over and over again that the
warnings weren't sufficiently clear to tell us what it was we needed to do to stop the attack. Here that is not the case.
The warnings are clear and I think the facts are relatively stark. We know that Osama bin Laden himself has said
that he wants nuclear weapons, that he sees getting weapons of mass destruction as a religious duty. Al-Qaeda
operatives have repeatedly attempted to buy highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon. They have tried to
recruit nuclear weapon scientists to help them. The extensive materials found in Iraq -- in Afghanistan, excuse me,
were evidence of Al-Qaeda's continuing interest. They were primitive, I agree with Dr. Hamza, but on the other
hand one doesn't necessarily leave one's best stuff in the safe house as you flee. We know from the physics of the
situation that unfortunately making a nuclear bomb, while difficult, is not necessarily beyond the bounds of a large
and well-organized terrorist group such as Al-Qaeda. Indeed, DoE's own internal security regulations require
protection against the possibility of terrorists who might break into a DoE site being able to set off a nuclear
explosion while they were still inside the facility with the materials right to hand. We know that the amounts
required are small and we know at the same time that plutonium and highly enriched uranium, while radioactive, are
not so radioactive as to be difficult to steal and carry away or to be easy to detect as they are crossing our borders.
We know that there is enough highly enriched uranium and plutonium in the world today for nearly a quarter of a
million nuclear weapons and it is in hundreds of buildings in scores of countries around the world with security at
some of these sites that is simply appalling. There are some sites that literally have no armed guard at the door.
There are sites with no detector at the gate. If someone were carrying out plutonium or HEU in his briefcase. There
are sites with no security cameras in the area where the plutonium or highly enriched uranium is stored. These
materials are the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons and they need to be secured at least as well as gold and
diamonds are. That is demonstrably not the case in the world today. It seems to me that these facts lead inescapably
to one conclusion, and that is that we need to do everything in our power to secure nuclear weapons and the nuclear
materials needed to make them wherever they may be anywhere in the world.
U.S. and Russian alliance is key to keep Iran’s nuclear weapons under control.
Gawdat Bahgat, director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Indiana University, 2006, “Nuclear
Proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran”, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.15283585.2006.00235.x/full
Iran has had hostile relations with the United States since the Pahlavi regime was overthrown in 1979. Since then, the Islamic Republic has held
an almost paranoid and conspiratorial view of the United States' role and action in the Middle East and has seen almost every U.S. initiative as a
direct or indirect assault on Iran's national interests (Ehteshami 2000:172). Iran's strategic standing in the international system has further
worsened since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower. This sole superpower has
been very suspicious of Tehran's intentions and nuclear program. Since the early 2000s the mutual suspicion between Washington and Tehran has
heightened. In October 2001, American troops were deployed to Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban regime. Less than 2 years later, in March
2003, American troops were deployed to Iraq and toppled Saddam Hussein's regime. Despite the fact that both the Taliban and Saddam Hussein
were Iran's sworn enemies, the American military presence on Iran's eastern and western borders is a matter of great alarm and concern to the
regime in Tehran. In short, since the early 2000s Iran has been encircled by American troops from almost all directions. This encirclement feeds
into Tehran's fear and suspicion of Washington's intention toward the Islamic regime. This suspicion has been further reinforced by the labeling
of Iran as a member of the axis of evil along with Iraq and North Korea, in 2002. Talks on a desire for a “regime change” in Tehran have further
fuelled Iranians' concern. Finally, the 2003 war in Iraq has sent a mixed signal to Tehran. On one hand, the United States was not provoked to
attack Iraq. Rather it was a pre-emptive strike. This clearly suggests that Washington is ready to use its overwhelming might to prevent the
proliferation of WMD. On the other hand, the United States' more benign and less confrontational response to North Korea's nuclear activities
suggests that acquiring a nuclear device can serve as a deterrent. Some members in the Iranian political/security establishment believe that a
nuclear capability is the only guarantor of the nation's independence and the regime's survival (Chubin and Litwak 2003:106). The aim of
acquiring such capability would be to “deter the United States before it ‘bullies’ the Islamic Republic” (Chubin 1995:91).
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US/RUSSIA RELATIONS GOOD-IRAN
U.S. depends on Russia’s relationship with Iran in order to control use of nuclear
weapons.
Gawdat Bahgat, director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Indiana University, 2006, “Nuclear
Proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran”, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.15283585.2006.00235.x/full
In addition to the European and the IAEA stands on Iran's nuclear program the Russian policy deserves special
attention. Since the mid-1990s Russia is the only country to have openly cooperated with Iran in the nuclear field
(Orlov and Vinnikov 2005:49). Several strategic and economic considerations have shaped the Russian stand on
Iran's nuclear ambition. First, given Iran's vital role and location in both the Middle East and Central Asia, the
Islamic Republic provides a significant opportunity to Moscow to expand its influence and interest in both regions.
Second, assisting Iran's nuclear program would further facilitate cooperation between the two nations in other areas
such as the Caspian Sea and Chechnya. Third, in recent years Iran has emerged as a major market for Russia's arms
sales. Furthermore, the Russian government and companies will earn millions of dollars by the successful
completion of the nuclear reactor in Bushehr and training hundreds of Iranians to operate it. This can also serve to
further market Russia's nuclear technology in other countries. Fourth, Russian leaders are aware of strong U.S.
opposition to any cooperation with Iran. Finally, Russian officials argue that a nuclear Iran, close to their southern
borders, would pose a threat to Russia's national security.
Given these conflicting considerations Russia and Iran signed a nuclear fuel supply deal in February 2005. The deal
paves the way for Iran to start up the nuclear reactor in Bushehr. A key part of the agreement obliges Tehran to
repatriate all spent nuclear fuel to Russia. Moscow hopes this will allay U.S. worries that Iran may use the spent
fuel, which could be reprocessed into bomb-grade plutonium, to develop arms.
C3- The US and Russia are working together to avoid a nuclear Iran
Alfred Evans, The Fresno Bee Journalist, 2011, “Illusions threaten benefits to U.S. from our relationship with
Russia,” The Fresno Bee,
Read more: http://www.fresnobee.com/2011/06/13/2425843/alfred-evans-illusions-threaten.html#ixzz1TNa08Mvx
Second, Russia has become more willing than ever before to support American policy toward Iran, in an effort to
discourage that country from developing nuclear weapons. In September 2010, President Dmitrii Medvedev of
Russia announced that in accordance with U.N. sanctions, for which his government had voted, he had canceled his
country's sale of S-300 surface-to-air missile systems to Iran. Third, in 2010 the government of Russia abandoned its
previous insistence that it would sign a new START treaty only if the United States would agree to explicit
limitations on the deployment of nuclear missile defense systems. Fourth, this year Russia chose not to veto a
resolution of the U.N. Security Council, supported by the U.S. and some of its allies, authorizing the use of force in
Libya to protect civilians from the government of that country. Recently, Medvedev joined in calling for Moammar
Gadhafi to step down and promised to help him leave power.
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US/RUSSIA RELATIONS GOOD-HEGEMONY
A U.S. and Russian alliance maintains hegemony and checks Chinese aspirations of global
dominance
Anatol Lieven, former senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011, “U.S. – Russian
Relations and the Rise of China”,
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/us_russian_relations_and_the_rise_of_china
Perhaps most importantly of all, the future relationship between the U.S. and Russia will take shape in the context of
perhaps the greatest shift in global power of the past 500 years: the rise of China to become the biggest economy in
the world. The argument that throughout much of history China was the largest economy misses the point. That was
the case in a highly regionalized world. The new China is becoming top dog in a globalized world economy. Unless
there is a radical change in Chinese or U.S. growth rates, this will come to pass in between 10 and 20 years. It is
possible that some political upheaval or economic crisis will derail China's growth; but China has now successfully
weathered Tiananmen, the Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990s, and now the global economic recession – the last
of which, by contrast, caused severe damage to the U.S. economy.1Ethnic protest in Xinjiang and Tibet is an everpresent threat, and could, in the future, lead to very damaging terrorism within China. However, the indigenous
populations of these areas are rapidly being reduced to minorities by Han Chinese migration and in China as a whole
the Han are so overwhelmingly dominant that it seems highly unlikely that China will ever face a serious danger of
disintegration along ethnic lines. There is no necessity that the rise of China will lead to increased tension or conflict
between the U.S. and China. China has gone from being one of the Western system's greatest victims in the 19th
Century to being one of the greatest beneficiaries of the global market system created by the British Empire and the
United States. The destruction of that system through economic conflict or war would deal a shattering blow to the
Chinese economy, and thereby to the stability of the Chinese political system and the rule of the Communist Party.
Moreover, even if China becomes the world's largest economy this will by no means automatically equate to an
ability to rival the U.S. as a global superpower. The yuan has a very long way to go before it even begins to rival the
pound or the yen as a global currency, let alone the dollar or the euro. In terms of military power, the Chinese may
well be approaching the point where they can drive the U.S. navy away from China's coasts and prevent the U.S.
from effectively defending Taiwan; but by reducing any possibility of a Taiwanese declaration of independence at
the same time, China makes a conflict over Taiwan much less likely.2When it comes to global power projection
China suffers from two huge drawbacks and is likely to do so for a long time to come. The first is its lack of aircraft
carriers. Beijing is now devoting great effort to developing these, but as the Soviet Union discovered during the
Cold War, this is one of the most complex of all military-industrial undertakings, and the Chinese are only at the
very early stages.
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US/RUSSIA RELATIONS GOOD-US/RUSSIA WAR
Space weaponization could cause a new cold war
Scott Lowery, Professor at the University of Colorado, 07, Why the weaponization of space should not be
pursued, page 7, http://www.colorado.edu
It is clear that the weaponization of space is not inevitable. However, does the
concern of foreign weaponization justify the pursuit of space weapons anyway? The
answer is an emphatic no. Although doing so would seem to increase the asymmetric
space advantage the US has, it would actually have a destabilizing effect and result in a
decreased advantage. The idea of space weapons brings to mind visions of military
omnipotence, with the US able to easily strike down any adversary without fear of
retaliation. Such an ability would deter many conflicts. A similar rationale developed in
the 1940s with the creation of the atom bomb. It too seemed to provide infinite power
that would cause the rest of the world to kneel before the US or suffer unimaginable
retaliation. This idea worked once, ending World War II. Once the atom bomb became
public, it sparked a massive arms race as other nations developed nuclear power. The
stockpiling of nuclear arms led to the Cold War, an era defined by a world on the brink of
destruction and rapidly shifting political climates. It is not a large leap in logic to
conclude that since space weapons offer advantages of similar magnitude to nuclear
weapons, their development will cause a similar situation. Other nations will not stand
idle as the US weaponizes space—they will follow suit. In the end, space will become a
volatile political liability and the medium for a new Cold War–style weapons spiral.
U.S. And Russia armed for a nuclear war leading to extinction
Ira Helfand, emergency physician from Northampton, Massachusetts, and John Pastore, Rhode Island
Democratic Party Politician, 09, U.S.-Russia nuclear war still a threat, projo.com
President Obama and Russian President Dimitri Medvedev are scheduled to Wednesday in London during the G-20
summit. They must not let the current economic crisis keep them from focusing on one of the greatest threats
confronting humanity: the danger of nuclear war.
Since the end of the Cold War, many have acted as though the danger of nuclear war has ended. It has not. There
remain in the world more than 20,000 nuclear weapons. Alarmingly, more than 2,000 of these weapons in the U.S.
and Russian arsenals remain on ready-alert status, commonly known as hair-trigger alert. They can be fired within
five minutes and reach targets in the other country 30 minutes later.
Just one of these weapons can destroy a city. A war involving a substantial number would cause devastation on a
scale unprecedented in human history. A study conducted by Physicians for Social Responsibility in 2002 showed
that if only 500 of the Russian weapons on high alert exploded over our cities, 100 million Americans would die in
the first 30 minutes.
An attack of this magnitude also would destroy the entire economic, communications and transportation
infrastructure on which we all depend. Those who survived the initial attack would inhabit a nightmare landscape
with huge swaths of the country blanketed with radioactive fallout and epidemic diseases rampant. They would have
no food, no fuel, no electricity, no medicine, and certainly no organized health care. In the following months it is
likely the vast majority of the U.S. population would die.
Recent studies by the eminent climatologists Toon and Robock have shown that such a war would have a huge and
immediate impact on climate worldwide. If all of the warheads in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals were
drawn into the conflict, the firestorms they caused would loft 180 million tons of soot and debris into the upper
atmosphere — blotting out the sun. Temperatures across the globe would fall an average of 18 degrees Fahrenheit to
levels not seen on earth since the depth of the last ice age, 18,000 years ago. Agriculture would stop, eco-systems
would collapse, and many species, including perhaps our own, would become extinct.
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US/RUSSIA RELATIONS GOOD-US/RUSSIA WAR
There is still a risk of nuclear war with Russia
Ira Helfand, emergency physician from Northampton, Massachusetts, and John Pastore, Rhode Island Democratic
Party Politician, 09, U.S.-Russia nuclear war still a threat, projo.com
Jan. 25, 1995, was an ordinary day with no major crisis involving the U.S. and Russia. But, unknown to almost
every inhabitant on the planet, a misunderstanding led to the potential for a nuclear war. The ready alert status of
nuclear weapons that existed in 1995 remains in place today.
U.S. takes cautious and careful actions to keep Russia from firing nuclear weapons
Joseph Cirincione, President of the Ploughshares Fund and previously served as vice president for national security
and international policy at the Center for American Progress in Washington, DC and for eight years as the director
for non-proliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007, “Nuclear Summer”, Center for
American Progress, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/07/nuclear_summer.html
The first jolt came June 3, when Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Russia will point its nuclear missiles
toward Europe if the United States constructs anti-missile bases on his borders. Putin warned that placing new
American weapon systems in Poland and the Czech Republic “increases the possibility of a nuclear conflict.”
Beyond the fact that Putin actually used his nuclear arsenal as a lever to alter U.S policy, the conflict underscored
the threat from the 25,000 nuclear weapons the two countries still deploy, with thousands on hair-trigger alert ready
to fire in 15 minutes. With Russian early-warning capabilities eroding, we increasingly rely on good relations
between the White House and the Kremlin to ensure that no Russian president will misinterpret a false alarm and
make a catastrophic decision. This summer, behind the smiles at the “Lobster Summit" in Maine, that good will was
in short supply, weakening an important safety net crucial to preventing an accidental nuclear exchange. Later in
July, the mutual diplomatic expulsions between Russia and the United Kingdom, which fields 185 nuclear weapons,
ratcheted tensions up another notch and should shake current complacent policies that take good relations for
granted and scorn any further negotiated nuclear reductions.
Weaponization would hurt growing space travel economy
Scott Lowery, Professor at the University of Colorado, 07, Why the weaponization of space should not be
pursued, pages 7-8, http://www.colorado.edu
Another reason to avoid weaponizing space is that to do so would threaten the burgeoning space industry. Presently,
there are several companies developing launch vehicles to lift payloads to space at far lower costs than any
government agency. Also, there is the space tourism and travel industry to consider. No longer in an embryonic 8
state, commercial flights will be available as early as 2009 (Overview). In the near future, suborbital flights will
become as common as trans-Atlantic flights are today. They are the first step towards a general private use of space.
There is a great deal of potential economic growth tied up in these ventures, but none of it will mature if people feel
that they would be flying through enemy territory, so to speak, or that their investments are at too great a risk. Since
there is no orbital analogue to airspace, future spaceflights could be endangered by weapons from any country
regardless of their trajectory. It is even possible that weapons could be deployed against civilian space targets
without detection. There would not be any evidence to assign blame to a particular nation, making spaceflights a
tempting target. Even if they were not targeted directly, spaceflights would still be at a significant risk from the
debris resulting from the use of space weapons. Much like chemical weapons, space weapons create a hazardous
environment. Simple physics insists that even a tiny piece of shrapnel from a destroyed satellite can cause major
damage when it is travelling at orbital velocities. In light of these concerns, the weaponization of space would not
benefit the United States and could potentially cause great damage, both politically and economically.
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US/RUSSIA RELATIONS-OTHER
U.S. and Russian relations are beneficial leading to advancements in trade and economic
policies
Allison Good, major in Political Science at Vassar, 2011, “U.S. and Russia are strengthing their relationship,
Ambassador says”, http://www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/2011/06/us_and_russia_are_strengthenin.html
"U.S. companies are now well-established in Russia and are creating jobs," he explained, citing the recent activities
of Ford, General Motors, and high-tech entities such as Microsoft, Cisco and Boeing. Democratic development in
post-Soviet Russia has also had positive implications for United States tourism. "Russia is now more open and
increasingly connected with the world," the ambassador said. "Russians recently discovered the American South,
and now there are direct flights to and from Houston and Atlanta." Beyrle, however, noted that there are still
significant obstacles overshadowing the U.S.-Russia economic relationship. "Russia is still a tough place to do
business because there are bureaucratic obstacles and corruption is an enormous problem," he continued. "For
example, the United States is constantly fighting protectionist lobbies that want to keep American beef and poultry
out of Russia." American initiatives to improve trade relations with Russia include working to support Russia's
membership in the World Trade Organization. According to Beyrle, this will "allow the United States to benefit
from the free movement of goods and services." The United States is also concerned with the uneven democratic
development in post-Soviet Russia and popular calls for more governmental accountability. "The road ahead for
Russia is not completely clear," the ambassador said. "It is our interest as Americans to support their transition to
democracy."Despite these impediments, Beyrle emphasized, the U.S.-Russia relationship remains an important
cornerstone of American foreign policy and trade. "This relationship has been and remains fundamentally important
to our national interests as Americans," he said.
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US/RUSSIA RELATIONS-OTHER
U.S. relations with Russia are mutually beneficial in areas including terrorism, instability
in the Middle East and energy security
Thomas, Graham, Served as a special assistant to the President and senior director for Russia at the National
Security Council, 2008, U.S. –“Russia Relations: Facing Reality Pragmatically”
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080717_graham_u.s.russia.pdf
In this uncertain world, the United States and Russia are not strategic rivals, and neither poses a strategic threat to
the other (despite some overwrought Russian rhetoric to the contrary), in contrast to the situation during the Cold
War. Rather, they share a set of common strategic challenges. Russia, by virtue of its geographic location, and the
United States, by virtue of its global role, must build new relationships with a Europe that is expanding and
deepening; they both must find a way to cope with the growing instability in the Middle East, the challenge to
energy security that implies, and, at least for Russia, the threat that that instability will infect Russia’s southern
reaches; and they both must manage relations with a rising China. In addition, both countries must deal with the dark
side of globalization, and both have a keen interest in the role and effectiveness of the institutions of global
governance, such as the United Nations and the G-8, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
Common challenges, however, are not the same as common interests. And there are deep differences in the way the
United States and Russia think of global order (consider, for example, the role of democracy or the United Nations).
But the question each country needs to ask is how important the other is to its achieving its own strategic goals. For
example: Given their standing as the world’s two leading nuclear powers, the United States and Russia are each
indispensable to dealing with the problems of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear terrorism, and
strategic stability. The United States, as the world’s largest energy consumer, and Russia, as the largest producer of
hydrocarbons, are essential to any discussion of energy security and energy’s future.
Global economic dynamics and transfers of wealth will require bringing Russia, along with China, India, and others,
into a more central role in managing the global economy, a service long performed by Europe and the United States.
In East Asia, to create a favorable new equilibrium, Russia has an interest in a strong power—that is, the United
States—acting as a moderating influence on China, and the United States has no interest in a weakening Russian
presence in Siberia and the Russian Far East, regions rich in the natural resources that fuel modern economies.
In the Middle East, both the United States and Russia have levers that could help promote stability, if the two
countries were working in concert, or fuel conflict, if they were not. In Europe, Russian energy is critical to
economic well-being, and the United States remains essential to security and stability.
On a range of other issues—for example, civil nuclear energy, pandemic diseases, climate change—each country is
capable of making a major contribution, given the vast scientific talent of each. In the former Soviet space, both
countries will be critical to building lasting security and economic structures.
In short, the United States and Russia are better off working together rather than at cross purposes, managing the
inevitable differences rather than magnifying them, as is too often the case today.
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Russian relations highly beneficial
Gale, Mattox, Dr. Gale A. Mattox is Professor, Political Science Department , US Naval Academy (1981- ), was
elected department chair (2003-7) and elected chair of chairs (2004-7). She has been awarded the Distinguished
Fulbright-Dow Research Chair at the Roosevelt Center, Netherlands for Spring 2009. Prof. Mattox served on the
Policy Planning Staff, Department of State (1994-95), was a Council on Foreign Relations Fellow at State
Dept.Office of Strategic and Theater Nuclear Policy (1984-85)and an international affairs analyst, Congressional
Research Service, 2010, “START: A New Beginning for U.S.-Russian Relations?”, AICGS.
For the Europeans as well as the United States, the recent suggestion made by NATO Secretary General Anders
Fogh Rasmussen to Russia to consider inclusion in a new Euroatlantic defense shield - "one security roof"- could
hold the potential for closer relations and ease the atmosphere between NATO and Russia and within the NATORussia Council. While admitting that he (Rasmussen) is "...suggesting nothing less than a radical change in the way
we think about European security, about missile defense, and about Russia. So I am asking a lot. But the result will
be worth the effort." (9) This and other initiatives may find discussions to be less contentious than has been the case
in the more recent pass - not necessarily or always easier to resolve, but a move in the right direction.
While not overestimating the degree to which the U.S.-Russian relationship may be 'reset,' mutually beneficial
relations hold the potential for improvements on a number of global issues with implications for Europe as well greater coordination on terrorism, better cooperation on climate change, and others. Just as the SALT I negotiations
two generations earlier, the START negotiations, as tedious and difficult as they were, may have created a
framework not only for the next steps in the nonproliferation/arms control agenda laid out by President Obama in
the opening days of his administration, but also for improved and more productive U.S.-European-Russian relations
on a range of issues of mutual interest.
Russia’s influence and power makes it a good ally for the U.S.
Robert, Legvold, Robert H. Legvold is professor of political science emeritus at Columbia University, 2006,
“U.S.-Russian Relations: An American Perspective”, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/NUMBER/N_7343.
Russia counts. It has emerged as a major alternative oil and gas axis, more important for some, such as Europe and
potentially China, than the Middle East. Its role on crucial international issues, like Iran and North Korea,
particularly in tandem with China’s, is no longer marginal. And, for good and ill, its capacity to shape Ukrainian and
Belarusian options, as well as to affect Central Asian security, is greater than any other state. Even its potential
influence on Chinese policy is far from negligible. The United States, therefore, has reason to rethink the place
Russia occupies in its foreign policy. Lest the Russian leadership treat the same considerations as justifying no
rethinking on its part, however, it should be mindful of the other side of the coin: the more Russia becomes part of
the global economy, as the U.S.-China relationship demonstrates, the more it will encounter the United States. The
sooner its oil flows less abundantly (2010), earns a good deal less, or, as is already true, suffers severely constricted
export capacity, the sooner it will want Western help and cooperation. The less successful the concentration of
power is in containing the country’s problems and unleashing its potential, the less easy will the leadership find it to
deny society the right to breath. And the day the brittle status quo in the post-Soviet space on which Russia counts
begins to crumble, because the hidebound regimes to whom it lends its support falter, will be the day Russia will
appreciate more the common ground it has with the United States. In truth, therefore, the failure of both sides to
recognize their deeper stakes in the relationship is less because it was an impossible dream than, alas, a path not
taken.
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The U.S. can gain more influence in the sphere of nuclear power if they are allied with
Russia
Robert, Legvold, Robert H. Legvold is professor of political science emeritus at Columbia University, 2003, “All
the Way: Crafting a U.S.-Russian Alliance”, http://www.columbia.edu/~rhl1/national.pdf.
RUSSIA AND the United States allied against the new century's primary strategic threats, particularly those
emanating from within and around the Eurasian land mass, would have much the same significance in the emerging
international order as key U.S. alliances have had in the past. Even more so will this be the case if the alliance is
underpinned by Russia's successful integration into the international economy and its safe passage to democracy.
Not insignificantly, movement toward alliance also has the advantage of blocking movement in the opposite
direction. This is a rare moment in history. For the time being, and almost uniquely in the last three centuries of
international politics, strategic rivalry among the major powers has disappeared. None of them defines any of the
others as a primary security threat; none strains to amass military power against another; and none labors with
alliances intended to thwart aggressive designs assigned to another. Given its weakness, Russia could not, even if it
wished, turn itself into a global rival of the United States anytime soon. Within its own neighborhood, however, it is
less disadvantaged. If events flow in the other direction, if Putin or someone to follow decides that alignment with
the United States is not worth the candle, this key region could be one of the first places where this historic blessing
begins to fade. It is not difficult to imagine what such rivalry could be about. An incipient jostling between the
United States and Russia in the post-Soviet space began in the 1990s, complete with competition over energy
pipeline routes and the mutual nurturing of alignments with favored states, leading in turn to the polarization of
regional groupings (such as GWUAM and the collective security cluster within the Commonwealth of Independent
States). 12 While these trends have dissipated, none has disappeared, and in some Russian quarters they simmer
unabated, sustained by U.S. troops on former Soviet soil and the impending enlargement of NATO across former
Soviet borders. Additionally, without a great deal of imagination one can conjure renewed trouble over strategic
military developments. This is and will remain a nuclear world. While U.S. attention is rightly focused these days on
preventing outlaw states and groups from arming themselves with nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction,
ultimately the nuclear superstructure will be determined by the major nuclear powers. Currently, U.S. preponderance
has permitted the United States to dictate the shape of the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship, and Putin has prudently
bowed to an outcome he cannot pre- 12 GUUAM is the acronym for the joint undertaking among Georgia, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova intended to coordinate security and economic interests among these five states.
Although Uzbekistan withdrew this past year, the group remains something of a counterpoise to Russian-led
enterprises within the larger region. .Tbe National Interest-Winter 2002/03.vent. In the process, he and parts of the
Russian security establishment are coming to accept the possibility of working with the United States and its NATO
allies on the future role of missile defense. But these are opening gambits in an ongoing process, leading in unknown
directions-probably into space and the uncertainties that competition there will bring, and to a set of Chinese
responses that will further complicate the IndoPakistani nuclear nexus and perhaps draw Japan across the nuclear
threshold. The United States may for some time enjoy technological leads, permitting it by means of its own
choosing to cope with the threats that lie ahead. In the modern era, however, history has been hard on states that
assumed they could unilaterally impose a security order of their own devising and make it last. If, on the other hand,
Russia is America's ally and not merely a reluctantly compliant foil, the United States would have much more
leverage in designing a nuclear regime drained of competitive pressures among established nuclear powers, and thus
more capable of circumscribing the behavior of new and would-be nuclear states. In this light, it cannot be a good
thing when Russians who are the strongest advocates of cooperation with the United States find it necessary to
defend the Moscow Treaty by trumpeting effects that scarcely contribute to a more stable strategic nuclear regime.
Sergei Rogov, for example, the director of the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, praises the agreement
for proving again that Russia remains the only nuclear interlocutor the United States deems worthy of engaging; for
restoring Russia's MIRV option; and for exempting Russia's large store of tactical nuclear weapons from arms
control at a time when, because of weaknesses in conventional capabilities, "present Russian military doctrine puts
much greater stress on nuclear containment than the Pentagon.
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Russia is a dangerous enemy but powerful ally
James, Goldgeier, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Elliott School of International Affairs,
George Washington University, Michael, McFaul, Professor of Political Science
Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Senior Fellow, by courtesy, at FSI, Ph.D., Oxford University, 2009,
http://www.caei.com.ar/es/programas/cei/P01.pdf.
There is no question that the Russian capacity to influence American interests, either positively or negatively, has
greatly diminished in the past two decades. Regarding traditional measures of power - military might, economic
prowess, and population - Russia today is a shadow of the Soviet Union. Its ability to project military force is
extremely limited, its military infrastructure is decayed, and its armed forces are in need of radical reform. After a
decade of dramatic decline, the economy began to grow steadily after 1999, but Russia will remain a middle-income
country at best for decades to come. Russia's population hovers below 150 million and is rapidly declining. At the
same time, it has enough power and potential power to be either a spoiler or a contributing partner as America
pursues its national security interests. For instance, Russia inherited and maintains military and economic ties with
Iran, Syria, North Korea, and China, relations that could be either useful or threatening to American security
interests. Moreover, Russia is the world's largest producer and exporter of hydrocarbons, an endowment which could
also either serve or impede American strategic interests, depending on whether leaders in the Kremlin are
cooperative or hostile to the United States. Armed still with thousands of nuclear weapons and intercontinental
delivery vehicles, Russia remains the only country in the world still capable of annihilating the American homeland.
It is hard to imagine how Russian leaders could ever use this kind of power in either a positive or a threatening way.
Yet, if controlled by leaders with genuinely imperial or anti-American intentions, Russia's nuclear arsenal could
again become a tool of blackmail against the United States and its allies. Today, Russian state weakness itself also
threatens American national security. U.S. policymakers must worry about the possibility of nuclear technologies
and weapons being stolen or sold on the world black market. The Russian state's inability to construct an effective
early-warning radar system increases the likelihood of an accidental ballistic missile launch in response to faulty
information. Russia's inability to defend its borders in the Caucasus has opened a new front on the global war on
terror.
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U.S. – Russia relations affect stability and safety of EurasiaRobert Levgold, professor of
political science at Columbia University and editor of the forthcoming Thinking Strategically:
The Major Powers, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian Nexus (The MIT Press), December 18
2002, “All the Way: Crafting a U.S.-Russian Alliance (an excerpt)”, The National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/article/all-the-way-crafting-a-us-russian-alliance-an-excerpt-2205
So what might animate a U.S.-Russian alliance? The core focus can and should be stability and
mutual security in and around the Eurasian land mass. This has three aspects. First, as Alexander
Vershbow, the current U.S. ambassador in Moscow, puts it: "Russia is the most important key to
the stability of Eurasia" itself, without which neither Europe nor Asia, two regions in which the
United States has vital interests, can "be stable and prosperous." As long as Russia respects the
sovereignty of the former Soviet republics, the United States has every reason to cooperate with
Russia in stabilizing and aiding those states. In this regard, as well as others, alliance does not
mean condominium; U.S.-Russian collaboration must not imply a readiness to decide matters
over the heads of Russia's neighbors. On the contrary, an alliance's purpose would be to
strengthen their sovereignty and vitality. One example of the subtle way in which the revolution
in Russian foreign policy makes this kind of alliance possible concerns Belarus. Putin's new
agenda has led to a sharp cooling in Russia's relations with Alexander Lukashenko's regime. As a
consequence, a leadership that flouts the values on which modern European security is based is
increasingly isolated, the prospect of a Russian-Belarusian union has faded and Ukraine's fears
of encirclement have eased. Although not perfectly parallel, U.S. and Russian interests in
Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova now converge sufficiently to make promoting stability and
successful reform there a matter of common U.S. and Russian ground.
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U.S. – Russia relations affect stability and safety of Eurasia
Robert Levgold, professor of political science at Columbia University and editor of the
forthcoming Thinking Strategically: The Major Powers, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian
Nexus (The MIT Press), December 18 2002, “All the Way: Crafting a U.S.-Russian Alliance (an
excerpt)”, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/article/all-the-way-crafting-a-usrussian-alliance-an-excerpt-2205
So what might animate a U.S.-Russian alliance? The core focus can and should be stability and
mutual security in and around the Eurasian land mass. This has three aspects. First, as Alexander
Vershbow, the current U.S. ambassador in Moscow, puts it: "Russia is the most important key to
the stability of Eurasia" itself, without which neither Europe nor Asia, two regions in which the
United States has vital interests, can "be stable and prosperous." As long as Russia respects the
sovereignty of the former Soviet republics, the United States has every reason to cooperate with
Russia in stabilizing and aiding those states. In this regard, as well as others, alliance does not
mean condominium; U.S.-Russian collaboration must not imply a readiness to decide matters
over the heads of Russia's neighbors. On the contrary, an alliance's purpose would be to
strengthen their sovereignty and vitality. One example of the subtle way in which the revolution
in Russian foreign policy makes this kind of alliance possible concerns Belarus. Putin's new
agenda has led to a sharp cooling in Russia's relations with Alexander Lukashenko's regime. As a
consequence, a leadership that flouts the values on which modern European security is based is
increasingly isolated, the prospect of a Russian-Belarusian union has faded and Ukraine's fears
of encirclement have eased. Although not perfectly parallel, U.S. and Russian interests in
Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova now converge sufficiently to make promoting stability and
successful reform there a matter of common U.S. and Russian ground.
Russian Relations necessary for U.S. space program
Steven, Pifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, 2003.
Mr. Chairman and members of this Committee. It is an honor to appear before you with my colleague from NASA.
We at the State Department consider it a privilege to work together with John Schumacher and his colleagues at
NASA to further one of America's loftiest goals -- the mission of human space flight. At State, our contribution to
this mission is to facilitate relations with our international partners in space exploration while safeguarding our
broader national security interests. Although we cooperate closely with many space agencies around the world, any
conversation about the U.S. space program would be incomplete if it did not note the unique and historic partnership
we share with Russia in the field of human space flight. Space cooperation between the United States and Russia
remains one of the most visibly successful elements of the U.S.-Russian bilateral relationship.
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Working with Russia is key to eliminating nuclear proliferation
William, Perry, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor at Stanford
University, with a joint appointment in the School of Engineering and the Institute for International Studies, where
he is codirector of the Preventive Defense Project, a research collaboration of Stanford and Harvard Universities,
and Brent, Scowcroft, Brent Scowcroft has served as the National Security Advisor to both Presidents Gerald
Ford and George H.W. Bush. From 1982 to 1989, he was Vice Chairman of Kissinger Associates, Inc., an
international consulting firm. In this capacity, he advised and assisted a wide range of U.S. and foreign corporate
leaders on global joint venture opportunities, strategic planning, and risk assessment, 2009, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons
policy”On July 15, 2008, Senator Obama said:
It’s time to send a clear message: America seeks a world with no nuclear weapons. As long as nuclear weapons
exist, we must retain a strong deterrent. But instead of threatening to kick them out of the G8, we need to work with
Russia to take U.S. and Russian ballistic missiles off hair-trigger alert; to dramatically reduce the stockpiles of our
nuclear weapons and material; to seek a global ban on the production of fissile material for weap- ons; and to
expand the U.S.-Russian ban on intermediate-range missiles so that the agreement is global. By keeping our commitment under the Nonproliferation Treaty, we’ll be in a better position to press nations like North Korea and Iran to
keep theirs. In particular, it will give us more credibility and leverage in dealing with Iran.
Notably, the United States has a treaty obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament as well as general and complete
disarmament, but there is no commitment for exactly when to achieve nuclear abolition. As a party to the 1970
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the United States has committed to Article VI of this treaty, as follows: “Each of
the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation
of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control.”
New spaces weapons can destroy MAD and destabilize world peace
Alex B. Englhart, Technological Expert, 2008, Common Ground In the Sky: Extending The 1967 Outer Space
treaty To Reconcile U.S. and Chinese Security Interests
http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/568/17PacRimLPolyJ133.pdf?sequence=1
In 1967, the stationing of nuclear weapons in orbit was the only
significant military threat that either side could envision in space.101 The
idea of precision-guided kinetic kill vehicles or laser weapons being
effectively used in space was science fiction at the time and thus did not
merit serious attention in the Treaty. But in 2007, these weapons are not
only conceivable, they are being actively pursued and some could become
operational within the next decade.102 While perhaps not as massively
destructive in their own right as actual nuclear weapons, these weapons have
the potential to be just as damaging to world peace and to humanity’s future.
Kinetic kill vehicles, space-based lasers, and ASATs have the potential to
seriously disrupt the effectiveness of ICBMs and thus vitiate the peace
through mutually assured destruction that has prevailed for more than half a
century.103 These threats are at least as serious today as the stationing of
nuclear weapons in space was in 1967, and updating the Treaty to deal with
them is the only way to fulfill the spirit of the Treaty in the 21st century
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U.S. – Russian relations are essential to control the threat of nuclear destruction.
William, Perry, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor at Stanford
University, with a joint appointment in the School of Engineering and the Institute for International Studies, where
he is codirector of the Preventive Defense Project, a research collaboration of Stanford and Harvard Universities,
and Brent, Scowcroft, Brent Scowcroft has served as the National Security Advisor to both Presidents Gerald
Ford and George H.W. Bush. From 1982 to 1989, he was Vice Chairman of Kissinger Associates, Inc., an
international consulting firm. In this capacity, he advised and assisted a wide range of U.S. and foreign corporate
leaders on global joint venture opportunities, strategic planning, and risk assessment, 2009, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons
policy”
Although Russia is no longer an enemy, and the United States has substantially reduced its number of deployed and
stockpiled war- heads, thousands of nuclear weapons remain in the U.S. and Russian
The New Security Environment
arsenals. The likelihood of intentional war with Russia has substan- tially decreased since the demise of the Soviet
Union, but the risk of miscalculation persists. Because this latent threat is the only man-made danger that can cause
the immediate destruction of the United States, the time is long overdue to reexamine whether the United States and
Russia can agree to further reduce the risk of nuclear conflict through better situational awareness of their nuclear
postures and better com- munication about nuclear policy and decision making regarding their nuclear arsenals.
Although reducing nuclear arms would not neces- sarily decrease the risk of miscalculation, it is an important part of
the nuclear arms control agenda.
This agenda will, however, have to contend with other issues, which have the potential to return the United States
and Russia to an adversar- ial relationship. Tensions over NATO enlargement, the 2008 Georgia- Russia armed
conflict, and proposed U.S. missile defense deployments in the Czech Republic and Poland are three of the most
vexing issues that have increased tensions between the United States and Russia. The conflict with Georgia in
particular has raised concerns about the direc- tion of Russian foreign policy. Nevertheless, Russian leaders generally welcome formal arms control talks. Negotiating a follow-on to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START)—set to expire in Decem- ber 2009—will top this agenda.
The large Russian arsenal of short-range nuclear weapons is believed by many security experts to be more
susceptible to theft or diversion than Russia’s strategic weapons. Under the 1991 and 1992 pledges by U.S. president
George H.W. Bush, Soviet president Mikhail Gor- bachev, and Russian president Boris Yeltsin, Russia agreed to
elimi- nate nuclear ground and naval forces. The United States pledged to reduce most of its short-range nuclear
weapon systems and has sub- sequently dismantled warheads associated with these systems. There are concerns that
Russia did not completely fulfill these dismantle- ment pledges, according to Stephen Rademaker, then acting assistant secretary of state for international nonproliferation.22 Notably, these pledges, known as the Presidential Nuclear
Initiatives, were not accompanied by any verification provisions. The totality of the issues briefly discussed here
underscores the fundamental impor- tance of U.S.-Russia relations, which are explored in detail in the next chapter.
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The United States and Russia depend on each other to maintain a successful economy.
Andrei P. Tsygankov, Professor San Francisco State University International Relations, 2009, “U.S. Russia
relations in the Post Western World, http://bss.sfsu.edu/tsygankov/Research/Articles.htm
Finally, the U.S. does not have a good alternative to developing energy cooperation with Russia. Russia represents a
critically important market for the United States, which consumes over 20 percent of the world’s energy and has a
shortage of domestic energy supplies. As U.S. Ambassador William Burns put it, “in the case of Russia, the United
States and energy, the power of the argument for partnership between us is obvious. Russia is the world's largest
producer of hydrocarbons; the United States is the world's largest consumer.” 1 A recovering great power with the
world’s largest energy supplies, Russia can be either a valuable partner or a major spoiler of Western policies in
Eurasia and beyond. Denying Russia the right to pursue its energy interests and to establish an independent energy
policy at home and in Eurasia is sure to come with large political and economic costs. Treating Russia as a potential
threat may bring to power in Moscow those who are not interested in strengthening relations with the U.S.
Politically, it may generate a prolonged cycle of hostilities shaped by clashing American and Russia perceptions of
each other’s energy intentions, resulting in a situation that some experts describe as the energy security dilemma and
others as the militarization of the global struggle over energy supplies. 2 Economically, it may lead to the isolation of
prominent American companies from developing important energy fields and energy relations abroad.
Space race not inevitable or needed for U.S. to retain dominance
Scott Lowery, Professor at the University of Colorado, 07, Why the weaponization of space should not be
pursued, pages 4-5, http://www.colorado.edu
The pro-weaponization adherents’ arguments of inevitability focus on the notion
that the United States must have an early lead in space weapons or suffer the
consequences. They have several reasons for believing in inevitability; however, each
argument contains logical fallacies that preclude it from representing a rational policy.
Karl Mueller of the International Studies Association best sums up the deficiency of their
arguments, which are “based on a smattering of evidence and logic, extrapolated into
facile overgeneralizations that are well-suited for television talk-show punditry but which
provide a poor basis for national policymaking (Mueller).” Their first argument is that
inevitability is a consequence of human nature. This is blatant pessimism as there are 5
many weapons such as chemical missiles and radiation bombs that provide tactical
advantages but have been shied away from. Agreements such as the Chemical Weapons
Convention banned the use of these weapons, because it is difficult to control their effects
and they create hazardous environmental conditions. The signature of 182 states (Status)
on this agreement signifies that logic can override baser instincts towards violence
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Historical evidence of ground weaponization shows no correlation to space
Scott Lowery, Professor at the University of Colorado, 07, Why the weaponization of space should not be
pursued, page 5, http://www.colorado.edu
The second argument for inevitability draws on historical analogies of the
weaponization of the sea and air. Though it seems that the progression to space power
would mirror the progression to sea power, this is not the case, as there is a difference of
functionality. Navies were developed to defend against pirates and raiders, but there are
no analogous threats to the theater of space that would warrant a buildup of defensive
weapons. The similarities between air and space are more intuitively striking, at least at
first glance. In fact, the two theaters have not evolved along the same lines at all. One
reason is timescale: less than ten years after Kitty Hawk there were airborne weapons in
World War I, yet after more than fifty years since the launch of Sputnik, there has been
no great buildup. The other difference is a lack of a multiplying effect in space. In the
case of air power, the development of one system, such as a bomber, necessitated other
developments, such as escort fighters. In contrast, the deployment of a new satellite
constellation does not require a new weapon system. It seems then that drawing
conclusions from sea and air power history fails to provide any support for
weaponization.
Space weaponization not inevitable
Andrew, Park, writer for Houston Journal of International Law, 2006, Houston Journal of International Law.
The fallacy of the inevitability argument is that, in the short run at least, the United States is the only country that
possesses the resources and capabilities necessary to deploy space weapons. (92) This has never been the case in
American history. As one historian notes, from the "development of ironclad warships in the 1860s, Dreadnought
battleships after 1900, or atomic weapons in the 1940s," different nations were simultaneously developing the same
technology. (93) This left a choice to the different governments to either take the lead in the arms race or get passed
by. (94) In the space weapons debate, in contrast, "the United States can unilaterally [for the time being] choose
whether space will be weaponized." (95) Consequently, the United States controls the inevitability of space
weaponization. This conviction is dangerously close to evolving into a self-fulfilling prophecy that simply cannot be
refuted. (96) While the realms of air, land, and sea have already been weaponized, presumably irrevocably so, they
have become so as a result of three very different paths. (97) Moreover, the evolutionary patterns of military and
commercial uses of new environments have [also] varied widely across the range of human experience. To conclude
that this evidence proves that the fourth will also be weaponized would require a degree of deterministic fatalism
that would make the most doctrinaire Marxist or environmental doomsayer blush.
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A war in the stars can be prevented by US conditional unilateral restraint from using space
weapons
Karl P. Mueller, 27 March 2002, “Is the Weaponization of Space Inevitable?”, International Studies Association
Annual Convention
The second scenario assumes that space weapons do in fact prove to be fairly useful and cost-effective. In this case,
there is a good chance that U.S. security in particular would be best served by perpetuation of the space sanctuary
for purely nationalist reasons: as the leading spacefaring state and the country most dependent upon satellites for its
military power and economic wealth, the United States has the most to lose if those satellites become more
vulnerable to attack. In addition, having invested vast resources in developing a preponderance of land, sea, air and
unweaponized space power, a true space weapon revolution that wiped the clean the slate of military competition
might well represent a net power loss for the United States relative to its rivals (as the steam, ironclad, and
Dreadnought revolutions each did in turn for the Royal Navy).
One approach to dealing with this problem would be for the United States to announce a policy of conditional
unilateral restraint in space weaponization: that it will not be the first nation to weaponize space, although it will
continue to develop the relevant technologies in order to be prepared to respond in kind should other states violate
the sanctuary. In this scenario, such an approach would not be motivated by an idealistic belief that eschewing space
weapons would inspire or shame other states to do the same. Instead, it would be based on a hard-nosed, realist
calculation: U.S. space weaponization would not only encourage other states to follow suit, but would greatly assist
them in doing so, since they would be able to exploit the advantages of backwardness after the United States had
paid the costs of trailblazing the new technologies. With the United States not leading the way, yet threatening to lift
its self-restraint in the absence of reciprocity from its rivals (thus denying them the hope of establishing hegemony
in space), other states might well find insufficient value in initiating space weaponization to justify its costs.
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The weaponization of space can be avoided, US sees no net benefit to deploying space
weapons
Karl P. Mueller, 27 March 2002, “Is the Weaponization of Space Inevitable?”, International Studies Association
Annual Convention
At the end of the day, most of the inevitability arguments are weak. Even the best one, that space weapons will
provide irresistible military advantages for those who employ them, is plausible but not decisive, and many of those
who assert it probably harbor exaggerated expectations about the capabilities that space weapons will offer. So if we
cannot say with confidence that weaponization is inevitable, is it possible to go farther and suggest plausible courses
of events in which space might not be weaponized over the reasonably long term? If not, weaponization might be
simply “not quite” or “only probably” inevitable, a distinction of rather minor significance.
What follow are three plausible scenarios describing ways in which space weaponization might not occur by midcentury. Each is based on a different set of assumptions, but is not intended to suggest that only a single outcome
could follow from them (nor are these the only paths that could lead to perpetuation of the space sanctuary). It is
worth noting, however, that all three scenarios share some essentially realist premises in common. In each case, it is
assumed that U.S. policy-making is driven by a desire to maximize national power and security in the face of a
competitive international system that includes powerful and aspiring rivals, and that the United States seeks to
perpetuate and exploit its current position of international hegemony. None of the scenarios assume further decline
in the bellicosity of nations, or that states’ actions will be shaped by altruism, mutual affection, or the inclination to
be honest or honorable (except for instrumental purposes). In short, none is set in the sort of rosy world of idealistic
international fraternity and easy arms control in which space weaponization advocates often accuse space sanctuary
proponents of naïvely pretending that we live.
In addition, none of these scenarios assumes that the United States will, or suggests that it should, fail to take a
number of important measures to increase its security in space. These include continuing to conduct basic research
to support the future military exploitation of space, equipping satellites with systems to detect and report attacks
against them, building a space tracking system capable of maintaining surveillance over all satellites in orbit,
preparing to carry out space control objectives thorough means other than traditional ASAT attack, and taking steps
to reduce the vulnerability of both the terrestrial and orbital elements of U.S. space systems through hardening,
decentralization, redundancy, and rapid reconstitution of damaged satellite constellations.
The first scenario is based on the possibility that the United States will not weaponize space simply because space
weapons will not appear to offer benefits commensurate with their costs. As discussed above, orbital space weapons
may well provide only marginal advantages for performing most military missions compared with systems whose
deployment would not constitute space weaponization. This is particularly true for the United States, given the U.S.
armed forces’ great power projection capabilities. Against these advantages will have to be weighed the costs of
developing, building, and operating what would be very expensive space weapon systems, paying for which would
of course require resources to be diverted from other defense or non-defense investment, along with the political
costs of being the first state to weaponize space. How great the latter would prove to be is highly uncertain, but it
does appear more likely than not that they would be considerably greater than zero.
Attacks for economic reasons would actually hurt offensive country’s economy
Scott Lowery, Professor at the University of Colorado, 07, Why the weaponization of space should not be
pursued, pages 5-6, http://www.colorado.edu
The third argument for inevitability is that the expanding influence space has on
the economy will precipitate an attack on space systems. Pro-weaponizers see the
economic dependence on space as a vulnerability waiting to be exploited. However, the 6
logic behind such an attack is lacking. It is unreasonable for another nation state to attack
US space assets for the sole purpose of economic disruption. Because the US is a
superpower, its economy is interlinked with the rest of the world, so that if another
nation—for instance, China—damaged US space assets, it would most likely feel the
economic effects of the attackitself, namely through the loss of the $200 billion (Trade)
of goods it exports to the United States.
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AT: OTHER
Terrorism wouldn’t be a problem due to sophistication of satellites
Scott Lowery, Professor at the University of Colorado, 07, Why the weaponization of space should not be
pursued, page 6, http://www.colorado.edu
Similarly, attacking space assets as a terrorist action is also illogical. There are
many surface targets whose destruction would also cause widespread havoc such as
dams, bridges, refineries, computer systems, and so on. All of them require far less
sophistication to destroy than satellites
Space would not become a military target due to terrestrial-based space systems
Scott Lowery, Professor at the University of Colorado, 07, Why the weaponization of space should not be
pursued, page 6, http://www.colorado.edu
The final and most solid case for inevitability rests on the fact that space assets
are an excellent military target, and attacking them would be an effective precursor to
terrestrial warfare. The argument has some merit, as it has been shown that space plays a
key role in the abilities of the US military. The argument states that if the US does not
develop space weapons, someone else will, placing the US at a disadvantage. This is
reasonable but not conclusive. If an enemy did want to disrupt US space power, it would
not necessarily need to weaponize space. The earth-based portions of space systems, such
as ground control stations and communication dishes, are equally vulnerable and can be
destroyed with existing, far cheaper systems: a few men with bombs can disable a
satellite network just as well as a ballistic missile. In summary, the arguments for
inevitability fall short of being substantive, relying on little more than the “sky is falling
mentality” (Belote)
U.S. wants to rebuild ties with Russia, but Russia is reluctant
Ariel Cohen, Senior research fellow for Russian and Eurasian studies, 09, The U.S. Agenda for the ObamaMedvedev Summit, www.heritage.org
For now, however, expectations of a major breakthrough should not be high. There are many indicators that Moscow is not ready
for a comprehensive deal with Washington. To date, Russia has continued its policy--begun under ex-president Vladimir Putin-of rapprochement with China and consistent challenges to the central role the United States plays in world affairs. The global
economic crisis has done little to change this behavior.
The Obama Administration is anxious to secure Russian cooperation on several pressing issues, such as arms control, nonproliferation, a joint policy on Iran and the Middle East, and energy cooperation. However, today's Russia is a tough customer.
While the Cold War may be over, Moscow, bristling with anti-Americanism, is engaged in the pursuit of a sphere of influence
and is reaching out to authoritarians from Beijing to Caracas to Tehran.
While pursuing the new realism and being attentive and polite to his Russian hosts, President Obama must not forget that in the
last decade Russia has retreated from the partial democratic achievements of the Boris Yeltsin era. Although Putin stepped down
as president last year, little has changed under Medvedev, despite his rhetoric to the contrary--probably because the real power is
still in the hands of Putin and his allies.
Moscow's Five No's
Over the last few years, Moscow has crystallized a policy of negativity toward the U.S., which includes the following five planks:
No to NATO enlargement that includes Georgia and Ukraine;
No to U.S. missile defense in Europe;
No to a robust joint policy designed to halt the Iranian nuclear arms and ballistic missiles program;
No to the current security architecture in Europe; and
No to the U.S. dollar as reserve currency and the current global economic architecture (Western-dominated International
Monetary Fund and World Bank).
Moscow's complaints have included allegations that the United States is interfering in Russia's internal affairs by promoting
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; supporting NGOs; and generally being "preachy," didactic, and heavy handed
39
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AFF: RELATIONS RESILIENT
Despite some struggles,the United States and Russian relationship have kept their
relationship strategic and diplomatic.
Alexei Fenenko. Leading Research Fellow, Institute of International Security Studies of RAS, Russian Academy of
Sciences. June 2011. “The Cyclical Nature of Russian-American Relations”. Rianovosti.
http://en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20110621/164739508.html
The third cycle was the “reset policy” proclaimed in February 2009. Predictably, it was also based on strategic
concerns. First, during the five-day war in August 2008 Russia and the United States came dangerously close to
direct military confrontation. Second, it was time for the agreed decommissioning of nuclear systems in the first half
of the 1980s. In the next two years, the Kremlin and the White House coordinated the parameters for START-III and
discussed the new rules for military activities in Europe under the framework of the Euro-Atlantic security
initiatives. The next period of Russian-American rapprochement peaked on April 8, 2010, when START-III was
signed in Prague. The relationship went on to follow the traditional pattern. The parties still demonstrated
convergence. But contradictions in the core (strategic) area became an increasingly regular occurrence. That is why
now, in mid 2011 the “reset” is going through a difficult time. But this fact is no indicator of inefficiency of either
Russian or American diplomacy. Put simply, the tasks assigned two years ago have been completed. The problem is
that Moscow and Washington have failed to develop their relations beyond the strategic sphere, which is a cause for
concern.
U.S.-Russia cooperation does not significantly impact relations
John, Logson, Editor, Jaes, Millar, Editor, 2001, “U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Human Space Flight Assessing
the Impacts”
http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/assets/docs/usrussia.pdf
Another participant was not sanguine about the transformational character of space cooperation:
"Like MinAtom, RKA is a force of the past. Most of its leaders commenced careers in the Soviet
period. Its programs are dominated by older scientists. . . . Joint Russian-American space efforts
must break free of these Soviet era carry-overs in administration and political justification for the
space program. They must focus on changing the old Soviet culture of doing research, selecting
topics, and giving promotions. I believe we must actively seek out mechanisms to change the
culture of doing business or science in all areas of Russian-American exchanges-legal,
educational, scientific." To do this, "One of our goals should be not only to keep individuals
from turning to weapons proliferation to support themselves, but also to provide younger
individual scientists the kind of research autonomy and discretion their American counterparts
enjoy. . . . Should NASA continue to cooperate with RKA, it should continue to insist that
younger scientists be included and granted decision-making powers as members of U. S.-Russian
teams. Joint programs must ensure funding for beginning specialists to overcome the generation
gap that has developed between those older scientists and the young persons who will fill the
agency's positions in the coming years." To this, another participant added, "Young people still
see the value of space- from a realist perspective, space is a way to integrate with the western
world." Another participant agreed that much change was still needed: "On issues of engineers
and technologies, I am much less sanguine. I am not convinced that, in fact, we have worked
wonders inside scientific and technical communities inside Russia.... There is a tremendous
bureaucratic and social inertia on the Russian side, particularly tendencies toward centralization.
I don't necessarily see any evidence that this has necessarily been overcome." Also, "it is unclear how propping up RKA-granted for peaceful
programs involving human space
flight-reduces Russian space military capabilities. U. S. funding and contracts must ensure the
creation of alternative domestic civilian sector employment opportunities for weapons
specialists, including RKA employees. I would add that much of the fear of brain drain was
orchestrated by Russian officials and scientists in search of western dollars in a time of economic
difficulty. This is clear in the statements of MinAtom and RKA officials alike. . . . Nunn-Lugar
and NASA funds cannot prevent Russian weapons specialists from seeking employment abroad.
That will happen in any event. Who knows how many have already gone abroad? And more will.
. . . Since we cannot prevent the flight of individuals, we must focus on seeking ways to deny the
spread of critical technologies throughout the globe. Providing a market for Russian technology
is therefore a much more effective way to fight unwanted technology transfer than is the fight
against brain drain.
40
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[Russian Relations]
[Oddo/Maycock]
AFF: RELATIONS LOW
U.S. support of Georgia causes tension between the U.S. and Russia
Anatol Lieven, former senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011, “U.S. – Russian
Relations and the Rise of China”,
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/us_russian_relations_and_the_rise_of_china
How Russia will fit into a world shaped by the rise of China and some degree of U.S.-Chinese rivalry is not at all
clear. What is clear is that Russia does not wish for an alliance with either country even if one were on offer. On the
one hand, hostility to the U.S. has become deeply ingrained in the Russian mass psyche, and has also to a
considerable extent been encouraged by the ruling system that has taken shape in Russia since Vladimir Putin's
accession to power in 1999. Much of U.S. policy from the mid-1990s to the Obama presidency was seen in Russia
as deeply hostile to Russian interests – and not always wrongly.8
The expansion of NATO, the encouragement of
revolutions against pro-Moscow regimes in the former Soviet Union, the construction of energy pipelines bypassing
Russia and the sponsorship of anti-Russian regional groupings were all rightly seen in Moscow as inspired in whole
or part by anti-Russian sentiments and calculations. The culmination of all this in Russian eyes was U.S. arming of
Georgia and encouragement of Georgian hopes of NATO membership, widely believed in Russia to have given the
Georgian government the green light to attack South Ossetia in August 2008, leading to the brief Georgian-Russian
war and an explosion of mutual hostility in the U.S. and Russian media. 9
August 2008 was what seems likely to
have been the high point of U.S. ambitions in the former Soviet Union and by the same token, the lowest point of
U.S.-Russian relations in the post-Cold War period. The most important fact about the U.S. role in the GeorgianRussian war is that it did not in fact intervene to help Georgia, and in consequence stood by while Georgia was
crushingly defeated. In view of what happened, it seems extremely unlikely that a future U.S. administration will
resume real pressure for Georgia's membership of NATO, even if European NATO members would agree to this,
which most assuredly won’t. The U.S. strategy of subordinating and/or marginalizing Russia not just on the world
stage (which was realistic enough and has to a considerable extent happened) but within Russia's own region came
to an end in 2008-2010 with the Georgian war and the global economic crisis. These events finished off at least for a
generation – and probably forever – the desire of European Union states for further eastward expansion. This
knocked away the greatest real incentive for countries to join the West. Given the continued corruption of Romania
and Bulgaria, the hostility of European populations to immigration, and perhaps most of all, deep opposition to
Turkey's membership, it is in my view highly unlikely that full membership of the EU will ever again be on the table
for Georgia, Ukraine and other states in the traditional Russian sphere of influence
Competition between U.S. and Russia for dominance as global powers decrease relations
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D in Russian and Eurasian studies, Stephen Blank, author, 2011, “Reset Regret: Russian “Sphere
of Privileged Interests” in Eurasia Undermines U.S. Foreign Policy”,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/07/Reset-Regret-Russian-Sphere-of-Privileged-Interests-in-EurasiaUndermines-US-Foreign-Policy
Russia also controls military bases and key military industrial facilities in Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Tajikistan,
and Kyrgyzstan. It has been trying to subvert the Georgian government and is using constant economic pressure to
take control of Belarus’s natural gas company and pipelines. Moscow’s policy remains to pressure the CIS countries
to turn their backs on Europe and preserve Russian leverage over its neighbors’ politics and economics.
Concurrently, despite official disclaimers to the contrary, Moscow assiduously attempted to expel the U.S. from
Central Asia even as the countries in the region assist the U.S. and NATO efforts in Afghanistan.
This adversarial view of the U.S., inherited from the Soviet past, helps Moscow ensure that the reset policy
effectively reduces U.S. influence in Eurasia and Eastern and Central Europe. U.S. gains from the reset policy are
limited to support in Afghanistan and the New START arms control treaty, both of which Russia would have
pursued without U.S. concessions regarding the CIS.
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[Oddo/Maycock]
AFF: RELATIONS LOW
Despite the United States and Russia’s attempts to come to a compromise on arms-control,
they have still failed.
Alexei Fenenko. Leading Research Fellow, Institute of International Security Studies of RAS, Russian Academy of
Sciences. June 2011. “The Cyclical Nature of Russian-American Relations”. Rianovosti.
http://en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20110621/164739508.html
The negotiations conducted over 8 - 9 June on anti-ballistic missile (ABM) issues as part of NATO-Russia Council
can not be called successful. The parties involved did not come to a compromise about the format for Russia’s
participation in the “European missile defense” project. This gave rise to a plethora of comments in the Russian and
American media about the end of the “reset policy”. Russian-American dialogue, of course, will continue. But no
one can deny that this is an alarming sign for Moscow-Washington relations. The “reset policy” crisis has been
discussed in the Russian and U.S. media for nearly a year. Both the Kremlin and the White House reported progress:
from START-III entering into force to expanded economic contacts. But after the Washington summit that brought
presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev together on 24 June 2010, there has been an increasingly dominant
sense that the “reset” process is, somehow, going very wrong. The U.S. refusal to compromise over its ABM
system, ongoing tensions over Iran, Libya and Georgia, Washington’s support for Japan in its territorial disputes
with Russia, the U.S. media’s infatuation with the “Khodorkovsky case” -- all these are symptoms of a deeper
problem.
Now, the situation is different. The preamble to START-III focuses on the balance between strategic offensive and
defensive weapons. Both parties, however, interpret this differently: the USA views it as an aspiration for the future,
whereas Russia sees in it the need to reach agreement on ABM. Over the past year, Moscow has offered the United
States two options for a potential compromise: either signing a special protocol to START-III or implementing the
“European missile defense” project. Washington’s refusal to compromise on missile defense casts doubt over the
idea that START-III (the main achievement of the two-year “reset policy”) stands any real chance of being
implemented. Moscow and Washington, of course, will try to reach a compromise on ABM. But the purpose of the
“reset policy,” i.e. building new partnerships and reviving relations between Russia and the United States, seems to
be fading. Russian-American relations appear to have reverted to the traditional type, with issues relating to arms
control comprising 80% of their agenda. Over the past two years the parties have failed to bring them to a new level.
American citizen caught helping Iran and Russia launch a satellite
Space.com, 2011, U.S. Space Entreneur Accused of Aiding Iran Satellite Launch
http://www.space.com/12083-american-accused-aiding-iran-rocket-launch.html
Nader Modanlo, who was born in Iran but came to the United States as a teenager, was indicted by a federal grand
jury on charges that he used his business and engineering contacts to secretly work out a deal with Russia to launch
the first Iranian Sina-1 satellite into orbit, according to the Associated Press. The Sina-1 satellite's launch was a
milestone that helped kick start Iran's young space program. The country launched its first satellite aboard an
Iranian-built rocket in 2009, and successfully repeated the feat by launching an observation satellite, called Rashad1, into orbit on June 15. In December 2001, Russia inked a deal with Iran to provide satellites, launch services and a
satellite control center. Modanlo's indictment states that he and several co-defendents founded a company called
Prospect Telecom in Switzerland that was used to funnel $10 million in compensation to Modanlo for his suspected
part in arranging the deal.
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[Russian Relations]
[Oddo/Maycock]
AFF: RELATIONS LOW
US development of Polish-based interceptors has heightened tensions to the highest level
since the Cold War
NY TIMES, author not given, September 27, 2007, “Russia issues warning on space-based weapons”
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/27/world/europe/27iht-russia.4.7662417.html
President George W. Bush signed an order in October 2006 tacitly asserting the right of the United States to space
weapons and opposing the development of treaties or other measures restricting them. Bush also had pushed an
ambitious program for space-based missile defense, and the Pentagon is working on missiles, ground lasers and
other technology to shoot down satellites. Popovkin said Russia would modernize components of its air and missile
defense systems. He said, in particular, that the military would build a new early warning radar near Armavir in
southern Russia's Krasnodar region to replace aging Soviet-built radars it currently shares with Ukraine.
Such radars are intended to detect the launch of an enemy's ballistic missiles. Popovkin also said that Russia in 2009
would start testing a new generation of satellites to spot missile launches. He said more than 60 military and dualpurpose satellites were currently in orbit. A number of top U.S-based physicists have concluded that the Bush
administration used inaccurate claims to reassure NATO allies about U.S. missile defense plans in Eastern Europe,
The Associated Press reported from Washington. They say the planned Polish-based interceptors and a radar system
in the Czech Republic could target and catch Russian missiles, thus threatening Russia's nuclear deterrent.
That view supports Russia's criticism of the system. Russia adamantly opposes the plan and the dispute has helped
escalate U.S.-Russian tensions to the highest point since the Cold War. The Pentagon agency overseeing the missile
program, the Missile Defense Agency, rejected the scientists' claims, saying their analyses were flawed. The United
States says the missile system is intended to counter a threat from Iran and could not take out Russian missiles.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has dismissed Russia's concerns as "ludicrous." But the six scientists said in
interviews that Russia's concerns were justified. "The claim by the Missile Defense Agency is not correct," said
Theodore Postol, a physicist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The scientists have not disputed another
argument used by U.S. officials that the 10 interceptors planned for Poland would be easily overwhelmed by
Russia's vast missile arsenal.
U.S. and Russian relations are weak.
Andrei P. Tsygankov, Professor San Francisco State University International Relations, 2009, “U.S. Russia
relations in the Post Western World, http://bss.sfsu.edu/tsygankov/Research/Articles.htm
Overall, cooperation between the two countries has been less than impressive. Although the nature of the current
post-Western world prescribes multilateral solutions, the U.S. has continued to make unilateral decisions, such as
bringing Georgia to NATO without addressing Russia’s concerns or encouraging Ukraine towards NATO
membership. It has armed narrowly-based militaristic regimes in Azerbaijan and Georgia. And it has sought to
control the Caspian Sea reserves and isolate Russia from the energy infrastructure in the region. President Barack
Obama has indicated his willingness to abandon his election rhetoric about a “resurgent Russia” and has proposed—
via Vice-President Joe Biden’s speech in Munich on February 10, 2009—to press the “reset button” on relations
with Moscow. The new administration has prioritized the stabilization of Afghanistan and expects the Kremlin’s
cooperation since terrorist camps and intense drug trafficking from the area create problems for Russia as well. In
addition to continuous counter-terrorist cooperation, the United States hopes to strengthen Russia’s support for
nuclear non-proliferation and to coordinate reactions to the global economic crisis. However, Russia remains
suspicious about U.S. intentions and policies as undermining Russian security interests. This suspicion has its roots
in the American support for the color revolutions, which that many in the Kremlin view as directed at Russia. Russia
feels humiliated by what it sees as lack of appreciation of its foreign policy interests, and it argues that it was Russia,
not America, that had to swallow the war in the Balkans, two rounds of NATO expansion, the U.S. withdrawal from
the ABM treaty, military presence in Central Asia, the invasion of Iraq, and now, plans to deploy elements of
nuclear missile defense in Eastern Europe. This has all served to complicate efforts at bilateral cooperation
43
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[Oddo/Maycock]
AFF: RELATIONS LOW
The United States and Russian differences in space could ultimately affect them on ground
as well.
Gregory Feifer. Moscow correspondant, author of The Great Gamble. 2009. “Tensions brew in U.S.-Russian
Space Partnership”. NPR. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103296402
Since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, cooperation in space has expanded. But there has been public
friction between NASA and the cash-strapped Russian space program in the past, chiefly over the Russians' practice
of taking on private customers — travelers willing to pay tens of millions of dollars to spend time at the space
station. The international space station was conceived as a technological showcase of what countries can do when
they work together. Orbital construction began in 1998, and the station is scheduled to continue operating until 2015
or beyond. "The American and Russian space programs do things differently, they have different cultures, and it's a
mistake to believe you can create one joint station in space successfully," said Vladimir Gubarev, a space expert
who was the Soviet spokesman for the joint Apollo-Soyuz mission in 1975. Gubarev says problems are exacerbated
by the international space station's fundamental problems. He says it's too complex and is not producing enough
scientific knowledge or technological advances to justify the tens of billions of dollars being spent on it.
"New components are being built, but no one can say exactly for what purpose. The international space station
symbolizes the fact that manned space exploration is currently at a dead end," Gubarev says. NASA's next
generation Constellation program calls for a new launch vehicle to be ready by 2014 with the goal of returning to the
moon no later than 2020. Until then, transportation to and from the space station will rely on the Russian Soyuz
vehicle.
Gubarev directs much of his criticism at Russia, which he says is mainly interested in squeezing as much money as
possible from outdated technology. The Soyuz launch vehicle is a 40-year-old design. He says that will leave the
Russian space program at a great disadvantage in the future.
The United States and Russia are having trouble on their joint space stations in space.
Gregory Feifer. Moscow correspondant, author of The Great Gamble. 2009. “Tensions brew in U.S.-Russian
Space Partnership”. NPR. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103296402
In the near future, the fate of America's manned space program rests, in part, at a massive, hangarlike building
outside Moscow. At the Star City complex — the Russian equivalent of NASA's Houston command center —
cosmonauts, astronauts and scientists from other countries train to work cooperatively in the international space
station program. After the U.S. space shuttle program is retired, scheduled to happen next year, the space station will
rely solely on Russia's Soyuz launch vehicle for transportation until the next generation of U.S. spacecraft is built.
But there are signs of tension among the U.S. and Russian space agencies, mirroring tensions in the broader Russian
relationship with the West. Just before he blasted off earlier this month, the space station's current commander,
Gennady Padalka, told a newspaper that squabbles over equipment and supplies are harming work on the station.He
said the Russian government started charging other astronauts for using Russian facilities in 2003. Now the Russians
eat their own food and the other astronauts eat theirs and use separate toilets, Padalka said. Russian space program
spokeswoman Marina Driga blames NASA. "It was NASA that started prohibiting Russian cosmonauts from going
onto American sections and banned others from eating their food. Before they all used to eat together like one happy
family," Driga said.
U.S. astronaut Michael Fincke denies there are problems in space but concedes that there are some differences that
officials on the ground need to resolve. "Once we're onboard, there's no politics," Finke said earlier this month after
returning from a six-month stint as the space station's commander. Fincke conceded that Russians have been barred
from using American exercise equipment. "The Americans definitely never said that the Russians could never use
our toilet, that's unfounded. And the Americans, of course, can use the Russian toilet — always — so that's not a
problem," he added.
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AFF: RELATIONS LOW
Russia and the United States have still failed to come to agreements or even try to
compromise a tactical nuclear weapons reduction, and missile defense abatement.
Alexei Fenenko. Leading Research Fellow, Institute of International Security Studies of RAS, Russian Academy of
Sciences. June 2011. “The Cyclical Nature of Russian-American Relations”. Rianovosti.
http://en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20110621/164739508.html
At first glance, the cyclical character of U.S.-Russian relations seems encouraging. Even taking this negative
scenario into consideration, Russia and the United States should enter a new rapprochement cycle in about 2016.
That is when they will need to have agreed on the decommissioning of their aging nuclear systems and overcome
this unnecessary hostility. However, the problem is that in the second half of the 2010s the potential for a
“rapprochement cycle” may well have been exhausted for the following reasons. First, Russia and the United States
have now reached critical ceilings in reducing strategic nuclear forces: up to 1,550 operational warheads deployed
by each side. A further ceiling reduction may result in a possible strike to disarm the strategic forces of either party.
With the development of missile defense systems and precision weapons accelerating, Moscow is unlikely to agree
to develop a new, more fundamental, START-IV. Second, over the past twenty years, Russia and the United States
have upgraded their strategic nuclear forces much more slowly than they did in the 1970s and 1980s. The potential
to decommission these nuclear systems will be far less than it was pre-2009. If it is to maintain the current groupings
of strategic nuclear forces, Russia will be forced to extend the operating life of its nuclear weapons. Presumably, the
United States, in turn, will not agree to compromise on missile defense without substantial concessions from
Moscow.
Third, the parties are not ready to begin a dialogue on tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) reduction. For Russia, this
functions as compensation for NATO’s superiority in conventional forces. For the United States it is a mechanism
by which they preserve their nuclear presence in Europe, especially in Germany. Theoretically, Russia could
exchange the partial reduction of tactical nuclear weapons for the involvement of Britain and France in the INF
Treaty (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty) and thus get guarantees for the non-development of Britain’s
nuclear capability. But the experience of 2010 proved that Washington is unlikely to be able to convince London
and Paris to join these Russian-American agreements.
Fourth, Russia and the USA have ever fewer compromise opportunities on missile defense issues. Washington has
allocated vast resources for this project, and American business gets big military orders. Americans do not yet know
what major concessions Moscow should make in exchange for an agreement on limiting anti-missile systems.
Russia, in turn, is not prepared to reduce the strategic potential for the sake of attractive promises about partnership
on ABM issues. In this sense, the failure of June’s missile defense talks is a greater cause for anxiety than any of the
previous obstacles encountered. Strategic relations between Russia and the United States are dwindling. In the
sphere of arms control both Moscow and Washington will go through a really difficult period in the second half of
the 2010s. Will it be possible to expand the agenda of the Russian-American dialogue before that starts?
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[Oddo/Maycock]
AFF: RELATIONS LOW
Russian nuclear aid to Iran raises uncertainty on the status of US-Russo relations
FOX News, August 14 2010, “Russia's Nuclear Help to Iran Stirs Questions About Its 'Improved' Relations With
U.S.”, accessed online at:
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/08/14/russias-nuclear-help-iran-stirs-questions-improved-relations/
Russia's announcement that it will help Iran get nuclear fuel is raising questions about what President Obama calls
the "better-than- ever" relationship between Russia and the U.S. after the two former Cold War adversaries recently
signed a nuclear reduction treaty. Obama also recently declared his Russian counterpart, Dmitri Medvedev, would
help the U.S. "secure strong, tough sanctions on Iran." But Moscow announced Friday it will start loading fuel into
Iran's first and only nuclear power plant next Saturday, giving Tehran a boost as it struggles with international
sanctions and highlighting differences between Moscow and Washington over pressuring the Islamic Republic to
give up activities that could be used to make nuclear arms. Uranium fuel shipped by Russia will be loaded into the
Bushehr reactor on August 21, beginning a process that will last about a month and end with the reactor sending
electricity to Iranian cities, Russian and Iranian officials said Friday. While the UN nuclear watchdog and U.S.
officials say the Bushehr reactor is not a proliferation risk, Russia's decision to supply the fuel calls into question
why Iran is enriching uranium in the first place.
"It quite clearly I think underscores that Iran does not need its own enrichment capability if its intentions as it states
are for a peaceful program," White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said.
If Russia carries out its plan, it will end years of foot-dragging on Bushehr. While Moscow signed a $1 billion
contract to build the plant in 1995, its completion has been put off for years.
Moscow has cited technical reasons for the delays. But Bushehr has also been an ideal way to gain leverage with
both Tehran and Washington. Delaying the project has given Russia continued influence with Tehran in international
attempts to have it stop uranium enrichment -- a program Iran says it needs to make fuel for an envisaged reactor
network but which also can be used to create fissile warhead material. The delays also have served to placate the
U.S., which opposes rewarding Iran while it continues to defy the U.N. Security Council with its nuclear activities.
After Russia said in March that Bushehr would be launched this year, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham
Clinton said that until Iran reassures the world it is not trying to build a nuclear weapon, "it would be premature to
go ahead with any project at this time." Formally, the U.S. has no problem with Bushehr. Although at first opposed
to Russian participation in the project, Washington and its allies agreed to remove any reference to it in the first set
of Security Council sanctions passed in 2006 in exchange for Moscow's support for those penalties. Three
subsequent sanctions resolutions also have no mention of Bushehr.
Still, the U.S. sees the Russian move as a false signal to Tehran as Washington strives to isolate Iran politically and
economically to force it to compromise on enrichment. In Washington, State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley
said Bushehr "does not represent a proliferation risk. ... However, Bushehr underscores that Iran does not need its
own indigenous enrichment capability. The fact that Russia is providing fuel is the very model the international
community has offered Iran." Russia, in turn, argues that the Bushehr project is essential for persuading Iran to
cooperate with the U.N. nuclear watchdog and fulfill its obligations under international nuclear nonproliferation
agreements.
Crowley added: "Our views on the Bushehr project should not be confused with the world's fundamental concerns
with Iran's overall nuclear intentions, particularly its pursuit of uranium enrichment, and Iran's willful violation of its
international obligations." Russian officials did not say why they had decided to move ahead with loading fuel into
the Bushehr plant now. But the move could have been triggered in part by Moscow's desire show the Iranians it can
act independently from Washington after its decision to support the fourth set of U.N. sanctions in June and its
continued refusal to ship surface-to-air missile systems that it agreed to provide under a 2007 contract to sell the S300s. The sophisticated S-300 anti-aircraft missiles would significantly boost Iran's ability to defend against
airstrikes. Israel and the United States have strongly objected to the deal. Russia has walked a fine line on Iran for
years. One of six world powers leading international efforts to ensure Iran does not develop a nuclear weapon, it has
strongly criticized the U.S. and the European Union for following up with separate sanctions after the latest U.N.
penalties -- which Moscow supported -- were passed.
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AT: TERRORISM IMPACT
Relations don’t solve terrorism- mutual distrust
Jenkins ‘ 9, SR ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE RAND CORPORATION, [BRIAN MICHAEL,
“HOW RUSSIA CAN AND CAN’T HELP OBAMA”, FOREIGN POLICY, AUG 26]
With U.S. President Barack Obama eager to cooperate with Russia on matters of mutual interest, expectations must
remain limited. The Marxist terrorists of the 1970s and 1980s are ancient history. Russia does not have superior intelligence on al
Qaeda or the jihadi movement. Although U.S. analysts no longer see Moscow's hand behind today's terrorist groups, it is difficult to
envision a close working relationship between the CIA and the KGB's Russian successors. Suspicions are mutual
and run deep. Despite the two countries' shared concerns about jihadi terrorism, Russian troops are not about to
return to Afghanistan to fight alongside NATO and U.S. forces. Passive logistics support is the most that can be
expected. And U.S. willingness to assist Russia's often-brutal counterterrorist operations in the Caucasus is
constrained by human rights concerns.
New airship commissioned to help fight terrorism checks the impact
Space.com, No Author Given, 2010, U.S. Army Orders Huge Airship to Aid Combat Missions
http://www.space.com/8615-army-orders-huge-airship-aid-combat-missions.html
The United States Army has ordered a huge hybrid airship longer than a football field to watch over battlefields in
Afghanistan by the end of 2011, according to the airship's builder Northrop Grumman Corporation. The company
has received a $517 million Army contract to build up to three of the huge military airships, called the Long
Endurance Multi-Intelligence Vehicles (LEMV). Such airships would serve as surveillance stations at 20,000 feet
(6,096 meters) above sea level and could stay on watch for as long as three weeks at a time. A LEMV would also
have the capability to carry a 2,500-pound (1,113 kg) payload, and still zip along at 92 mph (148 kph) if necessary.
The 302-foot (92-meter) airship would typically have a cruising speed of just 34 mph (54.7 kph).
Nuclear proliferation has and will continue deter major wars
Todd, Sechser, Assistant Professor, Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics, University of Virginia,
2009.
The idea that the United States should aggressively pursue nuclear nonproliferation rests in part on a widespread
belief that the spread of nuclear weapons would destabilize international relations. But this pessimistic view
confronts one incontrovertible fact: nuclear weapons proliferated to thirteen states during the six decades since the
dawn of the nuclear age, yet the world has not witnessed a single preventive or preemptive nuclear war, accidental
nuclear attack, or instance of nuclear terrorism. Motivated by this striking observation, scholars known as
“proliferation optimists” have suggested that nuclear proliferation may, in fact, exert a stabilizing force on
international politics. They argue that nuclear states new and old will be highly motivated to avoid taking actions
that might risk nuclear conflict. The core of the optimists’ position is that the cost of a nuclear war would be so
grave that even the world’s most risk-prone leaders will find themselves reluctant to risk fighting one. As one
prominent optimist, Kenneth N. Waltz, has argued, nuclear states quickly recognize that engaging in aggressive or
risky behavior that could prompt nuclear retaliation is “obvious folly” (Sagan and Waltz 2003, 154). Because a
nuclear conflict could place a state’s very survival at risk, national leaders have powerful incentives to manage their
arsenals with care and caution. Moreover, according to this view, even a few nuclear weapons constitute such a
powerful deterrent to aggression that they obviate the need for high levels of spending on conventional arms.
According to the optimists, then, the spread of nuclear weapons is likely to deter large-scale wars, restrain
conventional-arms races, and produce greater international stability.
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[Oddo/Maycock]
AT: PROLIFERATION IMPACT
Nuclear proliferation good
Justin, Pollard, College of Letters and Science, Department of Economics, University of California at Berkeley,
2009, http://elsa.berkeley.edu/econ/ugrad/theses/justin_pollard_thesis.pdf.
It seems counterintuitive to think that the spread of nuclear weapons could make the world a safer place, doesnít it?
Indeed, it appears painfully logical at first glance to think that a world of ubiquitous nuclear armament is a more
dangerous and unstable one. Certainly, a weapon of the nuclear magnitude has the potential to destroy millions of
lives. Thus, it seems that each newly born nuclear warhead increases the potential for destruction. Further, the
spread of these weapons across countries may increase the chances, however finite, of nuclear war, contributing to
an ever more dangerous environment (Waltz, 1981). However, there is another story that lives in parallel to this one.
Imagine a situation in which engaging in a dispute involved risking the possibility of such unbearable destruction
that a participant would never enter that dispute in the first place. This explanation may be an equally convincing
story when trying to describe the consequences of nuclear proliferation. The spread of these weapons could, in fact,
could make the expected cost of conventional war so high (due to the potential for a nuclear strike) that no country
would be willing to risk its consequences. If this logic is valid, the spread of nuclear arms could actually contribute
to a more peaceful world (Waltz, 1981).
Russia's proliferation of nuclear weapons complicates US-Russo relations
Henry Soloski, June 11 2003, Speech presented before the House Committee on Science, Subcommittee on Space
and Aeronautics “US-Russian Cooperation in Space: Its Tensions with nonproliferation”
In fact, two of Russia's most important incentives to proliferate have nothing at all to do with earning a profit. The
first of these is the foreign political access and influence Russia gains when it sells militarily useful space
technology to others. It isn't just the few hundreds of millions of dollars a year in sales in dangerous technologies
that keeps Moscow cooperating with Iran and China; it's also the leverage it affords Russia with them on a host of
other diplomatic, trade, and security issues. Second, for cultural and political reasons, Russia is anxious to maintain
its outmoded military-related industries - including its oversized space and missile sector. Because this infrastructure
is still too large ever to be either profitable or fully employed supplying legitimate demand, efforts to maintain it
continue to drive Russia toward risky exports in the mistaken belief that cornering this illegitimate market might
keep it from having to further downsize its space and missile sector.
These proliferation motivations are important: As long as they are in play, U.S.-Russian space cooperation and our
efforts to curb dangerous missile proliferation will be at odds.
Inadequate funding for the Russian space industry puts pressure on the companies to sell
military technologies to nations who use them to proliferate
Henry Soloski, June 11 2003, Speech presented before the House Committee on Science, Subcommittee on Space
and Aeronautics “US-Russian Cooperation in Space: Its Tensions with nonproliferation”
Finally, there is a tension between the lack of domestic military and civilian call for Russian space related goods and
services and U.S.-Russian space transfers, which tend to keep Russia's space infrastructure larger than legitimate
demand can support. U.S. and European cooperative space efforts and commerce with Russia are too modest to keep
all of Russia's oversized space and missile industry fully employed. But they are not small enough to force Russia to
make the painful political decisions to further downsize their industry so it will not be so prone to proliferate. In the
U.S., whatever surplus of space-related capabilities we have is maintained with the federal funding of space related
projects. Russian government funding of its space industry, however, is much smaller. As such, there is constant
pressure on many of its space enterprises to sell militarily useful technology to foreign customers who might use or
sell this technology to proliferate. Until Russia's space industry is downsized to accord with legitimate private and
domestic military demand, continued U.S. space cooperation and commerce with Moscow at current or higher levels
is doomed to encourage at least as much Russian missile and space proliferation as it might prevent.
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AT: PROLIFERATION IMPACT
The United States has nonproliferation policies that eliminate risk of war
Gawdat Bahgat, director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Indiana University, 2006, “Nuclear
Proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran”, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.15283585.2006.00235.x/full
The United States has long played a special role in influencing nuclear behavior both bilaterally and collectively.
Given the nation's history as the first nuclear power and its current status as the world's only superpower, the United
States has a significant impact on nonproliferation policy. Historically, U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy has
focused on the demand side. American security guarantees to allies such as Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South
Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey have reduced their incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. Besides these security
assurances, close bilateral relations have restrained other allies such as Egypt from pursuing the nuclear weapon
option. Finally, the United States had recently used its economic and diplomatic leverage to “persuade” potential
proliferators such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Libya to dismantle their nuclear weapon programs. In 1991
the United States led an international coalition that militarily ruined Iraq's nuclear ambition and infrastructure.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, particularly since the early 2000s, the United States' nonproliferation policy has
focused more on the supply side (denying “rogue states” access to nuclear materials.) In pursuing this goal, the Bush
administration has been willing to apply coercive diplomacy and even military force as instruments of
nonproliferation policy. This strategy is outlined in two official documents—The National Security Strategy of the
United States of America, published in September 2002, and National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction, published in December 2002. The thrust of the new strategy is that the new adversaries (rogue states
and terrorists) are different from the old one (Soviet Union). The old strategy (deterrence) succeeded in containing
military threats from the Soviet Union, but it will not be effective in dealing with the new enemies. These new
enemies need to be eliminated and denied access to WMD. To sum up, the growing nonproliferation literature and
the experience of several nations suggest that leaders initiate nuclear weapons programs to face perceived threats to
core national interests and to acquire prestige and political leverage. In order to restrain nuclear proliferation several
strategies should be applied. These strategies focus on domestic changes, the utilization of the international
nonproliferation regime, and an active and flexible U.S. policy. The thrust of these strategies is to reduce the
attractiveness of NW and increase the costs and dangers of acquiring them. Thus, leaders will come to the
conclusion that their countries will be better off without NW. This theoretical framework aside, it is important to
emphasize that each nuclear proliferation case is unique. Individual leaders make nuclear choices under specific
domestic, regional, and international conditions. In the following sections the Iranian case will be examined.
US’s New Fighter jets spark suspicion across the globe
Jeremy Hsu, Space.com contributor, 2011, Is a New Space Weapon Race Heating Up?
http://www.space.com/8342-space-weapon-race-heating.html
A U.S. Air Force space plane and a failed hypersonic glider tested by the Pentagon represent the latest space
missions to raise concerns about weapons in space. But while their exact purpose remains murky, they join a host of
new space technology tests that could eventually bring the battlefield into space. The U.S. military could even be
using the cloak of mystery to deliberately bamboozle and confuse rival militaries, according to John Pike, a military
and security analyst who runs GlobalSecurity.org. He suggested that the X-37B and HTV-2 projects could represent
the tip of a space weapons program hidden within the Pentagon's secret "black budget," or they might be nothing
more than smoke and mirrors.
New Military Airplane Shows the Dual use of Technology Originally Developed For Space
Jeremy Hsu, Space.com Staff Writer, 2011, Air Force Sees Hypersonic Weapons and Spaceships in the Future
http://www.space.com/8617-air-force-sees-hypersonic-weapons-spaceships-future.html
A recent United States Air Force scramjet test has hinted at a future where hypersonic vehicles streak through the
sky at many times the speed of sound around the world, and perhaps even open up access to space. The experimental
X-51A Waverider used a rocket booster and an air-breathing scramjet to reach a speed of Mach 5 and achieve the
longest hypersonic flight ever powered by such an engine on May 26. That technology might not only deliver cargo
quickly to different parts of the globe, but could also transform the space industry and spawn true space planes that
take off and land from the same runway. The wealth of possibilities offered by aerospace vehicles that can ride their
own shockwaves likely explains why the project has drawn support from the Pentagon's
Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA), NASA, and the U.S. Navy.
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US Military Shows Shady Interest In Space Inventions
Stephen Clark, Spaceflight Now, 2011, More Secret X-37B Space Plane Missions Expected, U.S. Military Says
http://www.space.com/11104-secret-x37b-space-plane-future-missions.html
The U.S. Air Force and Boeing anticipate more missions of the X-37B space plane to finish testing the craft's flight
characteristics and carry top secret experiments into orbit, but there is no firm timetable for additional launches of
the robotic mini-space shuttle, according to military officials. Boeing's Phantom Works division built two X-37
vehicles for the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, a unit managed from the Pentagon that develops shadowy and
fast-track programs for the military. [Photos: Air Force Launches 2nd Secret X-37B Mission] The second X-37B,
also called the Orbital Test Vehicle, launched several hundred miles above Earth Saturday (March 5) on an Atlas 5
rocket from Cape Canaveral, Fla. It will stay into orbit for up to 270 days, according to Air Force officials. But
almost everything the unmanned space plane does while in orbit is classified. All of the research objectives are also
guarded by the military.
The Test Fire of Missiles Creates Fear
Tariq Malik, Space.com Managing Editor, 2010, Air Force Launches Suborbital Ballistic Missile In
Weapons Test http://www.space.com/9142-air-force-launches-suborbital-ballistic-missile-weaponstest.html
The Minuteman 3 missile launched from California's Vandenberg Air Force Base, sending a single reentry test vehicle into suborbital space on a flight that soared some 5,300 miles (8,530 km) across the
Pacific Ocean. The test vehicle hit a pre-determined target about 200 miles (322 km) southwest of Guam,
the Air Force said in a statement. Minuteman 3 intercontinental ballistic missiles have a range of more
than 6,000 miles (9,656 km) and can travel at speeds of up to Mach 23 (15,000 mph or 24,000 kph) and
reach heights of up to 700 miles (1,120 km) above Earth. The weapons can reach altitudes higher than
the International Space Station, which orbits Earth at an altitude of about 220 miles (354 km), when they
hit the peak of their flight trajectories.
Recent spy satellite launch shows distrust
Space.com, Author Not Given, 2011, Air Force to Launch New tactical Military Satellite Wednesday
http://www.space.com/12094-nasa-rocket-launch-military-satellite-preview-ors-1.html
The United States Air Force is planning to launch a new tactical reconnaissance satellite this evening (June 28), to
help deliver fast, accurate information to warfighters on the ground. The new satellite's SYERS-2 is the Air Force's
most advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance sensor, according to the Goodrich Corporation, which
built it and integrated it into the satellite. The sensor provides high-resolution imagery day and night, and it can peer
through haze and light fog. The satellite will beam information gathered by the modified SYERS-2 sensor down to
Earth, where analysts will take a look and send relevant data along to the military's Central Command for nearly
real-time use by warfighters.
Recent spy plane mystery mission creates question Leonardo David, Space.com’s Insider
Columnist, 2010, Air Force Launches Secretive X-37B Space Plane on Mystery Mission
http://www.space.com/8275-air-force-launches-secretive-37b-space-plane-mystery-mission.htmlThe United States
Air Force's secretive X-37B robotic space plane blasted off from Florida late Thursday on a mystery mission
shrouded in secrecy for the U.S. military. The unmanned military Orbital Test Vehicle 1 (OTV-1) ? also known as
the X-37B ? lifted off at 7:52 p.m. EDT (2352 GMT) atop an Atlas 5 rocket on a mission that is expected to take
months testing new spacecraft technologies. Given the X-37B?s secretive duties, some analysts contend that the
mission is provocative, perhaps fanning the flames for war in space. The Air Force has already ordered a second X37B, presumably the Orbital Test Vehicle 2, which is slated to launch in 2011. But that mission, and any new flights
of this first vehicle, hinge on the performance during orbital and landing maneuvers. if these technologies on the
vehicle prove to be as good as we currently estimate, it will make our access to space more responsive, perhaps
cheaper, and push us in the vector of being able to react to warfighter needs more quickly.
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New US weapon may seem as a threat to other nations
Jeremy Hsu, Space.com, 2010, Airborne Laser Goes Off-Target Due to Software Bug
http://www.space.com/9193-airborne-laser-target-due-software-bug.html
The Airborne Laser was originally designed as an operational system that could shoot down missiles during their
boost phase, but has since served as merely a technology development platform. Two kilowatt-class solid state
lasers housed in the nose turret of the Boeing 747 help track the missile target, and also correct for atmospheric
disturbances by using an adaptive optics system. A main megawatt-class, high energy laser then seeks to destroy the
target.
US military is developing space nanomissiles
Turner Brinton, Space News Staff Writer, 2010, U.S. Army Wants Nanomissiles to Launch Small Satellites
http://www.space.com/8914-army-nanomissiles-launch-small-satellites.html
The U.S. Army's desire to deploy swarms of tiny satellites for various tactical missions is one of the reasons it began
development two years ago of what would be the United States' smallest orbital launch vehicle, designed to put
payloads of about 20 kilograms into space, government and industry officials said. Standing just a little taller than a
basketball hoop, the rocket's modularity could make it useful not only as a launch vehicle but potentially a missile
defense target, sounding rocket and hypersonic test vehicle as well, John London, SMDC's manager for nanosatellite
technology programs, said. It will also be a good way to make use of aging tactical solid-rocket motors that would
otherwise be decommissioned, London said in a recent interview.
U.S. developing a space weapon with a potential for mass destruction
Bill Christensen, No Job Given, 2008, DARPA Works to Perfect Self-Forging, High-Velocity “Spears”
http://www.space.com/5292-darpa-works-perfect-forging-high-velocity-spears.html
In his 1955 novel Earthlight, science fiction author Arthur C. Clarke thought of an incredible super weapon that
used giant electromagnets to shoot a stream of molten metal at lightning speed. Now, the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) wants one for America's military. They are calling it MAHEM, which stands
for Magneto Hydrodynamic Explosive Munition. The intent is to create a device that creates a powerful enough
electromagnetic field to propel streams of molten metal at enemy armor. If it works, the device will be a big
improvement on a technology that got its start in World War II — the self-forging penetrator. Self-forging
penetrators, as they are currently used, result from a conventional chemical explosion directed against a speciallyshaped metal liner. When the device is set off, the blast causes the metal liner to achieve a new shape, suitable for
penetrating deep into even moderately armored vehicles, and driven forward at a high velocity. The technology
dates back to WWII. This kind of weapon can be highly effective (it is currently being used against troops in Iraq)
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AFF: WEAPONIZATION INEVITABLE
Space weaponization inevitable
Michael, Krepon, Krepon is the author or editor of thirteen books, and more than 350 articles. Prior to cofounding Stimson, he worked at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the US Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency during the Carter administration, and in the US House of Representatives, assisting
Congressman Norm Dicks, and Christopher, Clary, Christopher Clary is a country director for South Asian
affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He previously served as a research associate in the Department of
National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, where he worked extensively on studies examining the
1999 Kargil conflict and the 2001–2002 India-Pakistan military standoff. He received a BA from Wichita State
University and an MA from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 2003,
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/spacebook.pdf.
Is the weaponization of space inevitable? If other states are bound and determined to develop, test, and deploy
antisatellite (ASAT) weapons, or weapons in space that can attack objects on earth, why should the United States
exercise forbearance? Indeed, a commission headed by the soon-to-beappointed Secretary of Defense, Donald H.
Rumsfeld, argued precisely this case in January 2001. The congressionally mandated Commission to Assess United
States National Security Space Management and Organization concluded that space warfare was “a virtual
certainty.” This report concluded that the lessons of history demonstrated that “every medium—air, land, and sea—
has seen conflict. Reality indicates that space will be no different.” In order to avoid a “Space Pearl Harbor,” this
report called for the United States to develop“superior” capabilities for “power projection in, from, and through
space” in order to “negate the hostile use of space against U.S. interests.”
The simplest inevitability argument is that warfare and armaments are intrinsically uncontrollable because people
are warlike and states ultimately will do whatever they believe to be in their self-interest. In short, weapons and
warfare abhor a vacuum, and will spread wherever humanity goes. In some cases, adherence to this belief is based
upon skepticism about, or even deep visceral revulsion for, negotiated arms control.
The premise that states are selfish rational actors in an anarchic world actually predicts little about what their
specific policies will be in the absence of additional information or assumptions. In fact, warfare and states’
preparations for war are often limited by a wide variety of rational considerations, most of which have little to do
with formal arms control negotiations. Deploying space weapons would involve a variety of potential political costs
and benefits, both domestic and international, and is far from unreasonable to think that states might shy away from
such a course even if it promised to increase their absolute military capabilities, depending on the complete set of
incentives and disincentives facing them. As the space weapons debate itself proves, the norm of space as an
unweaponized sanctuary that has evolved during the past forty-five years is far from politically insignificant.
Of course, the more important a military innovation appears to be to a state’s security, the more likely it is to be
adopted, even if the price for doing so is fairly high, while it is relatively easy to give up military opportunities of
limited value. For example, the longstanding success of the multilateral 1957 treaty prohibiting military bases in
Antarctica, often cited as an example of an effective sanctuary regime, would be more impressive if the signatory
powers had strong incentives to establish bases on that continent. Yet even so it flies in the face of the idea that
weaponization will follow wherever people go; the argument that space weapons in particular will have military
utility too great to resist is a different proposition from the contention that weapons always spread everywhere, and
will be later in this essay.
A variety of weapons have fallen into disrepute over the last century, While they have not yet disappeared,
chemical and biological weapons have been shunned by all but renegade states. Anti-personnel land mines are
following in their wake. Many states that could easily have developed nuclear weapons have opted not to do so, in
some cases in spite of apparently very good military reasons to go nuclear. Perhaps most strikingly of all, even
among space weapons advocates one does not find voices arguing that the placement of nuclear weapons in orbit is
inevitable based on the rule that weapons always spread. The fact that this has not happened is due to many factors
other than the Outer Space Treaty’s prohibition on such weaponization, but if some weapons do not necessarily
follow wherever people go, the idea that a law of human nature requires that others will do so should not be taken
very seriously.
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The US must weaponize space in order to protect satellites
Karl P. Mueller, 27 March 2002, “Is the Weaponization of Space Inevitable?”, International Studies Association
Annual Convention
The third inevitability argument holds that rapidly growing American commercial investment in and economic
dependence on space technology will make attacking U.S. satellites very attractive to enemy states, and that the
United States will need to build space weapons in order to defend them. American industry, commerce, and civil
society more generally do indeed depend heavily and increasingly on space systems for communications,
navigation, weather prediction, and many other functions. From this reality it seems just a short leap to the
conclusion that what is important to us must be an attractive target for our enemies, and another easy step to the
implication that averting this danger will require the active defense of satellites in orbit. However, it is not clear that
attacking U.S. space assets would actually appear to be worthwhile for an enemy seeking ways to hurt the United
States, or that protecting them would require weapons in space.
It is important to consider why an enemy might want to attack U.S. commercial satellites. The most obvious
reason would be simply to hurt the United States or, more likely, to coerce it to change its behavior in order to avoid
further punishment—in other words, for terrorist purposes, broadly defined. The second would be to damage or
disrupt the U.S. economy in order to gain a power advantage over it, most likely during a war or other protracted
conflict, although at the operational level such economic warfare would look very similar to terrorist or coercive
attacks against economically valuable targets.
In the abstract, it is clear why an enemy seeking to harm or to intimidate the United Sates might want to attack
important satellites, potentially causing considerable disruption of the services it provides, destroying expensive
pieces of American infrastructure, and possibly even causing significant damage to the U.S. economy. Although
major acts of state-sponsored terrorism directed against the United States have been relatively infrequent, such a
coercive strategy is certainly possible. However, an enemy that wanted to achieve such a result against the United
States could do so far more easily by attacking something other than satellites in orbit, and unlike satellites, most of
these targets can be attacked without first developing or acquiring specialized weapons for one particular target set.
This is even more true when considering non-state terrorist organizations, which are unlikely to be even remotely as
capable of attacking satellites as they are of striking a wide range of terrestrial economic targets.
It is likely that the greatest improvements in the security of valuable U.S. space assets will be achieved by
making the satellites less vulnerable to attack and, especially, making them less valuable. Hardening important
satellites could make attacking them more difficult, while satellite miniaturization is making it increasingly possible
to eliminate existing vulnerabilities altogether by making satellite systems more distributed and redundant, with
more smaller satellites doing the same jobs as fewer large, expensive ones. As this shift continues, there will be
fewer and fewer opportunities for attacks on a single satellite, or even several, to cause the sort of widespread
disruption that has occasionally occurred in the past due to mechanical failures of critical satellites. In short, it is
both desirable and likely that communications and other satellites will gradually become more like the U.S.
interstate highway system: economically vital to the nation, but hardly worth the trouble of attacking because its
resilience and redundancy means that none of its individual components is critical.
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