AMERICAN SUPPORT TO CAMBODIAN
POL POT
A QUEST FOR AMERICAN SECURITY?
Eva van der Bijll
3494918
E.c.Vanderbijll@students.uu.nl
Onderzoeksseminar III
Universiteit Utrecht
Supervisor: Ariel Sanchez Meertens
3/02/2014
Word count: 9747
TABLE OF CONTENT
Introduction
3
1. A Bipolar context
1.1 Introduction to the concept of polarity
1.2 Cambodia as a loss of the zero-sum game
1.3 Bipolarity in the Cambodian question
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7
8
8
2. The increase in capabilities as a reaction to the Vietnamese invasion
2.1 Introduction to the concept of capability
2.2 Reactions to the Vietnamese invasion
2.2.1 American reaction
2.2.2 Chinese reaction
2.2.3 Reactions of Western European countries
2.2.4 Reactions of ASEAN countries
2.3 The increase of capabilities
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9
9
9
10
11
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3. American national interests
3.1 Introduction to the concept of national interest
3.2 President Carter and the Cambodian question
3.2.1 The normalization of Sino-American relations
3.2.2 Chinese and American disagreement
3.2.3 Cambodian resistance movements
3.2.4 The support of Pol Pot
3.3 President Reagan and the Cambodian question
3.3.1 The Reagan Doctrine
3.3.2 The Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea 18
3.3.3 The end of the support
3.4 Strive for American national interests in the Cambodian question
13
13
14
14
14
15
16
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18
Conclusion
22
Bibliography
25
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19
INTRODUCTION
In 2006 the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (The Cambodia
Tribunal) was established by the Cambodian government in cooperation with the
United Nations. From 2006 onwards, the most senior and most responsible members
of the Cambodian Khmer Rouge party were tried. Cambodian citizens however were
quite sceptical about the expediency of the tribunal for two reasons. Firstly, would it
be unfit that prime minister Hun Sen -with his Khmer Rouge past- led the tribunals.
And secondly, was the fact that the Khmer Rouge leaders would only be tried for the
period of 1975-1979, also seen as negative. The United States therefore, would be
shielded from having to explain their support to Pol Pot after 1979 (The Economist:
2/11/2013). The United States namely, secretly supported the cruel regime of Pol
Pot from 1979 onwards. The reasons for this American support to Pol Pot, are the
main focus of this research.
***
After the 2nd World War the world system was quite clear. The United States and the
Soviet Union were the world leaders in the bipolar world. The Cold War had begun
and the systems of capitalism and communism ruled the world. One of the pillars in
the foreign affairs of the capitalistic United States during Cold War was the theory of
president Eisenhower: the Domino theory. The Domino theory, which dominated
America’s foreign policy during the Cold War (Divine 1981, Ninkovich 1994),
represented the thought that any country that would fall to communism, would
bring -as a domino stone- its neighbouring countries with it. In response to the
Domino Theory the strategy of containment was introduced, meant to stop the
spread of communism (Costigliola 1997:1310).
When France withdrew from colonial war in Vietnam, the Vietnamese communist
party of Ho Chi Minh grew out to be the biggest party of the country. As a result, the
United States started to take over the war. South Vietnam was supported by the
United States in order to start an uprising against the communist North Vietnam. The
Second Indochina War -or in other words, Vietnam War- was a fact. As North
Vietnams resistance became bigger, the scale of the war grew as well. Part of the
North Vietnamese resistance tactics was the Ho Chi Minh trail: a trail to supply the
soldiers on the front line. As the trail was repeatedly bombed by American soldiers,
the trail expended to Vietnams neighbouring countries Laos and Cambodia. As a
result, Laos and Cambodia were also bombed. This bombing of Cambodia, the
‘Cambodian Campaign’, conducted during mid-1970. The Cambodian Campaign does
not only mark the beginning of direct American involvement in Cambodia, it is also
argued by most historians to be one of the most salient reasons why, the Khmer
Rouge gained power in Cambodia in 1975 (Kiernan 2004, Becker 1986, Jones,
2004:166).
When Pol Pot and his communist party the Khmer Rouge overthrew the pro
American government of Lon Nol in 1975, he founded the government of Democratic
Kampuchea. A mass genocide was the result of the radical reign of Pol Pot, with an
estimated death toll of a quarter of the Cambodian population (Kiernan 2004:445).
Meanwhile, Pol Pot also changed the international relations with Vietnam,
particularly by calling for the restoration of old borders. During the French colonial
era, there had been made border adjustments. Some ethnical Vietnamese citizens
and some ethnical Cambodians lived ’on the wrong side of the border’, which
needed to be adjusted (Kiernan 2004:334). This was according to historian Marian
Kirsch Leighton, the origin of the Vietnamese-Cambodian conflict (1979:448).
From 1975 till 1977 the border conflicts were fought within Cambodian
territory, but in 1977 the conflict escalated. Multiple Khmer Rouge attacks on
Vietnamese soil resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Vietnamese civilians in the
border areas. Research shows that it was in the year of 1977 that Vietnam mobilized
the troops in order to take in lost land and to defend itself against Cambodian
attacks (Pribbenow 2006:465). This mobilization resulted in the Vietnamese invasion
of 1978, whereby the Khmer Rouge was overthrown in 1979. Pol Pot and the
remaining Khmer Rouge leaders fled to the jungle at the Thai-Cambodian border,
and a Vietnamese puppet regime under the leadership of the pro-Vietnamese
Cambodian Heng Samrin was established. The end of the Khmer Rouge era was a
fact. Although, not entirely: from the moment the Vietnamese puppet regime was
installed, the Western world kept supporting the former Cambodian government of
the Khmer Rouge. The puppet regime of the Vietnamese was not acknowledged by
other countries except the Soviet Bloc countries and India (Morris 1999:222).
Important to know in this daylight is that at the time of the Vietnamese invasion, and
even before that, there was international knowledge about the cruelty of the Khmer
Rouge administration. Even though there was little information seeping out of
Cambodia, in 1976 the first article about the Cambodian terror was published
(Thompson 2010:130). Time magazine described unbelievably brutal conditions
inside Cambodia in its article: ‘’Khmer Rouge: Rampant Terror’’ (19/04/1976:16). And
one year later two books were published about the genocidal regime. The
publication “Cambodia Year Zero” of the French author Francois Ponchaud and the
book “Murder of a gentle land: the untold story of communist genocide in
Cambodia” of American journalists John Barron and Anthony Pauls alarmed the
Western world about the genocide in Cambodia. According to diplomat Larry Clinton
Thompson, these works contributed to changing the myth that the Khmer Rouge
were benign agrarian reformers (Thompson 2010:131). Because of this publications
it was therefore known that the Vietnamese invasion made an end to the rule of the
genocidal Khmer Rouge.
***
In this thesis I seek to find an answer to the following research question: ‘Why did
the United States support the Khmer Rouge of Pol Pot after the Vietnamese invasion
of Cambodia, even while Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge had been responsible for a mass
genocide?’. I will research this question on the basis of the neo-realist -or structural
realist- theory.
The theory of the neo-realists was first outlined by Kenneth Waltz in his book
Theory of international Politics. In short, neo-realists argue that the primary concern
of states is to maintain their own security. Hereby it is assumed that every act of the
state, will be out of security means (Waltz 1979:200). After the Cold War, the
neo-realists approach became the prominent approach for the research of Cold War
history (Wohlforth 1994:101). Neo-realists hereby assume that the (foreign) policies
of states during Cold War, were inspired by the constant quest for security. In this
thesis it will be researched whether or not the American policy regarding the
Cambodian question, was also determined by security measures.
In order to strive for national security, neo-realists introduce the existence of six
prominent concepts: anarchy, structure, capability, distribution of power, polarity
and national interest. In the chapters of this thesis, each concept will be specified.
This will lead to the existence of three main chapters.
The first chapter will introduce the concepts of anarchy, structure and
polarity. The emphasis of the chapter will be on the concept of polarity. The sub
question raised in chapter one will be: In what way did the bipolar world provide
motives for the United States to condemn the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia?
In the second chapter, the first reactions of the international community to
the Vietnamese invasion are researched. The emphasis will be on whether or not
each country reacted according to the neo-realists concept of capability and the
distribution of these capabilities or, the distribution of power. The sub question
hereby will be: Did all countries of the international community react to the
Vietnamese invasion according to the principle of capabilities?
The third and more comprehensive chapter will discuss the concept of
national interest. Hereby I will research how the United States formed an ally with
China, which caused both countries to jointly support Pol Pot. The sub question will
be: In what way was the American policy regarding the Cambodian question
influenced by American national interests?
In the conclusion I will give an answer to my research question. As the
question is based on the theory of the neo-realists, the answer to my research
question will present whether or not the United States acted out of security
measures in the supporting of Pol Pot.
This research will contribute to the only partially known history of the aftermath of
the Cambodian period of the Khmer Rouge. Research shows us that little is known
about -and that little adequate scholarship is written on- the Khmer Rouge period
(Abspoel 2011:6). According to the Cambodia Peace Building Project in 2010, 76
percent of the Cambodian people that did not live under the Democratic Kampuchea
government rarely talks about the Khmer Rouge era, and 85 percent of these people,
would want to know more about it (Peacebuilding Data 2010).
The Cambodia Peace Building Project thus tells us that little is known about
the Khmer Rouge era itself. However, even less is written and known about
American interference in Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge era. Even worse,
according to historian Ben Kiernan, the Bush administration has ‘long reinstated
policies that opposed any tribunal of the Khmer Rouge people‘, so the American
support to the Khmer Rouge administration would be kept silent (2005:20). In 2006,
the Khmer Rouge Tribunal has finally been established, but still the American role in
the Cambodian question is silenced. This thesis therefore contributes to the need of
more scholarship about the American support to the Khmer Rouge.
This thesis also contributes to a few of the largest debates on American
foreign policy: Should the United States spread democracy? Should the United States
force democracy on other countries? Should the United States intervene when a
country is under a bad regime? How far should the United States go in the support of
other countries? These are all questions that this thesis triggers.
To research the knowledge about the American support to Pol Pot I will use in this
thesis academic and empirical sources. The academic sources are books and articles,
that will provide the context, the background information and the theory. The book
of Kenneth Waltz: Theory of International Politics, is of high importance for the
introduction of the theory of the neo-realists.
Next to the academic sources, I will use empirical sources. The empirical
sources will consist of documents of the history of American Foreign Relations. On
the website of the U.S. Department of State, all American Foreign Affairs documents
till 1980 are published. For this research I will use the documents of Volume XIII:
China 1977-1980, which contains 329 documents about the Sino-American alliance.
These documents contain presidential meetings, transcripts of telephone
conversations, memorandums of conversations and telegrams. In these documents I
hope to find clear motivations for the American support to Pol Pot under the
presidency of President Carter.
Since the documents are documented digitally till 1980, I can unfortunately
only use those documents to research the decision making of President Carter on the
matter (1977-1981). The decision making of the Reagan administration therefore,
will also be researched in academic sources. Here I will use the book of political
scientist Kenton Clymer, who has been to the American archives for his research
about the international relations between American and Cambodia.
CHAPTER ONE
A BIPOLAR CONTEXT
In this chapter the concept of bipolarity will be introduced. After that, the bipolarity
will be researched in the context of the Cambodian question. In this light the
following sub question will be aked: In what way did the bipolar world provide
motives for the United States to condemn the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia?
1.1. Introduction to the concept of polarity
As two of the principles of the world system, neo-realist Kenneth Waltz describes in
his book Theory of International politics the concepts of anarchy and structure. Both
concepts are intertwined as the one cannot exist without the other. The structure of
the state system is according to neo-realists, anarchic. Anarchy refers to the absence
of a world government (Waltz 1979:88). Within this anarchy conflicts are
unavoidable and states try to secure themselves from the anarchy by a self-help
system. This means that states increase their economic and military power in order
to align themselves with stronger powers rather than weaker powers, since there is
a constant feeling of insecurity amongst states (McKinnon 2007).
As a characteristic of this anarchic world, Waltz describes that there is a
certain form of polarity that determines the world structure. The three forms of
polarity -unipolarity multipolarity and bipolarity- are determined by the distribution
of capabilities (Waltz 1979:61) -which will be further explained in the 2nd chapter of
this thesis. Unipolarity occurs when there is one state is the system that is superior
over others. Some argue that the world we live in now is an unipolar world, in which
the United States is superior (Ikenberry 2002:46, Jervis 2006:6). We talk about
multipolarity when there are more than two states that posses equal amounts of
relative power, much like during the first half of the 20th century. Bipolarity exists
when two states posses equal amount of relative power, as the situation during Cold
War. Since this research comprises the Cold War era, the focus of this chapter will be
on the bipolar system.
In a bipolar world, the two great powers are driven by competition. If the one party
grows in geographical, economical or military strength, the other party’s main
concern, is to grow in strength as well, in order to counter the other (Waltz 2000:13).
The main thought hereby is that international politics are based on a zero-sum game.
This means that the gain of the one superpower, is exactly the same as the loss of
the other. As each party in a bipolar world wants to be the stronger one, each party
is designated to form allies with weaker states. In this competitive world, both
parties fear of losing allies to the other party (Leftwich 1993:605). It is therefore that
in a bipolar world the two superpowers provide almost all security for their blocks
(Waltz 2000:18). This does not make it surprising that each superpower wants to
form the biggest coalition. Bipolarity therefore, extends the geographic scope of
both powers’ concern (Waltz 1979:171). Anything that happens anywhere is
potentially of concern to both of them (Waltz 1979:171). In a bipolar situation
therefore, the two great powers tend to overreact to certain events (Waltz 2000:13).
1.2. Cambodia as a loss of the zero-sum game
In the Cambodian question, the situation of bipolarity is of high importance. During
Cold War, the bipolar world structure was divided in a Western capitalist bloc -the
United States-, and an eastern communist bloc, the Soviet Union. When Vietnam -an
ally of the Soviet bloc- invaded Cambodia, this was considered by the United States
as a geographical expansion of the communistic Soviet Bloc (Black & Koser 1993:40).
Cambodia was namely an ally of China, which on its part was an ally of the United
States. The Vietnamese overthrown of Cambodia was a gain for the Soviet Bloc, and
therefore a loss for the American Bloc. Within this zero-sum game, the United States
feared to lose more allies to the Soviet Bloc. As part of the Domino Theory, there
was the assumption that if Cambodia would become part of the Soviet Bloc, the
neighbouring countries would become communist as well.
According to one of the principles of bipolarity, the United States had to react
in order to reach the same power level as the Soviet Union, and in order to secure
neighbouring countries of Cambodia that were allies of the United States. The United
States were indeed strongly against the invasion and they condemned the invasion
openly (Foreign Relations of the United States: Document 199). From the moment of
the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia it was important for the United States to
counter the Soviet expansion, and to work closely together with American allies on
the matter (Foreign Relations of the United States: Document 199). From the
moment of the Vietnamese invasion, the United States wanted its loss of the
zero-sum game back.
1.3 Bipolarity in the Cambodian question
In this chapter it is made clear that the United States reacted to the Vietnamese
invasion of Cambodia according to the principles of polarity of the neo-realists
approach. The United States saw the Vietnamese conquest of Cambodia as a loss in
the zero sum game of the bipolar world structure and the American reaction was to
get it back. The Vietnamese invasion was condemned, and allies in order to counter
this invasion were found.
CHAPTER TWO
THE INCREASE OF CAPABILITIES AS A REACTION TO THE VIETNAMESE INVASION
In chapter one it is presented how in an anarchistic world, there is a certain form of
polarity. In this chapter, another characteristic of anarchy is introduced: the concept
of capability. The sub question that will be raised in this chapter will be: Did all
countries of the international community react to the Vietnamese invasion according
to the principle of capabilities?
First the concept of capability will be introduced. After, the reactions of the
United States, China, Western Europe and the ASEAN countries are presented. In this
chapter the concept of capability will be linked to the reactions of the countries in
the international community and those reactions will tell us whether or not the
countries reacted according to the neo-realist concept of capabilities.
2.1. Introduction to the concept of capability
As in a anarchic world each state has to survive on its own, there is a permanent
quest for security (Waltz 1979:105). In order to find this security, states increase
their capabilities. Capabilities are thus instruments for states to ensure this survival.
Therefore, when the security levels of states change, and when states feel more
threatened, they increase their amount of capabilities. Amongst these capabilities
are: the size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability,
military strength, political stability and competence (Rittberger 2001:43). According
to Waltz a state can react to a security threat in two ways: it can either do internal
efforts, or external efforts. As internal efforts Waltz names the increase of economic
capability, military strength or the development of clever strategies. And as external
efforts he mentions how states can increase their capabilities by strengthen or
enlarge their alliances, or by reducing the foe's alliance (1979:118).
The amount of capabilities a state has compared to the capabilities of
another state, tells us something about the power a state has. The more capabilities
a state has, the more power it obtains in the world system. Power is estimated by
comparing the capabilities of a number of units (Waltz 1979:98). This distribution of
capabilities, influences the polarity of a world system.
In this chapter the first reactions of the international community after the
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia is presented. According to the neo-realist principle
of capability, each state should strive for a high rate of capabilities in order to
preserve security. In reality, this means that countries that were threatened by the
Vietnamese invasion, should have reacted with the increase of their capabilities.
According to Waltz this increase of capabilities can also occur in the form of an
alliance (1979:118). In this chapter it is tested whether or not, countries indeed
reacted according to the neo-realist principle of capability.
2.2 Reactions to the Vietnamese invasion
2.2.1 American reaction
As described in the first chapter, the United States reacted to the Vietnamese
invasion according to the bipolar principle. The Vietnamese invasion was directly
seen as a threat to the American Bloc. The invasion was therefore seen in a typical
Cold War-analysis: a communist expansion on behalf of the Soviet Union (Black &
Koser 1993:40). The stronger the Soviet Union would be, the more threat there
would be to the American security (Black and Koser 1993:40).
Next to a stronger Soviet communist enemy, the invasion had other
consequences for the United States. As there were Vietnamese soldiers in Cambodia
on Thai borders, the security of Thailand was also in danger. Were Thailand attacked,
the United States would be obliged by treaty to assist in Thailand’s defense. This
military threat to Thailand therefore, was an indirect military threat to the United
States, which could bring America into war in South East Asia again (Solarz 1986:28).
Although the United States was strongly against the Vietnamese invasion, president
Carter did not want to intervene by military measures. Instead of that, the United
States did ’everything they could to encourage other nations to reduce foreign aid to
Vietnam‘ (Foreign Relations of the United States: Document 205). America turned
against any cooperation with Vietnam and isolated the country from the outside
world (Morris 1999:221). The United States wanted to encourage the ASEAN
countries to stand united against Vietnam and it increased aid to Thailand. The
Soviet Union was also warned by the United States that it would damage the
relationship with America, if it would support Vietnam (Foreign Relations of the
United States: Document 205).
Next tot the increasing aid to Thailand, the United States also increased its
relationship with China. A month after the invasion, on the 26th of January, the
Chinese Deng Xiaoping visited Carter in Washington. In these meetings Carter and
Xiaoping agreed upon facing the Cambodian question together (Foreign Relations of
the United States: Document 199).
2.2.2 Chinese reaction
As mentioned earlier, when Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge gained power over
Cambodia in 1975, they were supported by China. Vietnam on the other hand, had
chosen the side of the Soviet Union and had turned its back on China at the end of
the sixties. It was therefore very likely, that China was strongly against the
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. The Chinese government ‘condemned the
invasion as a major step in pushing its own regional hegemony (ed; Vietnam’s
regional hegemony) and an important part of the Soviet drive for hegemony in Asia
and the Far East’ (Morris 1999:221).
Next to Chinese fear of the Soviet Union taking over Asia, historian J.S. Solarz
argues that Vietnamese success over Chinese friendly state Cambodia, would be
seen as a humiliation for China. It was therefore, according to Solarz, inevitable that
China would have to retaliate against Vietnam military (1999:221). And this point of
view is also described in a memorandum of a conversation, between American
president Carter and the secretary of state Vance, in which Vance states that China
would want to ‘recoup some of the losses caused by the public setback after the fall
of Pol Pot’(Foreign Relations of the United States: Document 199).
China thus was fearing Soviet expansion, and it was humiliated by the victory
of Vietnam. China therefore wanted to react military and it wanted to form closer
allies with the United States and the ASEAN countries.
2.2.3 Western European reactions
In Europe there was also a typical Cold War analysis of the Vietnamese invasion.
Immediately after the Vietnamese invasion, most Western European countries chose
the side of the United States: the Vietnamese invasion meant a communist
expansion on behalf of the Soviet Union and Vietnam therefore, needed to be
isolated. Almost all Western European countries cut off their food supplies to
Vietnam, except for France and Sweden (Morris 1991:221). It was clear that in this
Cold War context, Western European countries followed the opinion of the United
States and that they kept supporting the Western alliance.
2.2.4. The reactions of ASEAN countries
For the ASEAN countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Indonesia at
that time being) the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia meant an important shift in
the policy of the organization. For the first time since its foundation in 1967, the
member countries talked about -and worked together on- security matters (Acharya
2009:102). ASEAN’s response to the invasion consisted out of a few objectives; the
legitimacy of the Vietnamese puppet regime would be denied, Vietnam would be
isolated, Vietnamese encroachment in Thailand would be prevented and a peaceful
and neutral Cambodia would be ensured (Acharya 2009:102). In order to reach those
goals, cooperation with the United States, Western Europe and China was
requested.
The Vietnamese invasion was especially from importance for Thailand, as it
shared borders with Cambodia. Thailand feared its own hegemony as either the
Soviet Union, or China would be apparent in Indochina. As a result, Thailand
increased its military power on the Thai-Cambodian border (Theeravit 1982:571).
Thailand also sought an ally in the Chinese, creating a new Asian alliance (Brosseau &
Kin 1994:7.12).
2.3.The increase of capabilities
“In the quest for security, alliances have to be made”
(Waltz 1979:166)
According to the neo-realist theory, in the anarchic world there is a permanent quest
for security. Once a state feels this security is endangered, it will respond by the
increasing of its capabilities. One of the ways to increase the capabilities, is the
forming or reforming of alliances.
After the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the Western Bloc felt its security
was endangered. The United States reacted not only by enlarging its own alliance,
but also by reducing the Soviet alliance. America cut off all help to Vietnam and it
encouraged other countries to do so as well. The United States aimed to contain
Soviet influence and it wanted a strong set of alliance partners to do so (Haas
1991:44). In the search for these alliance partners, China was found. China felt
endangered by the growing Soviet threat and it felt humiliated by the Cambodian
loss of Vietnam. China therefore wanted to work together with the United States
and the ASEAN countries in order to oppress the Soviet ally strongly.
The same occurred for the ASEAN countries. For the first time since their
establishment they worked together on security matters, increasing their military
strength, economic capability and competence. Thailand also increased its military
expenditure. Overall the ASEAN countries wanted to work together on the
Cambodian question and it looked for stronger allies in order to reach their
objectives.
For Western Europe countries the situation did not change a lot. Western
Europe countries strengthened their alliance with the United States and most of the
countries listened to the American appeal of the isolation of Vietnam.
In this chapter it is clearly presented how the countries of the Western Bloc indeed
increased their capabilities after their security was endangered and after the other
bloc of the bipolar world had grown in strength. The Vietnamese invasion especially
highlights the cooperation of the United States and China, and the internal
cooperation of the ASEAN countries. As a result of these collaborations, the
competence of the Western Bloc was increased. The Vietnamese invasion led to
more cooperation in the international community which led to higher capabilities
and therefore, to more security (Snitwongse 1998:185).
CHAPTER THREE
AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS
In this third and final chapter, the decision making regarding to the American
support of Pol Pot will be presented. The sub question that will be discussed in this
chapter will be: In what way was the American policy regarding the Cambodian
question influenced by American national interests?
First, the concept of national interest will be introduced. After that, within
the foreign policy of President Carter (1977-1981) and the foreign policy of President
Reagan (1981-1989), it will be researched whether or not both administrations acted
in order to strive for American national interests in the Cambodian question.
3.1 Introduction to the principle of national interest
Neo-realists believe that the world structure is an anarchy, in which there is a
permanent quest for security. In order to maintain a high security level, states
increase their capabilities. The distribution of capabilities over the world system, tells
us which states are more powerful than others. The way these capabilities are
distributed, indicates the polarity of the system. In the first two chapters of this
thesis, these five concepts of neo-realism have been introduced. In this final chapter,
the emphasis will be on the last concept: the concept of national interest.
As the last principle of the world system, neo-realists argue that states at all
times pursue their own national interests. As in the anarchic world, states feel a
constant thread of security, states compete with one another to pursue their
national interests (Banlaoi 2007:11). In order to strive for the highest amount of
security, neo-realists assume that states will be egoistic with a self regarding policy.
Therefore every act of a state, will be according to the interests of the state. In this
light, neo-realists argue that states relate with other states, not because of altruism,
but because of the pursuance of national interest (Banlaoi 2007:11). In order to
pursue their own national interests, neo-realists argue that states act out of
rationality (Behravesh 2010).
In this chapter it is researched whether or not the American foreign policies of
presidents Carter and Reagan were inspired by their national interests. It will be
tested if both presidents acted out of rationality in the Cambodian question, with a
self regarding policy.
3.2. The Cambodian question under President Carter
"Human rights is the soul of our foreign policy, because human rights is the very soul
or our sense of nationhood"
Jimmy Carter, 1978
Those are the words of American president (1977-1981) Jimmy Carter on a White
House meeting for the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. The democratic Jimmy Carter added human rights as one of his pillars
to his foreign policy, and he was focused on ending American agreements with cruel
regimes. Something his predecessor Richard Nixon was not particularly averse off
(Stork & Wenger 1991:24, Girling 1975:323). With the words "We are now free of
that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who
joined us in that fear"1, Carter promised the American people in June 1977, to never
support a cruel regime again. In the Cambodian question however, he did not keep
this promise.
3.2.1 The normalizations of Sino-American relations
As presented in the introduction of this thesis, around 1976 the first stories about
the Cambodian genocide were presented in American newspapers. The first time the
situation was discussed in the White House however, was more than a year later, at
the end of 1977 (Clymer 2003:250). According to political scientist Kenton Clymer,
President Carter was not really willing to react to the Cambodian issue, but as human
rights were amongst the priorities of the Carter administration, he had to do
something (2003:251). The president therefore approved a resolution in trying to
work with other nations to bring an end to the violations of human rights in
Cambodia. But in fact, nothing happened (Clymer 2003:251).
What seemed of higher importance to the administration, was to keep close
ties with newly formed ally China. ‘One of the more interesting potential benefits of
having china as a friend’ namely, was the Chinese ability to ‘quietly sway some
third-world countries with whom it was very difficult to communicate‘ (Carter
1995:200). A strong alliance with China would thus create opportunities for the
United States in the contact with third-world countries, and therefore this alliance
had to be maintained. At the same time however, China supported the cruel regime
of Pol Pot. Interfering in Cambodia would therefore 'seriously complicate' the
normalizations with China (Clymer 2003:252). According to Clymer, the ‘priority to
the geopolitical advantages inherent in normalizing relations with China, belied the
Carter's administration's insistence that concern for human rights was the primary
determinant in its foreign policy'(2003:254). An alliance with China was considered
of higher importance than the human rights matter in Cambodia and therefore with
this decision, Carter thus served America's national interest above the humanitarian
matter in Cambodia.
3.2.2 Different reactions to the Cambodian question
On January 28, 1979, the Chinese vice president Deng Xiaoping was the first Chinese
leader since 1949 to visit the United States. From the 28th of January till the 5th of
February, president Carter and Xiaoping discussed international matters, with the
Vietnamese invasion as one of their priorities (Clymer 2003:255). One thing was clear
in the matter: the United States and China had become allies, and the Cambodian
situation would be faced together (Foreign Relations of the United States: Document
114). Still, the first actions of both countries were quite different. Both countries
condemned the invasion, but their first reactions were not alike. China wanted to
‘minimize Soviet influences in Asia and Vietnamese influences in South East Asia’,
and it assumed that an invasion at the border of Vietnam was the best solution
1
Jimmy Carter's Commencement Speech at Notre Dame University (June 1977).
(Foreign Relations of the United States: Document 207). ‘If we don’t disrupt with
strength, we will only create more trouble’, was the opinion of Xiaoping (Foreign
Relations of the United States: Document 207). Xiaoping stressed that Vietnam
wanted to include Thailand in Indochina and he mentioned hereby that if Thailand
would go, ‘the rest of ASEAN’ would ‘fall like dominoes’ (Foreign Relations of the
United States: Document 205). Therefore Xiaoping asked Carter for American
support in the invasion and for humanitarian aid to Thailand (Foreign Relations of
the United States: Document 205).
President Carter on the other hand disagreed with Xiaoping on the matter, as
he argued that isolating Vietnam was ‘a better punishment’ (Foreign Relations of the
United States: Document 207). Carter believed that the isolation of Vietnam would
convince Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia (Foreign Relations of the United
States: Document 205). Carter was firmly against American support in the Chinese
invasion as he stated that it was ‘difficult’ for the United States to ‘encourage
violence’ (Foreign Relations of the United States: Document 205). After the Vietnam
War namely, the Vietnam Syndrome had kicked in, which induced the negativity of
the American people about American military use.
The United States thus did not support the Chinese invasion by military means but it
did support its ally in a different way. For on the day of the invasion, Carter
repeatedly told the National Security Council that the ’Soviet backed Vietnamese
invasion of Cambodia gave the Chinese little choice but to invade Vietnam’ (Clymer
2003:257). Hereby the Chinese invasion of Vietnam would not be condemned by the
international community. The United States also gave China intelligence briefings
(Foreign Relations of the United States: Document 205). In this way, the United
States did support the Chinese invasion of Vietnam. The invasion however, did not
succeed since the Chinese troops were forced to withdraw after three weeks, having
suffered thousands of casualties (Morris 1991:221).
3.2.3 Cambodian resistance movements
Six months after the Chinese Deng Xiaoping visited the American president Carter in
Washington, diplomats Richard Holbrooke and Nicholas Platt visited Peking to meet
with the Chinese foreign minister Huang Hua. On the 6th of July 1979, they discussed
the next course of action on the Cambodian question. Between February and July
China and the United States had supported Thailand military in order to secure the
Thai-Cambodian border. Cambodian refugees were also protected and resettled
(Foreign Relations of the United States: Document 252). Still there was need for a
more realistic strategy to oppose the Vietnamese and Soviet threat. Especially the
threat to the security of the ASEAN countries was stressed (Foreign Relations of the
United States: Document 252).
According to the United States, there was actually only one realistic strategy:
a ‘resolute struggle’ should be carried on. And in order to carry on this struggle, a
united front of resistance movements had to be formatted (Foreign Relations of the
United States: Document 252). China and the United States discussed the existence
of three resistance movements (Tucker & Roberts 2011). The first two resistance
movements were the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) of Son Sann,
the leader of Cambodia between 1968-1969, and the National United Front of
Kampuchea (NUFK) of Sihanouk, the prince of Cambodia who ruled over Cambodia
before Son Sann. Together these two resistance movements formed the NCR: the
non-communist resistance. Support of the NCR was in the preference of the United
States but since both parties were not strong enough, the NCR offered little
resistance to the Vietnamese army in Cambodia (Foreign Relations of the United
States: Document 265). Because of this little resistance of the NCR, a third resistance
movement was discussed: the Khmer people under the leadership of Pol Pot.
The Carter Administration had long time been against any cooperation with the
government of Pol Pot, as multiple requests of China to support the government of
Democratic Kampuchea had been neglected (Foreign Relations of the United States:
Documents 265 & 313). Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge would have ‘a terrible
reputation’ and the support of such government would therefore make it difficult ‘to
deal with American public opinion and the Congress‘ (Foreign Relations of the United
States: Document 313). The United States could thus not support Pol Pot, and the
Carter administration did not want Pol Pot as the focus of the resistance movement
(Foreign Relations of the United States: Document 265).
However, the increasing power of the Vietnamese army in Cambodia became
a direct threat to the allies of the United States. It was important in this question to
Carter, to keep strong alliances with China and with the ASEAN countries. China and
the ASEAN countries were highly in favour of supporting Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge since
it was the only effective resistance force. There was thus no other option for
president Carter than to support them (Haas 1991:45). It was therefore in
September 1979, that Carter changed his view in the support of Pol Pot.
3.2.4 The support of Pol Pot
On the 23d of September 1979, the United States voted in favour of seating Pol Pot
in the United Nations (Oscala Star Banner, 24/09/1979). With 71 to 35 votes, the
‘sympathies of most people were on the side of Pol Pot’s Democratic Kampuchea’
(Foreign Relations of the United States: Document 278). In the International
Community the United States proclaimed that its vote on Democratic Kampuchea
was because it would be ‘illegitimate to accept a government imposed by a foreign
invasion‘ (Clymer 2004). The real reason however was clear; it was important to
resist the extension of Vietnamese and Soviet power, and the United States did not
want to distance itself from ASEAN and China, who also opposed Vietnam’s actions
in Cambodia (Clymer 2004). According to the then Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
they made the only decision ‘consistent with the overall national interests’ (1983).
The American vote in the favour of Pol Pot in the United Nations was
however not the only support the Khmer Rouge obtained. From October 1979 the
Khmer Rouge was also provided with humanitarian aid in the form of food (Foreign
Relations of the United States: Document 313). From October 1979 it was clear that
the administration had hardened its policy towards the Vietnamese in Cambodia.
Carter was less hesitant about the support to Pol Pot, and this support was therefore
increased (Pilger 1997). According to Clymer, part of the reason for this change was
the toughened approach towards the Soviet Union after the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan on the 31st of October 1979. After this invasion, Cambodia would be
seen more through a ‘geopolitical Cold War lens’ (2004).
Another reason for the hardened approach was the resignation of the
Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance in 1980. As long as Vance had been Secretary of
State, American policy had been ‘relatively cautious’ (Pilger 1997). With his
resignation however, Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski,
moreover determined the American foreign policy. Brzezinski was less cautious as he
was fully behind China's policy in Indochina, which included restoring the Khmer
Rouge to power (Clymer 2001).
Even though the Carter administration had thus long deferred its support towards
regime of Democratic Kampuchea, from the beginning of 1980 the Administration
supported the Khmer Rouge not only diplomatically, but also in humanitarian ways.
According to political scientist Michael Haas, this bizarre situation was based on
‘American rationality’ (1991:51). It was however clearly contradictory with Carters
professed devotion to human rights and the promise he had made to end the
support to cruel regimes.
3.3 The Cambodian question under President Reagan
“We must not break faith with those who are risking their lives... on every continent,
from Afghanistan to Nicaragua... to defy Soviet aggression and secure rights which
have been ours from birth. Support for freedom fighters is self-defense."
Ronald Reagan,
1985
Those are the words of Carter’s successor Ronald Reagan who became president of
the United States in 1981. From the moment he was in office, his strategy regarding
the Soviet Union was different from other administrations. Where earlier
administrations ‘sought to prevent the communist expansion, Reagan sought to cure
them’ (Scott 1996:2, emphasis added). Areas under Soviet domination would be
liberated, and herein non communist resistance movements would be supported.
From the moment he was in office, Reagan obtained a hard-line foreign policy.
Another important pillar in the foreign policy of the Reagan Administration
was the importance of a regional stability and a balance of power in South East Asia
(Scott 1996:84). In this way, American security and economical interests in the
region would be best served (Scott 1996:84). In order to establish a regional stability
and a balance of power in the region, the United States held close ties with the
ASEAN countries and China. Clymer hereby states that Reagan ‘sought to create an
international environment that would best benefit the United States, its allies and
the survival of its political values and economic system‘ (2004). In order to reach
those goals, conflicts in the area had to be avoided, and alliances had to be
maintained. This foreign policy was clearly noticeable in the Cambodian question.
3.3.1 The Reagan doctrine
In the opinion of political scientist James M. Scott, Cambodia was ‘either directly
ignored by the Reagan Administration, or seen through the lens of the broader
debate that encompassed Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union’ (1996:84). The same
says Clymer, who states that ‘the Ronald Reagan administration displayed almost no
concern for Cambodia and the people who lived there‘ (2004). The American policy
towards Cambodia was just part of the alliance with China and Thailand.
In order to counter the Soviet influence in South East Asia, Cambodia became
part of the Reagan doctrine: America would support anti-communist resistance
movements in order to cure communist expansion. In the first 18 months of the
administration, president Reagan set the same course regarding Cambodia as his
predecessor Carter. He thus provided the Cambodian resistance movements with
political and humanitarian aid. After these 18 months however, the administration
moved towards a different policy that included the provision of more non-lethal aid,
including vehicles, food, uniforms, aid to civilians and medicine (Scott 1996:87). In
this support, the United States worked closely together with ASEAN and China, who
were the ‘key providers of assistance to the resistance forces’ (Scott 1996:87).
Even though the intention of the Reagan Doctrine was the support of
non-communist resistance, in fact 80 percent of the Cambodian support went to the
communist Khmer Rouge (Scott 1996:90). However, this was not in the favour of
other American allies. According to the Australian journalist John Pilger, the
‘worldwide revulsion at Pol Pot’s crimes was growing‘ (2001), which led to the
abstinence of voting in the United Nations for the Cambodian seat by Western allies
including Australia (National Archives of Australia: ‘Remembering 1980 and 1981‘).
Only due to ‘frantic lobbying‘, did the United States, China and ASEAN ensure a
majority for the Democratic Kampuchea government in the United Nations in 1982
(Pilger 2001).
3.3.2 The Coalition of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK)
Most Western allies of the United States thus opposed the American support to Pol
Pot. In order to keep the alliances strong and in order to divert the international
attention of the Khmer Rouge however, the United States in cooperation with the
CIA planned something else (Fawthrop & Jarvis 2004:69). ‘In CIA terminology’, the
plan was called a ‘master illusion’ (Pilger 2001). Together with China and Thailand,
on the 22th of June 1982, the United States invented the Coalition of the
Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). According to historian Ben Kiernan it
was a fraud ‘for it was never a coalition, nor a government, nor was it democratic,
nor was it in Kampuchea‘ (1999). Different from the former resistance movement
was that prince Sihanouk now was appointed as head, but technically, nothing really
changed. The Khmer Rouge still dominated the two non-communist movements of
Sihanouk and Son Sann (Pilger 2001).
For the United States however the master illusion worked out perfectly. It
diverted attention from support to the Khmer Rouge and it suggested that the
American-Chinese and Thai coalition now only supported the non communist forces
(Fawthrop & Jarvis 2004:68). The CGDK kept the seat in the United Nations and it
was praised by the international community as being ’the authentic representatives
of Cambodia’, ‘heroic survivors of the Cambodian holocaust’ and ‘reasonably
democratic’ (Pilger 2001). In reality however, the non-communist groups made the
public face of Cambodian resistance, while the Khmer Rouge retained most military
power (Tucker & Roberts 2011).
From 1982 the Reagan Doctrine was extended and support to the CGDK was
increased. Between 1980 and 1985 the extend of the American support was 85
million dollar (Pilger 2001). And even though the United States still did not support
the GDCK directly by military means, indirectly they did. Thailand provided the
sanctuaries and supply bases, Singapore contributed arms, Malaysia provided
training, and Indonesia supplied clothing (Scott 1996:89). Indirectly however, the
United States increased its assistance to Thailand to compensate for Thai support for
the resistance. Between 1982 and 1986, Thailand received 372 million dollar of the
United States (Scott 1996:90).
Since the United States preferred a regional stability, the Reagan
Administration actually preferred a political settlement, or a negotiation, with
Vietnam. But the Reagan Administration was aware that this would not happen
easily. Sustaining the Khmer Rouge however, would provide military pressure in
order to let Vietnam step down (Scott 1996:92). Expansion of the Reagan Doctrine
was thus in order to improve the chances of a political settlement.
3.3.3. The end of the support
The first Vietnamese genuine interest in a political settlement was not shown until
1987, when Vietnam started with the withdrawal of its troops in Cambodia. This
however was only partially because of the pressure of the Cambodian Resistance
movement. The decision to withdraw was affected more by Soviet decisions to cut
down costs in Cambodia and to reduce aid to Vietnam. Financial reasons therefore
forced the Vietnamese to retreat (Tucker & Roberts 2011). Between 1989 and 1890,
all Vietnamese troops were called back.
The American involvement in Cambodia was stopped around the same time.
The Reagan Administration had assisted the Cambodian resistance movements till
the end of the office holding of Reagan. Even when the Vietnamese troops started
withdrawing, the Khmer Rouge was still supported. It was not till 1990, that it was
voted by the Congress that the newly installed Bush Administration was persuaded
to cut off all covert assistance to the CGDK.
3.3. Strive for American national interests in the Cambodian question
In this chapter the concept of national interests is discussed. Hereby it is presented
how in an anarchic world, there is a constant quest for security, since all states have
to survive on their own. In this quest for security, states try to fulfil their own
national interests. Hereby neo-realists assume that states act out of rationality.
This concept of national interests is researched in the light of the American Foreign
Policy regarding the Cambodian question. In this chapter it is presented how the
foreign policy of the United States, was shaped by their national interests.
From the onset of his office holding, president Carter announced that one of his
pillars in this foreign policy would be human rights. On the Cambodian question
however, he rejected this statement completely. When Vietnam invaded Cambodia
and freed Cambodia from the genocidal regime of Pol Pot, the Carter Administration
condemned the invasion. More important than the human rights matter, was the
alliance with China, who supported the overthrown government of Pol Pot.
Geopolitical advantages in an alliance with China and the ASEAN countries,
convinced Carter that the government of Pol Pot had to be supported. Not only
would support to the Khmer Rouge offer resistance to the Vietnamese army, it
would also improve the Sino-American relation.
In the decision making of the support of Pol Pot, president Carter clearly
followed his national interests. Even though he would violate his human rights
principal, the alliance with China and ASEAN and the geopolitical advantages it
would produce, were of higher importance to the administration. Especially when
the Secretary of State Cyrus Vance had resigned and the Foreign Policy was partly
determined by Brzezinski, the Cambodian conflict was seen though a ‘Cold-War lens’.
The same is noticeable in the Reagan Administration. President Reagan announced
from the onset of his office holding that he would cure Soviet expansion with the
support of non-communist resistance groups. This Reagan Doctrine was also applied
in the Cambodian question, where resistance groups got financial and other
non-lethal support of the United States. In reality however, 80% of the American
support went to the communist Khmer Rouge. Like Carter, Reagan saw the
importance of a close alliance with China and the ASEAN countries. Not only would
this alliance provide assistance in the Cambodian matter, it would also increase
regional security and American economical accessibility.
When Western alliances and American people were against the American
cooperation with the cruel Khmer Rouge, the Reagan administration founded the
Coalition of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea. With this master illusion,
the United States played the international community and they gave the impression
they were supporting a democratic resistance movement. This so called coalition
however, was clearly an act to follow their own national interests. The Khmer Rouge
was still the only strong resistance movement of Cambodia and its existence was
therefore crucial to the United States. The Khmer Rouge was the only resistance
movement that could provide military pressure on Vietnam.
In this chapter it is researched whether or not the foreign policy of the United States
regarding the Cambodian question was based on the American national interests.
Both the Carter and the Reagan administration show that they made rational
decisions in the supporting of Pol Pot, which eventually all led to the
accomplishment of American national interests. In this chapter it is thus presented
clearly how the neo-realists concept of national interest shaped the foreign policy of
the United States.
CONCLUSION
‘To save Cambodia, all you had to do was let Pol Pot die.. Pol Pot was dying and you
brought him back to life’
Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, 1989
2
With these words, prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, claimed in 1989 that the United
States made a big mistake in their support of the cruel regime of Pol Pot. After the
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the United States had assisted the Khmer Rouge
in the resistance against the Vietnamese army. Hereby the Khmer Rouge obtained
political, humanitarian and indirect military aid of the United States. It is argued that
it is because of this aid, that the Khmer Rouge survived. In this thesis I have
researched this support to Pol Pot. Hereby I have tried to find the answer to the
following research question:
‘Why did the United States support the Khmer Rouge of Pol Pot after the Vietnamese
invasion of Cambodia, even while Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge had been responsible for a
mass genocide?’
I have researched this question on the basis of the neo-realists approach. Hereby six
concepts of the neo-realists have been introduced: structure, anarchy, capabilities,
distribution of power, polarity and national interests. These concepts have been
linked to the American policy in the Cambodian question.
In the first chapter it is presented how the world structure of the world is an anarchy
in which there is a permanent quest for security. This world structure is defined by a
certain form of polarity. During Cold War, the structure was determined by a bipolar
world, which was divided in a Western capitalist bloc -the United States-, and an
Eastern communist bloc, the Soviet Union. According to the principles of bipolarity, if
one of the states in the bipolar world increases in power, the other should react in
order to reach that same level. Hereby neo-realists also assume that the two
superpowers together play in a zero-sum game: the gain of the one superpower, is
the direct loss of the other.
The concept of bipolarity has been linked to the American response to the
invasion of Cambodia. The Vietnamese invasion was seen by the United States as an
expansion of Soviet power, and as a loss in the zero-sum game. The United States
therefore reacted in order to win its loss back. America condemned the invasion, and
it improved the alliance with China and the ASEAN countries. The United States
therefore acted exactly as the neo-realists assume a country would react in a bipolar
world. America tried to increase its own power, and decrease the Soviet power.
That reactions to the Vietnamese invasion were according to the principles of the
neo-realists, is also presented in the second chapter of this thesis. Hereby the
concepts of capability and distribution of power have been introduced. In the quest
2
Spoken by the Prince of Cambodia, Norodom Sihanouk, in 1989. Presented in:
Fawthrop & Javis 2004:55.
for security, states strive to the have a high level of capabilities. Amongst these
capabilities are the size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic
capability, military strength, political stability and competence. Neo-realists assume
that when states feel threatened, they will increase their capabilities. This increase
of capabilities can also occur in the form of an alliance.
In the second chapter it is tested whether or not states in the international
community reacted to the Vietnamese invasion with an increase of their capabilities.
This is researched on the basis of the reactions of the United States, China, Western
Europe and the ASEAN countries. As discussed in chapter one, the United States
condemned the Vietnamese invasion as it was seen as an expansion of Soviet power.
In order to counter this expansion of power, the United States formed a strong
alliance with China and with the ASEAN countries. China and the ASEAN countries
therefore, reacted in the same way. Alliances were formed, and capabilities were
thus increased. Thailand also increased its capabilities by the increase of military
expenses. The Western European countries reacted the same way as their American
ally: they condemned the invasion and helped in the isolation of Vietnam. Overall, all
countries reacted to the invasion by the increase of their capabilities. Alliances were
formed, existing alliances were strengthened, and military expenses were increases.
In the final and more comprehensive chapter of this thesis, the last concept of
neo-realists is researched in the light of the Cambodian question: the concept of
national interests. Hereby it is presented how neo-realists argue that states have a
self regarding policy within their Foreign Policy. In order to strive for the highest
security level, states are egoistic and they urge to fulfil their own national interests.
On the basis of the policies of presidents Carter and Reagan, I have researched
whether or not the American policy towards Cambodia was influenced by American
national interests.
From the beginning of the Carter administration, Carter announced his
altruistic policy: by all means, he would fight for human rights. One year later
however, he completely abandoned this policy with the support of Pol Pot.
Geopolitical advantages of an alliance with China and the ASEAN countries were of a
higher importance. The same is noticeable in the policy of president Reagan. For
Reagan the alliances with China and ASEAN were also of high importance since it
would increase regional stability in Asia and economical accessibility for the United
States in Asia. Reagan applied the Reagan Doctrine in Cambodia, whereby he would
support non-communist resistance movements in order to counter the power of the
Soviet Union. In fact however, 80% of this support went to the communist Khmer
Rouge. Even when the Western alliances were against this support to Pol Pot, the
Reagan doctrine followed the American national interests by supporting the Khmer
Rouge secretly.
In this thesis it is represented clearly how the bipolar world structure of the Cold War
era made the United States condemn the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.
Cambodia was a loss of the zero-sum game and it had to be won back. The United
States reacted with an increase of their capabilities, as they formed alliances with
China and the ASEAN countries. The self-regarding policy of the United States was
clearly inspired by American national interests. Geo-political and economical
advantages of alliances with China and ASEAN were more important than human
rights. Geo-political and economical advantages were more important than the
security of the people of Cambodia. The American security was more important than
the Cambodian people.
In this thesis it is presented how the United States acted according to all the
principles of the concepts of the neo-realist approach, with only one goal: security.
So, why did the United States support the regime of Pol Pot? The United States
supported the regime of Pol Pot in order to strive for American national security.
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