Counterplans
===Cuba===
Press Release CP
Note
Solves perception based advantages…it’s a little shady so don’t keep this as you're a-strat.
1NC
Text: The United States federal government should
 Issue a press release that says simply: The President, in consultation with
Congress, and without conceding America's explicit commitment to
promoting democracy and protecting human rights, will begin to
reconsider our policy towards Cuba. To that end, the Administration will
be convening a Cuba Study Group to reevaluate U.S.-Cuban relations.
 Create a Cuba Study Group
First step to relations
Perez 10 (David A. – J.D. Yale Law; “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy
Recommendation for the U.S. State Department”; Harvard Latino Law Review; 2010; Lexis) IIN
The White House and State Department should issue a press release that says simply:¶ ¶ The President, in consultation with
Congress, and without conceding America's explicit commitment to promoting democracy and protecting human rights, will begin to
reconsider our policy towards Cuba. To that end, the Administration will be convening a Cuba Study Group to reevaluate U.S.-Cuban
relations.¶ ¶ This
first step is entirely consistent with Secretary of State Clinton's statement to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee during her confirmation hearing, where she promised to review
America's Cuba policy. What this first step lacks in specificity, it makes up in potential: we
would not be committing ourselves to anything but an open mind. From this point forward we can
begin to understand how we can best approach Cuba by creating a "Cuba Study Group" that
can analyze the current situation and begin collecting official and unofficial contacts from
within Cuba. These contacts may prove to be invaluable, since the U.S. government currently lacks serious high-level contacts
or relationships within the Cuban government. Ultimately the Cuba Study Group will seek to answer the key
question that will dominate that reconsideration phase: What next?¶ Cuban exiles and Cuban-Americans
should not dominate this group, although each would bring invaluable insights to the table. The group's membership should
include men and women across America who have experience in academia, agriculture,
business, diplomacy, law, medicine, policymaking, and religion. Each member can then draw upon their
respective expertise, and solicit ideas from their respective communities around the United States. This group can then help
facilitate an incremental dialogue between the U.S. and Cuba.
Economic Liberalization QPQ CP
1NC (Embargo QPQ)
Text: The United States federal government should remove the Cuban embargo
if and only if Cuba accepts a policy of economic liberalization.
Solves relations and  political reforms – empirics
Perez 10 (David A. – J.D. Yale Law; “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy
Recommendation for the U.S. State Department”; Harvard Latino Law Review; 2010; Lexis) IIN
The United States should recognize that economic change is a precursor to political change. To
that end, the Obama Administration should craft its Cuba policy to emphasize and encourage
economic liberalization, rather than focusing on political conditions.¶ (4A) Economic Liberalization
Precedes Political Liberalization¶ ¶ American policymakers should adopt another type of Copernican shift: instead of placing
political reforms (i.e., free elections) at the center of our Cuba policy, the U.S. should make
economic reforms the gravitational locus of our diplomatic efforts. This shift would not lose track
of or diminish the importance of political change, but would simply acknowledge that such political change
necessarily orbits economic change, and not the other way around. Put differently, changing our point of
view does not change our objectives - it only changes the means by which we pursue our objectives.¶ The notion of offering a quid
pro quo - easing
restrictions for genuine irreversible reform - has always been impossible
because of Fidel's stubborn personality. Once he is out of the picture permanently, there
would be no other leader who could maintain such rigidity in the face of genuine and
constructive engagement from Washington. Reform-oriented leaders will [*207] feel less
pressure to remain silent, while the government itself will feel more pressure from the
populace to address the growing concerns on the island. While Fidel Castro has always exuded confidence in
his leadership, in the immediate wake of his death the Cuban regime is sure to feel a tremendous
amount of insecurity, which, if handled properly and respectfully, could strengthen
Washington's political hand. n52 At that point, the best - indeed, the only - way to have leverage in Cuba, is for America
to engage the island directly. n53¶ However, Washington's policy for the last fifty years has focused almost exclusively on
the political situation (i.e., free and fair elections). This myopic approach has ignored the possibility of doing
an end-run around Castro's political recalcitrance by simply giving the Cuban people (and
government) an offer they can't refuse: economic success. As long as the political arena remains
the battlefield upon which Washington and Havana wage their ideological war, there will
always be stalemate . Transitions from other Cold War-era governments demonstrate that
economic liberalization helped facilitate political liberalization. In Poland, the labor unions
flourished before political parties were finally established after the fall of the Soviet Union;
n54 in Russia, mass privatization paved the way for moderate political freedoms; n55 in Vietnam,
the government started to embrace market-based reforms in the mid to late-1980s; n56 and finally, in China, an unmistakably
capitalist society has emerged, although elections have still not been held. n57 Cuba will be no different.
In early 2009, the
Cuban government approved the largest land distribution since the revolution when it handed
out 45,500 land grants to the private sector. n58¶ Another reason economic reforms are likely to precede political
reforms is that the population seems hungrier to see an economic respite after decades of
austerity. This may also be a result of their belief that the Cuban regime will try to maintain its
monopolistic grip on politics for as long as [*208] possible, even if it loosens its grip on the
economy. When Raul Castro began his version of a "listening tour" around the island he also initiated a
series of debates.¶ During one of these town hall meetings Ricardo Alarcon, the leader of the National Assembly as of April
2009, was barraged with questions that focused on the economy - specifically Cuba's dual-currency
system. n59 Although such intimate private-public participation has been rare on the
totalitarian island, once the window of opportunity was opened, a burst of activity flowed
through. Reloading the diplomatic cannon by encouraging economic reform, rather than
focusing on political reform, would represent a more dynamic approach to U.S.-Cuban
relations.
Conditioning liberalization on embargo solves
Perez 10 (David A. – J.D. Yale Law; “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy
Recommendation for the U.S. State Department”; Harvard Latino Law Review; 2010; Lexis) IIN
(4B) Washington's Policies Should Encourage Economic Liberalization¶ ¶ The importance of this argument
cannot be overstated. The fact that economic reforms will precede political reforms means at least two
things. First, given this ordering, any quid pro quo from Washington should provide due
credit to any economic liberalization that the island may implement, however piecemeal. For
example, when the Cuban government privatizes parcels of agricultural land, or when it allows
its tourist industry to engage in the dollar economy, or when it allows its taxi drivers to charge
their own rates, these reforms should be seen as the economic equivalent of allowing smallscale political pluralism. When economic reforms are implemented, they should be praised - not belittled - and followed by
positive reinforcement by Washington.¶ Second, since these economic changes will be prerequisites for any significant political
reforms on the island, Washington should focus its short-term diplomatic efforts on an open Cuban
market, rather than an open Cuban polity. This might mean easing or restructuring, though not
necessarily fully eliminating, restrictions on trade, travel, and remittances, in order to encourage more
private economic activity. In these ways, the U.S. can help awaken Cuba's nascent economic society, providing the
necessary impetus for political reform.
1NC (Financial Community QPQ)
Text: The United States federal government should grant Cuba membership
into the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-American
Development Bank if and only if Cuba accepts a policy of economic
liberalization.
Solves relations and  political reforms – empirics
Perez 10 (David A. – J.D. Yale Law; “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy
Recommendation for the U.S. State Department”; Harvard Latino Law Review; 2010; Lexis) IIN
The United States should recognize that economic change is a precursor to political change. To
that end, the Obama Administration should craft its Cuba policy to emphasize and encourage
economic liberalization, rather than focusing on political conditions.¶ (4A) Economic Liberalization
Precedes Political Liberalization¶ ¶ American policymakers should adopt another type of Copernican shift: instead of placing
political reforms (i.e., free elections) at the center of our Cuba policy, the U.S. should make
economic reforms the gravitational locus of our diplomatic efforts. This shift would not lose track
of or diminish the importance of political change, but would simply acknowledge that such political change
necessarily orbits economic change, and not the other way around. Put differently, changing our point of
view does not change our objectives - it only changes the means by which we pursue our objectives.¶ The notion of offering a quid
pro quo - easing
restrictions for genuine irreversible reform - has always been impossible
because of Fidel's stubborn personality. Once he is out of the picture permanently, there
would be no other leader who could maintain such rigidity in the face of genuine and
constructive engagement from Washington. Reform-oriented leaders will [*207] feel less
pressure to remain silent, while the government itself will feel more pressure from the
populace to address the growing concerns on the island. While Fidel Castro has always exuded confidence in
his leadership, in the immediate wake of his death the Cuban regime is sure to feel a tremendous
amount of insecurity, which, if handled properly and respectfully, could strengthen
Washington's political hand. n52 At that point, the best - indeed, the only - way to have leverage in Cuba, is for America
to engage the island directly. n53¶ However, Washington's policy for the last fifty years has focused almost exclusively on
the political situation (i.e., free and fair elections). This myopic approach has ignored the possibility of doing
an end-run around Castro's political recalcitrance by simply giving the Cuban people (and
government) an offer they can't refuse: economic success. As long as the political arena remains
the battlefield upon which Washington and Havana wage their ideological war, there will
always be stalemate . Transitions from other Cold War-era governments demonstrate that
economic liberalization helped facilitate political liberalization. In Poland, the labor unions
flourished before political parties were finally established after the fall of the Soviet Union;
n54 in Russia, mass privatization paved the way for moderate political freedoms; n55 in Vietnam,
the government started to embrace market-based reforms in the mid to late-1980s; n56 and finally, in China, an unmistakably
capitalist society has emerged, although elections have still not been held. n57 Cuba will be no different.
In early 2009, the
Cuban government approved the largest land distribution since the revolution when it handed
out 45,500 land grants to the private sector. n58¶ Another reason economic reforms are likely to precede political
reforms is that the population seems hungrier to see an economic respite after decades of
austerity. This may also be a result of their belief that the Cuban regime will try to maintain its
monopolistic grip on politics for as long as [*208] possible, even if it loosens its grip on the
economy. When Raul Castro began his version of a "listening tour" around the island he also initiated a
series of debates.¶ During one of these town hall meetings Ricardo Alarcon, the leader of the National Assembly as of April
2009, was barraged with questions that focused on the economy - specifically Cuba's dual-currency
system. n59 Although such intimate private-public participation has been rare on the
totalitarian island, once the window of opportunity was opened, a burst of activity flowed
through. Reloading the diplomatic cannon by encouraging economic reform, rather than
focusing on political reform, would represent a more dynamic approach to U.S.-Cuban
relations.
Conditioning liberalization on membership into international financial
community solves
Perez 10 (David A. – J.D. Yale Law; “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy
Recommendation for the U.S. State Department”; Harvard Latino Law Review; 2010; Lexis) IIN
Another method Washington can use to lure Cuba into economic reform is membership into the
international financial community. The World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the
Inter-American Development Bank each have rules for borrowing money and can encourage
liberalization in Cuba by making their respective funds available as a carrot to incentivize
liberalization. n60 These regional and global economic organizations have [*209] rules and procedures that are
technically independent of the U.S. Congress. By couching these reforms in terms of
obligations to transnational financial organizations, any economic progress can be insulated
from the anti-American rhetoric that would otherwise follow their painful implementation.
Ending the U.S. opposition to the reengagement of the international financial community with
Cuba would go a long way toward promoting economic liberalization. n61
2NC
---AT: Transition = slow
Transition will be slow but net beneficial. Immediate transition alienates the
population – China proves
Perez 10 (David A. – J.D. Yale Law; “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy
Recommendation for the U.S. State Department”; Harvard Latino Law Review; 2010; Lexis) IIN
(4C) The Economic Transition Will Be Slow¶ ¶ Policymakers in Washington must realize that Cubans will not wake up the day after
Fidel Castro dies and experience broad-based attitudinal changes. Therefore, while
economic reform is sure to
preface political reform, the Cuban government will have to move slowly on the former so as
not to alienate the population, which would truncate the latter. At first, a successor regime may think that
choosing between Castroism and economic liberalization is a Faustian choice: economic
doldrums with continuity versus economic revitalization with instability . Indeed, continuing
Castroism embraces the history and normative values attached to the Revolution, but would
forestall any economic recovery . On the other hand, liberalizing the economy by adopting market
reforms would promote economic growth, but could also alienate large segments of the
population still enamored by Castro's revolutionary zeal. For example, one possible market reform would be
to lay off the excess workforce that has cluttered the state-controlled enterprises and rendered them inefficient and virtually
useless. Embracing
deep cuts in the public employment might be efficient, but it certainly will
not be popular. For decades Cubans have enjoyed job security, universal education, and universal healthcare. If market
reforms are interpreted as a wholesale rejection of the normative and ideological underpinnings that have dominated Cuban
discourse for the last fifty years, they
will no doubt alienate influential ideologues in the Communist
Party, the military, the Ministry of the Interior, and many others in the general population. ¶
When a state takes control of the economy, it also takes responsibility for it when it performs poorly. A strong state could surely
implement these reforms and survive the ensuing backlash; but to do so would require deft political maneuvering, and a careful
patience to not try to change everything all at once. A
poorly managed state-led economic opening can
quickly become unmanageable, and create instability. Given these concerns, a slow and methodical
economic transition, rather than an overnight toppling of the [*210] state-sector, would be a
far more pragmatic approach for the Cuban government.¶ China and Vietnam have both introduced market
reforms that dwarf any that the Cuban regime has introduced so far. Given that China has been on the path of
liberalization for over thirty years yet the state still controls wide swaths of the economy, one
might expect Cuba's economic transformation to also move lethargically - especially at first. The
stronger the parallel with Asia becomes, the more methodical Cuba's opening will be. Expectations that assume a quick economic
turnaround should be correspondingly adjusted. Thus, the United States should recognize that the
Cuban government has
little choice but to move at a relatively glacial speed, and instead work assiduously to make
the economic transition as smooth as possible. To that end, it is absolutely crucial that our policies not be used as
a way to settle political grudges. For example, if America moves to regain the properties taken by the Cuban
government fifty years ago as a way to "encourage" market reforms, the entire effort will be
short-circuited before it takes off the ground.¶ Some will argue that focusing on market liberalization, while
putting political reforms to the side, endangers Cuba's long-term prospects for liberty and freedom. This is a valid concern.
Nevertheless, in
normative terms, market reforms will vastly improve the lives of the Cuban
people. The improved living conditions will give fringe groups with few resources the ability to
focus their own efforts on political reform from within. Improved economic conditions, if used
as a prerequisite to political reform, may also prevent a costly civil war during the inevitably
painful transition.¶
XO CP
Note
This would only work for teams that eased restrictions i.e. Amir and Kyle who substantially
reduce the embargo…
Solvency
XO solves – Clinton, Bush, and Obama prove
Propst 11 (Stephen F. – Partner Hogan Lovells US LLP; “Presidential Authority to Modify
Economic Sanctions Against Cuba” ; A legal analysis prepared at the request of the Cuba Study
Group and released in connection with a forum on U.S.-Cuba Relations at The Brookings
Institution, 15 February 2011; Hogan Lovells) IIN
Introduction¶ On January 14, 2011, President Obama announced measures to significantly loosen the U.S.
sanctions¶ against Cuba, including broad new authorizations for travel and non-family
remittances to support private economic¶ activity in Cuba. These changes were made without prior
Congressional approval and are only the latest in a string¶ of modifications to the Cuba sanctions that have been
implemented solely under the President’s executive authority.¶ Along with the political and policy debates over the President’s
actions, there will undoubtedly be some who question¶ whether the President had sufficient legal authority to make these changes.
This paper reviews the sources of the¶ President’s authority to modify the Cuba sanctions and concludes that executive authority is
broad enough to support¶ not only the changes announced to date, but also a range of additional measures to ease restrictions. 1¶ I.
Overview¶ Through a complex series of federal statutes, Congress has codified the comprehensive U.S. economic¶ sanctions
against Cuba and restricted
the President’s authority to suspend or terminate those sanctions until
a¶ “transition government” is in power in Cuba. Notwithstanding these statutory requirements, the President
maintains¶ broad authority and discretion to significantly ease specific provisions of the Cuba
sanctions regime in support of¶ particular U.S. foreign policy objectives recognized by
Congress, including the provision of humanitarian support for¶ the Cuban people and the
promotion of democratic reforms. In fact, since Congress codified of the Cuba sanctions¶ in 1996, Presidents
Clinton, Bush and Obama have each exercised this authority to ease the scope of restrictions¶
applicable to Cuba, without action or approval by Congress. This executive authority to modify the Cuba
sanctions is¶ grounded in Constitutional, statutory and regulatory provisions that empower the
President and the responsible¶ executive branch agencies to grant exceptions to the sanctions
through executive actions, regulations and licenses.¶ The authority is particularly broad in certain
areas, such as telecommunications-related transactions and¶ humanitarian donations, where
Congress has explicitly granted discretion to the President under existing statutes.
XO solves easing restrictions
Propst 11 (Stephen F. – Partner Hogan Lovells US LLP; “Presidential Authority to Modify
Economic Sanctions Against Cuba” ; A legal analysis prepared at the request of the Cuba Study
Group and released in connection with a forum on U.S.-Cuba Relations at The Brookings
Institution, 15 February 2011; Hogan Lovells) IIN
Consistent with the relevant statutory authorities and restrictions, as well as statutory statements of¶ U.S. policy objectives, the
President arguably has sufficient legal authority to make the following types of additional¶ changes to the
current U.S. sanctions against Cuba:¶ • Establishing “general licenses” for existing categories of travel to
Cuba that are currently authorized¶ only by specific licenses;¶ • Expanding existing categories of
authorized travel to include new travel provisions (along the same¶ lines as the new authorization announced
on January 14, 2011 for travel related to non-academic¶ clinics and workshops in Cuba);¶ • Revising
existing general and specific license provisions to ease or eliminate current limitations and¶ conditions
applicable to travel and remittances to Cuba;¶ • Establishing a new general license for the
provision of services to Cuba (along the same lines as the¶ March 2010 revision that authorized services to
facilitate Internet communications);¶ • Establishing a general license for entry into U.S. ports of
vessels engaged in trade with Cuba;¶ • Permitting payment for authorized transactions with
Cuba (except sales of agricultural commodities¶ or products) to be financed through letters of credit or other
financing arrangements issued,¶ confirmed or advised by U.S. financial institutions (but subject to
statutory restrictions on the¶ extension of credit for transactions involving “confiscated property”);¶ • Authorizing imports
of certain goods and services from Cuba;¶ • Modifying current export control regulations to
establish more favorable licensing policies for¶ additional categories of items that may be
exported under specific licenses;¶ • Establishing additional license exceptions for exports of
U.S.-origin goods to Cuba; and¶ • Expanding the availability of existing license exceptions to
cover additional categories of exports and¶ easing conditions and limitations on the use of
those exceptions.
XO solves all the following
Propst 11 (Stephen F. – Partner Hogan Lovells US LLP; “Presidential Authority to Modify
Economic Sanctions Against Cuba” ; A legal analysis prepared at the request of the Cuba Study
Group and released in connection with a forum on U.S.-Cuba Relations at The Brookings
Institution, 15 February 2011; Hogan Lovells) IIN
¶ III.
Statutory and Regulatory Support for Presidential Authority to Modify Cuba Sanctions¶ Notwithstanding this framework of
successive federal statutes mandating sanctions against Cuba, the¶ President
retains broad authority to
significantly modify and even ease specific provisions of the Cuba sanctions.¶ This conclusion is
supported by two separate reports prepared by the U.S. General Accounting Office (“GAO”),¶ following detailed reviews of the
statutory framework and regulatory actions taken by the executive branch since the¶ enactment of Helms-Burton in 1996.52
Specifically, the reports prepared at the behest of Congress in 1998 and in¶ 2009 concluded that (i) the President still maintains
“broad discretion” to make additional modifications to the Cuba¶ sanctions; and (ii) prior measures, implemented by the executive
branch that have had the effect of easing specific¶ restrictions of the Cuba sanctions, have been consistent with statutory mandates
and within the discretionary¶ authority of the President.53¶ The
statutory and regulatory provisions supporting
the President’s authority to modify the Cuba sanctions¶ include the following:¶ • Article II,
Section 2 of the United States Constitution, which vests broad powers in the President to¶ conduct the
foreign affairs of the United States.54¶ • Section 602(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act and
Section 5(b) of TWEA (under which the CACR was¶ established), which grant broad authority and discretion to the President
to establish and make¶ changes to embargoes established thereunder.55¶ • Paragraph 2 of
Proclamation 3447, which explicitly grants authority to the Secretary of Treasury to¶ make such exceptions by
license or otherwise to the prohibition on imports from Cuba as he¶ determines to be
consistent with the effective operation of the embargo.¶ • Paragraph 3 of Proclamation 3447,
which explicitly authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to¶ “continue, make, modify or revoke” exceptions to
the prohibition on all exports to Cuba.¶ • Section 515.201 of the CACR that was in effect in March 1996,
which prohibits dealings in property¶ in which Cuba or Cuban nationals have an interest, but explicitly references the
authority of the¶ Secretary of Treasury to establish exceptions to the prohibitions by means of
regulations, rulings,¶ instructions, licenses, or otherwise.56¶ • Section 515.533 of the CACR that
was in effect in March 1996, which provides a “general license”¶ authorizing exports to Cuba that have
been specifically licensed or otherwise authorized by the¶ Department of Commerce (but subject
to certain conditions on the financing of such export¶ transactions).57¶ • Section 515.801 of the CACR that was in effect
in March 1996, which sets forth the authority of the¶ Secretary of Treasury to grant general and specific licenses for
transactions otherwise prohibited¶ under the CACR.58¶ • Section 1703 of the CDA, which states the
U.S. Government’s policy of seeking a peaceful transition¶ to democracy and resumption of
economic growth in Cuba through the careful application of¶ sanctions directed at the Castro
government and support for the Cuban people.59¶ • Section 1705 of the CDA, which further
elaborates upon the policy of providing support for the Cuban¶ people through specific types
of authorized activities.60¶ • Sections 2 and 3 of Helms-Burton, which reaffirm the objective of
providing support for the Cuban¶ people.61¶ • Section 102(h) of Helms-Burton, which codified
the CACR as it existed in March 1996, including the¶ authority of the Secretary of Treasury to exercise licensing
authority.62¶ • Section 109(a) of Helms-Burton, which authorizes the President to “furnish assistance and
provide¶ other support for individuals and independent nongovernmental organizations to
support democracy¶ building efforts for Cuba.”63
===Mexico===
ITS CP
Note
This is for the Points of Entry aff --- make sure in CX you clarify that the aff only modernizes
border tech and express lanes… for, my understanding of the aff is that it only does that much.
The CP could also apply to any cross-border affs as long as you change the CP text!
Sorry for not writing the 1NC
Solvency
ITDS solves
Bochner et al. 2001 (Brian Bochner, Bill Stockton, Dock Burke Texas Transportation Institute
Texas A&M University System; "A prototype southern border facility to expedite NAFTA trucks
entering the United States." the Proceeding of the 80th Annual Meeting of the Transportation
Research Board, Paper. No. 01-0406; 2001; http://bordercross.tamu.edu/about/trb_paper_010406.pdf) IIN
¶ A factor favoring the use of technology at the border is that North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) truck traffic is dominated by large companies—those that have adopted relatively high
levels of technology adoption in the areas of communications, computers, and software. If
technologies can be selected that reduce border crossing time and costs, it is likely that the
large NAFTA trucking companies will adopt them.¶ This paper is based on a Texas Senate initiative (Senate Bill
913) to examine the possibility of expediting current port of entry processing of commercial vehicles
entering the United States of America (USA) from Mexico. The paper describes the basic prototype plan and
operational concept proposed for northbound commercial border inspection stations with automated processing. The prototype
would use the International
Trade Data System (ITDS) currently under development by the U.S.
federal inspection agencies. This database would use Intelligent Transportation Technologies
to link ITDS and the inspection process. This combination of a consolidated electronic database and appropriate
Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) technologies can significantly reduce border crossing delays by
most commercial vehicles without compromising the processes required by the federal and
state agencies responsible for interdiction and law enforcement. The paper suggests the desirability of binational links to improve system efficiency, and provides a basis for more effectively accommodating growth in traffic and the
adoption of new technologies to improve agency performance.
ITS solves efficiency and safety of border crossing
Crainic et al. 09 (Crainic T.G., Gendreau M., Potvin J.-Y. “Intelligent freight-transportation
systems: Assessment and the contribution of operations research”; (2009) Transportation
Research Part C: Emerging Technologies, 17 (6) , pp. 541-557;
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0968090X08000648) IIN
3. Commercial Vehicle Operations (CVO)¶ The Commercial Vehicle Operations (CVO) area of ITS has been defined as
“Advanced systems aimed at simplifying and automating freight and fleet management
operations at the institutional level”, Commercial Vehicle Information Systems and Networks (CVISN) programs
targeting, in particular, safety information exchanges, electronic credentials administration, and roadside electronic screening.¶
National or regional authorities, in collaboration with carriers and firms that propose the required technologies, usually initiate CVO
projects. The
goal is to increase the performance of the infrastructure (mostly highways) and
customs systems, simplify and automate government control-related freight and fleet
management operations, and, thus, enhance the efficiency of commercial vehicle activities
through seamless operations based on electronic vehicle and cargo identification, location and
tracking, pre-clearance and in-motion verifications. These systems rely heavily on vehicle or cargo positioning
systems (GPS or radio frequency networks), bi-directional communications (DSRC, radio, satellite, or wireless phone), and EDI. The
importance of CVO applications has been acknowledged quite early on in ITS history, and a significant number of CVO projects have
been undertaken or are currently under way.¶ Initial
deployment efforts of CVO technologies have been
organised around the so-called “corridors”. A corridor is typically organised around a major
highway, or a system of highways, that cross several regional or national jurisdictions. The
goal is to increase the fluidity of truck traffic and to offer seamless interstate or inter-nation
border crossings, while ensuring adequate levels of control and reporting relative to
regulations on safety, traffic, customs, and so on. Weight-in-motion scales, overweight detectors, EDI, automatic
vehicle (and cargo) identification and classification systems, vision technology (to read license plates), and variable message signs
are among the main technologies used. Corridor projects usually involve national and local governments and agencies, private
technology providers (who, sometimes, also contribute significantly to the financing of the technology deployment), and, obviously,
carriers.
ITS would be a PPP venture
Crainic et al. 09 (Crainic T.G., Gendreau M., Potvin J.-Y. “Intelligent freight-transportation
systems: Assessment and the contribution of operations research”; (2009) Transportation
Research Part C: Emerging Technologies, 17 (6) , pp. 541-557;
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0968090X08000648) IIN
Integration for ITS and e-business alike is not a simple task, however, as it must engage with a large array of
disparate entities covering three broad areas: technical, political, and geographical . At the
technical level, ITS brings together the fields of transportation planning, telecommunications,
computing, vehicle and electronics manufacturing, and infrastructure con- struction. Many
stakeholders are involved in the development, deployment, and operation of ITS: government agencies at the national, regional, and
municipal levels, highway operators, carriers, equipment manufacturers, system vendors, service operators, etc. They
must all
collaborate to implement and run a system that is composed of a mixture of public and
private assets, means and services. A geographical integration must also be achieved at
regional and, in many cases, international levels. An end user, a container carrier for example,
would not like to be forced to buy a different set of equipment for each city or country it
intends to travel to. Intelligent Transportation systems are all about mobility, they are not
meant to infringe on it. The efforts aimed at the development of standards and national architectures attempt to address
these issues.
PPP solve freight
Wisetjindawat 10 (Wisinee – Departmet of Civil Engineering Nagoya Institute of Technology
Gokiso-cho, Showa-ku Nagoya, Aichi; “REVIEW OF GOOD PRACTICES IN URBAN FREIGHT
TRANSPORT A TION”¶ As part of the project¶ ECO-EFFICIENT AND SUSTAINABLE URBAN
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA UNESCAP”; April 30, 2010;
http://www.escap.asia/ttdw/common/TPT/egm_eco_efficiency/dr_wisinee_report.pdf) IIN
Public Private Partnership (PPP) is the most recommended organizational structure for freight
facilities. The Public sector should subsidize and/or organize the facilities together with private sector entities. Initial
funding for research work and pilot studies should be provided by the government sector. It
important to note that the key to success for most schemes is the enthusiasm of the private sector
operators participating in the project. The development of an understanding of the benefits of
sustainable transport among private sector operators is very important since the benefits in
reduced cost are not always obvious, and can cause the private sector to lose interest in the
long run.
Requiring upfront private sector financing avoids politics and spending links
Cooper, 12 - Donna Cooper is a Senior Fellow with the Economic Policy team at the Center for
American Progress (“Meeting the Infrastructure Imperative”, 2/16,
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/02/infrastructure.html)//DH
Private investors have partnered with state or local governments to build roads, expand highway
systems, and build or repair bridges. Typically in this case the private investor pays the public entity upfront an
estimated market value for the transportation asset, and then is required under an agreement
to cover the cost of improving the asset. In addition, these agreements permit the investor to charge tolls or receive
dedicated tax payments while also establishing clear maintenance requirements. Investors enter into these agreements where the
tolls or dedicated taxes are projected to cover all costs and profits and are most attractive to investors when the level of earnings
has the potential to exceed projections. Federal credit subsidies lower the overall project costs, which in turn reduces the pressure
on tolls and/or dedicated taxes, which
then has the positive results of making a project more politically
and financially feasible.
Congress wants greater P3’s because of opposition to spending
Marks, 11 - guest editor of Infrastructure Journal and partner in Milbank Tweed Hadley and
McCloy’s Global Project Finance¶ (Allan, “U.S. Infrastructure: Challenges, Politics and
Opportunities,” 4/11, http://www.milbank.com/images/content/6/6/6634/MARKS-USInfrastructure-Infrastructure-Journal-04-11-2011-.pd.pdf)//DH
¶ Despite ongoing reports from analysts about the ailing state of infrastructure in the United ¶ States, the US Congress
continues to focus more on the federal budget deficit than the ¶ infrastructure deficit.¶ Although
securing financing for new infrastructure projects can be a challenge, the recession ¶ has created an excellent opportunity to take
advantage of historically low interest rates and ¶ underutilized construction capacity to invest in critically needed infrastructure
upgrades. ¶ Because
there has been less and less money available from traditional funding sources
to ¶ meet the ever-growing need, both for new capacity and to repair and upgrade aging
facilities, ¶ governments at federal, state, and local levels have been reluctant to invest in many
new ¶ projects and have stalled existing projects. Fortunately, public-private partnerships (PPPs) ¶ offer an attractive
tool to bridge this gap.¶
Commissions CP 1NC Shells
CP 1NC (Energy Policy Specific)
The United States Congress should establish an independent bipartisan commission
empowered to submit to Congress recommendations for energy policy. Congress and the
executive will delegate authority to the commission to create recommendations and allow 90
days to pass legislation maintaining existing legislative baselines. If Congress does not pass
legislation revising the Commission’s recommendations within the specified period, those
recommendations will enter into legal force. The Commission should recommend to Congress
that the United States federal government should (do the plan).
Competes---the CP’s policy statement is not legally binding---it doesn’t enact
the plan, it simply recommends its mandates
Koch 5
(Charles H. Koch 5, the Dudley W. Woodbridge Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law, Spring 2005, “Policymaking by the
Administrative Judiciary,” Alabama Law Review, 56 Ala. L. Rev. 693, p. lexis n110 E.g., Consol Edison Co of New York v. FERC, 315
F.3d 316, 323 (D.C. Cir 2003))
"Policy statements" differ from substantive rules that carry the "force of law," because
they lack "present binding effect " on the agency. When an agency hears a case under an established policy
statement, it may decide the case using that policy statement if the decision is not otherwise arbitrary and capricious. Id. n111 One
brand of nonlegislative rule, "statements
of policy," may not have a binding effect on the agency,
distinguish statements of
resulting in even more ambiguous application to administrative judges Several courts
policy from other nonlegislative rules because the latter are not "binding norms" which
control the agency
For example, the D.C. Circuit described a statement of policy in these terms An
agency policy
statement does not seek to impose or elaborate or interpret a legal norm. It merely
represents an agency position
with respect to how it will treat--typically enforce--the governing legal norm By
issuing a policy statement, an agency simply lets the public know its current enforcement
or adjudicatory approach . . . Policy statements are binding on neither the public, nor the
agency
Syncor Int'l Corp v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1997). A
statement might not be binding
because it serves the dual purpose of "informing the public of the agency's future plans
and priorities for exercising its discretionary power," as well as educating and providing direction to
agency personnel who are required to implement the agency's policies and exercise its discretionary powers in specific cases.
Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 1987). A statement acts only prospectively and it does not establish a
"binding norm." Id. at 1014 Nonetheless, even a statement may confine the agency's discretion where it would be unfair to deny
the statement some effect. Ronald Levin urges that statements and interpretative rules have virtually the same effect Ronald in
Levin, Nonlegislative Rules and the Administrative Open Mind, 41 DUKE L J 1497, 1503 (1992).
And, it solves the entirety of the case and avoids politics
Rothkopf 11
(David Rothkopf, Prof @ Columbia and Georgetown and CEO and Editor-at-Large of Foreign
Policy, he also taught international affairs and national security studies at Columbia University's
School of International and Public Affairs and Georgetown's School of Foreign Service, The time
for a White House-led national energy policy is right now, October 26, 2011
http://rothkopf.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/26/
the_time_for_a_white_house_led_national _energy_policy_is_right_now)
It is currently conventional wisdom in Washington that the president will have a difficult time advancing any major new policy
initiatives between now and the election. It would be a mistake for the president and unfortunate for the country were that to prove
to be an accurate forecast. Fortunately, nothing is more suspect than Washington's conventional wisdom. Further, it is fully in the
president's power to challenge the low expectations of political professionals and average citizens everywhere by building his
campaign around not only a rehash of what he has accomplished and a wish list of things for the future, but by enlivening it with
meaningful, major new efforts that he is undertaking immediately due to the urgency of the challenges the United States faces. One
area in which such an effort is not just needed but is effectively several generations overdue is energy policy. To date, the
administration's efforts in the area of energy have concentrated on greening the U.S. energy mix and the jobs that green energy
might bring. While worthy, the efforts have been bogged down and undercut for a variety of reasons: ranging from the tactical
decision to put health care ahead of energy among policy priorities, the inflated and dubious nature of many green job provisions,
the success of climate skeptics in impeding the cap-and-trade debate, and the recent kerfuffle over Solyndra (and, by extension,
government energy loan programs, alternative energy programs in general, and the whole idea of "picking winners" associated with
some elements of green energy policy). The
Energy Department even initiated a worthy Quadrennial
Technology Review that mimicked the Quadrennial Defense Review, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, and the
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review processes at Defense, Homeland Security, and State respectively. But it was
not a broad-gauge energy policy and the U nited S tates has been in need of such a policy for
decades. There have been abortive efforts in that direction but they have been compromised or stopped short
of becoming a regular element of U.S. government policy making . One reason for the problem is that
despite the fact that the D epartment O f E nergy was created to help ensure the creation of such
policies during the 1970s, it is simply incapable of overseeing the development of the kind of
comprehensive policy that is needed. Unlike defense policy or diplomacy policy, critical components of a
true energy policy are managed not in one agency but across the entirety of the U.S.
government. It is a domestic and an international issue, a security and an economic issue, a regulatory,
financial, diplomatic, and environmental issue. Furthermore, for better or for worse, energy issues have tended
to become too politicized by different special interests. Recognizing the need for a "whole of government"
approach to the issue, the Bush administration put Vice President Dick Cheney in charge of its effort in this
direction. But because of his perceived closeness to certain segments of the energy community (which is far more diverse than
typically understood), the process was sidetracked. Similarly, Obama's efforts to date have been impeded because, as one senior
official said to me, they have been "too tied up in the climate issue." But of course, the reason an energy policy is so essential is
because real energy policy is not just about green jobs, it is about every single job in the United States. Every
business
depends on access to energy. So do individual citizens and the economy as a whole. Energy, the largest industrial
sector in the world, touches every other sector in profound ways. Interruptions in supply, spikes in prices,
changes in regulation, shifts in demand, and innovations in technology have ripple effects that go from border to border, from the
top to the bottom of the economy. Indeed, part
of the problem with the Obama administration's framing
of energy issues is that it has been too narrowly focused on new technology and regulation. Not only
does energy require a "whole of government" approach, it demands a "whole of economy"
approach and above and beyond that a "whole of U.S. national interests" vision. The president could initiate a
regular, institutionalized, interagency, economy-wide, holistic energy policy development
process without congressional approval
-- though he should do it with
active bipartisan consultation.
He contemplated this during his transition when the idea of an Energy Policy Council or Energy Security Council was contemplated,
advocated by at the time by folks like campaign honcho and thoughtful energy-policy thinker, former White House Chief of Staff
John Podesta. Because
the approach needs to be interagency, it should be directed out of the
White House. And because energy security and economic security need to drive it, it should be quarterbacked by
National Security Advisor Tom Donilon with the support of National Economic Advisor Gene Sperling.
The NSC has more staff, so it should probably lead on this. The D epartment O f E nergy could serve as a kind of
secretariat and coordinate key components. But vital issues go well beyond their scope of work and capabilities
and pertain to questions like regional stability, access to sea lanes, resource competition, currency policy, etc. While there is a
fondness and precedent for quadrennial reviews in the federal government at the moment, it might make
sense for this to be more frequent, possibly biennial , especially given the speed of
developments in this area. If a congressional mandate for the approach can be won, terrific. If it can
be done by executive order, terrific. Who could possibly rationally oppose the development of
such a policy?¶ In an election year, of course, such an effort would seem timely and be widely
supported -- especially with all eyes on the economy , with so many tens of millions of jobs
supported directly and indirectly by the energy sector, and with so many watershed developments
possible in areas like supply (shale gas, offshore gas, oil sands, the Arctic) and technology (efficiency tops the list),
even revenue generation (the tax policy implications are great and reform opportunities, even those fueled by some kind
of market-driven energy or carbon mechanism would be well worth considering). We are on the verge of real transformation at
home and around the world in this area -- in traditional as well as new forms of energy, with the vastly increased possibilities of U.S.
domestic supply one of the few clear potential game changers for the U.S. economy. (China's domestic energy development policy
focuses on "energy under foot." I'm not for slavishly following Chinese policies ... but "under foot" would be a good place to look for
our security and growth, too.)¶ Developing the policy would take us into 2013 and either the second term of the Obama
administration or the first term of a new administration. But America should
not wait
until then to
address this
vital set of concerns ... and much can be done during the year ahead to send a strong message
that a time of critical national and economic security we are not sitting on our hands. President
Obama can launch such an effort , get credit for it , and address a long overdue need within the
U.S. policy apparatus.
CP 1NC (Generic)
The United States Congress should establish an independent bipartisan commission
empowered to submit to Congress recommendations for international economic policy.
Congress and the executive will delegate authority to the commission to create
recommendations and allow 90 days to pass legislation maintaining existing legislative
baselines. If Congress does not pass legislation revising the Commission’s recommendations
within the specified period, those recommendations will enter into legal force. The
Commission should recommend to Congress that the United States federal government
should (do the plan).
Competes---the CP’s policy statement is not legally binding---it doesn’t enact
the plan, it simply recommends its mandates
Koch 5
(Charles H. Koch 5, the Dudley W. Woodbridge Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law, Spring 2005, “Policymaking by the
Administrative Judiciary,” Alabama Law Review, 56 Ala. L. Rev. 693, p. lexis n110 E.g., Consol Edison Co of New York v. FERC, 315
F.3d 316, 323 (D.C. Cir 2003))
"Policy statements" differ from substantive rules that carry the "force of law," because
they lack "present binding effect " on the agency. When an agency hears a case under an established policy
statement, it may decide the case using that policy statement if the decision is not otherwise arbitrary and capricious. Id. n111 One
brand of nonlegislative rule, "statements
of policy," may not have a binding effect on the agency,
resulting in even more ambiguous application to administrative judges Several courts distinguish statements of
policy from other nonlegislative rules because the latter are not "binding norms" which
control the agency
For example, the D.C. Circuit described a statement of policy in these terms An
agency policy
statement does not seek to impose or elaborate or interpret a legal norm. It merely
represents an agency position
with respect to how it will treat--typically enforce--the governing legal norm By
issuing a policy statement, an agency simply lets the public know its current enforcement
or adjudicatory approach . . . Policy statements are binding on neither the public, nor the
agency
Syncor Int'l Corp v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1997). A
statement might not be binding
because it serves the dual purpose of "informing the public of the agency's future plans
and priorities for exercising its discretionary power," as well as educating and providing direction to
agency personnel who are required to implement the agency's policies and exercise its discretionary powers in specific cases.
Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 1987). A statement acts only prospectively and it does not establish a
"binding norm." Id. at 1014 Nonetheless, even a statement may confine the agency's discretion where it would be unfair to deny
the statement some effect. Ronald Levin urges that statements and interpretative rules have virtually the same effect Ronald in
Levin, Nonlegislative Rules and the Administrative Open Mind, 41 DUKE L J 1497, 1503 (1992).
CP solve--commissions can be tasked with any issue
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
The creation of temporary, independent bodies that give advice to Congress, develop
common-sense recommendations on complex policy issues, and find broadly acceptable
solutions to contentious problems, is an important yet under-investigated area of
congressional delegation. The term “commission” is a prevalent catch-phrase, but
these entities have taken several names. Whether designated as blue-ribbon
commissions, committees, councils, boards, or task forces, they consist mostly of
nonelected officials, deal with major social crises and policy issues, and perform
technical studies. With variations to fit the circumstances, Congress creates
commissions to accomplish diverse goals: to cope with increases in the scope and
complexity of legislation, forge consensus, draft bills, finesse institutional obstacles,
involve noncommittee and junior members in issues, coordinate strategy, and
promote interparty communication. Commissions deal with issues as disparate as pay
raises, obsolete military bases, the budget deficit, Medicare, flue-cured tobacco, wartime
relocation and internment of civilians, amateur boxing, telemedicine, government
reform, and the regulation of professional baseball.
2NC Solvency
Overview
CP solves 100% of the case plus the net benefit- an independent agency
submitting a recommendation to do the plan would build consensus in order to
pass the plan- that’s Rothkopf
It’s competitive because its recommendation doesn’t carry the force of law, but
rather it’s an establishment of an agency position on an issue- that’s Koch
The result of the CP is indistinguishable from the plan--- it leads to the
consensus of doing the plan---nobody will perceive a difference between the
plan and the CP for the purpose of solvency and if they do, they’ll comply with
the CP as though it were binding.
View any solvency deficits through a lens of optimal vs. sufficient
Generic 2nc Solvency
CP is competitive and solves the case - Guidance documents have the power of
law but are not binding – agencies voluntarily comply with rules
Hunnicutt 99 (James JD – Boston College Law School “NOTE: Another Reason to Reform the
Federal Regulatory System: Agencies' Treating Nonlegislative Rules as Binding Law” Boston
College Law Review December, 41 B.C. L. Rev 153)
Rules created without process--interpretative rules, general statements of policy, rules of
agency organization and other nonlegislative rules--generally cannot have legally binding
effects. 117 In administrative and judicial proceedings, nonlegislative rules are not treated as law, but as influential agency
thought that may factor into a proceeding's outcome. 118 According to the courts, nonlegislative rules cannot be the decisive factor
in a court proceeding or enforcement action. 119 For example, in 1986, in Thomas v. New York, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit held that a letter written by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency could not have binding
legal effects because it had not been subjected to notice-and-comment process. 120 Several eastern states--including New York,
national environmental groups, American citizens owning property in Canada and a Congressman brought suit against Lee Thomas,
Administrator of the EPA under President Reagan in the early 1980s, for not revising certain air pollution standards. 121 Prior to
Thomas taking the helm of the EPA, Douglas Costle had been the EPA's Administrator under President Carter. 122 Days before
Reagan took office, Costle wrote a letter to then Secretary of State Edmund Muskie indicating that based on the findings of an
official joint American-Canadian commission, he believed pollution emitted by the United States was responsible for causing acid
rain in Canada. 123 According to the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act, if the Administrator of the EPA determines that
American air pollution is causing significant harm in Canada, the EPA must order the states causing the acid rain to reduce [*172] air
pollution. 124 Then, those states would be obligated to intensify the regulation of the private parties contributing to air pollution
within the states' jurisdictions. 125 The new Administrator, Thomas, chose to ignore the letter. 126 Intent on reducing acid rain in
Canada, the plaintiffs brought suit, arguing that the letter obliged the EPA to force the generating states to revise their air pollution
controls. 127 The court found that the letter constituted a rule within the meaning of the APA and that it had not been created as a
result of any rulemaking process. 128 The court reasoned that the rule did not fall within any of the § 553(b)(A) exceptions because
it affected individual rights and obligations by causing the states to heighten their regulations, which would result in the termination
or restriction of numerous utilities and manufacturers. 129 Because the EPA had not followed the notice-and-comment process to
create the rule, the EPA was not required to constrain its discretion by abiding by the letter. 130 The holding in Thomas evidences
the principle that nonlegislative rules cannot have binding legal effects. 131 Reality, however, may differ from this principle. 132 B.
Agencies May Try to Apply Nonlegislative Rules as Law Against Private Parties When
agencies treat a nonlegislative
rule as law, those rules will have the practical effect of binding law because people tend to
acquiesce to that which the government informs them constitutes the law. 133 Most
members of the public assume all agency rules constitute legitimate law, so they simply
conform to all rules. 134 By treating nonlegislative [*173] rules as law, agencies can convince the public into following
nonlegislative rules. 135 Occasionally, agencies rely upon nonlegislative rules for enforcement actions. 136 For example, in 1989 in
United States v. Picciotto, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed a conviction based upon a nonlegislative rule
because, by virtue of prescribing unlawful conduct, the rule imposed binding obligations on the public. 137 In 1981, Concepcion
Picciotto began a six year, twenty-four-hour-per-day protest against nuclear war across the street from the White House in
LaFayette Park. 138 In 1988 the Park Service issued an "additional condition" without performing any notice-and-comment
procedures. 139 The additional condition prohibited the storage of property in LaFayette Park beyond that which is reasonably
necessary to stage a twenty-four hour protest. 140 A Park Service police officer arrested Picciotto for violating the additional
condition. 141 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found her guilty and gave her a ten-day suspended prison
sentence and six months unsupervised probation. 142 The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the additional
condition was substantive because it imposed obligations enforceable by criminal penalty, even though the Park Service had created
it without notice-and-comment. 143 Although Picciotto won her appeal, this case demonstrates how agencies may create rules
without notice-and-comment and treat them as binding law. 144 Besides initiating or threatening enforcement actions based on
nonlegislative rules, agencies often rely on them to grant or deny applications and permits. 145 Similarly, federal [*174] agencies can
utilize nonlegislative rules to influence programs administered by the states. 146 As the trial court did in Picciotto, courts sometimes
agree with the agencies and treat nonlegislative rules as binding law. 147 For instance, in 1993, in United States v. American
National Red Cross, the District Court for the District of Columbia issued an injunction against the Red Cross, as part of a settlement,
ordering the Red Cross to conform with all of the FDA's nonlegislative rules regarding blood. 148 Concerned with the integrity of the
blood supply, the FDA passed numerous legislative and nonlegislative rules regarding how blood was to be handled. 149 Finding that
the Red Cross had failed to meet the standards imposed by the FDA, the court specifically differentiated between the FDA's
legislative rules and nonlegislative rules, and ordered the Red Cross to abide by both. 150 Therefore, rules created without noticeand-comment became binding law for the Red Cross. 151 [*175] C. Analysis of the Legal Effects of Nonlegislative Rules The situation
in Red Cross must be avoided because it robs the public of the opportunity to offer input on nonlegislative rules. 152 Because the
Red Cross, the FDA and the court agreed to this settlement, the FDA's nonlegislative rules regarding blood bind the Red Cross, even
though the rules create new law, impose legal obligations, have immediate effects, are not necessarily published in the Federal
Register and may have significant effects on the public. 153 Moreover, the public lost the opportunity to participate in the creation
of laws that will affect many people, including patients in need of blood transfusions. 154 When courts allow nonlegislative rules to
have substantive effects on the public, they undermine the foundation underlying the APA and the notice-and-comment procedures
therein. 155 Nonlegislative rules should not impose obligations or immediate effects on the public, and courts and agencies should
strive to avoid using them in such a manner. Too often,
nonlegislative rules have a practical binding legal
effect because people do not realize those rules are not binding. The parties affected by the
rules choose to acquiesce to the rules rather than attract agency attention, they lack the
resources to challenge the rules, or they have already fought the rule in court and have given
up on the appeals process. 156
Regulations are established by congress – agencies can make internal
modifications that avoid political blame
Schillaci 07 (William C. author of the book Most Misunderstood Regs March 27, “Reining in
Guidance Documents” http://enviro.blr.com/whitepapers/ehs-management/epaenvironmental-protection-agency/reining-in-guidance-documents/)
"The phenomenon we see in this case is familiar. Congress passes a broadly worded statute. The Agency
follows with regulations containing broad language, open-ended phrases, ambiguous
standards and the like. Then as years pass, the Agency issues circulars or guidance or
memoranda, explaining, interpreting, defining and often expanding the commands in regulations.
One guidance document may yield another and then another and so on. Several words in a regulation may spawn hundreds of pages
of text as the Agency offers more and more detail regarding what its regulations demand of regulated entities. Law
is made,
without notice and comment, without public participation, and without publication in the Federal Register or the Code
of Federal Regulations."
Recommendations Solve
Recommendations assure the passage of the CP
Mayer 7
(Kenneth R. Mayer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, “The Base Realignment and Closure
Process: Is it Possible to Make Rational Policy?,” December 2007,
http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kmayer/Professional/Base%20Realignment%20and%20Closure%20Process.pdf)
The binding character of the recommended closures was key. Once the ¶ president had
approved the commission recommendations, Congress had 45 ¶ days to reject the list by a
Joint Resolution, under expedited procedures ¶ designed to minimize obstructionist tactics
(Davis 2005). In practice, the process ¶ was unstoppable after this stage, since it would take
2/3 majorities in both the ¶ House and Senate to actually block the closures from going into
effect ¶ (assuming that resolution of disapproval would have to overcome a presidential ¶
veto).
Commission recommendations are perceived as coming from outside so means
politicians agree—aren’t linked with Washington
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
Policymaking has changed over the past several decades with the shifting American political
landscape. Public approval of Congress and its members has declined since the 1970s.38 Public
discontent about the legislative branch in the 1990s grew to unprecedented levels.39 Such
dissatisfaction not only reflects a generalized distrust of politicians but also a feeling that
government is not working well.40 The manifest result of this is a growing proportion of new
members who lack prior political experience and who echo this same critical sentiment.¶ With
incumbency a seeming curse, politicians often campaign against the government.41
Congressional leaders heed this populist reaction. They build agreement from the bottom up
with the inclusion of practitioners—experts in the field from across the political spectrum who
are involved in implementation. In doing so, Congress looks for ways to involve people back
home in two-way communication so that constituents can express their reaction to what is
going on in Congress. The ad hoc commission has become a device for achieving this goal,
allowing individuals who have diverse knowledge and experience to share information and
thus reach better results. The Commission on Service Members and Veterans Transition
Assistance set up by Congress in 1996 to the review benefits and services available to active
duty members and veterans visited over forty military installations around the world during its
two-year existence, talking to thousands of service members and family members.42 “The real
beauty of a commission,” proclaimed one Senate staff aide whose boss proposed the
Commission on Executive Organization, 43 “is the political weight you get from having
something put together by ‘common people’ as opposed to ‘politicians.’”
Commissions use experts and their recommendations are perceived as credible
and worth implementing
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
The progression toward congressionally created ad hoc commissions offers members of
Congress a way to separate politics from policy issues. The carefully crafted “independence”
of a commission helps legitimize congressional decisions and make them palatable to an
otherwise ambivalent public. Lawmakers and their staffs indicate that many contemporary
situations upon which legislative action must be predicated are so complicated that a political
body cannot hope to find the real facts. Certain modern-day problems call for analysis by more
than one mind with more than one approach by individuals who can access a difficult problem
without prejudice and with controlled emotions. A commission set up by Congress, according
to one congressional staff aide, “might have the credibility that normal legislative channels
such as a committee and that committee’s hearings would not have as well as provide
credibility to the rest of Congress in dealing with the particular question the commission is
handling.” Too often, congressional hearings become adversarial proceedings. In the spirit of
the regulatory commission a temporary, independent ad hoc commission provides advice
from people who are not beholden to public pressure.
Lack of Time solvency
Congress won’t even want to debate about the recommendations---they’ll
approve it due to lack of time
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
The increased use and development of ad hoc commissions by Congress reveals a growing
pattern: the use of alternative mechanisms in formulating policy. For the most part,
commissions have been set up in response to the extraordinary growth in the complexity and
size of the federal government’s responsibility since the New Deal, and especially during the
“Great Society” years of the 1960s.7 When the first Congress convened, the United States had a
tiny population, mostly rural and uneducated; its social and industrial structure was simple.
Changes occurred slowly, and the government’s tasks were few.8 The contemporary situation is
radically different. “Today,” reflected former Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R-Kan.),
“there’s an almost information overload, a bombardment by news, by faxes. Everything is
instantaneous with too little time for thoughtful reflection.”9 In the Capitol, elevator operators
still greet members and visitors, and paintings of powder-wigged Founding Fathers still gaze
down from their gilded frames. But now they share the corridors of power with fiber-optic cable
links, PCs, cell phones, and wireless modems. Staffers can even order lunch from the House food
system over the Internet at www.specialordersdeli.com.¶ A longtime watcher of Congress
summed up the hectic, new-age legislative life:¶ Legislators have very little time for reflection.
There are demands upon their attention literally every minute of the day—and these demands
would be made every minute of the night too if not for unlisted telephone numbers. They are
utterly dependent upon typed cards which they receive from their press secretaries the
moment they arrive in the office. These cards, broken down almost minute by minute, list every
engagement of the day and every committee and subcommittee meeting, with a brief
addendum of the agenda. They are dependent upon hasty briefings from aides who scurry
alongside as they dash about the Capitol. Too often, their only time for studying a complex
legislative problem is when they are driven to and from their offices by aides, wives, or
chauffeurs.10¶ If Congress did not delegate certain tasks to commissions, it would cede a
good portion of its responsibilities to other decision makers. The ad hoc commission enables
Congress to maintain its autonomy. It shows some of Congress’s aggressiveness in seeking out
new areas of endeavor. In certain areas of policymaking Congress has, in the past two
decades, usually been peripheral or reluctant to assert itself. Delegating to a temporary
commission may prove to be a source of influence in negotiations with other decision makers.
Most commission recommendations, in fact, are eventually accepted and implemented.11
Politicians get shielded solvency
Congressional action hinges on voters—getting shielded by the commission
means they’ll take action
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
Arnold demonstrates that while the decisions that Congress makes are partially dependent on
legislators’ own personal policy preferences or their need to trade favors, the quest for
reelection is legislators’ dominant goal. Thus, members of Congress tend to pursue the
preferences of the public on any issue that is salient to the public. Whenever lawmakers must
choose among alternative policies they will most likely select the one that will contribute
most to their reelection. Legislators’ decisions also depend on whether they are dealing with
policy effects that are directly traceable to their own individual actions or whether the
electoral connection involves only policy positions.8 Following this logic, delegation to the
Quadrennial Pay Raise Commission in 1967 was instituted to distance Congress from a delicate
decision—going on record in favor of raising its own pay. The “commission” label provided a
shield against public outcry and a way to explain a difficult vote.9 It also broke the chain of
traceability for individual legislators
Commissions enable action on issues that aren’t politically beneficial
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
Others treat Congress as a firm that makes policy and has the option of internal production
through direct legislation or outsourcing to the executive. Accordingly policy is made in the
politically most efficient manner, be it through legislation or through delegation. As with
actual firms, each alternative has both advantages and disadvantages, so the boundary
between legislative and executive policymaking lies where these net benefits “just balance at
the margin from legislators’ point of view.”19¶ In some cases, then, delegation may offer
legislators an attractive alternative to making policy themselves. The issue of airline safety is
an example. This policy area requires technical expertise but lacks potential political benefits.
Lawmakers will gain little credit if things go well and no airline disasters occur, but they will
have to withstand intense scrutiny if things go wrong—airline regulation is an issue with only a
political downside, and failures tend to be spectacular and well-publicized.20 The set of
individuals receiving benefits, the flying public, is diffuse and ill-organized, while those paying
the costs of regulation, the airline companies, are well-organized and politically active.
Delegated power is relatively easy to monitor when one keeps in mind the easy observation
of deficiencies in the system. Thus, even if legislators had unlimited time and resources,
delegation would be the preferred mode of policymaking.21
Delagation Solvency
Delegation to a commission overcomes partisanship and gridlock
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
Fingers are repeatedly pointed at Congress as contributor to or creator of many
problems in the policymaking process. A major objective of this study is to sort out
situations in which Congress, with sufficient information at hand or with a definite
interest in a policy matter, voluntarily delegates to a commission as part of the
policymaking process. The use of ad hoc commissions does not always represent a
dereliction of legislative duty. Such congressional action often reflects periodic
responsibility and curiosity about alternative, different means for Congress to intervene
directly and indirectly in policy development and implementation.¶ In the face of
challenging governing circumstances, lawmakers find creative ways to make policy.17
This has been especially apparent in the period since World War II. In this time
period, the trend has been toward tougher governing circumstances, including the rise
of divided government, mounting partisanship, increasingly fragmented committees, and
a more complex issue agenda. In response to these types of pressures, congressional
members seek ways to keep the lawmaking process going.
A2 Delay
No delay
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
There are a number of ways in which Congress performs its policymaking
functions. Ad hoc commissions are one device at its disposal. Despite criticisms that
these entities are inefficient and frequently evade the issues, commissions provide a
flexible option, the variation in their composition and organization reflecting the specific
mandates that establish them.79 Commissions can provide expert advice in matters of
public policy within a definite time frame. By virtue of their ad hoc status, they can
bypass normal bureaucratic channels. Commissions are a public relations device
designed to draw attention to certain issues, to elicit public support, and to achieve
consensus in a fragmented Congress. Commissions also allow for the direct
representation of functional consistencies in the advisory process by seeking the
advice of holders of diverse points of view.80 It is this list of advantages that has
encouraged the recent use of commissions and led to their becoming a stable feature of
public policies.
A2 can’t do new issues
No precedent has to exist---commissions can be tasked with any problems
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
Congressional delegation to a commission might be designed to investigate social crises;
to gain public or political consensus; to bring exposure and prestige to new policies and
problems and arouse and focus public concern for them; to reformulate a federal
program or commitment or to develop a new approach to a problem; to respond to
national crises; to foster a winning coalition; to convey a message to executive
agencies; to respond to initiatives from presidents who either desire support from
Congress or want to fund commissions through the regular appropriations
process; to satisfy constituents or interest groups from the member’s district or
state; because of precedent; for congressional involvement into or oversight of
presidential business; or as an option of last resort when Congress has no institutional
precedent for dealing with a novel problem.
The commission makes the groundwork for legislation
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
Ad hoc commissions as instruments of government have a long history. They are
used by almost all units and levels of government for almost every conceivable
task. Ironically, the use which Congress makes of commissions— preparing the
groundwork for legislation, bringing public issues into the spotlight, whipping legislation
into shape, and giving priority to the consideration of complex, technical, and critical
developments—receives relatively little attention from political scientists. As noted in
earlier chapters, following the logic of rational choice theory, individual decisions
to delegate are occasioned by imperfect information; legislators who want to
develop effective policies, but who lack the necessary expertise, often delegate
fact-finding and policy development. Others contend that some commissions are
set up to shift blame in order to maximize benefits and minimize losses.
A2 Congress can’t make a Commission
Commissions can be established by Congress or the President or both
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
Federal commissions are by no means limited to the legislative process. They may be
creatures of Congress or the presidency, some created informally by the mutual
consent of Congress and the president, others administered by an executive agency.
Many federal commissions cover multiple jurisdictions, making it difficult to decide
whether a commission is strictly congressional, executive, or judicial. Normally, all three
branches of government are willing to support commissions, but the commissions’
tasks, purposes, and composition can determine whether they belong to one
particular branch or have more diverse origins. “I was a member of the Federal
Courts Study Commission, a legislative study group to conduct a study of the jurisdiction
of the U.S. courts and report to Congress,” recounted one commissioner regarding the
inter-branch morphing of his commission. “But it became clear as the commission
progressed that the commission was a judicial creature serving the purposes of the
judiciary, not Congress, recommending ways for the Court to manage its case
workload as opposed to realigning parts of the judiciary.”
A2 Certainty
Certainty is nonsense --- the Aff can’t solve it
Posner 8
(Eric A., Professor of Law – University of Chicago, and Jacob E. Gersen, Assistant Professor of Law – University of Chicago, “Soft Law:
Lessons from Congressional Practice”, Stanford Law Review, December, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 573, Lexis)
Congress seeks to influence public behavior, and enactment of statutes is the normal method
for doing so. As we argued above, a statute can be analyzed as a type of communication that
affects people's beliefs about the legal consequences of their actions - in the form of sanctions
(or rewards). If a legislature enacts a statute at time 1 that governs behavior at time 2, people
will update their beliefs about the probability that a sanction will be applied to that
behavior. Enactment of a hard statute, however, only affects probabilities; it does not create
certainty. If no statute exists, people might still believe that at [*600] time 2 a sanction will be
applied to the behavior in question with probability p. For example, Congress might enact a later
statute that applies retroactively. If instead a statute is enacted at time 1, people will raise
their probability estimate to p*, but p* need not equal 1. Congress might subsequently repeal
the statute before it has any effect or enact additional statutes that offset the sanction of the
first statute. And even if the hard statute remains in force, officials who administer the statute
will have discretion about how stringently to enforce it. The enactment of a hard statute, then,
should only cause individuals to update their beliefs that the relevant behavior will be
sanctioned in the future from p (prior to the statute) to p*, where p < p* < 1. Now consider a
soft statute of equivalent content. By revealing information about Congress's intentions, the soft
statute will cause people, in most cases, to update their beliefs about the probability that a
sanction will be applied to the relevant behavior at time 2. The new probability, p', in general
will be less than p*. A congressional resolution that disapproves of the relevant conduct makes
it more likely that a subsequent statute will prohibit that conduct, but tends to increase the
probability of that prohibition being in effect by less than a hard statute would. In the case of a
hard statute, the behavior will not be regulated at time 2 only if the hard statute is repealed; in
the case of a soft statute, the behavior will not be regulated at time 2 unless a hard statute is
enacted. Nonetheless, it is important to see that we are dealing only with probabilities.
AT: Links to ptx
No link--perception
Commissions are key to policy popularity and solve perception
Glassman & Strauss 11
(Matthew Eric Glassman, Jacob R. Straus, Analysts on the Congress at the Congressional Research Services, “Congressional
Commissions: Overview, Structure, and Legislative Considerations”, http://www.wiseintern.org/orientation/documents/CRS%20commissions.pdf , February 2, 2011)
By establishing a commission, Congress can often provide a highly visible forum for
important issues that might otherwise receive scant attention from the public.38 Commissions often are
composed of notable public figures, allowing personal prestige to be transferred to policy
solutions.39 Meetings and press releases from a commission may receive significantly
more attention in the media than corresponding information coming directly from
members of congressional committees. Upon completion of a commission’s work
product, public attention may be temporarily focused on a topic that otherwise would
receive scant attention, thus increasing the probability of congressional action within the
policy area.40
Congress perceives commission recommendations as more publicly popular
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
The progression toward congressionally created ad hoc commissions offers members of
Congress a way to separate politics from policy issues. The carefully crafted “independence” of
a commission helps legitimize congressional decisions and make them palatable to an
otherwise ambivalent public. Lawmakers and their staffs indicate that many contemporary
situations upon which legislative action must be predicated are so complicated that a political
body cannot hope to find the real facts. Certain modern-day problems call for analysis by more
than one mind with more than one approach by individuals who can access a difficult problem
without prejudice and with controlled emotions. A commission set up by Congress, according
to one congressional staff aide, “might have the credibility that normal legislative channels
such as a committee and that committee’s hearings would not have as well as provide
credibility to the rest of Congress in dealing with the particular question the commission is
handling.” Too often, congressional hearings become adversarial proceedings. In the spirit of
the regulatory commission a temporary, independent ad hoc commission provides advice
from people who are not beholden to public pressure.
No link—makes policies popular
Commissions make unpopular policies bipartisan
Glassman & Strauss 1
(Matthew Eric Glassman, Jacob R. Straus, Analysts on the Congress at the Congressional Research Services, “Congressional
Commissions: Overview, Structure, and Legislative Considerations”, http://www.wiseintern.org/orientation/documents/CRS%20commissions.pdf , February 2, 2011)
Solutions to policy problems produced within the normal legislative process may also suffer politically from charges of
partisanship.30 Similar charges may be made against investigations conducted by Congress.31 The
non-partisan or
bipartisan character of most congressional commissions may make their findings and
recommendations less susceptible to such charges and more politically acceptable to a
diverse viewpoints. The bipartisan or nonpartisan arrangement can potentially give their
recommendations strong credibility, both in Congress and among the public, even when
dealing with divisive issues of public policy.32 Commissions may also give political
factions space to negotiate compromises in good faith, bypassing the short-term tactical
political maneuvers that accompany public negotiations.33 Similarly, because
commission members are not elected, they may be better suited to suggesting unpopular,
but necessary, policy solutions.34
Commissions are bipartisan – make unpopular issues bipartisan
Glassman & Strauss 11
(Matthew Eric Glassman, Jacob R. Straus, Analysts on the Congress at the Congressional Research Services, “Congressional
Commissions: Overview, Structure, and Legislative Considerations”, http://www.wiseintern.org/orientation/documents/CRS%20commissions.pdf , February 2, 2011)
Throughout American history, Congress
has found commissions to be useful entities in the
legislative process. By establishing a commission, Congress can potentially provide a
highly visible forum for important issues and assemble greater expertise than may be
readily available within the legislature. Complex policy issues can be examined over a longer time period and in
greater depth than may be practical for legislators. Finally, the non-partisan or bipartisan character of most
congressional commissions may make their findings and recommendations more
politically acceptable, both in Congress and among the public.
Commissions are bipartisan – Congressional Oversight
Schwinn 10
(Steven D. Schwinn, Associate Professor of Law at John Marshall Law School, “Obama Establishes Bi-Partisan Commission on Fiscal
Responsibility and Reform”, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2010/02/obama-establishes-bipartisan-commission-onfiscal-responsibility-and-reform.html. February 19, 2010)
President Obama signed an executive order yesterday establishing a bi-partisan commission to
address federal spending and the federal debt. The move comes after the Senate rejected bi-partisan legislation to create a similar
commission. Under the EO, President Obama will appoint the chairs (one from each party) and six members (no four of which
may be from one party). The Speaker of the House, the Senate Majority Leader, the Minority Leader of the House, and the
Minority Leader in the Senate will each appoint three members (who must be sitting members of their respective houses).
President Obama appointed Erskine Bowles, President Clinton's Chief of Staff, and former Senator Alan Simpson (R-WY), the
former Republican Senate Leader, as co-chairs. Minority Leaders Senator Mitch McConnell and Representative John Boehner
said they'll cooperate and appoint members next week. President Obama
gave the Commission the following
task: Identifying policies to improve the fiscal situation in the medium term and to achieve fiscal
sustainability over the long run. Specifically, the Commission shall propose recommendations designed
to balance the budget, excluding interest payments on the debt, by 2015. . . . In addition, the Commission shall
propose recommendations that meaningfully improve the long-run fiscal outlook, including
changes to address the growth of entitlement spending and the gap between the projected revenues and expenditures of the
Federal Government. The
Commission obviously cannot have authority to bind Congress.
Instead, it operates as an attempt to help solve a collective action problem--that every
single member of Congress has an incentive to push for disproportionate spending in his
or her home district, and therefore together the institution is ill-equipped to deal with a
fiscal crisis. The Commission's recommendations can provide political pressure on
Congress, even if they do not legally bind Congress. A model is the Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission, the BRAC, which helps to solve a similar collective action
problem by studying and making recommendations about military base closures and
moves. Unlike President Obama's Commission, however, the BRAC was created by Congress through legislation. This
difference is unlikely to diminish the influence of the Commission, however: If both parties participate, its
recommendations will or won't be politicized, whether it was established by statute or by
EO.
No link—doesn’t get attached to debates
Will pass and doesn’t drain pc
Mayer 7
(Kenneth R. Mayer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, “The Base Realignment and Closure
Process: Is it Possible to Make Rational Policy?,” December 2007,
http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kmayer/Professional/Base%20Realignment%20and%20Closure%20Process.pdf)
The conventional wisdom was that legislators, facing increasing deficits ¶ and budget rules
that were about to force the question of spending cuts, were ¶ searching for a solution to the
collective dilemma framed by the base structure. ¶ There was broad consensus that
something had to be done, and fewer and ¶ fewer members were willing to defend the
roadblocks that in practice made it ¶ impossible to close anything. The solution -- given shape
by Representative ¶ Richard Armey (R-Texas) – was to separate the process into two parts: the
first ¶ was the a decision to ratify the principle of base closing and establish a ¶ mechanism by
which specific choices would be made. The second was the ¶ binding nature of that process, in
which legislators gave up their power to ¶ amend the final list of closures. Breaking up the
process into two separate ¶ decisions created substantial political cover, insulating the
affected members ¶ from the consequences of a local base closing, and insuring that no
legislator ¶ was directly connected to a specific vote to close a base. A few legislators ¶
criticized the proposal, with some making half-hearted defenses of old-school ¶ logrolling, others
objecting to the refusal to consider closing foreign bases, and ¶ others because they foresaw that
their own installations would probably be on ¶ the list.
Commission deliberations are private---prevents politics from getting in the
way
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
Life on Capitol Hill has frequently become acrimonious because of escalating partisanship
between parties.48 Increasing polarization in Congress49 has led to gridlock50 and stimulated
the use of message politics,51 thereby limiting both the flexibility and the creativity of
congressional action through normal legislative channels.¶ The logic of commissions is that
leaders of both parties, or their designated representatives, can meet to negotiate a deal
without the media, the public, or interest groups present. When deliberations are private,
parties can make offers without being denounced either by their opponents or by affected
constituency groups; there is less chance to use an offer from the other side to curry favor
with constituents. Agreement to bipartisan commissions and adherence to their logic are
consequential because they represent a tacit promise not to attack the opponent. On some
issues, for instance, the promise might imply letting the commission pick the solution and
relying on party discipline to encourage lawmakers to go along even if their districts are
disadvantaged by the solution; on others it might involve nothing more than a bipartisan
admission that a commission is the next step Congress should take, without any understanding
that all the players are bound ex ante by the commission’s resolution.52 Commissions also
mean eschewing partisan attacks and suggest a strong preference for reaching an agreement.53
No link—blame shifting
The counterplan avoids politics-shifts the blame onto the commission
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
The third major reason for Congress to delegate to a commission is the strategy of distancing
itself from a politically risky decision. These instances generally occur when Congress faces
redistributive policy problems, such as Social Security, military base closures, Medicare, and
welfare. Such problems are the most difficult because legislators must take a clear policy
position on something that has greater costs to their districts than benefits, or that shifts
resources visibly from one group to another. Institutionally, Congress has to make national
policy that has a collective benefit, but the self-interest of lawmakers often gets in the way.
Members realize that their individual interests, based on constituents’ demands, may be at
odds with the national interest, and this can lead to possible electoral repercussions.55 Even
when pursuing policies that are in the interests of the country as a whole, legislators do not
want to be blamed for causing losses to their constituents. In such an event, the split
characteristics of the institution come into direct conflict.¶ Many on Capitol Hill endorse a
commission for effectively resolving a policy problem rather than the other machinery
available to Congress. A commission finds remedies when the normal decision making process
has stalled. A long-time Senate staff director said of the proposed Second National Blue Ribbon
Commission to Eliminate Waste in Government: “At their most effective, these panels allow
Congress to realize purposes most members cannot find the confidence to do unless
otherwise done behind the words of the commission.”56¶ When an issue imposes
concentrated costs on individual districts yet provides dispersed benefits to the nation,
Congress responds by masking legislators’ individual contributions and delegates
responsibility to a commission for making unpleasant decisions.57 Members avoid blame and
promote good policy by saying something is out of their hands. This method allows
legislators— especially those aiming for reelection—to vote for the general benefit of
something without ever having to support a plan that directly imposes large and traceable
geographic costs on their constituents. The avoidance or share-the-blame route was much of
the way Congress and the president finally dealt with the problem of financially shoring up
Social Security in the late 1980s. One senior staff assistant to a western Republican
representative observed that the creation of the Social Security Commission was largely for
avoidance: “There are sacred cows and then there is Social Security. Neither party or any
politician wants to cut this. Regardless of what you say or do about it, in the end, you defer.
Everyone backs away from this.” Similarly, a legislative director to a southern Democratic
representative summarized: “So many people are getting older and when you take a look at who
turns out, who registers, people over sixty-five have the highest turnout and they vote like
clockwork.”
Any backlash gets blamed on the commission
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
The ties between Congress and ad hoc commissions are now complex and symbiotic: elected
officials (and their aides) are in a position to construct public policy, in exchange for which
commissions can work for members whose roles are comprehensive and highly variable. They
also provide the expertise necessary for writing legislation. Of course, some of these
relationships are arrangements of blame avoidance. Commissions can allow members of
Congress to manipulate voters’ perceptions, because routine government action usually
eludes the sustained attention of the general public. Consequently, lawmakers use an element
of delegation to escape blame for politically sensitive decisions. In practice, most commissions
serve more than one purpose. Many provide a basis for informed legislative action and help
manage a growing legislative workload; they enable legislators to cope with burgeoning
demands—to follow more issues and process more bills.¶ It is now possible to consider what
motivates individual lawmakers to delegate authority to these organizations. One should review
the benefits and drawbacks with regard to the use of ad hoc commissions and their applicability
to the case at hand. While the disputes over the desirable extent of delegation are numerous,
there is no widely accepted explanation of why Congress delegates some of its policymaking
authority. In the next chapter a decision tree of legislative decision making will show the
conditions that encourage lawmakers to learn from others, to enlist help from others, and to
push responsibility onto others.
No link—depersonalizes the issue
Delegating power detaches congressional responsibility from a policy
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
Chapter 6 is a case study of blame avoidance. On occasion, Congress will establish a
commission to shift blame for any negative side effects connected with sensitive issues.
Because most lawmakers see themselves as agents of their constituents, they are unwilling to
sacrifice district prosperity for the collective good. So when members evaluate the costs and
benefits of a politically sensitive issue and find that it translates into electoral losses rather
than gains, they will create a commission to avoid the unwanted task of making a difficult
decision. No fights on Capitol Hill are as contested as the ones over whose districts lose
defense dollars. Lobbying for military projects comes naturally to members who are expected to
champion local interests. Liberals and conservatives, hawks and doves, Democrats and
Republicans all join the fray. The Base Closure Commission enabled lawmakers to turn away
from the dilemma of choosing which bases to close, thereby providing a political heat shield.
Legislators became advocates for their constituents rather than bearers of bad news,
passionately pleading the case for their constituents, thereby doing the job they were elected
to do but also confronting a national policy need.
Legislators only backlash when they believe it’ll involve them—CP
depersonalizes issues
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
Modern theories of legislative behavior begin with David R. Mayhew’s book, Congress: The
Electoral Connection, which suggests that congressional action has a direct electoral
connection, in which legislators are single-minded seekers of reelection, motivated primarily
by self-interest.1 Individuals may enter Congress with altruistic intentions, but their behavior
in office is best explained by the “electoral connection”: the need for reelection. As a
consequence lawmakers consider the preferences of their voters, especially on issues of
potentially high salience, that is, issues visible to the public.2 Congress is thus organized to
promote the goal of reelection. Members follow conservative strategies to capitalize upon
particularized benefits, to respond to organized groups, to claim as much credit as possible,
and to mobilize only when they can claim credit.3 The incentive to delegate, therefore, must
have some sort of electoral connection.¶ Follow Mayhew’s line of thought, others have
developed what has come to be known as the distributive theory of legislative organization.4
According to this view, the decision to delegate is a function of the political costs and benefits
for which elected officials will be held electorally accountable. Legislative action reflects a
desire to maximize net benefits to districts in order to increase the chances for reelection.
Delegation enables individual legislators to protect favored constituents5 or to shift blame for
political costs6 onto other organizations, but makes them unable to claim full credit for any
perceived benefits. Delegation is a function of this trade-off. Thus, congressional decisions to
delegate occur when the decrease in attributable costs is greater than the decrease in
attributable benefits.¶ R. Douglas Arnold notes that legislators are ever mindful of the direct
correlation between their individual performance and the voting booth. According to what he
calls the “incumbent performance rule,” voters tend to punish legislators for undesirable
effects only if there are both identifiable governmental actions and visible individual
contributions. Responsibility for unpleasant decisions is therefore frequently delegated to the
president, bureaucrats, regulatory commissions, judges, state and local officials, or temporary
commissions as a procedural strategy for “masking” legislators’ individual contributions.7
Such delegation is especially prevalent when there is a desire to shed policymaking tasks that
are too onerous or when dealing with issues that are likely to provoke disputes with voters.
Challengers will take full advantage of reminding citizens about issues as traceable as legislative
salaries, for example.
No link—politicians maintain their ideology
Neither side looks like they’re giving in—gives the counterplan bipartisan
support
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
A main institutional function of commissions, therefore, is to foster collective action.
Delegation of authority to a commission to examine an issue helps overcome seemingly
unmanageable and intractable problems. Such coordination may be essential in light of the disjointed nature of
policymaking in Congress and the fragmentation of institutional power.57 “A commission such as the National Commission on Health Care Fraud and
Abuse58 facilitated action by others in Congress to find ways to [reduce] health care fraud and abuse,” according to a legislative director to a
midwestern Democratic representative. “In that sense, the commission built support to encourage action. In the case of entitlements, however, the idea
that a commission will produce collective action is wrong. It is an idealistic anticipation to bring people together for something that just will not
happen.Ӧ Base closing illustrates a problem in which a policy in the collective, common good, but fragmented by the parochial interests of lawmakers,
is derived from delegation to a commission. Members knew that the military base structure bordered on the preposterous, and it was equally difficult
for anyone to argue that every base was essential to national security, especially when the Pentagon acknowledged nearly a billion dollars in excess
base capacity. The lack of coordination stemmed from the discomfort in Congress about closing bases in a fair manner and from fear of retaliation by
the administration (and constituents).59 The 1989 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, with its relatively neutral membership, was an
effective policyforging mechanism. Employing discretion-limiting procedures with carefully defined delegation secured congressional agreement and
maintained unity. The commision did this by requiring lawmakers to give up any meaningful power of review over its list of base closures. In this way
the commission decided the distribution of costs—an arrangement gaining the prior
agreement of a majority of members, with an eye toward the benefit of base closings before individual costs could be tallied.¶
Similarly a proposed bipartisan measure in the 105th Congress (1997– 1999) to establish an independent campaign finance
reform commission designed to study the issue and propose reform legislation to
Congress was offered to foster consensus. Supporters from both parties argued that the
partisan and contentious process of reform was not likely to result in the enactment of
new campaign finance laws. They believed that a commission that operated outside of
the political arena stood a better chance of suggesting reforms likely to garner significant
bipartisan support in both chambers.60 Moreover, the bill sponsoring the commission
offered a way for many Republican lawmakers to cast a vote for reform without supporting the more partisan measure offered by Representatives
This would allow them to claim to support reform,
thus avoiding criticism back home as well as escaping the wrath of their party leaders.61
Christopher H. Shays (R-Conn.) and Martin T. Meehan (D-Mass.).
Prefer our ev
Prefer our ev---political science proves Congress won’t backlash if delegation
occurs
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
There is no easy answer to why Congress creates ad hoc commissions, because the
circumstances of their creation are quite complex and vary widely. Many variables go into the
decision to entrust those bodies to render nonpartisan recommendations: to pacify, to
promote incremental decision making, to build support for proposals, or to obtain consensus
among different interests. Commissions are often hybrids that result from a multitude of
congressional incentives.¶ While disputes over the desirable or proper extent of delegation are
commonplace, our understanding of such congressional action is arguable. The literature
contains several variations on the theme that policymaking is sometimes so costly—both in
terms of expertise and for political reasons—that it must be delegated to others. A number of
political scientists and economists share the assumption that people’s motives in the political
arena are essentially the same as their motives in the marketplace, resting on rational
calculations of self-interest.8 The problem of delegation is frequently derived from economic
models,9 portraying delegation as an advantageous way for lawmakers to favor
constituents,10 to minimize political losses,11 or to shift blame.12 Also considered important
are the relationships that are assumed to exist between means and ends, which enable the
lawmaker to choose the most rational means to the specified end, as well as the relationships
between the costs and benefits involved, in the interest of efficiency.
No link—interparty communication
Commissions ensure interparty communication and which make the
recommendation acceptable
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
The creation of temporary, independent bodies that give advice to Congress, develop
common-sense recommendations on complex policy issues, and find broadly acceptable
solutions to contentious problems, is an important yet under-investigated area of
congressional delegation. The term “commission” is a prevalent catch-phrase, but
these entities have taken several names. Whether designated as blue-ribbon
commissions, committees, councils, boards, or task forces, they consist mostly of
nonelected officials, deal with major social crises and policy issues, and perform
technical studies. With variations to fit the circumstances, Congress creates
commissions to accomplish diverse goals: to cope with increases in the scope and
complexity of legislation, forge consensus, draft bills, finesse institutional obstacles,
involve noncommittee and junior members in issues, coordinate strategy, and
promote interparty communication. Commissions deal with issues as disparate as
pay raises, obsolete military bases, the budget deficit, Medicare, flue-cured
tobacco, wartime relocation and internment of civilians, amateur boxing,
telemedicine, government reform, and the regulation of professional baseball.
A2 SOP Turn/plenary powers/legislative veto
I/L turn SOP
Commission policymaking’s key to democracy
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
In short, the commission fits with the incremental style of policymaking common in the
United States, and it infuses a degree of direct democracy with its bottom-up approach to
policymaking and its nonpartisan membership. The commission is a flexible device for
developing political support on controversial legislation, and for sidestepping legislative gridlock.
By delegating to a commission, Congress can resolve intractable problems because lawmakers
mitigate the side effects commonly associated with transferring responsibility and authority.
At times it may be useful to move out of conventional channels of investigation and
communication toward individuals of independent mind and stature—a strategy commonly
used to overcome the pathologies of hierarchy and specialization to which the House of
Representatives is particularly prone. Whatever its political risks, as a means to counter the
expanding influence of unchecked experts, to preserve open discussion of complex issues, and
to mobilize elite support for innovations, the independent commission often has no peer.26
Commissions key to strong SOP
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
Those on Capitol Hill value commissions for removing from an issue the political dynamics that
pervade the institution, such as parochialism and partisan gridlock, as well as for evading the
rigidities of institutionalization and the loss of an originally intended purpose that frequently
plagues other institutions in government with more restrictive bureaucratic practices. “A
commission such as the Federal Workforce Reduction and Realignment Commission44 is a
prevention of too many political interests,” noted a congressional aide. Because commissions
typically meet for a year or two, they are able to hear from and accommodate many different
interests and points of view, and they have the capacity to focus congressional as well as
public attention.¶ Commissions conform to the public’s ideal of how decisions should be
made by government. Enlisting the help of commissioners with national prominence and
competence who are also representative of diverse interests and points of view adds to public
support and confidence, something not always given to other institutions in government with
their more restrictive bureaucratic practices. This is because Congress limits a commission’s
operation to a defined purview: commissioners collect and analyze data, arrive at conclusions,
submit their recommendations, and terminate shortly there after. Commissions keep out the
politics, giving them the freedom to make impartial judgments. They help to forge policy and
agreement with the inclusion and empowerment of the practitioners who are involved in the
day-to- day implementation of policy and who can express their feelings and reactions in two-
way communication with lawmakers. “We were very mindful to allow for community
involvement,” declared a congressional aide in response to the proposed Hudson and Mohawk
Rivers National Heritage Corridor Commission.45 This method of formulating policy differs from
the often-criticized backroom methods of normal congressional procedures or the rigidities of
institutionalization and the loss of an originally intended purpose exhibited by bureaucratic
agencies. In essence, advisory commissions provide an additional check in our separated
powers system.¶ Congressional policymaking is a process driven by the transactional politics
needed to sustain coalitions. While it is often a straightforward process to attract a coalition
in favor of general statements of principle, forming actual language and detailed policies can
divide previously unified interests and splinter coalitions.46 Commissions can be helpful in
overcoming this obstacle. Leadership uses them to cultivate consensus or facilitate a
preexisting consensus, to enact or shun policy change, particularly noteworthy when
controversial legislation is at stake or when bipartisan deals on major public policy issues are
being brokered.47 Leadership can design commissions to fit issues that do not fall neatly within
committees’ jurisdictional boundaries. As one staff aide to a Northeastern Democratic senator
noted, “There is compelling reason to create a commission on something like national
educational readiness when there is an action that Congress needs to take and there clearly is
no consensus around how to do that. It may not be perfect, but it’s the best we can do under
the circumstances.Ӧ
Heg won’t lead to war
Lots of factors prevent great power conflict without hegemony
Fettweis 10 (Christopher J. Professor of Political Science at Tulane, Dangerous Times-The
International Politics of Great Power Peace, pg. 175-6)
If the only thing standing between the world and chaos is the US military presence, then an adjustment in grand strategy would be
exceptionally counter-productive. But it is worth recalling that none
of the other explanations for the decline
of war – nuclear weapons, complex economic interdependence , international and
domestic political institutions , evolution in ideas and norms – necessitate an activist
America to maintain their validity. Were American to become more restrained,
nuclear weapons would still affect the calculations of the would be aggressor ; the process
of globalization would continue, deepening the complexity of economic
interdependence; the United Nations could still deploy peacekeepers where necessary; and democracy would
not shrivel where it currently exists. More importantly, the idea that war is a worthwhile way
to resolve conflict would have no reason to return. As was argued in chapter 2, normative evolution is
typically unidirectional. Strategic restraint in such a world be virtually risk free.
CP parameters check
Delegation doesn’t violate SOP, plenary power, or lead to legislative veto---the
CP defines clear parameters for the commission
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
A frequently encountered argument against Congress’s use of ad hoc commissions is that
this form of delegation perniciously influences American government by breaking up the
democratic process, further fragmenting a system in which power is divided among
three branches of government and in which Congress is less and less subject to party discipline.62 Vocal
critics charge that commissions represent improper delegation. Representatives and senators charged with a
duty of representation abdicate their constitutional responsibility by entrusting others, who make decisions
behind closed doors, with their legislative tasks.63 If commission members had preferences identical to those of
legislators, Congress could assure itself of favorable outcomes simply by delegating to commissions with
unfettered discretion.¶ According to the political philosophy of John Locke, as exemplified by the U.S.
constitutional system of separate powers, it is thought that a power originally given cannot be delegated away.
This non-delegation doctrine would appear to limit Congress’s authority to transfer power. How much lawmaking
authority, then, can Congress delegate to another body and still stay within the realm of public law? One scholar
comments that Article I, Section 1, of the U.S. Constitution endows Congress not with “all legislative power,” but
only with the “legislative powers herein granted.”64 Congress, theoretically, is thus a “legislative body possessing
only limited powers—that is, those granted to it by the Constitution.”65¶ Congressional
delegation is
constitutionally acceptable so long as Congress establishes clear directives and limits.
These limits include standards in charters and mission statements, specific criteria or
formulas for the delegated entity’s deliberations, and procedures for mandatory review
by the legislative body. If these criteria meet adequate standards given by Congress for
conducting general policy and purpose, entities to which responsibilities are delegated may be
given the discretion to make judgments from their analyses. 66 As the Supreme Court
noted in Yakus v. United States, “Congress is not confined to that method of executing its
policy which involves the least possible delegation of discretion to administrative
officers.”67
Congress gets the final say---that solves because Congress is the one ultimately
deciding
SOP wrong--emprics
Zero chance of power balance shift---even if the CP is perceived as
transparently political blame-shifting—it empirically works
Mayer 7
(Kenneth R. Mayer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, “The Base Realignment and Closure
Process: Is it Possible to Make Rational Policy?,” December 2007,
http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kmayer/Professional/Base%20Realignment%20and%20Closure%20Process.pdf)
Legislative delegation – the creation of external agents vested with the authority to make
decisions on Congress’ behalf – is a longstanding feature of American national government. 9
Despite a constitutional principle against delegation of legislative power (Fisher 1990, 226),
federal courts have generally allowed broad delegations of legislative power as long as
Congress articulates coherent principles as to how that power should be exercised.10
Legislators may choose to delegate because they lack technical expertise, wish to transfer
political blame, recognize that formal administrative processes may result in better policy, or
because they are politically unable to make policy decisions themselves (Epstein and
O’Halloran 1999; Becker 2005).
A2 Perms
A2 perm do both
CP leads to coalition-building which is key to solve politics--the perm destroys
this
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
Congressional policymaking is a process driven by the transactional politics needed to
sustain coalitions. While it is often a straightforward process to attract a coalition in
favor of general statements of principle, forming actual language and detailed policies
can divide previously unified interests and splinter coalitions.46 Commissions can be
helpful in overcoming this obstacle. Leadership uses them to cultivate consensus or
facilitate a preexisting consensus, to enact or shun policy change, particularly
noteworthy when controversial legislation is at stake or when bipartisan deals on major public policy
issues are being brokered.47 Leadership can design commissions to fit issues that do not fall neatly within committees’
jurisdictional boundaries. As one staff aide to a Northeastern Democratic senator noted, “There
is compelling reason
to create a commission on something like national educational readiness when there is
an action that Congress needs to take and there clearly is no consensus around how to do that. It
may not be perfect, but it’s the best we can do under the circumstances.”
Perm links to politics—involving Congress makes independent and neutral
compromises of congress fail which doesn’t resolve the politics link
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
“As the world is changing,” wrote former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, “we need to be flexible and find ways to
get people with competence in a room together to solve problems.”15 When used astutely, ad hoc
commissions foster bargaining, consensus, and compromise in relation to policy
proposals, mitigating conflict within Congress that might incapacitate the institution. Such
commissions help elected officials make necessary but unpopular decisions and deal
with complex social crises, policy issues, and studies. This is largely because
commissions are usually in a better position to perform in a visibly fair and politically
neutral manner that increases the perceived caliber and efficacy of their eventual
product. People on Capitol Hill acknowledge that Congress lacks the time to legislate every detail of
every issue, and that some actions necessary in the public interest are so sensitive that they
can be taken only if they are not subjected to an up-or-down rollcall vote. At their most
productive, commissions provide Congress with a flexible option for policymaking. They
are especially valuable tools when controversial and elaborate legislation is at stake.
When Congress faces a huge problem such as health care, rather than looking at the entire solution, it acts
sequentially, approaching the solution in small steps, building policy and agreement from the bottom up.
Commissions work well for this process because they are an incremental step toward a
policy end. Through commissions, Congress acquires an informed and timely baseline for decision making that
may otherwise be subject to uncoordinated or political criteria. Appointing a commission can shift responsibility
from lawmakers for a year or so while the commision deliberates. Further ,
commissions avoid the
rigidities of institutionalization and the loss of an originally intended purpose, both of
which frequently plague other institutions in government. This is because their
operation is limited to a defined purview: they collect and analyze data, arrive at
conclusions, submit their recommendations, and terminate shortly thereafter—an
attractive feature to a Congress that is increasingly made up of relatively conservative
members who express skepticism about many federal agencies.16 Finally, commissions
fit a pluralistic decision making process that conforms to the public’s ideal of how
decisions should be made by government—from the bottom up. A plebiscitary quality has seeped into
legislative life.17 And the ad hoc commission can be a more direct avenue of communication between
constituents and lawmakers than the committee rooms and chamber floors of Capitol Hill, for commissions
enable all the major political interests affected by a given situation to be represented by appointment.
A2 perm do the CP
‘Resolved’ means the plan has to be certain to pass
Kernerman Dictionary 6 - Kernerman English Multilingual Dictionary, 2006, “Resolve,”
online: http://www.thefreedictionary.com/resolution
1 to make a firm decision (to do something) I've resolved to stop smoking. 2 to pass (a
resolution) It was resolved that women should be allowed to join the society.
It severs the requirement that the plan should happen:
“Should” means immediate
Summers 94
(Justice, Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 11-8-1994, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant,” online:
http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14)
The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May 18
order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.14 ¶ ***TO FOOTNOTES¶ In
praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990).
In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective , as
opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct.
FOOTNOTES¶ The answer to this query is not to be divined
from rules of grammar;15 it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal
professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the
critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or
336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).¶ ***END
would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four
corners of the entire record. Nisi prius orders should be so construed as to give effect to every words and every part of the text, with a view to
carrying out the evident intent of the judge's direction.17 The order's language ought not to be considered abstractly. The actual meaning
intended by the document's signatory should be derived
from the context in which the phrase to be
interpreted is used.18 When applied to the May 18 memorial, these told canons impel my
conclusion that the judge doubtless intended his ruling as an in praesenti resolution of
Dollarsaver's quest for judgment n.o.v. Approval of all counsel plainly appears on the
face of the critical May 18 entry which is [885 P.2d 1358] signed by the judge.19 True minutes20 of a court neither call for nor
bear the approval of the parties' counsel nor the judge's signature. To reject out of hand the view that in this context "should" is impliedly
ritualistic
formalism now so thoroughly condemned in national jurisprudence and long abandoned
by the statutory policy of this State.
followed by the customary, "and the same hereby is", makes the court once again revert to medieval notions of
It also means mandatory---introducing uncertainty severs
Summers 94
(Justice, Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 11-8-1994, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant,” online:
http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14)
Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating
preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors
"should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory
negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an obligation and to be more than advisory);
Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, 802 P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to
the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an
obligation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958)
("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury
which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony").
The CP is a non-binding recommendation
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
With official status recognized by Congress, ad hoc commissions have a policy
formulation responsibility limited to an issue or group of related questions (bodies that are set up to
investigate wrongdoing, to assign responsibility for disasters, or to make explicit and detailed studies of internal
management are not considered a part of this grouping). But
because they are largely advisory and
rarely have power to implement their findings or recommendations, they are
infrequently mandated with administrative authority, except for the powers conferred on them to
assist them in collecting and gathering information. Because these entities consist in whole or in part of persons
from private life, they can be distinguished from congressional select or special committees, which may be
confused with commissions.3 In most instances advisory commissions hold hearings and request written
submissions from interested persons and organizations, secure information from federal departments or
agencies, conclude with the publication of a report, and close down. The report may include findings uncovered
during testimony, staff studies, background papers, preliminary reports, legal analyses, final reports, and
statistical surveys.
“The” means whole
Webster’s 5
(Merriam Webster’s Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary)
4 -- used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to
a group as a whole <the elite>
“Government” means all three branches
Black’s Law 90
(Dictionary, p. 695)
“[Government] In the U nited S tates, government consists of the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches in addition to administrative agencies.
In a broader sense, includes the federal government and all its
agencies and bureaus, state and county governments, and city and township governments.”
The CP’s fundamentally distinct from the normal legislative process---it’s not
USFG or normal means
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
So why and when does Congress formulate policy by commissions rather than by the
normal legislative process? Lawmakers have historically delegated authority to others
who could accomplish ends they could not. Does this form of congressional
delegation thus reflect the particularities of an issue area? Or does it mirror
deeper structural reasons such as legislative organization, time, or manageability?
In the end, what is the impact on representation versus the effectiveness of
delegating discretionary authority to temporary entities composed largely of
unelected officials, or are both attainable together?
The commission can’t enact the plan on its own
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
There is some basis for these arguments against commissions. Congressional
leadership may design a commission to allow friendly groups more points of
access to members of Congress. For example, special interests could come before
the temporary body to plead their case, out of the public view. But as so many on
Capitol Hill will say, it is the elected officials who must decide whether to adopt
commission recommendations. Legislators accept ultimate responsibility, Congress still
determines the basic outlines of national policy, lawmakers remain the paramount
representatives of constituents, and the legislative branch is the central agency for
legitimizing the decisions of government. In addition, commission
recommendations are only advisory. No changes in public policy occur on the
authority of a commission. Commissions do not make policy, for their actions do not
have the force of law. The implementation of a commission’s recommendations is
left to the determination of specific authorization by Congress. But as a legislative
director to a mid-Atlantic Democratic representative observed, a commission is
similar to a jury: “If you don’t give them [commissioners] firm marching orders,
they may not address the problem you want them to address.”
A2 Theory
Predictable
The CP’s predictable---it’s a consistent alternative to the normal legislative
process
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
Ad hoc commissions as instruments of government have a long history. They are used by
almost all units and levels of government for almost every conceivable task. Ironically,
the use which Congress makes of commissions— preparing the groundwork for
legislation, bringing public issues into the spotlight, whipping legislation into
shape, and giving priority to the consideration of complex, technical, and critical
developments—receives relatively little attention from political scientists. As
noted in earlier chapters, following the logic of rational choice theory, individual
decisions to delegate are occasioned by imperfect information; legislators who
want to develop effective policies, but who lack the necessary expertise, often
delegate fact-finding and policy development. Others contend that some
commissions are set up to shift blame in order to maximize benefits and minimize
losses.
The process for commissions is standardized—CP follows the normal rules for a
commission
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
Until recently there was little standardization of the features, organization, or
procedures of commissions. A degree of continuity emerged with the enactment in 1972
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), which created requirements for the
management and oversight of Federal advisory entities.4 While the statute concentrated
on advisory committees established by mission agencies, its jurisdiction also covered
national commissions created by legislative statute and presidential decree. Under
Section 3 of the statute, advisory bodies are any committee, board, commission,
council, conference, panel, task force, or other similar group, or any subcommittee
or other subgroup thereof, which is established¶ • by statute or reorganization
plan;¶ • by the president by executive order;¶ • by one or more agencies;¶ • by law
where the Congress specifically directs the president or an agency to establish it;¶ •
by law where the Congress authorizes but does not direct the president or an
agency to establish it;¶ • by an agency under general agency authority in Title 5 of
the U.S. Code or other general agency-authorizing law.¶ At the heart of FACA is a
series of provisions that maximize the public and broadly representative nature of the
panels; the provisions also minimize presidential dominance—at least in the eyes
of a Congress resentful of an imperial presidency.5
A2 Private Actor Fiat
The commission members are no longer private actors once it’s established
Campbell 2
(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,
visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:
Government by Commission)
Sometimes referred to as the “fifth arm of government,”1 commissions are formal groups
established by statute or decree. They have multiple members, with each commissioner sharing
equally the responsibility for findings and recommendations. They are sunsetted, limited more
or less to a definite time frame to complete work, usually one to two years from the time of creation to the
final report to Congress. In some cases, however, Congress may propose a commission to extend over several years. The Commission on a North
American Economic Alliance, for example, was designed in 1979 to study the development and utilization of the resources of the United States, Mexico,
and Canada, submitting annual reports to Congress until its termination in 1985. Generally speaking, a commission’s mandate includes a termination
date more than three years after the date of creation or at a specified date upon submittal of its recommendations or alternatives, which is anywhere
from thirty to ninety days after its final report to Congress. Commissions come in various sizes and shapes, with membership ranging anywhere from
nine to twenty commissioners, twelve to fifteen being the normal number of members. The final
number of commissioners will generally accommodate equal appointments by the majority and
minority in both the House and Senate as well as by the president.2 With official status
recognized by Congress, ad hoc commissions have a policy formulation responsibility limited
to an issue or group of related questions (bodies that are set up to investigate wrongdoing, to
assign responsibility for disasters, or to make explicit and detailed studies of internal management are not considered a part
of this grouping). But because they are largely advisory and rarely have power to implement their findings or recommendations, they are infrequently
mandated with administrative authority, except for the powers conferred on them to assist them in collecting and gathering information. Because
these entities consist in whole or in part of persons from private life, they can be distinguished from congressional select or special committees, which
may be confused with commissions.3 In most instances advisory commissions hold hearings and request written submissions from interested persons
and organizations, secure information from federal departments or agencies, conclude with the publication
of a report, and close
down. The report may include findings uncovered during testimony, staff studies, background
papers, preliminary reports, legal analyses, final reports, and statistical surveys.
Theory, and answers to the politics of the creation of the commission
Process Good
1. Our interpretation is 1 process Counterplan that substantially differs from
the normal legislative process
2. Process counterplans are key to test the immediacy and certainty of the plan
– that’s necessary to current events disadvantages and logical problem-solving
which is a portable impact to debate.
3. There’s resolutional basis – “resolved” and “should” imply immediacy and
certainty of plan action which makes the counterplan predictable.
4. DAs to the CP check
5. We don’t mandate the plan’s passage—say no args and defense of the
normal legislative process checks abuse
6. Functional competition is more real world- Congressmen fight over
implementation, not how the bill is specifically worded
7. Evaluate theory in terms of reasonability– competing interpretations
encourages debaters to go for theory over substance which makes their
education impacts inevitable. Also just a reason to reject the argument not the
team.