Rational Choice + Review

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Individuals who are caught and sanctioned by the criminal justice system will be less likely to re-offend

◦ Does prison reduce recidivism?

◦ Do “deterrence based” programs reduce recidivism?

 BOOT CAMPS

 INTENSIVE PROBATION

SPECIFIC DETERRENCE

1

Nature of Boot Camp (BC)

Relation to Deterrence Theory

◦ Other vague theories tied into (BC)

Evidence

◦ Over 35 experiments of reasonable quality conducted

◦ Most find no difference, the few that find differences go both ways

◦ Some evidence that BC with strong rehab component and good “aftercare” reduces crime

Boot Camps

2

Intensive Supervision

Probation

The nature of ISP

◦ Make probation meaner

Tie to deterrence

◦ Pain + Reduced opportunity to offend

RAND experiment

◦ 10 sites across country with random assignment

◦ No difference in arrest for new crimes

◦ ISP groups much more likely to get technical violations

3

Randomly assign d.v. strategies to police officers

◦ Arrest, Counsel, or Separate for 8 hours

◦ Arrest as painful “deterrent”

Findings:

Arrest = 10% re-arrested after 3 months

Counseling = 19%

Separate = 24%

BUT: Replications not supportive

◦ May work better with people who are tied to community

Minneapolis domestic violence study (Larry Sherman)

4

What about JOE?

5

University of Arizona

◦ Money from Joe to see whether his jails reduced crime

Comparison of cohorts of inmates pre-Joe and during-Joe

◦ There was no difference in recidivism rates

Joe’s Study

6

Weak empirical support

◦ If anything, the certainty of punishment may have marginal effects on crime

 Clearance rate, focused deterrence, etc.

WHY SO WEAK?

◦ Based on “weak” theory—weak assumptions

◦ Limits of deterrence in a democratic society

◦ MARGINAL vs. ABSOLUTE

Conclusions Regarding Empirical

Support

7

Policy Implications of Deterrence

Policy Implication = If the theory is correct, what can be done to reduce crime?

Rehabilitation, (unless painful) won’t work, and may

“send the wrong message”

Raising the certainty, swiftness or severity of criminal penalties will work

If system cannot be swift, severe and certain enough, then reduce opportunities for offending

◦ Incapacitation

8

A thug in prison can’t shoot your sister

◦ Easy (thought expensive) to do—we have the technology

◦ Common sense/logic dictates that some crime reduction will be achieved

Incapacitation

9

How well does it work?

◦ Comparing states to each other

◦ Projecting crime savings from surveys of people entering jails

◦ Examining states that are forced to release inmates

Works best for high rate offenses

(burglary, robbery, theft)—not at all for homicide

 Doubling prison population from 400K to 800K reduced robbery by 18%

Incapacitation II

10

Downsides

◦ Least effective for crimes that most scare

Americans (rape, homicide)

◦ EXPENSIVE

 Marginal effects—the more you do it the less it works.

 Fighting the “age crime curve”

◦ May be counter productive over long term

(nothing positive happening in prison)

Incapacitation III

11

Fear of Informal Sanctions is not

“Deterrence theory.”

◦ Informal social control theory (Hirschi, others)

However, formal sanctions may “kick in” informal sanctions.

◦ Arrest may disappoint parents

◦ Prison may alienate family/friends

What About Informal Sanctions?

12

Neo Classical Theory Part II

Rational Choice Theory

Routine Activities Theory

Situational Crime Prevention

Economics (language, theory)

◦ “Expected Utility” = calculation of all risks and rewards

◦ This is much broader than deterrence

 Includes risks not associated with criminal justice

Same core assumption as deterrence theory

◦ Human nature = rational, calculating, hedonistic

◦ This is because “economic theory” (supply/demand, rational consumers) has the same “classical school” roots

“Rational Choice Theory”

How “RATIONAL” is the offender?

◦ PURE RATIONALITY = only expected utility

(rational calculation of risk/reward) matters

 Few theories, if any, take this position

◦ LIMITED RATIONALITY

 Information/time limited (quick, “rough” decisions)

 Other “things” matters

◦ CORNISH AND CLARKE good example

Rationality Assumption

Crime as a Rational Choice

◦ Criminal Involvement: the decision to engage in crime (versus other activity)

◦ Criminal Event: factors that influence the decision to commit a specific crime

Cornish and Clarke (1986)

Choices to become involved in crime, to continue in crime, and to desist from crime

◦ Each (involvement, continuance, desistence) need separate explanation

◦ Involvement decisions are “multistage and multifactor,” extending over long time periods

MOST PEOPLE WANT MONEY/STUFF, WHY DO

SOME CHOOSE TO BURGAL (RATHER THAN

WORK) TO GET IT?

Criminal Involvement

Example of factors that explain initial involvement:

Background Factors

◦ temperament, intelligence, cognitive style, sex, class, education, neighborhood, broken home…

Previous experience

◦ Direct and vicarious learning, moral attitudes, self-perception, foresight and planning

Solutions evaluated

◦ Degree of effort, amount/immediacy of reward, likelihood and severity of punishment, moral costs

What happened to our “rational” offender guided by “free will?”

◦ In their models, rational thinking and free will are very constrained/limited

◦ Not much different from other theories of crime

 Borrow liberally from learning theory, psychology, social control theory…

◦ At what point does their theory cease to be a

“rational choice” model and start to become a learning, social control, IQ theory of crime?

Criticisms

Focus on predictors of specific crimes, look at immediate (situational) factors

◦ GIVEN THAT SOMEONE IS OK WITH BURGLING,

WHAT LEADS THEM TO BURGAL A SPECIFIC HOUSE

IN A SPECIFIC NEIGHBHOOD?

Area

◦ Easily accessible, few police patrols, low security

Home

◦ anyone home?, especially wealthy, detached, bushes/other cover, dog, security system...

The Criminal Event

Interviews with Federal Inmates involved in drug smuggling

How “rational” are they?

◦ Shipping Insurance

◦ Methods for evading detection (high end electronics, study of interdiction methods/patterns, etc.)

Still…

◦ Tendency to overestimate rewards and minimize thinking about risks.

The Criminal Event in Drug

Smuggling

Empirical Support?

 Criminal Involvement

▪ Ethnographic research suggests limited (if any) rational reasoning or weighing of costs/benefits.

 Criminal Event

▪ Ethnographic research somewhat supportive, but many crimes suggest limited/crude appraisals.

▪ Attempt to evade detection

Parsimony and Scope?

Policy Implication?

Evaluating Rational Choice

Crime as the

Convergence in Time and Space of Three

Factors

◦ 1. Motivated Offenders

◦ 2. Suitable Targets

◦ 3. Lack of Capable

Guardianship

Scope: “Direct-Contact

Predatory Crimes”

◦ Felson  in 1990s extended to white collar crime, drug crime

Routine Activities Theory (Cohen and Felson)

Assumption is that they are always present

◦ Criticized for this (really a theory of crime?)

Mostly explains “victimization” or the

“criminal event”

◦ Similar to Cornish and Clarke in that respect

Motivated offenders taken for granted

Value ($, ability to fence)

◦ Some universal ($) some dependent upon offenders environment

Visibility (sights and sounds)

Inertia (why autos are victimized, high tech movement)

Access (cul-de-sac vs open-ended street, garage parking vs. street parking)

Suitable Targets

Protection from police??

◦ Less emphasis in this over time

Informal social control

◦ “…not usually someone who brandishes a gun or threatens an offender with quick punishment, but rather someone whose mere presence serves as a gentle reminder that someone is looking.”

Strength in numbers

Time spent at home

Lack of Capable Guardianship

Social indicators better, poverty declines….

Changes in “Routine Activities”

◦ Time spent away from home increases

(Guardianship and suitability)

 Women in workforce and college

 More vacation, national park visits increase,

◦ Cheaper, lighter goods (suitability)

 Televisions in 1960s averaged 38 pounds, down to

15 pounds in 1970

Why did crime increase in the post

WWII era?

Empirical Support

◦ WHY DOES PROPERTY CRIME INCREASE

DURING ECONOMIC PROSPERTIY?

◦ Household activity ratio related to crime

◦ Criminal “Hotspots” within high crime areas

◦ Prison Studies (% time outside of cell)

◦ Victimization Studies

Criticism? Confirming common sense.

Evaluating Routine Activities

Theory

In deterrence theory, if the CJS (e.g., threat of arrest/imprisonment) is not effective, the only other option is incapacitation (removing offender from society).

◦ This has been the preferred U.S. strategy

Rational Choice and Routine Activities Theory suggest that we can remove or limit the opportunity to offend by changing the environment.

◦ This has been the preferred strategy in the UK

◦ Benefit of this approach over incapacitation??

Policy Implications

Deterrence vs. Environmental

Crim

Technique

Increase the effort for crime

Harden targets

Examples

Control access to facilities

Steering column locks, tamperproof packaging

Electronic access to garages

Control tools/weapons Smart guns, plastic beer glasses in taverns

Examples of Situational

Crime Prevention (Ronald

Clarke)

Street lighting, defensible space

Utilize place managers Two clerks in convenience stores

Strengthen formal surveillance Burglar alarms, security guards

Technique

Reduce Reward

Remove targets

Examples

Identify property

Removable car radios, women’s refuges

Property marking, cattle branding

Reduce Provocations

Reduce emotional arousal

Control drugs/alcohol

Controls on violent pornography

Avoid disputes

Examples of Situational

Remove Excuses for Crime

Set rules

Fixed cab fares, reduce crowding in

Crime Prevention II

Breathalyzers in bars, alcohol-free events

Study of police crackdowns and

“catchment areas”

◦ Crime displacement may be less prevalent than expected

◦ There may be some diffusion of benefits from crime prevention efforts

Does crime just go around the corner?

Roots in classical school (1750-1850)

◦ Commonality = humans as rational calculators

◦ Renewed interest 1970s-present

 Fit with conservative ideology

Main Flavors

◦ Deterrence

◦ Rational Choice

◦ Routine Activities

Review of Neoclassical Approach

Formal punishment

◦ Swift, Certain, Severe

Types

◦ Specific vs. General

◦ Absolute vs. Marginal

◦ Focused deterrence

Evidence converges on importance of certainty over severity

Deterrence Theory

Much broader than deterrence

◦ What factors to humans consider when choosing whether or not to commit crime?

 Criminal event vs. Criminal Involvement

Most RCT integrate concepts from other theories

◦ Common criticism: lots of things in the theory

(sex, impulsivity, moral values) that limit free will

Rational Choice Theory

Very similar to “criminal event” decisions in rational choice theory

◦ What immediate factors influence whether a criminal event will occur?

 Target Suitability

 Guardianship

◦ Policy implication = situational crime prevention

Routine Activities Theory

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