Crisis Decisionmaking, Disaster Response,
and Emergent Networks
PADM 523 & 524 Summer 2010
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Characteristics Defining a Crisis
Crises are defined as situations involving:
Threats to major values—high organizational and
personal stakes.
Time urgency; time pressures.
Ambiguity or uncertainty.
Surprise or uniqueness.
Insufficient information.
1. Jerrold M Post. 1993. “The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers,” in
Avoiding Inadvertent War, ed. A. George. Boulder: Westview Press.
2. Alan Dowty. 1979. “U.S. Decision-Making Under Stress: 1973,” International Political
Science Association.
3. Irving Janis and Leo Mann. 1977. Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of
Conflict, Choice, and Commitment. New York: The Free Press.
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Crises and Crisis Management
Crisis situations are by definition novel, unstructured, and
well outside of an organization’s or individual’s customary
operating framework.
Crises require nonprogrammed decisional responses.
Crises are highly uncertain and complex situations.
Crises are characterized by an overload of incomplete,
conflicting information.
The process of perceiving, selecting, and processing this
information is critical to effective crisis management
Reilly, A.H. 1993. “Preparing for the Worst: The Process of Effective Crisis Management.”
Industrial and Environmental Quarterly. Vol. 7, No. 2. Page 118.
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THE ROLE OF INFORMATION
IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT
CRISIS ATTRIBUTES
(Source: Reilly, A.H. 1993. “Preparing for the Worst: The
Process of Effective Crisis Management.” Industrial and
Environmental Quarterly. Vol. 7, No. 2.)
PROBLEM
SENSING
EVENT
PERCEPTION
PROBLEM/THREAT
DIAGNOSIS
CRISIS MANAGEMENT
CRISIS
OUTCOMES
DECISION
RESPONSE
RESOURCE
MOBILIZATION
RESPONSE ACTIONS
INTERNAL
INFORMATION
FLOW
DECISIONS
AND ACTIONS
EXTERNAL
INFORMATION
FLOW
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Tasks of the Crisis Decisionmaker
Define the principal elements of the situation
Maintain receptivity to new information
Identify and adequately consider the major values, interests,
and objectives to be fulfilled
Search for and evaluate alternative courses of action
Estimate probable costs and risks of alternatives
Seek new information pertinent to assessment of options
Discern relevant/important from irrelevant/trivial information
Consider problems that arise in implementing options
Assess the situation from the perspective of other parties
Resist both defensive avoidance and premature closure
Monitor the developing situation and make adjustments.
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Characteristics of Defective Decisionmaking
in a Crisis—Decisional Dysfunctions
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A truncated and compressed time span, with much more
attention paid to the immediate consequences of action than to
long-range consequences;
A perceived requirement for decisional closure—i.e., rushed
decisions—which may in turn lead to premature action; or,
conversely,
A tendency toward defensive avoidance, e.g., procrastination;
Cognitive rigidity, a tendency to maintain a fixed mind-set and
not be open to new information; diminished creativity.
A tendency to reduce cognitive complexity and uncertainty;
A reduction of the range of options considered;
Jerrold M. Post. 1993. “The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers,” in Avoiding
Inadvertent War, edited by A. George. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Page 475.
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Defective Decisionmaking
In considering options, a tendency to “bolster,” that is to
overvalue and overcommit to factors favor the desired action
prescription and devalue and set aside factors militating against
that desired course of action.
A tendency toward faulty historical analogies;
A tendency toward the fundamental attribution bias: To see the
other’s actions as being precipitated by internal (psychological)
causes rather than external circumstances (example: my
adversary’s actions show that s/he is malevolently out to destroy
us, rather than that s/he responding to external threats;
demonization, caricature.
With sustained cognitive conflict and increasing value conflict,
there is a tendency toward the emotional loading of chosen
options: Choices are often rationalized by such statements as
“We've run out of options,” when in fact good options remain to
be considered.
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PERFORMANCE/STRESS CURVE
Source: Post, Jerrold M. 1993. “The Impact
of Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers.”
PERFORMANCE
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Decisionmaking Patterns
Vigilance – follows a methodical, high-quality process to
objectively collect available information, thoroughly consider it,
search for other possible options, and make a well reasoned
decision.
Unconflicted adherence – continuing with the current situation.
Unconflicted change – following the last advice received.
Defensive avoidance – avoiding decision making.
Hypervigilance – The Inability to distinguish (or discern) the
critical or crucial from the unimportant; equal attentiveness to all
stimuli; undifferentiated scanning; leads to a vacillating approach.
Source: Fink, Steven. 1986. Crisis Management: Planning for the Inevitable. New York:
Amacom. Pages 133–150.
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A Definition of “Groupthink”
“a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are
deeply involved in a cohesive in-group…members’ striving
for unanimity override their motivation to realistically
appraise alternate courses of action… a deterioration of
mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgement that
results from in-group pressures.”
Source: Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. “From Group Think to Teamthink: Toward
the Creation of Constructive Thought Patterns in Self-Managing Work Teams.” Human
Relations. Vol. 47, No. 8. Derived from Victims of Groupthink, by I.L. Janis (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 9 in Groupthink.
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Antecedent Conditions for “Groupthink”
Primary: A moderately or highly cohesive group.
Structural or administrative faults in the organization in which the group
exists, including:
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Insulation of the group.
The group leader’s preference for a certain decision.
A lack of norms requiring methodical decisionmaking
procedures for the group.
Homogeneity of the group members’ social background and
ideology.
High stress from external threats with low hope of a better solution than
the leader’s solution—based in turn on over-reliance on the leader and
his or her framing of situations.
Relatively low levels of group self-esteem, often induced by the group’s
perception of recent failures, excessive difficulty of current
decisionmaking tasks, and moral dilemmas (for instance., apparent lack
of feasible alternatives except ones that violate ethical standards).
Source: Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. “From Group Think to Teamthink: Toward the Creation of Constructive
Thought Patterns in Self-Managing Work Teams.” Human Relations. Vol. 47, No. 8. Derived from Victims of
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Groupthink, by I.L. Janis (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Pages2 and 3.
Symptoms of “Groupthink”
Direct social pressure placed on a member who argues
against the group’s shared beliefs.
Members’ self-censorship of their own thoughts or
concerns that deviate from the group consensus.
An illusion of the group’s invulnerability to failure.
A shared illusion of unanimity.
The emergence of self-appointed mind guards that screen
out information from outside the group.
Collective efforts to rationalize.
Stereotyped views of potential adversaries outside the
group.
Unquestioned belief in the group’s inherent morality.
Source: Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. “From Group Think to Teamthink: Toward the Creation of Constructive Thought
Patterns in Self-Managing Work Teams.” Human Relations. Vol. 47, No. 8. Derived from Victims of Groupthink, by I.L. Janis
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(Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 3.
Correlative Symptoms of Defective
Decisionmaking
Incomplete survey of alternatives.
Incomplete survey of objectives.
Failure to examine risks of preferred choices.
Failure to reappraise initially rejected alternatives.
Poor information search.
Selective bias in processing information at hand.
Failure to work out contingency plans.
Source: Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. “From Group Think to Teamthink: Toward the Creation of Constructive Thought
Patterns in Self-Managing Work Teams.” Human Relations. Vol. 47, No. 8. Derived from Victims of Groupthink, by I.L. Janis
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 3.
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Decisional Limits in Disaster Response
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Research shows that while authority, leadership, and
accountability are necessary in any event, collaboration functions
better than over-centralized command and control approaches in
major crises (Drabek & McEntire, 2002).
Complex disasters necessitate decentralized decision making
structures and collaborative networks of exchange and support. A
decentralized network will often emerge in the post-event
environment of a large-scale disaster. The challenge is to
maximize collaboration and communication across that network.
Disasters disrupt the patterns of what can be absorbed by routine
procedures. As Tierney (2002) states, these types of events are
largely defined by the need for improvised responses—but not
entirely improvised. Rather, emergent organization shapes
responses based on a combination of experience & improvisation.
– Drabek T. E. and D.A. McEntire. 2002. Emergent Phenomena and Multi-organizational
Coordination in Disasters: Lessons from the Research Literature. International Journal of
Mass Emergencies and Disasters. August, 22(2), 197-224.
– Tierney, K.J. 2002. “Lessons Learned from Research on Group and Organizational
Responses to Disasters.” Paper presented at Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from
Natural and Technological Disasters. Academy of Sciences, February 28 – March 1
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Incident Management Systems
“A generic term for the design of ad hoc emergency management
teams that coordinate the efforts of more than one agency under a
unified command” (p.1)
A functional management system that integrates personnel from
different home organizations
Involve identification of an incident manager or unified management
team when jurisdictional areas or responsibilities overlap
Standard terminology facilitates cooperation (although some minor
regional variance remains)
Rules for chain of command, unity of command, and span of control
Protocols for communications and flow of information
Emphasis on logistics planning and centralized resources allocation
Planning functions on an equal level with operations and logistics
functions
Christen, H., P. Maniscalco, A. Vickery, and F. Winslow. 2001. “An Overview of Incident Management Systems.”
Perspectives on Preparedness. Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness. No. 4 (September).
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Emergent Organization in Disaster Response
Even with IMS in place, disasters evoke emergent responses.
 “Emergence is likely when members perceive a present threat, when the social
climate is supportive of emergence, when social ties are in place – at least to
some degree – before the mobilization, when the social setting legitimizes the
groups, and when resources are available (Quarantelli et al., 1983).”
This is so given that major disasters—catastrophes—involve situations where:
 Most or all of the community built structure is heavily impacted...[and] the
facilities and operational bases of most emergency organizations are
themselves usually hit
 Local officials are unable to undertake their usual work role, and this often
extends into the recovery period
 Help from nearby communities cannot be provided
 Most, if not all, of the everyday community functions are sharply and
concurrently interrupted
 The mass media system, especially in recent times, socially constructs
catastrophes even more than they do disasters
 Because of the previous five processes, the political arena becomes even
more important
“…[Therefore] the level of emergence necessary to contend with these severe and
unanticipated conditions is likely to be greater than would occur in more typical
disaster situations.”
Quarantelli, E.L., with K.E. Green, E. Ireland, S. McCabe, and D.M. Neal. 1983. Emergent Citizen Groups in Disaster
Preparedness and Recovery Activities: An Interim Report. Newark DE. University of Delaware, Disaster Research Center.
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Emergent Networks
 Emergent Multi-Organizational Networks (EMONs):
 The “structure of relationships that form among organizations, or
segments of organizations, that are focused on a specific
[activities or response functions]” (Drabek, 1996: 21-11)
 Form during the emergency period for a limited time in order to
address emerging needs
 In catastrophic events, EMONS are often simultaneously
comprised of a range of established, expanding, extending, and
emergent organizations.
 Emergent organizational networks are defined as such not
necessarily because they are comprised of emergent groups, but
because of the newly formed relations between organizations

Drabek, T.E. 1996. The Social Dimensions of Disaster. Washington, DC: Federal
Emergency Management Agency.
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Emergent Groups: Benefits and
Challenges
May be able to act more
quickly as they are outside of a
formal bureaucracy
May have a better pulse of
what emerging needs are as
they connected to emergent
systems and networks
May meet needs unidentified
or not being met by formal
systems
May not be governed by the
same standards or systems of
oversight as formal
organizations
May have less of a feel for
emerging needs as they not
necessarily part of the formal
network where certain
information is directed to
May generate overlap and
compete with existing systems
May be characterized by
unclear leadership
May have unstable definitions
of tasks and roles
Drabek, T.E. and D.A. McEntire. 2003. Emergent Phenomena and the Sociology of Disaster: Lessons, Trends
and Opportunities from the Research Literature. Disaster Prevention and Management, 12(2): 97-112.
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Role of Personal Convergence in
Emergent Groups and Networks
Personal or people convergence involves the influx
of people to areas associated with the disaster
milieu (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003; Fritz &
Mathewson, 1957).
- Fritz, C. and J. H. Mathewson. 1957. Convergent Behavior: A Disaster Control Problem.
Special Report for the Committee on Disaster Studies. National Academy of Sciences,
Washington, D. C.
- Kendra, James M., and Tricia Wachtendorf, 2003. Reconsidering Convergence and
Converger Legitimacy in Response to the World Trade Center Disaster. Terrorism and
Disaster: New Threats, New Ideas (ed. Lee Clarke). Research in Social Problems and
Public Policy (11), 97-122.
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Network Visibility
As existing groups take on new roles or other
groups emerge, information about key organizations
is often not known across the social network.
In catastrophic events where convergence and
emergence may play an even larger role than in
typical disasters, network visibility, which allows for
both open and coordinated systems, becomes
paramount. Networks need to take visible form so
that communications and role and task structuring
can begin to take shape as well.
- Wachtendorf, T., B. Brown, J. Holguin-Veras, and S. Ukkusuri, and Perez. (In
preparation). Network Visibility in Emergency Supply Chain Management.
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In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, emergent groups—
previously existing groups undertaking new tasks or with
new organizational arrangements—and established
organizations all formed new organizational networks as
they contended with the many response needs. Some
groups played more dominant roles than others in different
stages of the response and early recovery, with respect to
different tasks, and in working with different communities.
Some activities, such as Coast Guard search-and-rescue
were so pre-programmed and at the same time apt for the
situation at hand, that they were immediately deployable,
and they also formed nuclei for the self-organization of
emergent responses.
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Katrina Experience—Decisional failures
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Lack of adequate plans for things like evacuation
Flawed local planning process
Loss of local command and control facilities
Lack of coordination among organizations of all types:
volunteers in boats and buses, Coast Guard, Red Cross,
medication
Lack of initiative, as in the waste of city buses which could
have been mobilized for evacuation and instead ended up
under water.
Lack of creativity or resilience, as in the instance of refusal of
Amtrak’s offer to fill its last train out of the city with evacuees
Lack of expertise
Governor’s refusal to nationalize National Guard; political
pettiness.
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Strategic View of Disaster Response
Defining, articulating:
What is the nature
and scope of the
emergency? What are
the values involved
(those threatened and
those in prospect)?
What operational
capabilities*
and resources
are required?
*Capability =
organizational capacity
+ individual skill &
experience
Strategic
managerial
leadership:
individual and
systemic
What authorizers &
resources need be
involved, and aligned?
White House, FEMA,
Governor, Mayor,
Red Cross, etc.
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