INTR13/71/72-310
R. James Ferguson © 2007
Week 12:
The New International Relations From Crisis Management to Strategic Governance
Topics: 1. Political Realism as the Lessons of Conflict
2. Adaptive Change in Strategic Thought: From Human Security Towards
Humane Governance
3. Diversifying Pragmatism in the 21st Century
4. Bibliography and Further Reading
1. Political Realism as the Lessons of Conflict
Realism and neo-realism (structural realism) has provided some genuine insights
into the international system, and remains an important safeguard against 'wishful
thinking' and 'utopian idealism', both of which can lead to disastrous failures in
international policy, e.g. in the construction of European affairs after World War I,
simplistic interventions on ideological or humanitarian grounds, e.g. the Vietnam War
and the Somalia intervention through 1992-1995. As we shall see, how, realism
provides an important but incomplete vision of the international system,
especially during periods of globalisation and complex interdependence.
As we saw in lecture 2, the realist tradition in international relations is based on the
central experience of conflict in human affairs, and in the centrality of power in
global politics. This tradition was well established in ancient thinkers, both East and
West. In ancient Greece, the historian Thucydides wrote one of the first realist
accounts of the dire necessities of state leadership amid the problems of complex
alliance systems and endemic warfare (concerned with the 5th century Peloponnesian
War). Similar problems emerged in early China (8th-3rd centuries B.C.), and realist
thought would strongly colour (though not dominate) Chinese thinkers such as Sun
Tzu and Sun Ping, and eventually even influence modern leaders such as Chairman
Mao (Sun 1991). Likewise, a realist tradition would emerge early in Indian thought in
the type of statecraft recommended by Kautilya (for a range of such early systems of
international relations, see Watson 1992). Interestingly enough, Chinese statements
from 770 B.C. onwards tried a combination of statecraft, diplomacy, and defensive
wars to limit the power of aggression, but this could generate a stable multi-state
system (Creel 1970; Walker 1953).
Empire builders, of course, often relied on economic, military and religiouslydefined power to create and hold their extended territorial states, e.g. the
Macedonians, Romans, Chinese, the Muslim Caliphates, Persian, Mongolian, Spanish
and British empires. In different ways, each of these empires relied on military,
economic and political power to maintain themselves, though religious elements were
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often also used to launch phases of expansion or maintain ideological dominance. In
the modern period, combinations of military ability, economic power, political
leadership, and nationalist aspiration have been used to sustain powerful
modern states. Nation-building, historically, often relied on the realist use of force,
alongside the cultural forces of nationalism and the politics of national identity, a
trend re-iterated in modern German, Italian, and Balkan history.
We can review some of the key layers of the realist position in international
relations, which include:
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The effort to look at actual 'real' situation in the world, including negative
aspects.
An emphasis on power, and augmentation of power in international relations.
An emphasis on the state as the key actor in international relations.
An emphasis on national interests as the basis for the motivation of leadership
groups.
An emphasis on behaviour and outcomes, not ideas.
A reliance on a negative view of human nature as being essentially self-interested
An emphasis on elite leadership, plus a mobilised mass following, though genuine
participation is often limited.
Ideas and values are often used to support the regime, and thus are accorded a
real but subordinate role in power formation and utilisation (see Morgantheau
1985).
An emphasis on strategy and power projection in the international system.
At the same time there are real dangers in becoming addicted to a narrow realist
position, which can also be used as an ideology justifying the status quo. When
survival or power dominance is at stake, or relative position within economic and
diplomatic hierarchies, then self-interest may be both misunderstood and far from
enlightened (for such psychological factor during periods of crisis, see Farrar 1988;
Morganthau 1985). This means that leaders may over-react, in part due to domestic
political pressures and the need to gain support within domestic audiences within
democracies. The result can distort sober and realistic assessment of international
politics. In such conditions, assessments of power and power balance may also
become distorted. The key point, moreover, is that under conditions of intense
conflict, excessive fear or hope, the realist use of power may not always just based
just on rational assessments - a range of other factors including nationalism,
stereotyping and demonisation may be brought into play, e.g. the range of such misperceptions in the public arena in relation to the cultures of Iraq and Iran, in part
drawing on 'Persian' and 'Parthian' stereotypes, and to a lesser degree in relation to
PRC (see Seymour 2004; Farrar 1998; Ferguson 2005).
In the same way, much of the international relations discipline today, though rightly
concerned with problems of cooperation, strategic conflicts, political realism, and
international competition, has been conditioned by the experiences of World War II
and the subsequent experience of the Cold War period. Many institutions for global
governance, e.g. the UN, UNSC, the IMF, World Bank and related agencies were
born out of this period, and sought to promote peace, trade and one vision of
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development, but conditioned by the experience of war and the leadership of a
core group of victor nations. In spite of some reform, extension and adaptation, e.g.
of international financial institutions and new emphases on environment and
development via UN conferences and agencies, it is not certain that these
overlapping agencies can effectively implement the tasks they have set
themselves, e.g. global financial stability, weak sustainability environmentally, or the
Millennium Development Goals (see lectures 6, 7). Nor is it certain that InterGovernmental Agencies (IGOs) are well suited to the all governance needs of the 21st
century, including the diffuse transnational challenges of international terrorism,
civil war, refugees and labour flows, economic instability, transboundary
environmental problems or conflict over key resources (see Le Billon 2005; Klare
2002).
In other words, the intense and largely negative experiences of earlier periods have
influenced the judgement of many practitioners in foreign policy, international
governance and international institutions. The experiences and education of thinkers
and actors, of course, influence their judgement and the assumptions used in analysis.
But in some cases this experience can be so intense that it conditions people to carry
forward models from an appropriate setting to new settings where they are no
longer appropriate. A few areas where this has learning under new conditions has
not occurred, or only evolved slowly, can be listed: 
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The collapse of the Soviet Union has sometimes been viewed as signalling the
end of Communism and Socialism globally, and end of ideologically driven
conflicts and history (Fukuyama 1992). As a result, some have turned to look at
China and argue that the same forces will fragment the People's Republic of
China, or at least in the medium lead to the end of its unique political system and
increasing pressure for democracy (for such expectations, see Terrill 2005; Schell
2004; Segal 1994; Segal and Goodman 1994). The two cases, however, are not
that analogous: not only is Communism in China affected by what Deng
Xiaoping called 'Chinese Characteristics', but China has much stronger ethnic
cohesion with minorities less dominant in most of their homelands (92% of
China is ethnic Chinese). Furthermore, 'institutional learning' (for this
approach, see Haas 2000) would suggest that the Chinese leadership and many
people in China have learnt from observing what happened in the Soviet Union
and will intentionally avoid such transformations, allowing economic transition
and greater political openness but no immediate transition into a
democracy with opposition parties (for these issues see Schell 2004; Nathan
1993a & 1993b; Nathan & Shi 1993). For China itself, only Tibet, Xinjiang and
Taiwan are likely to exhibit such trends politically, and the PRC has relative
power preponderance within Tibet and Xinjiang itself. Some economic and
cultural decentralisation is underway, is not likely to force rapid transition (for the
problems of 'monoculturalism' in China, see Dreyer 1999). Furthermore, by
allowing economic reform and sustaining growth, the regime has managed to
meet some of the needs and expectations of key segments of the population
(beginning with the 'peasants' but perhaps now failing many small farmers),
thereby avoiding or delaying extreme political destabilisation. A similar path
has been unevenly pursued with the cautious economic reforms and preparing
for a future collective leadership in Cuba (see Robinson 2000), but followed by a
harsh clamp down in the regime through late 2002-2004, suggesting increased
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pressure on the Castro government. We cannot directly move from the Soviet
and Eastern Europe experiences to universal arguments concerning the fate of
communism, socialism and other regimes (Palmer 1997). More generally, PRC
has mobilised elements of culturalism, nationalism, and economic growth
to support its regime domestically, while using elements of soft and hard
power to gradually assert itself regionally and in global affairs. On this basis, it
will be very difficult to either contain China, or to directly 'absorb' or
'socialise' it into the existing regime of international norms and institutions.
At the same time, PRC has moved actively to secure its own network of
permissive politics including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),
global (Latin America and Africa) and regional energy accords (Russia,
Kazakhstan, Myanmar), positive trade and diplomacy with ASEAN (ASEANPlus-Thee, EAS), improved middle-level bilateral relations with India and
Australia, and has sought wider engagement with Iran, much of Africa and Latin
America. Whether this is a quiet network designed to offset US power
remains to be seen, but this has been suggested by at least one writer: China's forays into Latin America are part of its grand strategy to acquire
"comprehensive national power" to become a "global great power that is
second to none." Aiming to secure access to the continent's vast natural
resources and markets, China is forging deep economic, political and military
ties with most of the Latin American and Caribbean countries. There is more
to China's Latin American activism than just fuel for an economic juggernaut.
China now provides a major source of leverage against the United States for
some Latin American and Caribbean countries. As in many other parts of the
developing world, China is redrawing geopolitical alliances in ways that help
propel China's rise as a global superpower. Beijing's courtship of Latin
American countries to support its plan to subdue Taiwan and enlist them to
join a countervailing coalition against U.S. global power under the rubric of
strengthening economic interdependence and globalization has begun to
attract attention in Washington. (Malik 2006)
It has been argued that PRC's 'grand strategy' includes: China's activities in Latin America are part and parcel of its long-term grand
strategy. The key elements of Beijing's grand strategy can be identified as
follows:
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Focus on "comprehensive national power" essential to achieving the
status of a "global great power that is second to none" by 2049;
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Seek energy security and gain access to natural resources, raw materials
and overseas markets to sustain China's economic expansion;
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Pursue the "three Ms": military build-up (including military presence along
the vital sea lanes of communication and maritime chokepoints),
multilateralism, and multipolarity so as to counter the containment of
China's regional and global aspirations by the United States and its
friends and allies;
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Build a network of Beijing's friends and allies through China's "soft power"
and diplomatic charm offensive, trade and economic dependencies via
closer economic integration (free trade agreements), and mutual security
pacts, intelligence cooperation and arms sales. (Malik 2006)
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Although this seems impressive, we should also note that Mohan Malik has been
along-term critic of China, at times writing from either an Indian or US
perspective. It would also be possible for the US or other groupings to either
accommodate or restrict each of these PRC moves in turn, depending on the
costs and benefits for each policy by each 'player', e.g. resistance by Japan to such
regional empowerment. In negative scenarios, this could lead to a 'Cold Peace'
in the region that would entail the risk of future hot-conflicts. In the long term,
however, PRC has emerged as a new pole of power in the international
system that is deeply engaged in trade terms with the U.S. as well as with new
global energy flows. On this basis, it has been suggested by Yang Wenchang,
president of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, that it is now time
for a new framework of relations between PRC and the US: Sino-US economic ties, for example, are moving ahead in big strides and
have become a powerful factor cementing bilateral relations. The trade
volume between the two countries stood at zero in 1972. It shot up to $14.2
billion in 1992 and hit $270 billion last year. American enterprises have
poured into China, and the United States has become the biggest source of
foreign investment in China. Though trade imbalances have become a big
issue, efforts to consolidate and strengthen bilateral trade have become a
powerful driving force for the development of the Chinese-US relations.
Also, China and the United States have common responsibilities to safeguard
world peace and promote global development in a post-Cold War world that is
far from secure. The world is currently haunted by a string of security
problems, ranging from terrorism, local wars and nuclear proliferation to
energy shortages and worsening environmental conditions.
There are disagreements as well as consensus between China and the
United States on these important issues. The governments of China and the
United States should define new areas for cooperation and come up with
effective ways to settle the discords. (Yang 2007)
In turn, it seems that US policy has been driven by particular strategic concerns
over relative dominance of power in the Pacific, and in the economic arena by
uncoordinated economic policies driven in part by differences between the U.S.
executive (president) and Congress, though in recent years the Bush
administration has accepted the concept of China as a responsible
stakeholder in the global system, a concept that engages China but also
allows room for criticism (Garrison 2007).
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Containment and competitive policies can also run together, creating a
period of 'strategic ambiguity' in which policy can fluctuate across these two
lines, leading to room to move in terms of policy but perhaps heightening
international tensions (for the use of this term in relations to nuclear policy, see
Deutch 2005). Tensions between the US and PRC, for example, tend to work
along a cycle of mutual interests (trade flows, WTO entry for China, PRC
support in easing the North Korea crisis through 2003-2007), then diverge as
incidents remind the two leaderships of their different view of world order. The
temptation to use the past strategy of containment, however, exists, because
the strategy was seen (from one point of view) to work against an even stronger
opponent, the USSR. It seems that the view of China as a 'strategic competitor'
may have been reduced over the last decade (Bei 2001; Quinlan 2002), but have
been resurrected in the last few years as China's diplomatic and military leverage
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seem to have increased in the wider Asia-Pacific through 2003-2007. Here,
simplistic lessons from the past may have dangerous implications, including a
possible round of military high-tech re-armament and modernisation in
the region, as well as regional diplomatic competition. Rather different lessons
seem to have developed in the prospects for a strengthening India as a regional
nuclear power, with the US. ASEAN and Australia moving to cautiously
accommodate this new reality, though serious concerns over nuclear proliferation
remain even as India moves to provide greater safety of its nuclear power
programs (for these issues and the Convention on Nuclear Safety, see Tellis 2002;
Xinhua 2005a; Nason 2005). US policy here through 2000-2007 has gone
beyond alliance-building and hegemonic coalitions, to a more powerful
concept of engagement with new powers as they emerge (India, to a lesser
degree China)
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Other thinkers have taken the lessons from world wars and global competition in
the military arena and simply applied them to the economic arena. Thus,
visions of intensified competition in trade, investment and fiscal flows have led
to efforts to increase trade and reduce the negative impact of trade deficits,
debt default, market collapse, liquidity squeezes, and currency crises. This loose
pattern of governance now partly run through several institutional
arrangements such as GATT, WTO, the IMF, and the Bank of International
Settlements, BIS (see Roberts 1998; Spence 2004). In spite of reform of the IMF,
World Bank and BIS through 1998-2007, and the efforts of the G8 (2002-2007),
UNCTAD and the United Nations International Conference on Financing for
Development (2002) it is not certain that even with increased resources that
these institutions can ensure national, regional and global financial
stability due to the increase flow and speed of financial networks in the 21st
century (see lecture 6). Although enhanced peer monitoring has occurred in some
groupings (e.g. within ASEAN), there are still concerns that only a smaller group
of currencies remain strong, with a wider network of vulnerable economies in
many developing economies.
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Countries such as India and China, precisely because of their growing economic
strength, are viewed as sources of future threat but are themselves
threatened by growing needs that can only be sustained by an
international agenda. In this context, it is true that there now exists greater
competition for strategic resources such as oil, gas (e.g. in the Persian Gulf,
Caspian Sea region, South China Sea, as well as specific pressures on Nigeria,
Sudan and Venezuela), fisheries, and even over control of river waters, as in the
case of South Asia, Syria and Turkey.). Likewise, hot conflicts over resources
might subject victors to penalties that might make resource extraction
much less profitable (see Klare 2002), but elsewhere resource conflicts over
diamonds, timber and to some degree oil have heightened internal conflicts and
political instability, e.g in Sierra Leone, Angola, Nigeria (Le Billon 2005) and
Sudan. In the long run, however, there may be a nexus between resource
conflict, poor environmental protection, and reduced human security.
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Likewise, competitive advantages can be gained through leverage applied
through groups such as the WTO for those countries better suited to work with
these institutional norms, e.g. tensions between Indian and the U.S. and China
and the U.S., and the US and EU over trade liberalisation, piracy and non-tariff
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barriers. This has reached a partial blockages through 2006-2007 (though the US
and Brazil have signalled a desire in future months restart the Doha round):The future of the W.T.O. is also uncertain. Without the trade agreement, the
multilateral organization will lose one of its major reasons for existence. It will
still play a role in deciding trade disputes, but because the organization is
member-driven, it may fall apart if the major economies begin to resist its
trade rulings. It can be expected that a barrage of litigation will hit the E.U.
and U.S. farm sectors following the collapse of the Doha round and Brazil's
success in challenging Washington's cotton subsidies in March 2005. As of
now, Washington and Brussels have excellent track records of following
W.T.O. rulings because they can use the same dispute panels to their
advantage. If the United States and the European Union no longer see an
advantage in following W.T.O. rulings, the organization's existence will be
threatened. (PINR 2006)
These tensions have continued through 2007, with India being particularly
concerned about US farm subsidies: The Doha trade talks, named after Qatar's capital where they were launched
in 2001, aim to add billions of dollars to the world economy and help poorer
countries benefit from new trade flows. Negotiations have been deadlocked
because of wrangling between rich and poor countries over eliminating
barriers to farm trade and, more recently, manufacturing trade.
The WTO draft agreements released Tuesday require the United States to
reduce its trade-distorting farm subsidies to a level between $13 billion and
$16.4 billion. In return, major developing countries such as Brazil, China and
India will have to give greater cuts in industrial tariffs.
The proposal didn't make any major new demands for liberalizing farm
markets in the European Union, which has already offered substantial cuts.
Diplomats from member countries of the world trade body will start discussing
the proposal next week, though negotiators appear to have given up hopes of
reaching a final accord by year-end. (Mahapatra 2007).
This can be viewed as a kind of 'war of norms' or conflict over institutional
rules (Bell 2000) in which affluent countries deeply engaged in the international
system since the end of World War II have a distinct advantage over poorer or
less involved states. A wider, more diffuse conflict between the 'North and
South' has been waged, first over issues of fair economic development and debt
relief, but now over issues connected with protecting the environment, and fair
trade, access to agricultural markets, and investment policies. Likewise,
globalisation managed 'from above' by advanced nations and strong
institutions has begun to be challenged by organised solidarity 'from
below' which demands a say in how the life of local communities is managed
(see Herod et al. 1997; Brecher et al. 2002). Globalisation, then, has become a
highly contested area in terms of economics, cultural commodities and human
rights in the broader sense (see Stiglitz 2002). Wider cross-impacts and the issues
of accountability and responsible for negative impacts (on the poor, vulnerable
local communities and the environment) have not yet been consistently
allocated in the current pattern of 'global governance' (see lectures 5-11).
Partial accountability has been established through the UN and multilateral
agreements that established and monitored the Millennium Goals, with
progress from 2005, as well as by greater coordination of World Bank and IMF
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policies for heavily indebted and least developed countries. However,
coordinating aid, trade, debt, privatization, environmental and health crises still
remains highly problematic for poor countries.
We can see this in the case of the poor, land-locked African country of
Malawi. Loans and aid, of course, are usually highly conditional, either in terms
of debt repayments, restructuring of government spending, or other, less explicit
demands (see Ellis & Freeman 2004). We can see this in one very poor country
land-locked within southern Africa (east of Tanzania) Malawi, which has a per
capita GDP of US$ (PPP) 645 ($164 unadjusted. DFAT 2006). It has limited
resource base except for agriculture, with export focused on Tobacco, with
small amounts of tea and coffee exports (DFAT 2006). It is ranked among
countries with very low economic development, ranked 165 in the HDI
ranking (UNDP 2005). As well being one of the poorest countries in Africa,
Malawi has also suffered severe drought in 2002 and 2005, combined with
health problems such as HIV/AIDS, that have posed enormous problems for
this development. It also suffered delays in G8 debt-cancellation programs and
Highly Indebted Poor Countries debt relief through 2005, due to charges of
local corruption, as well as some ongoing political instability, but the country
hopes this will be soon rectified. Advice from the World Bank to self-off some
of its grain reserves was misused to sell of all reserves, leading to ongoing
food insecurity, with five million in need of food aid through 2005-2006
(BBC 2006b). Plans from 2005 to privatise its water utilities also remain
controversial.
The country has since made progress in increased grain production, in creating
anti-corruption agenda which also targets money laundering, and has since had its
debt cancelled, but remains politically and economically fragile: President Bingu wa Mutharika has spent almost three conflict-ridden years in
power, at the centre of a tense standoff with the opposition that has stalled
the functioning of Malawi's parliament and delayed the approval of bills.
The political crisis began when Mutharika left the UDF to form his own
political organisation, the DPP, shortly after it had sponsored him in the 2004
general elections. The UDF hit back with an impeachment charge, accusing
Mutharika of using US$300,000 of public money to launch the DPP. (IRIN
2007)
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Malawi Map (Courtesy PCL Map Library)
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The realist paradigm has also been 'ported across' into the area of culture and
religion. Here cultures, civilisations, and religious are viewed as potential causes
of conflict and for intensifying regional wars along fracture lines, e.g. in former
Yugoslavia with its religious divides, the Middle East and South Asia (see lecture
4; Huntington 1993; Huntington 1996). As we have seen, there are some
exaggerations to this claim, especially since cultures are adaptive, and
civilisations and religions can engage in productive dialogue and mutual
cross-fertilisation (see Küng 1997; Küng 1991; Ahluwalia & Mayer 1994).
Culture is important, including differences between various strategic cultures, but
once again their interaction cannot be viewed accurately through the narrow
conceptions of game theory or zero-sum games. Attempts to invoke new
'crusades' or 'jihads' are hard to sustain in the modern period in terms of
changing national or global outcomes (see lecture 9), even with the
heightening over tensions since through 2001-2007. However, these tensions
have been sustained by continued patterns of high-profile violence,
attendant security clamp-downs (e.g. in the US, UK, France, and to a lesser
extent Australia), and distrust of religious ideology. The down-side of this may be
more marginalisation for Islamic communities and the further collapse of
multiculturalism as a viable option in countries such as the UK and Australia. In
turn, organisations that might positively focus Islamic demands and
engage stronger global support remain relatively weak or divided, e.g. the
League of Arab States, LAS, (for its need to reform, see Anderson 2004) and the
Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) at the institutional level, or the
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global society of Muslims, the ummah, at the level of identity politics (see further
lecture 9).
Putting these issues another way, although the lessons of war and competition are
important, they are not the only lessons which can be learned from the events of
the twentieth century. Crisis management 'after the fact' has been one way that
institutions have adapted to deal with conflict, ranging from military containment,
coercive diplomacy, to long-term sanctions. Fortunately, these types of lessons have
been useful, but have been complemented by a wider range of options which are
proactive as well as reactive. New ideas drawn from structural realism, 'the new
institutionalism', from constructivism, from cultural and strategic studies,
cosmopolitan theories of governance (see lecture 11) have begun to suggest the way
the international system is shaped by patterns of engagement among
organisations and creative human activity (see Herod et al. 1997; Henderson 1998;
Hudson 1997; Hasselbladh 2000; Narine 1998). Here, some realist theories have been
adapted quite effectively to incorporate IGOs, INGOs, international civil movements,
and an extension of the notion of power into areas of dialogue, persuasion, and
institutional building.
2. Adaptive Change in Strategic Thought: From Human Security Towards
Humane Governance
We can see two aspects of adaptive change in the serious effort to widen notions of
security from a purely military focus to include a much wider range of threats and
problems which seem more common for many nations in the late 20th century.
Alongside this, there has been an effort to humanise, and to a lesser degree
democratise, globalisation trends and flows.
Comprehensive security involves a more inclusive and wider adaptation of
traditional patterns of strategic thought to the current international climate. There has
recently been considerable interest in redefining security, strategic and defensive
doctrines to be more inclusive than the past consideration of straightforward military
concerns. In large measure, this is due to the recognition that military power, by
itself, is unable to secure the fundamental purposes of defence (Cheeseman 1988).
This has been clearly demonstrated in terms of international terrorism, transnational
security challenges, and fundamental problems in the international order which cannot
be managed by single nations. Therefore, comprehensive security includes issues of
adequate resource security, access to needed trade routes, cooperative relations among
states, and protection of the environment (Dickens 1997). Comprehensive security in
new forms has been deployed by the EU, NATO, Japan and China. In the case of
China, it has supported a strong move towards multilateral regional politics in East
Asia, a major shift in policy through 1997-2007, in an effort to bolster its own
'comprehensive national strength' (see Kuik 2005; Malik 2006).
Likewise, there has been a renewed emphasis on human security, i.e. of individuals,
families, local communities and indigenous groups, in the face of a wide range of
threats, e.g. natural disasters, environmental collapse, poverty, and civil war (for
case studies, see Lizee 2002). Human security has formed a major part of recent
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Canadian and Norwegian foreign policy, as well as forming a central aspect of debates
within the UNDP, the United Nations Development Program (Axworthy 1999;
Axworthy & Vollebaek 1998). Though no single definition of human security has
been accepted, this shift of interpretation has given a renewed emphasis to
humanitarian concerns and the protection of the weak within the international system,
and put some pressure on IGOs such as ASEAN, the OSCE, and the OAS
(Organisation of American States). Likewise, it requires a concern for human rights,
community stability, and proper economic development within a secure environment
(see lecture 3). At the same time, it has become recognised that humanitarian
intervention (whether in Somalia, Bosnia, East Timor or Kosovo) is an extremely
complex, expensive and risky procedure. This is especially the case when it is
unauthorised by clearly UNSC resolutions and clear mobilisation of international
law, a factor complicated by non-state actors (including guerrilla groups, criminal
networks, and terrorists organisations). New research in human security in particular
tries to find ways to reconcile global, regional, national and human levels of
security with the minimum of destructive conflict (see Henk 2005; Bidwai 1999;
Magno 1997). In particular, overly weak or aggressively 'strong' governments can
in fact reduce the security of their citizens, neighbouring populations and even
strong states in the international system, e.g. in Zimbabwe (in spite of some pressure
from military leaders and even within Mugabe's political party, with claims that he
will step down after winning the next elections in 2008) and Myanmar (Gwaridzo
2007).
In part, this broadening of the notion of security has been a direct result of events and
changing international environments in the 1980's and 1990's (Maik 1992c) and a
redefinition of the nature of national power. National power is selectively
enhanced or restricted by regional and international organisations. The trend towards
regionalism and regionalisation is significant, and is in general more likely to
reduce rather than increase hot conflicts, e.g. moderations of conflict through
organisations such as ASEAN, the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), the OAS (with a
mixed track record), and APEC, and the reduction of conflict through expanding
European Union structures that have engaged in active dialogue with Russia and the
Ukraine. This type of cooperative security need not be based on deep integration
(as in the EU and NATO), but can be based on looser type of regionalism, called 'soft
regionalism' which uses the tools of soft power to influence regional orders
without heightening threat perceptions.
We can assess some of these changes by briefly looking at some of the areas where
environmental, human development and national security concerns have begun
to interact (see Stern 1995; Hassan 1991; Pirages 1991; Westing 1989). We can
illustrate these themes by briefly listing some of the environment and resource
issues which are directly impacting on national security and international
stability: 
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Pollution with related health and climate impact causing international
tensions, e.g. between Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia during the
repeated great fires that have caused sustained regional air pollution (1997-2000),
and over coal-based air pollution among China, South Korea and Japan (Dupont
1998, pp11-14). The estimated cost of the Indonesian bush-fires to regional
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countries in terms of health, tourism and agricultural losses for 1998 is in the
order of 6 billion dollars (Dupont 1998, p12). In wider settings, ongoing deficits
in environmental spending and remediation may set future limits on growth
in PRC, India and Southeast Asia, as well as set agricultural limits for Australia
and parts of Central Asia. At the level of international climate politics, the Kyoto
Protocol and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) are at best a limited success in spite of coming into force through
2004-2005 (see lecture 7). Future agreements will need bring on board
developing countries into emission targets, and issues being negotiated
through 2006-2007 (planning towards new commitments through 2012-2017).
The US has since floated the idea of a new, technology-based approach, the
Asia-Pacific Clean Development and Climate Partnership (AP6), to reduce
carbon emissions, trying to set up dialogue among the US, Australia, India,
China, South Korea and Japan, with 2007 debate over forming a new gorup
of 15 largest emitters, or progress towards a Kyoto II. However, it is not
clear that this would merely undermine the Kyoto Protocol, and no clear
targets have been set in the new agreement (Hodge & Uren 2005). It turn
energy efficiency drives and energy diversification, designed to enhance
energy security in growing economies (key policies emerging in PRC, India,
EU and ASEAN through 2004-2007) may provide another access point for this
problem. .

Water and soil pollution directly attacking the food chain, and undermining
agriculture, as well as riverine and marine fisheries, as has occured in parts of
China, Vietnam, the Philippines and India (Dupont 1998, p15). In the broader
context food security has not been confirmed for parts of Africa through (e.g.
Niger, Sudan, Ethiopia), while under-nourishment remains a real problem for
poor communities in South Asia, parts of Latin America, and war-torn or crisis
areas. In this context, poverty remains a major debating point, with diverse views
on whether globalisation has reduced or intensified this problem. Depending on
your definition, 1 or 2 billion people remain in real poverty globally, with real
differences between these projections. Although the Millennium Development
Goals and the G8 have tried to get some leverage on this problem, poverty
seem entwined with security, political and environmental problems that
make it hard to tackle unless systematic and sustained effort at different levels is
applied to the problem over the next two decades. The problem and related goals
have been established as an aim with voluntary targets through major
conferences through 1992-2005: Environment, food security, poverty, and land degradation were brought
together in three major international documents: Agenda 21 (UNCED 1992),
the UN Millennium declaration (UN 2000), and the Plan of implementation of
the World Summit on Sustainable Development (UN 2003). Agenda 21 is one
of the most balanced and cogently argued of all international documents. As
compared with the Stockholm meeting 20 years earlier which focused on
pollution, Agenda 21 gives equal place to development, and hence to the
environment as a productive resource. This meeting also drew wider attention
to the concept of sustainable development, in particular, the conservation of
natural resources for use by future generations. The Millennium declaration
listed nine Millennium Goals, the first of which was 'Eradicate extreme poverty
and hunger' and the seventh, 'Ensure environmental sustainability' (UN 2000
2004). The World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg,
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2002) took Agenda 21 as its starting point and produced a Plan of
implementation (UNCED 2003). Sustainability became the key, with emphasis
on protecting and managing the natural resource base of economic and social
development and recognition of the linkages between poverty, the
environment and the use of natural resources. A welcome feature is its
recognition that agriculture plays a crucial role in addressing the needs of a
growing global population, and is inextricably linked to poverty eradication.
The targets of halving the numbers suffering from hunger and poverty are
repeated, with a target date of 2015, adding an objective of halving the
numbers without access to safe drinking water. Again, however, in the
outputs of this Summit, the UN forecasts of population increases in the
developing world are taken as background, given, data. (Young 2005)

Basic requirements in the international system are often not well managed.
Soil fertility in intensive settings, sustainable agriculture, waste management,
megacities cities in the developing world, access to basic infrastructure remain
uncertain for up to one third of the planet (see lecture 1, 7, 9). Fresh water,
traditionally a renewable resource, is now in heavily increased demand for use by
urban populations, for agriculture, and in industrial processes, leading to
decreased availability of clean water globally, and in Asia-Pacific particularly
(Dupont 1998, p59-74). Water disputes have intensified tensions in the Jordan
River basin, the Nile and Euphrates river systems in the Middle East, and water
issues in South Asia and the Mekong River have to be carefully managed to avoid
such disputes in the future (Thapliyal 1996; see lecture 1). It has been suggested
that by the 2025, up to two thirds of the world's population will be under
conditions of 'water stress' (Dupont 1998, p59) due to lack of clean and
reliable water supplies. Likewise, global energy security remains in doubt until
alternative energy sources can seriously augment the use of gas and oil, especially
in modernising and industrialising economies such as China and India, alongside
existing high needs in the U.S. and Europe.
It is not surprising, on this basis, that there is a direct link among poverty, slow
development and a lack of human security. Using a compound indicator such as the
'index of human insecurity' (using a range of economic, environmental, social and
institutional factors) it is possible to map this against a variable reflecting the rounded
quality of life summarised by the Human Development Index (commonly used in UN
institutions). This yields the un-surprising fact that a low level of development
equates generally with a lack of human security, though crises or short-term
conflicts can complicate this picture (see Lonergan et al. 2000).
Even as traditional wars declined through the 1990s, various forms of civil conflict,
humanitarian crises, refugee problems, and the indirect costs of insecurity have
begun to emerge over the last decade as unresolved challenges for the 21st century.
Thus conflict, especially in developing countries, also heightens malnutrition,
disease vulnerablity, higher death rates among refugees and the internally
displaced, acceleration of HIV patterns, the spread of malaria, tuberculosis and
other infectious diseases (Human Security Centre 2005).
Thus, one snapshot of global affairs suggests that (Human Security Centre 2006): -
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


Even with escalating violence in Iraq and Sudan, that armed conflicts
globally decreased from 66 down to 56, by 15%, between 2002 and the end
of 2005.
However, battle-deaths have declined by 40% between 2002 and the end of
2005, but organised violence against civilians has increased by 56% since
1989.
International terrorist incidents increased threefold through 2002-2005,
supporting trends of one-sided violence, though as a whole, negotiated
outcomes have been able to reduce violence in East Timor, Aceh, Nepal,
Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone. (Human Security Centre 2006)
In summary, global governance trends suggest a serious effort to set the standards to
humanise globalisation, but serious gaps remain in the most basic factors of
human development, human security, and access to basic resource needs.
3. Diversifying Pragmatism in the 21st Century
Another key aspect thought about the global system over the last decade has been the
ability to include (sometimes reluctantly) a wider range of alternative patterns of
thinking and institutional alternatives than before. In large measure, this response
has been due to the fact that international and transnational forces are much stronger
than before, and are beginning to create a truly global pattern of interdependence, as
well as strong flows of wealth, information and contact that run alongside or around
inter-national linkages. Likewise, the powers of the state seem to have been in many
ways eroded, making the state a still important but more disturbed actor in the
global system (Sørensen 1996).
Some of these alternative descriptions and patterns of organisation include: 





Week 12
The 'Realism Against Idealism debate' vs Responsible Global Politics (Küng
1997, pp1-90).
International Anarchy vs Internationalism and an emerging International
Society of not yet a Global Community (See Henderson 1998; Iriye 1997).
Cultural differences as a source of conflict (Huntington 1993; Huntington 1996)
vs cultural differences as a resource of diversity and problem solving.
Extractive Economies vs Sustainable Economies (weak or strong
sustainability).
Traditional Economic and Financial Systems vs the need for Global Financial
Reform, plus added patterns of community or localised financial activity
including Islamic Banking, Grameen Banking, Micro-loan Schemes, and small
community business initiatives. These schemes augment rather than replace
tradition banking and investment arrangements.
Normative Globalisation verses 'Planetisation' (positive future visions of
global order), 'balanced globalism' and 'cosmopolitanism', whereby
pluralist ideas are beginning to shape international networks of ideas and
expectations (see lecture 11; Smyth 2001).
14



The State as the main International Actor vs a range of multi-level actors, e.g.
local communities, cities (megacities, World Cities, sister cities), corporations,
INGOs, IGOs, regional groupings, global level organisations (Sørensen 1996).
Revolutionary change vs Strategic Non-violent Action or Low-Violent People
Power, combined with transnational mobilisation strategies (see lecture 11).
The need to re-balance and fine tune global institutions to achieve a better
balance of international justice. As noted by Amartya Sen: The central issue of contention is not globalization itself, nor is it the use of
the market as an institution, but the inequity in the overall balance of
institutional arrangements which produces very unequal sharing of the
benefits of globalization. The question is not just whether the poor, too, gain
something from globalization, but whether they get a fair share and a fair
opportunity. There is an urgent need for reforming institutional arrangements in addition to national ones - in order to overcome both the errors of omission
and those of commission that tend to give the poor across the world such
limited opportunities. Globalization deserves a reasoned defense, but it also
needs reform. (Sen 2002)
We can see an effort towards multi-actor governance in the example of carbonemission trading, whereby a global agreement (the Kyoto Protocol and its emission
reduction targets) were used to structure a regional carbon-trading scheme (in the
European Union), and drawing in methods to help government, corporations, and the
public cooperate towards a sustainable environmental goal. This program also
engaged developing countries and the provision of funds towards cleaner and greener
technologies.
The key mechanism, which engages companies and markets in this process, is through
the creation of an emissions trading market [or carbon trading market]. This was
first taken up by the EU from 2005 as a way of making it easier to meet targets, and
encourage major companies to take an achievable and cost-effective track towards less
emissions. The point here is that some industries find it easer and more efficient for
them to reduce emission below the cap than others - thus they are encouraged to do so
they the trading scheme. In Europe this was the ETS [Emissions Trading Scheme].
The scheme has run through 2005-2007 (with forward trading from 2003), with a
second round running after 2008.
The ETS scheme was based on the following (European Commission 2005)





15 core countries of the EU are committed to reduce combined greenhouse
gas emission by 8% from 1990 levels by 2012, but can trade among themselves
to reach this overall level.
10 new members have reduction targets of 6-8% under the protocol [except for
Malta and Cyprus]
25 member EU states joined the ETS in January 2005.
The use of joint implementation of projects under the clean development
mechanisms of the UNFCCC, whereby European countries can invest in
emission reduction projects in Russia and the developing world.
Companies that produce greenhouse gas emissions [especially in energy
production, manufacturing, steel plants, etc], are given a mandatory level of
Week 12
15

emission. If they are below this ‘cap’, they can trade with those who are
above the cap, i.e. carbon trading.
Otherwise, they have to pay a penalty above the level of carbon credits that they
would have to buy.
Claimed strengths of the scheme (European Commission 2005): 









EU can meet its targets at an annual cost of 2.9-3.7 billion euro annually,
verses 6.8 billion [use of market efficiencies and different timeframes to meet
targets, plus more rapid adoption of new technologies]. This is about 0.1 of EU
GDP. Value of traded emissions to mid 2007 was circa 14.7 billion euro (El Amin
2007).
Allocations for countries (National Allocation Plans) are set in relation to
their Kyoto targets with the plans reviewed and accepted by the European
Commission.
Caps for companies are reviewed regularly, with compliance assessed every
year, with fines above the market value of the emission (originally 40 euro per
tonne, but from 2008, 100 euro per tonne).
In first phase 11,500 major installations covered, account for 30% of EU
emissions.
The system allows those companies the reduce emission with the ability to
efficiently reduce emission to do so say and trade the amount below the cap, while
companies where reductions are hard to achieve find it cheaper to buy credits
in the market.
The scheme allows credit from projects in developing countries, via the
CDM, as certified emission reductions (CER) which can be traded against EU
emission allowance, e.g. projects from the Netherlands included electricity
production plants using local crop residue in India, and wind parks in Northwest
China. (European Commission 2005).
Involved companies may have achieved emissions reductions of up to 7% (El
Amin 2007).
The ETS has been successful enough to act as a 'prototype' for a global system
and is one of the few ways to push the global climate process forward, with
Germany pushing for such a global scheme (El Amin 2007).
The NSW and ACT Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme has run since 2003, and
in NSW is a compulsory program for the power production industry, with a
National Emissions Trading Taskforce considering how such schemes might be
applied at the national level, suggesting a cap and trade market based system
(Uhlmann 2007; NSW 2007).
Globally, many corporations and investment groups have now begun to
voluntarily factor in climate and emissions risks, preparing for future
government regulation as well using the idea as part of their image and marketing,
either as offsetting energy usage, or as 'carbon neutral'. For example, Origin
Energy has put 40 million in solar technology, while AMP ANZ, BT Financial and
others have been involve in setting up voluntary report projects for companies to
(Galacaho 2007) However, Australian markets and investors have yet to fully
respond to moves in terms of share values (Galacho 2007).
Week 12
16
However, there have also been problems with such schemes: 






Estimates, measurement and targets for emissions needs exact, ongoing analysis,
and appropriate levels being set each year (Leone 2007).
It is crucial that targets and caps NOT be set too high, as this means that
targets are too easily met and there may be little impetus to trade or to implement
new technologies, e.g. this may have been the in levels established by the
European Commission, leading to a drop in carbon prices through April-May
2006 of one third of their value. (El Amin 2007)
Countries may disagree over allocations, e.g. Poland and the Czech republic had
problems entering the scheme, and disagreed with the targets set by the European
Commission (El Amin 2007).
The scheme creates new risks and costs for companies (El Amin 2007).
Some countries may set ambitious targets, e.g. the UK, thereby imposing extra
costs on their companies that may make them less competitive (El Amin 2007).
The system may create an artificial and flawed market that could fluctuate
wildly (El Amin 2007).
An agency such the European Commission would need to be set up to run the
global system (El Amin 2007).
The outcome of these mechanisms or agreements are crucial in pushing forwards
emission agreements for the 2008-2012 period. This is crucial when it is considered
that German Chancellor has called for a cut in global emission of 50% by 2050 from
the 1990 baseline (Leone 2007), the Australian Labor party has called for 60%
reduction by 2050 with trading to beginning for Australia by 2010, while the Howard
government has accepted in principle that trading should begin by 2012 but is
reluctant to establish early targets (Leone 2012; Uhlmann).
In a sense, then, people, organisations and governments are being offered a much
wider range of tools, resources and organisations for creative, low-violent change
in the current century. These tools and institutions allow us to think about the
international system in diverse ways, engage and participate in change even if on a
modest scale, and to be aware of a much wider ambit of the dynamic transformations
that are occurring. It is crucial that such change be pursued and further developed if a
positive and sustainable global system is to emerge in the following decades. At
present, the global system is far from complete, and seems to be a non-convergent,
contested mix of power and cooperative orientations. This may be due to ongoing
transitions, or because the global network of governance has not been linked together
into a coherent system. A planet without such systematic governance, however,
suggests that conflict, waste and human suffering cannot be systematically
avoided, but are merely the contingent thrust of powerful political agents, historical
trends, and poorly understood natural processes. Such a chaotic mix is not a world in a
human sense, and may defy both prediction and control.
It might be worthwhile to give one last example of this wider, inclusive strategy of
thinking about diversity. Religious differences have sometimes been presented as a
major source of conflict, e.g. in Ireland, the Middle East, and South Asia. There is, of
course, some truth to this, especially when religion is used as an excuse to ignore the
Week 12
17
claims of others, and used as a pretext for violence. However, most often it is the
misunderstanding of religion which intensifies conflict and deepens disaster. Hans
Küng has demonstrated this clearly in assessing the supposed role of religion in the
Yugoslavian conflict. One of the problems in modern international relations analysis
is that often religion is not taken seriously enough, due to a 'secularizing
reductivism' which sees only material issues of power as worth noting (Küng 1997,
p120). Küng notes that in the 1980s no serious analysis of ethnic and religious
differences in Yugoslavia was made in foreign affairs offices in Germany or France,
nor in London or Washington (Küng 1997, p122). As a result, several phases of
erroneous policies were made in relation to the ethnic crisis in Yugoslavia (Küng
1997, pp122-124).
Küng goes on to show that all the Churches in the region also failed to back up the
idea of peace, and only tried to build reconciliation with Muslim groups when events
had already seriously deteriorated (Küng 1997, p126). Put frankly, it was not so much
religion, as a misuse of religion and the reluctance of the international community
to chart a path for low violent reform that failed to avoid the holocaust in the
Balkans. In the current period, it is crucial that blockages in dialogue do not create a
similar set of incorrect signals in relation to Islam at the global level. It seems that
such considerations need to revisited in relation to the Middle East peace process, the
fate of democracy in Lebanon and Pakistan, outcomes for Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran-US
tensions, and the status of Muslim minorities in East and South Asia (see Ahmed
2007). Moreover, misunderstanding these key issues and not grasping available
tools will only tend to deepen such conflicts, reducing the political will to look for
ways to manage problems. To date, fairly simplistic and naive interpretations of
international relations, parading under the respectable titles of 'political realism',
'economic rationalism' or 'humanitarian idealism', have helped create problems as
much as solve them. A new pragmatism, relying on a wide range of viewpoints,
tools and actors, may be needed to complement the insights of a more genuine
realism that grasps the conditions of the 21st century. This process has begun in a
range of progressive policies but has yet to be entrenched as the 'guidance system'
for global politics in the current era.
4. Bibliography and Further Reading
Resources
The International Labour Organization is 'the UN specialized agency which seeks the
promotion of social justice and internationally recognized human and labour
rights. It was founded in 1919 and is the only surviving major creation of the
Treaty of Versailles which brought the League of Nations into being and it
became the first specialized agency of the UN in 1946.' See http://www.ilo.org/
The International Network for Environment and Security has a range of interesting
publications, links and bibliographies that can be found at
http://www.gechs.org/INES/ineshome.shtml
Week 12
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A wide range of Open Access Journals can be found at www.doaj.org (IR related
journals will be found under the Social Sciences and Sociology subheadings.)
The Carnegie Council has some interesting perspectives on Global Policy Initiatives,
Poverty, and Democratising Globalisation via http://www.policyinnovations.org/
The Global Policy Forum is a web-based resource with critical commentary on
major international actors, including the UNSC, NGO's and the US on the basis
of increasing accountability. Located at http://www.globalpolicy.org/
Further Reading
AHMED, Akbar S. Journey into Islam: The Crisis of Globalization, N.Y., Brookings
Institution, 2007
SEN, Amartya " How to judge globalism: global links have spread knowledge
and raised average living standards. But the present version of globalism
needlessly harms the world's poorest", The American Prospect, 13 no. 1,
January 1, 2002, pA2-7 [Internet Access via Infotrac Database]
BRECHER, Jeremy et al. Globalization from Below, The Power of Solidarity,
Cambridge, South End Press, 2002
HENK, Dan "Human security: relevance and implications", Parameters, 35 no. 2,
Summer 2005, pp91-106 [Access via Infotrac Database]
Human Security Centre The Human Security Brief 2006, Liu Institute for Global
Issues,
University
of
British
Columbia.
2006
[http://www.humansecuritybrief.info/]
KATES, Robert W. et al. "What is Sustainable Development? Goals, Indicators, Values
and Practice", Environment, 47 no. 3, April 2005, pp8-21 [Access via Infotrac
Database]
KLARE, Michael Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, N.Y., Henry
Holt and Company, 2002
KUIK, Cheng-Chwee "Multilateralism in China's ASEAN policy: its evolution,
characteristics, and aspiration", Contemporary Southeast Asia, 27 no. 1, April
2005, pp102-123 [Access via Infotrac Database]
LE BILLON, Philippe Fuelling War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflict, London,
IISS, Adelphi Paper 373, 2005
LIZEE, P. " Human Security in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia", Contemporary
Southeast Asia, 24 no. 3, December 2002, pp509-537 [Access via Infotrac
Database]
YOUNG, Anthony " Poverty, hunger and population policy: linking Cairo with
Johannesburg", The Geographical Journal, 171 no. 1, March 2005, pp83-95 [Access
via Infotrac Database]
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ANDERSON, Benedict The Spectre of Comparison: Politics, Culture and the Nation, London, Verso,
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ANTLOV, Hans & NGO, Tak-Wing The Cultural Construction of Politics in Asia, Richard,
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