The Appeal of Fascism
General
The Fascist movement held an appeal to Italians of various classes in the troubled post
-war period. In contrast to what seemed to be a weak and indecisive liberal
government, Fascism seemed strong and assertive; its uniforms, parades and marches
served to reinforced this image. In the wake of the mutilated victory, Fascism
promised to make Italy great again on the international stage. Perhaps, most of all,
Fascism seemed to be the only force prepared to resist the advance of socialism in the
turbulent years of the ‘Bienno Rosso’. Fascist violence gained acceptance because of
this and also served to intimidate any potential critics or opponents. It reinforced the
image of Fascism as a force for action and change, something that served to attract
support from the young.
Social Groups
While Fascism held a general appeal, it gained particularly strong support from
certain social groups. A key group of supporters came from the petty bourgeoisie, or
lower middle classes, who felt threatened by the advance of socialism both in the
towns and the countryside but felt that their interest were ignored by the liberal
government. Many were disgruntled ex-soldiers who looked for a better life after
what they consider to be a victorious war. Landowners and industrialists were
prepared to back a movement that seemed to take a much stronger stand than the
government in the face of socialist agitation. Even certain groups of workers and
peasants were attracted to Fascism because of its early revolutionary syndicalism and
its promise to create a classless society.
Mussolini’s Concessions
Mussolini helped to widen the base of support for Fascism by dropping some of its
more radical policies such as its anti-capitalist socialism, anti-republicanism and anticlericalism. Such concessions enabled the conservative elite to accept Fascism and, in
turn, Mussolini showed that he was willing to enter parliament and worked from
within the constitution. Increasingly the emphasis was placed on nationalism, an
active foreign policy and a strong state. The last of these was welcomed by many in
the face of the threat of socialist revolution that seemed very real during the years of
the ‘Bienno Rosso’.
Weakness of Opposition
The Government
Support for the Italian government was precarious enough in 1914 but the ‘mutilated
victory’ of 1919 and post-war problems such as inflation and unemployment
weakened the government even further. A series of short-lived minority coalitions
were the result of the introduction of proportional representation and the inability of
the two major parties ( the PSI and PPI ) to cooperate. Even within the two major
parties there were further divisions that exacerbated the situation and which impaired
their ability to present a united front in opposition to the fascist threat as it emerged in
1921-2. Giolitti’s misplaced attempt to bring the Fascists into the government in the
spirit of ‘transformismo’ politics further served to emphasise the impotence of Liberal
Italy.
The Socialists
Although the Socialists seemed to be the strongest force in Italian politics both before
and after World War One, they suffered from a number of weaknesses. The political
wing of the movement, the PSI, was split into three factions: the minimalists urging
reform through parliament, the maximalists urging revolution and the communists
who urged an even more radical revolution along Leninist lines. At the ‘shop-floor’
level, socialism was also divided into Chambers of Labour, Socialist Leagues and
more conservative Catholic Unions. Perhaps most significant was the lack of a leader
or leadership that was strong enough to bridge these divisions and challenge the rise
of Fascism; the PSI failed to agree to a coherent strategy. Moreover, in the turbulent
years of the ‘Bienno Rosso’, socialism frightened many Italians, as a repeat of the
Bolshevik revolution in Russia seemed all too real. Many patriots and ex-soldiers
already felt resentful of the socialists’ opposition or neutrality towards the war and the
way in which many socialist workers had ‘shirked’ their responsibility to fight.
The March on Rome
The reasons for the success of the March on Rome and Mussolini’s appointment as
Prime Minister can be largely attributed to perceptions of both the Fascist threat and
Fascist promise held by those in power in 1922. The successful agitation of the
Fascist ‘squadristi’ led by the so-called ‘ras’ in the provinces did much to develop
mass support for Fascism but also did much to create the threat of a Fascist revolution
or coup. The seizure of provincial cities was vital in creating the exaggerated threat
of the march on the capital in 1922. Although Mussolini himself showed little
confidence in staying in Milan and preparing to flee to Switzerland, politicians such
as Facta, Salandra and Giolitti showed little firmness either. This did little to
encourage King Victor Emmanuel who pulled back from his initial decision to impose
martial law and ask the army to oppose the anticipated Fascist advance.
The king’s eventual decision to invite Mussolini to become Prime Minister, on the
advice of Salandra, was influenced by number of factors. The fact that there was
some support and sympathy for the Fascists among the armed forces made the King
doubt their ability to resist the march. In the event of stern resistance, the king feared
the spectre of civil war: in the event of Fascist success, he feared his own replacement
by his pro-Fascist cousin, the Duke of Aosta. Like many members of the elite and
even Pope Pius XI, the King was disillusioned with the weak liberal government and
looked to Mussolini for a stronger leadership in the face of a socialist threat that by
1922 was more apparent than real. In a coalition ministry, it was hoped that the more
moderate Mussolini could be tamed further.