TACTICALFACTORSIN THE SPANISH CONQUEST
OF THE AZTECS
DOUGLASA. DANIEL
WesternWashingtonUniversity
A perspectivelargely unexaminedin past workson the Spanish Conquestof Mexico has
been the details of the tactical systems of the respectivesides, and how these systems
workedon the battlefieldto producethe Spanish victory.This article examinesthe Conquest in termsof tactics,applyinga military-historicalperspectiveto ethnohistoricaltexts
and data gleanedfrom modernworks.It is shownthat Spanishinfantrytactics and horse
cavalrywerecriticalfactors in the Spanishvictory.[Aztecs, ethnohistory,Mexico,Spanish
Conquest,war]
Introduction
Most interpretationsof the Spanish Conquestof
the Aztecs attributethe Spanishvictoryto psychosocial factors-the Aztecs had a differentconception of warfare, or they were paralyzedby the
Quetzalcoatl myth--or to technological factors,
such as the supposedsuperiorityof firearmsand
steel swords, or to combinationsof the two. As
Soustelleput it,
TheSpaniards
andthe Mexicans
werenotreallyfighting
thesamekindof war.Onthematerialplane,theyfought
withdifferent
on thesocialandmoral,theyhad
weapons:
totallydifferentconceptsof war(1970:215).
the Spanishvictoryin the Conquestcan be found
in the tacticsof the two sides.In this interpretation
the Spanish were able to win on the battlefield
largely becauseof two facts: 1) the way in which
the Spanish used their infantryformations(close
orderformationwith tightlydrilledbodiesof men)
gave thema decisiveadvantageoverAztec infantry
formations,and 2) Spanishcavalrywas capableof
disruptingand routinglargebodiesof Aztec troops,
at least on the open battlefield.The analysisemphasizesthe essentialvalue of disciplineand integration of effort in combat among the Spanish
forces.
Synopsis of the ConquestEvents
Davies (1973: 251) cites, amongother factors,the
Aztec conceptionof war as "half a process govThe expeditionof Cortes arrivedat San Juan de
ernedby ritualand magic"as a reasonfor the AzUlua, near present-dayVeracruz,in April 1519,
tec's defeat. Anotherpurportedreasonfor Spanish after skirtingthe coast of Yucatan.The expedition
battlesuperiorityhas beenthe supposedAztec "ob- consistedof 508 soldiers, 100 sailors,and sixteen
session"with takinglive prisonersfor latersacrifice horses(Diaz 1956: 42). At San Juan de Ulua the
of
(Davies 1973: 251; Soustelle 1970: 210), which Spanishmade contactwith both representatives
handicappedthe Aztec soldierbefore the Spanish Moctezumaand the local Totonacpeople. Cortes
induced the Totonacsto ally themselvesto him,
conquistador,who had no such compunction.
An issue unexaminedin detail in most Conthus establishinga securebase on the coast. Leavquest literatureis that of the tacticalconceptsand
ing a portionof his force as a colony,Cortesleft
for Mexicoon August 16, 1519.
practicesof both the Aztecs and the Spanish.This
article examinesthe SpanishConquestin termsof
On August 20th the Spanishcrossedthe fronits tactical background,applyinga military-histori- tier of Tlaxcala,a realmindependentof the Aztecs.
cal perspectiveto ethnohistoricalsources. These
Cortesintendedto makethem allies, as he had the
Totonacs.The Tlaxcalans,however,were initially
sources,includingBernalDiaz' The discoveryand
conquestof Mexico (1956) and de Sahagun'sGen- hostile,and a seriesof pitchedbattleswere fought
eral history of the things of New Spain (1975,
before they made peace and enteredinto an alliance with the Spanish.
1979), are largelyfromthe colonialperiodand the
Spanishpoint of view, but are reasonablywell-atHaving establisheda forwardbase in Tlaxtested and trustworthy.In addition,informationis
cala, the SpanishcontinuedtowardMexico,accomalso drawn from modernstudies, especiallyHaspanied by several thousandTlaxcalantroops. In
Cholulathe Spanishmassacreda largeforcewhich
sig's Aztec warfare(1988). Significantreasonsfor
187
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188
ANTHROPOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
they supposedwas aboutto ambushthem. Moving
on, the Spanisharrivedin Tenochtitlanon November 8. Duringthis marchthe Spanishmanagedto
avoid direct conflictwith the Aztecs, playing (by
accident or design) on the uncertainty of
Moctezuma. Moctezuma's policy was, in fact,
markedby vacillationand confusion,despite the
fact, as evidencedby later opposition,that manyof
Moctezuma'scommandersurgedimmediateaction
against the Spanish (Davies 1973: 242-243; Diaz
1956: 240).'
Very soon after their arrivalin Tenochtitlan
the Spanish staged a coup d'etat, seizing
Moctezumaand punishingAztec commanderswho
had opposedthem. However,subsequentSpanish
actions further antagonizedthe nobility and the
priests,and the Spanishpositionremainedprecarious. At this momenta secondSpanishexpedition,
sent by the Governorof Cuba,an enemyof Cortes,
arrivedon the coast. Cortes took the majorityof
his troopsto the coast to deal with this expedition,
leaving a small garrisonin Mexico. The garrison
commander,Pedrode Alvarado,massacredthe celebrantsof a religiousfestival,sparkinga rebellion.
Cortes returnedto Mexico and rejoinedthe besiegedSpanish.After some days of indecisivecombat the Spanishdecidedto withdraw.In the retreat
the Spanish sufferedheavy casualties, losing the
major portion of their force. However,they defeatedthe Aztecs in open battleat Otumbaon July
14, 1520, and escapedto Tlaxcala.
Having receivedreinforcementsand supplies,
the Spanishagain advancedon Mexico. Receiving
the allegianceof a breakawayfactionof the city of
Texcoco,the Spanishsubjugatedthe cities bordering the lakes of the Valley of Mexicoand besieged
the Aztecs in Tenochtitlan.After a 90-day siege
the city fell on August 13, 1521.
Tactical Organizationof the Spanish
The immediatequestionis how the two sidesin this
conflictused their forces and how that use led to
victoryfor the Spanishand defeat for the Aztecs.
Spanish tactics of this period were an outgrowthof theirexperiencesin boththe Reconquista
and the Italian campaigns,and the whole trendof
the late MiddleAges in reassertingthe superiority
of infantryformationsovercavalry.By the late fifteenthcenturythe heavyknighthad beendisplaced
on the Europeanbattlefieldby the commonfootsoldier.The pike was the preeminentweapon,sup-
ported by swordsmen,muskets,and artillery.An
importantresult of these developmentswas the
reintroductionof precisionmovementof units to
the Europeanbattlefield.
For the Spanish,the provinggroundfor their
new tacticswas Italy, wherethey foughta seriesof
protractedwars with the Frenchat the turn of the
sixteenthcentury.The essentialevolutionof Spanish tactics in this theater was the developmentof
the general Gonzalo Fernandezde Cordoba,who
integratedthe elementsof Europeanarms into a
functional,mutually-dependent
system.
of
successwashisevolution
Thesecretof DonGonzalo's
of the infantry
newinfantrytacticsandhis organization
units:pikemento resist
self-sufficient
into manageable,
to
the initialcavalrychargeof a battle;arquebusiers
andinfantry
guardthe flanksandenfiladetheattackers;
shortsword,
armedwithjavelinsandtheRoman-Spanish
and protectedby roundshields,to movethroughthe
pikemento the attack.TheGreatCaptaindiedin 1515,
selfof theindependent,
buthis tacticsandhis principle
sufficient
(Hills1970:53).
infantryunitsurvived
This tactical system revolvedaround a unit
to a regiknownas a tercio,roughlycorresponding
ment in modernparlance(Hills 1970: 53). When
standardizedin 1534 the tercioconsistedof twelve
companiesof 250 men each, six of pike, four of
swordsmen,and two of arquebusiers(p. 53). "In
column of route they marched;pikemen-swordsmen-pikemen,with the arquebusiersguardingthe
flanksand the vanguard"(pp. 53-54).
The key to this system was mutual support
among the different companies. If one unit/
weapon-typefailed, all might be lost. To insure
against this, a well-drilledand disciplinedorder
had to be maintained(Ropp 1959: 16; Jones 1987:
190-191).Individualunits wererelentlesslytrained
to work together.This disciplineenableda commanderto move and use his units efficiently,as
well as keepthem togetherin the face of an enemy
attack.
The formal organizationof the tercio, however, was not set until after Conquest.In the first
years of the sixteenthcenturythe organizationof
Spanisharmieswas flexible.
There[was]nosuchthingas a typical16thCenturybattle formation.Each battle was a separatetactical problem. It was a game in which not only the numbersbut
the values of the pieces variedwith each situation(Ropp
1959: 19).
The variabilityof unit and unit size was adaptive
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TACTICALFACTORS
in the sense that a commandercouldadjustthe organization of his commandto the needs of the
moment.
This flexibilityservedthe Spanishwell in the
Conquest.The Spanishorganizedand reorganized
their force accordingto their needs-at Tabasco,
against the expeditionof Narvaez, in the flight
from Mexico, and elsewhere (Diaz 1956: 47-50,
285-286, 313). Gomara(1965: 239) indicatesthat
in Tlaxcala Cortes organizedhis troopsinto nine
companiesof sixty men each beforebeginningtheir
return to Mexico. Diaz (1956: 395-396) records
that duringthe siege of Tenochtitlanthe force was
reformedinto nine companiesof about fifty men
each, groupedin turn into three "divisions,"each
of three companies.This handlingof troopswas in
keepingwith Spanishpracticeof the period.
On the otherhand,the role of Spanishcavalry
in the Conquestvaried from contemporaryEuropean usage. As noted above, the ascendancyof
heavycavalryin Europehad endedin the late Middle Ages with the re-inventionof effectiveinfantry
formations.In fact, cavalryhad faded to a largely
supporting role (Ropp 1959: 17). Nicolo
Machiavelli,in his Art of war, publishedin 1521,
gives an ideal for the makeupof an army of the
period.Cavalrytotalledno morethan 300 in a regimentof 6000 (Machiavelli1965:61, 82), and had
moreto do with the pursuitof a routedenemythan
involvementin the main battle.
In Mexico the absenceof infantryunits organizationallyand technologicallycapable of standing againstcavalryallowedmountedtroopsa brief
renaissance.The comparativelysmall force of cavalry availableto Corteswas a key ingredientin the
Spanishforce, which often achievedstartlingsuccess against native forces. At Cintla in Tabasco,
early in the expedition,thirteenhorsemenrouteda
huge enemy force engagedwith the infantry(Diaz
1956: 58-59). At Otumba the woundedand exhaustedcavalryrepeatedlybrokethroughthe overwhelmingnumbersof Aztecs troopsuntil they retreated(pp. 319-320). Duringthe campaignCortes
continuallyreorganizedhis cavalry,as he did his
infantry, to meet the needs of the moment. At
Otumbahe dividedhis cavalryinto squadsof five
(Diaz 1956: 319); while preparingto return to
MexicofromTlaxcalahe organizedhis cavalryinto
four "squadrons"of ten horses each (Gomara
1965: 239). Cavalrywas the "armof decision"in
the Conquest.2
The variousindigenousallies of the Spanish,
189
particularlythose of Tlaxcalaand Texcoco(in the
last phases of the campaign), roundedout the
Spanish force. These troopswere essentialto the
Spanisheffort in that they helpedredressthe imbalance in numbersbetweenthe Spanishand the
Aztecs. Evenso, in manybattlesthe Aztecs greatly
outnumberedthe Spanish and their allies (Diaz
1956: 318-320). However,withoutthe extra numbers affordedby indigenoustroops,the Spanishin
severalactions in the early campaignsin Tabasco
and Tlaxcala seem to have been more easily enveloped, restrictingtheir mobilityand sometimes
putting them in precariouspositions (pp. 58-59,
126-127).
These three parts of the Spanish
force-infantry, cavalry,and allies---canbe said to
form a whole tactical entity, performingdifferent
tasks and supportingone another.The integration
between strictly Spanish units and their allies
would necessarilyhave been more tenuous than
that betweeninfantryand cavalry,since the internal orderand disciplineof each was maintainedin
differentways. But the operational"fit" was, by
the evidenceof the ethnohistories,
sufficientfor the
coordinationof action.
Tactical Organizationof the Aztecs
The tactical formationscustomarilyused by the
Aztecs were basedon a differentmeansof recruitment than that of the Spanish.The Spanishwere
all volunteers,"gentleman-adventurers,"
who had
signedon for a sharein the Conquest.The Aztecs,
on the otherhand,employedwhat wouldbe called
a "levy,"essentiallyconscription.Everyable-bodied man was liable for militaryservice.Education
for youngmenof commonerstatuswas largelythat
of the soldier (Soustelle 1970: 42). Each calpulli
(ward)had at least one telpochcalli,staffedby experiencedwarriorswho served as instructors(p.
169). In this way the Aztecs possesseda highly
centralizedand universalsystemof conscriptionto
fill their manpowerneeds.
The militaryforcesof the Aztecsand theirallies wereorganizedinto a seriesof units.All troops
in Tenochtitlanwere levied on the basis of their
membershipin their calpulli and fought as a
calpulli unit (Hassig 1988:56-57). In turn,the variouscalpulli unitsweregroupedinto four"corps,"
to the fourquartersof the city, each
corresponding
of which was commandedby one of the four
councilorsof the emperor (Soustelle 1970: 44).
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190
ANTHROPOLOGICAL
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Troopsfrom other cities would fight in their own
units.
Eachtownmarchedunderits ownbannerwithits own
leader,andif it waslargeenoughto havemorethanone
calpolli,it wouldhaveone over-allleader,or tlahtoani,
and subordinate
leadersfor eachof the severalcalpolli
units.Thesecalpolliunitswereoftendispersedamong
andincorporated
intothelargerarmiesof a majorcamwerenotdivided.Theywere
paign,but theyapparently
thebasiccommand,
andtacticalunits,andviologistical,
latingtheirintegritywouldhavecausedtoomanysupply
andcontrolproblems
(Hassig1988:55-56).
In other words,tributarytroopswere not used in
piecemealreplacementsfor Aztec units.
The mass of troops in the Aztec units were
commoners.Davies (1988: 163-164) suggests that
the highest positionswere generally reservedfor
the nobility. However,lower "officer"ranks were
typicallyheld by commonerspromotedfor merit.
The calpulli forces were organizedinto units
of 400 men, sub-dividedinto "squads,"although
the exact size of these sub-unitsis unclear(Hassig
1988: 56). The "companies"of 400 were, in turn,
organized into "divisions"of 8000, called xiquipeles (Diaz 1956: 440; Hassig 1988: 56), althoughHassig suggeststhat this divisionwas more
an ideal than a unit regularly used, and often
towns and wards contributedless than a full xiquipelli to the levy.
In additionto these troops,the Aztecs had various elite units at their command.Groupedinto
soldier fraternitiessuch as the Eagle and Jaguar
Knights,these troopsfought as separatecorpsand
suppliedleadersto the regularunits (Davis 1973:
190;Hassig 1988:45). These elite soldierssupplied
the Aztec forceswith the skill and daringto be emulated by the levies (Sahagun 1975: 91-93) and
also acted as shock troops(Hassig 1988: 100).
How Aztec units were orderedfor battle is
largelya matterof conjecture.Sahagun(1979: 52)
does recordthat the Aztecs were carefulin ordering their "ranks"for battle, and stiff punishment
was handedout to those who brokeor confusedthe
lines. However,this orderingappearsto have little
resembledthe Europeansystemof close-orderdrill.
The typical employmentof these units on the battlefieldis clear. When battle was joined,there was
an initial release of missile weapons,followedby
combat between macquauitl-armedtroops (Soustelle 1970: 210; Hassig 1988: 98-99). Davies suggests that Aztec tactics were little more than various kinds of ambush, but Hassig indicates that
they also used flankattacksand encirclement(Davies 1973: 188;Hassig 1988:101). Hassigalso suggests that the Aztecs employeda comparatively
open battle formation,in order to give individual
soldiers room to employ their macquauitl with
maximumefficiency.
Thisopenformation
is typicallyemployed
whenfighting
of a similarnatureto one'sown,whereasa more
infantry
is employed
whenwithdenselypackedclosedformation
standinga cavalrycharge.Sincetherewerenohorses[in
wereused
pre-Hispanic
battles],thewayAztecsweapons
fosteredan openformation
(Hassig1988:102).
Hassig proposesthat the wide spacings (approximately six feet) betweensoldiersin these formations were perhapsfilledby spearmen(p. 102). An
Aztec armyengagingan enemyprobablyextended
into a line
of enemy
onlydeepenoughto preventthe breakthrough
elements.Oncethearmyhadclosedwiththe enemyand
formeda broadfront,skirmishing
occurredby unitsas
actualcombat
wholes,butgiventhe weaponsemployed,
was inevitablyan individualaffair.If the unit'sfront
broke,a routwaslikely(p. 101).
Hassig also pointsout that the Aztecs usuallyattemptedto surrounda foe and attack from all directionsat once.
Discussion
It seems apparentfrom the ethnohistoricalrecords
that the use of open formationsby Aztec units,
along with their inability to cope tactically with
Spanish cavalry, were the two critical battlefield
factorsof Aztec tacticalpracticewhichcontributed
to the Spanishvictory.In essence the Spanishinfantry,with theirclose-orderformationsand sword
and shield-armedtroops,were able to survivethe
initialcontactand penetrateAztec units,or at least
to standtheirground.Meanwhile,the Spanishcavalry was typically engaged in breaking up the
Aztecs' formationsand causing them to retreat.
This superiorcombat system was the reason the
Spanishwere able to win in tactical terms.
These two factorscan be seen in most of the
battles of the Conquest.The battle of Otumbaon
July 14, 1520, is one example.Havingjust escaped
from Mexico,the Spanish,alongwith survivingallies, were met near the village of Otumba by a
large Mexicanforce. Cortes,in a letter to Charles
V, indicates that the Spanish were disposed in
"squadrons,"deployed in a square, during their
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TACTICALFACTORS
191
tion in the middle of the enemy throughoutthe
battle and were hard-pressed(p. 319). As noted
I concentrated
mypeoplethere,andfromthosewhowere
above, Sahagun (1975: 79) seems to indicatethat
still capableof actionmadesquadrons,
placingthemin
the Spanishclosedranksbeforecontactwas made,
frontandbehindandon the sideswiththe woundedin
likewise(Cor- whichagreeswith Diaz' statement(1956:319) that
themiddle;andI distributed
thehorsemen
the Spanish paused to receive instructionsand
tes 1971:140).
orders.
A passage in Sahagunseems to indicate that the
From this evidencethe battle can be said to
cavalry flankedthe main formation,with the rehave had four phases. First, the Spanishand the
in the center Aztecs movedinto contact.Second,the Aztec formainingbaggageand non-combatants
(Sahagun 1975: 77). It is probablethat the Span- mations were engaged and "fixed,"or forced to
ish "closed ranks"at the approachof the Aztec
presentvulnerableflanksand rear,by the Spanish
forces (p. 79).
infantryand allies. Third,the SpanishcavalryreDiaz describesthe battle vividly, mentioning
peatedly charged through the Aztec formations,
that whenthe Aztecs triedto surroundthe Spanish
disruptingtheir ranks. Fourth, the Aztecs broke
forces, the Spanishcavalry "keepingin partiesof
and were pursuedby the Spanishand their allies.
five, broke through [Aztec] ranks. . ." (Diaz 1956:
Accordingto Diaz, the infantrykept movingfor319). The Spanish infantry"movedall mixed up
ward,engagingthe Aztecs at close quarters,while
with them foot to foot" (p. 319). Meanwhile,the
the cavalrychargedagain and again, particularly
cavalry"spearedthem as they chose,chargingand
targetingAztec leaders(1956: 319-320).3
returning.. ." (p. 319). Duringthe fightingCortes
This patternof infantryformationscoordinatgave instructionsto the infantryto direct their attheir
actions with the enemy-unit-"busting"
ing
tacks against the Aztec leaders.Finally,their forwas
cavalry
repeated,with variations,in most of
mationsbrokenand their chief commandersdead,
the
battles
of
the Conquest.In the brief war with
the Aztecs fled, with the Spanishcavalryand inTlaxcala
the
Spanish
appear to have been very
fantryin pursuit(p. 320).
hard
to
at
pressed times, the pointthat the infantry
Sahagun's informantsrecordedtheir view of
could
not move becauseof the mass of Tlaxcalan
the battle as follows:
troopsall aroundthem,and they had to rely on the
Alsoat thisverytimethe Mexicanscamearrivingthat
cavalryto breakthe enemy(Diaz 1956: 130-131).
At the battle of Cintlain Tabasco,the cavalryand
they mightintercept[theSpanish].. . . Andwhenthe
lookedtowardthem,theyawaitedtheirfoes;
Spaniards
infantrycaught the Tabascanforces in what was
thereforethey checkedthemselves
so that they might
essentiallya pincermovement(p. 76). In the fighthowthey
contendagainstthem.Theyindeedpondered
ing that attended the siege of Tenochtitlan,the
wouldbe able to succeedagainstthem.Andwhenthis
happened,[the Mexicans]fell uponthem,they threw Spanishand their allies spent much time and enthemselves
uponthemso thatall speedilywouldbe energy levelinghousesand filling gaps in the causeclosedwithinthem.Thentherewas repeatedspearing,
to gain accessto the city and give the cavalry
strikingdownof the men.ThereindeeddiedMexicans ways
room
to maneuver(Diaz 1956:417, 422-423).
. . . Therewereonlya few whoes[and]Tlatilulcans.
capedtheirhands,whodid not die. AndthosewhoreDuringthe campaignthe integrationof the inmainedat a distance. . . did not die. And whenthe
allies of the Spanish with the Spanish
digenous
hadslainthem,whentheirire abated,thereSpaniards
units
appearsto have been sometimesproblematic.
upontheywent.All whoboreburdensupontheirbacks
As noted above, the Tlaxcalansand other allies
wentto be the last (Sahagun1975:79-80).
helpedredressthe numericaloddsfacingthe SpanSeveral points in these narrativesare worth ish. A majoraspectof this functionmay have been
to absorbthe bulkof attritionallosses.The Spanish
noting. First is the suggestionin Sahagun (p. 79)
that the Aztecs were of such numbersthat they
employedtheir allies in a numberof positionsand
roles, both as advanceand rear guard(Diaz 1956:
completelysurroundedthe Spanish.Also notableis
the way in which the Spanish used their cav353, 396), as guidesand baggage-carriers
(pp. 317,
alry-in "parties of five"-to disrupt the Aztec
347), and laborers(pp. 337, 340), as well as comranks(Diaz 1956:319). In addition,Diaz seemsto
batants. However,Diaz (pp. 396, 400, 424, 431)
indicate a close coordinationbetweenthe cavalry also indicatesthat the allies sometimesobstructed
and the infantry.Finally, it seems clear that the
operations,particularlyduringthe siege of TenochSpanishinfantryat Otumbawere in close forma- titlan, and special precautionshad to be taken to
retreat:
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192
ANTHROPOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
avoid this. The difficultyappearsto have been the
sheernumbersof the allies and a tendencyon their
part to jam narrowor restrictedspaces (pp. 400,
431)'.
Concernfor the integrityof their formationsis
voiced by the Spanish in their narrativesof the
Conquest,particularlyby Diaz.
Aztec successesagainstthe Spanishappearto have
been duringengagementswithinconstrictedareas,
such as the fightingwhich precededthe Spanish
flightfromTenochtitlanand the retreatitself along
the causewayon Noche Triste.Limitedspaceobviously preventedthe Spanish from deploying in
their customaryformationsand kept the cavalry
from operating with impunity. During Noche
Whenwe reachedthe levelgroundwithour horsemen Triste this particularlyappearsto have been the
andartillery. . . we did not darebreakourformation, case. The
Spanishquite literallyhad run for their
for anysoldierwholeft the ranksto followsomeof the
lives:
and
wasat oncewounded
Indiancaptainsandswordsmen
rangreatdanger.. . . Wedarednotto chargethem...
lest theyshouldbreakup ourformation.
...
... [T]heycame on so fearlesslythat they surroundedus on twosides,andhadevenhalfdefeatedus
andcut us off,whenit pleasedourLordJesusChristto
giveus strengthto turnandcloseourranks. . andadvancingshoulderto shoulder,we drovethemoff (Diaz
1956:126,423-424).
The Aztecs, for their part, although disciplinedand orderedin their own units, had neither
the effectiveclose-orderformationsof the Spanish
nor any consistentmethodof preventingthe Spanish cavalryfrom operatingat will, at least on the
open battlefield.This was less true in roughterrain
or within cities, wherehorseswere less useful and
more vulnerable.Hassig (1988: 241) points out
that the Aztecs developeda numberof defensive
ploys, such as pits, which they used against the
Spanish cavalry. But these were often of limited
utility: "Most of the innovative tactics were
static. . . . [T]he Spaniards had to be drawn into
an appropriatepositionor maneuver"(p. 241). The
Aztecs never evolved tactics to enable them to
stand up to the Spanishcavalryin open battle.'
Becauseof this failurecavalrymust be considered the "armof decision"in the Conquest.However, because of their small numbersduring the
campaigns,and the varied terrain in which the
fightingtook place, cavalryalone would not have
been sufficientto defeat the Aztecs. Spanishinfantry and allies, by their ability to engage Aztec
forcesat close quarters,to pin their units downfor
the cavalryto chargeand disrupt,and to operatein
areaswherecavalrywere ineffective,were essential
ingredientsin Spanishforce.
While engaging the Tlaxcalans,the Spanish
found them to be brave but poorlyled and badly
deployed (Diaz 1956: 131). Cortes (1971: 142)
made much the same observationaboutthe Aztecs
in one battle in one of his letters to Charles V:
"[T]heywereso manythat they got in each other's
way, and couldneitherfight nor run."The greatest
which
whatcouldwe do beyondwhatwe accomplished?
to thosewho
wasto chargeandgivesomesword-thrusts
triedto lay handson us, andto marchandget on ahead
so as to get off the causeway(Diaz1956:315).
But it was on the openbattlefieldthat the fate
of the Aztec nationwas decided,both at Otumba,
wherethe Spanishsurvivedthe Aztec'sgreatestattempt to crush them, and later in the battles that
sealed off Tenochtitlanand allowedthe Spanishto
lay siege to the capitaland strangleit into submission. The Conquestcan be viewedas a classiccase
of a warwon throughsuperiortactics.The Spanish
infantryformationwas a moreeffectiveway of employing foot-soldiersthan the Aztec system, and
theircavalrywas a tacticalchallengelargelyunanswered. While the Aztecs and the Spanish were
fightingthe same kind of war, a fundamentaldifference between them was the mannerin which
they organizedand used their respectiveforces,
and that differencewas critical.
Conclusion
At the beginningof this article it was noted that
of the SpanishConquesthave
most interpretations
attributed the Spanish victory to conceptualor
technologicalfactors.A difficultywith these interpretationsmay be that they tend to obviateexaminationof importantfunctionalreasons-actions on
the battlefield-and producethe false impression
that the SpanishConquestwas inevitableand could
not havebeenstoppedby the Aztecs. In this article
a tactical/militaryhistoricalperspectivehas been
appliedto ethnohistoricalrecordsof the Conquest
in an attemptto understandthese "on-the-ground"
factors. The applicationof such a perspectiveto
ethnohistoricalworks has potentiallygreat utility
in explicatingactionsand eventswhichmay otherwise be obscureand difficult.
Battleis a specialsortof sociopoliticalinterac-
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TACTICALFACTORS
193
tion. Warfareis not randomviolencebut a calcu- on the Aztecs, and politicalcontroland strategy,
lated political act employingdefinabletechniques. must be includedin an explanation.As an example
Successin battle is mediatedthroughthe tactical/
of the last, Hassighas outlinedanothercriticalreaorganizationalconceptsand usages of either side.
son for the Spanishvictory-their abilityon a straWhenthe combatantscome fromtwo widelydiffer- tegic level to take "advantageof existingcleavages
ent cultures,the need for a close examinationof
withinthe [Aztec] systemto split the empire,turn
those conceptsand usages is acute. Moreover,any
its memberson the Aztecs, and rend it asunder"
war is won or lost because of a complexof rea(1988: 267). Such a perspectivecomplementsthe
sons-psychological, organizational,and technical.
analysis here. Strategy and tactics are linked but
Therefore,the inclusionof detailed discussionof
tactical organizationand practice is a necessary functionallydistinct aspects of any militarycamForvictorycombatantsmust havesuccessin
complimentto otherexplanationsof the Conquest.5 paign.
both
spheres.The Spanishhad to stripthe Aztecs
A more thorough-goingexaminationof the
their
of
subjectgroups,but withouttacticalsuccess
ethnohistokicalrecords would reveal more about
their diplomatic victories would have been
the tactics of the Conquest.In addition,many pertinentissues,such as logistics,the effectsof disease meaningless.
NOTES
AcknowledgmentsThis article is based on graduate research
and a paper presentedat the 1988 NorthwestAnthropological
Conferencein Spokane WA. I would like to thank Dr. Rick
Wilk for his initial inspirationand encouragementin early research and paperson this topic. I also would like to acknowledge the help and encouragementof the late Dr. HerbertTaylor, whosecommentsand suggestionson subsequentdraftswere
invaluable.
1The attitude of the Aztecs toward the Spanish, as recorded in the ethnohistorictexts, particularlySahagun,is one
of initial confusionand fear, then growingfamiliarity,closely
followedby opposition.In Sahagun the Spanishare presented
as greedyand perfidious,for example,attackingwithoutwarning the participantsin the Feast of Uitzilopochtli,whereupon
the Aztecs are- depicted as rising in righteous indignation
against them (Sahagun 1975: 55-57). The Sahagun narrative
of the Conquestends with the Spanish trying to extort more
gold fromthe survivingAztec leadership(p. 126). Terrorof the
Spanish seems to have faded very quickly for the Aztecs and
seems to have played little or no role in subsequentbattles.
'Much has been made by some (for example, Prescott
1964: 152, 237, 306) of the terrorthe appearanceof the horse,
an animal unknownin Pre-ColumbianMexico, engenderedin
the Aztecs. This belief has some basis in fact. Diaz (1956: 59)
records that the Tabascans "thought that the horse and its
riderwas all one animal, for they had neverseen horsesup to
this time" and that the Tlaxcalansafter their first battles with
the Spanishwere afraidof their animals (p. 131). However,it
is apparentthat this feeling did not last long after they discovered that horseswere mortalcreaturesthat could die and were
vulnerable in certain types of terrain. Certainly by Noche
Triste the Aztecs were capableof killinglarge numbersof horses (and their riders)given the right set of circumstances.The
utility and success of horse cavalryfor the Spanishlay not in
psychological or supernatural terror, but in their heavy
"shock"-value,or ability to breakand disruptenemy units, on
the open battlefield.
8BrianFagan (1984: 274) believes that the targeting of
the Aztec leaders by the Spanishwas the fundamentalreason
for the Spanish victory at Otumba, in that the death of the
leaderscaused the commonsoldiersto lose heart. This is true
only in the sense, as Hassig (1988: 96) points out, that the
leaderswere standardbearerson whomtheir men guidedtheir
formations,and that, with their loss, the unit wouldbe in danger of losing its directionand cohesion.Such a dangerwould
obviously be mitigated by the assumptionof command by
subordinateleaders. More importantwas the ability of the
Spanish to maintainthe integrityof their formationsand to
disrupt the Aztec units while killing large numbersof enemy
troops.
'This inability was not for lack of understandingof the
tactical necessities,but stemmed from the fact that for the
Aztecs to change the organizationof their armieswould have
entailed
considerabletime, since it would involveretrainingprofessional warriors.Closed formationswere not adopted,
apparently because while they may have cured the
problemsof a massed cavalry attack, they would also
have created a better target for Spanish gunners....
Instead,the responseswere largelytechnological(Hassig
1988: 238).
However,it is apparentfrom the recordsthat, either through
circumstancesor inspiredleadership,the Aztecs on occasion
were able to stop the Spanish cavalry charge. For example,
Diaz (1956: 379-380) writesthat at Xochimilcoa combination
of massedAztec troopsarmedwith improvisedpikes standing
on restrictedground(at a bridgeand perhapswith their backs
to the lake), managedto halt the cavalryattack and actually
drag Cortesfrom his horse.In this case Cortesand the cavalry
were rescuedby Spanishinfantryand Indianallies. However,
Hassig's point holds true-the Aztecs on the whole failed to
respondwith appropriateorganizationaladaptationsto cope
with cavalry(1988: 238).
At the same time the final stratagemwhich defeated the
Aztecs was the siege, ratherthan open battle. The siege as a
military operationwas well known in Pre-ConquestMexico
(Hassig 1988: 108) and necessarilyinvolveddifferenttactics
than combaton the battlefield.However,the ninety-daysiege
whichendedin the fall of Tenochtitlanwouldhavebeen impossible for the Spanishwithouttheir open-battlevictoriesand a
continuedcoordinationof all their arms in closing the circle
tight about Tenochtitlan.Once the siege began, the Spanish
adaptedtheir units and their movementsto an unrelentingadvance up the causewaysinto the city, supportedby a naval
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194
ANTHROPOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
presenceon the lakes in the form of armed brigantines.This
new order of Spanish forces was merely a variationof their
usual tactical functions.
'It is beyondthe scope of this article to examinethe sufficiency of these "orthodox"interpretations.However, certain
assumptionsabout the Aztecs and their way of war, and the
ways in which they respondedto the Spanish invasion, have
been criticizedor are susceptibleto criticism.For example,the
suppositionthat the Aztec conceptionof warfare was fundamentallydifferentfrom the Europeanis no longer defensible.
BarryIsaacs (1983a) has demonstratedfrom the ethnohistorical record that Mexican warfare on the eve of the Spanish
Conquestwas similaror identicalto "state-levelwarfareelse-
where...," with the same heavy casualties, destructionof
propertyand lands,and politicalobjectives.The captureof enemy warriorsfor sacrifice,in Isaacs'view, fades to a secondary
pursuitof peasantsoldierseagerto advancein rank;the overall
aims and methodsof warfarewere set by the elite, who had a
differentagenda (1983a). Even the special case of the "Flowery War" (xochiyaoyotl), which has usually been interpreted
as wholly religiousin motivationand content (Soustelle 1970:
101), in fact had very real strategic and attritionalpurposes
(Isaacs 1983b). Similarcriticismcan be leveledagainstthe assumptionof the superiorityof Spanishweapons,or the effects
of the Quetzalcoatlmyth on the Aztecs (see, for example,Hassig 1988: 237-238, 242).
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