UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI
May 9th
03
_____________
, 20 _____
Nathan Andrew Long
I,______________________________________________,
hereby submit this as part of the requirements for the
degree of:
Doctor of Education
________________________________________________
in:
Educational Foundations in the College of Education
________________________________________________
It is entitled:
THE ORIGINS, EARLY DEVELOPMENTS, AND PRESENT-DAY
________________________________________________
IMPACT OF THE JUNIOR RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING
________________________________________________
CORPS ON THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
Approved by:
Marvin Berlowitz, Ph.D.
________________________
Eric Jackson, Ed.D.
________________________
Leo Krzywkowski, Ph.D.
________________________
Miriam Pemberton, Ph.D.
________________________
________________________
THE ORIGINS, EARLY DEVELOPMENTS AND PRESENT-DAY IMPACT OF THE
JUNIOR RESERVE OFFICERS’ TRAINING CORPS ON THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS
A dissertation submitted to the
Division of Research and Advanced Studies
of the University of Cincinnati
in partial fulfillment of the
requirement for the degree of
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION (Ed.D.)
in the Department of Educational Foundations
of the College of Education
2003
by
Nathan Andrew Long
B.M., University of Kentucky, 1996
M.Ed., University of Cincinnati, 2000
Committee Chair: Marvin J. Berlowitz, Ph.D.
ABSTRACT
The Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (Junior ROTC) has been a part of the
American educational system for nearly ninety years. Formed under the 1916 National Defense
Act, its primary function was and is to train high school youth military techniques and history,
citizenship and discipline. The organization has recently seen its stature elevated and its reach
widened once Congress lifted caps on its expansion in 2001. The Junior ROTC’s proliferation
has led to criticism from peace activists who denounce military training and tactics in schools
and political leaders who claim the benefits are suspect. Conversely, the program has earned the
praises of varied school and government officials. What becomes clear is that little consensus on
the program has been reached.
It is my contention that Junior ROTC’s current popularity within the American
educational system is multifaceted and cannot be simplistically embraced or summarily
discounted by disparate analyses. One must understand the organization’s historical roots to
comprehend its current manifestation. Thus, three related questions have guided my research.
First, what, if any, prerequisites existed relevant to Junior ROTC? Second, how does recruitment
correspond to the purpose of Junior ROTC’s inception and consequent growth? Third, has the
program focused on the recruitment of working class and racial minorities over its ninety-year
history?
First, two dialectically related historical constructs – preparedness ideology and
economic imperialism-expansionism – serve as prerequisites to Junior ROTC’s inception and
consequent growth. The antecedent relationships of military philosophy, education, training and
drilling are explored in relation to these constructs. Second, the historical record points to a
program designed primarily to recruit high school aged youth. Primary data in various forms
aptly illustrate the point. Third, the combination of historical and recent demographic data
confirm Junior ROTC’s recruitment focus on working class and disadvantaged youth, primarily
in urban centers, which provides the military a ready reserve of labor. Junior ROTC while an
attractive program to ‘reach’ at-risk high school students is a quick-fix approach to the numerous
structural and social barriers placed in front of our youth. Thus, attention is devoted in the last
chapter to potential alternatives.
© Nathan Andrew Long, 2003
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This first piece of scholarship would not have been possible had it not been for the
numerous supportive people I have had in my life. Family members, friends, colleagues, and
committee members all played a pivotal role in its completion. My heartfelt thanks and love
extend to all of these people.
My family has been and continues to be an inspiration to me. My mother, a feminist who
marched fervently for the Equal Rights Amendment inspired me to pursue a career in this field.
My father, Buzz, deserves a great deal of credit, as well. He was the first to obtain a college
education in our family and paved the way for me. Like my mother, he has committed himself to
a lifetime of public service helping people in this world – and doing so with class and dignity.
My in-laws have also been a constant source of love and support. I cannot thank Ted and Judy
enough for sticking by us. My daughter, Simone, blessed us with her presence at the start of my
doctoral career and continues to bless us. Her vivid imagination and zest for life have provided
me ample reason to complete the degree so that I might make a better life for her and enjoy her
growing up years. Finally, without the love and constant support of my wife this dissertation
would never have materialized. Her undying ardor, her editorial prowess, her embraces, and her
amazing gift to keep things in perspective made this dissertation process – and all of the
academic hoops – much more palatable. We have faced numerous struggles throughout my
tenure in graduate school and it is to her that this dissertation and degree are dedicated. She is the
light of my life, my beacon of hope, and my ray of sunshine.
Colleagues and friends were no doubt a critical component to my expeditious completion.
I must thank Dawn and Cathy who encouraged me to study with Marvin and who offered endless
encouragement throughout the process. My thanks also go to Roy who ranks among the most
intelligent and kindest men I have been acquainted with. Ruth Pedersen, the Educational
Foundations Administrative Assistant, is perhaps the most patient and accommodating human
being. Her willingness to always help in a pinch and her service to this department – while often
unrecognized – deserve acknowledgement. Dr. Berlowitz’s wife Rinda also earns my gratitude
for her patience and scholarly contributions. She has an amazing mind and is bar none, the best
chef this side of the Alleghenies. The research presented here would not have been possible had
it not been for Patricia Luna’s assistance who graciously offered me a place to stay, food to eat,
and transportation while in D.C. Finally, I want to say to all my friends and colleagues not
mentioned by name – thank you!
This dissertation would not have been possible at all had it not been for the brilliance,
expertise, love and encouragement exhibited by my committee members. Dr. Eric Jackson has
been and always will be the consummate scholar and friend. His periodic phone calls and
reminders to ‘get the damn thing done’ kept me on track. Dr. Miriam Pemberton is to be thanked
for her willingness to come on board and really apply her own paradigm and expertise. I also
must express gratitude to her colleagues at the Institute for Policy Studies for the resources
provided to me to complete my research via the Melman Fellowship. Dr. Leo Krzywkowski was
detail-oriented and read what seemed every drop of ink. During what felt like an unending period of
revisions, I reminded myself as to why I chose him. He has no doubt been a vital contributor in
making this document solid. Dr. K also pushed me to apply for the doctoral program and was
supportive in the choices I made. I would be remiss if I failed to thank Dr. K and his wife who
displayed acts of love and kindness to my family as I journeyed through graduate study. Finally,
words cannot express my indebtedness and gratitude to Dr. Marvin Berlowitz. I met this man six
years ago and in a short period of time he altered the way I thought about life and society. My
blinders were ripped open and the reality struck me that there was a rhyme and a reason to
society’s failings and why many of the children in our schools, in our communities, and in this
nation struggle to get a loaf of bread let alone an education. His amazing gift for words, his
constant support of his students (both in terms of publication collaboration and conference
presentations), his passion for social justice, and his burning desire to teach ‘just one more
student,’ is why I am in this field and why I so deeply desire to enter academia.
I must also express my deep gratitude to the staff at the United States National Archives
and Records Administration, the Hamilton County Public Library (Beth), the Langsam Library
staff, the College of Education, and the Office of Research and Advanced Studies. The direction
I received from these staff members was truly priceless.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
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Chapter
1. ANTECEDENTS: EARLY MILITIA PHILOSOPHY, STRUCTURE, AND
TRAINING, 1609 TO 1815
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19
Early Military Philosophy: 1609 to 1765
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21
Military Education and Training
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Revolutionary Military Philosophy: 1765 to 1792
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36
Pre- and Post-Revolutionary Military Training
and Education
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44
Jefferson’s Election and the Birth of Formalized
Military Education .
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The War of 1812 and Its Aftermath .
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55
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63
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2. THE ANTEBELLUM AND POST-CIVIL WAR PERIOD
The Antebellum Period: Growing Military
Professionalism and Purpose
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Military Education and the Evolution of
Professionalization .
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“Educational Democratization”: The First
Morrill Land Grant .
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Proliferation of the State Academies .
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78
Southern Military Academies and African
Americans .
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Reconstruction 1865-1876
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The Integrated Academy System and the Morrill
Acts of 1883 and 1890
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1
3. PREPAREDNESS AND PACIFISM: 1898 TO 1916
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93
American Imperialism, Military Reorganization,
and Arguments for Preparedness .
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The National Guard: First Federalization Attempts .
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101
Roosevelt and Wood’s Preparedness and Expansionist
Philosophies Defined
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105
Preparedness and Neutrality Politics .
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111
Public Debate toward a National Defense Act
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116
Educational Institutions
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122
4. THE BIRTH AND EVOLUTION OF JUNIOR ROTC .
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125
National Defense Act: Its Passage and Junior ROTC’s Creation
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128
Junior ROTC: The First Two Years: 1916 to 1918,
World War I and Formative Challenges .
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135
1918 to 1925 .
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140
ROTC, Pacifism, and the War Department’s Response
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A Brief Portrait of Junior ROTC through 1964
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161
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5. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
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169
Prerequisites relevant to Junior ROTC
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172
Junior ROTC for Recruitment: Preparedness for
National Service
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176
Disadvantaged Youth and JROTC as Recruitment
Mechanism in the Present-Day
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180
Final Analysis, Implications for Further Research
and Conclusion
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191
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198
WORKS CITED
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2
Appendix
A. Curriculum Outlines for Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps,
1923 and 2002 .
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217
B. Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps Enrollment Patterns,
1923, 1953, and 2003 .
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220
3
INTRODUCTION
“…and my question to either the secretary or to General Shinseki, in regard to getting at
this in another way, I'll never forget the movie, Born on the 4th of July, starring Tom
Hanks. That young man was in high school, a Marine recruiter came, talked to that class,
that school, about serving in the armed forces and what a great thing that would be for a
young person to do. Why don't we look very closely, Secretary, at trying to encourage,
maybe if not mandatory, but to -- for our government to support Junior ROTC programs,
and have them in more of our school systems across this country so that our young people,
not at the time they get to Yale or Princeton or Harvard or even Georgia Tech -- where I
went -- let's get them at the high school junior and senior level and teach them.”
Representative Gingrey, House Armed Services Committee,
Defense Budget Hearing FY 2004, February 12th, 2003.
The Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (Junior ROTC) has been a part of the
American educational system for nearly ninety years. Formed under the 1916 National Defense
Act, its primary function was and is to train high school youth military techniques and history,
citizenship and discipline. The organization has recently seen its stature elevated and its reach
widened once Congress lifted caps on its expansion in 2001. The Junior ROTC’s proliferation
has led to criticism from peace activists who denounce military training and tactics in schools
and political leaders who claim the benefits are suspect. Conversely, the program has earned the
praises of varied school and government officials. What becomes clear is that little consensus on
the program has been reached.
Its recent success has hinged on a strategy implemented by its commanding agency,
Army Cadet Command (ACC), and General Colin Powell through a program entitled Operation
Capital, intended to implement Junior ROTC units in as many inner-city and rural school
districts as possible to benefit ‘at-risk’ school children. Interestingly, this program came about
when the military began to experience drastic reductions in its size and financial structure. With
a lack of enlistees, depleted recruiting budgets, and an already high turnover rate many in the
peace community did and still view the Junior ROTC expansion program as a vehicle for
4
military recruitment. Peace activists touted Junior ROTC’s targeting of inner-city youth as
another attempt by the military industrial complex to press disenfranchised youth into enlisting.
Further allegations have come about citing Junior ROTC’s ‘racist, cutting edge’, recruiting
minority youth into the program for reasons already mentioned. Others, such as Catherine Lutz
and Leslie Barrett, analyzed the curriculum noting its overemphasized instruction in weapons,
military drill, and tactics.1
Such criticisms have been answered by the military and sectors of academia. In several
studies, Junior ROTC cadets’ grade point averages were compared to the general high school
population. Not coincidentally, however, Junior ROTC imposes grade point average restrictions
for students even to participate. Another study researched ‘community engagement’,
investigating Junior ROTC units’ service contributions within their community, citing their
contributions as justification for unit presence in local high schools. More dubious studies
include a series of articles on Junior ROTC and ‘democratization’. These studies compare cadets
with entering college freshmen, non-JROTC students, and other high school populations, such as
band members, athletics, and other similar extra-curricular groups, concluding Junior ROTC
students exhibit higher levels of democratic ideals. Other qualitative studies have been
conducted, investigating academic achievement outcomes, dogmatism and personality type, and
disadvantaged youths’ propensity to enlist.2
1
Marvin Berlowitz, “Racism and Conscription in the JROTC,” Peace Review, 12 (September,
2000), pp. 393-399; Catherine Lutz and Leslie Barrett, Making Soldiers in the Public Schools:
An Analysis of the JROTC Curriculum, (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee,
1995), pp. 1-37; Conscientious Objector.Org, http://objector.org/jrotc/jrotcrecruits.htm,
(Oakland, CA: Internet Publication, 2000), ad passim.
2
Rosemarie Kolstad, John P. Slovar, and Dennis L. Ritter, “Comparing the Democratic Maturity
of 50 College Science Majors with 154 High School JROTC Cadets,” College Student Journal,
33 (March, 1999), pp.120-123; Cletus R. Bulach, “Comparison of Character Traits for JROTC
Students versus Non-JROTC Students,” Education, 122 (Spring, 2002), pp. 559-563; Major
Raymond Schmidt, “JROTC Cadets in Leadership Training Display Significantly Higher
5
Finally, the existing historical narratives deal primarily with the senior component
(collegiate-level program). These scholarly works while helpful in establishing a baseline
understanding, fail to capture important nuances between two programs which historically have
different intents. There are two existing pieces relating specifically to Junior ROTC. Army Cadet
Command: The Ten Year History devotes one chapter to the program’s establishment, evolution
and current status. The second piece, a study completed by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies by author William Taylor is titled JROTC: Contributions to America’s
Communities. Final Report of the CSIS Political Military Studies Project on the JROTC. It
briefly traces Junior ROTC’s development among all service branches, providing a helpful
perspective on its overall growth. Markedly disconcerting is the pro-military bias and lack of
depth in both studies. The lack of historical and sociological scholarship, coupled with
ubiquitous misconceptions about the program, necessitates a more thorough and comprehensive
study. 3 It is my contention that Junior ROTC’s current popularity within the American
Personal Development than Typical Students,” Education, 122 (Winter, 2001), pp. 302-306;
David J. Hoff, “JROTC to Roll Out Standards-Based Curriculum,” Education Week, 21 (April,
2002), p. 12; Johnny Johnson, The Effects of High School Junior Reserve Officers’ Training
Corps Programs, (University of California Santa Barbara, Dissertation Abstract, 1999), ad
passim; Daniel MacHir. A Comparative Study Between Navy Junior ROTC Cadets and General
Population Students. (Wayne State University, Dissertation Abstracts, 1991), ad passim; Beth
Asch, Military Support for Youth Development: An Exploratory Analysis, (San Francisco:
RAND, 1994), pp. 1-40. I would like to remind readers that qualitative studies, while valuable in
many ways, are not useful in generalizing an N of 1. This is not a surprise considering the Army
Cadet Command (ACC) insists Junior ROTC is not a recruiting program, but rather one that
“motivates and develops young people”. Various military advertisements, as well as a televised
broadcast (1996), even a change in wording of the Junior ROTC motto (“To Motivate and
Develop Young People”) produced by Army Cadet Command have been disseminated to counter
the criticisms.
3
Arthur Coumbe, and Lee Harford, U.S. Army Cadet Command: The 10 Year History, (Fort
Monroe, Virginia: USACC. 1996), pp. 257-287; William Taylor, Jr., JROTC: Contributions to
America’s Communities: Final Report of the CSIS Political Military Studies Project on the
JROTC, (Washington DC: CSIS, 1996), pp. 1-64. For more on the collegiate level program see,
Gene M. Lyons and John W. Masland, “The Origins of the ROTC,” Military Affairs, 23 (Spring,
1959), 1-12; Gene M. Lyons and John W. Masland, Education and Military Leadership: A Study
of the R.O.T.C., (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1959), ad passim; and, Michael S.
6
educational system is multifaceted and cannot be simplistically embraced or summarily
discounted by disparate analyses. One must understand the organization’s historical roots to
comprehend its current status. Thus, three related questions have guided my research. First, what,
if any, prerequisites existed relevant to Junior ROTC? Second, how does recruitment correspond
to the purpose of Junior ROTC’s inception and consequent growth? And, third, has the program
been focused on the recruitment of working class and racial minorities over its ninety-year
history?
The first question’s answer is embedded in several hundred years of military evolvement
in the United States. “Preparedness” ideology in particular, is an omnipresent thread throughout
American martial history, easily noted by the mounting concerns vis-à-vis troop readiness and
effectiveness. The preparedness concept is simply defined as a nation or state maintaining a
program or desiring a program of military readiness to effectively defend its national or
international sovereignty. Preparedness efforts and debate existed early on, as is evidenced by
George Washington’s request for a regular army to conduct the Revolutionary War, the
development of West Point Military Academy, arguments over troop effectiveness during the
War of 1812, Civil War conscription policies and Theodore Roosevelt’s armed services overhaul
in the early twentieth century. Connected with preparedness ideology as an historical thread, is
imperialism. Imperialism is best-defined as: “the policy of extending the rule or influence of a
country over other countries or colonies.” Its relationship to preparedness is underscored by the
United States Government’s efforts following the Revolution to expand its territory first intranationally, then intra-continentally, and finally internationally. Obvious examples abound,
Neiberg, Making Citizen Soldiers: ROTC and the Ideology of American Military Service,
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), ad passim.
7
including Alexander Hamilton’s desire to use the military for political ends, the Mexican War (a
part of the expansionist agenda existing prior to and during President Polk’s time in office), and
the Spanish-American War. The link to preparedness becomes pronounced, when one realizes
that a strong and effective military force is necessary in carrying out an imperialist or
expansionist agenda.4
Next preparedness and imperialist ideology can be viewed within the context of military
education and training culminating in professionalization – the creation of career military
officers and enlistees. Historically, citizen militias, sometimes referred to as the citizen-soldiery,
were responsible for the welfare and defense of property and sovereignty. This citizen-soldiery
was unique in that after fighting or executing its various missions, they would recede back into
the population, pursuing their original duties within the settlement, colony, or state. Their lack of
preparedness elicited frequent criticism, but was often stifled, since in fact their overall success
record was high (they did after all, help win the Revolutionary War). Following the Revolution,
growing and competing political ideologies ushered in the moderate Whig-Republican (states’
rights’) and Federalist mantras, placing the citizen militias (now state militias) squarely at the
nation’s political-philosophical epicenter.5
State militias, while supposedly democracy’s protectorate, were viewed by Federalists as
incapable splintered entities that could potentially fracture the new nation’s cohesion. Instead,
federalists argued, a federalized-centralized military would ensure a quick, malleable, and
efficient defensive force should the need present itself. States rightists’ contrarily stated a fully
federalized militia would subvert the initial freedoms sought in the Revolution. To sum up,
4
“Imperialism”, Encarta® 2002 Encyclopedia, (Microsoft Corporation, 2002).
5
It is important to keep in mind states’ rightists’ arguments were as much about maintaining
slavery as it was about democratic process.
8
states’ rightists desired a traditional citizen’s army in the form of state militias that could be
readily activated by the federal government, leaving control and training under state purview.
Federalists, on the other hand, desired a strong standing or professional army that could be easily
activated and placed into action as necessitated. Though state militias could play a role in
Federalist plans, their’s would be a minor one.
Tension continued through the nineteenth century when federalist mentality gained
traction as America continued its expansion, requiring an effective and sizable fighting force.
Concomitantly, federalization attempts required expanding military educational opportunities in
order to train competent officers. The professionalization of the United States military, then,
begins with the founding of West Point and the subsequent proliferation of private and state
military academies throughout the country and continued as the Spanish-American drove
Theodore Roosevelt’s desire in revamping military hierarchy and chains-of-command. It is
during Roosevelt’s tenure the terms ‘preparedness’ and ‘imperialism’ become recognized and
oft-used expressions emanating from the former Rough Rider’s observations about his military
comrades. He alleged the military had miserable battle preparation and communication, rampant
troop inefficiency, and generally poor performance. Assuming the presidency after McKinley’s
assassination, military purpose would need to modify with his new foreign policy approach. As a
consequence, the Roosevelt Corollary, his selection of Elihu Root, and his alliance with General
Leonard Wood married preparedness and imperialism. In order for America to dominate world
markets, preserve American interests in the Western Hemisphere, and administer its newly
acquired territories, a lethal and effective military machine was key.
Preparedness and imperialist ideology’s reliance on military expansion begs the next
research question: how does recruitment, via preparedness ideology and imperialism, rationalize
9
Junior ROTC’s inception and consequent growth and the program’s connection to early
federalization efforts? In order to grow a professional officer corps and attain sizable enlistments
in the name the name of military readiness, recruiting young men into the enlisted ranks was
necessary. The nation’s public high schools and preparatory academies would become feeder
programs, encompassing military training and education, leading to service in the federalized,
regular army. Preparedness ideology as the driving force behind Junior ROTC’s creation, then,
cannot be ignored when discussing its purpose in 2003 or in 1916. Yet, recruiting a large force
can only be successful when it targets large pockets of the population. The third research
question surfaces: is Junior ROTC a mechanism for recruiting underprivileged, working class
children or an opportunity afforded to young people with little hope for a bright future, or is it a
combination of both? These three questions will be addressed in greater detail from an historical
and sociological perspective. The following chapter outline explains the direction and purpose of
the dissertation, assisting the reader in establishing a framework in which to comprehend and
critically analyze Junior ROTC’s role in the American educational landscape.
Chapter one identifies three major antecedents or prerequisites to Junior ROTC, paying
particular attention to citizen militia development, Federalist and Whig political philosophy, and
the beginnings of preparedness ideology. Section one explores issues pertaining to early militia
endeavors, setting in place how the organizations were implemented and utilized. A common
theme stated in this section will weave itself throughout this dissertation: the concept of citizenarmies. Section two summarizes militia training activities, typically termed musters. Musters
were as much socially-oriented, bringing together townsfolk for long stays of military training,
socializing, and community-building. This section also brings to bear the challenges colonials
faced as they dealt with attack from Native American tribes and other ‘menaces’. One main
10
conclusion readers may come to is the training days’ haphazard nature and the issues faced by
Washington and other Revolutionaries during the War. But, the second conclusion is reiterative
from section one. The citizen-soldier concept holds firm in American culture, and while the
concept contributes to problems during the Revolution, America indeed arose victorious. Section
three further develops military philosophy permeating citizens’ hearts and minds. America’s
Continental Congress demonstrates the growing rift between those who desired a strong military
presence (a Regular Army) and a less-threatening presence, with citizen-soldiers, by establishing
a Regular Army overseen by members of Congress. Section four continues the conversation
regarding military training and education, but here I begin to emphasize the growing education
movement towards a military educational system, identifying Washington’s interest in a National
University and officers’ training school. Again, the debate between those advocating a state
militia system (Whig-Republicans) or a federalized regular army (Federalists) is brought to bear.
Early imperialist remnants appear with Alexander Hamilton’s desire to use the military for
political purposes, emboldened by the Whiskey Rebellion’s success. Section five begins with the
Federalists eventually losing control to Republican Thomas Jefferson, who was mainly opposed
to an extravagant and over-sized armed service. Ironically, Jefferson’s views apparently become
tempered by reality: He engaged the military more than his predecessors combined and signed
legislation founding West Point. Section five also digresses momentarily, weaving in West
Point’s predecessors - indispensable in appreciating the United States Military Academy’s
curriculum. Section six briefly delves into the War of 1812. Once more, the citizen-soldier
versus federalization debate reveals itself in a complex dialectical relationship when naval
victory saved America from defeat, but America’s imperialist aims were in part related to the
11
war’s unpopularity. The War of 1812’s end marks military professionalism’s beginning, in part
marked by Sylvanus Thayer’s appointment at West Point.
Chapter two further explores the historical strains of preparedness and imperialist
ideology via the government’s strategic military expansion and military professionalization.
Section one offers a brief overview of military philosophy during the Antebellum Period. This
section considers the growing professionalism within the military and American expansionist
efforts prior to, during, and after the Mexican War. The term professionalization speaks to the
increasing number of career officers and enlisted men. Professionalization’s impact on future
armed service expansion is too great to comment on here. Suffice it to say, the growing officer
fraternity and the Mexican War’s achieved objectives (namely westward expansion and
occupation) laid groundwork for extensive military expansion. Section two elucidates military
education’s maturation process. Academy-style instruction would contribute to officer
professionalism, in addition to setting education precedents. These precedents include greater
emphasis on a liberal arts curriculum establishing the military academy system’s higher
education prominence, officer development and training, as well as intensive lessons on the art of
war. Section three discusses higher education’s democratization and military federalization
efforts via the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862. This landmark legislation plants the seeds of
mass higher education, setting aside lands for agricultural and mechanical colleges and
universities within each state. The 1862 act would be revised in 1883 and 1890, reflecting the
growing needs of the country, as elaborated on in section seven. Private and state academies are
elaborated on in section four. Their propagation throughout the south, exemplifies two major
philosophical departures. First, profound concern existed on the part of many southerners
regarding West Point’s elitism and ‘secretive’ ways’. Secondly, southerners had their own view
12
of militarism – emphasizing duty, honor, and discipline. This militarism was drastically different
from the Northern version, and will be explicated on in this section. Section five continues in the
vein of southern military academies, discussing their incorporation of African Americans at
Reconstruction’s commencement. Section six persists with the theme of professionalization from
Reconstruction up to the Spanish American War. Finally, section seven probes in greater detail
the integrated academy system and the Morrill Acts of 1883 and 1890. The acts’ major
requirement, that all institutions incorporate military training and drill, is ROTC’s first real
connection with the nineteenth century.
The third chapter explains preparedness activities following the Spanish-American War
and the convergence of preparedness and imperialist ideology. Section one briefly investigates
the new challenges relative to American Imperialism and its administration of the new Spanishisland acquisitions (Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines). Military reorganization and
subsequent arguments for preparedness naturally surfaced due to complexities involved with
managing foreign territories. President William McKinley defied tradition appointing Secretary
of War Elihu Root - a lawyer. Elihu Root’s appointment is historically significant in that he was
the master designer behind America’s modern military system. He developed a general staff
structure, consistent military education and training and first steps towards the armed services’
federalization. Section two examines the National Guard, better known as the state militia
system, since it was a primary target of Root’s federalization efforts. Elihu Root endorsed the
legislation known as the Dick Act, which would delineate two militia forces – a Reserve and a
National Guard force, both to be called up to duty in the event of a national emergency. This new
reserve structure became the platform for federalizing military operations. Section three explores
President Roosevelt and General Leonard Wood’s preparedness campaigns. Root’s reforms took
13
place during the Roosevelt’s early years in office. Here, however, Roosevelt’s philosophies are
meted out to comprehend his position and his impact on domestic as well as foreign policy issues
toward the middle of his presidency. Leonard Wood enters as a vital supporter, political
appointee, and eventual standard-bearer of preparedness rhetoric. He and Roosevelt established
the massive movement and rationale that would essentially carry through to World War I. In
section four, preparedness and isolationist politics become amplified between Leonard Wood,
Roosevelt, and President Wilson. The three politicians became locked in heated disagreement
over the manner in which America would successfully sustain its world dominance.
Preparedness offered military solutions in order to maintain open, free trade. Wilson’s economicpacifistic-neutrality platform envisioned America’s dominance and security via capitalist
expansion, allowing Americans to prosper from neutral trading ties, improved diplomatic
interventions, and reduced threat of war. In section five, I examine how at first debate remained
at the periphery during Wilson’s first two years. Leonard Wood had developed military training
camps for college men, but these were seen as mere thorns in Wilson’s side. However,
imminence of World War I ushered in public debate regarding a National Defense Act preparing
America in the event of war. Wood seemed to have won the ‘battle’. Wilson would capitulate to
preparedness legislation, but the final signed bill would bear his imprint, leaving Roosevelt and
Wood at the perimeter. Finally, section six outlines the American High School’s increasing
presence: establishing a home for Junior ROTC. These public schools would serve as they do
today, centers of experimental educational efforts, with military training pinpointed as critical to
the growth and development of young men. Additionally, military academies – their curriculum
and design – would allow military officials to envision an organization modeling academy-style
learning at the public school level.
14
Unlike the first three chapters, which relied heavily on secondary sources, chapter four
introduces primary documents from the Adjutant General and Chief of Staff records never before
used when discussing Junior ROTC. In light of this fact, chapter four adds a great deal to the
scholarly record. The historical strain of preparedness ideology resulted in direct federal control
of all military activities manifested in the passage and implementation of the National Defense
Act. Section one, then, continues with the 1916 National Defense Act, the coup de grace of
military federalization and Junior ROTC’s founding. This discourse is inserted here to emphasize
growing nationalist and militarist tendencies in a nation divided over the military’s function.
Specific to the National Defense Act is the various forms it took prior to passage, the political
posturing and the final bill itself. Senator John Hay was primarily responsible for the bill’s
passage into law, a personality discussed in some detail. Alluded to in chapter three, the National
Defense Act also bears the mark of President Wilson, who insisted that while preparedness
efforts were required as a result of international tumult, citizen control remained somewhat intact
during peacetime. The political dynamics will be discussed as they help fit the National Defense
Act into the larger picture. Section two introduces the first of many primary sources relative to
Junior ROTC’s beginning two years. This section investigates the early process, procedures and
issues. Connectedly, initial program implementation favored military preparatory academies as
they had a Professor of Military Science and Tactics in place. Junior ROTC’s presence in public
high schools would not become significant until 1918. Section three covers the period 1918 to
1926. Three major “events” appeared to have facilitated Junior ROTC’s expansion into the
public high schools. In 1918, a series of amendments to the 1916 Defense Act, suspended the
ROTC program in lieu of military training in the schools. Illustrative of this point was
Leavenworth High School’s (Leavenworth, Kansas) establishment in early 1917 and its
15
dissolution in October. Second, a 1918 memorandum by the Chief of Staff’s office
recommended a more defined program for military instruction within the schools, called the
United States Junior Reserve. Though it is unclear whether or not this program was intended as a
replacement or extension of Junior ROTC during World War I, the obvious implications of the
recommendation, as explained, set in place standards for the program’s implementation postWorld War I. Curriculum is discussed in this section, outlining suggestions made by Corps
Commanders, detailing extended course information and books recommended for us. This
section also reveals valuable descriptive statistics on Junior ROTC’s unit placements around the
country, including general enrollment trends particular to specific high schools and localities
gathered from Corps Area Commanders memoranda. This data permits the reader to better
understand its early proliferation and growth, particularly in urban-centered high schools.
Economic issues pertinent to Junior ROTC are brought to bear, as the military as a whole
experiences Congressional budget limitations, placing Junior ROTC in a tenuous position.
Nonetheless, the program remained intact, as the evidence suggests. The growing pacifism
influence on military training in the schools may have had some effect as will be discussed in
section four. Section four explores the anti-ROTC movement and the War Department’s
response between the years 1926 and 1932. The pacifist arguments offer unique insight and
historical perspective when one compares the 1990 anti-ROTC movement. Numerous pacifist
groups began speaking at colleges and universities, causing some colleges and high schools to
drop their programs altogether. The War Department was obviously concerned and drafted a
response to help their instructors deal with the ‘menace’. Section five briefly looks at the
program from the 1930s through 1964. Descriptive statistics are employed from the mid-1950s to
show the strength of the program around the country, its placement and general trends. The
16
newly formed defense department created a more organized approach than their predecessors.
The period through 1964 is marked by declining enrollments and large-scale disinterest of Senior
ROTC, but culminated in passage of the 1964 ROTC Vitalization Act, providing more federal
control. This will be discussed in some form here.
Chapter five concludes the dissertation. I will analyze the preparedness and imperialistexpansionist ideological threads as Junior ROTC’s primary pre-requisites. The question
regarding recruitment, elucidated in chapter four using with enrollment data from 1923 and 1953
as well as the present day available information will be addressed and placed in contemporary
contexts. Finally, I will attempt to resolve the issue of Junior ROTC as a recruitment mechanism
that targets working class, disadvantaged youth. The historical record, combined with the present
day statistics and structural issues related to class and race will be focused upon.
Delimitations
A few items are necessary in assisting the reader. The present study is an interdisciplinary
approach emphasizing a historical and sociological analysis. The attempt to show, for example,
Junior ROTC’s historical relationships to preparedness and imperialism, provides support for the
argument that federalization-centralization of the military occurred. However, it is not, nor is it
intended to be an exhaustive approach. Most of the primary sources in chapter four, including
memoranda, letters, charts, graphs, et cetera, used in chapter four were obtained in March 2003
from National Archives Record Group 407, the Adjutant General of the Army Records, 1897 to
1917 and 1917 to 1939; and National Archives Record Group 319, the Chief of the Army
Reserve Records, 1945 to 1965. As such, this dissertation’s evidence and scope is limited to
those developments in the Army, and particularly those correspondences emanating and arriving
17
to the Adjutant General’s Office. The Adjutant General’s Office (AGO) was responsible for the
operation of ROTC throughout its beginning, up through the 1960s when there was significant
redesign to program – a result of the 1964 Vitalization Act. The AGO was also the most
significant available data on the program. Upon choosing this topic, my immediate goal was to
work directly with Army Cadet Command and their records. Army Cadet Command currently
operates the entire ROTC program. Due to a series of significant challenges obtaining access, I
was able to retrieve minimal data sets from the organization. It is important for the reader to
understand this limitation on evidence, if for no other reason than setting groundwork for future
research. It is apparent much more research on the program would prove useful. In response to
the technological advances, I have incorporated where appropriate, web links to certain
documents or websites that may spark further interest or effectively illustrate a point.
Lastly, the dissertation’s first three chapters will inevitably contain some gaps in the
literature. The intent of presenting the first three chapters is to help the reader comprehend the
historical developments, or prerequisites, leading up to Junior ROTC. Thus, to reiterate, the
current study incorporates an interdisciplinary method emphasizing a historical and sociological
analysis
18
CHAPTER 1
ANTECEDENTS: EARLY MILITIA PHILOSOPHY, STRUCTURE, AND TRAINING,
1609 TO 1815
“The militia, or what we call the Militia, is not a select Part of the People as it is in
England, set apart for that purpose, and under officers ready to be made use of on
Occasion, and when there is need for them, employed and payed at the Public Charge; but
the whole Body of the People from 16 years of age to 50. It is fit that all these people
should be trained and taught the use of Arms, and it is chiefly for this that the Militia Act is
intended. Part of these people that are nigh to the Place where an Enemy makes and
attempt, may be got together and make some Defence… It is the Duty of every man to
resist and invasion… Militia is always to be employed as there is Occasion, and such as are
employed to be paid in the manner directed.”
Governor Morris, 1744, quoted James Whisker, The Rise and
Decline of the Militia System, 202
Introduction
For many years, American military historians were primarily concerned with past efforts
at organizing and managing combat armies and navies. Few concerned themselves with the
social origins of military personnel, the process of socialization and value inculcation in the
military systems, military attitudes toward the public, the relation of military to economic and
political elites, the development of inter-service rivalries, or the effect of military service on the
individual. The historical recognition of the military’s social and political design is and has been
moving beyond mundane accounts of battlefield tactics and lionized generals.
Chapter one depicts the early progression of military philosophy, process, and education.
Written off as primitive, the colonial militias actually served as a foundation for current military
manifestations. Conditions for the raising and training of militias were harsh, but their presence
flew in the face of British military tradition. As America rose to prominence, the militia design
19
would be called upon as the only true mechanism for evading tyrannous government and
maintaining the locus of control in the people.
Chapter one identifies three major antecedents or prerequisites to Junior ROTC, paying
particular attention to citizen militia development, Federalist and Whig political philosophy, and
the beginnings of preparedness ideology and imperialist-expansionist thought. Section one
explores issues pertaining to early militia endeavors, setting in place how the organizations were
implemented and utilized. This section introduces the citizen-soldier and the citizen-army which
becomes a prominent theme of the dissertation. Section two summarizes militia training
activities, typically termed musters. Musters were as much socially-oriented, bringing together
townsfolk for long stays of military training, socializing, and community-building. This section
also brings to bear the challenges colonials faced as they dealt with attack from Native American
tribes and other ‘menaces’. As evidenced in the following pages, the training days’ haphazard
nature and issues faced by Washington and other Revolutionaries during the War were cause for
concern about the viability of a citizen-soldier. But, the second conclusion is reiterative from
section one. The citizen-soldier concept holds firm in American culture, and while the concept
contributes to problems during the Revolution, America indeed arose victorious. Section three
further develops military philosophy permeating citizens’ hearts and minds. America’s
Continental Congress demonstrates the growing rift between those who desired a strong military
presence (a Regular Army) and a less-threatening presence, with citizen-soldiers, by establishing
a Regular Army overseen by members of Congress. Section four continues the conversation
regarding military training and education, but here I begin to emphasize the growing education
movement towards a military educational system, identifying Washington’s interest in a National
University and officers’ training school. Again, the debate between those advocating a state
20
militia system (Whig-Republicans) or a federalized regular army (Federalists) is brought to bear.
Early imperialist-expansionist remnants appear with Alexander Hamilton’s desire to use the
military for political purposes, emboldened by the Whiskey Rebellion’s success. Certainly, the
Whiskey Rebellion is not an imperialist-expansionist issue, but the implementation of the militia
to put down the rebellion points to the military as a useful tool for political purposes – including
imperialist-expansionist aims. Section five begins with the Federalists eventually losing control
to Republican Thomas Jefferson, who was mainly opposed to an extravagant and over-sized
armed service. Ironically, Jefferson’s views apparently become tempered by reality: He engaged
the military more than his predecessors combined and signed legislation founding West Point.
Section five also digresses momentarily, weaving in West Point’s predecessors - indispensable in
appreciating the United States Military Academy’s curriculum. Section six briefly delves into the
War of 1812. Once more, the citizen-soldier versus federalization debate reveals itself in a
complex dialectical relationship when naval victory saved America from defeat, but America’s
imperialist aims were in part related to the war’s unpopularity. The end of the War of 1812
marks military professionalism’s true beginning with expanded efforts to train officers, in part
with Sylvanus Thayer’s appointment at West Point Military Academy, which is discussed in
chapter two.
I. Early Military Philosophy: 1609 to 1765
“The colonial militia, in particular, represents the happy uniqueness of America,
where Englishmen in the Seventeenth Century revived this military relic of the
middle ages just as in Europe it was sinking beneath the superiority of the politically
dangerous mercenary army on the battlefield.”6
6
John W. Shy, A New Look at Colonial Militia, ed. Peter Karsten, The Military in America:
From the Colonial Era to the Present, (New York: The Free Press, 1986), p. 27; and, John Shy,
“New Look,” William and Mary Quarterly, 20 (April, 1963), pp. 175-185.
21
The arrival of early colonists marked a brand new beginning. The militia system that
developed over the ensuing one hundred years hearkened back to a bygone era in England.
Many new settlers were political refugees, religious dissidents, and people with ‘unsavory’
pasts. The concept of a militia run by the people, though practical in its implementation also
held to the basic principles of citizen-controlled leadership. While the colonials varied in their
loyalty to the Crown, there was no mistake that the militia system placed the commoner at the
fore.7
The settlement came at a cost for everyone involved – colonist, African, and Native
American. Beginning with Jamestown’s settlement, early Americans battled disease, starvation,
and domestic as well as foreign attack. The challenges faced by colonists naturally cast doubt on
their ability to permanently settle America. However, after a great deal of maneuvering by the
British government including the redistribution of charters and leadership, the settlement grew
with increasing verve. It also was the colonial militias that became the dominant method for
survival and growth and stability. Small cadres of men served the locality, fending off Indian
attacks (and in as many cases initiating attacks). As time wore on, the new representative bodies
of colonies sanctioned the raising of military service, as in the case of Virginia in 1639
compelling all able-bodied males to serve in a military capacity as required.8
Militias were utilized as expeditionary forces, scouting the areas for arable land, timber,
and other natural resources. Having a small core group of easily assembled men to protect the
7
One should not parlay the fact, however, that throughout American history (and the colonial era
is no exception), men and women from working classes were the primary battle casualties. Thus,
the citizen militia concept is contradicted by the fact many in the aristocracy simply did not carry
war’s burden. The initial three chapters do not deal as deeply with this issue as the author would
like, but it is an important relationship. An in-depth analysis of the first American militia see
William L. Shea, “The First American Militia,” Military Affairs, 46 (February, 1982), pp. 15-18.
8
Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1984), p. 5.
22
settlements, the locality’s disposal was crucial. Financial constraints of colonists made a full-time
military, known as a Regular Army or Standing Army, impossible. The new settlements required
a great deal of labor, requiring the skills of every man, woman and child for the settlement’s
economic and social stability.9
Aside from financial limitations there also was a unique philosophical bent in the
colonists desire to avoid the professional ‘Regular’ force that Britain relied on. The use of
‘citizen-soldiers’ was what many historians view as the hallmark of America’s eventual success
in the Revolution. These men were citizen-soldiers - resistant to military professionalism –
serving only when duty called.
Distrust of a standing army reaches as far back as 1620 with the arrival of the Pilgrims
and the eventual immigration of Puritans en masse to the New World. King Charles’ forced
military musters on Sundays and his penchant for impressments caused great consternation
among the ultra-religious Puritans. Ultimately, King Charles’ military policy of ‘train bands’ had
a deleterious effect on the Puritan mindset, resulting in their migration to the New World:
“He (Charles I) angered the Puritans by requiring that, following church services on
Sundays, the train bands were to engage in such sports as ‘archery, running,
wrestling, leaping, football playing, casting, the sledge hammer and playing at
codgels’… in the bitter debate in the parliamentary session of 1628 they railed hard
against the imposition of tyrannical standards on an essentially civilian body.”10
9
Ibid., p. 4. The Standing or Regular Army concept developed in Europe. Soldiers were paid to
be permanent members of a military unit and served at the discretion of monarchs, parliaments,
or both. For more information on the early British Standing Army tradition, see George J.
Neimanis, “Militia vs. the Standing Army in the History of Economic Thought from Adam
Smith to Friedrich Engels,” Military Affairs, 44 (February, 1980), pp. 28-32; Dallas Irvine, “The
First British Regulars in North America,” Military Affairs, 9 (Winter, 1945), pp. 337-354; Ian
Steele, “Governors or Generals?: A Note on Martial Law and the Revolution of 1689 in English
America,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 46 (April, 1989), pp. 304-314.
10
James Whisker, The Rise and Decline of the Militia System, (London, England: Susquehanna
University Press, 1999), p. 93. William L. Shea, Op. Cit., pp. 15-18.
23
Religious persecution ultimately caused the Puritan’s flight. Issues such as military readiness that
infringed upon their religious activities increased their resolve.
The militia system was first and foremost a practical entity. As just mentioned, its
general mission was in the business of protection, not war. When defending what was important
to them: their homes and property, their effectiveness was unyielding. Their efficacy decreased
considerably, however, when they embarked on ‘expeditions’, resulting in large numbers being
massacred, falling ill, or suffering mental and physical fatigue.11
“Unlike professional soldiers, citizen-soldiers want to avoid wars, and they bring
such wars as do occur to a rapid conclusion. They then fully reintegrate back into the
mainstream society. They fight for nationalism and principle, not booty, rewards or
honors… They go to war to defend their own homes and families and national
interests, not for money in a land alien to them.”12
A plethora of towns, hamlets, and villages throughout colonial America proved
necessary to militia success. Militias relied on these localities to serve as ‘strategic villages’ or
outposts where if protracted war developed, there was safe haven, food and supplies, and
military facilities: New England towns often fed and boarded soldiers in townsfolks’ homes. The
central meeting house also doubled as a garrison, housing weapons, ammunitions, and other
Much ado has been made about Puritan’s influence on American mores, political, economic and
social entities – and for good reason. See also, Sanford Kessler, “Tocqueville's Puritans:
Christianity and the American Founding,” The Journal of Politics, 54. (August, 1992), pp. 776792. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Henry Reeve, (ed.), (Online publication,
http://www.hti.umich.edu/cgi/b/bib/bibperm?q1=AKR4001); and, Joseph A. Conforti, Imagining
New England: Explorations of Regional Identity from the Pilgrims to the Mid-Twentieth
Century, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 1-34.
11
Weigley makes this clear, stating that militia training and experience “did not prepare them for
extended campaigns, nor did militia organization befit the maintenance of long expeditions,”
Weigley, Op. Cit., p. 12.
12
James Whisker, Op. Cit., p. 381.
24
warfare needs. This loosely-organized set-up in the end was extremely useful and imitated
throughout the New England colonies.
“…The colony (Massachusetts) developed a net of what have been called, in another time
and place, ‘strategic villages’… each protected by its own militia, and augmented by
provincial troops who used horses in the summer, snowshoes in the winter, to connect the
towns by patrols and conduct raids into Indian country.”13
As the colonies increased in social and political viability, so to did the overall organization
of the militia. Resource consolidation became fundamental for survival. The New England
Confederation, an alliance of many colonies was conceived, pooling valued resources together in
putting down Native American threats and other incursions. Later on this consolidation would be
one of Britain’s greatest oversights since the Confederation appears to have been the foundation
for a Revolutionary movement in the eighteenth century. The New England Confederation was
the colonists’ first attempt at military centralization in the New World “…adopting a mutual aid,
self-defense program based on the colonial militias of these member regions. The Confederation
would make, or at least approve, all appointments of officers, and designate an overall
commander-in-chief. It would contract for maintenance and repair of the Confederation’s arms…
sought authority to decline war.”14
Ranks of militia men also developed during the Confederation period. Historian James
Whisker discusses the Confederation’s categorization of certain men as selectmen or minuteman,
a distinction while seemingly minuscule, is extremely important:
13
John W. Shy, Op. Cit., pp. 30-31; T. H. Breen, “An Empire of Goods: The Anglicization of
Colonial America, 1690-1776,”The Journal of British Studies, 25 (October, 1986), pp. 467-499.
Ronald L. Boucher, “The Colonial Militia As a Social Institution: Salem, Massachusetts 17641775,” Military Affairs, 37 (December, 1973), pp. 125-130.
14
James Whisker, Op. Cit., p. 100; and, Jack S. Radabaugh, “The Militia of Colonial
Massachusetts,” Military Affairs, 18, (Spring, 1954), pp. 1-18.
25
“The select militia, in the colonies called ranges or ranging units and minutemen,
received special training and the best arms provided at the expense of the province.
Rangers were primarily frontiersmen who lived too far away from the towns to be
able to attend regular Militia musters. Minutemen were city dwellers who pledged to
muster at the proverbial moment’s notice.”15
This notion of a “Confederation” should not imply all colonial militias were imitating.
Indeed, this was far from the case - and leads to a major interweaving concept throughout
American History. Each militia was a part of the town and each town had its own provincial
character. It cannot be stressed enough the importance of self-autonomy brought about by those
colonial structures. The colonies provincial character ripened the self-autonomy ideal,
contributing to the resistance towards federalization. Throughout the remaining chapters, this
concept will continually reoccur.
Provincial character greatly defined colonial obsession against tyranny, best exemplified in
the Northeast, giving way to a unique concept mystifying many incoming immigrants and southern
colonial brethren: they elected officers, basically democratizing their militia units. At the onset of
the Pequot War in 1636 in which the “…the legislature (Massachusetts) passed legislation allowing
each regiment and company to nominate its own officers, subject of ratification by the council… the
militia units responded immediately by holding elections and sending in the names for approval.”
Election of officers was a primary mechanism to gain control and was virtually unheard of in the
rest of the world. In their search for an increasingly egalitarian militia colonists opposed any trend
set by British Regular army tradition!16
The middle and Southern colonies differed, in some ways radically, from the New England
colonies, if for no other reason than slavery. Southern militias leaned towards loyalty to the Crown
15
James Whisker, Op. Cit., p. 96 and John C. Ranney, “The Bases of American Federalism,”
The William and Mary Quarterly, 3 (Jan., 1946), pp. 2-3.
16
James Whisker, Op. Cit., p.100.
26
(after all, profits from a slave-driven economy proved lucrative to the Crown and colonial
inhabitants). The flavor of militia service first on was consistent, and throughout the early period,
laws governing basic enlistment criteria were similar if not exact.17
Slave Revolts, though less frequent in the 1600s, increased as the “Peculiar Institution”
gained momentum throughout the South. There is no real doubt that threat of Indian attack
persisted, but only in decreasing amounts as time wore on. Late eighteenth century and
nineteenth century slave insurrections like the Stono Rebellion, Prosser’s Rebellion, the Haitian
Revolt, Denmark Vesey’s nearly successful rebellion are all examples of incidents which
illustrate southern fears resulting in slaves being barred from bearing arms and battle.
Consequently middle and southern colonies, made extensive use of militias as slave patrols:
“Resolved by the Common Council that for the future the inhabitants of this Borough
shall, to prevent any invasion or insurrection, be armed at the church upon Sundays,
or other Days of worship of Divine service, upon the penalty of five shillings…
Josiah Smith, Mayor.”18
17
For further elaboration on this topic see Carter G. Woodson and Charles Wesley, The Negro in
Our History, (11th ed.), (Washington, DC: Associated Publishers, 1966), pp. 409-424; Ira Berlin,
Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America, (Cambridge,
MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 15-195; and, John Hope Franklin,
From Slavery to Freedom: A History of Negro Americans, (5th ed.), (New York: Knopf
Publishing, 1980), pp. 54-156.
18
Edward W. Iams, ed., The Lower County, Virginia Antiquary, Vol. 1, (New York: Peter Smith,
1951), p. 101; quoted in James Whisker, The Rise and Decline of the Militia System, (London,
England: Susquehanna University Press, 1999), p. 225; and, John C. Ranney, “The Bases of
American Federalism,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3 (Jan., 1946), pp. 2-3. Various
sources on slave revolts and planned but failed rebellions helped center the South’s rationale
with regard to arming slaves. John M. Lofton, Jr., “Denmark Vesey's Call to Arms”, The Journal
of Negro History, 33 (Oct., 1948), pp. 395-417; Kenneth S. Greenberg (ed.), The Confessions of
Nat Turner and Related Documents, (Boston, MA: Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press, 1996),
ad passim; Vincent Bakpetu Thompson, “Leadership in the African Diaspora in the Americas
Prior to 1860,” Journal of Black Studies, 24 (September, 1993), pp. 42-76; Marion D. deB.
Kilson, “Towards Freedom: An Analysis of Slave Revolts in the United States,” Phylon, 25
(2nd Qtr., 1964), pp. 175-187; and, Joyce Tang, “Enslaved African Rebellions in Virginia”,
Journal of Black Studies, 27 (May, 1997), pp. 598-614. Whisker claims Natives sided w/
Colonists or were simply too weak. However, logic points to British concentration of troops for
economic reasons- protection of manufactured goods and white colonists. Whereas, in the North
there existed greater resistance on the part of British presence.
27
Another unique feature of middle and Southern Colony militias, particularly Maryland,
was their implementation of King Charles’ “Stuart militia system” – a system where ‘regulars’
were a prominent feature charged with protecting colonial and British interests – putting down
riots, public disturbances, and generally keeping the peace. Charles’ Stuart Militias southern
implantation, allude to the south’s Loyalist tendencies toward the British. The militias were
class-based and hierarchical meaning the aristocracy held officers positions while general troops
consisted of middle and lower class males. Northern colonies generally repudiated the Stuart
Militia in favor of more democratic control. Stuart Militias in the South contained fairly welltrained men presumably better than in the North. In reality, these militias trained more regularly,
and were often better equipped. Unlike the North’s system of electing officers, the South’s
system centered on a definitive hierarchy-facilitating quick and lethal deployment troop
deployment in the event of revolt.19
In summary, colonial militia varied depending on region, British loyalty, and purpose.
Northern militia, less concerned about slave revolt, focused energies on protection from attack,
expeditions, and so forth. The middle and southern colonies, on the other hand, were terrified for
good reason, about slave revolts – a ‘menace’ created by their reliance on slave labor.
II. Military Education and Training
Training and drilling were compulsory, but strangely haphazard early colonial features in
that the content, focus, and rigor of the training varied among and within localities. In general,
age requirements remained consistent (with the exceptions of Virginia and Pennsylvania).
19
James Whisker, Op. Cit., pp. 224 – 227; and, William L. Shea, Op. Cit., p. 18.
28
Military service in most colonies began at the age of 16, capping off between ages 50 and 60.
Men were required to minimally maintain and operate their weapons, report for service, or face
fines should they refuse. The Rhode Island militia provides a generalizable example in terms of
service eligibility requirements enacting laws fining militiamen up to five shillings if absent for
musters. All able-bodied males between the ages of sixteen and sixty were “required to have a
‘musquet cartouche box, 12 bullitts (sic), a half pound of [gun] powder and 6 flints…” and were
ordered to maintain their equipment. Generally, however, the wealthier settlers evaded service by
paying men to serve in their place or simply paid the requisite fines. 20
Training and drilling were much less consistent in practice than on paper. Some militias,
as in Rhode Island and Massachusetts, trained regularly, whereas New Hampshire required less
training than in wartime. Often training began earnestly, declining over time warranted by
necessity.
Training was not necessarily an event in which the military arts were paramount. More
typically it was a combined social event:
“…with whole families in attendance. The women folk prepared the meals, which
were taken in common. The children enjoyed the opportunity rare, at least in rural
areas, to socialize and to play with large numbers of other children. Many young,
single men met their future wives at these gatherings. Occasionally, a church or
public building had to be repaired, and this was done as part of, or adjunct to,
training days.”21
20
James Whisker, Op. Cit., p. 125; William L. Shea, Op. Cit., p. 18; Douglas Edward Leach,
“The Military System of Plymouth Colony,” The New England Quarterly, 24 (September, 1951),
pp. 342-364; and, H. Telfer Mook, “Training Day in New England” The New England Quarterly,
11 (December, 1938), pp. 675-697.
21
John Russell Bartless, (ed.), Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantation
in New England, vol.3, (Providence, R.I., 1856-1865), p. 93 and pp. 295-97; quoted in James
Whisker, Op. Cit., p.100; H. Telfer Mook, Op. Cit., pp. 675-697.
29
Training and drilling served then at the very least a mechanism for socializing, an
infrequent occurrence in the quite hectic and tumultuous times. The socializing aspect should not
imply that training exercises were absent. There were various accounts of well-trained
troops. Socialization, more than anything seems to have contributed to the camaraderie of
militiamen and townspeople.
Numerous and conflicting accounts exist as to the militia’s efficacy. Positive general
accounts existed where piety of the town militia was extremely respected praising the militia’s
training methods, focusing on the religiosity and orderliness. The militiamen’s abilities were
exalted by ministers and townsfolk alike. Their training regimen was geared towards the
godliness and order of troop camps – more commonplace than fighting agility, as in one case an
official points out “public prayers, Psalm singing and martial exercises engrossed their whole
time at Albany.” 22 On the other hand, emphases on godliness, religiosity and orderliness, drew
criticism (particularly from British officers). Instead, militia readiness was scrutinized when it
came to warring practice. Describing the disorganized crew of poorly trained and poorly
equipped rabble-rousers, famed British General Jeffrey Amherst was appalled at training
conditions and “…was amazed to discover that many militiamen had only the most rudimentary
knowledge of how their firearms worked. He expected to find the fabled “nation of riflemen” but
instead discovered to his dismay that many of the urban New England militiamen possessed only
the faintest knowledge of how their arms operated and how to care for them.23
Amherst’s dismay in part contributed to the increased British presence and incorporation
of a universalized military training doctrine. This doctrine was expressed via books such as
22
James Whisker, Op. Cit., p.100.
23
Ibid., p. 111.
30
Humphrey Bland’s treatise on military discipline, The Manual Exercise as Ordered by His
Majesty in 1764, Military Guide for Young Officers, An Easy Plan of Discipline for a Militian
by Thomas Pickering, William Windham’s A Plan of Exercise for the Militia of the Province of
Massachusetts and a smattering of others. These treatises advocated European warfare discipline
and tactics. What the colonials discovered was just how hampered they were by Amherst and
others’ desire to educate them in the ways of “correct” European methods.24
What inefficiency existed was borne out of traditional British fighting tactics proffered by
the aforementioned treatises. Certainly, these would come in handy during Washington’s
Revolutionary battles when battling the English incursions. However, fending off Native
Americans engaging in ‘guerrilla’ warfare posed the largest challenge to training and drill of
everyday militiamen who were educated in traditional British methods, known loosely as a
‘gentlemen’s style’ warfare. Musters, or training days, convened frequently to prepare the men
in battlefield tactics, weapons handling, and maneuvering against this threat.
Frequency and content of musters reflected the diverse approaches among the colonies
particularly when dealing with threatening Native American attacks and raids.
“If a man was in the militia, he participated in periodic musters, or training days,
with the other members of his unit. Attendance of musters was compulsory; militia
laws levied fines for non-attendance. During the initial years of settlement, when
dangers seemed particularly acute, musters were frequent. However, as the Indian
threat receded, the trend was toward fewer muster days, and by the early 1700s, most
colonies had decided that four peacetime musters per year were sufficient.”25
The very notion of Indian threats plagued colonists for years. The effectiveness of musters
only increased as militia members shed their old European ideas about battle-armor, swords and
24
Ibid., pp. 171-172. These primary sources are located in Whisker’s narrative. Based on his
assessment, they seem to provide an invaluable guide as to early militia philosophy.
25
Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United
States of America, (New York: The Free Press, 1994), p. 3.
31
the like in favor of more appropriate fighting techniques, eventually overwhelming the Native
Americans. Nevertheless, early training experiences consisted of detailed weapons instruction,
European tactics and socialization. Many colonists quickly discovered the horrific effects of the
Europeans professed tactics and weapons instruction when combating enemy forces:
“Yet most colonists made little effort to adjust to Indian-style warfare. On muster
days militiamen practiced the complicated motions and maneuvers prescribed by
European drill manuals. One commonly-used drill book described fifty-six steps for
leading and firing a musket. In battle, many militiamen never lived to crucial Step
Forty-three: ‘Give fire breast high”… the settlers’ reluctance to adjust to New World
conditions was partly psychological. They considered Indian warfare barbaric…”26
As time passed and tactical adjustments were made, threat of Indian raids declined
significantly. The invention of better equipment, most notably the Pennsylvania Rifle, led to
better protection of the localities (a quicker ‘bullet’ did the trick much better than hatchets, bows
and arrows, and the like). The settlers found life to be less threatening and as a result the
economic and social tentacles of the colonials took root. As a result, militias disbanded or
significantly reduced muster requirement, permitting greater economic, social and political
growth. The need for militias did not evaporate entirely, but there was less need for most men in
a settlement to come together in military units.
American colonials observed a great deal of change by the mid- eighteenth century. The
British were now becoming a menace. Following the French and Indian Wars, British Parliament
and the Crown commenced levying exorbitant taxes against colonists. The King’s exploitation
26
Ibid., pp.11-12. See also Adam J. Hirsch, “The Collision of Military Cultures in SeventeenthCentury New England,” The Journal of American History, 74 (March, 1988), pp. 1187-1212;
John K. Mahon, “Anglo-American Methods of Indian Warfare, 1676-1794, ” The Mississippi
Valley Historical Review, 45, (September, 1958), pp. 254-275; and, Craig S. Keener, “An
Ethnohistorical Analysis of Iroquois Assault Tactics Used against Fortified Settlements of the
Northeast in the Seventeenth Century,” Ethnohistory, 46, (Autumn, 1999), pp. 777-807.
32
enraged Americans who were engaged in frequent mob action, pamphleteering, and frequently
petitioning Parliament and King George. The British government, nonplussed over colonial
misbehavior became increasingly agitated over what was seen as undisciplined and treasonous
behavior. King George and British Parliament ordered military incursions to putdown radicals.
All the historical background here is set forth to highlight the important fact early Americans
were not at first prepared for such actions, politically or militarily. It would take several years
and egregious actions impressments, taxation without representation, and atrocities before
American colonials could or would act militarily.27
By the time the initial volleys were fired, several military related conundrums became
apparent. Local militias were unprepared for war against British professional troops. Second, the
Revolutionary cause, though embraced by many, was difficult to sustain. Third, Washington’s
Federalist desire for a large Regular army contributed to a great deal of political conflict as the
very thing Americans fought against and feared most they thought had been left behind: a
monarchy that potentially could use standing or regular militia as a vehicle toward subversive
ends. Conversely, most early Americans knew that organized military was essential to prevail.
27
These ‘egregious actions’ included the Sugar Act of 1764, the Stamp Act of 1765 and the
Townshend Acts. Varied and interesting accounts on these topics can easily be found. The
following sources provide unique perspectives: Allen S. Johnson, “The Passage of the Sugar
Act,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 16 (October, 1959), pp. 507-514; T. H. Breen, “Baubles
of Britain: The American and Consumer Revolutions of the Eighteenth Century,” Past and
Present, 119 (May, 1988), pp. 73-104; Edmund S. Morgan, “Colonial Ideas of Parliamentary
Power 1764-1766,”The William and Mary Quarterly, 5 (July, 1948), pp. 311-341.There are also
numerous books on the causes of the Revolution. Two outstanding books on the topic were
selected as part of my bibliography, notably Edmund S. Morgan and Helen M. Morgan, The
Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1995) and Gordon S. Wood, The American Revolution: A History, (New York: Modern Library,
2002), ad passim.
33
Still, initial debate surrounding war with Britain swirled about, which prompted constant
questioning of the military and the dangers it posed to a society desiring liberty. 28
The citizen-army concept recapitulated during this Revolutionary period and all
throughout America’s early organization. This theme, however, was not new to colonial
America. The concept, traced deep into England’s torrid political history, rose in during
American political maturation in the form of moderate and radical Whig ideology. Whigs, as
historically portrayed, had a loose interpretation of the role of government and its impact on the
daily lives of citizens. People were primarily in control of their own destinies, but more
importantly, they could only be free to determine their destinies in the absence of political and
military tyranny. The development of moderate and radical Whig ideology stems from political
philosophers such James Harrington author of Oceana who represented what Lawrence Delbert
Cress calls the classical Republican view of militia involvement and early progenitor of Radical
Whiggery. Harrington viewed professional militias with less suspicion than some more radical
than he, capping his argument illuminatinf its true value in providing “constitutional balance,”
and an “..association of propertied independence, political personality, and military obligation
with political stability provided the common ground for classical republicanism and latter-day
Radical Whig thught.” 29 Ultimately for Harrington, the professional militia carried a broad swath
of individuals and fought at the discretion of the nationality.
28
See Edmund S. Morgan and Helen M. Morgan, Op. Cit., ad passim; and, Gordon S. Wood, Op.
Cit., ad passim.
29
Lawrence Delbert Cress, “Radical Whiggery on the Role of the Military: Ideological Roots of
the American Revolutionary Militia,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 40 (March, 1979), pp. 4546. See also John Toland, (ed.), The Oceana and other works of James Harrington (3rd edition),
(London: Private printing, 1747, 1656), ad passim; and, Alan Craig Houston, Algernon Sidney
and the Republican heritage in England and America, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1991), ad passim.
34
Conversely, Algernon Sidney, author of Discourses Concerning Government (among
numerous other works), represented the idealized Radical Whig mentality. Cress pins Sidney’s
argument on the Whigs’ historical interpretation of militia development and its historical
precedents in perpetuating political tyranny. He pointed to Sidney’s belief that:
“A government was as effective as it was able to prepare itself for war. Since the ability to
make war depended on the quality of the commanders and the courage of the rank and file,
Sidney believed that the citizen armies of mixed government had the greatest military
potential.” To bring the point home, Sidney expounds that citizens ‘fighting for their own
interests share in the promise of victory. ‘The advantages of good success are
communicated to all, and everyone bears part of the losses.’”30
Among other political philosophers, Cress points to Blackstone, Frances Hutcheson, John
Locke and major pamphleteers in England opposed to the potential threat imposed by standing
militia. Cress makes the added point such philosophies, while not fully embraced in England, did
have a vital impact on people such as John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, among others. No doubt,
the growing debate in the early Confederation Congress through the War of 1812 seem firmly
founded in these 17th and 18th century British philosophers.
Whig ideology overwhelmingly appeared in the training of all men (free property
holders) regarding military matters. This would no doubt ensure the safety and credibilty of the
government. Whig-Republican advocacy of liberal arts education for military officers-in-training
would have the added effect of softening military training, “avoiding an otherwise inevitable
division of society into cowards and barbarians.”31
30
Lawrence Delbert Cress, Op. Cit., p. 47.
31
Ibid., p.51. For more information on this topic see James E. Bradley, “Whigs and
Nonconformists: "Slumbering Radicalism" in English Politics, 1739-89,” Eighteenth-Century
Studies, 9 (Autumn, 1975), pp. 1-27; James Conniff, “Reason and History in Early Whig
Thought: The Case of Algernon Sidney,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 43, (July, 1982), pp.
397-416; and for an in-depth explication on Lockean principles (underpinning the United States
Constitution) see Richard Ashcraft and M. M. Goldsmith, “Locke, Revolution Principles, and the
Formation of Whig Ideology,” The Historical Journal, 26 (December, 1983), pp. 773-800.
35
III. Revolutionary Military Philosophy: 1765 to 1792
Historians debate whether Revolutionary War activities began in 1765 or 1775.
Historians Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski argue that the Revolution truly had its start in 1765
citing numerous instances of organization on the part of colonial leaders, the rise of a national
political culture, and various attacks against British symbols, property, and philosophy.32
Regardless of the particular starting date, as war became imminent, a ‘dual army’
developed. First, there were the citizen militia colonial regiments that supplying a steady reserve
of soldiers. Second, was the Continental Army’s establishment (America’s version of a standing
army) that served at Congress’ will and was commanded by General George Washington. This
was Congress’ recognition that “English moderate Whigs who had argued that a regular force
under firm legislative control was not only consistent with constitutional freedoms but also
essential to preserve those liberties.”33 The Continental Army was intended to serve as an
assistive measure to ensure consistency and size. Washington inherited poorly prepared citizen
soldiers and poorly treated regulars. Similarly, he was at the mercy of colonial legislators and
governors who habitually failed to meet their commitment, negligent in their duties to enlist
needed militiamen.
The war effort persevered despite such challenges. Those colonies fulfilling their
enlistment obligations increased muster frequency, heightened fines, created and stockpiled arms
and equipment, and developed ranking systems allowing some men to serve longer periods of
time than others. This piecemeal cooperation served Washington at least for the time being.
32
33
Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski, Op. Cit., p. 53.
Ibid., p. 57.
36
No situation was ideal, and his reliance on protracted warfare seemed the only answer. The
numerous legends about Washington’s troops and haphazard training during the colonial times
are indeed true, and serve as testament to the fortitude, but also the enormous social class issues
of early Americans. Paralleling colonial militia social-class composition, the Revolutionaries
were primarily comprised of lower socioeconomic classes. Rank-and-file consisted of “recent
immigrants, enemy deserters and prisoners of war, Loyalists and criminals (both of whom
sometimes had the option of joining or hanging). For many men, the lure of bounties (money for
service) increased their desire to stay. Other men simply had no other viable option! It became
clear that working class and poor people populated military rolls. 34
Nineteen thousand total men were involved in the Revolutionary War effort. Nine
thousand had training, giving credence to the fact “Washington’s was a generalship shaped by
poverty”. This was a prominent hallmark of the entire Revolutionary War, and in large-part
precipitated by “the loose Revolutionary Confederation and the limited resources of a scattered
agricultural economy.” The consequence was Washington’s reliance on protracted warfare and
strategic attacks against small British detachments. To reiterate and elaborate, there are three
main issues that affected Washington’s Revolutionary cause.35
First, inexperience and inconsistent performance of the Continental Army forced
Washington to indirectly engage British troops. These two elements are examples of the
haphazard militia training discussed previously. Second, maintaining the ‘fire for war’ in
America’s colonial citizens, would pose challenges due to Washington’s strategy of protracted
34
Ibid., p. 57. Don Higginbotham, “The Early American Way of War: Reconnaissance and
Appraisal,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 44 (April,1987), pp. 237-238. See also William B.
Skelton, “The Confederation's Regulars: A Social Profile of Enlisted Service in America's First
Standing Army,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 46 (October, 1989), pp. 770-785.
35
Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War; A History of United States Military Strategy
and Policy, (New York: MacMillan Press, 1973), pp. 3-4 and William B. Skelton, Op. Cit., pp.
770-785.
37
warfare. Though attention span and commitment might wane, he believed small victories would
enhance confidence in America’s fledgling military. Finally, America’s fiscal health in waging
Revolution against Britain was a prime consideration. Financial resources were indeed, limited,
offering bare-bone minimums. Washington’s protracted military strategy had to be attempted,
“because American resources permitted no other way to lay the military foundation of political
dependence.”36
It could be construed with all the seemingly insurmountable challenges that Washington
scorned citizen-soldiers and the militia system. Washington did find the poorly prepared soldiers
confining and strategically exasperating, but politically he also understood the balance required
in having a state militia as protectors of the future states. His small army and resources could
only do so much to protect regions, but never could they probe the British Navy or Army’s every
deployment, as Washington noted “the militia, Independent of other troops, being more than
competent to all the purposes of defensive war.” would eventually save the day.37
July of 1775 would mark the birth of the Continental Army and the first army to be
sanctioned by an act of Congress. The act raised ten companies with expert men trained in arms,
emanating from three colonies in particular – Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. The army’s
creation was significant, but perhaps more significant is the various checks and balances put in
place by the Continental Congress to avoid the rise of a military dictatorship.
36
Russell F. Weigley, Op. Cit., 5. See also Paul David Nelson, “Citizen Soldiers or Regulars:
The Views of American General Officers on the Military Establishment, 1775-1781,” Military
Affairs, 43 (Oct., 1979), pp.126-132; and, Gordon S. Wood, The American Revolution: A
History, (New York: Modern Library, 2002).
37
John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington, 23 (Washington: United States
Government Printing Office, 1931-1944), p. 27. For varied discussion on Revolutionary officers’
views, see Paul David Nelson, Op. Cit., pp. 126-132.
38
“From its first measures establishing a Continental Army, Congress was acutely
mindful that the similar Parliamentary army of England little more than a hundred
years before had turned upon its own legislative creator and erected the military
dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell…the dangers of a standing army as a threat to
liberty were close to everyone’s thoughts since the attempts to station British
regiments permanently in America, despite the elimination of New
France…therefore Congress looked to the assurance of its ascendancy over the
Army.” 38
Similarly, Congress’ borderline-obsession with control over the Army resulted in superattentive Congressional oversight.39 Scores of Congressional committees throughout the course
of the Revolution were formed to stay abreast on the effort as well as to ensure that the military
was adhering to the wills of Congress. This effort to maintain a civilian controlled military was
eventually manifested in their creation of a “Board of War.” The Department of Defense is the
obvious great-grandchild of this early incarnation and is evidenced in the creation in 1781 of the
War Department. Though it signified institutionalization of civilian control over the military,
the historical trend of this department actually resulted in proliferation of military professionals
controlling process, expansion, and reduction of civil control.
America was victorious, but questions abounded as to type of government and defense.
The philosophy toward a standing American Army after the Revolution was conflicted. There
were still concerns about maintaining a stable force that could protect the fledgling Country’s
interests. Nevertheless, Federalist arguments resulted in Congress creating the very first ’Officer
Corps’ during peacetime in 1784. William B. Skelton takes a look at what he deems the
‘official’ beginning of the United States Army. He identifies the pivotal moment when in 1784
the Confederation Congress authorized several hundred volunteers, “maintain order on (the)
38
Russell F. Weigley, Op. Cit., p. 5.
39
Ibid., pp. 45-48.
39
remote Ohio River frontier.” Skelton investigates the social-political-military role of the enlisted
men who held rank, what he calls a contribution to “the new military history.” This “first
American regiment”, the first standing military as it was, is critical to the debate between
Federalists and Whigs-Republicans.
He attempts to also tease out designation of social class among the newly formed army’s
officers, challenging the myth the men purely emanated from the social and political elite. He
demonstrated that 48.7% came from middling class backgrounds, but his study was still short on
nineteen officers’ backgrounds (of out of a total of 58). The remaining 51.3% still came from the
colonial upper-classes. He draws the generalization that these statistics reflect the
democratization of America – both in military and political affairs. This proves nothing other
elite – were rewarded positions of authority in the first days of the U.S. Army, much as it is
today. He also states that while post-Revolutionary militia pay and benefits were abysmal, the
upward social mobility gained from being an officer proved lucrative. He identified a number of
occupations these first officers engaged in upon their discharge: physicians, farmers, appointed
and elected office (often the former given as a reward in lieu of the poor military pay), and other
“respectable” occupations. Of one thing it seems certain, that “the officer corps of the
Confederation Army was an institution in transition.” 40 To declare otherwise would be
misguided. Their performance along the Ohio River frontier proved lackluster, spurring
Congress’ authorization of General Anthony Wayne’s militia to wage war against the Native
American threat in the Northwest Territory. Additionally, a great deal of men were discharged
from the service, either for length of time served, lack of fitness, and drunkeness. The officer
40
William B. Skelton, “Social Roots of the American Military Profession: The Officer Corps of
America's First Peacetime Army, 1784-1789,” The Journal of Military History, 54, (October,
1990), pp. 435-452.
40
corps’ played a part early on and its formal organization in 1784 sparked the beginnings of the
United States military bureacracy.
The federalized militia debate, pro and con, during Constitutional Ratification grew
fiercer, as early Americans plotted a course of governance. The more illuminating arguments
proffered by the Federalists originate from John Jay and Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist
Papers. As has been demonstrated in other texts, John Jay and Alexander Hamilton present their
case to the public as to the benefits of a Standing Regular Army among numerous other
concerns. 41
Jay explicated that sole reliance on states to come together quickly in the event of attack
was foolhardy at best, mentioning countries in Europe would hardly be functional militarily if
confederacies relied on friendly cooperation:
“What would the militia of Britain be if the English Militia obeyed the government
of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the government of Scotland, and if the
Welsh militia obeyed the government of Wales! Suppose an invasion; would these
three governments (if they agreed at all) be able, with all their respective forces, to
operate against the enemy so effectually as the single government of Great Britain
would?”42
Jay, like many who witnessed the ineffectual forces of the Revolutionary militia, felt the
pooling of such resources would no doubt benefit the country:
“Wisely, therefore, do they consider union and a good national government as
necessary to put and keep them in such a situation as, instead of inviting war, will
tend to repress and discourage it. That situation consists in the best possible state of
41
Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1984), p. 75. See also Daniel W. Howe, “The Political Psychology of The Federalist,” The
William and Mary Quarterly, 44 (July, 1987), pp. 485-509.
42
John Jay, The Federalist Papers, Number 4, quoted in Clinton Rassiter, ed., The Federalist
Papers: Hamilton, Madison, Jay, (New York: Penguin Books, 1961), pp. 45-50.
41
defense, and necessarily depends on the government, the arms, and the resources of
the country.”43
Hamilton was equally persistent in his view of a national military. In Federalist Paper
twenty-four, he addressed concerns over the vagueness in the Constitution on a standing military
- in addition to which branch of government - Executive or legislature, or both, would control the
militia.44 Hamilton’s argument reiterated that while flexibility was vital, the very life of the
United States was dependent on the appropriate uses and abilities the government might employ:
“The result from all this is that the Union ought to be invested with full power to
levy troops; to build and equip fleets, and to raise the revenues which will be
required for the formation and support of an army and navy in the customary and
ordinary modes practiced in other governments.”45
Hamilton was known for his deep desire for federalization of the military. The success of the
1794 Whiskey Rebellion (albeit with actual militia), strengthened his position. Hamilton
believed that the troops could be used towards political ends, carrying out what he considered
protection of the constitutional mandate. He also entertained using a standing army to wrest
Spanish territory, over-expansion of the army during Adams’ diplomatic struggles with France,
and general military use to further government purview, as in the Whiskey Rebellion.
Hamilton’s aims, however one defines them (imperialistic or expansionist), never manifested
themselves. But, his ideas as to military power for political ends would no doubt stay, if at the
very least, in the background of American military and political philosophy. The experiment of
a peacetime army and ensuing debate between Federalist and Republican political forces
43
Ibid., pp. 45-50.
44
Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, Number 24, quoted in Clinton Rassiter, ed., The
Federalist Papers: Hamilton, Madison, Jay, (New York: Penguin Books, 1961), pp. 157-162.
45
Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, Number 23. quoted in Clinton Rassiter, ed., The
Federalist Papers: Hamilton, Madison, Jay, (New York: Penguin Books, 1961), pp.152-157.
42
resulted in an eventual compromise that would place the Army, in large part, back to the states
in the form of citizen militias.46
This decision would have an impact on the early days of the War of 1812 and resulted in
large-scale changes during and after that war. The drafts and final version of the Constitution
exemplify the Congress’ true concern over the standing army issue. “Under the Articles,
Congress could declare war, but it had to requisition the states for both militia and money.”
Further, checks-and-balances placed control of the forces in the executive branch, but limited the
Executive Branch’s ability, avoiding military despotism through Congressional appropriations.
There is one final point to the checks-and-balances Congress created and that was the right for
citizens to keep and bear arms. This critical component, found in the Bill of Rights, recognizes
the importance of citizens to protect themselves from affronts: both invasions on their property
and the potential of a government that might use force toward totalitarian ends.47
By 1792, the United States had won the Revolution and set in place its foundation for
governance. That year would also mark the first and most influential piece of legislation for the
military. The Militia Act of 1792 created a functional reserve army, to be called into service
should there be warranted cause. The Act was a compromise to maintain states’ rights that militia
be would maintained and would serve when the federal government deemed necessary. One
caveat remained in place: ultimately necessity rested under state government purview at all other
times, but guidelines were set forth by the federal government, standardizing ranks. A small
46
Willard Sterne Randall, Alexander Hamilton: A Life, (New York: HarperCollins, 2003),ad
passim; and, Richard Brookhiser, Alexander Hamilton, American, (New York, NY: Free Press,
1999), ad passim; and, Russell F. Weigley, Op. Cit., pp. 99-106.
47
U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 9 and art. 2, sec. 2; and, Russell F. Weigley, Op. Cit., pp. 76-77.
43
federal regular army was in force, but reinforcement capability was obviously needed,
rationalized under this militia act.48
IV. Pre- and Post-Revolutionary Military Training and Education
Pre- and post-Revolutionary training was similar to the earliest settlement period. The
function of the militia as ‘guardians’ had the benefit of its male soldiers possessing fairly
competent knowledge on equipment usage, for “as long as colonial community remained a
frontier community, the part-time soldiers of its militia company were likely to be fairly
competent Indian fighters no matter what occurred on training days.” Nevertheless some
training in the form of drills and exercises occurred, some localities with more regularity than
others, intermittently over a year and sometimes frequently within a month. In general, the
amount of drills fluctuated with the threat of attack or invasion, sometimes as few as twice a
year, and as often as twice a week.49
The lack of organized training and competent officers led some American leaders to
fume and fret. What, the query might have gone, would be the future of a country with such
limited military resources? Few personnel existed, hence training activities, warfare, and
maintaining consistency appeared a lost cause. No institutionalized form of military training for
officers or enlistees was present. Only in Europe were there formal educational facilities
designed for the instruction of war. These included the Prussian and French military training
academies most notably Ecolé Polytechnique.
48
U.S. Second Congress, Session I, Providing for the Authority of the President to Call out the
Militia, Chapter XXVIII, May 2, 1792, see http://www.constitution.org/mil/mil_act_1792.htm
for online version of this Act.
49
Russell F. Weigley, Op. Cit., p. 9.
44
European newcomers viewed military educational institutions as breeding grounds for abuse,
reminiscing on incredible personal and professional risks professional officers assumed serving
at the whim of a monarch, protracted and bloody wars, and persecution. Further, no centralized
government within the colonies appeared ready to support a training facility (let alone a
standing army). Victorious General Washington was forced to study the European war drills
and tactics on his own, never formally educated in the art of war.50
Thus, military education and training occurred more accidentally than by any real
organized process, becoming exceedingly evident during myriad failed Revolutionary War
battles and skirmishes. Attuned to these educational deficiencies, Washington made overtures
toward an educational system advocating for a military academy and a national university upon
assuming the presidency.51
The national university model presents two imperative points. First, it would answer
concerns many founders had in terms of perpetuating the newborn Republic. Second, and
connectedly, the role of an educated citizenry would deter the rise of a military autocracy.
While one should not ascribe too much to Washington’s vision, his national university concept
was the first attempt at a national program for educating youth. Washington expounds on this in
his Last Will and Testament:
“That visit has always been a source of serious regret with me to the youth of these
United States sent to foreign Countries for the purpose of Education, often before
their minds were formed, or they had imbibed any adequate of the happiness of their
50
Stephen Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West Point, (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1966), pp. 4-7. Washington’s attention to this area was also the reason behind his
victory. Washington in fact knew his American Revolutionary force could not withstand the
British in regular battle. His was a ‘respectable retreat’ mentality. Additionally, Washington’s
lack of education bolstered those arguing against training facilities.
51
Stephen Ambrose, Op. Cit., pp. 4-23. Those who strictly define Junior ROTC as a high school
matter might question the relevance of Washington’s national university concept as an
antecedent.
45
own; contracting, too frequently, not only habits of dissipation and extravagance, but
principles unfriendly to Republican Government and to the true and genuine liberties
of mankind. For these reasons, it has been my ardent wish to see a plan devised on a
liberal scale which would have a tendency to spread systematic ideas through all
parts of this rising Empire, thereby to do away local attachments and state prejudices,
as fare as the nature of things would, or indeed ought to admit, from our National
Councils… my mind has not been able to contemplate any plan more likely to effect
the measure that the establishment of a University in a central part of the United
States, to which the youth of fortune and talents from all parts thereof might be sent
for the completion of their Education in all the branches of polite literature; in arts
and sciences in acquiring knowledge in the principles of Politics and good
Government; and (as a matter of infinite Importance in my judgement)…I give and
bequeath in perpetuity the fifty shares which I hold in the Potomac Company
towards the endowment of University to be established within the limits of the
District of Columbia.”52
In dealing with the matter of a National University, Washington also voiced this
concern to members of his cabinet, including his Vice President and a letter to Catherine
MacCauley. Hence, the topic was at the very minimum broached upon more than one occasion
during his presidency.53
Washington’s interest in education was not reserved solely to a national university. His
cabinet and other prominent Federalists, like Hamilton and John Jay, were strong advocates of
a military academy. Such an institution seemed an appropriate answer to the question
distressing Washington: how would an army truly be able to protect and defend the nation in
52
John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington, from the Original Manuscript
Sources, 1745-1799, Vol. 37, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office,
1940), pp. 275-303.
53
Ibid., pp. 22-23; and, John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington, from the
Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799, Vol. 30, (Washington, DC: United States Government
Printing Office, 1940), pp. 275-303. Over the next one hundred years, sentiments about a
National University remained strong in some political sectors. See also John Wesley Hoyt,
Memorial in Regard to a National University, (Washington, DC: United States Government
Printing Office, 1892), ad passim; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee to Establish the University
of the United States, University of the United States, (Washington, DC: United States
Government Printing Office, 1902), ad passim; and, Albert Castel, “The Founding Fathers and
the Vision of a National University,” History of Education Quarterly, 4 (December, 1964), pp.
280-302.
46
the event of attack? While Washington and his cadre saw its value, the anti-military
establishment instilled deep fear with claims of military elitism and military dictatorship.
Washington’s colleagues tried providing compelling arguments for an academy. Benjamin
Rush exhorted “In a state where every citizen is liable to be a soldier and a legislator, it will be
necessary to have some regular instruction given upon the art of war and upon practical
legislation.” Though neither the national university or academy concepts came to fruition, the
practice of formal military education would surface, ironically, under the Republican President
Thomas Jefferson. 54
V. Jefferson’s Election and the Birth of Formalized Military Education
Following passage of the Militia Act of 1792, dispute between two social-political camps
continued, often aggressively. The Federalists had as their ambition the build-up of a standing
Army. Alexander Hamilton was among those Federalists at the debate’s epicenter. Hamilton
enunciated his views at the Constitutional Convention, that “a coercion of laws or coercion of
arms (is among) the great and essential principles for the support of government.” Hamilton, as
did other Federalists, envisioned political ends for the military. One such case was the Whiskey
Insurrection, but also there were visions of conquering Spanish America. “Hamilton was the
most influential figure in the new Army, and it was no secret that the notion of political uses for
the Army had long intrigued him. The Army had – or rather, more ironically, the militia – had
already served such purpose on a limited scale in suppressing the Whiskey Insurrection in 1794.”
These ‘assaults’ on states’ rights, eventually thrust Thomas Jefferson into the Presidency
in 1801. A throw-back to moderate Whig-Republican ideology, Jefferson saw militia used in
54
Andrew, Rod. Long Gray Lines: The Southern Military School Tradition, 1839-1915, (Chapel
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), p. 10.
47
furthering political or social ends “as the kind of tyranny they (Republicans) had feared from the
Federalists.” However, necessity being the mother of invention, forced Jefferson to utilize the
military. Early in his administration, he drastically reduced the size of the standing army, but did
not eliminate it as many radical Republicans had been seeking. Moreover, Jefferson’s alleged
duplicity stoked his own Republican Party’s ire when he deployed militia during the Embargo
Rebellion in 1808. Scholars have pointed to Jefferson’s penchant for employing the military
when it served economic interests.55
Political issues aside, Jefferson was a major proponent of educational accessibility. He
continually proposed bills, voiced ideas, and gave money when the subject presented itself. The
founder would find success in the establishment of the University of Virginia, and though less
his own doing, the United States Military Academy. The former is not quite as surprising as the
latter, since West Point would become the military’s dominant resource for training military
officers and at first glance appears to contradict Jefferson’s military philosophy.56
55
Russell F. Weigley, Op. Cit., pp. 100-102. Alternatively, see Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His
Time. Vol. 4, (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1970), pp. 24-27; and, Merrill Peterson, The Jefferson
Image in the American Mind, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 222-226; Willard
Sterne Randall, Op. Cit., ad passim; and, Richard Brookhiser, Op. Cit., ad passim. An interesting
case study, though somewhat ancillary, can be found in Charles O. Lerche’s, “Jefferson and the
Election of 1800: A Case Study in the Political Smear,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 5
(October, 1948), pp. 467-491. Eric Foner and John Garraty, (eds.), The Reader’s Companion to
American History, (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991), pp. 352-353;See also G.
W. Daniels, “American Cotton Trade with Liverpool under the Embargo and Non-Intercourse
Acts,” The American Historical Review, 21 (January, 1916), pp. 276-287; and G. E. Watson,
“The United States and the Peninsular War: 1808-1812,” The Historical Journal, 19 (December,
1976), pp. 859-876.
56
On University of Virginia’s creation, see Tony W. Johnson and Ronald F. Reed, (eds.),
Historical Documents in American Education, (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2002), pp. 21-26;
Merrill Peterson, Op. Cit., pp.240-244. On West Point, see Edward C. Boynton, History of West
Point, (New York: Van Nostrand Publishers, 1863), ad passim.
48
1802 would mark the founding year of what Army and all military services would come
to know and respect as West Point. The new service academy was identified by John Lovell as a
seminary academy for its near-monastic approach to training and education. West Point’s
ancestors all would be based in some part on its structure. Jefferson, who viewed the military
establishment with skepticism, eventually found value in the concept of a military academy. In
fact, the irony of his proposal to implement the academy can be swept away when one
understands his philosophy. Prior to his Presidency, Jefferson, Washington and others
contemplated on the possibility of a national university or academy that would train young men
of the new Republic in the subjects related to democratic processes. An educated citizenry in the
classical tradition, Jefferson believed, was the best safeguard against tyranny. The proposal never
went far under Washington, since he penned only a few supportive letters to Congress.
Similarly, the concept of an educational academy system would be costly and not, in many
members of Congress, the best use of scarce resources. When a proposal for a military academy
came before Jefferson he leapt at the idea, fostering its development.
His endorsement needs to be understood as a reversal of philosophy in part to incorporate
his Republican prerogatives and educational purview. Not unlike today, Republican thought
focused on smaller, less-intrusive federal governance and a reduced national debt. However,
unlike today, Republicans of 19th century America viewed the military with suspicion. Hence,
smaller government equaled a smaller military. Thus, it should be construed that Republicans
and Jefferson for that matter did not completely disdain the military. For Jefferson, military
presence was a matter of efficiency and economy, both of which could be done with a relatively
small force. With regard to the academy, his Republican views were tempered by his desire for a
national university and the need to place his imprint, philosophically, on the military creating “a
49
Republican avenue into the officer corps.” Jefferson also had control in selecting faculty and
encouraging direction for a course of study. He packed the academy with Republicans
“furthering the process of Republicanizing the Army.” West Point was formally founded in
1802, but had operated sporadically prior to its official founding. To Jefferson, this was a fair
compromise. As an advocate of states’ rights, a military academy equipped with good instructors
and curriculum would instill a sense of democracy amongst American citizens, as well as forge
the citizenry with the military. The structure of the academy admissions supplemented
Jefferson’s desires that the military would control the academy’s day-to-day operations students
would be selected by civilians. “Through the device of a civilian-controlled academy, Americans
would enjoy defense, while avoiding dangers of a standing army.” 57 Checks-and-balances were
the hallmark of Jeffersonian thought, and the Academy structure was no different.
West Point’s roots reached back to the French. It was the French who were the innovators
in the area of military tactics and engineering contributing to Napoleon’s successes. Cadet
schools were formed in France as early as 1723. The curriculum of Ecolé Militaire and the Ecolé
de Mars (a lesser academy) placed engineering as the highest priority. Consequently, the Ecolé
Militaire (later the Ecole Polytechnique) was the first engineering school in the world. The U.S.
Military Academy, or West Point, would soon become the second. “On March 16th, 1802,
authorization by Congress to organize a Corps of Engineers at West Point” was enacted.
57
Stephen Ambrose, Op. Cit., p. 7; and, Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski, Op. Cit., p.104. An
interesting organization called the United States Military Philosophical Society was formed
simultaneously with West Point in order to scientifically investigate matters of war and peace,
while also dealing with the tenuous balance between a nation needing defense while holding true
to Republican virtues of government. More on this can be found in Sidney Forman’s, “The
United States Military Philosophical Society, 1802-1813: Scientia in Bello Pax,” The William
and Mary Quarterly, 2 (July, 1945), pp. 273-275.
50
Jonathan Williams, great nephew to Benjamin Franklin, though often forgotten laid the essential
“groundwork for a forward-looking scientific-engineering program”. It would not be until the
appointment of Sylvanus Thayer in 1815 that Williams’ groundwork would be expanded. 58
Practical need and lessons from the Revolution also hastened West Point’s creation.
Historian Sydney Forman illustrates this in his article Why the United States Military Academy
was Established in 1802. He identifies prerequisites relevant to the practicality of officer training
and attributes these to the United States Military Academy’s birth. Forman’s historical analysis
back to early colonial America, in which he designates between informal and formal military
training and education up through the moment of Congressional legislation forming the United
States Military Academy.
While various training maneuvers and tactics were imparted from British Generals, the
notion of “military science” began to develop as the Revolutionary War drew near. “Just before
the Revolution, the study of military science became popular with the patriotic faction which
expected that the issues between England and the American colonies would be settled by war.”59
Forman continues by providing examples of that growing interest. George Washington, Henry
Knox, Anthony Wayne and many others began an informal study of war and military
engineering. No amount of formal or informal study would be enough, however, to counter
reliance on foreign expertise in training of officers in military science. Washington, as Forman
58
Stephen Ambrose, Op. Cit., p. 22; and, John Lovell, Neither Athens nor Sparta, (Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press, 1979), p. 20. While French thought was a critical component to
West Point, it would be the appointment of Thayer in 1815 which would draw French tactics and
thought into the Academy. Norman B. Wilkinson, “The Forgotten "Founder of West Point,”
Military Affairs, 24 (Winter, 1960-1961), pp. 177-188. See also William B. Skelton, “Samuel P.
Huntington and the Roots of the American Military Tradition,” The Journal of Military History,
60 (April, 1996), pp. 325-338.
59
Sidney Forman, “Why the United States Military Academy was Established in 1802,” Military
Affairs, 29, (Spring, 1965), pp. 16-28; and, William B. Skelton, Op. Cit., p. 338.
51
points out, bemoaned this fact in a letter to New Jersey Governor Mourris, Henry Knox also saw
a great lack of training in the officership, citing the dearth of training books and manuals.
One fascinating piece of information, is Forman’s unearthing of 1777 legislation creating
a “Corps of Invalids”. Forman describes the Corps, modeled after French King Louis XIV’s
concept, in which “provide[d] lodging, food, and clothing for wounded or disabled soldiers.” In
America, the design was similar, but varied in that these veterans would instruct future officers
in the Revolution in addition to other “light duties”. Subject areas included “math, geometry,
vulgar and decimal fractions, and the extraction of roots”. Future officers were also required to
relinquish a certain amount of pay to support a growing library. The school was placed at the
current site of West Point. Forman also describes Knox’s efforts at military education in New
Jersey (and similar attempts throughout the country) via lectures on military tactics. However,
Forman contends that such training did little to serve the needs of an educated officership. The
acute need for engineers in the military was voiced by General Washington, Knox and others.
The lack of experienced, knowledgeable men at moments proved deleterious against Britain. As
time progressed, the entrenched attitude tilting towards states’ rights impeded progress towards a
military academy. Forman noted that there was a tremendous amount of pacifistic and
provinicialist feelings that opposed a military educational establishment. Upon ratification of the
Constitution and George Washington’s election, the question of an academy resurfaced in
cabinet meetings. Save for Jefferson, the idea would have passed quite easily, but Forman points
out that this objection caused Washington to lay the proposal before Congress. Forman
describes Congress new twist on the Corps of Invalids and established in May of 1794 “a Corps
of Artillerists and Engineers, and for the first time established in the U.S. Army the rank of cadet
‘with the pay, clothing, and rations of a sergeant’ attached with the new Corps”. While the initial
52
idea incorporated a reasonable set curriculum, inclusive of amenities paid for by the War
Department, success was elusive:
“It was later reported that some officers became indignant at descending to the grade
of pupil, and in 1796, by design or accident, the Provost (an old two story stone
building), books, and instruments were destroyed by fire.”60
Forman documents various proposals put in front of Congress by Washington, Benjamin
Rush, Benjamin Latrobe (architect of the D.C.), Alexander Hamilton, and others. Success, then,
was not to be found until the Jefferson administration, though it should be noted Hamilton’s
proposal came closest to the final legislated product. One lacking component in Forman’s
discussion is Jefferson’s rationale. A Republican doubtful of an entrenched military
establishment, Jefferson’s attitudes and motivations should have been investigated a bit more
thoroughly to provide a more thorough understanding of the legislative process. Nonetheless,
the bill was passed in the following form:
“Sec. 26. That the President of the United States is hereby…to organize and
establish a corps of engineers to consist of one engineer with the pay, rank, and
emoluents of a major; two assistant engineers with the pay, rank, and emoluents of
captains; two other assistant engineers with the pay, rank, and emoluents of second
lieutenants; and ten cadets with the pay of sixteen dollars per month and two rations
per day…Sec. 27. That the said corps when so organized, shall be stationed at West
Point, in the state of New York, and shall constitute a military academy…Sec. 28.
That the principal engineer, and in his absence the next in rank, shall have the
superintendence of the said military academy.”61
Its passage in 1802 merits discussion of a few points. First, many politicians and
militarymen saw a very practical opportunity to fill a void: a military academy. The point where
sheer military instruction breaks off, is partially influenced by Hamilton’s earlier proposals, the
history of the French Polytechnique and Military School, and ultimately Jefferson’s fingerprint,
60
Sidney Forman Op. Cit.,17-20.
61
The Debates and the Proceedings of the Congress of the United States, 7th Congress, 1st
Session, p. 1312; quoted in Sidney Forman, Op. Cit., p. 18.
53
as only could have been managed by his ascendancy to President. This view will be taken into
account at some length, but it bears discussion here. Jefferson’s passion for education, and the
concern of democratizing the function of the military via liberal arts instruction played a key role
in the multifaceted curriculum developed over a short time, with courses in math, history,
science, languages, and so forth. The departure of the academy with some of Europe’s
seemingly impractical educational subjects, marks the military academy as a dsitinctly American
convention. Moreover, (Forman makes a broad generalization here that is riddled with potential
problems but nevertheless interesting), West Point’s impact on higher education (and education
in general) would be immeasurable. The argument might be made that Jefferson’s signing of the
1802 legislation paved the way for Justin Morrill’s 1862 legislation. Certainly, as with anything
else, this may have been precedent. The military academy served as a model of curriculum but it
was not the sole impetus behind the Morrill Act. It was the first true engineering school in the
United States and developed a set of core values in academics and physical rigor that colleges
and universities developing under the Morrill Acts took into account. Yet it was distinctly
military in its aims. In other words: it produced officers for military purposes. Its first hundred
or so years point to that: limited scholarship in the civilian realm but extensive intellectualization
of military practice on the battlefield. Finally, West Point’s contribution came more in the form
of its role in the professionalization of the military. Certainly this accounted for a great deal of
change between the Civil War and the Spanish American War, discussed in chapter two.
West Point’s initial enrollment was small. Its isolated location (only reachable by boat)
kept many potential cadets away. It would not be until Thayer’s ‘reign’ and the arrival of the
Mexican War that West Point would make an indelible mark on the military. The first military
academy was no different than the military or public for that matter. African Americans would
54
not be permitted into its ranks until 1870, and its record of graduating African Americans would
remain weak, at times non-existent, until Vietnam. Alongside West Point, there were other
colleges and universities in operation. Their curriculum, however, usually dealt in seminary
training. West Point is therefore notable as the first secular organization of its time.62
VI. The War of 1812 and Its Aftermath
Internal conflicts preceding the War of 1812 bear mentioning here. Strained debate over
military involvement exacerbated tensions between Republicans and Federalists. The Jefferson
and Madison administrations fostered the growing chasm, ironically causing Federalists to cry
tyranny! Britain had barred free trade into Europe and had been impressing Americans into
service once American ships had been seized. In response, the 1807 Embargo Act was
Jefferson’s attempt to persuade the British, diplomatically and financially, to cease their
activities. American businesses, primarily in the south, were drastically affected by the Embargo,
causing war sentiments to rise. Responding to the sentiment, Federalists believed war would
inevitably be too costly and America would be unable to match the British navy. War would
soon be on America’s doorstep. By the time of the War of 1812, four major problems plagued
the war effort: poor preparation, poor leadership, factionalism, and national and strategic
concerns.63
Poor military preparation came in the form of too few troops who were poorly trained and
equipped. The ‘dual army’ concept still existed with Congressionally-approved strengths of
62
Other notable events in education occur at the Constitutional convention, when the tenth
amendment to the U.S. Constitution allows for public education, but leaves its implementation to
the states.
63
Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski, Op. Cit., pp. 106-109. Note should be made here I
recognize a large number of military and political events occur between 1802 and 1812.
55
35,000 (regulars), 50,000 volunteers (filtered into the regular army), and 100,000 militia. The
reliance on militia proved vexing at best as some states, particularly in the Northeast refused to
comply with the sending troops or at the very least engaged in foot dragging. President
Madison’s alleged poor leadership led to a dire situation in the military leadership and possibly
contributed to wartime fence-sitters. Madison was reportedly “a poor judge of men” and
administratively not entirely savvy. His notorious hiring of incompetent, “over-aged” generals
and staffers led to a faulty wartime machine. Similarly, lacking organizational infrastructure
contributed to factionalism:
“Generals rarely cooperated with one another and navy and army officers paid little
attention to each other’s concerns.” They continue later, citing that “…political and
personal rivalries rent Madison’s cabinet, reflecting the deep divisions even among
Republicans as to the War’s wisdom and the most effective measures for waging it;
meanwhile the Federalists opposed the war almost unanimously.”64
As Jefferson’s administration faded and the Madison administration began, the general
crux of Republican military policies resulted in meandering strategy, at times interested and at
other times, extremely cavalier. This inconsistency devastated portions of the military, and the
lack of Presidential or Congressional support caused the Army to fall into some disrepair. The
vast political differences resulted in what historians have seen as two extremes with little
attention paid to moderation. “The Federalists had conducted military matters more purposefully,
but their interest in the Army was tainted…as a bludgeon against domestic political rivals…the
Republicans had squelched that menace, (but) they substituted no policy of their own.”65
64
Ibid., p. 107. See also, J. C. A. Stagg, “James Madison and the "Malcontents": The Political
Origins of the War of 1812,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 33 (October, 1976), pp. 557-585;
Rudolph M. Bell, “Mr. Madison's War and Long-Term Congressional Voting Behavior,” The
William and Mary Quarterly, 36 (July, 1979), pp. 373-395; and, Donald R. Hickey, “Federalist
Defense Policy in the Age of Jefferson, 1801-1812,” Military Affairs, 45 (April, 1981), pp.6370.
65
Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski, Op. Cit., p. 115. See also, David S. Heidler and Jeanne T.
Heidler, The War of 1812, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), ad passim; Donald R.
56
The national and strategic concerns also hampered the initial war effort. Growing concern
permeated Madison’s administration over what to do with Canada and numerous Indian tribes
who were receiving British support against the American effort.
While it is a wonder America even prevailed in the War of 1812, the myriad challenges
typified America’s love-hate relationship with the military and the constant flux in political and
social philosophy as to its role in America’s fledgling democracy. The War of 1812 also is
important in that it sets the foundation for military reform over the ensuing century.
Through the War of 1812, the philosophy toward the military had to change due to the
British threat. Madison, a “Democratic-Republican”, was, like Jefferson, to be noted for his
duplicity, embodied in conscription mandates, which consequentially became an important tool
due to the War’s unpopularity. Also, the Regular Army was put into full force with
Congressional approval for the largest increase ever. Lastly, the concept of the expansible Army,
a brainchild of Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, would become a permanent fixture in military
structure. Though modified, it is seen in today’s current construction.
The War of 1812 was basically a battle over free trade and seamen’s’ rights. The British
had been losing a great deal of their men to American ships. Hence, they were stopping the
vessels and searching for men as well as goods. This “infringement” on American free trade and
free travel created such animus that Congress declared war in 1812. Initial war plans called for
attacking Canada, retaining it should America win. The American public, however, had a great
deal of concern over the fighting of this war, as it seemed to be fought more for aristocratic
survival – protection of industry and industry profits – than the common person. This feeling led
Hickey, The War of 1812 : A Forgotten Conflict, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989), ad
passim; J. C. A. Stagg, Op. Cit., pp. 557-585; and, Donald R. Hickey, Op. Cit., pp. 63-70.
57
“historian Samuel Elliot Morrison to state that the War of 1812 ‘was the most unpopular war this
country has ever waged.” 66
The War’s unpopularity made it even more difficult to recruit men. As such, conscription
had to be implemented. African Americans answered the call more loyally (though not without
motive) than their white counterparts. One last important point to bring out is the birth of the
defense industry. War efforts in subsequent conflicts would be beneficiaries of 1812, “when the
War Department contracted the Cotton Gin’s inventor, Eli Whitney, to manufacture assemblyline muskets at his Whitneyville, Connecticut factory.”67 This seemingly insignificant tidbit of
military history is important for the precedence it set in years to come, leading to the growth and
development of the military-industrial complex, fully realized in the National Defense Act of
1920. Ironically, the debate and fear over states’ rights connected to governmental tyranny must
be juxtaposed against the entire country’s malice toward the slave and free population. It is
obvious that ‘rights’ were only afforded to stakeholders!68
66
The vote for war, however, was significantly divided among Federalists and Republicans. This
reinforces the earlier discussion of an America divided. Gail Buckley, American Patriots, (New
York, NY: Random House, 2001), pp. 44-45; Clifford L. Egan, “The Origins of the War of 1812:
Three Decades of Historical Writing,” Military Affairs, 38 (April, 1974), pp. 72-75; Warren H.
Goodman, “The Origins of the War of 1812: A Survey of Changing Interpretations,” The
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 28 (September, 1941), pp. 171-186; David S. Heidler and
Jeanne T. Heidler, Op. Cit., ad passim; Donald R. Hickey, Op. Cit., ad passim; and, Eric Foner
and John Garraty, (eds.), Op. Cit., pp. 1130-1131.
67
Gail Buckley, Op. Cit., p. 46.
68
J. C. A. Stagg, “Soldiers in Peace and War: Comparative Perspectives on the Recruitment of
the United States Army, 1802-1815,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 57 (January, 2000), pp.
79-120. The Haitian Revolution of 1791 most likely contributed to the tightening of restrictions
African Americans faced. No doubt, the logical considerations mentioned earlier are critical, but
the defeat of Napoleon by a black man named Toussaint L’Overture, exemplified to many, slave
and free, the power of tenacity, bravery, and taking the moral high ground. White Americans
were fearful of the ideas manifesting inside the slave population. The white population,
particularly the plantation owners, were likely correct in their assumptions as slave revolts not
only continued, but proliferated with a vengeance. Of note, were Gabriel Prosser’s rebellion in
1800, Arthur’s planned rebellion, (Arthur’s rebellion was an amazing plot. Had it been carried
out, the casualties would have been high and many slaves would have found their freedom. This
58
was similar to the planned rebellion of Denmark Vesey later on), and Charles Deslondes’
rebellion are among the most noted of the period. The end of the African slave trade was
implemented on January 1, 1808. Though the trade was slowed, illegal and amoral means
perpetuated plantation owners’ ends of maintaining and expanding the “peculiar institution”.
While Jefferson no doubt was hopeful slavery would end (or was he?), the ceasing of the trade
did not go far enough, and abolitionist voices were aware of the political shenanigan. The Militia
Act of 1792, along with its amended version in 1795, barred service by exclusion of African
Americans. Ironically, free blacks in the South were recruited to serve typically as laborers,
cooks, and musicians. Slaves were allowed, but only when “hired out” and their duties were
severely restricted. In conjunction with the Militia Act, the United States Marine Corps, the elite
force formed in July of 1778, barred blacks outright from service. The Navy, which was coming
into its own, had bigger problems. Sailing vessels were riddled with horrible conditions. One will
recall that merchant ships had to rely on blacks to assist for few whites would have any part of
the work. Similarly, the Navy struggled to maintain a skeletal force, and so it at first casually,
and then at the onset of the War of 1812 sanctioned the enlistment of black officers. It is
important to note that during these first two decades, the military educational structure was going
to leave out African Americans, and would not permit them into their ‘hallowed halls’ until the
1870s. While this does not negate the presence of education and training for blacks in the
military, the lack of opportunity within the military was a direct reflection of society. In
American civilian life, the struggle to educate blacks – free or slave – was uphill. Again, there
were exceptions to the rule. One can point to certain men and women who survived in spite of
mounting racism, but one cannot overwhelmingly state that education was the rule. Not until
Emancipation did the efforts to educate African Americans take on significance. Despite the lack
of training and education, African Americans exhibited loyalty and heroism in the War of 1812
akin to their performance in the Revolutionary War. As was the case in the Revolutionary War,
need overcame desire when enlistments were low. Freemen and slaves (the latter had
restrictions) were welcomed by the federal Army and Navy after the first year of war proved
disastrous. Desertions were high and enlistments remained problematic as state militias often
dragged their feet when recruiting. Washington, D.C. had been burned and other cities were
facing more British incursion. The dangerously low number of troops in the state militias was an
obvious problem in protecting American interests. In 1814, the state governments lifted the bans.
Various regiments sprung throughout, including Louisiana, which organized, regiments called
“the free men of color.” Aside from need, the British were repeating the tactics of Lord
Dunmore, of Revolutionary fame. Like Dunmore, the British military capitalized on America’s
entrenched system of slavery, offering freedom to former black militiamen who would defect to
the British cause. The tactic was working and the American government had to strategize.
Hence, opening its ranks was a way to slow defections! Andrew Jackson was aware both of the
enlistment and defection issues. His appeal to blacks served the American cause well. Even
though Jackson maintained his promise of land and money to the black, the promise of
acceptance and freedom for the remaining blacks in bondage waned as quickly as the winds of
war. Examples of prowess and bravery are numerous even though African Americans were only
allowed to enter the war near its conclusion. At Put-in-Bay, Ohio in September 1813, Oliver
Perry, considered no friend to blacks, praised his black seamen as being “absolutely insensible to
danger”. Captain Nathaniel Shafer was so impressed by his black seamen, he wrote of one
soldier: “The name of one of my poor fellows who was killed ought to be registered in the book
of fame and remembered with reverence as long as bravery is considered a virtue…John
Johnson, who after being shot and losing the lower part of his body (shouted) fire away my boys,
do not haul a color down”. And, Andrew Jackson was more than complimentary, stating,
“Soldiers! The President of the United States shall be informed of your conduct on the present
occasion; and the voice of the representatives of the American nation shall applaud your valor, as
your General now praises your ardor.” (Michael Lee Lanning, The African-American Soldier:
from Crispus Attucks to Colin Powell, [Seacaucus, NJ: Carol Publishers, 1997], pp. 20-25)
59
VII. Conclusion
America’s first two hundred years demonstrated that the military establishment took time
to maturate. The War of 1812’s end only empowered critics who strenuously voiced concern
regarding military readiness and federalization. Even with West Point’s formation, many still
wondered if any reputable defensive force was possible. Such concerns would gradually result in
the military’s professionalization.
These early antecedents must be judged in the context of concerns raised by citizens and
politicians who perceived an obvious relationship between a standing, federalized army and a
tyrannous government. The first colonial militias and their endurance remained a testament to the
chasm in American political philosophy between the ideas of citizen control and centralized
oversight of military operations. Pre-eighteenth century Radical and Moderate Whig
philosophies dominated much of the discourse throughout the colonial era, as did the actions of
the British Parliament and the King. Moreover, the criticisms of General Jeffrey Amherst against
colonial militia effectiveness may have been true to a small degree, but the settlers’ ability to
wrest control of the new land, even in light of their socially-oriented musters, intense Native
American attacks, and difficult geographical conditions provides credibility to their
effectiveness. By the time of the Revolutionary War, their battle worthiness was indeed
After the surrender was completed in 1814, valor and ardor were stricken from the record, and
replaced with reinstatements of bans previous to the War. Exclusion in the services, War
Department orders, and state militia policy removed many blacks from the equation. A large
contingent of African Americans determined to find freedom escaped to Florida and fought with
the Seminoles as the American military attempted to wrest control (of course, they eventually
did) of the land. The very same military that expelled blacks for a host of reasons, failed to
repulse the combined fighting force of the blacks and Seminoles for a number of year. Andrew
Jackson, commander, could not help but recognize the same valor and ardor he witnessed in
1812, and knew that such ferocity came from a spirit of liberty.
60
noteworthy. True, Washington struggled with many untrained and unprepared soldiers. Yet his
tactical adaptations and the growing Revolutionary fervor would win the war. However, the poor
training and equipping of soldiers did need addressing and led to an increasing consensus that
something had to be done to strengthen defensive forces, especially once America became
independent. The frequent heated debates over military readiness during the Constitutional
Convention and Confederation Congress, in tandem with the 1792 Militia Act which bolstered
federal control (minimal though it was) allude to early preparedness efforts and the struggle
among the those aligned with Moderate Whig-Republican ideology and the Federalists. The
former evolved into the states’ rights contingent and the latter represented the philosophies of a
strong centralized federal government. The military and its uses fall squarely in the middle of the
debate, and the complexities are many. The developing states’ rights position not only was
concerned with an out-of-control military aristocracy, but with their autonomy economically (i.e.
the slave trade) and socially. Similarly, though less pronounced, was Hamilton’s interest in using
militia for political ends. His curiosity for expansionism (both westward and into Spanish
territory) gives credence to an early imperialist-expansionist historical thread, and his strong
endorsement of armed force during the Whiskey Rebellion offers evidence, at the very
minimum, to using the military for political ends. Granted, American expansion was a slow,
often arduous process and the military did not intervene in every occasion where there was
rebellion in the Union. Nonetheless, its roots seem to stem from Federalist thought. The War of
1812, again, while not carried out, initially had American Democrat-Republican war hawks
seeking annexation of Canada. Finally, Jefferson’s hand in creating West Point while a
concession on his part, appealed to his initial desire for a national university. Concomitantly,
once Thomas Jefferson was in office, he realized the need for a military, at the very minimum for
61
border protection and enforcement. Thus for Jefferson, West Point’s allure was its potential
inculcation of democratic-republican training for military officers, which, in turn, would answer
many of the questions from citizens who resisted federalization-centralization. His hand in West
Point’s founding in 1802 signaled the birth of military professionalization. This
professionalization process would lead to an established core of military professionals that
provided continuity and longevity to certain military objectives, as is evidenced in the following
chapter.
62
CHAPTER 2: THE ANTEBELLUM AND POST-CIVIL WAR PERIOD
“The Americans have, on either side, almost nothing but volunteers. The little
nucleus of the former United States' regular army has either dissolved, or it is too
weak to leaven the enormous mass of raw recruits which have accumulated at the
seat of war. To shape all these men into soldiers, there are not even drill-sergeants
enough. Teaching, consequently, must go on very slow, and there is really no telling
how long it may take until the fine material of men collected on both shores of the
Potomac will be fit to be moved about in large masses, and to give or accept battle
with its combined forces. But even if the men could be taught their drill in some
reasonable time, there are not enough officers to lead them. Not to speak of the
company officers -- who necessarily cannot be taken from among civilians -- there
are not enough officers to make commanders of battalions even if every lieutenant
and ensign of the regulars were appointed to such a post. A considerable number of
civilian colonels are therefore unavoidable; and nobody who knows our own
volunteers will think either McClellan or Beauregard over timid if they decline
entering upon aggressive action or complicated strategical manoeuvres (sic) with
civilian colonels of six months' standing to execute their orders.”
Frederick Engels, Lessons of the American War,
November, 1861
Introduction
Chapter two further explores the historical strains of preparedness and imperialist
ideology via the government’s strategic military expansion and military professionalization.
Section one offers a brief overview of military philosophy during the Antebellum Period. This
section considers the growing professionalism within the military and American expansionist
efforts prior to, during, and after the Mexican War. The term professionalization speaks to the
increasing number of career officers and enlisted men. Professionalization’s impact on future
armed service expansion is too great to comment on here. Suffice it to say, the growing officer
fraternity and the Mexican War’s achieved objectives (namely westward expansion and
occupation) laid groundwork for extensive military expansion. Section two elucidates military
education’s maturation process. Academy-style instruction would contribute to officer
professionalism, in addition to setting education precedents. These precedents include greater
63
emphasis on a liberal arts curriculum establishing the military academy system’s higher
education prominence, officer development and training, as well as intensive lessons on the art of
war. Section three discusses higher education’s democratization and military federalization
efforts via the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862. This landmark legislation plants the seeds of
mass higher education, setting aside lands for agricultural and mechanical colleges and
universities within each state. The 1862 act would be revised in 1883 and 1890, reflecting the
growing needs of the country, as elaborated on in section seven. Private and state academies are
elaborated on in section four. Their propagation throughout the south, exemplifies two major
philosophical departures. First, profound concern existed on the part of many southerners
regarding West Point’s elitism and ‘secretive’ ways’. Secondly, southerners had their own view
of militarism – emphasizing duty, honor, and discipline. This militarism was drastically different
from the Northern version, and will be explicated on in this section. Section five continues in the
vein of southern military academies, discussing their incorporation of African Americans at
Reconstruction’s commencement. Section six persists with the theme of professionalization from
Reconstruction up to the Spanish American War. Finally, section seven probes in greater detail
the integrated academy system and the Morrill Acts of 1883 and 1890. The acts’ major
requirement, that all institutions incorporate military training and drill, is ROTC’s first real
connection with the nineteenth century. Ossian Flipper, Reconstruction’s challenges affecting
military education and general education will also be developed.69
69
I feel it is important to point out the South’s hypocrisy here. Rod Andrew, Op. Cit., ad passim,
identifies this seeming obsession on southerners’ part regarding egalitarianism. W.E.B. Du Bois,
Black Reconstruction in America, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), ad passim; Carter G.
Woodson and Charles H. Wesley, The Negro in Our History, (Washington, DC: The Associated
Publishers, 1972), ad passim; and, John Hope Franklin, The Militant South, (Cambridge, MA:
Belknap Press, 1956), ad passim, point out this obsession had as much to do with fear – fear of a
growing Northern military machine that could one day roust away their way of life – a life very
much built around slavery, extremely ‘un-egalitarian’.
64
I. The Antebellum Period: Growing Military Professionalism and Purpose
Upon the War of 1812’s completion, professionalization of the Army was the immediate
task of John C. Calhoun, Secretary of War. With Congressional approval to build and maintain a
standing Army and the new expandable Army concept, focus naturally turned towards West
Point and general training procedures for enlisted men. Instituted officially in 1802, Calhoun
believed an overhaul was necessary in order to maximize its potential. His overhaul entailed
adding hard science faculty, increasing faculty pay to attract the best and brightest men, raising
the minimum age to sixteen and, finally, divorce the Academy’s relationship with the Army
Corps of Engineers. Connected to this effort was Calhoun’s creation of the Army’s first “postgraduate school. The concept of military education, a tactic to provide a ready cache of military
officers in peacetime and in war was indeed attractive. Their abilities to lead on the field, and
train effectively off the field would make the art of war that much coherent in the military
psyche. 70
The concept of states’ rights would also surface throughout Andrew Jackson’s election
campaign challenging the Hamiltonian Federalist perspective. His election ushered in an age of
70
Russell F. Weigley, Op. Cit., pp. 145-153. The post-graduate school was an artillery field
school. Paraphrasing with regard to citizens’ comfort levels also comes from Weigley. The
following sources provide an interesting perspective into the life and mind of John C. Calhoun –
a prominent Southern politician espousing states’ rightist views. See also John Niven, John C.
Calhoun and the Price of Union: A Biography, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press,1988), ad passim; John L. Thomas, John C. Calhoun: A Profile, (New York: Hill and
Wang, 1968), ad passim; Frederick D. Drake and Lynn R. Nelson, States' Rights and American
Federalism: A Documentary History, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), pp. 104-106; R.
Don Higginbotham, “The Martial Spirit in the Antebellum South: Some Further Speculations in
a National Context,” The Journal of Southern History, 58 (February, 1992), pp.3-26; Norman K.
Risjord, “1812: Conservatives, War Hawks and the Nation's Honor,” The William and Mary
Quarterly, 18 (April, 1961), pp. 196-210. On Andrew Jackson, see Thomas P. Govan, “John M.
Berrien and the Administration of Andrew Jackson,” The Journal of Southern History, 5
(November, 1939), pp. 447-467.
65
egalitarianism and renewed distrust of an overly centralized military establishment. Similarly,
southern states’ philosophy against professional soldiers and the maintenance of a standing army
was viewed as constitutionally unsound and fiscally imprudent. In the eastern United States
Americans were also growing accustomed to a more peaceful existence since Native American
attacks subsided and Napoleon’s downfall assured no invasion from the French. To the credit of
Jackson’s egalitarian age (also referred to as Jacksonian Democracy), many critics of the
standing army and professionalism cited the lack of opportunities afforded to, and overconscription of, a large contingent of lower-socioeconomic classes. The general resistance while
not shattering the growing military establishment did retard its growth. The terms “civilian” and
“military”, delineating everyday citizens from military men became prominent during this time.
These designations, still used presently, were in part a result of scorned military men selfisolated, in many cases, devoting themselves to monastic study of war and war administration. A
wedge between militia officer and citizen had been driven, particularly in the south.
Constant feuding among Northern Whigs and Southern Democrats regarding slavery and
annexation plagued national politics leading up to the Civil War. Between Jackson and Polk’s
administration, tension mounted as to the viability and justification for annexation of Texas and
California, and whether or not these territories would be admitted as slave or free states. The
Mexican War, occurring during Polk’s administration, tentatively solved the issue, but only in
terms of land acquisition. The Mexican War also factors into the discussion of economic
imperialism-expansion and professionalization of the military. Inevitably, success depended on
troop readiness and competent officers. Legislation enlarged enlistment ratios and bestowed
additional monies on military activities. The Army was well equipped with the very officers
who had ‘ostracized’ themselves in pursuit of military study. President Polk oversaw the
66
Mexican War and set a precedent for generations to come in what was to be presidential
oversight of the war. In addition to increased military expenditures and enlistments, a new
precedent would be set. Known as the first ‘Dark Horse’ President, Polk took his Commander-inChief Constitutional mandate seriously. Polk controlled all facets of the war, staying in close
contact with the War Department, working with military planner and war plans, and maintaining
awareness on day-to-day minutiae.71
The hotly debated Mexican War was ratcheted up by many in the North (the growing
Northern Democratic contingent known as ‘Barn Burners’). Annexation surely meant more land
for the South, and more land meant more slaves! Polk’s incessant politicking had the residual
effect of military officers getting involved in the fray, claiming aspirations for political office,
debating with elected officials or writing articles. Such precedents, Zachary Taylor being among
the group, would leave a legacy of what is called the political military elite, including Theodore
Roosevelt, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, and Colin Powell. 72
Finally, Mexico’s eventual defeat and the United States’ securing of Texas and California
resulted in another precedent-setting event: the transitional American military government
(occupation) of a foreign country. This not only set a foundation for the south’s post-Civil War
71
John Hope Franklin,Op. Cit., pp. 96-128; and, Russell F. Weigley, Op. Cit., pp. 156-176. The
Mexican War beginning in 1846 started what would be America’s first efforts in global missions.
At heart, here, was the annexation of Texas and California. An angry Mexico fought back and
lost, only to have its capital, Mexico City, fall under United States military rule.
72
Polk held the belief of Manifest Destiny which was a primary rallying point to the war with
Mexico and a point of contention amongst many opposed to him. For more on this topic see
Eugene C. Barker, “The United States and Mexico, 1835-1837,” The Mississippi Valley
Historical Review, 1 (June, 1914), pp. 3-30; Norman A. Graebner, “James K. Polk: A Study in
Federal Patronage,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 38 (March, 1952), pp. 613-632;
Francis Paul Prucha, “Distribution of Regular Army Troops Before the Civil War,” Military
Affairs, 16, (Winter, 1952), pp. 169-173.
67
Reconstruction, but also for the colonial expansionism-imperialism of America in the latenineteenth century.
The oncoming Civil War was brewing as soon as Texas had been annexed. There are
multiple explanations put forward about the philosophical origins. Three reasons, however,
appear to dominate: 1) The South was fighting for its way of life; 2) the war was one of
economic as well as cultural concerns – slavery being chief among those concerns, and the
concept of states’ rights; and 3) once secession occurred, the preservation of the Union. The
Civil War had the consequence of creating the largest military expansion ever. This was
permissible due to the Militia Act, which gave federal authority to call state militias into federal
service. The use of conscription was critical, particularly since the war dragged on dashing the
Union’s hopes the South would quickly re-think its secessionist position. In July of 1861 the
first one million troops were called into service, a significantly larger force than at any previous
time in American history. Along with increased troop strength, the rise of wartime industries
came into being. Much of the weaponry from the early part of the century remained, so
provisional supplies and mass production due to the massive numbers of troops required largescale production. The war on all fronts, then, seemed ready to be fought. The Civil War, unlike
any other war before it would prove to be the most epic struggle, and in that struggle hundreds of
thousands of would perish.73
One of the long-lasting legacies of the Civil War was conscription, and this is essential to
any discussion of the military’s presence in a free society. The philosophy against conscription
was overridden by necessity. State militias, while not falling to the wayside, would see their
73
W.E.B. Du Bois, Op. Cit., pp. 55-83; Larry M. Logue, To Appomattox and Beyond: The Civil
War Soldier in War and Peace, Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1996), pp. 3-31; and, Russell F. Weigley, Op.
Cit., pp. 201-208. See also the 1792 Militia Act, in U.S. Second Congress, Session I, Providing
for the Authority of the President to Call out the Militia, Chapter XXVIII, May 2, 1792,
http://www.constitution.org/mil/mil_act_1792.htm for the online version of this act.
68
days numbered as a result of the War’s conscription policies. A sequence of events led to
Lincoln and Congress expanding the powers of the President to raise an effective army. The
amendment to the 1792 Militia act and the Enrollment Act’s passage, instituted a federal draft of
300,000 militiamen for nine months. Lincoln announced that “…any state which had not met its
quota of three year volunteers by August 15th (1863) would be subject to the ‘draft.’” This
essentially trampled states’ rightists, undercutting militia mobilization, and set further
groundwork for President and Congress to implement a centralized, federal army, sanctioned
now by law. Enlistments were still low and wartime angst was exacerbated by wealthier
citizens’ ability to ‘opt-out’ of service. The egalitarians during Jackson’s administration had
been right, such unfairness resulted in poor men fighting shouldering most of the burden. The
infamous draft riots of 1863 occurred throughout New England, and required the intervention of
military and political forces.74
74
The draft riots also were initiated by whites incensed at the idea of fighting with black troops,
in addition to labor market competition. Two interesting articles highlight the draft riots: Albon
P. Man, Jr., “Labor Competition and the New York Draft Riots of 1863,” The Journal of Negro
History, 36 (October, 1951), pp. 375-405. See also, Peter Levine, “Draft Evasion in the North
during the Civil War, 1863-1865,” The Journal of American History, 67 (March, 1981), pp. 816834. John Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry in 1859 was perhaps the first unofficial battle of the
Civil War, but as shown previously, tensions had been increasing for quite some time.
Abolitionism was on the rise. Free blacks and progressive whites were agitating the system,
highlighting the hypocrisy of an America founded in liberty, but still involving itself in the
chains of slavery. At the advent of the Civil War, some 4 million African Americans were held
in bondage. The abolitionists are an important preface to comprehending African American
involvement in the War as well as understanding the general shift in Northern attitudes toward
slavery. David Walker, a free black Bostonian and publisher “called on Americans to remember
their Declaration of Independence”. Walker’s appeal in the late 1820s was a precursor (though
not the only one, it was perhaps the most fervent at the time) to the abolitionism to come. “Do
you understand your own language? Hear your language, proclaimed to the world…’We hold
these truths to be self-evident – that all men are created EQUAL! That they are endowed by their
creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness’…Now Americans! I ask you candidly, was your suffering under Great Britain one
hundredth part as cruel and tyrannical as you have rendered ours under you?!” (Gail Buckley,
Op. Cit., p. 60) Walker’s militancy and passion was rewarded with his death in 1830. Walker’s
Appeal, however, placed a great burden on Northerners who began to see the moral morass of
slavery. William Lloyd Garrison was a white “militant pacifist” and consistently “prophetic
voice before the 1840s. Taking up Walker’s mantle, he held strong moral beliefs that slavery’s
evils should never be condoned in the country. His publications and public actions called on
69
abolitionists to act. Frederick Douglass was also rising to the fore as an ardent abolitionist – and
what better abolitionist to have than a former slave! Douglass contributed intelligence and
passion to the movement. Where a great number of abolitionists were white, Douglass was “the
voice of Black America” and that voice, “was black at last”. Douglass’ gift for speaking and
rousing the crowds was unequalled. He similarly was a political power broker to President
Lincoln and was in large part responsible for the large enlistment of blacks to the war effort.
Among the abolitionists, mention must also go to Harriet Tubman who was a General in the
Underground Railroad. The Railroad was used to transport runaway slaves to their freedom,
with a good portion of them moving to Canada. Her service aided hundreds. Her service
extended to the Civil War where she served as a nurse and spy. Her work was so valued she was
buried with full military honors upon her death in 1913. Harriet Beecher Stowe also contributed
to the abolitionist cause with her international best seller, Uncle Tom’s Cabin. The novel helped
“abolitionism win the propaganda war hands down” and inflamed Southerners so drastically, the
Lincoln is said to have recognized her as “the little woman who started such a big war.” Three
major occurrences happened in the 1850s that brought Civil War closer to happening. The Free
Soilers and Pro-Slavery forces battled over the recently acquired Kansas territory. While the
“Soilers” claimed Kansas and planned on barring slavery in its state organizing elections, ProSlavery “gangs” arrived to “steal the ballot”. The ballot went to Pro-Slavers, but the battle was
only half over. After a great deal of horrific bloodshed, the Free Soil contingency won back the
territory and regained control of governance and rewrote the existing laws and constitution. In
terms of legislative and judicial decision, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 and the 1857 Dred Scott
decision continued to fan the flames of abolition. Among the injustices of the 1850 law, it
mandated the return of any runaway slave, banned slaves testifying on their own behalf, and
forbade trials by jury. The Dred Scott decision was borne primarily out of the Free Soil debate. It
denied blacks citizenship and had the consequence of driving many fence-sitting Northerners to
the anti-slavery and abolitionist movements. The final straw for much of the South was the
official formation of the Republican Party. The North was now predominantly abolitionist in
thought (though not anti-slavery). The various groups bonded together, including Free Soilers,
Conscience Whigs, and Barn Burner Democrats. The Republican platform was clearly activists
because they espoused the concept states’ rights actually was a larger threat to freedom than a
strong federalized-centralized government. The result was Lincoln’s election in 1860. Not more
than two months later, South Carolina had seceded and several Southern states were to follow,
forming the Confederate States of America. At the start of the war, the issue of need over desire
was plaguing the North. As mentioned previously, the issue of conscription would be dealt with
in such a way, that its imprint would be felt through the twentieth century. The South saw to it
that slaves were the first to be impressed into service, though as was standard, their typical duties
were labor related. The North, however, “saw no need for black soldiers”. Whether it was
arrogance, or a combination of both is up for debate. What is important is the end result: blacks
were sought after the war had dragged on as the need for enlistees, and ultimately victory
required their presence. However, once African Americans were permitted into the depths of
fighting, their valor was consistent with history. The Civil War produced a significant number of
events where the presence and bravery by both races proved significant. The first documented
occurrence of blacks in battle occurred under the auspice of Brigadier General James Lane and
his cavalry in 1862. One black man, not noted by name, was reported by a Kansas newspaper to
have been “well-armed and very black”. Another important designation the paper placed upon
the gentleman was the following label, made famous by General Benjamin F. Butler,
‘Contraband of War”. James Lane, in that same year also formed the First Kansas Colored
Volunteers. Robert Small became a Union hero when he stole a ship from the dock while its
white officers and crew were ashore. The “Corps d’Afrique’ was formed out of group of wealthy
and middle class black regiment soldiers and was noted for having the highest contingent of
officers in the Army. Perhaps the single-most important event for blacks, aside from
Emancipation, was the formation of the United States Colored Troops. Their role in advancing
70
the Union’s cause in the last two years of the war was invaluable. Their bravery was noted in
various circles of Union and Confederate leadership. The formation of the Massachusetts 54th
Regiment (a group of abolitionist soldiers) was also critical not only to the success of the Union.
Always battle ready and fierce, they contributed to numerous victories. More importantly, they
placed their values above everything else. Upon discovering that white soldiers in the same
regiment were going to be paid two-times more than they, they petitioned and lost. As a result,
they refused pay for their remainder of their time and continued fighting the Union cause. Fort
Pillow was one of the more unfortunate events, but it served as the rally cry for the Union troops.
This massacre, perpetrated by future Ku Klux Klan founder General Nathaniel Bedford Forrest,
occurred after the Union had surrendered the fort. The horror that ensued was not only tragic, but
criminal. Black troops swore vengeance and were reported have taken “an oath on their knees” to
avenge Fort Pillow. In Poison Spring, Arkansas, they did just that. The fall of Richmond in 1865
signaled the end of the War. As with past conflicts, the general treatment of Americans was
incredibly inconsistent. Hence, life in the military had not changed all that drastically. The theme
of ‘need over desire’ recapitulates constantly in the American epic. As demonstrated by General
Lane, when the Union needed troops, blacks were called into service. Several examples abound.
Take for instance General David Hunter, who “issued a…three-state emancipation proclamation,
in order to enlist and arm blacks”. President Lincoln was hesitant to jump on board with the idea
of blacks serving, but soon, need overcame desire. He first ordered were known as Confiscation
Acts, which granted freedom to any slave “who supported or aided the rebellion”. And, of
course, the much heralded humanitarian act, known as the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863
was more about expanding the Union Army as it was to free the slaves. Lincoln was a moderate
Republican, who cared less about anti-slavery than he did abolitionism, and more about
preservation of the Union than the propagation of what was ethically right. Lincoln’s military
strategy nonetheless worked, for it created what Lord Dunmore had only dreamed: a mass
exodus of blacks, free and slave, into the Union cause. The forming of the United States Colored
Troops in May of 1863 was testament to the ‘need over desire’ philosophy. Further, its creation
resulted in the first black Regular Army troops, paving the way for involvement in the standing
Army for years to come. Nonetheless, the Civil War and all the outright contradictions in policy
resulted in a new society. The years to follow, at least through the Compromise of 1876, would
usher a new era of egalitarianism known as Reconstruction. The benefits for black Americans in
the military, socially and educationally would set the ablaze the flame of liberty in the souls of
black folk, and set the stage for a cultural revolution known as the Civil Rights movement a
hundred years later. Alas, a note here is important on the education of African Americans, slave
and free, during the Civil War. There is no great shock in the insight that the Union Army
centrally organized educational efforts for its newly formed United States Colored Troops.
However, examples abound as to the informal and even formal educational efforts made by the
troops themselves and by their forward-thinking white officers. Perhaps out of a sense of pride, a
sense of enlightenment, a sense of urgency, or all three, it was clear that African Americans
desired to read and write. They were learning through drill the rudiments of battle. But, previous
scholarship demonstrates actual learning by around the campfire. Soldiers and their wives, the
chaplain, or hired teachers would slowly but methodically learn the alphabet, read to one
another, and practice writing. And in some documented cases, African American soldiers took
only six months to become fully proficient in reading and writing. Northern abolitionists took it
upon themselves to create educational funds via donations and pay teachers and chaplains to go
into the Union camps to work with the men, as well as to create educational opportunities for the
general population. Edward L. Pierce is the first such person who made an attempt at creating a
formal bureau of education for the general population. “In 1862, (Pierce) imported a whole
company of teachers, young men and women from the North, to begin the work among
thousands of Negro men, women and children in the Department of the South.” (Dudley Taylor
Cornish, “The Union Army as a School for Negroes,” The Journal of Negro History, 37 [October,
1952], pp. 368-382). The American Christian Association formed in Louisiana, at the same time
71
II. Military Education and the Evolution of Professionalization
Sylvanus Thayer’s appointment to West Point’s superintendency in 1817 was what many
historians deem as the ‘true founding’ of West Point, since by many accounts it had fallen into
disrepair academically. Its initial floundering occurred for two reasons: General Republican
disdain for the military academy and incompetent leadership (argued by some to be a result of
Republican policies). Thayer brought to the academy a structure developed in the French
system. The French system emphasized discipline and character building, pedagogy and a
prescribed curriculum. Hierarchy and order were Thayer’s motto, and were strictly enforced
during his tenure. Cadets were often discharged for poor behavior. Religious and ethical
responsibility also was emphasized as components to a cadet’s character and strength.
Most supporters believed academy pedagogy should emphasize practical education.
Thayer however, balanced this perspective by infusing the requirement of a four-year college
of the Louisiana Regiment, also devoted funds to the general population and military units for
educational purposes. Various regiments would, as stated previously, take their downtime for
educational purposes, as depicted by Thomas Wentworth Higginson: “Their love of the spelling
book is perfectly inexhaustible, - they, stumbling on by themselves, or the blind leading the
blind, with the same pathetic patience which they carry into everything. The chaplain is getting
up a schoolhouse, where he will soon teach them as regularly as he can. But the alphabet must
always be a very incidental business in a camp”. Newspaper reports abounded of African
Americans and their love for learning, and the evidence was found among the soldiers
themselves – even among the dead: “It is not surprising to find reports that The New England
Speller should have been in great demand among these troops and that the knapsacks of the dead
colored soldiers often contained ‘a spelling book and a Testament,’”(Dudley Taylor Cornish, Op.
Cit., 371). Aside from specific examples, it also important to point out that numerous
philosophies abounded as to the work-ability of actual educational programs. Representative
John Hickman of Pennsylvania wrote for the provision in a bill to Congress, but it was never
passed. Lieutenant Colonel Francis Adams acted on the notion of what the Army could do for it
African American soldiers, frequently writing to various general on his work with his troops.
While he felt the necessity to assist his soldiers in reading and writing, he also emphasized
vocational work, such as blacksmithing or bricklaying. These skills would immediately benefit
the Army during the war and in peacetime. The education during the war was a first attempt,
scattered though it was. Yet, it fostered the growing concern that African Americans, who had
been chained to ignorance by no choice of their own, deserved the fruits of what an education
could bring them. This fervor on the part of the abolitionists would serve beneficial, if only for a
short time, during Reconstruction. It is also critical to emphasize that prior to this, as exampled
in the previous sections African Americans were victims of haphazard educational efforts. The
Union Army, during the period of the Civil War in addition to the work of Northerners was the
first real effort at mass education.
72
education. The cadet was for all intents and purposes a college students, engaged in typical
subjects such as science, math, French, engineering and natural philosophy. Daily recitations
were commonplace, with weight placed on math and science.
Instructors also became increasingly sought after, as Thayer attempted to develop the
academic core reflective of university-style education. Instructors ranged in expertise, coming
from Harvard and France, as well as within the military’s own ranks. Thayer would institute the
tenure system, highlighting the importance of well-trained, academically fit instructors.
Additionally, he would often take graduates of the Academy into his rank, fostering the
academy’s continued growth. Thayer’s resignation in 1833 came about when Andrew Jackson
and the ‘egalitarians’ thwarted many of his initiatives. But, Thayer’s influence was not lost. Over
a period of eighteen years, he had embedded the traditions necessary to perpetuate an institution
of higher learning.75
Various other military academies imitative of West Point (e.g. Virginia Military Institute
and The Citadel) cropping up throughout the country began an era of military
professionalization. The idea of professional versus civilian armies also became problematic.
Still rooted in states’ rights, the idea of a civilian army that provided a volunteer fighting power
and officers, came into conflict with those in the academy establishment with increasing
contempt for the ‘masses’. Jackson’s ‘egalitarian’ age ushered in the distrust of the academy
establishment, believing that this era of professionalism would lead to inequality and entrenched
officers. Officer training up to the Civil War did occur, shepherding some of the greatest Civil
War personalities, and training upwards of three-fourths of the military officers. It would not be
until the Mexican War that the academy establishment and its officers would prove themselves
75
Stephen Ambrose, Op. Cit., pp. 87-105; and, Norman B. Wilkinson, Op. Cit., pp. 177-188.
73
useful in the field of battle; even then, complaints from citizen soldiers and officers swirled
about.76
A year before the Mexican War, the Naval Academy’s creation at Annapolis, Maryland
continued professionalization efforts. The War of 1812 had demonstrated to Americans that a
stronger naval component was necessary. Several proposals had been placed in front of
Congress, to no avail. As Lovell explains, “congressional support was lacking, however,
especially among representatives of the inland states. Naval appropriations from the first to the
second Monroe administration were cut, as was the number of naval officers and enlisted men
that were authorized.”77
Then, in 1845, George Bancroft, (also the noted American historian) was appointed
Secretary of the Navy. His pro-Navy sentiments along with Polk’s general support of the military
became critical for advocates of a naval academy. Interestingly, what should have been
congressionally approved was ordered by Bancroft himself. Normally, a move such as Bancroft’s
would yield terrible political consequences. At the time, however, two major issues in naval life
caught the public’s attention consequently lending support to Bancroft’s ‘coup’. First, American
midshipman had been so poorly trained, that scandal finally broke involving then Secretary of
War Spencer’s son. Secondly, the invention of steam powered ships and better navigational tools
created a new problem: who would master the technical operation and maintenance of
equipment? The Naval Academy was born in October of 1845. Almost to the letter, the Naval
Academy developed its faculty, curriculum, traditions, and discipline on the basis of West Point.
76
James L. Morrison, Jr., “Educating the Civil War Generals: West Point, 1833-1861,”
Military Affairs, 38 (October, 1974), pp. 108-111.
77
John Lovell, Op. Cit., pp. 20-28. Naval Academy development is nicely outlined in the
following works: Graydon Decamp, The Annapolis Story: The Blue and Gold, (New York: Arco
Publishing Co., 1974), ad passim; and, Jack Sweetman, The U.S. Naval Academy: An Illustrated
History, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), ad passim.
74
These developments would not be put into full use until a few years after the Mexican War, in
1850.
The academies, particularly West Point, would prove their value on the arrival of the
Civil War. Generals such as Grant, Sherman, McClellan, Jefferson Davis, and Robert E. Lee
graduated from the two main academies and even served stints in the administration. Their
training, along with the various officers, would prove vitally important since one million troops
conscripted for service necessitated massive training. The Civil War would further cement in the
minds of many that the academy system was serving its purpose of training able-bodied,
intellectuals, who, in turn, trained the soldiers. So while the academy establishment suffered
prior to the War from issues of funding to general support, after the War, their usefulness was
not as questioned as had previously been the case.
III. “Educational Democratization”: The First Morrill Land Grant
Any discussion of high school and collegiate military instruction would sorely lack
credibility were some elaboration on Justin Morrill forgotten. The Vermont Republican
politician’s imprint is firmly embedded in state universities and colleges across America. Though
initial legislative attempts on Morrill’s part failed during the late 1850s, and with the election of
Abraham Lincoln and Civil War still looming, his bill became law in 1862.
Morrill’s desire for agricultural and mechanical colleges stemmed from two main ideas.
First, he firmly believed in the democratic power education possessed. His upbringing excluded
a formal education and, while he lacked such background, he was largely self-taught. Morrill’s
prerogative was that American citizens had an unalienable right to such an education. Second
and more practical to Morrill was the state of America’s agricultural (and mechanical) industry.
75
Declines in production were so acute, many wondered if America’s agricultural might could
continue. His legislative power was put to the test, when states’ rightists challenged the bill,
frequently voting it down. His logical retorts were very astute, considering the argumentative
tactics of legislators, as found in this brief excerpt: “We have schools to teach the art of
manslaying, and make masters of ‘deep-throated’ engines of war; and shall we not have schools
to teach men the way to feed, clothe, and enlighten the great brotherhood of man?”78
He continued to expound on such inconsistencies, denoting the U.S. Government’s funding
of railroads, setting aside of lands for veterans, and so forth. It only seemed logical land set aside
for the purpose of constructing colleges was appropriate. But, similar to debate on military
expansion, states’ rights advocates and southerners were opposed to the federal government’s
over-extended hand. Its eventual passage in 1862 (possible largely due to secessionist efforts)
under the title “An Act donating Public Lands to the several States and Territories which may
provide Colleges for the Benefit of Agriculture and the Mechanic Arts” marked a new era in
education and an historical moment for working class American citizens:
“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That (sic) there be granted to the several States, for
purpose hereinafter mentioned, an amount of public land, to be apportioned to State,
a quantity equal to thirty thousand acres for each senator and representative in
Congress to which the States are respectively entitled by the apportionment under the
census of eighteen hundred and sixty…”79
The new law also mandated several conditions, among those that any state making use of
set-asides, were required to begin a college or university within five years of acceptance, and that
78
Speech by Justin Morrill, “Bill Granting Lands for Agricultural Colleges,” (April 20, 1858),
quoted in Coy Cross, Justin Smith Morrill: Father of the Land-Grant Colleges, (East Lansing,
MI: Michigan State University Press, 1999), p. 81. Many politicians (primarily in the South)
disagreed citing a direct infringement on states’ rights. See also, John H. Florer, “Major Issues
in the Congressional Debate of the Morrill Act of 1862,” History of Education Quarterly, 8
(Winter, 1968), pp. 459-478.
79
United States Statutes at Large, Vol. 12, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1863),
503.
76
new colleges and universities were to submit annual reports to congress. Interestingly though not
surprisingly, Congress was not about to apportion such lands to rebel states in the South. The
sixth condition made very clear “no state while in a condition of rebellion or insurrection against
the government of the United States shall be entitled to the benefit of this act”. The stipulation
held, and proved a viable tool during Reconstruction.80
Additionally, training at institutes of higher education became exceedingly necessary
with the advent of the common school system. Horace Mann’s impact on public education
would bring about a nationwide push for the development of schools for the training of children
from virtually all walks of life. Hence, the military academies, in addition to other colleges and
universities, began opening their doors to more and more working class folk. The construct of
upward mobility, championed by Jacksonians would play a heavy hand in this development.
Similar to the common school, more people were receiving a better education. As a result, those
coming from two-year colleges might enroll at the military academies better trained in the
academics that typically they had lacked no thanks to a fairly non-existent system of education.
Most of these changes occurred following the Civil War, but the Morrill Act was essential in
placing at the fore education for the masses. Two more Morrill Acts (passed in 1883 and 1890),
paved the way for military federalization (see section VII).81
80
Ibid., p. 503; J. P. Powell, “Some Nineteenth-Century Views on the University Curriculum,”
History of Education Quarterly, 5 (June, 1965), pp. 97-109; and, Eldon L. Johnson,
“Misconceptions about the Early Land-Grant Colleges,” The Journal of Higher Education, 52
(July, 1981), pp. 333-351.
81
The common school movement is also a vital precursor to the American educational
establishment. Horace Mann’s work in from the 1830s onward would cement their place. See
Robert L. Osgood, “Undermining the Common School Ideal: Intermediate Schools and
Ungraded Classes in Boston, 1838-1900,” History of Education Quarterly, 37 (Winter, 1997), pp.
375-398; Robert H. Wiebe, “The Social Functions of Public Education,” American Quarterly, 21
(Summer, 1969), pp.147-164; and, Lawrence Cremin, The American Common School: An
Historic Conception, (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia
University, 1951), ad passim.
77
Of no great surprise is it to realize that African Americans, on the whole, were vastly
under-educated (if at all). The Northern cities, assisted by Abolitionists and other charitable
groups had begun schools to assist blacks in their training. Some common schools (though rare)
might educate blacks. But the overwhelming population of African Americans, either enslaved
or free with no options could not read or write (estimates place it as high as 90.9% others a tad
lower). In terms of trends, it is important to emphasize while blacks were experiencing greater
support from the North, by-and-large, their educational opportunities were severely hampered.82
IV. Proliferation of the State Academies
Along with the development of the major service academies, came the birth of numerous
private and state-supported military academies throughout the South. The minimal scholarship
on these institutions does not tell the whole story as to their rise and importance on America’s
educational scene. It has been long assumed that the South held a solely restrictionist policy in
regard to military matters – holding Republican views that a strong military equaled tyranny.
The crux of their system was rooted in how the defined militarism – a concept for them defined
differently than in the North. Rod Andrew brings out in his book Long Gray Lines: The
Southern Military School Tradition, 1839-1915 the different southern view of militarism,
“emphasizing that southerners subscribed to a brand of militarism that expressed less interest in
policies of ‘aggressive military preparedness’ than in the exaltation of military ideals and
virtues.” Furthermore, the work of these academies was in many ways a response against what
82
Broad and varied discussion exist in the following books and articles, see Carter G. Woodson
and Charles H. Wesley, Op. Cit., pp. 382-423; W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk, (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1999), pp. 62-74; Horace Mann Bond, The Education of the Negro in the
American Social Order, (New York, Octagon Books, 1966), pp. 58-63; James M. McPherson,
“White Liberals and Black Power in Negro Education, 1865-1915,” The American Historical
Review, 75 (June, 1970), pp. 1357-1386; John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom: A
History of Negro Americans, (5th ed.), (New York: Knopf Publishing, 1980), pp. 255-266.
78
many considered the elitist culture in the premier service academies. The southern academies
developed what legislators and citizens believed to be an egalitarian approach to educating
young men for military life. Their growth and development was spurred by the work of Alden
Partridge, former West Point Superintendent and numerous Southern military leaders. Simple
training and guarding of the arsenals characterized the new academy system. However, southern
boys and their ‘bad boy’ lifestyles, as well as mounting concerns over slave populations and
economic livelihood led to a broader plan of education. Advocates of southern military
academies offered two main points supporting their program, both to doubters and supporters.
First, the institutions would strengthen the Republic by instillation of civic virtue and by
positively shaping young men prone to deviance. Second, a state and private academy system as
proposed by Alden Partridge and John L. Preston “would inculcate habits of order, diligence, and
punctuality,” deterring youth from “idleness and mischief” and “benefited the morals of students
as well.” 83
Partridge was not stranger to the academy life. As one of the former superintendents of
West Point, Partridge had a particular desire to see the expansion of an academy system,
hearkening back to Greco-Roman days where all citizens were trained in the ways of war. In a
1951 historical tract released by the Newcomen Society, Partridge is described as a man who
held the “radical belief that all students should be trained to perform all the duties of a citizen
83
Rod Andrew, Op. Cit., pp. 2-13; and, John Hope Franklin, The Militant South: 1800-1861,
(Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 146-170. The first private
and state academies include Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, Virginia (VMI – 1839) and
the Citadel, located in Charleston, South Carolina and its counterpart, The Arsenal (1842). Alden
Partridge is an interesting figure and further study of him in understanding military academy
growth is essential to any complete knowledge of the subject. In particular, he was
superintendent at West Point and later appointed as president at Norwich University in
Northfield, Vermont beginning in 1819. Partridge was actually one of West Point’s greatest
critics citing that their poor graduation rates impeded effectively filling officer ranks in the
Army. Perhaps more importantly was his philosophy of a citizen-controlled military. Many see
his views and efforts as precursors to the ROTC program.
79
soldier, equally prepared for war or peace” and it was such views, that seem to have gotten
Partridge released from West Point! His founding of Norwich University intended and achieved
military training for young men. It embraced the liberal arts curriculum, while instilling a
healthy dose of military training in producing numerous officers. Indeed, it was Norwich
University and Partridge’s efforts with the establishment of southern military academies that
provided the U.S. Army with its expanded officer corps. 84
The southern academies’ proliferation were also precipitated by what many viewed as
West Point’s increasing aristocratic nature, as it trained only the nation’s “rich and influential”.
Henceforward, academies in the South espoused what they viewed as an egalitarian tradition.
Cadets hailing from impoverished backgrounds were provided “free tuition, room and board, and
books” numbering up to one-third of all cadets in 1860. As Andrew notes, the southern brand of
‘egalitarianism’ carried over to general military tradition integrating poor and rich cadets –
recognizing that military rank superceded social class standing. A major benefit of these
academies (particularly state-supported academies) to public education was their designation as
Normal or teacher training schools. The young men who were designated as ‘state cadets’ (those
receiving free room and board, tuition and books) were required “to teach for at least two years
in the public schools or colleges of the state.” Various states, including Virginia, North Carolina,
Alabama, and Georgia implemented various versions of this requirement as a condition for
receiving state aid.85
84
Ernest N. Harmon, Norwich University: Its Founder and His Ideals, (New York: The
Newcomen Society in North America, 1951), ad passim; and, R. Don Higginbotham, “The
Martial Spirit in the Antebellum South: Some Further Speculations in a National Context,” The
Journal of Southern History, 58, (February, 1992), pp. 3-26.
85
Rod Andrew, Op. Cit., pp. 15-17.
80
Nonetheless, there were critics of the southern academies rising presence. Arguments
abounded that such schools, in the hands of rowdy young men, actually diluted any positives that
defending various arsenals and training might bring. One southern writer was even more
suspicious of the academic integrity any military academy, including West Point possessed,
stating “that of the ten young men appointed to West Point, not one managed to graduate.”
Northern politicians expressed their own suspicions that the build-up of private- and statesupported academies was evidence of the growing division and sectionalism of the South. Their
suspicions were partially correct, though in 1839 secessionist ploys were a small minority.
Critics aside, Andrew determined that “between 1845 and 1860 every slave state except Texas
had at least one fully state-supported military school, and there were dozens of other private
southern military academies that received assistance in the form of arms, funding, or tuition for
state cadets.” 86
V. Southern Military Academies and African Americans
In 1868 Hampton Normal and Agricultural Institute was founded in Hampton, Virginia as
one of the first black military academies. While most blacks were deemed unfit for military
service throughout the upper academy system, the South attempted to provide the beginnings of
a home for black officers and training. Yet, one should be cautious to draw too much out of this.
86
Ibid., pp. 18-19. For further elaboration on the state academy system, Andrew suggests Bruce
Allardice’s dissertation from the University of North Carolina. Andrew cites Allardice’s
numbers, indicating “slave states saw the opening of ninety-six academies and universities that
operated solely on the military system while the Free states had only fifteen”. This is perhaps
another, very tangible reason for Northern suspicions as to the trustworthiness of Southern states
‘military build-up’ and a significant fact I believe Andrew should have explored in greater depth.
A unique perspective on southern education and its frustration with northern educational practice
can be found in L. Minerva Turnbull, “The Southern Educational Revolt,” William and Mary
College Quarterly Historical Magazine, 14 (January, 1934), pp. 60-76.
81
First, Reconstruction was already underway and while making some headway, the south was
making small strides in their approach to equality. Secondly, there was a great deal of mistrust of
African Americans, resulting in their not having access to weapons in the new military
academies. The basic function of training came in the form of drill and formations, for in the
words of one general such drill was advantageous only to “correct perceived flaws of the
Negro…sloth, licentiousness, lack of self-discipline, and improper bearing of blacks and
Indians.” It should also be noted that the infectious and heinous paternalism cited above may
have psychologically bled into the black cadet themselves, engraining a self-hatred of what they
were in favor of the southern military standard. A tangible historical example is found in Booker
T. Washington’s successor at Tuskegee Institute, Robert Russa Moton, who is said to have
scorned anything “black” in favor of the more “white” way of doing things. The concept of these
schools, then, was not necessarily to train militarily, but militarily train black men into
submission while the guiding concept of white and black was the “same”, the process and
psychology was drastically, daresay, dangerously different. Andrew expounds on the relationship
of racism and citizenship, explaining “the most fundamental factor and the one that underlay all
the others was the recognition that soldiership implied full citizenship, and whites were
unprepared to concede the latter to blacks.” 87
87
Rod Andrew, Op. Cit., pp. 91-102; Susan D. Hansen, “The Racial History of the U.S. Military
Academies,” The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, 26. (Winter, 1999), pp.111-116;
Evonne Parker Jones, “The Impact of Economic, Political, and Social Factors on Recent Overt
Black/White Racial Conflict in Higher Education in the United States,” The Journal of Negro
Education, 60 (Autumn, 1991), pp. 524-537; and, John Hope Franklin, Op. Cit., ad passim. See
also William Hardin Hughes and Frederick D. Patterson, Robert Russa Moton of Hampton and
Tuskegee, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1956), ad passim.
82
VI. Reconstruction 1865-1876
From this point forward, a great deal of crossover begins to occur. The military, now in
the position of enforcing martial law during Reconstruction, finds itself dealing internally with
similar, if not identical problems in the civilian sphere. Moreover, the military begins some have
called its era of imperialism, as it was instrumental in carrying out and maintaining the policies
pertinent to Cuba, Puerto Rico and The Philippines.88
The Army’s role in Reconstruction was as profound as its role in the Civil War. Southern
humiliation over their defeat resulted in a great number of beatings, killings, and implementation
of Black codes. The obvious stared the U.S. Government, in particular Charles Sumner and
Thaddeus Stevens, in the face. Reconstruction would not be possible without Federal legislation
and military interdiction. The Civil Rights Bill of 1865, the 13th and 14th amendments and most
relevant, the establishment of the Freedmen’s Bureau, provided assurances that order could be
restored.
The Freedmen’s Bureau, under the War Department’s aegis, was responsible for the
repossession of lands, their distribution (to blacks), the organization of schools and asylums, and
the administration of justice- particularly pertaining to Civil Rights violations. Under the
guidelines of Congress, the Army was to oversee five districts, with oversight by an officer of no
lower rank than Brigadier General. The military’s supervision and the Reconstruction congress
would serve as the South’s rationale for distrusting a centralized government bent on control. But
88
Norman Etherington, “Reconsidering Theories of Imperialism,” History and Theory, 21
(February, 1982), pp. 1-36; Robert Zevin, “An Interpretation of American Imperialism,” The
Journal of Economic History, 32 (March, 1972), pp. 316-360; Jeannette P. Nichols, “The United
States Congress and Imperialism, 1861-1897,” The Journal of Economic History, 21 (December,
1961), pp. 526-538; and, for a disputation, see James A. Field, Jr.. “American Imperialism: The
Worst Chapter in Almost Any Book,” The American Historical Review, 83 (June, 1978), pp.
644-668.
83
few options were to be had due to the South’s relentless attitude. Hence, what seemed logical
policy turned into conflict between President Andrew Johnson and Congress:
“These men [Sumner and Stevens] were of the opinion that inasmuch as the Southern
states had rebelled and had failed to maintain their cause, they were then subject to
the same treatments as any other people in a conquered territory. This meant
antagonism to the administration and led to long differences of opinion between that
Boyd and Johnson, which finally culminated in the impeachment of the President.”89
The Army, then, suffering little cooperation in the South and in no way aided by the
President, “turned to Congress”, and soon “the Army stood more openly with Congress against
the President, if only for the self-protection of the officers and men assigned to the South.”
Connected to this whole Reconstruction morass was the issue of the military’s judicial hearing.
Exparte Milligan, the preliminary decision of the Supreme Court nullified what should have been
civil hearings in the militarily occupied south. Finally, while the need for military incursion was
high, recruitment was low. For the efficient carry-through of military policy in the five districts,
numbers were needed. Congress approved greater strength but few joined, with the peak force
reaching only 19,000.90
While Reconstruction legacy was nonetheless shortlived. The Army struggled in this
period to ‘maintain’ but to do more was a task for Sisyphus. The Compromise of 1876,
essentially ended Reconstruction returning the southern aristocracy to power and prompting Jim
Crowism. The armed services’ sights turned westward as they strengthened their various
89
Carter G. Woodson and Charles H. Wesley, Op. Cit., p. 393; W.E.B. Du Bois, Black
Reconstruction in America, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), ad passim; Larry M. Logue,
To Appomattox and Beyond: The Civil War Soldier in War and Peace, (Chicago: I.R. Dee,
1996), pp. 3-31.
90
Russell F. Weigley, Op. Cit., pp. 258-262. For more on Ex Parte Milligan, see Kenneth M.
Stampp, “The Milligan Case and the Election of 1864 in Indiana,” The Mississippi Valley
Historical Review, 31, (June, 1944), pp. 41-58; and, Stanley I. Kutle, “Reconstruction and the
Supreme Court: The Numbers Game Reconsidered,” The Journal of Southern History, 32
(February, 1966), pp. 42-58.
84
detachments for the task at hand: the Great Migration. This required an effective regular army
that could ward off Indian threats and a military that would “tame” the frontier.
The Army had to make critical adjustments to its tactics- from a traditional military style
confrontation to that of guerrilla warfare. Regular militiamen now included a renowned regiment
of African Americans referred to as Buffalo soldiers. Also, the Army began to expand its
education aims building and staffing various state academies and post-graduate training facilities.
These educational venues would no doubt have a lasting impact with regard to officer
acquisition. What’s critical to point out here, is the continuing federalization and
professionalization historical strains: the Federalization strain comes from a regular army, which
could carry out governmental aims and the professionalization strain because of the new
educational opportunities being afforded to the men.
The third major service academy, the Coast Guard Academy would be formed in 1876.
Originally known as the Revenue-Merchant Service, it initially was a branch of the Treasury
until 1915 when it would receive its name change by Congress. Initially, the Revenue-Merchant
service was under control of the Treasury Department, charged with ensuring proper trade,
collecting duties, and the like. As time wore on, its mission would include rescuing and
protection of the borders. Its first initial requests to have an academy in the late-1840s met
resistance by the Navy. The Navy felt the Revenue-Merchant service would most adequately fall
under its governance. After a few more years of wrangling, it was granted its academy charter in
1876. The content of its training would differ in one major respect: the other branches of service
(Army and Navy) were committed to fighting battles. The Coast Guard, on the other hand, was a
rescue unit and guardian of the nation’s shores. This distinction bore itself out in the curriculum,
85
though a great deal of the attributes shared by West Point and Annapolis – such as discipline,
training, and pedagogy – would remain constant.91
The period also saw the rise of pacifist tendencies in those who saw less and less need for
a military establishment. Ironically, this contingent came from the business and industrial
communities based in the East - few saw the need for the Army’s presence out West. “More
profound doubts about the need for an Army came from an increasing number of influential
Americans who affirmed the obsolescence of war itself. To industrialists and financiers… war
might well seem an archaic, irrationality that would interrupt industrial progress and profits.”
The pacifist sentiment would die down by the Spanish American War, but the ‘mood’ was
already evident in the decreasing Congressional appropriations and the general “climate of
unconcern.”92
VII. The Integrated Academy System and the Morrill Acts of 1883 and 1890
The emancipation of all slaves in 1863 and the policies of Reconstruction would affect
the academy establishment as it did all other facets of American life. Cadet cohorts began
matriculating through the academy system since the academies’ reputation was viewed as a
91
For interesting explication on the Coast guard, see Robert Erwin Johnson, Guardians of the
Sea: History of the United States Coast Guard, 1915 to the Present, (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1987), ad passim; Irving H. King, The Coast Guard expands, 1865-1915: New
Roles, New Frontiers, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), ad passim; and Captain
W.D. Puleston, Mahan: the Life and Work of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, (New Haven, Yale
University Press, 1939), ad passim. On African Americans in the Coast Guard, see John W.
Davis, “The Negro in the United States Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard,” The Journal of
Negro Education, 12 (Summer, 1943), pp. 345-349.
92
Russell F. Weigley, Op. Cit., p. 271. On the pacifist movement and era, see also Peter Brock
and Thomas P. Socknat, Challenge to Mars: Essays on Pacifism from 1918 to 1945, (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1998), ad passim; Charles De Benedetti, “Peace History, in the
American Manner,” The History Teacher, 18 (November, 1984), pp. 75-110.
86
bulwark of American intellect. Illustrative of this point, Alfred Thayer Mahan had become
published, and then became world-renown, for his work in naval ships and tactics. Albert
Michelson, an instructor in the science department was the first to win the Pulitzer Prize in
physics. Most of the winning generals were either West Point trained or influenced. The Thayer
system had benefited the service academies well. For the most part, the officers’ large presence
and high capabilities earned the respect of the citizen-soldiers during the Civil War. The
curriculum and discipline seemed to carry the day for Union officers.93
Reconstruction also brought ‘integration’ of the military academy, though it was
extremely minimal first on in that African Americans did not fill the ranks in any large-scale. In
fact, even though blacks were permitted to join the military racism would disable many from
fully participating in academy life for nearly one hundred more years.
It is noteworthy, however, to cite the ‘opening (and closing)’ of doors at the academies to
blacks in 1870. James Webster Smith was the first African American to be admitted to West
Point in 1870, and John Conyers was the first African American at Annapolis, in 1872. Their
time did not last long, which is not surprising due to the heavy presence of Southern military
leaders. The next eighteen years would be a dismal time for African Americans. “From 1870 to
1898, twenty-three blacks were appointed to West Point; twelve actually attended, six stayed
longer than one semester, and only three graduated.” Annapolis, however, after admitting three
African Americans in the 1870s, would not admit another black midshipman until 1949. 94
Why the bother to attempt integration? Grant, the victorious Union general and a
majority in the Reconstruction Congress felt black officers should be cultivated to lead black
93
Captain W.D. Puleston, Op. Cit., ad passim; Robert Erwin Johnson, Op. Cit., ad passim; and,
Irving H. King, Op. Cit., ad passim.
94
Gail Buckley, Op. Cit., p. 120.
87
troops (there was a stigma attached to the white officers who did lead the troops). The
exceptional work of the Buffalo Soldiers in this period was partly an impetus to the decision as
was the general fervor brought about by Reconstruction. The academies, rooted in tradition and
Southern values, did not agree and took great steps to wash them out of the program. White
cadets and administrators would heckle and even torture the cadets, with the obvious result of
blacks leaving or in other cases being dishonorably discharged.95
Henry Ossian Flipper is an exception. His arrival to West Point in 1873 began the
journey of the first African American to graduate from there, and only the seventh to have been
admitted. Flipper had been educated well by missionary instructors and had previous instruction
at Atlanta University. His resolve was high, but so was his willingness to accommodate a great
deal of the behavior exhibited by cadets and instructors. Flipper, however, also brought an
intelligence and demeanor that earned the respect of the cadets, in part due to his initial refusal of
a “$5,000 offer from a white man to have his son take Flipper’s place”, and as a result, Flipper
became a “semi-celebrity…his West Point career tracked by the press.” His marks were
consistently amongst the highest in the class, and his willingness to endure the rampant racism
placed him, ironically, in high esteem. Flipper would go on to serve with distinction as a scout
and a guide in the 10th Regiment. Like his fellow cadets at West Point, racism would follow
Flipper and result in his dishonorable discharge from service. Having found money missing
from his baggage, most likely stolen by a white officer who had altercations with Flipper at West
95
Charles L. Kenner, Buffalo Soldiers and Officers of the Ninth Cavalry, 1867-1898, (Norman,
OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995, 1969), ad passim; John H. Nankivell, Buffalo Soldier
Regiment: History of the Twenty-fifth United States Infantry, 1869-1926, (Lincoln, NB:
University of Nebraska Press, 2001), ad passim; and, Frank N. Schubert, “Black Soldiers on the
White Frontier: Some Factors Influencing Race Relation” Phylon, 32, (4th Quarter, 1971), pp.
410-415. In Frank N. Schubert, On the Trail of the Buffalo Soldier: Biographies of African
Americans in the U.S. Army, 1866-1917, (Wilington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1995), ad
passim, (there exists several hundred biographies of Buffalo Soldiers, a truly interesting resource
in terms of compiled sources on these amazing Americans).
88
Point, Flipper feared telling his superiors. He repaid the money over two months, but was found
out. A trial was had, and he was found innocent, but guilty of “conduct unbecoming an officer”.
His discharge was not entirely traumatic for him. Flipper had a distinguished career as a
surveyor, mining engineer, and as first black editor of a “white American newspaper, the
Nogales Sunday Herald.” Flipper would be one of a handful, then, to graduate from the academy
for nearly one hundred years. 96
At this time, the American public education establishment was coming into its own with
the creation of high schools and vocational training facilities. Though not integrated (Plessy
versus Ferguson was no help with its Separate but Equal pronouncement), educational
opportunities for whites and blacks were increasing significantly throughout the country. The
Industrial Revolution and the plethora of immigrants coming to the United States spurred the
need for education and. Education for democracy was often the mantra, a variation of Horace
Mann’s “education…the great equalizer of all men”. The creation of an extensive secondary
school system was also important to the growing number of colleges. One begot the other.
Colleges needed students, and a greater number of high school students desired more education
following high school. The Morrill Acts of 1883 and 1890 were also critical to the furthering of
secondary and higher education, but more importantly to the military centralizationfederalization. The 1883 act was influenced by military academies’ developments, evidenced by
the courses of instruction initially offered – primarily, practical training in areas such as
engineering, farming, mathematics, and the sciences. The act made notice of these curricular
96
Gail Buckley, Op. Cit., pp. 123-124; Henry Ossian Flipper, The Colored Cadet at West Point:
Autobiography of Lieutenant Henry Ossian Flipper, Academic Affairs Library, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1999, 1878), electronic resource file,
http://docsouth.unc.edu/flipper/menu.html, ad passim.
89
advances, but one might also ascribe certain proscribed curricula, a necessity with the
burgeoning growth of high schools from 1875 onward:
“…and the interest of which (referencing money) shall be inviolably appropriated by
each State which may take and claim the benefit of this act, to the endowment,
support, and maintenance of at least one college where the leading object shall be
without excluding other scientific and classical studies, and including military
tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the
mechanical arts, in such manner as the legislatures of the States may respectively
prescribe, in order to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial
classes in the several pursuits and professions in life.”97
This Congressionally ‘imposed’ course of military instruction would lay the foundation for the
Reserve Officer Training Corps and Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps in 1916.
The Act of 1890 was critical in the continued establishment of Black colleges and
universities, as well as the admission of blacks to the A and M universities “provided, that no
money shall be paid out under this act to any State or Territory for the support and maintenance
of a college where a distinction of race or color is made in the admission of student.” The
forward thinking of the act was ‘balanced’ by a separate-but-equal clause located directly after,
stating “…but the establishment and maintenance of such colleges separately for white and
colored students shall be held to be a compliance with the provisions of this act if the funds
received in such State or Territory be equitably divided as in hereinafter set forth…”98
The Morrill Act of 1890 also stipulated a broader liberal arts instruction, mandating that
funds must be used for “instruction in agriculture, the mechanic arts, the English language, and
97
United States Statutes at Large, 22 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1883), 484485; See also Walter Crosby Eells and Ernest V. Hollis, “Origin and Development of the Public
College in the United States,” The Journal of Negro Education, 31 (Summer, 1962), pp. 221-229;
David L. Angus and Jeffrey E. Mirel, The Failed Promise of the American High School, 18901995, (New York: Teachers College Press, 1999), ad passim.
98
United States Statutes at Large, 26 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1892), p.
417.
90
the various branches of mathematical, physical, natural and economic science, with special
reference to their applications in the industries of life.” This expanded curriculum again
highlights concern that with educating the masses in public high schools, colleges must be ready
to further develop and educate the throngs of young people coming through their doors.99
VIII. Conclusion
Chapter two has continued with two dominant themes – preparedness and imperialismexpansionism. Preparedness, though in constant conflict with the citizen-army, becomes a greater
issue, particularly with the Civil War’s declaration. More convincingly, the preparedness strain is
best captured in looking at the proliferation of military academies, both in the major service
branches and private and state academies, particularly throughout the south. It would be unfair to
say generalize the entire south’s subscription to a military readiness ‘doctrine’. One however,
can question their intent, logically concluding a military build-up and extensive, accessible
officer training would surely be beneficial in dealing with northern advances. Similarly, West
Point, the Naval Academy and the Coast Guard Academy (note the official founding of the Coast
Guard Academy was not until 1915, but its predecessor was in existence) all represent the
growing professionalization of military life, inevitably connected to military readiness. In
addition to ‘democratizing’ education, the Morrill Acts, particularly the amended versions in
1883 and 1890, aid military centralization and federalization via military training on college and
university campuses. The expanded curriculum, the growing relationship between high schools
and colleges, serve as prerequisites for Junior ROTC’s inception.
99
Ibid., p. 417
91
Imperialist and expansionist threads also become increasingly prominent during the
professionalization era. The War of 1812, the Mexican War and the United States’ military’s
occupation of Mexico City, and westward expansion are all examples. American expansionism,
especially after the Civil War, relied heavily on a malleable, trained centralized military.
Similarly, well-trained officers were needed to lead these troops. Thus, the strains of
preparedness and imperialist-expansionist efforts become more pronounced in this period.
However, they are not quite ‘married’ in the sense that federalization-centralization is required
for military success. The state militias, or National Guard, are still in existence, states’ rightists
re-emerge following Reconstruction and much of the federalization attempts are hampered. The
martial ‘instability’ is addressed at the tail-end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth,
when the Maine exploded prompting the Spanish-American War. America’s acquirement of
Spanish territories, Roosevelt’s military expansionism, and the growing preparedness movement
signal that federalization-centralization would occur in short order.
92
CHAPTER 3: PREPAREDNESS AND PACIFISM
1898 TO 1916
“When trade is secured by force, the cost of securing it and retaining it must be taken out
of the profits and the profits are never large enough to cover the expense. Such a system
would never be defended but for the fact that the expense is borne by all the people, while
the profits are enjoyed by a few. Imperialism would be profitable to the army
contractors; it would be profitable to the ship owners, who would carry live soldiers to
the Philippines and bring dead soldiers back; it would be profitable to those who would
seize upon the franchises, and it would be profitable to the officials whose salaries would
be fixed here and paid over there; but to the farmer, to the laboring man and to the vast
majority of those engaged in other occupations it would bring expenditure without return
and risk without reward.”
William Jennings Bryan, Excerpt from speech delivered in
response to the Committee appointed to notify him of his
nomination to the presidency, at Indianapolis, August 8, 1900. Jim
Zwick, (ed.), Imperialism Under Other Flags: Travels, Lectures,
Speeches,
Introduction
The period of 1898 to 1916 is critical for several reasons. Theodore Roosevelt assumed
the presidency upon President McKinley’s assassination. Roosevelt’s military views, embodied
in preparedness ideology, permeated American domestic and foreign policy even through
President Woodrow Wilson’s administration. The preparedness concept is simply defined as a
nation or state maintaining a program or desiring a program of military readiness to effectively
defend its national or international sovereignty. Essential to America’s survival as a growing
power, preparedness would slowly build into a powerful ideology making the case that the nation
was poorly equipped to handle any threat, particularly the growing specter of war in Europe.
Likewise, imperialist-expansionist aims grew in intensity. Connected with preparedness ideology
as a historical thread, imperialism is best-defined as: “the policy of extending the rule or
93
influence of a country over other countries or colonies.” Realizing preparedness and imperialistexpansionist goals necessitated revamping militia organization, improving military education and
training efforts, and most importantly, federalizing the armed services.100
Section one briefly investigates the new challenges and changes relative to American
imperialism and the United States administration of the new Spanish-island acquisitions. Military
reorganization and subsequent arguments for preparedness naturally arose due to the
complexities involved with managing foreign territory. President William McKinley defied
tradition appointing a Secretary of War who was a lawyer by trade. Elihu Root’s appointment is
historically important in that he is by many accounts the creator of our modern military system.
He developed a general staff structure, a consistent military education and training program, and
the first key steps towards armed service federalization-centralization. Section two examines the
National Guard, better known as the state militia system, since it was a primary target of Root’s
federalization efforts. The consequent legislation known as the Dick Act delineated two militia
forces – a Reserve and a National Guard, both which could be called up to duty in the event of a
national emergency. This new reserve structure became one of the platforms for Junior and
Senior ROTC.
Section three explores President Roosevelt and General Leonard Wood’s preparedness
philosophies. Roosevelt’s viewpoints are meted out to comprehend his position and their impact
on domestic as well as foreign policy issues toward the middle and end of his presidency.
Leonard Wood enters as a vital supporter, political appointee, and eventual standard-bearer of
100
“Imperialism”, Encarta® 2002 Encyclopedia. (Microsoft Corporation, 2002). President Taft,
while important, in terms of this dissertation is viewed as a secondary figure carrying out
Roosevelt’s preparedness policies.
94
preparedness rhetoric. He and Roosevelt established the massive movement and rationale which
would essentially carry through to World War I.
In section four, preparedness and isolationist politics emerge among Leonard Wood,
Roosevelt, and President Wilson. The disagreement hinged on the manner in which America
would successfully sustain its world dominance. Preparedness offered military solutions in order
to maintain open, free trade. Wilson’s economic-pacifistic-neutrality platform, on the other hand,
envisioned America’s dominance and security via capitalist expansion, allowing industry to
prosper from neutral trading ties, improved diplomatic interventions, and reduced threat of war.
Section five examines Wood’s military training camps for college men and the public
debate prefacing the 1916 National Defense Act. The training camps and General Wood’s
persistence generated friction. The imminence of World War I notched up public debate
regarding a national defense act preparing America for potential war. Wood seemed to have won
the ‘battle’. However, Wilson’s capitulation permitted the legislation’s passage, gaining critical
concessions from the staunchest preparedness advocates leaving Roosevelt and Wood at the
perimeter. This aspect will be covered in chapter four in more detail. Finally, section six outlines
the American High School’s growing presence, establishing a home for Junior ROTC. Public
schools would serve as centers of experimental educational efforts, with military training as
substantial to the growth and development of young men. The academy structure will be briefly
touched upon. Military academies – their curriculum and design – would allow military officials
to envision an organization modeling academy-style learning at the public school level.
95
I. American Imperialism, Military Reorganization, and Arguments for Preparedness
Following the Spanish American War, the federal government became entrenched in
governing Spain’s former territories – Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. America’s agenda
required efficient administration and military operations, causing growing concern among many
in the Democratic Party’s states’ rights wing and pacifists like William Jennings Bryan. Due
consideration should be given to one main point: America’s colonial presence was a mechanism
to expand the nation’s free trade capabilities, otherwise, it seems counterintuitive that a lawyer
and businessman would be selected to spearhead the administration. The man chosen to
administer the territories and head military operations, Elihu Root, became Secretary of War
under William McKinley, continuing under Theodore Roosevelt ultimately becoming the most
influential Secretary in the post since the department was formed, with the possible exception of
John C. Calhoun.101
Root’s appointment was surprising, but not ill-advised. The government had little option
other than managing these new acquisitions in part to avoid Spanish attempts at forceful
reclamation. McKinley made it clear he wanted a deft administrator, someone familiar with
international, legislative, and legal process. Observing these qualities in Elihu Root, McKinley
sent Root a telegram offering him the appointment. In his communiqué, McKinley emphasized
Root’s law experience and administrative abilities as fundamental to effectively managing the
Spanish acquisitions. Root set a new tone for the military in concert with the loudest advocates
of military preparedness. And, it was this very topic of preparedness that would propel supposed
101
Norman Etherington, Op. Cit., pp. 1-36; Robert Zevin, Op. Cit., pp. 316-360; Jeannette P.
Nichols, Op. Cit., pp. 526-538; James F. Hoge and Fareed Zakaria, (eds.), The American
Encounter: The United States and the Making of the Modern World, (New York: Basic Books,
1997), ad passim; Jeanette P. Nichols, “The United States Congress and Imperialism, 18611897,” The Journal of Economic History, 21 (December, 1961); and, for a disputation, see James
A. Field, Jr.. “American Imperialism: The Worst Chapter in Almost Any Book,” The American
Historical Review, 83 (June, 1978), pp. 644-668.
96
need for drastic changes to military structure and efficacy. Early on, preparedness advocates saw
the importance of the military, not only for war ends, but also for expansion of capital interests
overseas. In contrast, a great deal of Congress and the public, at least for the first years of the
twentieth century, embraced an amalgamated concept of isolationism and pseudo-pacifism
(neutrality). America was coming into its own as an industrial powerhouse. Those in the
isolationist camp, business owners and financiers were arguing that isolationism and neutrality
would benefit the economy. Neutrality had more to do with ‘playing both sides’ than a true
commitment to peace. As well, Southerners had returned to the seats of power, rejecting the
notion of a large standing, professional Army. Their disdain for a large concentrated military
establishment surely emanated from what they perceived as misuse during the Civil War and
subsequent Reconstruction.102
In addition to creating a smoother operation, Root’s law and business background helped
him successfully administer America’s foreign occupations. Root’s political prowess and
administrative direction led Congress to authorize a peacetime expansion of the Army adding
3,820 officers. The new enlistees and officers would help in the operations of government as
well as protect the newly acquired territories from attack or seizure.
Completion of the Spanish-American War resulted in McKinley’s signing the Foraker
Act of April 12th, 1900. The Foraker Act enabled Puerto Rico management. Root devised a
highly centralized system with virtually no popular participation, with the rationalizing that
“…wise exercise of the ballot could not be expected from a population of which 90% were
102
Philip Jessup, Elihu Root, Vol. 1, (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1938), p. 215. Robert
Bacon and James Brown Scott, (eds.), Men and Policies: Addresses by Elihu Root, (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1926), pp. 36-37; and Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr, “The Idea of a
Citizen Army,” Military Affairs, 17 (Spring, 1953), pp 30-36.Carter G. Woodson and Charles H.
Wesley, Op. Cit., p. 393; W.E.B. Du Bois,Op. cit., pp. 670-710.
97
illiterate”. During occupation, a governor and legislative council were to be appointed by the
president, and no elective assembly was envisioned. 103
The Platt Act in 1901 gave Root effective control over Cuba. As opposed to Puerto Rico,
Cuba was politically vastly different since a numerous Cubans had fought for independence from
Spain. Root mandated corporations have free access in establishing a solid economic base. Reestablishing normalcy was vital and the sooner trade relations could be stabilized, the better both
parties would be. In helping materialize Cuba’s post-war constitutional convention, Root was
also quick to negotiate and establish a set of naval bases, built and operated by the United States
Navy, creating trade zones handled by and for the American government. Such effective
administration had the added effect of thwarting would-be colonizers. Finally, Root appointed as
General Leonard Wood colonial governor, a man who would quickly jump into the forefront of
America’s Preparedness movement. Wood’s regime and adeptness at colonial administration
“became a model for all future proconsuls.” Root’s insistence on democratic reforms, opening
capitalist markets, and immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops in May of 1902 was considered a
great success of his administration.104
The Philippines proved more difficult in terms of administering America’s new
possession. Root knew the limitations of administering a colony halfway around the globe. But
during this time, he earned the loyalty of servicemen. His unflinching support of them despite
allegations that surfaced regarding American atrocities while fighting in the region, earned him
103
Richard William Leopold, Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition (Boston, MA: Little,
Brown, Inc., 1954), p. 28; and, Pedro Caban, Constructing a Colonial People: Puerto Rico and
the United States, 1898-1932, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), ad passim; and, Arthur A.
Ekirch, Jr, Op. Cit., pp. 30-36.
104
Louis Perez, Cuba under the Platt Amendment: 1902-1934, (Pittsburgh, PA: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1986), ad passim.
98
their loyalty. The importance is not necessarily the administration of the said colonies, but to
demonstrate what new capacities the Secretary of War was filling, and more importantly the
direction of the military establishment which would be forever changed by Root’s and
Roosevelt’s administration with the ensuing years of preparedness legislation and military
expansionism. 105
Not every American was convinced of Root’s wonders. Author Richard Leopold, less
than praising in his assessment of pacifist and anti-imperialist resistance, described the highly
oppositional pacifist movement to the Secretary of War’s job performance:
“To pacifists, the foes of expansion, and the friends of the Filipinos, Root
represented everything that was abhorrent in the colonial adventure…so bitter were
the Anti-Imperialistic mugwumps on the Board of overseers of Harvard University
that they blocked for several years the awarding to him of an honorary degree.”106
Pacifists and Anti-Imperialists would show up in more decisive force and speak out against
American expansionism and preparedness by the end of the decade, contributing to Woodrow
Wilson’s successful election in 1912.
In 1903, Congress authorized the first of Root’s structural proposals – the general staff
structure. This feature would leave an indelible mark on the United States military. The new
105
Richard William Leopold, Op. Cit., pp. 28-40. Thirty years later, Root bemoaned the manner
in which Cuba was left possibly frustrated by American business interests that belly-flopped
soon after, which “bruised the pride of many Cubans.” (p. 32). See also Leonard Wood, Civil
Report of the Military Governor, 1902, (Havana Cuba, 1902), ad passim; Leonard Wood, The
Military Government of Cuba, (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social
Sciences, 1903), ad passim; Theodore Roosevelt, “The Burdens of Policeman in the Caribbean”,
in Problems in Modern Latin American History: A Reader by John Charles Chasteen and Joseph
S. Tulchin (eds.), (Wilmington, Del. : SR Books, 1994), pp. 307-310; Campbell Dauncey, The
Philippines: An Account of Their People, Progress, and Condition, (Boston, MA: J. B. Millet,
1910), ad passim; Theodore Roosevelt, “The Rough Riders”, in Mine Eyes Have Seen: A Firstperson History of the Events that Shaped America by Richard Goldstein (ed.), (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1997), pp. 189-191.
106
Richard William Leopold, Op. Cit., pp. 45-46. There is a wealth of early twentieth century
writing on this topic. African American peace leaders offered additional, compelling arguments
against America’s management. See Marvin Berlowitz, Eric Jackson, and Nathan Long,
Reflections of African American Peace Leaders in the Twentieth Century, 1897-1967, (New
York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2003), ad passim.
99
bureaucracy and federalization-centralization efforts paved Junior ROTC’s way into the militaryeducational venue. Under Roosevelt, Root’s general staff structure encompassed change to the
oversight structure shifting to a chief of staff and general staff structure and organized the Army
War College. Root discovered early on the War Department was in disarray. One of Root’s
primary concerns was the lack of accurate and consistent communication between the generals,
the Secretary, field officers, and the President. This issue and the alleged discombobulated
efforts of the U.S. Army during the Spanish-American War caused Root to reconsider and
implement a more logical, centralized apparatus.107
He began by creating a Chief of Staff position, which helped centralize military affairs by
disseminating instructions and delegating duties to lower-level generals. The chief of staff also
served as an “information filter” for the President and Secretary of War. The general staff would
serve under the Chief, carrying out myriad duties as assigned such as administration and
planning operations. The Army War College created a flow of officers into the general staff. Its
chief function was designed as to be post-graduate facility for the academies, establishing “a
higher school for the study of war…(which) could direct the intellectual exercise of the Army,
acquire information, and also devise war plans and advise the Commander-in-Chief.” 108 Added
to the War College, was Root’s plan for every military base to create, operate and maintain a
school. These schools offered instruction in writing, reading, military drill and tactics, as well as
other preparatory instruction potentially aiding soldiers in their future endeavors. This important
step would not be fully utilized until later in the century under the Universal Military Training
Act.
108
Russell F. Weigley, Op Cit., pp. 316-317. See also Judith Stiehm, The U.S. Army War
College: Military Education in a Democracy, (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2002),
ad passim; and, Robert D. Miewald, “The Army Post Schools: A Report from the Bureaucratic
Wars,” Military Affairs, 39 (February, 1975), pp. 8-11.
100
II. The National Guard: First Federalization Attempts
The National Guard, better known as the state militia system, would become the center of
controversy during Root’s administration, as efforts were underway to federalize the
organization. This was accomplished via passage of the Dick Act. Supported enthusiastically by
Elihu Root, the Act would effectively change America’s oldest and treasured military enclave –
the state militia system. The legislation served as the foundation over upcoming battles over
preparedness and federalizing state militia operations. The Dick Act is considered the first in a
series of key Congressional legislative bills leading to the passage of the 1916 National Defense
Act.
1865 through 1906 marked the National Guard’s ascent. Each state required what was
called Universal Military Obligation (UMO) on all able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and
45 years of age. Clinging to the 1792 Militia Act, states knew they had a safety mechanism
against an out of control federal government and more importantly, could organize and deploy
troops as needed to quell any insurrections. Its effectiveness at the national level was debated,
but their presence was nonetheless essential to state and national security. Throughout the
nineteenth century, state militias supplied troops, armaments, and officers during wartime.
Similarly, they enforced state laws and protected business interests. Professional military officers
agonized over state militias’ inconsistency and battle-readiness. However, the military
organizations were provincial points of pride, embodying the idea that states were largely in
control of their own destiny.109
109
John Mahon, History of the National Guard, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company,
1983), p.109. Elbridge Colby, “Elihu Root and the National Guard,” Military Affairs, 23,
(Spring, 1959), pp. 28-34; Louis Cantor “Elihu Root and the National Guard: Friend or Foe?,”
Military Affairs, 33 (December, 1969), pp. 361-373; Arthur Roth, “Development of the Army
Reserve Forces,” Military Affairs, 17 (Spring, 1953), pp. 3-7.
101
The Civil War period changed the face of state militias, notably in the South. During
Reconstruction, the South was barred from raising its own troops. From 1865 to about 1876,
control fell into the hands of the Reconstruction government. By bringing the South under
control, many military leaders posited that black soldiers should populate militia regiments
providing protection to various business interests, overseeing proper elections, and general
peacekeeping. Likewise, rapid reforms spread throughout Southern cities aimed at creating a new
social order. What seemed radical and forward-thinking, however, became deadly for black
Guardsmen and black Southern citizens:
“To the white people of the South and to the Dunning school of historians of
Reconstruction, the Negro militia was made up of only swaggering bullies. The
whites opted, therefore, to use unbridled violence if necessary to eliminate it…White
riflemen ambushed and killed black officers and white supporters of the Negro
militia. When the Democrats returned to power in state after state of the exConfederacy, they terminated the black militia, disarmed blacks, and excluded them
from any role in the militia.”110
Through the period of Reconstruction and up to 1906, state militias came to be known
officially as the National Guard. Each National Guard detachment protected state interests –
quashing race riots, putting down strikes, and defending against various insurrections.
Furthermore per the 1792 Militia Act, they were activated in the event of national emergency.
During the post-Civil War period, lynching and race riots were prevalent throughout the country
and depending on the region and the men, guard responses drastically varied. On one hand, their
presence, a critical buffer in many instances, may have helped deter larger post-Civil War
casualties. On the other hand, their enforcement of Jim Crow policies throughout the south
110
John Mahon, Op. Cit., p.109. Also, Jim Dan Hill, The Minute Man in Peace and War: A
History of the National Guard, (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Co. 1964), ad passim; and, Alwyn
Barr, “The Black Militia of the New South: Texas as a Case Study,” The Journal of Negro
History, 63 (July, 1978), pp. 209-219. Regarding Reconstruction era governance and occupation
see, W.E.B. Du Bois, Op. Cit., ad passim; Larry M. Logue, Op. Cit., pp. 3-31; and, Russell F.
Weigley, Op. Cit., pp. 201-208.
102
following the 1876 Compromise (also known as the Betrayal of Reconstruction), contributed to
increased fragmentation and segregation.
Labor and management strife also increased in intensity during this period. Industrial
bosses aligned with the state militias, (interestingly, spurring the National Guard’s official
naming via the 1877 railroad strike. As management across America struggled with the growing
intensity of strikers, National Guardsmen were activated to assist in protecting property and
maintaining order. Businesses supplemented financial aid into these militia units to carry on their
duties and ‘ensure’ corporate interests remained intact. Occasionally guardsmen sided with
strikers even setting aside their weapons or walking off duty. It was these types of action and the
provinciality of their organization, which caused consternation amongst ‘professional’ military
officers, later on precipitating the Dick Act’s passage.
Military professionals saw little value in the National Guard. These provincial citizen
armies elected officers, socialized more than trained, and seemed to serve to the detriment of
national interests. Similarly, when necessity called, state governors served as Commander-inChief, calling the Guard to duty. The executive privilege was a stark reminder to federalization
proponents that state governments were largely in control of their own military operations. Elihu
Root’s efforts, fueled by professional soldiers’ animus, changed all that.111
Professional officers snubbed the National Guard as a relic of 1792. Indeed, its
provincial character and the troops’ inconsistency may have merited some concern. However,
Roosevelt’s Administration was strongly grounded in his preparedness rhetoric. The Spanish111
Gerald Friedman, “Strike Success and Union Ideology: The United States and France, 18801914,” The Journal of Economic History, 48 (March, 1988), pp. 1-25. See also Jim Dan Hill, Op.
Cit., ad passim. This section would be incomplete without mentioning in some form the betrayal
of Reconstruction. Obviously, the post-1876 National Guard would most likely have been
impotent in promoting Jim Crow and mob action against African Americans. The North’s
compromise and eventual pull-out sounded the death knell for any potential social gains that
could have been made.
103
American War had been (at least in his mind) a key indicator that change was needed in training
and deployment of troops. The National Guard was targeted by the Administration and
professional officers who deplored citizen-soldiery as antiquated and problematic towards
establishing a functional military machine. The Dick Act, properly titled “An Act to promote the
efficiency of the militia, and for other purposes”, was the first of several legislative efforts
strengthening military operations over the next twenty years. The act identified two branches or
classes of service – the National Guard and the Reserve Militia. Either branch could be called
into service by the president. Service obligations could be no greater than nine months and, upon
federal activation, guardsmen and reservists would be paid by the Federal government similar to
Regular army officers and enlistees. Another important feature was the reorganization of the
Adjutant-General Corps. Initially, Adjutant-Generals served as figureheads. Now, the onus of
responsibility fell to these men, reporting directly to the Secretary of War. The Act’s impact on
the National Guard was astounding. Congress essentially commenced dismantling state control
over military matters. Gone were the days of complete gubernatorial prerogative to support or
not support the federal government during wartime, haphazard training and drilling, and
provincially entrenched military detachments. The very frustrations endured by Washington and
his successors, seemed a fleeting memory. The Federal Government tightened its control.112
After shepherding through his landmark legislative reforms, Root departed his Secretary
of War post to pursue political office. Roosevelt then named William Howard Taft his successor.
112
United States Statutes at Large, 22 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903), pp. 775776. For more on this topic see Horace Mann Bond, “Education in the South,” Journal of
Educational Sociology, 12 (January, 1939), pp. 264-274; W.E.B. DuBois, Op. Cit., pp. 670-710;
George M. Blackburn, “Radical Republican Motivation: A Case History,” The Journal of Negro
History, Vol. 54, No. 2. (Apr., 1969), pp. 109-126; and, Patrick W. Riddleberger, “The Radicals'
Abandonment of the Negro During Reconstruction,” The Journal of Negro History, 45 (April,
1960), pp. 88-102. John Mahon, Op. Cit., p. 109. Mahon notes that from 1865 to 1906, nearly
1/3 of all National Guard actions were directed towards labor strikes, and a large portion –
particularly during Reconstruction assisted in putting race riots. The Guard’s ineffectiveness is
still a point of discussion today in debate about value of professional versus citizen-soldiers.
104
Taft was his protégé, eventually handpicked by Roosevelt to be the Republican nominee in 1908.
Taft was also a lawyer, continuing the legacy Root had left. Taft’s strengths, however, were
overshadowed by his weaknesses, noted by his frequent political faux pas while president.
Various political sectors found his policies wanting or simply erroneous and used these against
him both during his tenure as Secretary of War and as President, causing Roosevelt to leave the
party and contributing to Wilson’s election in 1912. Taft’s one choice for the somewhat new
Chief of Staff position was General Leonard Wood. Wood lent credence to the previous
President Roosevelt’s preparedness platform, gradually galvanizing support throughout the
country. Always the political dramatist, Wood evangelized his military perspectives, frequently
and without regret. Both Taft and Wood reinforced the Rooseveltian view that the United States
military must be ready in any crisis that would challenge its economic or national sovereignty.
III. Roosevelt and Wood’s Preparedness and Expansionist Philosophies Defined
Roosevelt’s views were shaped by his experience in the Spanish-American War. His
Rough Riders allegedly witnessed a United States army in chaos, causing Roosevelt to insist
America’s military and political future was in doubt. One argument or another could be make
the case Roosevelt’s ire was overblown – and in fact – Roosevelt’s experiences have been
deduced by some as racially and class motivated. In spite of his motivations these arguments are
of little consequence, given that his views shaped preparedness doctrine during and after his
presidency. Leonard Wood’s appointment at Roosevelt’s urging was a clear articulation of his
philosophies. Wood’s presence throughout the Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson administrations also
set the stage for ideological clashes surrounding America’s involvement in World War I.113
113
For more information on this, see Theodore Roosevelt, Pocket Diary, 1898: Theodore
Roosevelt's Private Account of the War with Spain, (Cambridge, MA: Theodore Roosevelt
105
Patriotic fervor in the end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century waned in
intensity. The rise of American industrial might, coupled with an economic boon, gave
Americans room to think about improving domestic life. Industrial and economic prosperity for
some did not ensure for all of America’s citizens. An even greater concentration of inner-city
poverty, crime and health crises plagued the nation. Labor and management were constantly in
turmoil as evidenced by the numerous strikes and disputes. The tension between industry and
labor and the after effects were obvious thread of the American fabric that weaved through the
Collection, Harvard College Library-The Houghton Library, Harvard University, 1998), ad
passim; Theodore Roosevelt, The Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt, (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1920), 506-531; and Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott, Op. Cit., pp. 17-48.
Additionally, William Howard Taft while judged as politically inept did conform to preparedness
doctrine. It should also be noted, however, that his stint as governor in the Philippines, was
viewed by many as a model governorship. He was primarily responsible for the development of
roads, industrialization, and communications. Again, though, this must be balanced against the
imperialist-expansionist ideology – what was good for the Filipinos was essentially good for the
U.S. The 113-day Spanish War, precipitated by the explosion of the Maine in Havana in 1895
began on April 21st, 1898. The first troops called to this “exercise in jingoism, empire building
and war nostalgia” were Buffalo Soldiers of the 25th infantry. This ‘Splendid Little War’ would
be the most integrated the military had been since the Revolution and until after World War II.
Though a list of heroism seems redundant, the examples of bravery in battle show that despite
the rise of Jim Crow and the sanctioned lynching, black troops fought fearlessly and loyallyequal or unmatched in many cases, by white troops. History paints the Rough Riders 1st
Volunteer Regiment as the unflinching heroes of war. The true history shows that had it not been
for the bravery of the Buffalo Soldier, “who came to their rescue in three important battles: the
10th Cavalry, at Las Guasimas, the 25th Infantry, at El Caney (“Hell Caney”), and the 9th and 10th
Cavalries, at San Juan Hill. Ironically, Roosevelt- always the politician and never the one to miss
the spotlight- retold the events, even going so far as to say that the battles resulted in the black
troops fleeing from battle and Rough Riders have to save the day. This was never the case, but it
did irreparable harm to the black infantry and their stellar reputation. It bears further comment
that Roosevelt’s inaccurate portrayals- not only of the black infantry, but also the bulk of the
army- to boost his and the Rough Riders’ performance, resulted in a perception that the Army
was ill-prepared. Of course, the Imperialist nature of the war, and the need for American military
to support the oncoming capitalist expansion seemed to demand a stronger, better Army.
Preparedness would eventually win the day. The loyalty of the soldiers, though questioned, was
sincere, outshining their white comrades. One poignant example was at El Caney. “In the midst
of ‘Hell Caney’, when white troops from New York refused to fight, the 24th, in the rear of and
supporting the white 13th Infantry, asked to take the lead. Their bravery there and at El Caney
would be noted throughout the land, but at the onset of World War I would soon be forgotten.
The Brownsville Raid was a turning point and exemplified the thanks black troops received for
their bravery U.S. Government’s. Due to what is said to have been a massive frame up: one
hundred and sixty-seven troops of the one hundred seventy were accused, tried and convicted of
murder. The exposure of racism’s ugly head in the military and the court of public opinion by
Roosevelt’s demand for justice did insurmountable damage.
106
entire country’s institutions, including the military. While Americans focused on repairing their
economic house, defense spending also became victim to drastic fluctuations in armaments and
numbers.114
Roosevelt recognized the dangers of these fluctuations, and the critical importance
international affairs played in America’s economic future. Historian Nathan Miller observed,
“unlike most Americans of his day, Theodore Roosevelt was fascinated by international affairs
and realized that the war with Spain had transformed the United States from a provincial nation
on the fringes of power…’whether we desire it or not,’ he warned Congress in his first annual
message, ‘we must henceforth recognize that we have international duties no less than
international rights.’”115
Miller’s remark typified Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency and his beliefs in a strong U.S.
military and solid foreign policy, consisting of three major tenets. First, he believed in stabilized
Caribbean and Latin American governments. Reducing their debt and increasing democratic
elections would, at least in his mind, thwart internal or external military conflict. Second, a
strong Latin American base was vital to Roosevelt’s ‘canal plan’ in either Nicaragua or Panama,
spurring establishment of trade routes and greater flexibility in transportation. Third, and finally,
114
Congressional legislation from year-to-year caused great fluctuations in terms of budget
expenditures and size of the regular army, eliciting immense concern among military elites and
the likes of Theodore Roosevelt. At the start of the Spanish-American War in 1898, 209,714
military personnel were engaged. By 1901, 85,557 were active duty and only six years later
active rosters counted only 64,170. By 1916 the number of troops had risen above 105,000 and
would stay at these levels following the passage of the National Defense Act. (Russell F.
Weigley, Op. Cit., pp.596-600). For more on the progressive era, see Gerald Friedman, Op. Cit.,
pp. 1-25; Lewis L. Gould, America in the progressive era, 1890-1914, (New York: Longman
Press, 2001); Lawrence A. Cremin, The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in
American Education, 1876-1957, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1969, 1961), pp. 127-273.
115
Nathan Miller, Theodore Roosevelt: A Life (New York: William and Morrow, Inc. 1992), p.
382. See also Robert H. Holden and Eric Zolov, Latin America and the United States: A
Documentary History, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 34-37; Theodore
Roosevelt, Op. Cit., pp. 506-531.
107
he desired a strong and secure Pacific Basin. This guaranteed safekeeping of America’s colonial
acquisitions. Military organization played a critical role in Roosevelt’s view, because a
strengthened military equaled dependable enforcement of his agenda. Historians argue against
labeling Roosevelt’s aims as anti-imperialistic, citing his policies were protectionist-driven,
merely ‘intended as a step on the difficult road to self-rule’. 116 Regardless of how he is
portrayed, understanding that military domination and control, via military readiness, opened
pathways for the expansion of capitalist markets.
Furthermore, the “Roosevelt Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine basically justified
America’s new police presence throughout the Western Hemisphere. His ‘corollary’ alienated
Isolationists, fence-sitters, and even some military personnel who grew concerned America was
treading dangerous waters. The corollary’s important precedent here is in fact the unprecedented
expansion of America’s economic and military presence advanced by Roosevelt’s view America
should be an intermediary in all matters concerning United States foreign and domestic policy.117
Roosevelt’s military philosophies were in fact not immediately popular with Big
Business. Though his preparedness plan would reap ‘positive’ financial outcomes over the long116
Nathan Miller, Op. Cit., p. 384. Evidence of this point is available by studying Roosevelt’s
approach to the Venezuelan debt crisis in which Germany claimed rights to briefly invade
Venezuela to collect on their debt. This particular moment in history, highlights Roosevelt’s
philosophy towards stable, competent and responsible governance throughout Latin America.
Miller does an excellent job describing the events in pages 392 to 393.
117
Nathan Miller, Op. Cit., pp. 394-399; and, Robert H. Holden and Eric Zolov, Op. Cit., p. 37.
For further and varied discussion see Jeffry A. Frieden, “The Economics of Intervention:
American Overseas Investments and Relations with Underdeveloped Areas, 1890-1950 in The
United States in the International Economy,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 31
(January, 1989), pp. 55-80; Jamie W. Moore, “National Security in the American Army's
Definition of Mission, 1865-1914,” Military Affairs, 46 (October, 1982), pp. 127-131; Robert
Zevin, “An Interpretation of American Imperialism: The Tasks of Economic History,” The
Journal of Economic History, 32 (March, 1972), pp. 316-360; Larry Hufford, “The U. S. in
Central America: The Obfuscation of History,” Journal of Peace Research, 22 (June, 1985), pp.
93-100; and, John M. Mathews, “Roosevelt's Latin-American Policy,” The American Political
Science Review, 29, (October, 1935), pp. 805-820.
108
term, business executives were initially skeptical. No fan of Big Business, Roosevelt’s early
political activity ruptured government-corporate camaraderie, dealt severe blows to monopolies
and business corruption and exacerbated management disputes with labor! If Americans were to
“buy” into preparedness, the business sector would have to accept the ideology. Roosevelt’s
complete plan would have to wait, since Woodrow Wilson’s eventual election confounded
military preparedness activists’ attempts. Wilson touted the positive monetary and political
rewards pacifism could bring the country. The rise of Wilsonian ideology, then, can be strongly
linked to a sort of economic-isolationist-pacifism, a rebuff of Roosevelt’s views. Even at the
commencement of World War I, business leaders were still wary, experiencing the large profits
gained by American neutrality. However, over time business, education, and political beliefs
shifted as Leonard Wood’s evangelization took a spirited turn.118
It was not accidental that Leonard Wood and Roosevelt shared similar views. Wood had
trained and served with Roosevelt’s Rough Riders and was appointed to leadership posts under
McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson. His stints as governor in Santiago, Santiago City,
military governor of Cuba, the Mora province and as Chief of Staff brought numerous accolades
from civilian and military leaders.
Wood’s philosophy on preparedness paralleled Roosevelt’s. It was shaped by his SpanishAmerican War experiences in the concluding years of the nineteenth century. Wood, like
Roosevelt, observed what he alleged to be poor, lackadaisical performance of American troops
on and off the battlefield, a nepotistic and entrenched military leadership, and a complacent
public. He shared in Roosevelt’s view of expanding America’s reach, but Wood first-and118
Nathan Miller, Op. Cit., pp. 394-399; Robert H. Holden and Eric Zolov, Op. Cit., 34-37;
Theodore Roosevelt, Op. Cit., ad passim. Wood’s Plattsburg camps, discussed in the following
section, spurred ‘businessmen camps’. As with Plattsburg, these took some time to catch on, but
eventually were attended in large numbers.
109
foremost championed the military life as a primary component of citizenship and practical
sustainer of American foreign policy and democracy.
“The foundation of peace [he wrote] lies in the proper education of the youth. If you
have decent men, you have decent governments and decent governments try to do
the square thing. The suppression of war or struggles is about as difficult as to
effectually neutralize the influence of gravitation or to revise the general law governs
all things, namely, the survival of the fittest.”119
As with Roosevelt, his opinions were not shared by many, including anti-war and antiimperialists. This contingent frequently challenged Wood’s assertions, questioning his wisdom
as to the necessity of a fighting force in the absence of conflict. Wood frequently responded to
his critics, defining preparedness as nothing more or less than keeping the ‘ship ready’ in the
event of war. Pointing to a ship headed out to sea, he retorted to one critic, saying: ‘I will answer
you, madam,’ he said, ‘if you can tell me for what particular storm the captain of that ship is
prepared. You may notice that he has all his life-boats hung and ready.’”120
His response was highly indicative of his beliefs that military troops, armaments, and
leadership must be adequately primed to face any challenge arising before the United States. He
was consumed by these thoughts talking “preparedness day and night with whomever would
listen, made speeches and pleaded with the Secretary of War (Garrison) to let the facts be known
to the President of the nation’s unprepared state.”121
119
Hermann Hagedorn, Leonard Wood: A Biography, Vol. 2, (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1931), p. 173.
120
Ibid., p. 173. For continued discussion on the topic of pacifism, nationally and internationally
as well as from the early- to mid-twentieth century, see Peter Brock, Varieties of Pacifism: A
Survey From Antiquity to the Outset of the Twentieth Century (Toronto: Syracuse, N.Y.
Syracuse University Press, 1998), ad passim; and, Peter Brock and Thomas P. Socknat, Op. Cit.,
pp. 218-330.
121
Hermann Hagedorn, Op. Cit., p. 143.
110
IV. Preparedness and Neutrality Politics
Following Wilson’s election, Wood continued in the Chief of Staff position. It was in the
early part of Wilson’s administration he became interested in the concept of military training
camps – a vehicle illustrating how simple military readiness could be. By 1913, his idea that
college-aged men attend a training camp in the summer began came to fruition, a set-up that
would play a crucial role in outlining the ROTC program in 1916. His concept, known as the
Plattsburg Idea, was in part a reaction to growing problems overseas and though not immediately
successful became a behemoth in two short years. The Plattsburg idea was a source of growing
friction between himself and Wilson’s administration.
Wood was extremely adamant about the practicality and necessity of his camps,
preaching his preparedness mantra along the way. Those who charged the camps were
propaganda tools for militarism or military expansionism were quickly rebuffed by Wood:
“The ultimate object sought is not in any way one of military aggrandizement, but to
provide in some degree a means of meeting a vital need confronting us as a peaceful
and unmilitary people, in order to preserve the desired peace and prosperity through
the only safe precaution, viz., more thorough preparation and equipment to resist any
effort to break the peace.”122
Camp organizers targeted recruits at land-grant colleges and universities because of their
direct ties to the military instruction as mandated by the Morrill Acts of 1862 and 1890. Camps
occurred during students’ summer vacations, incorporating courses in tactics, drill, and evening
122
Joseph Sears, The Career of Leonard Wood (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1919),
pp. 214-215. ROTC’s beginnings could essentially be attributed to Wood’s address to a meeting
of land grant colleges in which he suggested “a program whereby five hundred graduates of the
land-grant colleges would be selected each year for commissions as ‘provisional’ second
lieutenants and assigned to regular units for one year’s training, after which they would pass in a
special officer reserve.” See also John Clifford The Citizen Soldiers: The Plattsburg Training
Camp movement, 1913 – 1920, (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1972), p. 24.
While printed in 1917, the Plattsburgh Manual is a wealth of information pertinent to camp
operation. A copy is on file at the Hamilton County Public Library, O.O. Ellis and E.B. Garey,
The Plattsburgh Manual: A Handbook of Federal Training Camps, (New York, The Century
Company, 1917), ad passim.
111
lectures on military history and policy. During evening lectures campers heard Leonard Wood
vehemently reiterate the camps were in no way ‘preaching militarism…but [to establish] some
true conception of what our military history has been and what we need in the way of a sound
military policy for the future.” 1913, its first year of operation netted a total of 222 students, but
after combining with businessmen the total eventually climbed to 3,500,000 men trained, and
well over 200,000 fully trained reserve officers.123
Wood’s constant stumping became a thorn in President Wilson’s side. Wilson’s
somewhat contrary beliefs to military intervention would constitute what Wood thought was a
grave threat to American superiority. Certainly, he received the support he needed under
Roosevelt and Taft, but Wilson proved less inclined towards Wood’s views. President Wilson,
the former Princeton academic countered that matters relative to foreign policy and military
build-up were analogous to President James Madison’s diplomatic and economic incitements
that led up to the War of 1812. Wilson believed that America’s worst nightmare was to be drawn
into a military fiasco when time, money and resources could be better spent expanding capitalist
markets, alleviating domestic strife, and assisting the international community in resolving
disputes peacefully. Wilsonian biographer August Hecksher described Wilson’s philosophies
toward pacifism. A new strategy that would make a long-term impact regarding American
foreign policy, seemed in order.
“Wilson was convinced that his administration had as much opportunity to transform
the Country’s foreign as well as its domestic policy – to make it genuinely
123
Joseph Sears, Op. Cit., 200-216, and, John Clifford, Op. Cit., pp. 54-117. The American
Defense League and American Defense Society hedged a powerful pro-military camp
movement, combining Wood’s Plattsburg Camps and the businessmen camps, forming the
Military Training Camps Association (MTCA). After a great deal of debate during proceedings
for the National Defense Act, section 54 of the act provided monetary resources for MTCA.
112
democratic, pacific, anti-imperialistic, free of the manipulations of financial
interests.”124
The last point, however, should not be misconstrued as complete renunciation of financial
or military interests. He was in line with his party platform having championed resistance of an
expanded military establishment, attacked corrupt business practices and addressed social ills (as
Governor of New Jersey), and advocated for states’ rights. Nevertheless in his mind, maintaining
open free trade required military intervention and it is said he employed the military in matters
affecting business more so than any other previous presidential administration. Logically, then,
Wilson’s adoption of anti-Imperialism and pacifism should not be read as complete repudiation
of American economic expansion. Wilson’s insistence America freely trade with the belligerents
throughout the first two years of World War I is a prime example.125
Pacifist and anti-imperialist views helped him win the 1912 election. When he chose his
cabinet and administration, he retained General Leonard Wood as Chief of Staff (left over from
Taft’s administration in part because of Wood’s astute capabilities in managing military affairs),
124
August Heckscher, Woodrow Wilson, (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1991), p. 293.
125
Ibid., pp. 296 – 299. One other prime occasion exemplifying his politicking on subjects such
as states’ rights and foreign policy was the ‘Japanese imbroglio’. California had shamelessly
passed legislation barring Japanese immigrants from owning land. The incident was a huge battle
between states’ rights advocates and federal government views supporting strong, friendly ties
with Japan. Wilson helped avoid war with Japan, it is also noted in historical circles that Wilson
perpetuated the Democratic Party platform supporting States’ Rights and Separation of Powers.
This is an important foundation in terms of understanding Wilson’s imprint on the National
Defense Act. I would also direct the reader’s attention to the last point of Wilson’s use of
military and the parallels to Jefferson’s administration. I would be remiss for not mentioning one
outstanding work consulted in the process of compiling research for this chapter. Arthur Link’s
biographical survey of Wilson, the most comprehensive to date is a phenomenal achievement.
The five-volume set goes into extensive detail on his life, presidency, and philosophies. The
following titles were also consulted: Arthur Link, Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 19141915, Vol. 3 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960), ad passim; Arthur Link, Wilson:
Confusions and Crises, 1915-16, Vol. 4, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), ad
passim; Arthur Link, Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, Vol. 5 (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1965), ad passim; Arthur Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, Vol. 2
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956), ad passim. See also Leon H. Canfield, The
Presidency of Woodrow Wilson: Prelude to a World in Crisis, (Rutherford, NJ: Farleigh
Dickinson University Press, 1966), pp.39-74.
113
Wilson frustrated the establishment when he formalized his pacifistic views. By selecting
William Jennings Bryan, Democratic Party stalwart and anti-military activist, as Secretary of
State Wilson gave a nod to the Democratic Party’s anti-Imperialist, states’ rights, and pacifist
wings. Bryan, a religious pacifist, was an ideal choice for the staunchly Presbyterian President
and someone Wilson respected immeasurably, but the choice was as much political as it was
ideological. Early in Bryan’s political career, he served as the persistent voice against military
expansionism. Though losing the 1900 presidential election, many Americans respected his
fervency, religiosity, and intelligent positions. Yet, Bryan for all of his intellect was observed by
many in Washington circles as a man of ‘incurable innocence’. He unwittingly proved their
point. Guilty of diplomatic faux pas, Bryan intertwined religious perspectives with foreign
diplomacy fueling preparedness activists’ arguments that Wilson and his cabinet were inept.
Bryan was asked to resign after two years in office, but Wilson held his views as critical to
supplementing his own ideas pertinent to military proliferation. William Jennings Bryan served
Wilson well, however, in developing a comprehensive foreign policy strategy, shaping the
president’s diplomatic approach. 126
Wilson, along with Bryan, developed what historians label ‘The New Freedom’. The
‘New Freedom’ would encourage international order resulting in greater economic competition
and free market capitalism among nations. Henceforward, the new Wilsonian doctrine worked
tirelessly to avoid wars by establishing persistent and detailed analysis of what constituted
126
August Heckscher, Op. Cit., pp. 294-295. One famous ‘faux pas’ occurred when Bryan served
grape juice instead of wine to foreign heads of state. This incident, while innocent enough,
resulted in a fury when Bryan attempted to publicly explain himself through the national media,
turning a benign political gaffe, into a political nightmare. For more on Bryan, see Fred H.
Harrington, “The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States, 1898-1900,” The Mississippi
Valley Historical Review, 22 (September, 1935), pp. 211-230; Willard H. Smith, “William
Jennings Bryan and the Social Gospel,” The Journal of American History, 53 (June, 1966), pp.
41-60; Malcolm M. Willey and Stuart A. Rice, “William Jennings Bryan as a Social Force,”
Journal of Social Forces, 2 (March, 1924), pp. 338-344; and, Willard H. Smith, “William
Jennings Bryan and Racism,” The Journal of Negro History, 54, (April, 1969), pp. 127-149.
114
‘revolutions for change’ or uprisings that became deleterious movements serving as impediments
or threats toward democracy. Wilson’s political savvy handling regional and international
conflicts gave him much needed credibility and many Americans – including businessmen and
everyday Americans – saw great value in his accomplishments.
Equally important was the public’s lack of interest in militarism. Wilson’s ideology
spoke to a vast majority of Americans – many of whom saw a great need to repair domestic
strife. By the 1916 election, Republicans saw the writing on the wall. Looking for someone with
broad appeal, they carefully chose John Hughes as their presidential candidate – passing over
‘preparedness’ powerhouses Theodore Roosevelt and Leonard Wood. Thus the “Republicans
were mindful of the pacifist attitude extending through much of the country particularly in the
Midwest…” Wilson’s platform heralded the “Second New Freedom”, in which, “he supported
rural credits, workmen’s compensation, a child labor bill, with the single-mindedness formerly
for promoting economic equality; and to these the eight hour day was soon to be added in
dramatic circumstances.”127 The platform reflected the voting populace’s disenchantment in
regarding military matters, placing political focus on issues directly concerning American
citizens. The platform was in many ways precursory to the Progressive strand catching on in
America. Though the ‘strand’ would take a short hiatus during World War I it would return with
vigor by the mid-twenties.
During his first term, Wilson stalled the ‘war’ against war and preparedness rhetoric with
his unique foreign policy approach. Leonard Wood remained a fringe figure, some describing
him as a ‘has-been’. Conversely, the road to his second term, lined with Americans craving
domestic relief, became riddled with navigational challenges, forcing Wilson to capitulate to
military readiness issues and proffer his own preparedness strategy.
127
August Heckscher, Op. Cit., pp. 395-398.
115
V. Public Debate toward a National Defense Act
Calling for a new system of military readiness at the start of the election year, Wood’s
allies gained momentum in the arena of public opinion. Try as he would, Wilson’s peace agenda
was quickly in conflict against a preparedness platform that had gained significant traction
among business elites and a growing (though still small sector) number of Americans outraged
over German atrocities against American merchant vessels and the British boycott. The federal
government’s economic trade neutrality policy also created significant rifts with Britain. Britain
implemented a boycott against American merchant ships and they felt their cause for boycott was
just: America’s fence-sitting and supplying of materials to both sides simply galled them.
Furthermore, Germany had crossed the line by breaking its promises not to destroy American
merchant vessels. Added to the outrage, several months previously, the Lusitania had been sunk.
One cannot discount these mounting dynamics triggering the president to develop his own
preparedness plan. There seemed no other choice. The question before him, though, was to what
extent should the preparedness legislation go? Complete federalization seemed far from the
answer and was in direct conflict with many Democratic Party members.
Wilson’s disdain for federalizing military operations and Roosevelt and Wood’s staunch
pro-federalization mentality showcased the increasing dialectical relationships occurring in a
country desperate for peace, yet ferocious when matters affecting national sovereignty arose.
Ongoing diplomacy with the Central Powers and the Allies had failed, and in some cases quite
miserably. Concomitantly, the Germans knew well America’s – and Wilson’s – revulsion of war.
German conventional wisdom assumed America was not a threat politically or militarily
furnishing added fuel for Leonard Wood’s preparedness argument:
“As far as the financial and economic situation is concerned,” the Naval Minister,
von Cappelle replied, “I have always laid great stress on the importance of
116
America’s entrance in to the war. But from a military point of view, her entrance
means nothing. I repeat: from a military point of view America is nothing. I am
convinced that almost no American will volunteer for war service. That is shown by
the lack of volunteers for the conflict with Mexico. And even if many enlist, they
must first be trained. This will take time, for America has neither commissioned or
non-commissioned officers enough to train large bodies of troops…America’s
entrance is as nothing…”128
The collective groan emanating from Roosevelt and Wood over comments like these led
to others joining their chorus. Von Cappelle’s reaction was the exact perception preparedness
advocates feared. In late-1915 and throughout the 1916, the MTCA was gaining steam, as were
organizations like the Junior American Guard, the National Security League, the American
Defense League, and the American Defense Society. Still, America’s electorate was not
completely convinced war or preparedness was the answer. Wood and his cadre argued,
however, that a strong military establishment assured America’s readiness in time of need.129
Editorials and reports peppered newspapers. The articles lamented military effectiveness,
offering alternative military training techniques or denouncing military expansion. Over the
course of several weeks, over fifty articles appeared in the New York Times alone dealing with
the topic of preparedness. The national debate had earnestly begun. No sooner had debate
commenced, when political casualties accumulated.
128
Arthur Link, Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, Vol. 5 (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 289.
129
Robert D. Ward, “The Origin and Activities of the National Security League, 1914-1919,” The
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 47 (June, 1960), pp. 51-65; Howard C. Hill, “The
Americanization Movement,” American Journal of Sociology, 24, (May, 1919), pp. 609-642;
and, George Creel, “Propaganda and Morale,” American Journal of Sociology, 47 (November,
1941), pp. 340-351. The preparedness chorus pled their case to the American public, having cited
their cause as a noble effort - a strong military establishment spreading democracy and human
rights. Wilson was in a political chess match. Had they “won”, they could have wrested away
the presidency.
117
Secretary of War Lindlay Garrison’s and General Wood appeared at a speech for over
one thousand New York bankers at the Hotel Astor. Wood’s well-defined verbiage stridently
preached pro-federalization. He denounced America’s over-reliance on an all-volunteer force
with little or no emphasis on training for professional commissioned and non-commissioned
officers. This over-reliance would lead to the nation’s inevitable demise. Wood implored the
bankers, affirming ‘national control (was) essential, decrying America’s ‘forty-eight separate
armies’ as ineffective.
Wood and Garrison targeted New York bankers purposefully. Their appeal that “…for
war, a nation must be able to fall back instantly upon perfected economic and industrial
organizations in the moment of national emergency” drew concurrence. 130 Wood’s speech,
couple with German attacks against American merchant vessels and the impact on Wall Street
caused the powerful New York financial establishment to reconsider the government’s trade
neutrality policies. Garrison spoke as well, expounding on Wood’s ideas, adding an aura of
official sanctioning by the Wilson administration. Wilson, of course, had not sanctioned this
course of rhetoric. Shortly after the speech an insurmountable rift occurred between Garrison and
Wilson, and the Secretary was forced to leave office. Outraged, Wilson was devastated with
Garrison’s insubordination. The Secretary of War’s refused to back-down on his concept that a
federal militia or Continental Army was the only sure way to protect American interests. As the
National Defense Act was drafted and hearings took place, Garrison led the charge in hopes
Wilson would support his effort. Giving the president an ‘ultimatum’, Garrison quickly
discovered Wilson would not accept being pigeon-holed. Wood did not go unscathed. Once
130
New York Times,“Garrison Points to Nation’s Peril,” (New York City), 18 January 1916, p. 1.
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World War I started, he was assigned unsavory assignments, sent to the backfield, basically
exiled. 131
Anti-militarists and military personnel who leaned towards states’ rights put forth
military readiness differing proposals. There was a streak of social practicality in the debate,
merging Wilson’s ‘Second New Freedom’ and growing preparedness position. On January 17th,
a New York Times article described the League for Constructive Defense’s unique plan.
Socially-oriented, the League proposed placing regular army enlistees under the Army Corps of
Engineers. The end result would be two-fold: first, such a plan prepared men for service, but,
secondly and more importantly, it entailed a social component providing needed jobs and service
during economic downturns, explaining Americans should “retain for the unemployed their selfrespect and give the American people value received for all the money spent on the Army.” 132
The proposal received scant support from certain political and military circles, and never gained
the desired traction. Later that week, Frederic C. Howe further explored the concept of a standing
military responsible for training troops and rectifying social ills – opposing its use as a sole
instrument of war. Howe, United States Commissioner of Immigration in New York City and
self-described anti-militarist saw inherent value in dual training. Referring to words by Colonel
Whistler, Howe quoted: “Those soldiers who avail themselves of the shop work opportunities,
return to civil life much better trained and equipped for work useful to the community and
profitable to themselves than at the time of their enlistment.” Howe also used Colonel Whistler’s
words to elicit a warning: “preparation for war should be the most democratic thing that we can
undertake…it (the military) should be shorn of everything that menaces our democracy or
131
John Clifford, Op. Cit., pp. 122-128.
132
New York Times,“Suggests Defense by Industrial Army,” (New York City), 17 January 1916,
p. 1.
119
impairs our contribution to civilization.” 133 Indeed, the fear of a standing army and growing
militarism, as Howe saw it, was a danger to America’s institutions.
Preparedness advocates were swift in their rhetorical retaliation. General John J.
Pershing took exception to Frederic Howe’s negative historical assessment of standing armies.
Pershing’s argument recalled historical examples, but focused instead on the turmoil experienced
by Washington, Jackson, Grant, and others when relying solely on volunteer troops. Pershing
contended this dependence on an outmoded National Guard system, as well as under-prepared
and under-trained soldiers unnecessarily drew out the length of wars, severely hampered military
activities and nearly cost America victory during the War of 1812, and created tactical and
strategic headaches during the Civil War. Pershing, pontificating his own view of history
claimed, “in the light of historical facts, and if we are really in earnest, it would the part of
wisdom to adopt at once the principle of universal military training as the first step towards
preparedness.”134
Roosevelt’s speech at the Americanization Conference held in Philadelphia illustrates the
preparedness point-of-view quite well. Roosevelt, speaking to labor leaders, teachers,
sociologists and a myriad of local, state, and national leaders deplored America’s “hyphenated”
Americans – immigrants – who were essentially dividing America. He compared America’s
immigration ‘crisis’ to slavery – exhorting “once it was true, as Lincoln said, that this country
could not endure half free and half slave. Today it is true that it cannot endure half American
and half foreign. The hyphen is incompatible with patriotism.” It was Roosevelt’s vision that
education could play a monumental role in ridding America’s new ‘challenge’, particularly
133
New York Times Magazine “Would Teach Every American Soldier a Trade,” (New York
City), 23 January 1916, p. 1.
134
New York Times Magazine “General Pershing Wants Every Man a Soldier” (New York City),
30 January 1916, p. 1.
120
through high schools which would serve as vehicles for Americanization and military education,
instilling moral and civic virtues in America’s ‘newcomers’. Reminiscent of Horace Mann,
Roosevelt firmly believed “there should be military training as part of a high school education,
which should include all-round training for citizenship. This training,” he continued, “should
begin in the schools in serious fashion at about the age of 16.”135
This “war of words” continued for quite some time while Congress mulled varying
versions of preparedness legislation. Legislative proposals spanned the gamut from complete
abolishment of the National Guard, to complete federal control of all military matters, to shared
control between state and federal entities. The Wilson Administration was resistant to further
engage the debate, but international matters heated up, stoking fires of war in certain sectors.
Anti-Preparedness critics attempted serious campaigns to discredit arguments made by the likes
of Pershing and Roosevelt, arguing that military build-up would propel America into unwanted
war. Democrats legislators embraced (especially during Congressional hearings and nominating
convention) the continued politics of neutrality-isolationism siding with pacifist groups’
assessment of the effects of military expansion. More central to their argument was the issue of
states’ rights. There was in their mind no doubt that federalization of the National Guard was a
direct affront to the Constitutional balance of powers.
Finally, the constant legislative battling and military officers increased attendance at the
hearings augmented the growing political chasm between Wood and Wilson. Wood had left as
Chief of Staff in 1914. But, he was still minimally connected with Washington’s political
heavyweights. His attempts to sideline Wilson - indeed, exclude him - through public debate
135
New York Times “Roosevelt Urges Full Readiness” (New York City), 21 January 1916, p. 1.
Horace Mann, discussed in the previous chapter founded the common school as a mechanism to
Americanize immigrants and provided skills. to the millions of unfortunate Americans.
‘Mannian’ fashion simply refers to Horace Mann’s philosophies about schooling.
121
was probably what led to Wood’s ultimate exile. Eventually, tumultuous the road it was, the
National Defense Act would pass, but Wilson drafted and approved its final form.
VI. Educational Institutions
1902 to 1916 marked a period of struggle. Most of the academies, including those other
than the ‘big three’, were deeply rooted in the Thayer system. His system had worked quite well
for one hundred years, but times had changed. Higher education and secondary education circles
were poised to revamp curriculum, making college more attainable. In response to the
Progressive era reforms, schools were also beginning to offer more democratic choices in the
curriculum, known as electives. West Point offered few of these opportunities and was less in
tune with the new public school system than the colleges. Innovation was slow coming, and the
work was difficult. Many instructors at the academies saw their requirements as beneficial.
Others outside the academy system saw them as rigid and elitist. Eventual changes were
modified in the curriculum, but tradition had its place in the academy structure for years to come.
This period also brought about the Life Adjustment period in U.S. education. Not surprisingly,
the NEA endorsed military training as part of the Life Adjustment period. The principles were
designed to strengthen the bonds between colleges and high schools, creating a more seamless
path, as well as offering opportunities to make education more practical in the everyday lives of
students. 1918 saw the National Education Association Cardinal Principles of Secondary
Education published. These argued that high school should curriculum centering on civic,
vocational, and social responsibilities.136
136
Alan Sadovnik, Exploring Education, (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 2000), Ch. 4; Stephen
Ambrose, Op. Cit., ad passim; Lawrence A. Cremin, The Transformation of the School, (New
York: Alfred Knopf, 1961), pp. 240-250. Jurgen Herbst, “High School and Youth in America,”
Journal of Contemporary History, Education and Social Structure, 2 (July, 1967), pp. 165-182;
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A departure from the academy system here is now relevant, as the subject of the
dissertation shifts to the formation of the Junior ROTC. The advent of the American high school
in 1875, its exponential expansion and the growth of colleges as a result of the Morrill Acts
fostered a new faith in the citizen in addition to recognizing the economic advantages education
could provide. Similarly, the ever-increasing size of the military would, at least eventually,
demand increases in its officer ranks. By the start of World War I, preparedness advocates were
deeply concerned over the ability of the military to handle large-scale wars with the dearth of
officers to execute battles and lead troops. Colleges and universities had implemented military
training at their campuses, but it was clear their efforts did not dramatically add officers.
VII. Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the various personalities and philosophies pertaining to the
preparedness and imperialist-expansionist historical threads. The preparedness campaign began
in earnest when Theodore Roosevelt alleged military incompetence and lack of ready troops.
Similarly, America’s victory required military occupation in Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto
Rico. President McKinley’s appointment of Elihu Root as Secretary of War was a critical choice
with regard to military readiness and territorial management, striking a win for preparedness
advocates. His administrative and legislative prowess contributed to military readiness
legislation and efficient territorial administration. The culminating Dick Act and restructuring of
military hierarchy set in motion the process of federalization and centralization. Conversely,
Wilson’s election somewhat neutralized these initial Republican victories. Instead, he embraced
a policy of neutrality and semi-isolationism, primarily benefiting industrial America. The
preparedness movement, however, continued identifying weaknesses in the nation’s military
Joel Spring, “Education and Progressivism,” History of Education Quarterly, 10 (Spring, 1970),
pp. 53-71.
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capabilities. Their arguments gained traction as German attacks and the British boycott lead to
consternation over Wilson’s policies. Wilson was then painted into a corner. He did not
completely disregard the military, the election in 1916 hinged on a decisive strategy that would
at the very minimum silence his critics. Whether ideological, political, or both preparedness
became a policy of the federal government.
The imperialist-expansionist thread has two different angles (economics and territorial)
that merge when related to military preparedness and federalization-centralization. America’s
occupation in the acquired Spanish Territories demanded a well-equipped, well-led, and better
prepared military. Preparedness activists well-understood that American expansionism could not
continue, nor could it maintain control of their current territory. The Roosevelt Corollary
cemented this fact, since he believed America’s economic and political dominance hinged on a
strong martial entity. Again, Root’s reforms were based on this construct, and would set the
stage for federalization and centralization. Wilson’s agenda, while complicating matters, only
served as a temporary distraction. The economic turmoil caused by German transgressions,
convinced many in the financial world military readiness was indeed the posture that would best
protect American capitalist interests. Finally, the merger between imperialism-expansionism and
preparedness became official with the passage of the 1916 National Defense Act. The 1916 Act
thus becomes the culminating prerequisite for Junior ROTC’s inception and consequent growth.
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CHAPTER 4: THE BIRTH AND EVOLUTION OF JUNIOR ROTC
Now, we feel that we are not so poorly protected against invasion as some people
would have us believe. We feel that the war trust, or those who make munitions for
profit, are the most interested in this preparedness program, although they are not the
entire cause for this agitation. There are other factors. Those who are responsible, or
partly responsible at least for the continuance of the European conflict are also eager
that we prepare for what may come after that conflict in Europe may cease.
James H. Maurer, President of the Pennsylvania Federation of Labor, Hearings
before the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, January 18
through February 16th, 1916.
Introduction
Up to this point, the dissertation has outlined antecedents or prerequisites to Junior
ROTC’s inception. This chapter details the program’s beginnings and subsequent evolution over
twenty years, borne out of the preparedness movement’s resultant federalization-centralization of
the military. Unlike the first three chapters, which relied heavily on secondary sources, this
chapter introduces primary documents from the Adjutant General and Chief of Staff records
never before used when discussing Junior ROTC. In light of this fact, chapter four adds a great
deal to the scholarly record.137
The historical strain of preparedness ideology resulted in direct federal control of all
military activities manifested in the passage and implementation of the National Defense Act.
Section one, then, continues with the 1916 National Defense Act, the coup de grace of military
federalization and Junior ROTC’s founding. This discourse is inserted here to emphasize
growing nationalist and militarist tendencies in a nation divided over the military’s function.
Specific to the National Defense Act is the various forms it took prior to passage, the political
137
I am indebted to the National Archives staff whose assistance occurring in March, 2003 was
invaluable. All primary source records were obtained from Record Groups 407 and 319. Copies
have been made and are on file with the author. Full recording of these National Archives
records can be found in the bibliography.
125
posturing and the final bill itself. Senator John Hay was primarily responsible for the bill’s
passage into law, a personality discussed in some detail. Alluded to in chapter three, the
National Defense Act also bears the mark of President Wilson, who insisted that while
preparedness efforts were required as a result of international tumult, citizen control remained
somewhat intact during peacetime. The political dynamics will be discussed as they help fit the
National Defense Act into the larger picture.
Section two introduces the first of many primary sources relative to Junior ROTC’s
beginning two years. This section investigates the early process, procedures and issues.
Connectedly, initial program implementation favored military preparatory academies as they had
a Professor of Military Science and Tactics in place. Junior ROTC’s presence in public high
schools would not become significant until 1918.
Section three covers the period 1918 to 1926. Three major “events” appeared to have
facilitated Junior ROTC’s expansion into the public high schools. In 1918, a series of
amendments to the 1916 Defense Act, suspended the ROTC program in lieu of military training
in the schools. Illustrative of this point was Leavenworth High School’s (Leavenworth, Kansas)
establishment in early 1917 and its dissolution in October. Second, a 1918 memorandum by the
Chief of Staff’s office recommended a more defined program for military instruction within the
schools, called the United States Junior Reserve. Though it is unclear whether or not this
program was intended as a replacement or extension of Junior ROTC during World War I, the
obvious implications of the recommendation, as explained, set in place standards for the
program’s implementation post-World War I. Curriculum is discussed in this section, outlining
suggestions made by Corps Commanders, detailing extended course information and books
recommended for us. This section also reveals valuable descriptive statistics on Junior ROTC’s
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unit placements around the country, including general enrollment trends particular to specific
high schools and localities gathered from Corps Area Commanders memoranda. This data
permits the reader to better understand its early proliferation and growth, particularly in urbancentered high schools. Economic issues pertinent to Junior ROTC are brought to bear, as the
military as a whole experiences Congressional budget limitations, placing Junior ROTC in a
tenuous position. Nonetheless, the program remained intact, as the evidence suggests. The
growing pacifism influence on military training in the schools may have had some effect as will
be discussed in section four.
Section four explores the anti-ROTC movement and the War Department’s response
between the years 1926 and 1932. The pacifist arguments offer unique insight and historical
perspective when one compares the 1990 anti-ROTC movement. Numerous pacifist groups
began speaking at colleges and universities, causing some colleges and high schools to drop their
programs altogether. The War Department was obviously concerned and drafted a response to
help their instructors deal with the ‘menace’.
Section five briefly looks at the program from the 1930s through 1964. Descriptive
statistics are employed from the mid-1950s to show the strength of the program around the
country, its placement and general trends. The newly formed defense department created a more
organized approach than their predecessors. The census may have been taken to answer
Congressional critics and public concern following World War II. The period through 1964 is
marked by declining enrollments and large-scale disinterest of Senior ROTC, but culminated in
passage of the 1964 ROTC Vitalization Act, providing more federal control. This will be
discussed in some form here.
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I. National Defense Act: Its Passage and Junior ROTC’s Creation
The 1916 National Defense Act was ultimately a product of Wilson’s political savvy.
His concerns in early 1915 were correct. Failure to adopt preparedness as a platform was
potential political suicide. He obviously knew that he risked alienating a great deal of his party
should he come out in favor of any preparedness legislation. Thus, he was required to tread
carefully. In November of 1915, Wilson would embrace the preparedness doctrine to save his
political life and the Democratic Party new dominance. The back-pedaling, however, would
cause enormous angst among the Party’s peace activists, anti-militarists, and anti-imperialists.
Wilson did little to coax their fears, nor did he effectively work with the military planners in
drafting legislation until returning from his honeymoon in January.138
Entering the fray was Representative John Hay of Virginia, a Democratic Southern
conservative who vehemently opposed federalization. He believed the standing army concept
and the War Department’s constant legislative efforts would no doubt contribute to a dangerous
military establishment. Hay needed reigned in by Wilson for any preparedness legislation to
move forward Hay’s support was critical in that he was one of the most powerful members in
Congress chairing the House Military Affairs Committee. Additionally, gaining Hay’s
endorsement would strengthen Wilson’s position that preparedness was the right course for the
country. Hay would capitulate, but only after he received endorsement of his National Guard
plan and constant conferring with President Wilson.
Complicating matters was Secretary of War Lindlay Garrison, who by all accounts
believed in a large scale “Continental Army” volunteer plan and a significantly increased
138
There are four sources that commit scholarly effort to the National Defense Act. The
following works were very helpful: Arthur Link, Op. Cit., Vol. 4, pp. 18-52 and pp. 330-334;
John Garry Clifford, Op. Cit., pp. 129-145; and, George C. Herring, Jr.,“James Hay and the
Preparedness Controversy, 1915-1916,” The Journal of Southern History, 30 (November, 1964),
pp. 383-404.
128
Regular Army. He refused to endorse Hay’s federalized National Guard plan, believing this
would simply water down any effectiveness military leaders would have. Hay and Garrison were
constantly at odds, in part because of Garrison’s antagonistic remarks and behavior towards Hay
and other anti-military-expansionist Congressional members. During Congressional hearings on
the National Defense Act, the Secretary of War, in chorus with many other military officers,
deplored the National Guard as ineffectual. Furthermore, under Hay’s proposal the military
establishment rationalized that the National Guard could not be counted on as a solid second line
of defense should the need arise. Garrison’s frequent persistence in goading Wilson to side with
him on this particular issue generated conflict. Wilson surmised that a large-scale standing army,
especially during peacetime, flew in the face of common sense, and more importantly, would
prove politically devastating. Embracing preparedness, for Wilson, required a balanced and
thoroughly well-constructed approach, which incorporated increased citizen-soldier involvement,
and the National Guard scheme seemed the best path. Garrison would not budge, as was
evidenced by his alignment with General Leonard Wood and his multiple appearances to civic
and business group. Wilson’s willingness to compromise with Hay and other politicians on the
National Defense Act prompted Garrison’s resignation in February of 1916.139
The National Defense bill went through several manifestations before passage, but the
important work had been done: Hay recognized Wilson’s position as one of political motives that
would keep the Democrats from losing in November. Hay, in fact, sponsored the bill working
with Wilson to craft the bill’s final form. It passed the House by a significant margin. The bill
then went to Senate Conference Committee. A number of senators clamored that Hay’s
139
George C. Herring, Jr., Op. Cit., pp. 383-404; and, Chase C. Mooney and Martha E. Layman,
“Some Phases of the Compulsory Military Training Movement, 1914-1920,” The Mississippi
Valley Historical Review, 38 (March, 1952), pp. 633-656.
129
legislation did not do enough for a strong regular army establishment. Their initial revision
mandated that a continental army be established, incoporating several hundred thousand
volunteer forces. Hay was not prone to the idea, but Wilson massaged the details, calling for no
continental army structure, but instead allowing for a dramatic increase in regular army
regiments. Wilson’s revisions mollified many senators, who tended to side with preparedness
advocates, but were not strictly Rooseveltian in their prerogative. The proposed legislation kept
the National Guard intact, and several ‘citizen-soldeir’ elements were added, including an
Officer Reserve Corps, A Reserve Officer Training Corps, and a section for the military training
camps initiated by General Leonard Wood back in 1913. The act passed and was placed into
effect on June 3rd, 1916.140
Preparedness stalwarts were outraged. They announced the National Defense Act went
far from preparing the armed services. The reinforcement of the National Guard culture and what
many considered to be a weak system of centralization was the Act’s “Achilles’ heel”. Hay
quickly rebutted their arguments, stating the National Defense Act would not completely prepare
the nation for war: “It is not intended to raise an army for the purpose of possible war with
Mexico or any other power. It is intended as a peace proposition, and no man who understands
the bill or the situation can couple it with what it must be necessary to do in the event of a war
breaking out in the next few months.”141
Federalization and centralization of the military was essentially born at this moment in
American history. Granted, the Act underwent further clarifications and revisions in 1918 and
1920, a result of World War I, but it resolved many of the Constitutional questions relative to
140
George C. Herring, Jr., Op. Cit., pp. 383-404; and, John Garry Clifford, Op. Cit., pp.129-145;
and, Chase C. Mooney and Martha E. Layman, Op. Cit., pp. 633-656.
141
U.S. Congressional Record, 64th Congress, First Session, 8396; and, United States Statutes at
Large, 39, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917), pp. 167-217.
130
military implementation. Illustrative of the Act’s federalization mandates were its Regular Army
enlistment quotas and increased militia regiments, centralization of the National Guard, the
increase in financial support for equipment, uniforms, and training, and the creation of the
Officer Reserve Corps and the Reserve Officer Training Corps – including a senior and junior
division.
The issue of military strength was the first item addressed in section two of the Act. The
Regular Army could be called into service as deemed necessary, but peacetime strength was
never to exceed 175,000. The standing army enlistees were required to meet certain physical and
mental health requirements. Next, the National Guard’s function fell under federal requirements,
governance and restrictions. Previously, guardsmen could only be activated for national and state
emergencies. With this new legislation, the President was able to call the Guard up for service if
an international crisis arose, dispatching troops to foreign territory if needed. The provisions in
the act also placed federal control – both financially and in terms of training and drilling – under
the War Department’s jurisdiction. States still maintained some control in the event of
emergency, but they no longer held the same control they once had. Training and drilling of the
Guard, once held at the discretion of the states, was now under the aegis of the War Department
and the regular army, extending required training and drilling activity to 48 days per year.
Perhaps most importantly, the federal government bore the major financial burden, paying for
equipment, uniforms, officer and enlisted pay, as well as general maintenance costs. This seemed
to be a political act, placating the states’ rights contingencies, who might view federal financing
as a relief. Also created was the Officer Reserve Corps (ORC), essentially a pool of National
Guard and reserve officers who be called into service as duty required. Section twenty-four
stipulated six officer designations and succession requirements to the position of second
131
lieutenant. Third only to West Point commissions, this Officer Reserve Corps was called upon
when “vacancies in the grade of second lieutenant, created or caused by the increases due to this
Act, in any fiscal year, shall be filled by appointment.”142 Practically speaking, its creation
significantly addressed officer-enlistee ratios, especially during wartime and became a tangible
benefit during the World War II.
The 1916 National Defense Act also created the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC),
containing a senior and junior division. Its organization was designed to fill officer ranks in the
event of war, and provide for a constant flow of educated and well-trained military personnel that
pooled into the Officer Reserve Corps during peacetime. ROTC did not appear out of the blue as
some bizarre conception on Wilson’s part. It was originally conceived by Ohio State President
William O. Thompson. Thompson felt strongly that a more organized and effective military
training program within the nation’s land-grant colleges and universities needed to be in place,
strengthening the Morrill Act of 1862. He presented his idea in 1913 at the annual land-grant
schools conference. The basic outline of his program included: “Two years of military drill,
three periods per week of military instruction; strict discipline during drill periods; a week of
field training each year; and instruction in small unit tactical operation.”143 Hence, not
accidentally, the first section of the National Defense Act states, nearly verbatim, Thompson’s
plan:
“Sec. 40: The President is hereby authorized to establish and maintain in civil
educational institutions a Reserve Officers’ Training Corps, which shall consist of a
senior division organized at universities and colleges requiring four years of
collegiate study for a degree, including State universities and those state institutions
that are required to provide military tactics under the provisions of the Act of
Congress of July second, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, donating lands for the
142
United States Statutes at Large, Op. Cit., p.182.
143
Arthur Coumbe and Lee Harford, Op. Cit., p. 14.
132
establishment of colleges where the leading object shall be practical instruction in
agriculture and the mechanic arts, including military tactics, and a junior division
organized at all other public or private educational institutions, except that the units
of the senior division may be organized at those essentially military schools which
do not confer an academic degree but which, as a result of the annual inspections of
such institutions by the War Department, are specially designated the Secretary of
War as qualified for units of the senior division, and each division shall consist of
units of the several arms or corps in such number and of such strength as the
President may prescribe.”144
As defined in the act, sections forty through fifty-one deal specifically with the
organization, curriculum, oversight and function of ROTC. Section forty-one provided the
President with authority to establish multiple units at institutions and ensure the presence of a
Professor of Military Science and Tactics (PMS and T), who was responsible for instruction,
organization, and maintenance of government issued goods. Section forty-two officially
authorized the President and War Department to establish Junior ROTC units. Both the college
and high school programs were required to ensure a PMS and T would teach or was being
commissioned to their location prior to officially starting the unit. High schools were required to
maintain a roster of no fewer than “one hundred physically fit male students”. Moreover, both
senior and junior units were to follow a mandated curriculum prescribed by the Secretary of War.
Schools, however, were permitted to forgo the curriculum in lieu of requiring three hours of
military training and drilling per week. Failure to do one or the other would result in revocation
of the unit charter. Section forty-four required all ROTC cadets to be United States citizens, to
be no less than fourteen years of age and to be physically fit. PMS and T selection was covered
under sections forty-five and forty-six. Professors could either be retired or active military
personnel, but were not to possess rank higher than colonel. Additionally, the consent of active
officers was required during peacetime, but if at war, the President held commissioning rights
that mandated their re-activation, should he so choose. Retired officers had the opportunity to
144
United States Statutes at Large, Op. Cit., p. 191.
133
accept or decline a ROTC commission whether at peace or war. Section forty-six permitted the
use of animals, arms, munitions, books and uniforms furnished at government expense, though
each school was obligated to submit a bond for the issuance of equipment. Section forty-eight, in
line with General Wood’s summer camp program, required ROTC cadets to attend a six week
training camp during their summer vacations. Military drilling and training, additional study,
and other activities as defined by the War Department were to take place. Lastly, sections fortynine through fifty-one specified the commissioning process. Junior division cadets were given a
commission, but only once they reached twenty-one years of age. The commission, upon their
graduation, would be ten years.145
The 1916 National Defense Act, even more than the 1903 Dick Act, solidified the role of
the federal government in military matters. While not necessarily meeting the needs of many
preparedness advocates, America’s success in World War I hinged on its presence. As Hay
indicated, the Act was not intended for war, but peacetime military activities. Nonetheless, it laid
important foundational tools for military readiness.
The military would not reap the benefits of ROTC – in either division – until after World
War I. One last point needs to be made clear. The brilliance and constitutionality in forming
ROTC was emanated from one existing piece of legislation – the 1862 Morrill Act, which
required military training and instruction at all state colleges and universities. ROTC, then, was
145
Ibid., pp.191-194. It appears that this four year waiting period for junior division cadets, was a
method which fed the senior programs at colleges and universities maintaining a program. There
are no valid evidentiary sources to lead to this conclusion, but the assumption seems appropriate.
A specific reference should be made here regarding General Leonard Wood’s Plattsburg
Movement. While Wood was not well-liked by Hay and other members of the House, his
Plattsburg Training Camp effort, embodied under the Military Training Camps Association, was
provided for in the National Defense Act under Section 54. The MTCA won a major battle in
securing this section. Financial assistance, equipment, and other items were provided by the
United States Government.
134
the government’s method of centralizing training and drilling on college campuses and high
schools.146
II. Junior ROTC: The First Two Years: 1916 to 1918, World War I and Formative Challenges
By 1916, Junior ROTC, or the junior division as it was more frequently addressed, had
yet to be formally organized. Dr. Arthur Coumbe and Lee Harford’s initial assertion is partially
correct that program implementation was problematic. The program floundered in its first two
years, but this was understandable considering World War I was imminent, not to mention the
War Department was obligated to draw up articles of incorporation. The United States’ entry
basically depleted noncommissioned and commissioned officer resources, leaving few if any
officers to assume the position of PMS and T.
According to Dr. Arthur Coumbe and Lee Harford, prior to World War I only one public
high school, Leavenworth High School, Leavenworth, Kansas was documented to have been in
operation. There has been much ado about the Leavenworth High School in Kansas being the
first and only public high school that operated a Junior ROTC unit. However, the Kamehameha
Schools in Honolulu, Hawaii applied for and received permission to begin a Junior Reserve
program in early 1917 as well. Perhaps they were not officially counted, because of Hawaii’s
status. Regardless, the point is made that only a couple public schools were operating units
between 1916 and 1917. The remaining schools with operating units were what the War
Department labeled ‘Essentially Military Schools’. These schools consisted of state and private
military preparatory academies mentioned in chapter two. These were typically non-degree
granting institutions, though a handful of preparatory military academies offered a high school
diploma upon graduation. Academy cadets continued training at a United States military
146
Arthur Coumbe and Lee Harford, Op. Cit., p. 14.
135
academy installation, or enlisted for service. In contrast, most public schools at first had their
applications declined. War Department officials cited two main reasons as is evidenced by this
letter from Adjutant General W.T. Johnson:
“On account of the uncertain conditions existing on the border, it is not practicable to
any at present just how soon officers be detailed to public high schools and to private
schools, but it (sic) will not be practicable to extend the Reserve Officers’ Training
Corps into such schools during the school year 1916-17, except ones where the
authorities of the school succeed in securing a retired officer of the Regular Army
who is willing to accept a detail to the school on active duty status.”147
The War Department was willing, however to provide arms and equipment, since under War
Department regulations, schools could apply for these to continue with military training.
The previous October, Chief of Staff H.L. Scott informed Adjutant General W.T.
Johnson that there simply were not enough officers to meet demands of the various schools, and
deal with the rising international conflicts. Pancho Villa’s rampage and the imminence of World
War I simply took precedence. Obviously, there was concern that by denying schools the
‘privilege’ of having a Junior ROTC interest would quickly die off. Throwing a bone to the
public high schools in the form of armaments, uniforms, and other supplies as provided in the
National Defense Act, was a way in which to keep them connected to the program.148
147
Letter from Adjutant General W.T. Johnson, Washington, D.C., to Principal J.E. Lemon, Blue
Island, Illinois, November 3rd, 1916. See also, Arthur Coumbe and Lee Harford, Op. Cit., pp.
257-259; and, Michael S. Neiberg, Op. Cit., pp. 22-29. For more on the Leavenworth High
School Junior ROTC, see http://leavenworthjrotc.tripod.com/homepage/id1.html. In a
conversation with a staff member of Army Cadet Command in April 2001, there was a great deal
of insistence from Leavenworth High School cadets theirs was indeed the first and only in
operation. The web link takes readers directly to their history.
148
Memorandum to Adjutant General H.P. McCaid, the Chief of Staff, October, 1916. Between
July 1916 and through 1917, numerous schools had made application for establishment. The
Detroit Public Schools was used to establish a precedent in declining Junior ROTC programs in
public high schools. Mainly, these programs were either too small to warrant an officer, as in the
case of Alameda Public High Schools, and too large to accommodate the student-cadets as in the
case of the Gainesville Public schools. Letter from Principal George C. Thompson, Alameda,
CA, to Adjutant General Henry P. McCaid, Washington, D.C. March 23rd, 1917; and, Letter
from Superintendent O.R. Anderson, Gainesville, TX, to The Adjutant General’s Office,
Washington, D.C., October 9th, 1916. Both men were responded to with the same letter of denial.
136
The military academies, then, were the initial experimental ground for Junior ROTC.
These ‘Essentially Military Schools’ naturally had the means to nurture a Junior ROTC program.
They usually had in their employ a Professor of Military Science and Tactics. Classroom space,
outdoor drilling areas, and storage facilities for munitions were also common features. Moreover,
graduates moved on to some form of academy training after their preparatory experience, and in
the opinion of the War Department, offered a ready reserve of men in case of war. Preparatory
academies such as the Harvard School, Los Angeles California and Culver Military Academy
were among the first schools with a Junior ROTC. In addition, schools like Culver applied for
junior and senior divisions, as it provided instruction at the secondary and post-secondary
level.149
In view of the fact that the majority of Junior ROTC units were placed in military
academies, the basic curriculum emphasized drilling, tactical training, and physical fitness.
Additional attention was paid to training young cadets in the handling of weapons, battle
formations (trench warfare training was not uncommon) and uniform care. The already
formulated academy curriculum also provided quick relief for War Department officials who
would be burdened with creation of a new curriculum in ROTC units. Discussed in the next
For more information regarding United States military involvement and Pancho Villa, see
Friedrich Katz, “Pancho Villa and the Attack on Columbus, New Mexico,” The American
Historical Review, 83 (February, 1978), pp. 101-130; and, Jeff Jore, “Pershing's Mission in
Mexico: Logistics and Preparation for the War in Europe,” Military Affairs, 52 (July, 1988),
pp.117-121.
149
Letter from the Headmaster (The Harvard School Military Academy), Los Angeles, CA, to
The Commanding General Western Department, March 1, 1917; and, Letter from Superintendent
Colonel L.R. Gignilliat (Culver Military Academy), Culver, IN, to The Adjutant General’s
Office, Washington, D.C., October 10, 1916. In a Letter from Superintendent C.S. Roller
(Augusta Military Academy), Fort Defiance, Virginia, to The Adjutant General’s Office,
Washington, D.C., July 12, 1916 requesting a Junior ROTC, he was informed that a unit could
not be immediately placed because War Department regulations had not been finalized. The
academy eventually did obtain a unit.
137
section, a set curriculum specific to the ROTC came about as the program gained the War
Department’s attention following World War I. An apparent answer to preparedness and pacifist
critics, 1916 and 1917 also saw the publication of tracts and books promoting and justifying
youth military training. L.R. Gignilliat, Superintendent of Culver Military Academy in Culver,
Indiana authored a book titled Arms and the Boy. Published in 1916, Gignilliat outlined the
various types of schools and training that occurred within them. He made mention of both
“Essentially Military Training Schools” and high school training. He further rationalized two
benefits afforded to high school students participating in military training programs: citizenship
and moral training, would aid young boys in their maturation. Chapter thirteen explicated
Gignilliat’s views on citizenship. The superintendent stated that, “educators are agreed that a
lack of respect for authority is our greatest national defect. We see evidence of it
everywhere…anything that tends to overcome this defect, certainly lays the groundwork for
more useful and effective citizenship.” 150 He continued, indicating moral training was another
useful benefit, instilling honesty, right living and thinking, and development of will power. Later
on in the chapter, he challenged former Harvard President Dr. Eliot’s objections regarding high
school military training. Eliot argued military training instilled in student’s the concept of ‘blind
obedience.’ Gignilliat responded that while other countries may adhere to that, America’s
democratic processes countered such effects. Another piece, written by W.S. Jesein, appeared in
the Bureau of Education’s 1917 annual report. He investigated on the junior reserve components
in various countries, including Germany, France, Russia and Great Britain. The report clearly
150
L.R. Gignilliat, Arms and the Boy, (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1916), pp.
18-40 and 112-126.
138
sided with the benefits of youth military training, and added a uniquely international comparative
perspective to the rhetoric.151
The effort to offer military training for as many young men as possible continued with a
brochure titled The Junior Plattsburg Camp: Long Point, on Lake Champlain. Its apparent
replication of ROTC training caused a furor within the War Department, but more important was
the brochure’s assertion that military training for young men should occur during the summer
vacations. Advertising for the summer of 1917, brochure contents stated that training lasted sixty
days, held high above the waterline and was in close proximity to Plattsburg. The brochure also
assured potential campers “the routine will be temperate and will not attempt the impossible. To
train without strain will be watch-word.”152 Publications such as these highlighted the need to
convince the general public regarding youth military training’s vital importance for national
security and defense.
Though not true of every tract released during the period, these particular publications
also point to the growing need for young men in the military, an obvious result of America’s
entrance in World War I. Following the armistice, Junior ROTC would gain a foothold in the
public schools.153
151
W.S. Jesien, Military Training of Youths of School Age in Foreign Countries, Bulletin 17, 25.
(Washington, Government Printing Office, 1917), pp. 1-35.
152
The Junior Plattsburg, Inc. The Junior Plattsburg: Long Point, On Lake Champlain. (Brochure
publication, n.p., n.d.).
153
World War I had essentially tapped the ROTC and ORC. No amount of enticement would fill
the numbers. Though occurring a year later, the need for interested young men to fill enlisted
and officer positions is exemplified by Congress’ establishment of the Students’ Army Training
Corp in 1918. It served as a conduit for both volunteers and draftees. “The object of
establishing units of the Students’ Army Training Corps is to utilize effectively the plant,
equipment, and organization of the colleges for selecting and training officer candidates and
technical experts for service in the existing emergency. For more on this, see War Department
Special Regulations, No. 103, Student Army Training Corps Regulations, (Washington
Government Printing Office, 1918).
139
III. 1918 to 1925
Junior ROTC had struggled in large part because the country had larger military
priorities. At the end of fiscal year 1918, approximately 119 civil education institutions were
operating ROTC units, and of that number approximately twenty were junior division units
housed predominantly in military academies. Furthermore, in 1918, most ROTC units were
disestablished or placed in a hold status via amendments to the 1916 National Defense Act. The
amended versions suspended sections forty-six and forty seven, recalling many PMS and Ts. The
President, however, was permitted to utilize them in training large cohorts of young men.
Military training was strongly encouraged for public schools, and mandated for all institutions
required to conduct military training. The War Department was provided additional money so
that equipment and officer resources could be allocated accordingly in conducting massive war
training efforts. By 1919, the number reportedly climbed only slightly to thirty, but by-and-large
the first units were located at the “Essentially Military Schools.”154
One of the ways in which the evidence pointed to the presence of junior divisions in
predominantly military schools was the distinguished and honor school recognition. The honors
program was implemented by the War Department staff in an effort to acknowledge schools who
had achieved the highest levels of efficiency and training. In 1917, after a full year of operation,
ten schools with junior division programs were awarded the ‘Honor Schools’ designation, all of
which were military academies. 1918 and 1919 continued the trend. The War Department’s
154
War Department, Annual Reports, 1918, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1919), pp. 184-189; United States Statutes at Large, 40, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1919), pp. 531-532; and, Army General Orders 49, September 20, 1916. The numbers
here are somewhat misleading. An accurate census of all programs later on, provides more
consistent numbers and demographic data.
140
orders also allowed honor school cadets to be nominated for induction into the United States
Military Academy, in addition to wearing a gold or silver star while at their unit detachment.155
General preparedness efforts resulted in large numbers of trained officers during World
War I, and these first junior division units most likely contributed to the corps. Without the
amended version of the National Defense Act, it may have been impossible to train and deploy
the number of troops needed. Junior ROTC as predominantly high school program was not far
from the minds of War Department officials, however. High schools, perhaps responding to the
massive patriotism, had sent numerous applications to establish units. Recognition of this fact
surfaced in a six-page memorandum-proposal dated October 8th, 1918 from Brigadier General
Lytle E. Brown. The proposal suggested incorporating a United States Junior Reserve. While it is
unclear whether this plan was enacted, Brown’s proposed United States Junior Reserve plan
appeared to have become the model for Junior ROTC’s inclusion in public high schools.
The Committee of Education and Special Training was “empowered” by General Orders
15, 1918. Brown’s memorandum outlined “a plan developed by the Committee of Education and
Special Training for the preparation and training of a serviceable body of young men over 16 in
secondary schools, by organizing them for military instruction under the supervision of the War
Department.”156 Brown cited the ineffective War Department efforts toward establishing a
greater Junior ROTC presence, when he noted “the War Department has thus far not put in effect
any well considered and constructive scheme for making effective the energies of youths of this
155
War Department, Annual Reports, 1918, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1919), pp. 184-189; War Department, Annual Reports, 1920, (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1921), pp. 260-263; Memorandum from Acting Chief of Staff Tasher Bliss, to
The Adjutant General of the Army, August 7, 1917; and, Memorandum from Assistant Chief of
Staff Lytle Brown, to The Adjutant General of the Army, June 12, 1919.
156
Memorandum from Brigadier General Lytle Brown, to Chief of Staff, October 8, 1918, pp.1-6.
The content of this memorandum deserves extended attention. I have included a large number of
quotes to support my point that Junior ROTC was officially designed from this communiqué.
141
age.”157 The Student Army Training Corps, a special organization designed to increase training
and recruitment efforts now on college campuses had filled the enlistment need for men over
eighteen years old. However, Brown exhorted, “what shall be done concerning the boys over
sixteen not in collegiate institutions?”158 He rationalized that young men between the ages of
sixteen and eighteen were plagued by ‘uncertainty and unrest’ contributing to inefficiency in
schools, and would be best served preparing themselves while in school to matters important to
national duty. By making clear his role and purpose, the student would understand his obligation
both to his country, his school, and his community.
“In this period of general unrest on the part of young men, it is of the utmost
importance to prevent an unnecessary interruption of their school studies by making
clear to every young American his National duty, viz: (sic) to prepare himself in
mind and body for service to the country. He must be educated to the point of view
that the weight of the world problems bears upon us and our allies during and after
the war; that all must serve and help to solve these problems; that he has a definite
part and duty to perform, namely, to improve his physical and general fitness while
waiting for the call to the colors, and to perform such definite service for the
Government during this period as he may be qualified for. The plan must be based
on the principle that preparation and service go hand in hand (sic) and are equally his
duty…better education, physical development, and for an addition to the industrial
power of the country (emphasis mine).”159
The committee proposed that mandatory Junior Reserve units and military units be organized in
all secondary schools. Participation was voluntary, requiring potential cadets and parents to sign
a permission slip, but it was understood that school personnel should encourage participation.
Physical and elementary military training, academic and technical schooling, and national
service in industry and agriculture, comprised the program’s three ‘phases’.
157
Brigadier General Lytle Brown, Op. Cit., p.1 The National Defense Act as amended on April
17, 1918 ‘provided a limited amount of federal assistance’ to secondary schools.
158
Ibid.
159
Ibid.
142
The Junior Reserve was to be subdivided into three groups, paralleling the three phases.
The first group consisted of a “cadet section” at military academies where junior and senior
ROTC divisions were in operation. Group two was designated as the ‘Technical Section’. These
were vocational or ‘Manual Training’ high schools. As Brown indicated, there was a severe
shortage of skilled labor thus requiring “a cooperative plan (that) will undoubtedly meet with the
approval of the industrial establishments”.160 The third group was labeled the ‘academic section’.
It encompassed all other secondary schools, private and public.
No school would be considered which could not contribute a minimum of seventy-five
young men above the age of sixteen. Ten hours per week of training and drilling was required, or
six hours minimally devoted to physical training, and four hours to ‘theoretical instruction’.
Student-cadets, regardless of their track (military academy, technical high school, or academic),
would attend an annual six-week summer camp, expanding on the skills they had learned
throughout the year, cross-training in other specialty areas. Instructors included former officers
of the National Guard, “discharged for physical and other reasons not due to inefficiency”,
Canadian officers, Plattsburg graduates, and trained men from the Students’ Army Training
Corps. Finally, the only equipment required was a rifle (at government expense) and uniforms (at
student expense).161
The program’s goal was the enlistment of two hundred and fifty thousand young men
upon their graduation from high school or preparatory academy. Though it does not appear to
have been implemented in its entirety, the United States Junior Reserve proposal, as evidenced
later, may have provided the building blocks for a more comprehensive program and detailed
160
Ibid., pp. 2-3
161
Ibid., pp. 3-5
143
prospectus that expedited Junior ROTC’s presence and purpose in the nation’s secondary schools
following World War I.
The end of World War I marked a new era in American history. The horrendous carnage
and toll on American lives had in many ways prompted preparedness advocates to speak out
about the sheer lack in training. For all of its stipulations, the 1916 National Defense Act was
still a peacetime proposition. The aftermath of the war, departmental reorganizations, and
passage of the 1920 National Defense Act generated a marked shift in War Department policies
towards Junior ROTC. The 1920 Act gave the War Department increased flexibility and
authority for public school incorporation. Section forty authorized the Secretary of War to
“prescribe standard courses of theoretical and practical military training” in all schools.162
162
United States Statutes at Large, 41, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1921), pp. 776778. Following the First World War, American military prowess had been proved. It was an
effective pinch-hitter, and the military establishment seemed assured of its continued expansion.
The American public had different notions. Wilson pronounced that this “would be the war to
end all wars” was being followed through by his work in creating the League of Nations. Men
were flocking home in hopes to regain a sense of normalcy. As a result, Congress authorized
their typical postwar reductions. Further debate raged pertaining to military expansion. And
Congress, always in the midst of the fray, wobbled constantly in an attempt to appease all
involved parties. The Interwar Period is marked by two significant issues. First, significant
debate resurfaced about the competence of an all-volunteer Army. Though their fighting was
often stellar, two camps emerged which placed the volunteer in the middle. Uptonians versus
Palmerians were two camps of officers within the Army divided over the issue of whether
professional, mercenary type order (Uptonian) trumped the value of the citizen soldier
(Palmerian). Palmerians won the day, as they saw the citizen soldier, fighting as warranted but
only when called to service, as the vanguard of democracy. There were two concerns Congress
had with the Uptonian view. First, a largely expanded professional Army in a time of peace
would do severe damage to the notion of fiscal responsibility and mood of peace. Second, states’
rights and the importance of democratic controls seemed to supercede the idea of a professional
Army that could, if used incorrectly, become a force of tyranny. Congress recognized, however,
that officers had played as vital role as citizens. A compromise was in order, but one favoring the
Palmerian view. The military should have the capability to mobilize quickly and fall under
federal controls should situations arise. But, the system of a National Guard controlled by the
state was essential. The teeth of needed for mobilization and implementation came in the form of
the National Defense Act of 1920. The act provided for citizen control – officers and enlistees at
the state level, but added the professional reserve component to aid in the perpetuation of a
professional component. Again, a system of checks and balances was put into place! The act also
allowed not only for the mobilization of troops, but also for wartime industries by establishing
the conversion of steel, auto and textile plants for purposes of war. The military-industrial
complex is born.
144
Similar to the 1916 Act, schools were required to devote at least three hours per week for
military instruction or adopt the Secretary of War’s prescribed curriculum. Moreover, schools
desiring ROTC designation had to make ROTC a prerequisite for high school or college
graduation. School’s failing to abide by these standards would lose their designation or would
not be considered at the time of application. Section forty of the Act also clarified ROTC school
classifications. Land-grant institutions and “Essentially Military Schools” were classified as
senior units. Junior units, then, were “organized at all other public and private educational
institutions and shall consist of units of the several arms, corps, or services…and, no unit shall be
below one hundred physically fit male students, except in the case of cavalry or artillery”163
Recognizing the hardship requiring all high schools desiring ROTC programs to oblige
themselves to military instruction as a prerequisite for graduation, section fifty-five, part c, was
added. This alleviated the strictures of section forty, and instead provided equipment, training
manuals, and officer-instructors for all schools able to maintain the interest of at least one
hundred, physically fit male students. Public schools, junior colleges, normal schools, trade
schools, and private schools began operating junior division units in force and the War
Department initiated efforts to determine what ‘civil educational institutions’ best met conditions
for Junior ROTC units that could function under the new provision. In a memorandum by
Brigadier General William Lassiter, he confirmed the process:
“…means should be taken to extend the number of schools operating under the
provisions of Section 55c, National Defense Act. Recommendations will be made for
the advancement of the training in the latter schools and to increase the number that
will conduct such training. Military training in accordance with Special Regulations
45 is believed to be best adapted to public schools as it places the obligation for its
163
Ibid., p. 777. In the case of artillery or cavalry regiments, a minimum of fifty students was
required. There is still some confusion that exists based on the evidence. Junior division units
and senior units sometimes seemed confused with Senior ROTC and Junior ROTC. This may be
indicative of the time and the language used.
145
control and maintenance primarily on upon the community, rather than the
Government. The school officials exercise a maximum degree of supervision of its
administration and the parents provide the uniforms, both of which are wholesome
conditions and conducive to the permanency of such training.”164
By 1923, Junior ROTC units in the form of 55c units and officially designated Junior Divisions
under section forty were established throughout the country. Regulations, curriculum and myriad
policies were in development in response to the swelling demand. Even with demobilization and
drastic Congressional budget cuts which reduced the number of available officers and briefly
halted Junior ROTC expansion at the end of fiscal year 1921, it was apparent that junior units
had begun operating with greater intensity and schools were requesting units with continued
vigor.165
In November 1921, the first real evidence in the Adjutant General records of junior
division incorporation in the public schools materialize as honor high school designations during
the summer 1922 for the previous 1921 school year (it also is believed the first year honor high
schools were introduced). The initial list included Arsenal Technical High School and
Indianapolis Public Schools (Indianapolis, IN), Council Bluffs High School, (Council Bluffs,
IA), Dallas High School (Dallas, TX), Englewood High School (Chicago, IL), Gloucester High
164
Memorandum from Brigadier William Lassiter, to Adjutant General of the Army, September
30, 1921. The memo specifically addresses the budgetary cuts and demobilization effort,
requesting that military schools’ stay in contact with the War Department regarding training and
instruction. Williams also stated: “Due to the limited amount of funds appropriated by Congress
for this fiscal year, and to the scarcity of personnel due to the recent reduction of the Regular
Army, no additional junior units of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps can be established
during the remainder of the fiscal year. For specific mention of demobilization efforts, see War
Department, Annual Reports, 1920, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1921), pp.
263-265; and, Roswell P. Barnes, Militarizing Our Youth: The Significance of the Reserve
Officers’ Training Corps in our Schools and Colleges, (New York: Committee on Militarism in
Education, 1927), p. 41.
165
Memorandum from Acting Chief of Staff R.H. Williams, to All Military Schools, November
23, 1921; Memorandum from Assistant Adjutant General L.S. Carson, to Fourth Corps Area,
Fort McPherson, Georgia, November 2nd, 1921.
146
School (Gloucester, MA), Knoxville High Schools, (Knoxville, TN), Lake View High School
(Chicago, IL), Northern High School (Detroit, MI), Pasadena High School, (Pasadena, CA),
Rockford High School (Rockford, IL), and the Gary High Schools (Gary, IN).166 Honor high
schools were to appear in War Department memorandum, though it is not immediately known if
attending cadets received any specific benefit.
Increased high school units also meant that a curriculum needed construction. In
September of 1921, recommendations were made to incorporate a systematized program of
instruction in both high school and college units. The effort appears to have made the ROTC
curriculum the same for both divisions, with topics and subjects outlined by essential content
area (see Appendix A, Table 1).
The curricular recommendations reflected the wishes of Corps Commanders and PMS
and Ts that theoretical instruction be limited to the third and fourth years, whereas infantry
tactics, drilling, discipline and physical fitness be present all four years. The recommended
primary text for classroom instruction, which paralleled the subject outline, was Paul Stanley
Bond and E.B. Garey’s The ROTC Training Manual: A Textbook for the Reserve Officer
Training Corps. Those students who successfully completed the first two years, were given
“detailed certificates as to the subjects covered, signed by a school official and the professor of
military science and tactics.” Under the 1920 National Defense Act guidelines, cadets desiring to
166
Memorandum from Adjutant General H.H. Tabutts, to Publication Division of the War
Department, July 24, 1922; Memorandum from Adjutant General R.S. Kimball, to Publication
Division of the War Department, November 23, 1923. I found no evidence existed in the
Adjutant General file or War Department Reports specifying particular enrollment numbers prior
to 1923. Hence, I relied on these honor high school designations. In addition, policies relevant to
honor high schools permitted only 7% of schools to be named honor schools, indicating there
were approximately 70 units in operation at the time, but this needs further investigation. In
1923, a series of memoranda were disseminated reiterating from past years the outlined
requirements needed to obtain the honor high school designation, in addition how the process
functioned. Memorandum from Major General C.G. Morton, to the Office of the Corps Area
Commander, May 21, 1923.
147
serve could do so at the age of twenty-one. After completing a loyalty oath, they could be
commissioned for five years. Student-cadets, depending on their competency and test scores,
were also permitted to forgo some senior division training. Logically, the program seemed
structured to allow junior division cadets matriculation into senior division units. 167
The curriculum and subject outline underwent another set of recommended revisions in
August of 1923. A board of officers was convened to review a new set of army special
regulations, related to the ROTC and military training. The board suggested three main
modifications. First, the board thought the War Department should integrate the United States
Constitution “bringing out especially defense sections be made a part of the course of study in all
units.” Furthermore, curriculum decisions, including the subject breakdown, needed left to the
individual institutions. Second, the board concurred that Paul Stanley Bond and E.B. Garey’s
text be continued, though it would need annual modifications. Third, and finally, the topic
dealing with issuance of uniforms and equipment was addressed. Government issued uniforms,
rations of canned meats, canteens, condiments, haversacks, and the like would be provided in
limited quantities of fifty to each junior unit.
The curriculum modifications and implementation of honor high school criteria were
essential elements which pointed to the program’s expansion. This expansion led to a census of
the Nine Corps areas (military management districts) conducted in 1923 in an effort to determine
the total number of units. Due to the geographic layout, there was curiosity as to whether units
167
The Adjutant General’s Office, Schools: General Instructions and Suggestions, September 6,
1921; and, Arthur Coumbe and Lee Harford, Op. Cit., pp. 257-258. At the end of the document,
various texts are cited. See, Paul Stanley Bond and E.B. Garey, Op. Cit., ad passim; Bernard
Lentz, The Cadence System of Teaching Close Order Drill and Exhibition Drills, (Menasha, WI:
George Banta Pub. Co., 1919, 1918), ad passim; William Henry Waldron, Platoon Training, 2
volumes, (Washington: United States Infantry Association, 1921), ad passim; and, David Carey
Shanks, Management of the American Soldier, (Fort Armstrong, TH: U.S. Army Printing Plant,
1918), ad passim
148
should or could be combined. Included in correspondences by PMS and Ts and Corps
Commanders were travel distances between schools, and in most cases the city, the number and
names of high schools, and the total number of students enrolled in the program. The results as
compiled, show a pattern of implementation (see Appendix B, Table 1).
There are a few noteworthy items to mention from the above table. First, ROTC units
were located principally within large public school districts. Chicago, San Francisco, Atlanta,
Dallas, and Los Angeles had the largest student concentration in any given area, with Chicago
having the highest at 5,371. Ironically, New York City public schools, of which eighteen boys’
high schools existed and the most populous area in 1923 is the only exception. According to a
letter from New York Public School Board of Education statistician Eugene Nifenecker, military
training in all schools was dismantled after the war since the national requirement no longer
existed. Secondly, technical schools experienced some of the highest proportions in relation to
the other public high schools in the area. The data with regard to technical schools are murky,
since some school PMS and T’s or Corps Commanders offered extended information on their
particular schools, while others simply provided the minimum information required. In general,
an approximate one-to-two ratio of public school cadets to technical trade school cadets existed.
Technical, trade, or vocational schools provided a large number of students with industrial skills
that proved helpful in military operations – mechanics, phone operations, metallurgy, and a
variety of other beneficial technical trades, thus logical deduction would dictate the trend.168
168
Aaron Benavot, “The Rise and Decline of Vocational Education,” Sociology of Education, 56
(April, , 1983), pp. 63-76; David L. Angus and Jeffrey E. Mirel, The Failed Promise of the
American High School, 1890-1995, (New York: Teachers College Press, 1999), Ch. 2; and
David H. Parker, “The Talent at Its Command: The First World War and the Vocational Aspect
of Education, 1914-39,” History of Education Quarterly, 35 (Autumn, 1995), pp. 237-259.
Vocational education was federally supported by the Smith-Hughes Act in 1917. Public Schools
adopted vocational school training in part for the federal dollars, industry money and in response
to Progressive Era activists who argued schools had become to lofty in their goals of ‘classically’
educating students.
149
Jim Crow and Junior ROTC was also prevalent as observed in the above data. It was
evidenced in brief notations by Corps Commanders and PMS and Ts. The segregated units,
mainly located in southern school districts (but also in Nebraska and Missouri), made specific
mention as to which schools were “white” and those that were “colored”. One letter made
particular reference to the race issue. A Nashville, Tennessee communiqué to Adjutant General
Robert Whitfield stated as such in a special addendum to the census form:
“There are three schools at Nashville, Hume-Fogg, Colored H.S., and at the edge of the
city limits the County H.S. Public opinion is unfavorable toward military training in the
colored high school. The ROTC could be extended to include the County H.S. on the
assignment of additional personnel.”169
Throughout the south, including Texas, Alabama, and Tennessee, segregation of the high schools
often meant no establishment or no mention of Junior ROTC. Washington, D.C., in the third
corps area, was the exception, as it permitted units and training, but most of the African
American cadets were in band or special units. There is no way to be clear what the situation was
like in the northern and far western regions, since no remarks as to the color or segregation of
units were made. 170 These numbers and their location reinforce that Junior ROTC was
169
Internal Memorandum to Adjutant General Robert Whitfield, November 22, 1923.
170
Jim Crow, empowered by the 1896 Plessy versus Ferguson Supreme Court decision, barred or
limited African Americans service in the military. Separate-but-Equal, the damning decision in
1896 by the Supreme Court seemed to sanction everything from colored bathrooms to lynching.
There was no such thing as equal, and for African American veteran and citizen alike, the time
had come to stand up as a group and unflinchingly demand a new society. The rise of the
NAACP in 1909 (initially the Niagra Movement) began the process and would become over the
next fifty years the critical organ of change for the black community. Justice still elusive, many
blacks continued to look for employment throughout the country and the military, for many had,
at least for a short time, lost its appeal. After Roosevelt’s behavior, African American citizens
left the Republican Party in droves. Many joined the Democrats in the North, though their
allegiance would not fully evolve until Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s administration. Eventually,
the country, including black veterans and civilians saw the winds of war blowing in their
direction. Soon, the call would be upon all Americans to fight for democracy. Always loyal and
looking for an opportunity to prove their abilities, African Americans heeded that call. When
war was declared on April 2nd, 1917, African Americans enlisted in large numbers.
Unfortunately, due to the pathetic educational and social conditions, many were illiterate and
poorly trained. This would serve as a hindrance to their active participation in the war, forcing a
150
great deal of them to be subjugated to low-ranking positions relegated to mess duty or labor.
Most would never see combat, or for that matter officer positions. One prominent African
American West Point graduate, Charles C. Young (also a Buffalo Soldier) determined to start a
school “entirely on his own to prepare black enlisted men for officer training” reasoning that the
war and need for black officers to lead troops would be enormous. Woodrow Wilson and the
War Department felt otherwise and demanded he shut down the school. Further, they denied
Young any units of his own and denied officer positions to blacks. However, at even though the
First World War’s black battalions would be led by white officers, there were a great number
eventually commissioned (see below). More discrimination came on April 24th, 1917 when the
War Department announced blacks would not be accepted for enlistments.The NAACP and
various elements of the black press were outraged. The obvious hypocrisy, fighting a war for the
sake of democracy, was slung back at the Wilson administration. Few of their plights were to be
heard, and soon, as need replaced desire, the War Department reversed the order as thousands of
troops were dying in battle. Similar to past efforts, African Americans proved their worth in
more ways than one. More blacks were certified than whites upon enlistment for “out of every
100 colored citizens called, 36 were certified (for service) and 64 were rejected, exempted, or
discharged; whereas, out of every 100 white citizens called, 25 were certified and 75 were
rejected, exempted, or discharged.” It is important to add, however, that the number of blacks
eventually was so high that it was disproportionate to the 13% general population. This can be
read one of two ways (and Vietnam would see this debate resurface): the military often typically
recruited an amount proportionate or less than the general population. If blacks were being
enlisted in larger numbers, the questioned came up: is it truly an effort on the part of the military
to exercise equality or was it a disregard for the lives of African Americans. The question would
not be resolved until 1967. Charles Young’s initial dream of training black officers came to
fruition, but its effectiveness was debatable. In Fort Des Moines, Iowa, Major Charles C. Ballou
began the camp to train and commission black officers, incorporating a staff of 12 officers from
West Point were present as were a crew of regular Army non-commissioned black officers, and
few officers were activated during the war effort. Outcry throughout the South caused a great
deal of racist acts, as well. Additionally, while these positions were given, there was no rank
above captain. None of these officers would lead troops into battle. World War I was as much an
exposure of American racism as anything else. Blacks did serve valiantly. But, unfortunately, the
most notable part of the period was the rampant racism. Training for black enlistees was
humiliating. The military officials forced them to sleep in tents without any bedding or flooring,
while the white troops had barracks; whites also were recipients of intensive military training,
but all blacks, whatever their education, were given labor duties. At Camp Logan, in Texas one
of the most tragic events occurred. The 24th infantry (a black-designated unit) had endured a
great deal of overtly racist acts. When one the soldiers went to the aid of a beaten black woman
in town, he too, was beaten severely. The black soldiers retaliated by marching on the Houston
Police department. A brawl ensued and a number of whites were killed. Thirteen of the black
infantry, as a result of tainted evidence, were sentenced to death, while forty one others were
sentenced to life in prison. The 92nd and 93rd Divisions were activated near the tail end of the
war. Their heroics saved a number of white troops in the heat of battle. Yet, false reports of
cowardice (when whites were actually the ones fleeing battle) surfaced, placing a blemish on the
troops. As heinous was the practice of placing black troops, on the way to serve, in the hull of
the ship while white servicemen were permitted above the hull of the ship. This subjected the
black men to be the first casualties of German U-Boat attacks. In 1920, the damning report “Use
to be Made of Negroes in the U.S. Military Service” made the following observations: “As an
individual the negro is docile, tractable, lighthearted, carefree, and good-natured. If unjustly
treated he is likely to become careless, shiftless, irresponsible and secretive. He resents censure
and is best handled with praise and by ridicule. He is immoral, untruthful, and his sense of right
doing is relatively inferior. Crimes and convictions involving moral turpitude are nearly five to
one as compared to convictions of whites on similar charges”. The Buffalo Regiment, the hailed
151
established in full force along the line of Brigadier General Lytle Brown and the Committee on
Education’s recommendations for a fully functional United States Junior Reserve. Moreover, the
1920 National Defense Act paralleled the proposal almost precisely: It distinguished senior and
junior divisions and mandated a workable curriculum. Similarly, Junior ROTC implementation
in technical, trade, or vocational schools was astoundingly similar. Summer camp instruction, a
feature of the 1920 Act and the proposal, are implemented, but no evidence currently exists
supporting the claim these occurred with any regularity.
The location of units in high populace areas and large public school systems such as
Chicago, Atlanta, and Detroit may indicate two related issues. First, in order to recruit and train
large numbers of young men, the public schools in these areas offered an extensive population in
which to establish units. Second, unit presence in large urban areas with high immigrant and
working class populations (with the exception of New York), may have aided Americanization
efforts. The idea for military instruction in urban centers as a mechanism for Americanization
and enunciated by Theodore Roosevelt at the Americanization Conference held in Philadelphia
only a few years previously, certainly merits further investigation. The data, then, would appear
to contradict (if somewhat partially) Dr. Arthur Coumbe and Lee Harford’s historical
assessment:
“Federal support for and assistance to the JROTC program remained limited between
the world wars. Due to funding constraints and a lack of enthusiasm on the part of
the Army, the number of JROTC units increased only gradually during this era.”171
black service members from the early period served in World War I in the 92nd and 93rd
infantries. They would see the dismantling of the units, and mainly for reasons the report cited
above. Despite the bravery exhibited on the battlefields of Europe, the most obvious effects that
the war had was entrenching racist values in society. World War II, with many of the same
leaders, would perpetuate the policies.
171
Arthur Coumbe and Lee Harford, Op. Cit., pp. 257-258. Coumbe cited one source for his
statistics, L.R. Ginilliat, “Students and National Defense,” The World Tomorrow, (October,
1926), 148-150. Gignilliat was superintendent of Culver Military Academy. After the period
152
At least in the four year period from 1919 to 1923, Junior ROTC in fact expanded six times its
original size. Coumbe is correct that increased Congressional budget cuts and focus on other War
Department activities may have affected Junior ROTC, but this seems to be more the case from
1925 onward. The exponential growth of both Section 55c and Section forty programs may have
created an economic issue for the War Department, offering partial validation to Coumbe and
Harford’s assessment. In general, between 1923 and 1925, little change in enrollments had
occurred, aside from the periodic enrollment declines in certain school districts.
Thus, by 1925 communiqués between the General Staff, Adjutant General of the Army,
and Corps Commanders indicated a nervous attention to the growing size of Junior ROTC. Most
high school programs, due to their unit size, required more than one officer for instructional
purposes. Additionally, rations, weapons, and uniforms (provided it seems to Section forty
units), were taxing already strained budgets. The mid-1920s also saw a large movement in the
country toward national economy, causing problems not only for ROTC, but the whole military
establishment. Congressionally approved enlistment strengths declined from 175,000 to 150,000,
and by 1927, approved strengths were leveled at 118,750. The Budget and Accounting Act of
1921 and a new conservative series of administrations would have increasingly negative effects
on the army, in particular special funding and appropriations requests. Many Americans (aside
from the progressive era activists) were enamored with the idea that there was little need for an
extended military establishment or an economically unwieldy government. Reform in
government expenditures and fiscal responsibility were the main feature throughout the twenties.
1923, detailed enrollment records of Junior ROTC drops out of view. While supervision of the
program remained in the Adjutant General’s officer through the 1950s, I believe general
enrollment reports may have been kept at the Corps level or the compilation duties were shifted
to another office. War Department Annual Reports offer a snapshot of the combined programs,
which does not assist the reader in this study. Further research is thus recommended.
153
1924 and 1925 ushered in a time when ROTC experienced the Congressional cutbacks alluded to
by Dr. Arthur Coumbe and Lee Harford.172
In the autumn of 1925, War Department officials were expecting cutbacks to the
program, particularly for fiscal year 1927. The General Staff requested the Adjutant General of
the Army poll the Corps Areas for feedback, and seek advisement related to increased cutbacks
and reductions in staff size, indicating “a number of economies could be effected (sic) by a
closer study of the individual problems of each institution.” The General Staff communiqué
continued, noting several recommended cutbacks in funding. Other memorandum from Corps
Area commanders cited a loss of one or more instructors, frustration with cadets being obligated
to pay for their uniforms (section forty units), reduction in pay for instructors (at the senior and
junior level) and restrictions on enrollments.173 In his plea to the Corps Commander, Captain
Harry Mitchell implored his Commander to consider the popularity of the Junior ROTC. His
pitch implied that Junior ROTC’s popularity was strong not only among students, but with
parents as well:
“The great majority of people in this city will consider such limitation as decidedly
unwise. Prominent men have expressed the opinion that the Junior ROTC is
decidedly the most popular branch of the army – and the cause of a favorable attitude
being taken by the public toward the army at large. They see in it real national
172
Russell F. Weigley, Op. Cit., pp. 399-401; Arthur Coumbe and Lee Harford, Op. Cit., pp. 257258; James Kirby Martin, (et. al.), America and its Peoples: A Mosaic in the Making, (New
York: Longman Press, 2000), pp. 672-692; and, Hugh Rockoff, “The Origins of the Federal
Budget,” The Journal of Economic History, 45 (June, 1985), pp. 377-382.
173
Memorandum from Brigadier General H.A. Drum, to Adjutant General of the Army,
November 24, 1925; Letter from L.D. Coffmann (President, Association of State Universities),
n.p., to Secretary of War Dwight F. Davis, December 14, 1925; Memorandum from Colonel
William Dashiell (PMS and T), to Commanding General Fourth Corps Area, November 10,
1925; and, Memorandum from Captain Harry Mitchell (PMS and T), to Commanding General
Seventh Corps Area, November 3rd, 1925.
154
defense without militarism. Practically all the teachers many of whom three years
ago were averse to military training readily champion the ROTC work here and in so
doing are departing from an ultrapacifistic (sic) attitude. They are getting a proper
conception of national defense. More and more are advocating it in their
teaching.”174
Economic measures and concerns were perhaps a sign of good planning on the part of War
Department planners. Generally, however, there was no indication of large-scale reductions in
the program. War Department officials had their hands full with a different problem – the pacifist
movement. As mentioned in the last part of Mitchell’s letter, his impassioned closing words
were countered over the next few years by a budding anti-ROTC movement throughout the
nation, as illustrated in the following section.
IV. ROTC, Pacifism, and the War Department’s Response
The federalization-centralization of the military, including the rising prominence of
ROTC on the nation’s high school and college campuses must have been endorsed by parents
and students alike, or else Mitchell’s statement and the sheer numbers were an illusion. Yet,
there was also a growing movement during the 1920s marked by isolationism, progressivism,
and pacifism. America had become increasingly isolationist in its economic and political
leanings. The potentially unwieldy military machine was a primary focus of peace groups who
questioned the need for such a large defensive force. Added to their frustration was that college
ROTC programs operating under section forty of the 1920 National Defense Act were required
graduation components at state land-grant institutions. Though pacifism’s impact on ROTC was
primarily at the college-level and may not have dramatically affected enrollments at the junior
174
Memorandum from Captain Harry Mitchell, to Commanding General Seventh Corps Area,
November 3rd, 1925.
155
level, angst among high school PMS and Ts, the War Department’s response and the parallel
activities that occurred on college campuses demonstrate an important facet to the program’s
historical portrait.175
On October 22nd At the University of Kansas, PMS and T Major J.R. Cyson wrote to the
Adjutant General of the Army explaining his anxiety about pacifists who were speaking on
campus. The pacifists – Bruce Curry, Kirby Page, Conrad Hoffman, and Sherwood Eddy – were
scheduled to present their speech on the “Harmony Peace Plan”. His letter condemned the men
for “spreading the most destructive propaganda,” causing Cyson to request some type of
“corrective publicity,” in addition to “data available on the national or international connections
of the men named…and their relationship, if any, with agencies having destructive purposes
could be used to advantage.”176
While not new to the War Department, the pacifist campaign was at the very minimum,
bothersome to the generalship. In 1923, the University of Wisconsin had abolished ROTC from
the campus by a student vote, and the Minnesota Public Schools dismantled their entire Junior
ROTC program. By 1925, “agitations” had occurred, causing some schools and universities to
vote on ROTC’s existence or for removal of the compulsory training requirement. With regard to
the latter, Pacifist organizations raised issue with the constitutionality of compulsory military
training and associated ROTC programs under the 1862 Morrill Act. They were emboldened
when the Department of the Interior determined that indeed the program could not be made
175
Michael S. Nieberg, Op. Cit., pp. 29-31. This section of the dissertation does not intend to
cover all facets of the pacifist movement against ROTC. The items selected were part of the
Adjutant General records.
176
Memorandum from Major J.R. Cyson, Lawrence, Kansas, to the Adjutant General of the
Army, October 22, 1925; and, Hachtel, et al., Reserve Officers Training Corps and Citizens
Military Training Camps, (Brochure), (n.p. July, 1925), pp. 7-8.
156
compulsory, except as the individual states legislated. The War Department, in 1924 conceded
that “it could not insist on compulsory military training in any of the schools” but that it “should
inform the Professor of Military Science and Tactics as to its stand on this question, and G-2
should prepare and have available, as required, data with which to combat radical movements in
their schools.”177 1925 also marked Walter C. Longstreth’s published tract titled Regarding
Military Training at Universities, published by the Peace and Service Committee of Philadelphia.
Longstreth overviewed the program and explicated at some length ROTC’s flawed mandate via
the Morrill Act and its coercive effects on young men. Another tract rich with data, was handed
out at the University of Missouri. Titled Reserve Officers (sic) Training Corps and Citizens (sic)
Military Training Camps its authors, Edward Hachtel (Fellowship of Youth for Peace), John
Nevin Sayre (Fellowship of Reconciliation), and Tucker P. Smith (Y.M.C.A.) exposed what they
believed were ROTC’s coercive effects. The coercion allegation was directed at schools, who
whether intentionally or unintentionally, enrolled students into their program under section forty
guidelines (this compelled students to enlist upon graduation). The authors continued, presenting
enrollment statistics for high school and college programs (40,000 and 75,000, respectively), the
type of curriculum employed at the senior and junior level, and how schools could rid themselves
of the ROTC. The last two pages of their work identified several colleges and universities that
were considering, by student or by faculty vote, abolishing the Junior ROTC program.178
177
Memorandum from Assistant Chief of Staff H.A. Drum, to the Chief of Staff, November 12,
1925; and, Walter C. Longstreth, Regarding Military Training at Universities, (Philadelphia, PA:
Peace and Service Committee of Philadelphia, 1925), pp. 1-8.
178
Hachtel, Op. Cit., pp. 1-9. The brochure’s authors cited sources not consulted for this
dissertation, but are nonetheless valid. He cited various Congressional Hearing proceedings and
Army Regulations. Furthermore, I would like to point out my enrollment numbers, indeed
matched their approximated numbers.
157
The student votes and pacifist activities marked a contentious period between ‘pacifist
radicals’ and the military establishment, as the anti-ROTC movement (labeled as such by the war
department) expanded nationally to various college campuses. The issue was further
compounded when resolutions, such as one passed by the Massachusetts Federation of Churches,
was sent to military leadership. The resolution, passed unanimously that “…for the good of our
country in this period of the world history, that compulsory military training in schools and
colleges and the attendant instruction should be abolished.”179
The War Department, in conjunction with the Adjutant General’s Office, responded. Signed by
Major General Robert C. Davis, the letter the Federation’s members justified ROTC’s
implementation, and argued its placement was “based on the constitutional principle of
‘Common Defense,” later in the letter Davis stated “the principle of Common Defense and the
adopted system under which it is carried out is not new, as it has existed in America since the
earliest colonial days.”180
Faced with the increasing attack, Junior ROTC professors and instructors as well as
Corps Commanders appeared to have become quite antipathetic, sometimes organizing
‘counterstrikes’. Correspondence from PMS and Ts on college campuses such as Coe College in
179
Letter from E. Tallmadge Root (Massachusetts Federation of Churches), Boston,
Massachusetts, to Major General Robert C. Davis, March 3, 1926; and, Letter from E. Tallmadge
Root (Massachusetts Federation of Churches), Boston, Massachusetts, to Department of War,
January 21, 1926; Cornell Alumni Times, “Voluntary Drill Petition Put in Farrand’s Hands,”18
January 1926, p.1. In reviewing these letters, I made note of the board of officers. Under
‘honorary vice presidents’ four men’s names were underlined by someone in the War
Department: Mr. Roger W. Babson, Dr. Charles W. Eliot, Alvan T. Fuller, Reverend William
Lawrence.
180
Letter from Major General Adjutant General Robert C. Davies, Washington, DC, to E.
Tallmadge Root, Boston Massachusetts, January 20, 1926; Letter from Adjutant General Major
General Robert C. Davies, Washington, DC, to E. Tallmadge Root, Boston Massachusetts,
February 17, 1926.
158
Iowa and DePauw University expressed outrage at student movement ‘radicals’ and even
administrators sympathetic to the cause. In a letter to Chief of Staff J.L. Hines, Professor Major
Bowers Davis at Coe College lamented the movement on his campus, writing he had begun
collaborating with the American Legion, the board of trustees, and the business community.
Heartened by the community’s patriotism and willingness to help fight the anti-ROTC
movement, he ended “the fine spirit shown here…makes one realize that the socialist, pacifist,
and others may realize some day that this is a country for 100% Americans.”181
In 1928, DePauw University President Dr. G. Bromley Oxnam had taken a decisively anticompulsion stance. In a memorandum composed by Major General D.E. Nolan of the fifth corps
area, his high-level acridity, suspicion and extensive detail (six-page memo) was presented to the
Adjutant General’s office.
“Dr. Oxnam is a pacifist of the type which says ‘I am not a pacifist, but ----.’ Ever
since he arrived here he has been ‘preaching against acceptance of the axiom that
war is inevitable,’ as will be borne out by the clippings I have sent corps area
headquarters from time to time. He is a man of powerful physique, tremendous
energy, keen mind, and personal wealth. He is friendly with Sherwood Eddy, or at
least, he quotes him extensively. He is alleged to have had connections at various
times with numerous organizations which tend toward pink or even red. According
to a statement made by him to Dr. Felix McWhirter, president of the Peoples State
Bank, Indianapolis, he favors recognition of Soviet Russia. He has been,
incidentally, on a trip into post-war Russia as a member of an investigating
group.”182
181
Memorandum from Major Bowers Davis, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, to General J.L. Hines, Chief of
Staff, Washington, DC, January 14, 1926. The community rallied together and actually won the
‘campaign’. The student vote was significantly lopsided, but not without good reason. In midFebruary, 1927, the students voted 192 “in favor of retaining military training and 21 voted
against it. (Complete vote was not obtainable on account of meeting being closed while votes
were being collected).” Apparently, once the vote to retain the program took place, the doors
were reopened. The ballot turnout was significantly higher as Davis noted “178 voted for
voluntary training and 159 voted for compulsory which I believe shows that compulsory training
is fairly popular.”
182
Memorandum Captain B.B. McMahon, Green Castle, Indiana, to Commanding General Fifth
Corps Area, General D.E. Nolan, December 16, 1928.
159
Alas, the ‘radicals’ though not necessarily unknown, did not carry the intellectual weight of one
man who threw his muscle behind the anti-ROTC movement, John Dewey. Dewey, famous
American educator and philosopher, came out squarely against ROTC in 1927. In the pamphlet
Militarizing our Youth: The Significance of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps in our Schools
and Colleges, Dewey authored the introduction, with the remainder of the forty-seven page text
penned by Roswell P. Barnes. To date, the pamphlet was the most extensive attack against
ROTC that had been produced. Dewey proclaimed the work “not of reckless aspersions in which
the militaristic crowd freely indulges but in the form of facts, readily verifiable, most of them
cited from official sources.” Dewey further noted the military establishment’s disinterest in facts
and attacks on anti-ROTC activists, in which he observed:
“The attack on the fifty-four persons who endorsed the previous (Lane) report of the
society which sponsored also the present report was certainly long on venom and
fury, but short on facts and figures – except figures of speech. Nothing will be as
fatal to the success of the militaristic attempt as knowledge of the facts. Their
previous activity shows a that it considers on one of the most effective means of
suppression to be zeal in discrediting those who make the facts known by any kind of
disingenuous and misleading statement.”183
The brochure went on to explain point-by-point, the role of each ROTC unit, in addition to
countering military philosophy, tactics, and curriculum. The extensive treatment, including
massive statistical data was compelling enough for activists to use the pamphlet throughout the
late-twenties and early-thirties.
183
Roswell P. Barnes, Militarizing Our Youth: The Significance of the Reserve Officers’
Training Corps in our Schools and Colleges, with an introduction by John Dewey, (New York:
Committee on Militarism in Education, 1927), p. 3. The pamphlet was included with a series of
flyers and other pamphlets that were being handed out in large quantities at Ohio State
University during the early 1930s.
160
V. A Brief Portrait of Junior ROTC through 1964
Junior ROTC maintained its presence in American high schools and other institutions
even with the prevalent Anti-ROTC rhetoric. Enrollment figures fluctuated only slightly,
hovering around the forty-thousand mark through 1941. By 1941, operating units had increased
to approximately 139. As might be expected, the enrollments through World War II were
considerably higher, as the call for compulsory service grew. Hence, between the years 1942 and
1949, one hundred units were in operation, with over 72,000 cadets enrolled. 184 In July 1953, a
fill report of operating Junior ROTC units was made to the Adjutant General’s Office, Office
Recruitment Branch. The report by city and high school, detailed enrollment numbers, uniform
allotments, and instructor placement.
Several trends become apparent. Most noticeably, southern cities saw increases in the
number of units. In 1923, thirty-two public high school units were functional. By 1953, eightytwo schools were in operation, and enrollment figures had increased several times as well.
Dallas, Texas and El Paso, Texas are particularly noteworthy as their enrollment figures
increased significantly – nearly two times their original enrollment figures. This excludes the
increase in military academies which also obtained units over the thirty year period. Urban areas
in the north and west including Chicago, Los Angeles, and Oakland had fairly sustained periods
184
All statistics through 1949 were taken from Arthur Coumbe and Lee Harford, Op. Cit.,
Appendix C, 302. It should be noted, however, that there are some significant discrepancies
between Appendix C and the assertions made within the text. For example, Coumbe provided
enrollment figure from 1919 through 1994-1995. In the text, he states that the number of Junior
ROTC units in operation “established in only thirty schools.” (Arthur Coumbe and Lee Harford,
Op. Cit., p. 258) However, in Appendix C, the year 1919 is listed as having fifty in operation.
Similarly, Coumbe stated that “by 1939, 295 JROTC units were in operation…”(Arthur Coumbe
and Lee Harford, Op. Cit., p. 258) Yet again, the number in Appendix C, is listed as having only
one hundred units in operation. I have made the determination to use some of his numbers as a
guide, but referred to primary sources as available or needed. My particular focus in this chapter
is to look at distribution patterns.
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of enrollment over the thirty-year period (see Appendix B, Table 2), but had increases in the
number of operating units. Indianapolis, Gary, and Detroit, Michigan doubled or tripled their
growth both in enrollments and units. Generally, there is also a trend for smaller cities peppered,
throughout the north and Midwest that began Junior ROTC units between 1923 and 1953. No
designations in the report were made as to “white” or “colored” nor were technical schools
labeled with the frequency of the 1923 report. Thus in 1953, public high schools had
approximately 58,275 cadets enrolled in nearly 301 Junior ROTC programs. The enrollment
figure may not appear significant on first glance. However, the 66% enrollment increase (an
average of one thousand cadets per year) and a 41% increase in units spread out over a larger
geographic region seem to indicate to the contrary that Junior ROTC stagnated in growth.
Considering the Interwar period, the Great Depression, and World War II (typically, the military
rescinds appropriations for special programs like Junior ROTC during wartime), the numbers
actually show a healthy organization, though perhaps it did not attain the growth it desired.
Korea also played a significant role. The Cold War, which prompted the science and technology
movement in American schools, probably had as large an impact on the number of interested
youth and presence of military personnel in the public schools. Historian Michael Nieberg,
author of Making Citizen Soldiers: ROTC and the Ideology of American Military Service, quoted this
Army ROTC pamphlet from 1960, which encapsulated 1950 military and political philosophy:
“The educational system of the Iron Curtain countries train their men as soldiers of
the state first, and then as scientists, technicians, even painters and poets, as part of
their over-all plans for world domination. From the privileged sanctuary of our
campus quadrangles, laboratories and study halls, dare we forget for whom the bell
tolls? It tolls not for the murdered students of Prague, Riga, and Warsaw, but for
those now bent to the task of the extinguishment of man’s hops. It tolls for those who
“don’t have the time,” for those who cynically ask “what’s in it for me?” It tolls for
all who fail to realize the nature of this supreme contest of our times.”185
185
Michael Nieberg, Op. Cit., p. 41. Education was forced to respond to the era of science and
technology. Coming under increasing attacks for its ‘lackluster’ student performance, and focus
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on soft subjects resulted in a renewal of testing, strengthening the math and science curriculum,
and better teacher education. Now, with potential nuclear destruction a reality and the
competition developing between the U.S.S.R and the United States education for science and
technology seemed extremely appropriate. The social sciences and humanities gained significant
attention, particularly psychology, sociology, and history. These subjects provided understanding
about the new cultural phenomenon the military was facing. “The war had posed a number of
challenging social, political, and economic problems for military professionals: working together
with persons from other nations in allied operations, coping with problems of supply and
industrial mobilization, administering occupied territories.” (John Lovell, Neither Athens or
Sparta, 50) The Army and military’s current manifestation is a result of the Cold War era. At the
close of World War II, America’s international military presence was justified as a safeguard
against the spread of Communism. Of course the alliance between military and industry also
proved a factor. The spread of capitalism was as much the rationale as was restricting the
Communist threat. The creation of the atom bomb added complications to an already strained
relationship with the U.S.S.R. America, thanks to John Dulles, developed the doctrine of
‘massive retaliation’ – or nuclear war. America seemed willing to carry out this doctrine at any
cost. The Cold War began with the low-scale ‘brush fire’ conflicts and the stockpiling of nuclear
weapons in both countries, leading to the concept of ‘mutually assured destruction’. The terms
of surrender also exacerbated the situation, albeit in an effort to avert further war with the Soviet
Union. The compromises made gave the U.S.S.R. a significant eastern European presence and
considerable leverage in world affairs. The military, forced to respond to the threat, had to find a
new way of operating within the old structure. First, a great deal of maneuvering and political
wrangling involved the organization of the general staff. World War II proved to have many
strengths but the central command in Washington, D.C. had numerous breakdowns in
communication. The National Security Act of 1947 was passed creating the Department of
Defense (scrapping the designation of War Department). Under the act, the heads of military
units – Army, Navy, and Air – would be consolidated into the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A civilian,
the Secretary of Defense, would oversee and coordinate Department of Defense activities. The
Department of Defense (DOD) would now be a clear member of the executive branch of
government (its role having previously been somewhat boggled). Finally, under the act, was the
creation of the CIA and the National Security Council. The act finalized the marriage of defense
and intelligence, with future amendments filling including industry as a viable partner. The
DOD’s formidable role in the exercise of war and spread of capitalist intentions was essential to
American global ‘success.’ The involvement in Korea further established the U.S. military’s
global police presence. Once the U.S.S.R. invaded South Korea past the 38th parallel, America’s
initial policy had been to train insurgents, provide weapons and supplies. The policy soon
escalated to American troop mobilization. As soon as the mobilization occurred, America
adopted its doctrine of ‘brushfire’ or ‘limited’ warfare in hopes that it could repel Communism
without global war. This philosophy demonstrates the cyclical nature of history. Such tactics
were implemented in seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe during the various religious
wars. Limited loss of life – civilian and military was the ideal. Hovering over the conscience of
the military, the Koreans and the American public, however, was the devastating potential of the
atom bomb. This threat was further evidence that World War II’s mobilization that had served
military officials would soon be reinstated. The Congress of 1948 expanded the Selective
Service system and the Universal Military Training Act (1951). Though the latter would prove
less beneficial, the military was in prime shape to deal with the threat, or so it thought. As with
Vietnam, Korea presented an issue the U.S. military had not dealt with since the nineteenth
century – guerilla warfare. This required a reinvigoration of training camps and military
educational institutions to implement the tactics accordingly into the curriculum. America’s
eventual success (many accurately call it a stalemate) in Korea – the repulsion of the North
Koreans back to behind the parallel – would demonstrate the need for and maintenance of a
strong professional army. While a great many innovations were occurring in education
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By the middle- to late 1950s and early 1960s, Junior ROTC remained fairly stable in comparison
to its senior counterpart. The junior division hovered at approximately 60,000 students, while the
senior division units ranged between 120,000 and 180,000 cadets. The value of Junior ROTC as
compared to Senior ROTC came was questioned, however, by Kennedy Department of Defense
Secretary Robert McNamara. His primary concerns were the program’s lack of focus,
inefficiency, and most importantly, its true benefit to the military enlisted and officer ranks. The
Senior ROTC had potentially been a victim of several forces including the reduction in Cold War
fears, increasing job availability in the private sector, more difficult academic loads, and that
“the college student of the 1960s was more interested in making money and less interested in
serving his country…”186 The anti-war movement had not quite set in by the early 1960s, but
concerns over ROTC’s general future did. Over a three year period, Defense Department
following the war, perhaps the most influential was the General Infantry Bill of 1945. Several
million men (with all services combined about 16 million) were returning home and jobs were
scarce. Congress also felt that a reward for service was the correct thing to do. More practically,
it was designed to delay entry into the workforce for millions of returning veterans. The United
States may very well have plunged back into a depression had the G.I. Bill not been enacted. Its
provisions included access and, most important, money to public and private institutions. Many
took advantage of the system. The program was the most advantageous educational provision by
Congress in its history. Its benefits, however, would be debated. Some believed it to be a
rectification from previous years in that it addressed the economic and social inequalities
inherent in America. Harvard President James Conant, however, feared “the policy would
threaten the traditional meritocratic selection process and result in the lowering of academic
standards.” (Alan Sadovnik, Exploring Education, 81) Regardless, the G.I. Bill would afford the
opportunity for millions to receive an education – among the beneficiaries were African
Americans. The educational system, since its inception with the common school, rarely
functioned in the best interests of African Americans. The 1896 Plessy decision sanctioned
separate-but-equal schools resulting in disproportionate funding. The cascade-effect would no
doubt severely prohibit African Americans ability to get a good education and adequately
compete in the market economy. By the 1950s, as evidenced by the military, the issue of
segregation was going to have to be addressed head on. As such, 1954 saw Thurgood Marshall
brilliantly argued the illegalities of state-imposed segregation of schools. While the effort was
laudable, it would not end discriminatory practices. It would take various civil rights groups
(e.g. SNCC) working in concerted action throughout the 1960s to end the pressures of
segregation. Postwar academy structure responded to the innovations following World War II
and the oncoming nuclear proliferation by implementing extremely rigorous courses in
engineering including aeronautical and nuclear as subjects.
186
Michael Nieberg, Op. Cit., pp. 88-89.
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personnel conducted a full-scale study of the entire program. Under McNamara’s guidance,
ROTC in both forms would have to be completely redeveloped in its scope to conform with
societal and academic perceptions, but also maintaining the vitality and purpose of the program:
recruitment, development, and training of young officer and enlisted recruits. Out of this work
came the 1964 ROTC Vitalization Act. While primarily geared toward the Senior component,
McNamara had apparently been forced by public demand that Junior ROTC be kept in its present
form. His initial proposal was to fold junior units into the National Defense Cadet Corps, a less
costly program, in what seemed to be an effort to focus on the senior division.187
Public Law 88-647, was signed on October 13, 1964. The law stipulated several items.
First, it placed definitive caps on enrollment and unit creation in all branches of the military,
mandating that no more than two hundred units could be established per year, and not more than
1,200 could operate at any one given time. It further limited unit establishment at only secondary
educational institutions. Second, it maintained the policy requiring at least one hundred
physically fit male students be enrolled for a unit to remain in operation. Third, it required all
schools to require three years of military training and “limit membership in the unit to students
who maintain acceptable standards of academic achievement and conduct, as prescribed by the
Secretary of the military department concerned.”188 Fourth, the Vitalization Act of 1964 required
the governing military agency to provide junior units with uniforms, equipment, and texts. Fifth,
and finally, it established the increased use of retired officers over active commissioned (CO) or
noncommissioned officers (NCO). Since Junior ROTC’s inception, the instructor piece was
haphazard. The new guideline, while not completely doing away with COs or NCOs, allowed
187
Arthur Coumbe, and Lee Harford, Op. Cit., pp. 258-259.
188
United States Statutes at Large, Vol. 78, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965),
pp. 1063-1065.
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flexibility in assigning placements. The ROTC Vitalization Act ensured the minimum health of
the program for years to come. 189
VI. Conclusion
Junior ROTC’s history arose as part of preparedness legislation, embodied in the
1916 National Defense Act. Its impact on the public schools and nation’s colleges and
universities highlighted the importance of military training and education in civil insitutions,
even after World War I. While the 1916 Act proved ineffective on one level, its descendants –
the 1918 amendments, the 1920 Defense Act, and the ROTC Vitalization Act point to the
nation’s shift toward federalization-centralization of military functions. This shift was not
completely popular, as is discovered in section five. Anti-ROTC sentiment throughout the
twenties and thirties, often spurred by religious groups add an interesting perspective not only to
what happened, but also to the growing concern over federalization’s impact. Likewise, the War
Department’s interdepartmental response indicated (though this is not conclusive) an emergent
military machine, bent on protecting the integrity of its programs by engaging in red-baiting and
politicking as opposed to mounting an effective marketing strategy. Dewey’s ire about baseless
attacks against anti-ROTC activists illustrates the probability the War Department had engaged
in such tactics.
The curriculum was no doubt preparedness-driven, as 75% of its core component was
military drilling, courtesy, and training. Furthermore, compulsory service (the root cause of AntiROTC activists) prevailed in many cases. Schools that applied for section forty units, obliged
189
Ibid., pp. 1063-1065
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their students into compulsory military service. While the enrollment numbers are still a bit
unclear, further investigation might help mete out the differences and impact on Junior ROTC
enlistment ratios following high school graduation.
Enrollments capture a crucial snapshot of the bigger preparedness picture. Schools
operating units were not necessarily making money on the program. However, federal aid in the
form of uniforms, food, text books, and other money assisted these schools. Thus, the
implementation of units in large, urban centers around the country implies that the War
Department’s desire to reach a large segment of the population was critical in maintaining
enlisted strengths. The large enrollment numbers at technical-trade high schools elicit three
points. First, technical-trade schools and other civil institutions offering technical training
received federal funding under the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917. Secondly, those schools receiving
federal funding were mandated to require military training as part of the curriculum. Third, large
numbers of students attended technical-trade schools and high schools offering extended courses
in trade areas, in large part to prepare for the industrial workforce. These young men provided
the military with usable skills during war and peace.
But the 1920s were also problematic for the military. Demobilization and mounting fiscal
reforms placed limitations on the programs growth. Post-World War I feelings seemed to cling to
promises that the last war would indeed be the last. Junior ROTC (along with a number of other
military programs) experienced cutbacks in uniforms, equipment, staff and instructor pay
subsidies. These were the norm in a new political age of smaller government and reduced threat
of war.
Junior ROTC still remained strong. Certainly, it was not in every single high school or in
every American city. The approximate 40,000 enrolled student-cadets, in over 120 high schools
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by 1923, point to a program if not thriving, at least holding its own. Its continued enrollments
through three decades illustrate the program’s stability, popularity, and placement in the
American educational scene. The ROTC program served a vital function during World War II –
particularly the senior division. Much of the military operations would have failed, had there not
been a steady reserve officer component. Again, the impact Junior ROTC had in this movement
is unclear. Exposure, increased numbers, and some military training in the schools must have had
some effect. What becomes evident is Junior ROTC’s lasting presence. The question that
remains: what does all of this mean? The next chapter attempts to answer that very question.
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CHAPTER 5
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
“U.S. SENATOR JACK REED (D-RI): Sergeant Green, do you have a JROTC
Program in your sector, and could you comment does it help measurably in terms of
your recruiting?
SERGEANT FIRST CLASS ELIZABETH GREEN, ARMY: I believe it does, sir,
not because it's there as a benefit to me to go in there and recruit, but….they're
motivated. You have prior service in there motivating them, teaching them the right
way, discipline. Our schools nowadays, it's a lot tougher for the teachers to take
control depending on where you're at. Los Angeles, it's pretty tough out there. But I
believe that the discipline and maturity, a focus, where do you want to go. They see
recruiters coming in and out; you talk to them throughout the year. They see what
you're about. They get the education and the leadership skills in there, and whether
they join the military or not it's helping society. But those are the students I like to
focus on, because I know they're going to make good team players in the Army
Reserve (emphasis mine).”
Testimony before the U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services
Committee, Subcommittee on Personnel, February 24th, 2000.
“…how absurd is the conception of history held hitherto, which neglects the real
relationships and confines itself to high-sounding dramas of princes and states.”
Karl Marx, The German Ideology, The Illusion of the Epoch
Introduction
More often than not, military historical narratives have been written about the great
generals, the sordid battles, the politicians who ride the coattails of victory into the Oval Office,
or the men who fell from grace. Certainly, these narratives do contain valuable details and
provide scholarly contributions. Unfortunately, they are deeply mired in institutional politics,
personality conflicts and overblown agendas; the most significant revelation is merely that
human beings are sociologically similar. The military, with all of its intricate history, hierarchies,
philosophies, social and cultural connections, and political high drama, is rocky terrain for any
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scholar. It seems possible that the military’s raison d’etre could indeed be forever shrouded by
unbounded minutiae.
The preceding chapters of this dissertation have attempted to paint a historical portrait of
the origins, inception, and evolution of the Junior ROTC, while also providing an analytical
framework to illuminate the consistent threads that exist. I stated in the introduction that
scholars, activists, and military proponents cannot simplistically embrace or summarily dismiss
Junior ROTC. Simplistically embracing the program has been and is still a tactic of many
military personnel, school districts that benefit monetarily from the program and cadets who
have gone through the program. This core group, in the interest of military training or
recruitment, often all-too-readily dismisses criticisms of the program, arguing that such a
program serves many in the population, including at-risk school children and those who may not
have, or do not desire, college as a post-graduation option. On the other hand, some who
summarily dismiss the program as meaningless, as endorsing militarism or as being secretly
motivated by military leaders, overlook many large-scale issues, fail to ground their analysis in
historical as well as sociological data, and reduce their arguments to trite anti-war and antimilitary establishment verbiage. By identifying the historical threads of preparedness ideology
and its dialectical relationship with imperialist-expansionist mentality, my analysis is rooted in
the historical and sociological record and will add to the current discourse.
Three questions guided my research and speak to the goals and objectives of this study.
Section one addresses the first question: what, if any, prerequisites existed relevant to Junior
ROTC? This section reintroduces these historical trends in abbreviated form, concluding there is
merit to my initial thesis that preparedness ideology and imperialist-expansionist mentality
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played a consistent part in military federalization-centralization and in the program’s naissance
and subsequent growth.
Weaving in Junior ROTC’s historical prerequisites, section two answers the question:
how, then, does the issue of recruitment correspond to Junior ROTC’s inception and consequent
growth? Based on preparedness ideology, the matter of Junior ROTC as a mechanism for
recruitment is addressed early curriculum outlines, school placement and population statistics. Its
consistent growth between 1923 and 1953 reinforces my thesis that preparedness ideology has in
fact been the main reason behind its success.
Section three compares the evidence presented in section two with the present
manifestation of Junior ROTC, addressing the last, and perhaps most significant question: has
the program been focused on the recruitment of working class and racial minorities over its
ninety-year history and, if so, why? To illustrate my position, I will provide a brief discussion of
military draw-downs, curriculum analysis, the increase in unit establishment and purposeful unit
placement, and recent legislation establishing that Junior ROTC is at the very least, a
machination used to expose young people to the military.
Section four offers a final analysis of the data presented, implications for further research,
and concluding thoughts. In this section, I address the following questions: Is the program
worthy of school resources or is it just an oblique attempt at school reform, citizenship building
and character education that should be eradicated? My observations will draw together these
ideas and Junior ROTC’s ultimate impact on the American public schools.
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I. Prerequisites relevant to Junior ROTC
The main premises proposed in this dissertation assert that the concepts of preparedness
and imperialism-expansionism were prerequisites or antecedents to Junior ROTC. Undeniably,
these themes reverberate throughout history, inasmuch as the ROTC program was the ultimate
manifestation of preparedness ideology and imperialist-expansionist motivations.
Preparedness ideology involves three major themes. First are the philosophical debates
between advocates for a citizen-army and those in favor of a standard professional army. Second
are the various pieces of enacted legislation that directly address the military’s design and
purpose. The third is the evolution of military education and training for officers and enlisted
men. These themes help to explain the federalization and centralization of military affairs and,
equally important, the creation of Junior ROTC.
Preparedness has been a term typically relegated to the early twentieth century,
associated with Theodore Roosevelt’s obsession with military readiness. Yet, preparedness as an
‘ideology’ actually began to develop much earlier in American history. By its very definition,
preparedness is “to be ready.” If this baseline definition is accepted, then the military in America,
even from its earliest militias, has been in a constant state of preparedness (or at the very
minimum, engaged in an ongoing argument over what that ‘state’ should be). Debate over the
merit of a regular standing army has long permeated American politics. From the earliest
deliberations in the Confederation Congress vis-à-vis the 1916 National Defense Act, Americans
have questioned the logic behind a full-time regular army. Certainly, many understood the need
to occasionally defend American sovereignty, but it seems apparent that those against a strong
military establishment favored citizen control. People like John Jay, Alexander Hamilton,
Theodore Roosevelt, and Leonard Wood represented the strain of preparedness ideology. They
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believed that a strong, centrally-controlled military establishment was key in supplying highly
effective and well-trained enlisted officers and troops. On one level, their argument appears quite
solid: Who, in their proper frame of mind, declines protection if attacked?
An examination of legislation is also critical in understanding preparedness ideology.
The 1792 Militia Act began the military’s gradual federalization and centralization. The Militia
Act did not fully embrace federalization. As is evidenced, it formally established and
strengthened state militia units; however, state units could be called into service by the federal
government in case of national emergencies primarily limited to domestic disturbances and
defense. States generally exercised their control. The 1903 Dick Act restructured the National
Guard, formerly the state militias, in an effort to tighten federal control. The national government
had increased purview as to the National Guard’s activation in all instances of national defense,
but again guardsmen were limited to a nine-month activation period. Training and drilling were
increasingly governed federally, but really only in terms of oversight. States still maintained a
large extent of the control. While not dismantling the National Guard, Congress set in motion a
series of legislative events that led to the military’s ultimate federalization and centralization in
1916.
West Point’s creation in 1802 signified the beginning of military professionalization.
Trained officers were the military’s most consistent resource. Their education at the highest
levels ensured a consistent crop of men to train and drill troops, lead them into battle, and
establish continuity from one generation to the next. West Point’s influence, though felt in
differing ways, impacted the military by spurring wide-scale military educational development
within state and private military academies, and professionalizing the military, which, in turn
provided the military much needed credibility as demonstrated in the Mexican War and the Civil
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War. Spurring the growth of the academies was the War of 1812. For those in military
leadership and hawkish Congressmen, troop performance in that war was a demonstration of
martial incompetence and the academy system – professionalization – would resolve these
challenges. Thus, Sylvanus Thayer’s appointment as superintendent at West Point commenced a
new era in which sweeping curricular and structural changes were put in place. West Point’s
academic innovations became widely regarded and its officers won tremendous respect fighting
in Mexico and the Civil War. These changes became a model upon which most of the fledgling
academies based their study. It was the 1862 Morrill Act, however, that marked ROTC’s
foundation and first tangible nineteenth-century connection. The 1862 act and its 1883 and 1890
amended versions established land-grant schools which were required to offer military
instruction as part of the core curriculum.
As opposed to being a distinct or parallel ideology, economic imperialist-expansionist
mentality is dialectically related to preparedness. Preparedness would eventually assure a strong
martial institution, but economic imperialism-expansionism historically has defined America’s
activities and intentions regarding its armed forces. To expand nationally or internationally, a
strong fighting force was required. America would certainly be limited in its capitalist
expansionist plans had it utilized its military solely for defense. Alexander Hamilton firmly
believed in the military value of a defensive force, but also saw the economic and political
significance. His expansionist agenda and his yearning to use the military to quell insurrections
were among the first indicators that the military could be used for purposes other than security.
The War of 1812 and the Democratic-Republican War Hawks’ initial insistence to wrest Canada
and extend America’s landholdings westward (which eventually occurred) perpetuated
Hamilton’s philosophy that the military could indeed be used to advance American interests.
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And, while the army’s poor performance during the war doused any hopes of annexation, the
seeds of expansion were in place. War with Mexico further underscored the point that American
expansionism was best carried out with military force. Moving westward and southward, the
revitalized United States’ Regular Army, led by West Point and other academy-trained officers,
proved invaluable in securing California and Texas. Equally important was the United States’
temporary occupation and establishment of a military government in Mexico City, Mexico.
Though not an overwhelming precedent, it does illustrate America’s use of the military to ensure
its sovereignty and protection while in pursuit of land and resources. This imperialistexpansionist mentality became even more evident during the Spanish-American War, the
subsequent administration of Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico, and President Theodore
Roosevelt’s foreign policy change to the Monroe Doctrine, titled the “Roosevelt Corollary”.
Regardless of the Spanish-American War’s contentious objectives, what was clear was
America’s post-war strategy; occupying and administering the territories required an able
fighting force, a military entity that could enforce policies, establish American-backed
governments, and repel any possible attempts by the Spanish to reclaim the territory. The
Roosevelt Corollary, designed as a mechanism to establish the United States’ dominance, was
also a critical component of this imperialist-expansionist approach. Using preparedness as his
platform, Roosevelt held that in order to establish free trade routes, protect American interests in
the Western Hemisphere, and repel attacks against American sovereignty and trade, an effective
armed force was imperative.
It was preparedness ideology that dominated the discourse, tied together by legislative,
philosophical, and educative efforts. Equally important, its dialectical relationship with
imperialism-expansionism accounts for the strong push, especially at the start of the twentieth
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century, for a large, well-constructed, and well-trained fighting force that could effectively
administer American policy. Accordingly, the 1916 National Defense Act was the culmination of
years of preparedness ideology emphasized by imperialist-expansionist aspiration. The 1916 Act
allowed the United States to carry out its national defense responsibilities via preparedness, fully
federalizing and centralizing the militias and permitting the use of military force to execute the
policies of the government, which were often politically and economically motivated. Junior
ROTC was indeed born of and for preparedness, and the dialectical relationship of economic
imperialism-expansionism helped solidify the process of federalization-centralization. Its
historical roots are fixed to these constructs, and its design encouraged enlistment in service of
one’s country so that a cadre of minimally-trained potential officers and enlistees were available
as necessitated. The obligation and intent for America’s young men was clear.
II. Junior ROTC for Recruitment: Preparedness for National Service
The historical record has established Junior ROTC as a recruitment tool for military
service since its very beginning. The 1916 National Defense Act was the farthest-reaching
preparedness legislation ever passed by Congress. It was essentially authored by Woodrow
Wilson, who capitulated to preparedness ideology partly because of international developments,
but also for his own political survival. Preparedness, as a concept, required readiness, and
readiness required training. Youth military training was viewed as critical in introducing young
men to their obligation and national duty. Early legislation sanctioning military training as
embodied in the Morrill Acts reinforced the point that military service or national obligation was
expected. When the National Defense Act incorporated a youth military training initiative via
Junior ROTC, the message was clear that the organization could be used to articulate to the
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nation’s youth their obligations as citizens. The spread of the program was delayed by the
imminence of World War I with Junior ROTC’s public school proliferation beginning around
1918. The program had expanded from approximately 6,500 in 1919 to 39,000 in 1923. By 1953,
the program showed no sign of decline, with enrollment increasing 41% during that thirty-year
period – an average of nearly 1,000 new cadets annually. Three reasons appear to explain the
consistency and size of these numbers: curriculum and advancement opportunities, school type,
and school location.
First, the matter of curriculum as a recruitment and preparedness device requires
attention. Military leaders in 1918 asserted that the ROTC curriculum could in fact be used to
strengthen citizenship and also prepare young men to recognize their national service obligation.
At both the junior and senior level, there was a significant difference in allotted time between
citizenship training and military tactics and drill. In fact, citizenship as a core area was absent
from the list of intended subject areas. 50% of the first year was devoted to infantry drill and
military courtesy. By the second year, 55% of the students’ time was committed to the two
subject areas. The benefits of citizenship appeared to be indirect. Later proposed revisions
suggested integration of the Constitution with emphasis placed on passages that were specifically
defense-related, increasing ever so slightly the “citizenship” component. Most importantly,
schools operating under Section 40 of the 1920 National Defense Act obligated students to enroll
in military training and either enlist in the armed services or continue their training with the
senior component upon graduation. While the place of citizenship education was not entirely
clear, the notion of national service. In the same vein, the ‘targeting’ of public schools gave the
Junior ROTC increased visibility among the country’s working classes. Large immigrant
populations and economically disadvantaged youth were the primary consumers of the American
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public school system. Through military training, high school students would benefit the armies
of labor as well as defense:
“In this period of general unrest on the part of young men, it is of the utmost
importance to prevent an unnecessary interruption of their school studies by making
clear to every young American his National duty, viz: (sic) to prepare himself in
mind and body for service to the country. He must be educated to the point of view
that the weight of the world problems bears upon us and our allies during and after
the war; that all must serve and help to solve these problems; that he has a definite
part and duty to perform, namely, to improve his physical and general fitness while
waiting for the call to the colors, and to perform such definite service for the
Government during this period as he may be qualified for. The plan must be based
on the principle that preparation and service go hand in hand (sic) and are equally his
duty…better education, physical development, and for an addition to the industrial
power of the country (emphasis mine).”190
The type of school and its geographical location proved significant. Technical or tradevocational schools in 1923 trend toward high Junior ROTC enrollments. This is in part explained
by the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917, which provided federal allocations to schools that
incorporated vocational education as a chief component of their curriculum. As discussed briefly
in chapter four, in order for schools to receive these federal funds, military training was
compulsory. Technical and trade schools in Cleveland, Ohio, Chicago, Illinois, and Atlanta,
Georgia had considerably large numbers of students enrolled for this very reason. Additionally,
these technical and trade schools provided the military with young men who possessed usable
labor skills beneficial to the military. Urban areas were ideal locations as they were also centers
of industry, offering industrialists a ready reserve of labor. The populations of these schools were
comprised chiefly of working class young men, who had either little desire or little relevant
190
Memorandum from Brigadier General Lytle Brown, to the Chief of Staff, October 8, 1918;
Aaron Benavot, “The Rise and Decline of Vocational Education,” Sociology of Education, 56
(April, , 1983), pp. 63-76; and David L. Angus and Jeffrey E. Mirel, The Failed Promise of the
American High School, 1890-1995, (New York: Teachers College Press, 1999) Vocational
education was federally supported by the Smith-Hughes Act in 1917.
178
opportunity to go to a traditional school in which a liberal arts curriculum was the norm. For this
reason, exposure to military process and procedures was naturally the result.
High population-concentration areas such as Chicago, Los Angeles, Indianapolis and
other large urban areas had well over 15% of the male school population enrolled in Junior
ROTC. It seems that, on average, 35% of these urban school boys between the ages of fourteen
and eighteen were at the very minimum engaged in military training and drilling. In terms of
recruitment and enlistment, of course, no definitive answer can be provided since statistics that
traced direct enlistments from Junior ROTC are either not available or were never actually
compiled. However, its mere centrality within the population and the success Junior ROTC
enjoyed seems indeed to be an indicator that it was minimally successful and used in many cases
in large public schools as a mechanism in which to attract urban, working class students (see
Appendix B, Table 3).
By 1953, while the numbers in the urban areas remained fairly constant, there was a
significant change that had occurred in rural and southern areas. 126 units were in operation in
1923. In 1953, the total quantity of units jumped remarkably to 301, averaging five new units per
year. A great number of these sprang up in the south, which calls attention to two interesting
sociological phenomena. First while the growth of Junior ROTC in rural areas in1923 showed a
smaller number of units in rural areas; 1953 numbers showed a substantial increase, with over
50% of schools and the Junior ROTC population existing in rural areas and smaller cities under
fifty-thousand. The second phenomenon, relative to Junior ROTC’s southern presence, was its
proliferation in military academies. This could be due to several factors, but three stand out.
Number one, the federal aid provided to schools with Section 40 programs was much more
significant than Section 55c schools, consequently federal aid was most likely beneficial to large
179
concentrations in the military academies. Number two, is Rod Andrew’s and John Hope
Franklin’s hypothesis that southern pride and discipline wrapped in militarism may have played
a significant role in the military academies absorption of junior units during this period. This is a
rich area for further study and research. Number three, mere practicality dictated that units in
these schools would quickly benefit the military, in the hopes that officer-trainees and enlistees
could be easily obtained in time of war.
School motivation to maintain Junior ROTC units, particularly as pertains to the period
under discussion, has yet to be completely determined. Most likely, the acquirement and
maintenance of units afforded federal aid in the form of textbooks, additional school instructors,
and uniforms. Moreover, as will be discussed in the next section, throughout the twentieth
century, urban areas have consistently contained significant immigrant populations, as well as
large numbers of working class white, Hispanic, and African American families. The perceived
need to assist ‘at-risk’ youth, particularly in terms of discipline and citizenship, contributed to
the assessment of Junior ROTC as beneficial, especially as schools struggled with burgeoning
public school populations. As discussed in chapter four, national focus on science and
technology - a result of Cold War politics, may have also guided schools in their decision to
retain or develop a Junior ROTC program. Preparedness ideology and the emphasis placed on
military training as a viable part of the curriculum and attracting large numbers of young males
adequately connect Junior ROTC’s increasing presence in the public school system.
III. Disadvantaged Youth and JROTC as Recruitment Mechanism in the Present-Day
Junior ROTC, historically-speaking, has always been a mechanism for recruitment. The
program, in its current manifestation, has allegedly taken on the yoke of ameliorating the social
180
ills of America’s disadvantaged youth – better known in today’s school vernacular as ‘at-risk’
students. First, it is critical to reiterate that Junior ROTC initially established itself as a
mechanism to ‘assist’ young men who were, as General Lytle Brown articulated, in a ‘general
period of unrest.’191 Providing skills, focus, and discipline in an effort to attract these young men
to national service was as much a part of the Junior ROTC mantra ninety years ago as it is today.
The postulation that them program’s mission has changed significantly from these stated
objectives is at best, ignorant of historical precedent, and at worst deliberately deceitful. The
following introduces recent, supporting data that parallels JROTC’s early work in terms of
curriculum, school placement and demographics assisting the program in satisfying recruitment,
and program objectives. Corollary studies, which show that the need increased particularly
through the 1990s, will first be presented in an effort to demonstrate Junior ROTC’s recent
enjoyment of unhindered expansion and the eventual relationship that materialized between
Army Cadet Command and United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC). Next,
explication of the contemporary anti-ROTC movement, an overview of the current curriculum,
and the descriptive statistics depicting location and demographical characteristics of current unit
placements and school systems will clarify the relationship of Junior ROTC to recruiting
techniques that is often assumed or implied: Junior ROTC is a mechanism for recruiting
underprivileged high school-aged youth for military enlistment.
Three selected RAND studies completed in the nineties indirectly point to Junior ROTC
as a viable mechanism for recruiting ‘at-risk’ school children, consequently increasing the
number of enlistments for a struggling military. The first study, conducted in 1994, Military
191
Memorandum from Brigadier General Lytle Brown, to The Chief of Staff, October 8, 1918.
181
Support for Youth Development: An Exploratory Analysis, investigated how the military model
might be applied to assist disadvantaged youth.
“Recent public debate suggests widespread interest in potential military roles in
preparing youth, especially disadvantaged youth, to become productive members of
the workforce and society. As the nation’s largest employer of youth, the Army
appears to some as a model for future programs.”192
The results of the study suggested ‘caution’ with regard to implementation of the military model,
alternatively offering options such as combined civilian-military programs, or primarily civilianfunded programmatic opportunities. While their suggestions do not explicitly incorporate Junior
ROTC, there is an obvious connection in later years as to how it was marketed to schools as a
cost-sharing initiative, in which secondary institutions were able to secure a Junior ROTC
teacher for half the cost of hiring a new teacher without the military connection and benefits.
More recently, Junior ROTC programs have engaged in a program titled “America’s Promise,” a
community service model for the students and instructors of the various units around the country.
The second study, Beth Asch and Bruce Orvis in Recent Recruiting Trends and Their
Implications: Preliminary Analysis and Recommendations explored the significant decline in
military recruiters both in numbers and in key geographical areas. The study reported potential
negative enlistment trends emanating from the declines, particularly during the draw-down
period. The third study, Enlistment Decisions in the 1990s: Evidence from Individual-level Data,
studied recruitment-enlistment through the use of ‘recruiting targets’ higher than those in the
draw-down period. This 1999 study encouraged military recruiters and planners to focus efforts
192
Beth J. Asch, Military Support for Youth Development: An Exploratory Analysis, (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), iii. These are not the only RAND studies that have been conducted
on the topic of recruitment. However, these particular studies illustrate, quite effectively, the
need for viable recruits.
182
on high school students going into typical wage-labor positions following graduation, integrating
a particular set theory in gauging student outcomes.193
These studies demonstrate one key point particularly relevant to the 1990s: the military
suffered serious staffing power shortages as a result of draw-downs or cutbacks in military
expenditures. The evidence supports that Junior ROTC was an elixir to the dramatic recruitmentenlistment declines and recruiting center closures. Not accidentally, soon after the military drawdowns, Operation Capital, a Junior ROTC program supported and developed by then Joint
Chiefs Chairman Colin Powell (in collaboration with Army Cadet Command), appealed for an
increased presence in the public schools, another prime indicator that the program could indeed
serve, at the very minimum, as a tool for enlistment. Over the past few years Operation Capital’s
success has been palpable. The increase in sheer student enrollments and units sufficiently
illustrates the point (see Appendix B, Table 4).
The evidence that such schools were targeted, particularly lower-income neighborhoods, is
even more pronounced. The policy handbook for establishing Junior ROTC in public schools
released by the Department of Defense is quite clear in this matter:
“5.2.6. Reimburse the institution for JROTC instructor salaries at the rate of one-half
the amount of the difference between instructor retired (sic) or retainer pay and the
amount of active duty pay and allowances (excluding hazardous duty pay) the
instructor would receive if he or she were ordered to active duty. Schools meeting
specific criteria of need, if determined by the Secretary of the Military Department to
be in the national interest, may receive additional instructor funds if, as follows:
5.2.6.1. The percentage of students eligible to participate in subsidized meal
programs is more than 30 percent of the enrolled student body and/or less than 75
percent of the students graduate; 5.2.6.2. On-site visits by the JROTC headquarters
193
Rebecca Kilburn and Jacob Klerman, Enlistment Decisions in the 1990s: Evidence from
Individual-level Data, (San Francisco, CA: RAND, 1999), pp. 1-14; and, Beth Asch and Bruce
Orvis, Recent Recruiting Trends and Their Implications: Preliminary Analysis and
Recommendations, (San Francisco, CA: RAND, 1994), pp. 1-33. The latter piece is consistent
with data which identifies an enlistment decline as high as 61%. The RAND Corporation
typically serves as a sub-contractor for the Department of Defense, conducting studies on
military effectiveness and readiness. For more on their work, see www.rand.org.
183
element (sic) determines the neighborhood in which the school is located has a
substandard quality of life, many families' income below the poverty level, and a
high incidence of violent crime; or, 5.2.6.3. Other additional criteria, as determined
by the Secretary of the Military Department concerned, whereby the school is
determined to be an educationally and economically deprived area (to meet a
compelling need of the community or national interest).”194
What remains troublingly furtive is the ‘compelling need’ and ‘national interest’ referenced in
the context of the memo.
During this time period several peace-oriented and anti-militarist groups, including the
American Friends Service Committee, elucidated inconsistencies relative to the perceived
program; alleging that it was militarizing our high schools. In a condemnatory report titled
Making Soldiers in the Public Schools: An Analysis of the JROTC Curriculum by Catherine
Lutz and Leslie Barrett, they accentuated that the program was, in fact, militarizing the public
schools. Lutz and Barrett identified several components including recruitment, curriculumpropaganda, and placement. The notion of recruitment, confirmed that available and qualified
enlistment candidates had significantly declined (from a mid-1980 high of 1.8 million to a 1994
low of 1.1 million), that the curriculum was slanted towards encouraging service in the military,
and that minorities were targets of the enlistment process. This is strikingly similar to the 1927
tract Militarizing our Youth: The Significance of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps in our
Schools and Colleges, which highlighted many of the same topics, Barrett and Lutz presented
their case in a comparable format, using a combination of hard data and circumstantial evidence.
Unfortunately, the reader is left with only a partial understanding or view of the program and of
the anti-ROTC movement.195
194
Department of Defense, Instruction Memorandum, (Number 1205.13, December 26, 1995).
195
Catherine Lutz and Leslie Barrett, Making Soldiers in the Public Schools: An Analysis of the
JROTC Curriculum, (Philadelphia, PA: American Friends Service Committee, 1995), pp. 1-37;
and, Roswell P. Barnes, Op. Cit., ad passim.
184
Conversely, the military rejected allegations of ‘targeting’ young people. They cited their
benevolent attitude toward helping ‘at-risk’ children who had little to look forward to upon high
school graduation. In 1995, America’s Defense Monitor conducted an interview between several
peace activists and military leaders. The purpose of the interview was to dispel the allegations
outlined in Barrett and Lutz’s report. The exchange began with the narrator lamenting America’s
failed public educational system, noting that “the U.S. lags in science and math scores and is
rated next to the bottom in educating students to compete in the global economy.”196 The
interview continued with dialogue between Consortium on Peace Research, Education and
Development (COPRED) director Barbara Wein, Harold Jordan from the American Friends
Service Committee and various military and government personnel. The military staff was
insistent that Junior ROTC was far from a recruiting mechanism. Instead it was inculcating
values of citizenship and responsibility. Tom Wilson, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Personnel Management and Equal Opportunity, seconded the point, emphasizing that
the interest in military careers as ‘a way out’ of poverty was no longer present like it once was
when local recruiting offices were centered in blighted communities, a result of recent budgetary
cutbacks. Junior ROTC provided a source of information no longer available to high school
students:
“Let me tell you another reason why I think we’re there (in the schools). Many of the
young people used to come into the Army, use the Army as a stepping up process to
better themselves and to gain a skill and move on. Many of those people – young
kids who are in the inner city don’t have that opportunity anymore because recruiting
stations have been closed.”197
196
America’s Defense Monitor, “The Military in America’s High Schools,” (Washington, DC:
Center for Defense Information, 1995), p. 3.
197
Ibid., p. 5.
185
Later in the interview, the issue of curriculum – weapons training in particular – was
addressed by Admiral Eugene Carroll. He noted that the curriculum needed updating, and
that weapons training would be re-visited. The weapons training while not eliminated, was
made optional, though the use of M-16s was banned.198 Secretary Wilson also conceded
that more rigorous studies would need to be conducted as related to geographic distribution
and student diversity. Such plans would result in later efforts by Army Cadet Command to
re-distribute its unit placement and diversify even further its student body. 199
Over the past eight years, it has further developed its curriculum in response to the criticisms. It
also significantly revamped much of its image, engaging in significant advertising campaigns,
news releases and an updated website, reassuring visitors and educational consumers that the
program was implemented as a mechanism to instill in students citizenship and self-esteem
ultimately with the objective to “motivate and develop young people.”
The revised curriculum centered on leadership training and education. Army Cadet
Command seemed cognizant of past criticism that the program potentially indoctrinated and
drilled students with military ideology. Four manuals, one for each level or grade (nine through
twelve) were designed with specific content focused on leadership development, military history
and procedure, and citizenship. Junior ROTC’s class curriculum outline demonstrates several
198
Memorandum from Major General Stewart W. Wallace, Fort Monroe Virginia, to U.S. Army
Commanding, to Commanders, U.S. Army First, Second, and Fourth Regions, April 3rd, 1998.
199
“JROTC units will reflect a cross section of the school’s population. Administrators and
Counselors must work closely with JROTC instructors to ensure the students enrolled represent a
cross section of the school enrollment in order to maintain the balance required for an effective
program (e.g. under no circumstances will there be more special education or special needs
students or students with disciplinary problems in the JROTC program than exists in the overall
school population).” United States Army Cadet Command, Junior Reserve Officers’ Training
Corps Program: Organization, Administration, Operation, Training and Support JROTC
Establishment Booklet, Draft CCR 145-2, (Fort Monroe, VA: Department of the Army
Headquarters, United States Army, April 2003), p. 11.
186
points. First, the program exposes young people to a great deal of American military ideology.
The history and civics component seem more contrived than truly substantive, considering that in
many school systems and states, civics, history and government are required to graduate (see
Appendix A, Table 2). In an age where economy reigns, one wonders why there is such
extensive duplication. The question remains – what benefits are they receiving from this type of
curriculum? Similar to the early curriculum development initiatives, the texts are heavily slanted
towards military history, military drilling, and emphases on defense and tactics. Second, the
emphasis on citizenship hearkens back to the 1920 curriculum, focusing a great deal on service,
obligations, and reinforcement of the Constitution’s emphasis on ‘common defense.’ Third and
most provocatively, in the first three years and most notably in the third year, the curriculum
places strong emphasis on ‘career opportunities.’ There is usually an either-or decision presented
to cadets in the form of ‘civilian or military’ employment. Perhaps the most striking unit on
careers is the junior year emphasis on signing-up for selective service, development of manners,
and portfolio development, followed directly by a description of each of the armed services in
chapter twelve. Certainly, if recruitment is not the aim, one must ponder the question – what is?
Does Army Cadet Command use Junior ROTC as a recruiting mechanism? The question
seems redundant when looking back historically, but the insistence by many in the Junior ROTC
leadership that the program does not aim to do so, is insincere at best especially in light of a
Memorandum of Understanding released three years ago. This document solidified the
relationship between United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) and Army Cadet
Command, permitting recruiters to play an active role in working with the area high schools in
making their pitch about the army. The substance of this memorandum is so surprising, that
187
extended parts are included verbatim to illustrate the point that indeed, Junior ROTC is - or at
least is presently - a mechanism for recruitment.
“Cadet Command brigade Recruiting Officers coordinate the high school marketing
and visitation plan with USAREC battalions. The Cadet Command high school
marketing and visitation plan brigade point of contact will ensure that USAREC
battalions are provided a copy of the brigade’s plan which lists all high schools and
responsible Cadet Command element. Whenever possible, combined, coordinated
efforts for marketing the Army will be exercised. The U.S. Army Recruiting
Command battalions will ensure that each USAREC company, recruiting station, and
recruiter knows the Cadet Command element responsible for each of their assigned
high schools. USAREC brigades will invite representatives from appropriate Cadet
Command regions/brigades to brigade-level USAR Recruiting Partnership Council
(RPC) meetings. Cadet Command elements responsible for high schools will know
the responsible USAREC company (sic), recruiting station, and recruiter visiting
their high schools. Brigade Recruiting Officer/PMS will assist USAREC recruiters in
gaining access to any high school that USAREC has a problem entering (my
emphasis). Recruiting companies and Cadet Command battalions will: Refer leads
and prospects to each other as appropriate. Cadet Command cadre will refer
prospects (off-campus visits, drop outs, stop outs) through QUEST using Cadet
Command Form 155-R or by calling 1-800-USA-ROTC, extension 727.
Additionally, prospects will be referred to the on campus, college or local station
recruiter via a phone call or personal contact. The U.S. Army Recruiting Command’s
recruiters will provide information on the Army ROTC program to interested
students and will transfer qualified leads to Cadet Command. Note: getting
additional information for the prospect is not considered a referral, and a referral to
ROTC does not automatically give a prospect a scholarship application. For students
who request information on ROTC or request a scholarship application, USAREC
recruiters should provide the 1-800-USA-ROTC telephone number to Cadet
Command’s QUEST fulfillment center. They may call the number personally with
the student if time permits. Recruiters must also provide the student with the
telephone number and address of the ROTC battalion at the prospect’s college of
choice or nearest ROTC battalion.”200
Colonel Carlos Glover, current head of the Junior ROTC, reiterated the point in a PowerPoint®
presentation to his staff, further negating arguments put forward that the Junior ROTC program
is not a recruiting device:
200
Memorandum, Memorandum of Understanding, Between U.S. Army Recruiting Command
and U.S. Army Cadet Command Department of the Army headquarters, United States
Army Cadet Command Fort Monroe, signed March 3 r d and March 18 t h , 2000 by
Major General Evan R. Gaddis, (USAREC) and Major General Stewart W. Wallace, (Army
Cadet Command), respectively. I am in possession of this document.
188
“US Army Cadet Command will recruit quality prospects, develop confident leaders,
retain them to commission, and sustain the force in support of the Army active and
reserve officer accessions mission and in support of the Army Reserve Officers’
Training Corps Mission.”201
Later in the presentation, he states the program is not to recruit young people for the armed
services, but the previous quote and the memorandum of understanding demonstrate the
obvious duplicity of his statement.
One final question remains unanswered in the quest to determine if Junior ROTC has
maintained its historical mandate of recruitment. Does the program economically conscript
disadvantaged youth – namely working class white children and racial and ethnic minorities? Dr.
Marvin Berlowitz, in an article titled Racism and Conscription in the JROTC, alleges that it does.
By pursuing “at-risk” high school youth, the military preys upon young men and women pushed
by deleterious economic situations and pulled by the potential benefits of military service.
Several pieces of data illustrate his point quite effectively, including unit placement and general
school district population characteristics via Army Cadet Command information releases and
Decennial Census Data; and, current military statistics on the composition of the armed forces.202
Between 1999 and 2002, cadet enrollment increased by 38,275. In the ten year period
prior (including the military draw-downs), enrollments surged over 101,000. In the current
school year, 2002-2003, over 1,500 units were in operation with 272,746 enrolled cadets. The
201
Colonel Carlos Glover, JROTC Current Overview and Recent Initiatives, (n.p. PowerPoint
Presentation, circa January 2001).
202
Marvin Berlowitz, “Racism and Conscription in the JROTC,” Peace Review, 12 (September,
2000), pp. 393-399.
189
concentration of units in large, urban populations is underscored by similar phenomenon seen in
the two other data sets for 1923 and 1953. Raw numbers and comparisons with median income
and poverty levels within each school district, indicate that the focus of Junior ROTC in areas
where the ‘urban underclass’ exist may be significant. While there is a need for in-depth and
more accurate statistical analysis, a quick overview of the numbers exemplifies the point that this
sample of unit placements and populations is representative of the larger distribution. The data
suggest that indeed, Junior ROTC pursues students in lower socio-economic positions.
Furthermore, the trend toward technical schools or vocational-educational schools and smaller
rural areas acquiring units is increasing and suggests consistent growth in these sectors
paralleling the 1923 and 1953 data sets (see Appendix B, Table 5).
In addition to social class, the numbers appear to support the hypothesis that Junior
ROTC targets racial and ethnic minorities. In 2001, the total minority enrollment reached nearly
62%. The present school year, while incomplete in its tabulations, finds a similar trend. In the
Second Region, 42% of enrolled cadets are African Americans, 5% Hispanic, and 27% white. In
the Fourth Region, which includes many West Coast school districts, 5% of enrolled cadets are
African American. However, 29% are Hispanic, 22% Native Alaskan, and 18% white.203
The piece that ties these data together is enlistment decisions following high school.
Approximately 40% of all Junior ROTC cadets enlist in the military upon high school
graduation. Further research drawing these demographics with those of social class would most
likely confirm the notion of economic and racial-ethnic conscription.
203
Enrollment Data, First, Second, and Fourth Regions, (Fort Monroe, VA: Army Cadet
Command, 2003), ad passim. First Region data was not computed, and hence not included in the
data sets provided by Army Cadet Command. The author has copies of the data sets in his
possession. These items are public information and can be obtained through Army Cadet
Command, Junior ROTC division.
190
lifting of caps on Junior ROTC unit establishment and the most recent national education
legislation, No Child Left Behind Act, Public Law 107-110, Section 9528. The program’s
unmitigated success evidenced by rising enrollments and demand, culminated most recently in
the lifting of unit establishment caps in 2001. The legislation is reflected in the revised U.S.
Code.204 Public Law 107-110, Section 9528, which requires school districts to accommodate
military recruiters, providing them with the names, phone numbers, and addresses of all students
within a district. The impact of this ‘edict’, in tandem with Junior ROTC’s alignment with
United States Army Recruiting Command is significant, because Junior ROTC now potentially
serves as a conduit for recruiters outside the school in cooperation with retired military personnel
instructors.
IV. Final Analysis, Implications for Further Research and Conclusion
Section Three presents a sizeable amount of data relevant to Junior ROTC’s significant
proliferation in the past decade. Obviously, the present-day implications are to be determined.
What is important to point out, is that regardless of the claims made by Army Cadet Command
and Junior ROTC advocates, the program is and always has been about recruitment for the armed
services. Though it may appear obvious, the insistence on the part of military personnel that the
program is designed to ‘motivate and develop young people” is doubtful at best. The data portray
a different picture.
Preparedness ideology is perpetuated by Junior ROTC’s increased presence and focus on
training and drilling students in basic military functions, keeping them ever-mindful of their
204
United States Code, Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps, (10, Sec. 2031).
191
obligation. Federalization and centralization of Junior ROTC operations and management has
been critical to its continued success. Couching the program in compassionate verbiage and
community service programs serves only to mask the fact the program is essential to providing a
literal ready reserve army of labor that can serve at the whim of defense department planners and
military operatives. The “push-pull phenomenon” assists the military achieve adequate
enlistment targets by allowing easy access to young people who live in large pockets of poverty
and typically have little hope for a future that includes the educational and economical benefits
enjoyed by those in the upper-classes.
What has been lacking, however, in analyses presented by peace activists and
organizations, is grounding in historical trends, and recognition that the race-class dialectic is
more than a mentionable item located in a bar graph. Certainly, the assumptions based on current
data can aid in making a salient argument. Unfortunately, merely acknowledging that Junior
ROTC was formed in 1916 misses a very relevant analysis rooted in preparedness ideology, and
dialectically related to imperialist-expansion mentality. Junior ROTC was designed to effectively
recruit working class young men into service, or at the very least, embed in them the idea that
national service should be fundamental to their lives. Unit placement in large urban areas,
working class neighborhoods, and serving ‘at-risk’ populations is nothing new. Furthermore, the
vast numbers generated by targeting working class and racial and ethnic minorities throughout its
history, has made Junior ROTC an invaluable program as demonstrated in its consistent numbers
and most recent exponential growth.
Along these same lines, their analysis stops at criticizing a program that for all intents and
purposes is popular because it seems to be effective in reaching large numbers of disaffected
youth. Alternatives to the program and analysis of structural implications rarely are mentioned,
192
with the exception of Berlowitz’s construct of structural violence. Demilitarization of our
schools becomes a pat phrase that embodies a great deal of liberal rhetoric without much
substance. In other words, summarily dismissing the program without offering tangible, practical
options must be addressed. Concomitantly, a sincere examination of the structural barriers
affecting school districts which may result in the implementation of Junior ROTC programs must
occur. Otherwise, they become a band-aid approach, avoiding the vast inequity in school
funding, the condition of school buildings, the outmoded textbooks, and a largely impoverished,
disaffected student populace. Structural school (and societal) reforms, rooted in consistent
analysis, must be enacted if there is to be a true movement to make schools places of learning
and growth, and not dungeons of despair or a purgatory in which students are herded and left
without much hope for release. No approach – whether it is Junior ROTC or increased extracurricular activities will make a viable impact without recognition of the structural implications
our youth deal with on a daily basis.
Likewise, the military establishment must rise to a higher-level of honesty. The evidence
presented throughout this dissertation, reiterates the program’s recruitment objectives. If the
Junior ROTC wants to function in good faith, it must be straightforward about its motivations,
rather than continuing its fallacious assertion the program does not aim to recruit students. In
honestly working with the public, the military allows school districts to make informed, accurate
decisions based on truth. The ultimate question remains – will the military engage in honest,
forthright discussion? Nearly ninety years ago, the program unapologetically placed itself in
schools with intentions that were seemingly obvious to students, school administrators, and
parents. Today, it purports to aid those students who are said to be lacking discipline, motivation,
and hope. The program may, in fact, be able to do both, but it should do so candidly.
193
Lastly, school districts are guilty of implementing a program they appear to know little
about. Minimally, the idea of obtaining an instructor at half the cost of a traditionally-trained
teacher is attractive. Likewise, the program appeals to those in the school district who desire a
“character-education” program that instills values such as citizenship, leadership, and service.
However, the benefit to the school remains suspect. If Junior ROTC claims to reach ‘at-risk’
youth, why are restrictions placed on students with grade point averages lower than a ‘C’, with
physical disabilities, or with disciplinary challenges? The very intent of the program comes into
question when one recognizes that recruiting needs for the military outweigh the ‘benevolent’
intentions. Data presented earlier points to the military’s need for students with reasonably
moderate academic achievement and the ability to assimilate quickly into enlisted life which
clearly precludes students with disabilities and disciplinary problems from enrolling in the
program. The onus is also on school districts to thoroughly investigate Junior ROTC as a
workable program within the contexts of their needs and concerns. The very notion that the
program is financially beneficial, must be discussed in light of the reality most schools often end
up allocating more than they initially budgeted. Again, school districts must recognize Junior
ROTC’s historical mandate and understand how that mandate could impact the students,
teachers, and parents of the district.
This dissertation has emphasized the historical strains that preparedness ideology and the
dialectical relationship that economic imperialism-expansionism mentality have played in Junior
ROTC’s inception and growth. It is important to recognize the program’s historical prerequisites
or antecedents in relation to its mission as a mechanism for recruiting high school students. The
implications of this research for future scholarship are plentiful. Extended historical investigation
is still needed in the early period. For example, the impetus of the program seems to have been
194
derived from Brigadier General Lytle Brown’s detailed memorandum outlining the proposed
creation of a United States Junior Reserve, located in public secondary schools. Additional
corroborating evidence would no doubt greatly add to this research. Similarly, Junior ROTC’s
consistent enrollment throughout the interwar period, points to a strong connection with the
military and the Great Depression and the public’s view as to the program’s merit. The period
1945 to 1975 also needs more investigation particularly with regard to Cold War era politics,
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s supposed resistance to the program and its subsequent
survival in light of his desire to eradicate it. The relationship between technical-trade or
vocational-education schools and Junior ROTC’s proliferation within those schools needs to be
investigated. There is a significant opportunity in this specific area to analyze the intersections
between race, class, and gender. I also referred to the growing rural and southern enrollment
figures and unit placements. The connection between southern militarism, the state and private
academy systems would prove beneficial for both military and educational historians.
Detailed statistical analysis relative to race, ethnicity and social class is an area that needs
explored and as of this writing no quantitative studies pertinent to enrollment and demographic
characteristics have been conducted. Numerous and irrelevant studies have been performed
comparing Junior ROTC populations with other social groups. These surveys only reinforce the
lacking comprehension regarding the structural aspects of American education and Junior
ROTC’s connection to the public schools. I am aware of the descriptive statistical data’s
shortcomings as presented here. As such, I would encourage quantitative specialists to embark
on a research agenda incorporating Junior ROTC as it would be advantageous to both the
government and private sectors. Scores of raw school district data, Defense Department
statistics, and Army Cadet Command datasets would most assuredly prove lucrative. Mixed
195
methodology would no doubt strengthen any compiled statistical data. Generally speaking, more
viable evaluation studies of Junior ROTC are needed to adequately assess the claims that the
program is indeed beneficial or slanted toward positive outcomes.
In conclusion, should Junior ROTC be a part of our schools? The question is best
answered by asking what we desire as a nation for our youth. Recent estimates point to the fact
94% of our enlisted young men and women have only a high school diploma. Acknowledging
economic conscription’s presence exposes the structural barriers and structural violence
embedded into our schools. Quick-fixes, be they Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, character-education or
Junior ROTC prove inadequate when dealing with children in abject poverty, schools in
disrepair, underpaid and overworked teachers, and vast inequities in school funding. The harsh
realities that plague our children and the inequities they face daily, suggest our agenda must be
greater than simply prescribing military training as a mechanism to improve self-discipline. Our
teacher training schools and in general our universities, must re-situate themselves back into the
communities in which they are supposed to serve. No number of federal dollars designated for
after-school programs or improving standardized testing scores will address the poor conditions
of the schools or the educational attainment of our youth. Bridge programs, consistent and
vigilant efforts at reaching children from kindergarten onward, viable social programs and
addressing the structural violence in our society are vital to making an indelible mark on young
minds as to the essential and liberating potential of education. Public school military training
with all of its alleged financial, social, and behavioral incentives is no substitute for the monetary
and psychosocial investment we must make for our youth. Furthermore, such training results in
the institutionalization of conflict resolution through violent means. Character education that
teaches conflict management and prevention, and school districts that focus concentration on
196
implementing comprehensive educational establishments that tap into a labor pool of working
class kids, are suggestions in addition to the aforementioned bridge programs, which recognize
the often untapped and disregarded potential of disadvantaged young people. To ‘invest’
accordingly, then, requires major structural changes and repudiation of the ‘band-aid’ or quickfix approaches. By embracing the greatest goals of American citizenship and education, America
must first redefine what those goals will be for the next generation and commit to the structural
changes within our school. A renewed and sincere commitment to these ideals will do more to
ensure no child is left behind and that America fulfills what it considers to be its founding
principles.
197
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APPENDIX A
Curriculum Outlines for Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps,
1923 and 2002
TABLE 1 1921 SUGGESTED ROTC JOINT CURRICULUM205
Subjects
Infantry Drill
Physical Training
Military Courtesy and
Discipline
Woodcraft and
Signalling (sic)
Scouting
Rifle Marksmanship
Gallery Practice
Range Firing
Map Reading,
Sketching.
Interior Guard Duty
Minor Field
Engineering.
Auxiliary Infantry
Weapons and
Equipment
Psychology of
Leadership
Tests, Competitive
Drills, Exercises and
Examinations
Explanations
Close and extended order to include the
schools of the soldier, squad, platoon, and
company. Use of bayonet, nomenclature
and care of rifle. Ceremonies.
Calisthenics and mass games
The relation of courtesy to discipline and
efficiency. Military forms of courtesy.
Message carrying and personal hygiene
Patrolling and first aid to the injured
The first, second, third, fourth, and fifth
steps in “Rifle Marksmanship”.
Shooting skills and overview
Minor Tactics to include the platoon by
sand table, tactical walks and field
exercises.
Knots, splices, trench construction, camp
sanitation.
Freshman
Year
Sophomore
Year
Junior
Year
Senior
Year
Percentage of available time to be devoted
to subjects
40%
50%
50%
40%
25%
10%
15%
5%
10%
5%
5%
5%
15%
10%
0%
0%
5%
0%
5%
5%
10%
4%
10%
2%
0%
0%
0%
5%
0%
0%
5%
0%
10%
5%
4%
10%
0%
0%
0%
0%
2%
0%
4%
5%
0%
0%
4%
5%
0%
0%
0%
5%
5%
5%
0%
0%
205
List of courses and outline taken exactly from The Adjutant General’s Office, Schools:
General Instructions and Suggestions, September 6, 1921.
217
TABLE 2 CURRICULUM OUTLINE FOR JROTC, 1997 THROUGH 2002206
LET 1 – First Year
LET 2 – Second Year
LET 3 – Third Year
LET 4 – Fourth Year
Unit 1: Spirit of American Citizenship and
Army JROTC
Chapter Outline –
1. A Look at Army JROTC and Getting
Involved.
2. Foundation of American Citizenship
3. Construction of Citizenship in JROTC
4.Becoming a Model American Citizen
(Introduction to civilian and military career
opportunities is placed in this section).
5. Consumer Education and Budgeting
Unit 2: Communication and Behavior
Chapter Outline –
1. The Importance of Communication
2. Getting your Point Across: Oral
Presentations
3. Winning Colors: Excellence is Not an
Accident
4. Brain Power: Recruiting Skills on Both
Sides of the Brain
5. Learning Styles: Jump Starting the
Learning Process
6. Working out Conflicts
Unit 3: Leadership
Chapter Outline –
1. Leadership and You
2. You can be a Leader
3. Knowing Yourself
4. Leading Your Group
Unit 1: Introduction to LET 2
1. LET 2 At a Glance
Unit 1: Introduction to LET 3
1. LET 3 At a Glance
Army JROTC Building a Bridge
for a Better Tomorrow
Unit 1: Introduction to LET 4
1. LET 4 At a Glance
Indicating a life accomplishment
resulting from your JROTC
experience.
Unit 2: Techniques of
Communication
Chapter Outline –
1. Getting Your Point Across
2. Principles and Methods of
Instruction
Unit 2: Techniques of
Communication
Chapter Outline –
1. Interpersonal Communication
2. Ready to Read
Unit 2: Techniques of
Communication
Chapter Outline –
1. Getting your Point Across
Unit 3: Leadership
Chapter Outline –
1. What makes a Leader
2. Leadership Ethics
3. Management Skills
Unit 3: Leadership
Chapter Outline –
1. The Way of Leaders
2. Leadership Development
Program
3. Human Relations
Unit 3: Leadership
Chapter Outline –
1. Leadership and Mentoring
Unit 4: Cadet Challenge
Chapter Outline –
1. Getting Started on Total Fitness
2. Taking the Challenge
Unit 4: Cadet Challenge
Chapter Outline –
1. Taking the Challenge
Unit 4: Cadet Challenge
Chapter Outline –
1. Taking the Challenge
Unit 5: Leadership Lab
Chapter Outline –
1. Step by Step
2. Leading and Following in Drill
3. Learning How to Drill – Executing Drill
without Weapons.
Unit 6: First Aid
Chapter Outline –
1. Split-Second Emergencies
2. The Second Life Saving Step
3. First Aid Extras
4. Substance Abuse
Unit 5: Leadership Lab
Chapter Outline –
1. Learning How to Lead
2. Company Drill
3. Executing Drill
Unit 5: Leadership Lab
Chapter Outline –
1. Battalion Drill and
Inspections
2. The Saber and the Scabbard
Unit 4: Cadet Challenge
Chapter Outline –
1. Taking the Challenge
2. Nutrition: The Key to
Dynamic Living
Unit 5: Leadership Lab
Chapter Outline –
1. Being a Successful Leader
2. Being a Successful Leader in
Drill
Unit 6: First Aid and Hygeine
Chapter Outline –
1. Being Prepared for
Outdoor Hazards
2. Field Hygiene and
Sanitation
3. Alcohol and Tobacco
Unit 7: Map Reading
Chapter Outline –
1. How to Get There
Unit 6: First Aid and Hygeine
Chapter Outline –
1. Treating Burns
2. Stress Control
3. Alcohol and other Drugs
Unit 6: Drug Abuse Prevention
Program
Chapter Outline –
1. Getting Involved
Unit 7: Map Reading
Chapter Outline –
1. How to Get There
2. Orienteering
Unit 7: Map Reading
Chapter Outline –
1. Air Navigation
Unit 7: Map Reading
Chapter Outline –
1. Don’t Get Lost
2. Where are You?
3. Contours and Landforms
218
LET 1 – First Year
LET 2 – Second Year
LET 3 – Third Year
LET 4 – Fourth Year
Unit 8: Overview of Citizenship through
American History
Chapter Outline –
1. Our American Heritage
2. Our Changing America
- The Founding
- Formative Years
- War and Peace
- The Cold War
- Times of Turmoil
- America’s Challenge to Change
Unit 9: Your American
Chapter Outline –
1. The Constitution of the United States of
America
2. Citizenship, Allegiance, and Respect for
Constituted Authority.
Unit 8: American Military
History
Chapter Outline –
1. The Nuclear Age
2. The Korean Conflict
3. America’s Longest War
4. Changing Times: Since
Vietnam
Unit 8: Geography
Chapter Outline –
1. Exploring the World
Unit 8: American Government
Chapter Outline –
1. The Making of a Constitution
2. Major Principles of the
Constitution
3. Other Governmental
Processes
Unit 9: Your American
Citizenship
Chapter Outline –
1. Basic Rights and Freedoms
2. Dynamics of Freedom
3. Constitutional Basis for
and Values of the U.S. Armed
Services
Unit 9: Your American
Citizenship
Chapter Outline –
1. Role of the Military in the
U.S. Expansion
2. The U.S. Military in World
War I
3. The U.S. Military in World
War II
Unit 10: Career Opportunities
Chapter Outline –
1. The Federal Judicial System
2. Enforcing the Law
Unit 9: American Military
History
Chapter Outline –
1. The American Revolution
2. The Army Helps Build a
Nation
3. The Civil War
4. Experiencing History
Unit 11: Role of the U.S.
Army
Chapter Outline –
1. The U.S. Army Today
Unit 11: Career Opportunities
Chapter Outline –
1. A Guide to Manners,
Portfolios, and Selective Service
Registration
Unit 11: Career Opportunities
Chapter Outline –
1. Personal and Career Planning:
A Commonsense Connection
Unit 12: Technology on the
Job
Chapter Outline –
1. Technology around You
2. Technology on the Job
3. Technology for Fun and
the for the Future
Unit 12: Role of the U.S. Armed
Forces
Chapter Outline –
1. The Nation’s Defense Forces:
- The Department of Defense
- The U.S. Navy
- The U.S. Marine Corps
- The U.S. Air Force
- The U.S. Coast Guard
Unit 13: Technology Awareness
Chapter Outline –
1. Technology and Ethics
2. Protecting our Planet
Unit 12: Science and
Technology Awareness
Chapter Outline –
1. Environmental Awareness
Unit 10: Career Opportunities
Chapter Outline –
1. Exploring Career
Opportunities: “Considering a
Civilian or Military Career”
206
Unit 10: Your American
Citizenship
Chapter Outline –
1. Ethics: The Military and You
2. Serving your Community
Unit 13: Technology Awareness
Chapter Outline –
1. Technology and Ethics
2. Protecting our Planet
ROTC Manual No. 145-4-3, Leadership, Education, and Training, 4 vols. (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army ROTC
Cadet Command, 1997). The information presented in the above table is taken in whole or in part from the table of
contents in each of the four volumes.
219
APPENDIX B
Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps Enrollment Patterns,
1923, 1953, and 2003
TABLE 1 1923 JUNIOR ROTC ENROLLMENTS207
Corps
Area
City and State
Total Number
of High
Schools
1st
2nd
3rd
Bangor, Maine
New York City
Birmingham, Alabama
Chattanooga, Tennessee
Chattanooga, Tennessee
Knoxville, Tennessee
Knoxville, Tennessee
Macon, GA
Memphis, Tennessee
Montgomery, Alabama
Washington, D.C.
Washington, D.C.
Nashville, Tennessee
Atlanta, Georgia
Gary, Indiana
Louisville, Kentucky
Indianapolis, Indiana
Cleveland, Ohio
Owensboro, Kentucky
Chicago, Illinois
Detroit, Michigan
Wisconsin
Michigan (Minus Detroit)
Illinois (Minus Chicago)
Omaha, Nebraska
Omaha, Nebraska
Kansas City, Missouri
Kansas City, Missouri
Joplin, Missouri
Leavenworth, Kansas
Davenport, Iowa
Council Bluffs, Iowa
3
1
4
3 “White”
1 “Colored”
3 “White”
1“Colored”
1
3
1
5 “White”
4 “Colored”
1
4
2
1
2
8
1
23
9
1
1
3
4 “White”
1 “Colored”
4 “White”
1 “Colored”
1
1
1
2
3rd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
High
School
Total
Enrolled
749
Circa 100
582
559
0
550
0
465
880
115
1180
752
775
564
191
602
599
2164
112
3585
816
311
120
761
463
48
691
244
270
133
300
435
Total
Number of
Trade
Schools
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
1
0
0
1
2
0
4
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Technical
School
Total
Enrolled
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
1175
N/A
N/A
512
1670
N/A
1786
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Total Number
of Junior
Cadets
749
Circa 100
582
559
0
550
0
465
880
115
1180
752
775
1739
191
602
1111
3834
112
5371
816
311
120
716
463
48
691
244
270
133
300
435
220
TABLE 1 1923 JUNIOR ROTC ENROLLMENTS (CONTINUED)
Corps
Area
City and State
Total Number
of High
Schools
8th
El Paso Texas
Dallas, Texas
Idaho, Wyoming, Utah,
Washington
Los Angeles, California
Oakland, California
San Francisco, California
TOTAL Units
2
4 “White”
Unknown
9th
8
5
5
126
High
School
Total
Enrolled
500
1757
6927
Total
Number of
Trade
Schools
N/A
N/A
N/A
Technical
School
Total
Enrolled
N/A
N/A
N/A
Total Number
of Junior
Cadets
500
1757
6927
1437
1302
1160
1
1
1
397
424
353
TOTAL
1834
1726
1513
38,471
207
This list appears to be exhaustive of every school under the War Department’s jurisdiction. One key designation, creating a
bit of an illusion here, is the awarding of government aid under Section 55(c) of the National Defense Act. Some schools did not
have the military training as prerequisites. Nonetheless, I am still including their participation as Junior ROTC program, since the
program’s current concept is nearly the same. Section 55(c) is explained previously on page 143. Memorandum from Adjutant
General Archibald Campbell, Commander First Corps Area, to Adjutant General of the Army, Washington, D.C., November 2,
1923; Letter from Eugene Nifenecker, New York City Board of Education, to Major General J.T. Conrad, New York, NY,
October 31, 1923; Memorandum from Adjutant General J.T. Conrad, Commanding General Second Corps Area, to Adjutant
General of the Army, November 8, 1923; Memorandum from Commanding General, Third Corps, to Adjutant General of the
Army, October 31, 1923; (Second attached memo for Third Corps Area cover page for schools in Tennessee, Macon, Georgia,
and Alabama not present in file, dated November 22, 1923); Memorandum from Major Jesse Gaston, Commanding General
Fourth Corps Area, to the Adjutant General of the Army, October 26, 1923; Memorandum from Major General J.H. McRae,
Commanding Headquarters Fifth Corps Area, to the Adjutant General of the Army, October 30, 1923; Memorandum from
Adjutant General Charles C. Smith, Adjutant General Sixth Corps Area, Chicago, Illinois, to the Adjutant General of the Army,
November 10, 1923; Memorandum from Robert Barton, St, Joseph High School, to Commanding Officer, Seventh Corps Area,
Omaha, Nebraska, October 25, 1923; Memorandum from H.E. Mitchell, Kansas City, Missouri, to Commanding Officer, Seventh
Corps Area, Omaha, Nebraska, October 22, 1923; Memorandum from J.T. Menzie, Joplin Missouri, to Commanding Officer,
Seventh Corps Area, Omaha, Nebraska, October 25, 1923; Memorandum from Raymond F. Edwards, Leavenworth, Kansas, to
Commanding Officer, Seventh Corps Area, Omaha, Nebraska, October 25, 1923; Memorandum from C.J. Ballinger, to
Commanding Officer, Seventh Corps Area, Omaha, Nebraska, October 23, 1923; Memorandum from H.H. Galliett Council
Bluffs, Iowa, to Commanding Officer, Seventh Corps Area, Omaha, Nebraska, October 24, 1923; Memorandum from
Headquarters, Eighth Corps Area, response from Dallas High Schools, Dallas High Schools, Dallas, Texas, October 22, 1923;
Memorandum from Headquarters, Eighth Corps Area, response from El Paso High Schools, El Paso, Texas, October 31, 1923;
Memorandum from Headquarters, San Francisco, California Junior ROTC, to the Commanding General, Ninth Corps Area,
November 5, 1923; Memorandum from Headquarters, Oakland, California Junior ROTC, to the Commanding General, Ninth
Corps Area October 31, 1923; Memorandum from Headquarters, Los Angeles, California Junior ROTC, to the Commanding
General, Ninth Corps Area November 1, 1923
221
TABLE 2 1953 JUNIOR ROTC ENROLLMENTS
Army Area
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
4th (continued)
5th
City, State
Bangor, ME
Gloucester, MA
New Bedford, MA
New York, NY
Newport, RI
Ashland, KY
Lyndon, KY
Louisville, KY
Owensboro, KY
Birmingham, AL
Opelika, AL
Montgomery, AL
Tampa, FL
Augusta, GA
Athens, GA
Atlanta, GA
Decatur, GA
Hapeville, GA
Macon, GA
Columbus, GA
Savannah, GA
Jackson, MS
Wilmington, NC
Chattanooga, TN
Johnson City, TN
Memphis, TN
Shreveport, LA
Guthrie, OK
Bryan, TX
Galveston, TX
San Antonio, TX
Dallas, TX
El Paso, TX
Fort Worth, TX
Houston, TX
San Antonio, TX
Canon City, CO
Denver, CO
Pueblo, CO
Chicago, IL
Joliet, IL
208
Total HS
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
3
1
1
13
1
3
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
7
2
1
1
1
1
8
4
6
6
5
1
5
1
33
1
Total Number of Junior Cadets
200
435
150
587
205
275
132
355
250
444
131
219
1914
576
179
2119
215
618
806
542
721
360
363
796
186
1689
789
170
98
179
469
2494
992
981
1231
1248
117
1137
364
5521
144
222
TABLE 2 1953 JUNIOR ROTC ENROLLMENTS (CONTINUED)
Army Area
5th (continued)
City, State
Wattoon, IL
Rockford, IL
Waukegon, IL
Gary, IN
Counsel Bluffs, IA
Davenport, IA
Dubuque, IA
Leavenworth, KS
Bessemer, MI
Calumet, MI
Detroit, MI
Grand Rapids, MI
Ironwood, MI
St. Paul, MN
Faribault, MN
Carthage, MO
Joplin, MO
Kansas City, MO
St. Joseph, MO
Independence, MO
Omaha, NE
Beloit, WI
Prairie Duchien, WI
Cheyenne, WY
Casper, WY
Phoenix, AZ
Alameda, CA
Glendale, CA
Long Beach, CA
Los Angeles, CA
Oakland, CA
Pasadena, CA
Riverside, CA
St. Ignatius, CA
Sacramento, CA
San Diego, CA
San Francisco, CA
Santa Barbara, CA
Boise, ID
Reno, NV
Logan, UT
Ogden, UT
Salt Lake City, UT
Tacoma, WA
Walla Walla, WA
Independence, MO
Total HS
1
2
1
4
2
1
1
1
1
1
15
3
1
1
1
1
1
8
4
1
4
1
1
1
1
5
1
2
2
13
4
1
1
1
2
5
7
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
1
Total Number of Junior Cadets
196
391
524
470
453
286
367
194
111
174
2267
352
198
621
89
159
326
1080
422
241
1321
140
353
307
275
1008
184
249
367
2004
766
115
199
310
258
781
1099
150
459
301
212
489
450
153
277
241
223
TABLE 2 1953 JUNIOR ROTC ENROLLMENTS (CONTINUED)
Army Area
5th (Continued)
6th
208
City, State
Omaha, NE
Beloit, WI
Prairie Duchien, WI
Cheyenne, WY
Omaha, NE
Casper, WY
Phoenix, AZ
Alameda, CA
Glendale, CA
Long Beach, CA
Los Angeles, CA
Oakland, CA
Pasadena, CA
Riverside, CA
St. Ignatius, CA
Sacramento, CA
San Diego, CA
San Francisco, CA
Total HS
4
1
1
1
4
1
5
1
2
2
13
4
1
1
1
2
5
7
Total Number of Junior Cadets
1321
140
353
307
1321
275
1008
184
249
367
2004
766
115
199
310
258
781
1099
Total Enrollment
301
56,275
The Adjutant General’s Office Officer Recruitment Branch, Enrollment Report, (Army Reserve Officers’ Training Corps,
Junior Division Enrollment, July 24, 1953). When military academies are added to the whole number, the total equals 60,526.
Chapter five will analyze the data in more detail.
TABLE 3 1923 JUNIOR ROTC ENROLLMENTS AND TOTAL MALE ATTENDANCE
City
Total Males Attending
Total Males in JROTC
Percent to School Population
Atlanta
4907
1739
35%
Birmingham
2152
582
27%
Chicago
16,726
5,371
32%
Cleveland
11,113
3834
34%
Dallas
2,300
1757
76%
Los Angeles
6463
1834
28%
San Francisco
8,154
1,513
18%
224
TABLE 4 JUNIOR ROTC ENROLLMENT FIGURES, 1992-1999209
Year
Units in Operation
Total Enrollments
1992-93
856
125,700
1993-94
1142
155,534
1994-95
1242
178,271
1995-96
1357
204,821
1996-97
1362
230,498
1997-98
1368
228,163
1998-99
1370
231,060
209
Excel Spreadsheet, Historical JROTC Enrollments, 1964-2002, (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Cadet Command, 2003).
225
TABLE 5 2002-2003 JUNIOR ROTC ENROLLMENTS210
State-City
Total Enrollment of
Schools with JROTC
JROTC Units
JROTC Enrollment
Alabama
Birmingham
California
Los Angeles
Oakland
San
Francisco
Washington,
D.C.
D.C. Public
Schools
Georgia
Atlanta
Illinois
Chicago
Indiana
Gary
Indianapolis
Kentucky
Louisville
Michigan
Detroit
Missouri
Kansas City
New York
NYC
Ohio
Cleveland
Tennessee
Memphis
Nashville
Texas
Dallas
El Paso
H.S.
10,023
Voc-Ed
Unknown
H.S.
10
Voc-Ed
Unknown
H.S.
3,087
50,504
8,594
10,811
3,276
1,755
Unknown
15
5
6
1
1
Unknown
7,974
625
10
8,620
1,571
35,953
210
Median
Income of
School
District211
Voc-Ed
Unknown
Poverty Levels
of Families
with Children
under the age
of 18212
$36,431
30%
3,454
679
1,218
241
119
Unknown
$37,655
$48,445
$47,239
28%
29%
16%
1
2,044
97
$36,442
28%
7
2
1,947
293
$40,878
35%
17,754
27
10
6,523
2,371
$41,815
25%
4,398
6,405
Unknown
2,171
5
4
Unknown
1
709
665
Unknown
330
$40,030
$40,114
28%
22%
1,622
0
1
0
206
0
$39,756
15%
28,671
5,510
20
3
3,908
328
$37,525
28%
6,148
Unknown
7
Unknown
2,019
Unknown
$39,895
28%
14,052
Unknown
5
Unknown
1,200
Unknown
$35,033
28%*
2,586
Unknown
2
Unknown
326
Unknown
$38,522
24%**
22,639
2,265
Unknown
1,956
23
2
Unknown
Unknown
3,888
233
Unknown
290
$36,610
$41,166
24%
17%
33,611
11,640
Unknown
Unknown
19
8
Unknown
Unknown
4,322
1,035
Unknown
Unknown
$42,736
$26,318
25%
33%
Enrollment Data, First, Second, and Fourth Regions. (Fort Monroe, VA: Army Cadet Command, 2003).Though not included
in the above table, the rural enlistments show a definite increase across the board in rural areas and vocational educational
institutions. Also, areas where the term “unknown” appear, does not necessarily imply vocational-education institutions are
211
nonexistent within the district. This is an area that could use extended research.
U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Decennial Census,
Estimated Median Household Income by County: Estimates model 1998 income reported in the March 1999 Current Population
Survey. Table C98-06, California; Table C98-01, Alabama; Table C98-11, District of Columbia; Table C98-13, Georgia; Table
C98-17, Illinois; Table C98-18, Indiana; Table C98-21, Kentucky; Table C98-39, Ohio; Table C98-47, Tennessee; Table C98212
48,Texas; Table C98-36, New York; C98-26, Michigan; Table C98-29, Missouri.
U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Decennial
Census Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates 1999 School District, FTP Files and Description, update February 27th, 2003.
http://landview.census.gov/hhes/www/saipe/school/sd99ftpdoc.html. Data for Cleveland area were averaged together among the
four school districts containing Junior ROTC. Data for New York is for all New York City Public Schools, though there are only
five spread throughout the main boroughs. Online Census Bureau data for the 2000 Decennial Census.
226