Cracks in the Glass Slipper: Local Government Managers’ Perceptions and Cinderella Federalism
Bruce J. Perlman, Ph.D.
Regents’ Professor and Associate Director
School of Public Administration, University of New Mexico
Michael J. Scicchitano, Ph.D.
Director Florida Survey Research Center
Department of Political Science, University of Florida
Yahong Zhang, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
School of Public Affairs and Administration, Rutgers University at Newark
Prepared for the 2014 Deil S. Wright Symposium on Intergovernmental Management: Reflections and
Directions
75th Annual Conference of the American Society for Public Administration
March 14-18, 2014, Washington, D.C.
Glass Slipper - Page 1
Introduction: Outworn Metaphors for Federalism and IGR after the Great Recession
Since its inception, two articles of faith have guided the study of Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) in
the United States. The first is that the three levels of government (Federal, State, and Local) work
together in a formal and informal collaboration to satisfy the needs of the nation’s populace all of whom
are citizens of both the Federal and State Governments as well as residents of local jurisdictions where
they receive most services. The second, is that a series of metaphors can help one understand the
relations implicit in U.S. Federalism (Wright, 1982). The initial vision of intergovernmental relations was
that of the “layer” cake where the federal, state and local governments operated, for the most part
independently of the other branches of government. The other images of intergovernmental relations,
however, the “marble” cake and the “picket fence” suggests a degree of collaboration in which federal
and state governments provide funding and local government provide services. What happens,
however, under severe fiscal stress such as we have had for the past several years in which the federal
and state governments simply do not have the revenues to pass to local governments? Indeed, federal
and state governments may still mandate that existing services be provided and may even issue
mandates for additional services (Perlman, 2010).
The focus of this research is to examine the relationship between federal and local governments and
state and local governments under severe fiscal stress. The data for this research was developed from a
national survey of city (N=306) and county (N=438) managers and other chief officials of local
government. The survey asked a series of questions regarding city and county leaders’ perception of
the relationship between their local government and the federal and state governments. This paper first
provides descriptive information regarding the local government managers’ perceptions of the
relationship between their local governments and the state and the federal government, the other
players in the U.S. IGR system. Second, it tests three hypotheses implicit in our current understanding of
the IGR system and the strength and coherence of their relationship. Third, it examines the implications
of the foregoing for traditional ways of understanding or “telling the story” of the US Federalism and
IGR. Fourth, it suggests a new, allegory for understanding the perceptions of local government actors in
the US IGR system and draws out the implications of this allegory for public policy.
The Old Metaphors
For most of the U.S. national experience, Federalism and its working out through the relations of the
Federal, State, and local governments – a set of transactions later called Intergovernmental Relations
(IGR) – was mostly a concern pertinent to constitutional law. It should be remembered that Dual
Federalism, a concept that continues to be used to mark the relations between the Federal Government
and State Governments, was originally a descriptor for the balance of power between the two achieved
under the doctrine of States’ Rights. The idea of Dual Federalism implied a sort of constitutional
hierarchy as well as a dichotomy. The Federal government had
Two ideas are implicit in the view of a “Dual” federal system. First, that the Federal and State
governments have twin or double roles in governance and are more equal than not, remaining supreme
in their own areas. Second, that both governments have important responsibilities in representing and
serving the public in their spheres, much more so than local governments. It might be said that local
governments were relatively ignored entities in this formal framework as the notion “Dual” implies:
“stepchildren,” so to speak, of the two parent governments. Power is shared between the Federal and
state governments.
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Beginning with the Great Depression, pressure was put on the division of powers, decisions, and
responsibilities, implicit in the idea of a Dual Federalist system. The skyrocketing citizen demand for
governmental support and services as well as the attempts to innovate governmentally like the WPA,
the NRA, and the New Deals, inherently gave a new role to all levels of government. Not only did the
Federal government’s role and that of its partners, the states, change, but even localities and the private
sector had to become involved in serving public needs. Settled patterns of provision gave way to new
arrangements and collaboration across levels of government. In short, the possible still constitutionally
accurate description of Dual Federalism became outmoded practically.
Taking the Cake
In an attempt to characterize the then outmoded view of IGR in Dual Federalism Mortin Grodzins called
it famously, “Layer Cake” federalism (Grodzins, 1960). Holding aside technical and culinary questions
like how many layers, what flavors, and what holds the layers together, this was a useful metaphor for
illustrating the clear notions of separateness, hierarchy, and rough equality implicit in Dual Federalism.
Moreover, it is a metaphor that suggests a larger role for local jurisdictions than they were given
traditionally. This not only better mirrored fact, but was a more accurate model of how people
interacted with government and, eventually, how governments interacted than that presented by the
more legalistic ideas of Dual Federalism. In sum, it was a better model for IGR in practice.
In tandem with the Layer Cake metaphor, and really grounded by it, Grodzins also introduced the
contrasting simile, of the Marble Cake. This type of Federalism, also known as Cooperative Federalism,
as the name implies typifies an IGR system in which the costs, administration, decisions, powers, and
responsibilities of the various types of governments are mixed together. As Grodzin’s says in his famous
work, The Federal System:
The American form of government is often, but erroneously, symbolized by a threelayer cake. A far more accurate image is the rainbow or marble, characterized by an
inseparable mingling of differently colored ingredients, the colors appearing in vertical
and diagonal strands and unexpected whirls. As colors are mixed in the marble case, so
functions are mixed in the American federal system.
Under these conditions, the Federal, State and even local governments mix together to pay for, set
standards for, execute, and evaluate policy activity. One of many examples is the cooperation inherent
in constructing, maintaining, and policing highway and road systems. In this more modern view,
Cooperative Federalism is as much a description of the informal cooperation that has evolved over
time, especially incented by grant in aid programs, rather than a legalistic encapsulation of formal
relations.
Pointed References
One limitation of metaphors is that, while revealing and helpful, they may not depict everything or at
least what is desired. The Cake Metaphor for Federalism and IGR has been extended by several notions
and metaphors, one of these is the idea that Federal, State, and Local relations in delivering programs
and meeting public demand, might best be represented by the metaphor of a Picket Fence. This
metaphor focuses primarily on the relationships at the federal and state levels that develop among
policy professionals in the various cooperating bureaucracies that enable the implementation of
federal polices at the local level through the states. It has been pointed out, variously, that these
arrangements can either disable or enable political officials (Sanford, 1967).
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In this metaphor, the specific policies and programs that are carried out by different governments are
represented by the vertical, pointed pickets in a picket fence. The notion of the levels of governments,
national, state, and local, are depicted by the horizontal boards or slats in the fence. This is a model of
government that involves all levels of government in program implementation as indicated by the
pickets which run from the top to the bottom for every policy or program. The image of the picket
fence is used to visually show how after the 1960’s all levels of government had a stake and an interest
in formulating public policy and carrying out public programs. Challenges as diverse as elementary and
secondary education, welfare, and public housing are the sorts of cross-cutting programs represented
by the vertical pickets of the fence. Support, communication, and, reinforcement are provided by the
federal, state, and local governments portrayed by the horizontal.
Federal programs designed to address urban problems and to meet the needs of the disadvantaged
(e.g., Medicare and Medicaid programs) grew in the 1960’s during the Johnson administration’s War on
Poverty. This saw funding increase substantially to local governments through state governments.
Federal grant programs provided funding to local school districts, governments, and nonprofits rather
than to states. Successful grant applications required clear strategies, well developed budgets, public
participation, and a sound management plan. Also, localities and not for profits had to raise matching
funds to apply for federal grants as well as meet performance and reporting requirements. These grant
programs led to more competitive intergovernmental relations. One interesting factor for the picket
fence metaphor is that although services are directly administered and delivered at the local level, the
resource and equity demands of the system require a funding role for the other two levels
In a similar vein, although the picket fence metaphor does not directly address the role of regional
governments, it has been extended to an attempt to illustrate the workings of intergovernmental
agreements as a cooperative endeavor among governments. Contrarily, this work posits the “slats” of
the fence as the reinforcing parts of the model. This point of view focuses more on the relationships
among lower, or local levels of government through mediated structures like councils of government
than does the conventional model of picket fence federalism, although it does not focus on these levels
directly (Wood, 2002).
Recently, it has been pointed out that this metaphor does not capture well some of the dynamics of
modern Federalism and IGR. For example, Thompson, points out that the picket fence metaphor does
not capture well what has lately been called Executive Federalism (Thompson, 2013). This theory places
more emphasis on the relationships of political executives and their appointees rather than bureaucratic
actors. In addition, others have contrasted this point of view with the new emphasis on a Performance
Based Federalism, though pointing out the difficulty in determining the actual impact of this point of
view (Wong, 2008).
Sound and the Cloud
There have been some attempts to replace these tried and true metaphors and models with new ones.
An interesting attempt has been the work of Schapiro (Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive
Federalism, 2006) (Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: Toward the Protection of Fundamental Rights,
2009), who has attempted to develop a theory of what he calls Polyphonic Federalism. In this theory, he
attempts to address the dualism of contemporary Federalist theories and replace them with one that
preserves the differences in points of view and manages to give a small nod to the role of local
governments. The chief notion in this schema is that the most effective way to portray U.S. Federalism is
not visually, but aurally and that rather than using a visual metaphor, a more adequate one would be a
musical Fugue or Canon. This representation purports to have the advantage of assuring that, individual
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voices are not lost in combination, but rather create a new whole while preserving their individual
nature. Likewise, Bidjerano, uses the metaphor of the World Wide Web or Internet as a representation
of U.S. Federalism (Bidjerano, 2004).
Useful Metaphors?
The usefulness of the foregoing metaphors – and to the same extent the theories that accompany or
react to them – have been criticized as not highlighting what is important in U.S. Federalism or even
being useful as ways to understand them (Weissert, 2011). Additionally, it is not clear that metaphors or
even theories that are not rigorous models can capture the evolving and cyclical nature of U.S.
Federalism and IGR. One might ask for example, how the metaphors and theories can account for subtle
changes in the system that may have occurred and may come back but no longer obtain. For example,
Richard Nathan points out about the states that:
States reshaped programs to their priorities, increased the funding of programs in areas
in which the federal government had become less active, and assumed more control
over the activities of local governments and nonprofit organizations. In these ways and
others, states expanded their influence vis-à-vis the federal government and in their
relationships with local governments and nonprofit organizations (Nathan, 2006).
Do any of the foregoing show this sort of subtle evolution in their depictions? Not only this feature, but
are they able to show what some of the earliest writers on IGR have pointed out as a potential and
possibly desirable evolution of the state internal system into a sort of intra-state federal system with
counties playing a new role (Belmonte, 1973)? Probably, it is for these and related reasons that some of
the leading writers about U.S. Federalism and IGR suggest the use of multiple models for studying U.S.
IGR, even if the contingencies for their application and the definitional criteria for the inclusion and
exclusion of phenomena are not crystal clear (McGuire, 2001). In some respects, the endeavor of
studying U.S. Federalism and IGR should not be just the expansion, extension, and application of what
we know, but the incessant questioning of it. As Robert Dilger has pointed out, much of what we think
we know about U.S. government, Federalism, and the IGR system is not so and it is in the interests of
everyone to challenge assumptions about the workings of U.S. Federalism; for example, national
budgetary policy may not be incremental or grant in aid funding may not be declining really. Continuing
to operate on received wisdom affects both interest groups as well as public officials and thus the policy
making process itself (Dilger, 2000).
In addition, these metaphors fail to capture both significant parts of the U.S. Federal system and IGR,
but also, changes that have occurred recently. As noted in passing above, the least developed
representation in the various depictions of the U.S. Federalism and the IGR System is that of the local
government. These, layers, slats, nodes, notes, or whatever they might be are the least fleshed out in
telling the story of U.S. Federalism. It is tempting to explain this away because of the dependent nature
of U.S. cities and counties as political or administrative entities, but that hardly explains why they have
always been included in the metaphors and theories. Yet, in reality these jurisdictions are where the
rubber of federalism meets the road of governance and it is the effects of changes at the center on them
that tells the story of U.S. Federalism and IGR (Perlman, 2010). As Deil Wright said, “We need to get a
handle on the study of intergovernmental relations in a multilevel and multidimensional way
(Fernandez, 2004).” It is likely that the latter has been better attended than the former. We have not
been very Marxian and turned the received wisdom of Federalism and IGR “on its head.”
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Moreover, the metaphors and models, by their nature cannot account well for changes after
considerable upheavals in the system itself. The most recent example of this is the impact of what has
come to be called the Great Recession (Perlman & Benton, Going It Alone: New Survey Data on
Economic Recovery Strategies in Local Government, 2012). The impact of this near depression like
event from which we are still recovering and its impact has been felt most greatly at the local level of
the economy whether homes or local governments.
In short, the old metaphors of US Federalism may no longer capture what is really going on in the IGR
system today. The economic downturn has stressed the IGR system, possibly to the breaking point. A
Federal Government trillions of dollars in debt is not financially or politically capable of helping other
governments much. Without the possibility of deficit budgeting, State Governments devote every
available dollar to their own operations and dedicate the lion’s share of Federal grants in aid to the
largest and fastest increasing portion of their budgets – Medicare and Medicaid. Local Governments
have shed jobs and reduced expenditures and waited for help from above that has not come.
Meanwhile, shrinking tax bases, growing benefit burdens, increasing service demands, and deteriorating
infrastructure have put local governments against the fiscal wall. Where and how is any of this reflected
in conventional metaphors and models?
The Research
Recently, the authors have surveyed just under 750 (N= 744) local government administrators – both
city and county level – on the actions they have taken to cope with fiscal pressures during and after the
Great Recession and their perceptions about the support they receive from the other two levels of
government. In particular, the questions examine the views of these local managers on the relationship
of their governments with the other two levels of governments: the states, on whom they most directly
depend and the federal government from whom they have gotten most of their resources in the recent
past.
Model
Although the metaphors and attendant theories reviewed above do not apply directly to local
governments, they do present some important potential variables for the current study. The layer cake
metaphor and its handmaiden theory, Dual Federalism, give insight into the importance of authority in
the legal-hierarchy in which U.S. Federalism operates and the constitutional nature of both the national
and state governments and the primacy of the former. The Marble Cake metaphor and accompanying
notions of Cooperative Federalism suggest the way that governments actually operate in practice, in a
much more fluid and shifting manner in which governments work together in a pragmatic and not
always legalistic manner to help each other. The Picket Fence metaphor and contrary points of view
such as Executive Federalism point out the way in which much of U.S. Federalism works using
interlocking and cross-cutting demands and supports and ad hoc program mechanisms whether these
are the result of bureaucratic or political interactions. Newer theories such as Polyphonic Federalism are
more difficult to reduce to variables and suggest the metaphor of a Fugue.
Nevertheless, however U.S. Federalism is depicted, two things remain true. Since 2008, the
environment of U.S. Federalism has changed drastically. The programs of jobs, grants, and aid that
powered the old IGR system since the Great Depression and through the Reagan Administration, no
longer exists. The second is obvious: local governments’ role in and view of IGR is not highlighted in the
dominant metaphors and has been given less attention than that of the other levels. Local governments
roles and views are an afterthought in most of the studies of Federalism and IGR, but they were the
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governments that benefited from and, perhaps, progressed most during evolution of U.S. Federalism,
but have suffered the most in the break up the old IGR system.
To remedy the foregoing, the research reported here, looks at the three important constructs suggested
in the metaphors of authority, support, and burdens for local governments from the States and Federal
governments. It examines the way that changes in these constructs by the State and Federal
government impact the perceptions of local governments of their relations with these other two levels
after the economic downturn. In short, it looks at the perceived relationship between local governments
and the Federal and State governments after the Great Recession.
Hypotheses
The purpose of the research is to shed light on the current views of the local governments of their
relations with the other two levels of government. That is, to tell the IGR story from the local point of
view. This was examined by looking at the relationship of two key dependent variables, revenues and
authority. Because the most direct he responses of the local administrators were analyzed to test the
following three hypotheses, which support each other in a triangular framework:
1. As a local government’s revenues decline, its relationship with the state becomes more negative
and its relationship with the federal government becomes more positive.
2. As a local government’s revenues decline, state governments reduce funding and authority
while adding more burdens to local government; similarly, the federal government does not
provide more support by offering more funding and authority.
3. A Local government’s relationships with the federal and state governments depend on the
change of support from the two levels of government respectively.
Data
The data for this analysis was collected from an online survey that was directed to the chief operating
office for a random selection of cities of all sizes and each county in the U.S. The chief operating officer
was the city/county manager or mayor in those cities with a strong mayor/mayor only form of
government. Multiple reminders were sent to maximize the participation rate. A response rate of
approximately 28 percent was obtained. The survey asked a number of questions regarding the actions
taken by city or county governments in response to the financial downturn. The survey results permitted
the development of six dependent variables and a series of independent variables that are used in the
multivariate analyses reported below.
Dependent Variables
This research focuses on three different measures of the relationship between city and county
governments and the state and federal government. These measures are the dependent variables in the
analysis. Each respondent who completed the survey was asked to select any of four conditions that
pertained to their jurisdiction regarding the current status of "State Support Reduction:"




Decreased funding
Reduced local authority
Increased mandated local activities without funding
Increased local responsibilities without funding
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A second dependent variable was developed from a similar set of items about any increases in support
from the state. Essentially, this variable is a mirror image of the first dependent variable. Respondents
were asked to select any of four conditions that pertained to their jurisdiction regarding the current
status of “State Support Increase:”




Increased funding
Increased local authority
Decreased mandated local activities without funding
Decreased local responsibilities without funding
The same set of questions were asked of the respondents about the federal government. Accordingly,
the two resulting dependent variables are "Federal Support Reduction" and "Federal Support Increase."
Taken together these items provide four dependent variables for this analysis: state "Reduction" or
"Increase" and federal state "Reduction" or "Increase."
These variables are measured by giving a value of "1" each time the respondent indicated the
perception that the federal or state government decreased or increased support. As such, the value of
this variable ranges from "0" indicating that the respondent perceived that no support "Reduction" or
"Increase" actions were taken by the appropriate government to a "4" indicating that all of the
"Reduction" or "Increase" actions were taken.
The final two dependent variables were developed from two similar questions. "Do you think the
relationship between your [city/county] government and the [state or federal] government has
improved, stayed about the same, or gotten worse in response to the economic downturn?" These two
dependent variables are measured by ordinal responses ranging from, "Improved=3," "Same=2" and
"Worse=1." Respondents who indicated that they did not know the answer to a question or otherwise
refused to answer were dropped from the analysis resulting in a total N of 663 cases.
Independent Variables
The survey also provided several independent variables for the multivariate analyses. These were
constructed from the appropriate survey items. The independent variables and their measurement are
summarized below:

Economic Improvement
A factor score developed from three questions about the economic condition of the jurisdiction in
the past three years; 1.) Current condition; 3.) Real estate market; 4.) Job Availability. Survey
responses for each item were "Improve," "Same," or "Worse."

Revenue Change
This was taken directly from a single survey question. Respondents were asked to indicate if their
local government’s revenues over the past three years have "Declined a great deal," "Declined
somewhat," "Stayed about the same," "Increased somewhat," or "Increased a great deal."
In addition, six control variables from questions were used in the modeling to control other factors that
might influence the responses. The control variables used were 1.) Economic Condition – to control for
local economic variability; 2.) Population – to control for variability in the size of the jurisdictions; 3.)
City or County – to control for the type of jurisdiction; 4.) Tenure – controlling for the length of time in
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office of the respondent; 5.) Political Ideology – controlling for ideological influences of the respondents.

Economic Condition
This variable controls for current economic improvement in the reporting jurisdiction affecting
responses. It was measured by a single survey question. It asked the respondent to indicate if the
current economic condition in the city/county is "Excellent (4)," "Good (3)," "Fair (2)," or "Poor (1)."

Population
This variable controls for population differences among jurisdictions. It was taken from a survey
question that categories responding jurisdiction population from "Less than 5,000 (1)" to "500,000
or more (8)."

City/County
This variable is a dummy variable to control for the differences in jurisdiction type. It was coded and
scored as City=1, County-0.

Tenure
To remove the effects of tenure in office by the respondent a question was used to control for this
factor. It asked the number of years a respondent has been in the current position.

Political Ideology
It is also necessary to control for differences in political views of the respondents. Accordingly, they
were asked to self-describe their political views from "Very conservative (1)" to "Very Liberal (5)."
Analysis
Frequencies were computed for the variables detailed above. A multivariate analysis was performed. On
the dependent variables, t tests and chi square tests were performed to see if there is significant
difference between cities and counties. The results show no difference between the two types of local
governments. In addition
Findings
Two categories of results are presented. First, a descriptive analysis of the six dependent variables is
presented in univariate frequency tables. Second, multivariate Ordered Logit Regression Models are
presented for the six dependent variables to help better understand the attitudes of the respondents
toward the actions of state and federal governments as well as the respondents’ overall perceptions of
the relations ship of their government and the state/federal government. In addition, these latter
models test the relationships of the variables to see whether the Hypothesis outlined above about
relationships among the variables are indeed confirmed.
Descriptive Analyses
The tables following present the frequencies computed for the six dependent variables. Each table
presents the number of respondents reporting from none to all four possibilities for the variables above.
Table 1 presents the results for the responses regarding reduction of State support in the categories of
funding, reduction of authority, increase of unfunded mandates or increase of unfunded responsibilities.
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Table 1: State Support Reduction
Number of
Freq. Percent
State Resource
Reductions
0
41
6.18
1
85
12.82
2
123
18.55
3
182
27.45
4
232
34.99
Total
663
100.00
Cum.
6.18
19.00
37.56
65.01
100.00
As Table 1 indicates, 663 respondents answered the questions that make up the variable. Of those
responding, 622 or over 90 percent indicated one or more reductions in support by their state
government. 442 or over about 65 percent responded affirmatively to experiencing three to four
reductions.
Table 2 presents the results for the responses regarding reduction of Federal support in the categories
of funding, reduction of authority, increase of unfunded mandates or increase of unfunded
responsibilities.
Table 2: Federal Support Reduction
Number of
Freq. Percent
Federal Resource
Reductions
0
204
30.77
1
218
32.88
2
113
17.04
3
81
12.22
4
47
7.09
Total
663
100.00
Cum.
30.77
63.65
80.69
92.91
100.00
Conversely from Table 1, as can be seen on Table 2, almost 204 or about 30 percent of the respondents
indicate no reduction at all in federal support and 331 respondents or just barely half report undergoing
zero to two reductions from the federal government. Unlike the states, only 128 or less than one fifth
(19 percent) of respondents report experiencing three to four federal support reductions.
Like the foregoing tables, Table 3 presents the results for the responses regarding State increase of
funding, increase of authority, decrease of unfunded mandates or decrease of unfunded responsibilities.
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Table 3: State Support Increase
Number of State Freq. Percent
Supports
0
559
84.31
1
81
12.22
2
18
2.71
3
4
0.60
4
1
0.15
Total
663
100.00
Cum.
84.31
96.53
99.25
99.85
100.00
When it comes to increases in support, things are somewhat different than in reductions in support and
somewhat more similar between the states and the federal governments. As Table 3 makes clear,
nearly all of the local governments, 559 or 84 percent, did not experience any increase in state support
or attendant reduction of unfunded mandates.
Table 4 presents the results for the responses regarding Federal increase of funding, increase of
authority, decrease of unfunded mandates or decrease of unfunded responsibilities.
Table 4: Federal Support Increase
Number of
Freq. Percent
Federal Supports
0
553
83.40
1
98
14.78
2
11
1.65
3
4
0.60
4
1
0.15
Total
663
100.00
Cum.
84.31
96.53
99.25
99.85
100.00
In these respects, the federal government is almost identical to the states when it comes to support.
Nearly all of the respondents, 553 or 83 percent, reported no increase in support. The federal and state
governments are close to identical in all other categories.
As the results clearly indicate, state government added significantly more burdens to local government
than did the federal government in the three years before respondents answered. Nevertheless when it
comes adding support for local governments, there is no substantial difference in the change of support
between state and federal governments. In other words, although the federal government largely held
local governments harmless during this time and held resources at prior levels and did not add burdens,
neither level of government increased support to local governments in most cases during the same time.
The results of this can be clearly seen in the answers to two other questions asking directly about
perceptions of federal and state relations. The tables below summarize the frequencies on two
questions on whether or not relationships have improved, gotten worse, or stayed the same for local
government and state and federal governments. These results are reported on the other frequency
tables below.
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Table 5 : Relationship with the State
Number of
Freq. Percent
Federal Supports
Worse
401
61.31
Same
217
33.18
Improved
36
5.50
Total
654
100.00
Cum.
61.31
94.50
100.00
As shown on Table 5, perceptions of the respondents are that the relationship with the state and their
local jurisdiction has worsened. Almost two thirds, 401 or 61 percent, of the 654 respondents answering
report this. Only 36 or a little under 6 percent think things have improved and only about a third, 217 or
33 percent, even think things are the same. Almost 95 percent in total think things between the
localities and states are the same or worse and it is almost two to one that see things worse rather than
the same.
Table 6 : Relationship with the Federal Gov’t
Number of
Freq. Percent Cum.
Federal Supports
Worse
176
26.55
26.55
Same
449
67.72
94.27
Improved
38
5.73
100.00
Total
654
100.00
As might be expected, perceived relations with the federal government is nearly the inverse. Only 176 of
the 654 respondents, barely over one quarter or about 27 percent, think the relationship with the
respondents has worsened. The bulk of them believe that things with the federal government are
primarily the same with a sold two thirds, almost 68%, reporting this. Interestingly, just about as many
of the local government administrators thought that things were improving with the federal government
as they did with the states (38 compared with 36 for the states). In sum, 61 percent of local
governments think their relationship with state became worse, while 27% of them think their
relationship with federal government became worse.
Multivariate Analyses
The first four Tables below 7, 8, 9, and 10 examine the factors that explain the reduction or increase in
state or federal support of the local government test Hypothesis 2. This hypothesis captures the
circumstances that as a local government’s revenues decline, the federal government provides more
support by offering more funding and authority. Also, at the same time conversely, state governments
reduce funding and authority while adding more burdens to local governments. Four dependent
variables are involved in this hypothesis, thus four models are offered.
Although the variables are measured in counts of the total number of reductions, one of them (number
of resources reduction from state) does not follow a Poisson distribution, thus a Poisson model or
negative binomial model is not appropriate. Actually, the number of resource reductions from the state
and the number of resource reductions from the federal government can be treated as ordinal variables.
Thus, two ordered Logit models (Tables 9 & 10) are performed for these two outcome variables.
Glass Slipper - Page 12
Table 7: Hypothesis 2 - Reduction in State Support
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
Revenue
-.2590847
.0799504
-3.24
Change
Economic
-.1434539
.1175326
-1.22
Condition
Economic
.0288757
.1256186
0.23
Improvement
Population
.1693422
.0495851
3.42
City/County
.1824612
.1641022
1.11
P>|z|
0.001
[95% Conf. Interval]
-.4157846
-.1023848
0.222
-.3738136
.0869059
0.818
-.2173322
.2750835
0.001
0.266
.0721573
-.1391731
.2665271
.5040956
Table 7 shows that there is a significant negative relationship of the state’s reduction of support while
controlling for the impact of a local government’s economic condition, economic change, and
population. That is, as a local government’s revenues decline, state government will reduce funding and
authority while adding more burdens to local government. This supports Hypothesis 2.
Table 8: Hypothesis 2 - Reduction in Federal Support
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
Revenue
.0454891
.0795394
0.57
Change
Economic
.1868789
. .120947
1.55
Condition
Economic
-.5314595
.1315713
-4.04
Improvement
Population
.0653095
.0481603
1.36
City/County
.4873421
.1628671
2.99
P>|z|
0.567
[95% Conf. Interval]
-.1104054
.2013835
0.122
-.0501728
.4239306
0.000
-.7893345
-.2735845
0.175
0.003
-.0290829
.1681285
.1597018
.8065557
With respect to federal support, Table 8 shows somewhat different results for Hypothesis 2. Federal
government support has a slight but not significant positive impact. That is, as a local government
reports declining revenues, the federal government does NOT reduce funding and authority and does
not add more burdens to local government. As in Table 7, the results control for reported current
economic condition, economic change, population, and type of jurisdiction.
Table 9: Hypothesis 2 - Increase in State Support
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
Revenue
.1389743
.1180891
1.18
Change
Economic
.1179983
.1778066
0.66
Condition
Economic
-.1506095
.1921924
-0.78
Improvement
Population
.058486
.0720478
0.81
City/County
-.1559709
.2446914
-0.64
P>|z|
0.239
[95% Conf. Interval]
-.0924761
.3704247
0.507
-.2304961
.4664928
0.433
-.5272997
.2260806
0.417
0.524
-.082725
-.6355572
.199697
.3236154
Table 9 depicts the third Model run that looks at the relationship of local government revenue decline
with an Increase in the state support variables. The results on this table are not significant. In short, it
Glass Slipper - Page 13
shows that, as a local government’s revenues decline, state governments do not provide more supports
of funding and authority variables.
Table 10: Hypothesis 2 - Increase in Federal Support
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
Revenue
-.0285571
.119887
-0.24
Change
Economic
.0810638
.1789347
0.45
Condition
Economic
.0643527
.1915396
0.34
Improvement
Population
.0782835
.0719339
1.09
City/County
-.4035207
.2508933
-1.61
P>|z|
0.812
[95% Conf. Interval]
-.2635313
.2064171
0.651
-.2696417
.4317694
0.737
-.3110581
.4397634
0.276
0.108
-.0627044
-.8952625
.2192713
088221
Table 10 reports the results of the fourth model run for Hypothesis 2. is It shows that, as a local
government’s revenues decline, the federal government does not provide more support by offering
more funding or authority. Nevertheless it is significant, but merely so. This does not support Hypothesis
2 and therefore, Hypothesis 2 is partially supported only as shown in the first two tables and the second
two which support and do not respectively
Tables 11 and 12 use two models to test Hypothesis 1: As a local government’s revenues decline, its
relationship with the state becomes more negative and its relationship with the federal government
becomes more positive and Hypothesis 3: A Local government’s relationships with the federal and state
governments depend on the change of support from the two levels of government respectively:
In Table 11, local government’s relationship with the state is the dependent variable and an Ordered
Logit model is used to analyze the data. This model is significant. The coefficient of Revenue Change is
significant positive, indicating that, as a local government’s revenues decline, its relationship with the
state becomes significantly more negative. In addition, the coefficient of Reduced State Support is
significantly negative. This indicates that a Local government’s relationship with state government will
be significantly worse as the state reduces resources and adds more burdens on the local government.
Moreover, the coefficient of Reduced Federal Support is positively significant. This means that a Local
government’s relationship with state government will be significantly better as the federal government
reduces resources and adds burdens on the local government. Conversely, the coefficient of Increased
State Support is positive but not significant. On average, a local government’s relationship with state
government will be better as the state government increases support to the local government; however,
this impact is not statistically significant. The coefficient of Increased Federal Support is negative but not
significant. Controls for Population, Jurisdiction Type, and Political Ideology of the reporting
administrator seems not to influence these outcomes.
Glass Slipper - Page 14
Table 11: Hypotheses 1 & 3 – Relationship with the State
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
Revenue
.24408
.1161872
2.10
Change
Reduced State
-.9386689
.1029837
-9.11
Support
Reduced
.3273858
.0976164
3.35
Federal Support
Increased State
.3740501
.2756224
1.36
Support
Increased
-.0014687
.3102417
-0.00
Federal Support
Economic
-.0420321
.1686431
-0.25
Condition
Economic
-.3123342
.1847631
-1.69
Improvement
Population
.160825
.0700964
2.29
City/County
.1013982
.2405731
0.42
Tenure
-.043251
0163424
-2.65
Political
-.2655355
.130624
-2.03
Ideology
P>|z|
0.036
[95% Conf. Interval]
0163574
.4718027
0.000
-1.140513
-.7368245
0.001
.1360613
.5187104
0.175
-.1661599
.91426
0.996
-.6095313
.6065939
0.803
-.3725665
.2885024
0.091
-.6744632
.0497949
0.022
0.673
0.008
0.042
.0234386
-.3701163
-.0752815
-.5215539
.2982114
.5729127
-.0112206
-.0095171
Table 12 presents the results of the model testing the local government’s relationship with the federal
government as the dependent variable. In this Table too an Ordered Logit model is applied. Like Table
11 the model reported on Table 11 is significant.
The coefficient of Revenue Change is negative but not significant, indicating that, as a local
government’s revenues decline, its relationship with the federal government becomes more positive on
average. Nevertheless, this association is not statistically significant. Likewise, the coefficient of Reduced
State Support is negative and not significant. The coefficient of Reduced Federal Support is negative and
it is significant. This means that as reported by the respondents in this data, a local government’s
relationship with the federal government will be perceived as significantly worse as the federal
government reduces resources and adds burdens to the local government. The coefficient of Increased
State Support is negative and is not significant. Table 12 below indicates that the coefficient of Increased
Federal Support is positive and it is also significant. In effect, what this means is that as local
government’s relationship with the federal government will be better off as it receives more support
from the federal government.
Glass Slipper - Page 15
Table 12: Hypotheses 1 & 3 – Relationship with the Federal Government
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
Revenue
-.1311011
.1141423
-1.15
0.251
Change
Reduced State
-.0733047
.0970775
0.76
0.450
Support
Reduced
-.7477991
.0980292
-7.63
0.000
Federal Support
Increased State -.2613756
.2948751
-0.89
0.375
Support
Increased
1.189616
.3390225
3.51
0.000
Federal Support
Economic
.0384144
.1706749
0.23
0.822
Condition
Economic
.3284183
.1809179
1.82
0.069
Improvement
Population
.1160427
.072642
1.60
0.110
City/County
-.1900872
.2363366
-0.80
0.421
Tenure
-.0072861
.0149408
-0.49
0.626
Political
.0854533
.1312403
0.65
0.515
Ideology
[95% Conf. Interval]
-.3548159
.0926137
-.2635731
.1169638
-.9399327
-.5556655
-.8393202
.316569
.5251437
1.854087
-.2961023 .3729311
-.0261742
.6830108
-.0263331
-.6532984
-.0365696
-.1717729
.2584184
.273124
.0219973
.3426795
The data in this study largely confirm the hypotheses. The sample of local government managers, no
matter the state of their jurisdiction’s recovery, population size, their personal political ideology, or their
length of time in office have largely negative attitudes about their state governments and much more
positive ones about the federal government. This seems to occur due to two additional factors. First,
state governments, depending on the federal government as well as their own economies just like local
governments, are seen by respondents as having reduced support to localities by reducing financial
backing, as well as adding constraints, and not reducing responsibilities. Second, the perceptions of
respondents indicate that as a group they do not see the federal government as increasing support, but
they do not see the federal government as reducing support. This is contrary and the obverse of the
view of the state governments. Also, the data shows that while the perceived relationship of the local
governments with the state governments has become more negative, the relationship with the federal
government has not and this is largely due to the perception that the state governments have both
reduced support and not increased it whereas the federal government has only not increased it.
Discussion: Federalism and IGR as a Fairy Tale - Cinderella Federalism?
How should these data be interpreted? Perhaps, taken together, they indicate that from the point of
view of local government managers, the prevalent metaphors and theories of US Federalism and the IGR
system do not capture their intergovernmental reality. Maybe, even more clearly, they do not seem to
lend much credence about newer notions like “collaborative” or picket fence federalism.” If the implicit
notions of “relationships,” whether political or professional, that are found in the latter ideas were
dominant, then the data would not so clearly portray a dependence of attitudes on support. Moreover,
there is nothing in the data that suggests that local governments are looking for ways to adjust the old
IGR system with joint and collaborative formal innovations, for example new regional governance
structures or local buying cooperatives.
Glass Slipper - Page 16
An important point about the data in this study that needs to be emphasized is that they do not report
factual claims about reduced or status quo support for local governments from the other levels, but
rather are assertions about the local perceptions of the behavior of federal and state governments. This
is important for two reasons. First, if as Dilger (2000) suggests, what participants in the federal system
think are the ground facts is of utmost importance and conditions their attitudes about policy in the
system, then these perceptions need to be matched against reality in further research. Second, and
more importantly for this research, the perceptions of local government managers themselves are likely
to endure beyond the changes in the factual landscape. That is, behavior of these actors in federalism
may be best interpreted for some time to come by their attitudes conditioned in the Great Recession
and the stories which they tell themselves.
The data suggest that from the standpoint of local governments, a better way to capture the dynamics
of the post Great Recession federal and IGR system might be to cast it not as a metaphor as it has been
in the past, but as an extended metaphor or allegory. It has been pointed out by many authors that
stories have the advantage over simple metaphorical models – whether visual or aural – of capturing not
only behavior, but also attitudes and even hopes and dreams (Hummel, 1991). Moreover, stories can
capture history as well as the present or even the future. In particular, the story might be told as a
specific fairytale: the Story of Cinderella. The data in this study from the point of view of local
governments are the story of “Cinderella Federalism.”
Been to the Ball
Like Cinderella, U.S. local governments have been to “the Ball” and are waiting for “Prince Charming” to
return while they “scrub floors” under the watchful eye of their “Wicked Stepmother.” “The Ball” was
the earlier period of U.S. Federalism and IGR most often referred to as “Cooperative Federalism” and
worked out, implemented, and administered through the relationships implicit in “Picket Fence” and
“Executive” Federalism. The “Ball” was the thriving period of U.S. Federalism in which a robust national
economy and national policy on grants to the states and localities created much of what we see as the
IGR system today. It is especially tempting to identify “the Ball” with the Clinton years when the federal
deficit was under control and local governments received much of their assistance directly from the
federal government without much state intervention.
The Wicked Stepmother and the Chores
Who is the “Wicked Stepmother?” The data indicate that it is none other than the states who continue
to force poor Cinderella to clean and scrub – that is deliver the bulk of needed services – as they pass
regulatory and governance burdens ranging from election administration, environmental regulation and
public safety (emergency management, law enforcement, corrections) burdens to the local governments
without concomitant funding. This habit of carrying out the bidding of the “Wicked Stepmother” was
developed by poor local government Cinderella prior to attending the ball through the development of a
dependence on the states for their funding. As Nathan (2006) points out:
In the 1980s, when the pendulum of social policy nationally swung toward conservatism,
there was a similar spurt in state activism in response to President Reagan’s domestic
policies to cut domestic spending. States reshaped programs to reflect priorities,
increased the funding of programs in areas in which the federal government become less
active, and assumed more control over the activities of local government’s nonprofit
organizations. In these ways and others, states expanded their influence vis-a-vis the
federal government and in their relationships with local governments
Glass Slipper - Page 17
Mostly, what local governments are doing is continuing to “scrub floors” (reducing costs and delivering
services) while they wait for Prince Charming to return and take them away. This data in this study
could be portrayed as showing local governments to be somewhat resentful that tasks have been
increased by the states and prior funding withdrawn. In short, local governments find themselves
continuing to work for the states, but not being supported in it.
Waiting for Prince Charming
Of course, “Prince Charming” is the federal government itself, who local governments hope, will arrive
to fit the “glass slipper” of financial assistance onto the dainty foot of the “Cinderella local
governments” and make them into Princesses. Then they can tap the royal treasury to pay servants
(employees) to scrub floors (deliver services), and take care of the castle (infrastructure, health and
pension benefits). This point too may capture the attitudes of local governments in the data in this
study. Resentment is not directed at the federal government, but at the states. Perhaps, it is going
beyond the data to cast the respondents at hopeful about their rescue by the federal government and
the future, but clearly they have a more positive attitude about federal support. Whether, this is a
lingering halo effect or hope for the future would take additional research to confirm.
Conclusion
It may be too early to tell whether Prince Charming will return, but slow economic growth, continued
weak job expansion, and international turmoil do not present a rosy picture for the near future for local
governments. The usefulness of the allegory, as indicated in passing above, is not that it captures the
current facts only, but that it might be extended into the future. It is just possible that Cinderella will
never get out bondage or that she must figure out how to “run-away” and find new prospects. In reality
this potential outcome could take the form of the increased attempts at local economic development
and even international trade seen in some local jurisdictions to the greater interlocal collaboration that
has been repeatedly heralded.
This research points out four things using a historical view of portrayals of U.S. Federalism and IGR, data
from local government managers, and a final allegory. First, that while illustrative and analytically
useful, traditional metaphors and models of U.S. Federalism and IGR are somewhat static and do not
capture reality well, under-portray the local point of view. It is not clear that this can be “fixed” in any
way, but rather needs to be recollected in application of such descriptions. Second, that stories may be
useful complements to these metaphors and models of U.S. Federalism and IGR because they can
narrate the metaphorical snapshots and develop accounts that include current facts and changes in
them. Third, that attitudes about the federal and IGR system matter and endure in government actors.
Even though their behavior is paramount for explanation, explaining it requires some understanding of
what they see when they are acting and to what they are reacting. Fourth, that U.S. Federalism and IGR
are today in a period of reconfiguration and challenge as they were after the Great Depression. What
cannot be determined just yet is whether the “Glass Slipper” is cracked or solid and whether in the long
run it will fit.
Glass Slipper - Page 18
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