Submission Type: 2011 SAAP Paper Submission
Title: “Privileging Possibility: Constructing an Epistemology of
Possibility in W.E.B. Du Bois”
Abstract
It is hard to imagine finding the strength in the early 1900’s to rise up and fight
against the catastrophic circumstances that rampant racial inequalities produced without
having a strong faith in the real possibilities of something better. Appealing to such
possibilities is not merely an act of hope, however, but an epistemic endeavor that
necessitates the inclusion of all those suffering from inequality and exclusion. This is
seen in the epistemology that W.E.B. Du Bois offers in Darkwater. This epistemology of
possibilities not only adds to our conception of epistemology, but further serves as an
additional piece to feminist standpoint epistemology given that it has generally been
concerned with marginalized or oppressed knowledge positions. Therefore I propose to
elucidate an epistemology of possibilities that emerges in Du Bois’s Darkwater and show
the ways it adds to the greater goal of feminist standpoint epistemology.
1
Paper Submission:
Introduction
In an optimistic moment W.E.B. Du Bois muses, “What a world this would be
when human possibilities are freed, when we discover each other, when the stranger is no
longer the potential criminal and the certain inferior!”1 One can’t help but wonders if this
appeal to the possibilities tucked away in humanity is representative only of a momentary
overexcitement in human potential, or if there is something more Du Bois is appealing to.
One place to begin looking for answers is in the epistemology created by Du Bois in
Darkwater. The particular epistemology that emerges from Du Bois is one concerned
with marginalized epistemic positions and the knowledge these positions contain. This
emphasis on marginalized standpoints is similar to reformulations that have come out of
feminist critiques of epistemology. Therefore, the role of possibilities as it functions in
Du Bois’s epistemology is something new that can be added to the larger conversation of
feminist standpoint epistemology.
In order to place the epistemology of Du Bois in the larger context of feminist
standpoint epistemology a small overview epistemology will first be given. This will be
followed by a relevant critique of feminist epistemology formed by Uma Narayan. Next,
what an epistemology of possibility would entail will be explored through W.E.B. Du
Bois’s Darkwater. This exploration will include how Du Bois’s epistemology of
privileging of the various possibilities different standpoints bring answers Narayan’s
critique.
1
W.E.B. Du Bois, “Of Work and Wealth” pp.78.
2
Standpoint Epistemology and Du Bois’s Possibility
Traditional epistemology has been under scrutiny from feminists, post-colonial,
and race theorists for quite some time and continues to be a site for productive
engagement. The traditional epistemic frameworks under scrutiny generally situate a
knower as a neutral, rational observer and the knowledge generated from this ‘objective’
viewpoint as neutral and value-free.2 Many feminists contend that this ‘objectivity’ is in
fact a masquerade and that the supposedly neutral ‘knower’ is really male, western, and
privileged; thus the knowledge generated from this false neutrality is not value free and
instead contains the values imbedded in this social position. As a result, in an attempt to
undermine this “abstract, rational, and universal image” of a neutral knower creating
‘value free’ knowledge, feminists have advanced a standpoint theory of epistemology.
Feminist standpoint epistemology claims that “in contrast to the modernist view” of an
abstract, universal knower “knowing agents are local and heterogeneous” because
“agents as knowers are “embodied,” having specific gender, racial, class, historical, and
cultural locations that shape the content of their thought”.3 Attention to the sociohistorical standpoint of an agent makes who the knower is and where the knower comes
from as epistemologically relevant fact. Furthermore, some feminists have claimed that
particular standpoints coming out of marginalization or oppression can contain a certain
kind of privileged knowledge.
Marginalized standpoints can be seen as privileged in the sense that they
challenge the dominant paradigm by incorporating a view of both the oppressed and
oppressor. For instance under the paradigm of patriarchy women can be seen bringing
2
3
Elizabeth Potter, Feminism and Philosophy of Science: An Introduction, pp. 136.
Ibid.
3
an “ “outsider” perspective to epistemological issues that provides insights not readily
accessible to men, who benefit from the status quo and who therefore have less incentive
to question it.”4 In other words “oppressed groups, whether women, the poor, or racial
minorities may derive an “epistemic advantage” from having knowledge of the practices
of both their own contexts and those of their oppressors.”5 Additionally, then,
constructing marginalized standpoints as containing a certain kind of privileged insight
brings value to knowledge claims and knowledge positions that may have been
previously devalued under the traditional epistemic paradigm.
Feminist standpoint theory and the theories of privilege that accompany some
conceptions have not, however, come without critiques. Since neither feminist standpoint
epistemology nor the critiques constitute a homogenous group I will continue to focus on
the standpoint epistemology that inscribes privilege with marginalized positions in
conjunction with a critique of this method by Uma Narayan. In “A Nonwestern Feminist
on Epistemology” Narayan recognizes the useful tools that come out of feminist
standpoint epistemology, and the revaluing of previously discarded knowledge as a
positive but complicated task. Using her nonwestern standpoint Narayan outlines four
different lines of thought in feminist standpoint epistemology, critiquing three of them.
First, Narayan reminds us that some “themes of feminist epistemology may be
problematic for nonwestern feminists” due to the function that traditional roles of women
play in nonwestern societies as the main, and sometimes only, site that ascribes any kind
of importance to women.6 She claims, “in nonwestern countries feminists must still
stress the negative sides of the female experience within that culture and that the time for
Jorge Valadez, “Standpoint Epistemology and Women of Color” pp. 72.
Uma Narayan, “A Nonwestern Feminist on Epistemology” pp. 265.
6
Ibid., pp. 258.
4
5
4
a more sympathetic evaluation is not quite ripe.”7 In other words, this makes ascribing
privilege to a historically devalued epistemic position and the knowledge it generates
risky; it allows oppressors to claim that since such traditional locations are so privileged,
the oppressed should just stay there, and are perhaps not oppressed at all. Next she
critiques the emphasis western feminists put on the marginalizing effects of positivism
because in many nonwestern settings positivism is not the main culprit and yet the
marginalization of certain epistemic positions occurs nonetheless. By keeping the focus
on positivism, some of the other culprits in epistemic disenfranchisement may escape
culpability. Lastly, Narayan questions the privileging of the “critical perspective” and
“double vision” that oppressed groups may have by claiming that this double vision
doesn’t always lead to a positive criticism of oppression. Indeed, this critical perspective
ascribed to oppressed peoples can have negative ramifications by keeping one in a
schizophrenic state of constantly choosing between two views, of accepting the
oppressors view as better, or feeling alienated by both sides.8 These critiques of feminist
epistemology do not lead Narayan to conclude that we should abandon it but, instead, that
critical analysis of different settings needs to be continually considered.
Narayan’s critique is timely given the various minority communities that
constitute the West, many of them immigrant communities that have brought their
traditions with them, her critiques speak well to the multiple considerations and epistemic
positions that should be attended to. By considering these critiques a conception of
epistemic privilege dynamic enough to account for those marginalized through various
7
8
Ibid., pp. 259.
Ibid., pp. 266.
5
factors can be constructed. This new conception can be thought of as an ‘epistemology
of possibilities’ and will be elucidated through W.E.B. Du Bois.
An epistemology of possibility highlights the epistemic function of formulating
particular possibilities of what can be on the basis of knowledge that is garnered from
particular experiences of oppressed positions. It is this function of creating possibilities
on the basis of certain experiences unavailable to those in dominant epistemic positions
that allows for a privileging of marginalized standpoints. If we consider that epistemic
standpoints are characterized by distinctive relations which produce a unique set of
possibilities, the hypothesis creation that arises from such unique standpoints serve to set
up a range of hypothetical conditionals that express different possible courses of actions.
These hypothetical conditionals and the possibilities that they open up are key part in
arguing for the inclusion of marginalized standpoints as necessary in developing the
widest picture of any epistemic community.
Those in the margins have had to place a strong emphasis on possibilities that
their experience and knowledge led them to create as a mechanism for survival. Martin
Luther King Jr.’s “dream” can be seen as a tangible possibility forged out of the
knowledge of the oppressive structure of racism, and the possibilities that could be
reached in its elimination. W.E.B. Du Bois gives us a conception of standpoint
epistemology that privileges the knowledge of the oppressed because of the possibilities
for change they can introduce into larger contexts.
Du Bois is keenly aware that he is equipped with a knowledge forged out of
racism and that this knowledge has thus far been ignored. In the “Postscript” he states
that he is aware of the things “of which men think” and that he has “only to add a point of
6
view: I have been in the world, but not of it;” his knowledge has been ignored by larger
epistemic communities and Du Bois thus calls for its inclusion. 9 He calls for this
epistemic inclusion on the basis that marginalized epistemologies bring new possibilities,
which aren’t present in the dominant paradigm. This leads to his formation of a new
possibility for the meaning of whiteness, his claim that democracy needs to include the
possibilities inherent in all people, and finally the new possibility of womanhood as
exemplified through black women.
Du Bois realizes his marginalized epistemic position has been forged from his
experiences and thus that this epistemic position can be used to inquire into the larger
problem of racism. In “The Souls of White Folk” Du Bois describes himself sitting high
above the human masses in a “tower”, a position that allows him to “see in and through”
the “Souls of White Folk”.10 Coming from what he describes as “unusual points of
vantage,” evoking the “Double Consciousness” he is famous for, Du Bois is positioned to
see into the nature of whiteness in a unique way.11 This knowledge position, his seat in
the tower, is not given but attained through the experience of being black in America. As
Du Bois tells us, the knowledge he gains of white folk is “not foreign…not the
knowledge of the traveler or the colonial composite” but is instead a knowledge derived
from the “bone of their thought and flesh of their language”.12 That is, particular ideas
and actions coming from white America lead to experiences that allow Du Bois not only
see the ways “their thought” and “language” construct him as a black man, but how it
W.E.B. Du Bois, “Postscript” pp. xxiii.
W.E.B. Du Bois, “The Souls of White Folk” pp.21.
11
Ibid. For an in depth treatment of how Du Bois situates how he can see both what white people think of
him as a black man and themselves as priviledges whites, see The Souls of Black Folk where he explicitly
talks about ‘double conciousness’. For the purpose of this essay espitemology will be extracted from
places such as “The Souls of White Folk” where it can more easily be missed.
12
Ibid.
9
10
7
simultaneously constructs whiteness as well. Du Bois is thus able to critique whiteness
because he has access to a particular form of knowledge that comes from an epistemic
position formed out of racial oppression.
In his critique, Du Bois is able to form new possibilities of what whiteness as a
racial category means. For example, he places the emergence of the category of
whiteness in connection with a racial hierarchy that puts whiteness at the top and is
institutionally perpetuated. The institutional perpetuation is shown to persist in schools
simply “by emphasis and omission to make children believe that every great soul…was a
white man’s soul…every great thought…a white man’s thought.” 13 This hierarchy
allows knowledge claims to take on an authoritative position that both perpetuates and
does not disrupt the “assumption that of all the hues of God whiteness alone is inherently
and obviously better than brownness.”14 In order to challenge the knowledge claims
coming out of the epistemic position of whites Du Bois appeals to other possibilities of
what whiteness mean, inserting his own knowledge claims and constructing whiteness as
oppressive and dominating. This destabilizes the notion of whiteness as superior by
adding other possible notions that he was able to create from his particular epistemic
position.
Furthermore, Du Bois argues that the particular knowledge that arises from
marginalization must be given a voice in order for different possibilities of larger
relations to be taken into account. We see the recognition of this unvoiced knowledge in
“Of The Ruling Of Men” where epistemology and democracy go hand in hand. Du Bois
illustrates the inability of one to truly know the thoughts or ideals in others by invoking
13
14
Ibid., pp. 22-23.
Ibid., pp. 22.
8
something like James’ theory of “certain blindness.”15 Du Bois tells us that when
forming democratic practices, “intelligent men, not only knew little about each other but
less about the action of men in groups” which led them to false assumptions of who could
and should vote. 16 He then claims that the vote needs to be extended to everyone in
society regardless of skin color, gender, or class since those who have thus far been
ignored in the democratic process are in fact situated in an epistemic position and that
this knowledge regarding one’s own situation must be voiced through their vote.17
The fact that many segments of society have been denied the right to vote denies
the state as a whole of “The vast and wonderful knowledge of this marvelous universe”
that is “locked in the bosoms of its individual souls.”18 By making the argument that
every individual contains within them a particular knowledge that must be used in order
to make the state as a whole the best it can be, Du Bois calls for universal suffrage by
respecting the many places that knowledge can come from and the many unlocked
possibilities in those positions. Du Bois directly says that “only the man himself,
however humble, knows his own condition” and that it is here where we find “sources of
knowledge” that are yet untapped.19 Not only is it true that “only the sufferer knows his
suffering” but also “that no state can be strong which excludes from its expressed wisdom
that knowledge possessed by mothers, wives, and daughters” or any other
William James, “On Some of Life’s Ideals” pp. 3-4. James talks about a “blindness” that prevents us, “in
an absolute way on the value of other person’s conditions or ideals
16
.W.E.B. Du Bois, “Of the Ruling of Men” pp. 105.
17
Ibid., pp.111. Du Bois claims that even “the best monarchy, suffered from lack of knowledge” since “in
the last analysis only the man himself, however humble, knows his own condition” and that democracy
gives us a chance, through the vote, to allow each person regardless of background to make their interests
known.
18
Ibid., pp. 109.
19
Ibid., pp. 111
15
9
disenfranchised group.20 Thus, this theory of democracy is based on the inclusion of all
in a society since everyone, even the most humble, come from a particular knowledge
position which allows for certain possibilities to form that are invaluable to the
democratic process and the strength of the nation. Strength and invaluable knowledge
also comes from the last place we will search for epistemology in Du Bois, the place of
women.
In, “The Damnation of Women” Du Bois writes about the predicament of black
women. What is important to note is that because he sees black women coming from a
particular vantage point, a new knowledge of the world and women’s place in it emerges.
In fact, when describing the various movements of the “modern cause” such as “the
problem of the color line and the peace movement” Du Bois remarks that when, “two of
these movements – women and color – combined in one, the combination has deep
meaning.”21 This deep meaning is expressed in the way that black women have
reformulated traditional womanhood.
The particular history of oppression and struggle that black women are situated in
significantly challenged the reigning idea of women and work. Du Bois sees the
damnation of women to be an ideal of womanhood that demands the sacrifice of
intelligence and work in order to have children.22 However, economic circumstances
forced black women to work whether or not they had children and Du Bois argues that
instead of deploring these women this model of womanhood should be supported as an
“efficient womanhood” as a new, and for Du Bois better, possibility of what womanhood
20
Ibid., pp.112.
W.E.B. Du Bois, “The Damnation of Women” pp. 140.
22
Ibid., pp. 128. Du Bois says that what the world wants is “healthy babies and intelligent workers” but that
“Only at the sacrifice of intelligence and the chance to do their best work can the majority of modern
women bear children. This is the damnation of women.”
21
10
could be that is formed directly out of black women’s realities. This new definition
opens up new possibilities for freedoms and rights for women and Du Bois acknowledges
and promotes these freedoms saying that women must have “life work and economic
independence. She must have knowledge. She must have the right of motherhood at her
own discretion.”23 These freedoms are both demanded by and can be attained by a new
model of womanhood, efficient womanhood, as they promote intelligence, work, and
having children as in agreement with each other. Traditional roles of women are thus
opened up by providing new ways of considering women’s roles that reflect the
experiences of the women Du Bois is concerned with. After examining these new
possibilities for race, democracy, and gender roles how Du Bois’s epistemology responds
to Narayan’s concerns can now be turned to
Narayan’s first concern is that when standpoint epistemology revalues the
position of women that are marginalized because of the knowledge it creates, there is a
risk that this revaluation functions to keep women in traditional roles, even if these roles
are harmful. Du Bois privileges certain epistemic positions because of the new
possibilities they bring to a situation to conceive of “true and worthy” ideals that “frees
and uplifts a people; a false ideal imprisons and lowers” and the only way to see if an
ideal is uplifting or imprisoning is to check it against a larger context or goal.24 This
provides a paradigm where traditional roles are being attended to only with a larger goal,
or problem in mind. For example Du Bois turns to the traditional role of “womanhood”
to show how racism and gender intersect in a way that lead black women to actively
reconstruct and produce a new model of womanhood.
23
24
Ibid.
W.E.B. Du Bois, “The Souls of White Folk” pp. 24.
11
Next, Narayan claims that positivism cannot be the main culprit for epistemic
disenfranchisement for everyone. Du Bois is clearly in agreement as positivism is never
mentioned. Instead, Du Bois situates a person’s experience as the main factor in creating
an epistemic position. This allows for multiple culprits of epistemic disenfranchisement;
sexism, racism, positivism, a mixture of all three, or something else entirely. Also, by
basing the formation of an epistemic position as something that arises as a result of one’s
experience where one is located in relation to certain systems is taken into account.
Accordingly, while the system of racism in America equips Du Bois with an epistemic
position that allows him to come up with new possibilities regarding the meaning of
whiteness or the reason behind the World War25 it is seen to limit the scope of possibility
creation for whites.
Therefore, the experience of being the dominant race in a system of racism limits
the possibility of whites for valuing non-whiteness. Du Bois records this, and his
irritation, recalling the numerous well-intentioned whites who see him as a “poor, unwhite thing” who “know, too well, that the curse of God lies heavy” on him.”26 This lack
of conceiving better possibilities in relation to race is not always so benign however.
Everything in the history of the United States, from slavery to Sunday
supplements, from disenfranchisement to residence segregation, from
“Jim-Crow” cars to a “Jim-Crow” army draft – all this history of
discrimination and insult festered to make men think and willing to think
that the venting of their unbridled anger against 12,000,000 humble,
upstriving workers was a way of settling the industrial tangle of the ages.27
Du Bois sees the “competition for the labor of yellow, brown, and black folks” as “the cause of the
World War.” See “The Souls of White Folk” pp. 32.
26
Ibid., pp. 22.
27
W.E.B. Du Bois, “Of Work and Wealth” pp. 72. In this essay in Darkwater Du Bois describes the East
Saint Louis Riots giving a complicated account of the various forces, such as newly free labor from slaves
and the interests of industrial giants, that served to turn workers against each other.
25
12
The experience of discrimination here leads white laborers to neglect other
possibilities such as forming unions with African American workers and instead
leads to the predictable conclusion of blaming black workers, and eventually
violence.
Lastly, Du Bois is again in agreement with Narayan as he too does not by any
means situate marginalized knowledge as purely positive. He is very clear about the pain
and suffering racism has caused.28 However, he is equally clear that the knowledge of
the sufferer must be used to undo the situation that has caused such pain. He claims that
one reason African Americans are denied the right to vote is because “They [those who
deny African Americans the vote] assume that white people not only know better what
Negroes need than Negroes themselves, but that they are anxious to supply these needs”
however “They cannot “understand” the Negroes; they cannot protect him from cheating
and lynching.”29 Therefore, even if this double-vision or double consciousness is painful
it and the circumstances that formed it can only be made visible, and thus attended to, if
the person experiencing it is given a voice.
It should be emphasized that this does mean that every person situated in an
oppressed position possesses a critical perspective that allows for a revolutionary critique
of power structures. But if we take seriously that “no one knows himself but the self’s
own soul” in conjunction with problems that some ‘self’s’ might be dealing with such as
28
A particularly telling place of this suffering is in Du Bois’s description of the fear he endures everyday
as he worries about and encounters discrimination:
“I arise at seven. The milkman has neglected me. He pays little attention to colored districts. My white
neighbor glares elaborately. I walk softly, lest I disturb him. The children jeer as I pass to work. The
women in the street car withdraw their skirts or prefer to stand. The policeman is truculent. The elevator
man hates to serve Negroes. My job is insecure because the white union wants it and does not want me. I
try to lunch, but no place near will serve me. I go forty blocks to Marshall’s but the Committee of Fourteen
closes Marshall’s; they say white women frequent it.” W.E.B. Du Bois, “Of Beauty and Death” pp. 171172.
29
.W. E.B. Du Bois, “Of the Ruling of Men” pp. 113-114.
13
lynching, it is imperative to give voice to those in oppressed position if only in order to
see the fuller picture of the situation.30 Without taking seriously the knowledge from
oppressed groups, the possibilities groups may have formed in light of and in response to
oppressive practices, may never be illuminated and oppressive structures never
dismantled.
Conclusion
I conclude by returning to another inspiring quote from Du Bois; “Infinite is
human nature. We make it finite by choking back the mass of men, by attempting to
speak for others, to interpret and act for them, and we end by acting for ourselves.”31
This infinity is seen in the infinite amount of ways human beings can form to live and
relate to each other. We can form and function under systems of inclusion or exclusion,
oppression or liberation. How one paradigm of relating and living with each other is
shifted depends on the possibilities for change and new ways that are put forth by people.
Du Bois recognized this and in his effort to find ways of living that didn’t involve racism
and prejudice he privileged the formation of new possibilities that accompanied
marginalized epistemic positions. By privileging a marginalized epistemic position on
the basis of the possibilities it can offer to current problems, a practical reason for
privileging certain standpoints that keep a larger problem in view emerges. Du Bois
privileged these standpoints because he could see the possibility of a brighter future
ahead, even in his darkest moments he never shuts out the possibility for change.
30
31
Ibid., pp. 109.
Ibid.
14
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