3D03 - Assignment 4 2. Thermodynamics of biochemical reactions (10 marks) This question concerns the following two molecules that are intermediates in the glycolysis pathway. 3-phosphoglycerate (henceforward PG) 1,3-bisphosphoglycerate (henceforward BPG) The following reactions represent the hydrolysis of BPG to PG and the hydrolysis of ATP to ADP. Pi denotes an inorganic phosphate ion. BPG + H2O → PG + Pi G’ = -12.0 kcal mol-1 ATP + H2O → ADP + Pi G’ = -7.7 kcal mol-1 G’ denotes the free energy change at standard conditions of 1M concentration for the organic molecules and physiological conditions of H+, Pi etc. The enzyme phosphoglycerate kinase can catalyze the reaction of transfering a phosphate from ATP to PG: ATP + PG → ADP + BPG reaction 1 (a) What is the free energy change G’reac for reaction 1 under the same conditions? (Hint: you can imagine that the enzyme couples the first two reactions together, but you should find that reaction 1 will not proceed spontaneously in the forward direction). Turn the first reaction round. Its G’ becomes positive. Then add them together. The sum is reaction 1. The Pi and the H2O are the same on both sides so they don’t contribute. PG + Pi → BPG + H2O G’ = +12.0 kcal mol-1 ATP + H2O → ADP + Pi G’ = -7.7 kcal mol-1 ------------------------------G’reac = + 4.3 kcal mol-1 (b) From G’reac calculate the equilibrium constant for reaction 1 under these conditions. The temperature is 25oC, and the gas constant is R = 1.987 cal mol-1 K-1. K = exp(-G’/RT) = exp(-4300/(1.987 × 298)) = 7 × 10-4 1 (c) The cell is not at standard conditions. Write down the free energy change for reaction 1 in the cell (Greac) as a function of the free energy change at standard conditions (G’reac) and the concentrations of the molecules involved. RT ln answer: Greac Greac [ ADP ][ BPG ] [ ATP][ PG] (d) The cell maintains the ratio of [ATP]/[ADP] at approximately 10. If the ratio [PG]/[BPG] = r, how big must r be in order to make reaction 1 thermodynamically favourable? We want to know when is Greac < 0. 1 RT ln Greac 0 10r RT ln 10r 0 Greac / RT ln 10r Greac 1 / RT ) exp( Greac 10 r > 0.1 × exp(+4300/(1.987×298)). r r >142 3. Quasispecies (10 marks) This question will develop a simplified version of the Eigen theory for populations of replicating sequences. The question is long because it tells you exactly what to do at each step! There is not much calculation or writing to do, but I would like you to work through the equations so that you understand what they mean. Let there be a master sequence that replicates at rate A0, and suppose that all other sequences replicate at rate A1. If 0 is the fraction of the master sequence in the population, then the mean replication rate is A o A0 (1 0 ) A1 . (3.1) In the diagram below, the black circle represents the master sequence, and the white circles represent the 1-mutant neighbours of the master sequence. There are many sequences with 2 or more mutations that are not shown. 2 The sequences are of length L. When a sequence is replicated, there is a probability u that a mutation occurs at each site, and a probability 1-u that it is accurately replicated. The probability that the master sequence is replicated exactly (with no mutations) is Q00 (1 u ) L . We are considering u << 1 and L >> 1, so we can make the approximation that Q00 (1 u ) L exp( U ) , where U = uL. Check with a calculator that this approximation is good (e.g. when u = 0.001 and L = 1000). We may now write d0 (3.2) 0 A0 Q00 0 A dt Here, we have ignored the degradation rates D that were in the Eigen theory (and in the lectures) because they do not make much difference to the answer. This means that the “mean excess production” is just A . The first term in (3.2) is the rate of accurate replication of the master sequence. The second term represents dilution of the medium at a rate A . This is required, so that the total concentration of all sequences remains constant (i.e. there is competition for resources). Equation (3.2) does not include a term for mutation from a 1-mutant neighbour back to the master sequence. This term is negligible if L >> 1, because almost all mutations of a 1-mutant neighbour will take you further away from the master sequence (as indicated by the arrows in the diagram). (a) At equilibrium, d0 / dt 0 . By combining (3.1) and (3.2) obtain the equilibrium concentration 0 as a function of U, A0, and A1. At what value of U does the error threshold occur? (Follow the same steps as in the notes). At equilibrium, assuming 0 0, A0 Q00 A . Therefore A0 e U 0 A0 (1 0 ) A1 A0 e U A1 0 A0 A1 The error threshold occurs when e-U = A1/A0. Therefore U = - ln (A1/A0) = + ln (A0/A1). 3 (b) Draw an accurate graph of 0 as a function of U for the case where A0 = 2 and A1 = 1. Use the range of U between 0 and 1 on the x axis of the graph. What is the numerical value of U where the error threshold occurs in this case? 0 = 2e-U-1 Error threshold is at U = ln(2) = 0.693 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.693147 0.7 0.9 1 0.902459 0.809675 0.721416 0.637462 0.557602 0.481636 0.409376 0.34064 0.275256 0.213061 0.1539 0.097623 0.044092 0 0 0 0 0.090246 0.161935 0.216425 0.254985 0.278801 0.288982 0.286563 0.272512 0.247731 0.213061 0.16929 0.117148 0.057319 0 0 0 (c) Now let 1 be the fraction of 1-mutant neighbours (i.e. the sum of the concentrations of all the sequences exactly 1 mutation away from the master sequence). The probability that a 1-mutant neighbour is accurately replicated is Q11 exp( U ) , the same as Q00. The probability that a 1-mutant neighbour is created by mutation of the master sequence is Q10 uL(1 u ) L 1 U exp( U ) . Now we may write: d1 0 A0 Q10 1 A1Q11 1 A dt (3.3) We already know from (3.2) that, at equilibrium, A A0 exp( U ) . Hence, show that 1 0UA0 /( A0 A1 ) at equilibrium. Draw the curve for 1 on the same graph as in (b). d1 0 A0Ue U 1 A1e U 1 A0 e U 0 dt result follows immediately. For these numerical values 1 = 2U0 = 2U(2e-U-1) At equilibrium 4 (d) Describe in words what is happening to the population of sequences when U is close to 0, when U is midway between 0 and the error threshold, and when U is above the error threshold. 4. Prisoners’ dilemma (5 marks) The prisoners’ dilemma model uses the following payoff matrix. You C D C R S D T P Me In the standard evolutionary version of the game, players meet at random. If is the fraction of cooperators, the average payoff to a cooperator is AC R (1 ) S , and the average payoff to a defector is AD T (1 ) P . The average payoff to the population as a whole is A AC (1 ) AD . It is supposed that the fraction of cooperators obeys the equation d ( AC A ) . (4.1) dt (a) For simplicity, consider the case where P = S = 0 and R = 1, so the only variable parameter is T. The temptation is more than the reward (T > 1). d Work out the equation for in this case. Show that will always decrease, i.e. dt cooperators will always die out. AC = AD = T A 2 (1 )T d ( 2 (1 )T ) 2 (1 )(1 T ) dt But is between 0 and 1, so 2(1-) is always positive. T > 1, therefore d is always dt negative. (b) In the spatial version of the game, each site plays against its 8 neighbours and a copy of itself. The fitness of a site is the sum of the payoffs from these 9 games. The payoff parameters are as in (a), with only T considered as variable. Calculate the fitness of the cooperator marked C1 below and the defector marked D2. Under what conditions does C1 have higher fitness than D2? Hence, show that a small cluster of cooperators surrounded by defectors can sometimes expand, i.e. the cooperators do not always die out in the spatial game. 5 D D D D D D D D D D D3 D D D C C1 D2 D D D C C D D D D D D D D D D D D D D Fitness of C1 = 4R + 5S = 4 Fitness of D2 = 2T + 7P = 2T C1 is better than D2 if 4 > 2T, i.e. if T < 2. As long as T is not too large, cooperators will survive. Additional information - A single C on its own cannot survive (prove this!), but a larger cluster, for example a 3×3 square of Cs can also survive if T < 2. To understand the behaviour of the model it is necessary to consider many different configurations that could arise. Nowak and May show that if T < 1.8, the Cs take over the whole lattice. If 1.8 < T < 2, both C and D survive together. If T > 2, Ds take over the whole lattice. (c) This is a point to think about. No answer is required for this part. If u = 0 in the error threshold theory, Q00 = 1. Hence, equation (3.2) looks the same as equation (4.1). There is an important difference, however. In the error threshold theory, the rates A0 and A1 are constants, whereas in the prisoners’ dilemma, the payoffs AC and AD are functions of the frequencies of the strategies. This is called ‘frequency dependent selection’. It is an essential part of evolutionary game theory models. In (4.1), we assumed that the strategies were accurately reproducing. However, we could add ‘mutations’ in strategies if we wanted. We could say that the offspring of a C becomes a D with a small probability u (and the same from D to C), while the offspring is the same strategy as the parent with probability 1-u. How would this change equation (4.1), and what difference would it make to the outcome? 6