Mitch Hernandez
PHIL 190 – Nietzsche
Essay
Analyzing and Critiquing Subjection of Women
I have long had a curiosity regarding societal norms and how easily we fall into them – both
unconsciously and consciously perpetuating tired, old stereotypes. This unconscious adherence to
established norms in turn affects the way we function when we try to step back and critique the very
norms that we uphold in our daily lives. In this way our critique of societal norms, including gendered
ones, becomes a bit hollow in so far as it remains a product of our unquestioned assumptions of how
the world is ordered. I claim that Mill makes this error in his work regarding the status of women. In
this essay I will first examine selections of Mill's The Subjection of Women, exercising caution to avoid
judging it outside of its historical contextualization. Next I will critique the work, examining how
unconscious ideology is at play in his prescriptions for ending the inequity between genders. I claim
that due to unconscious ideology working itself into his work, Mill's prescriptions already unwittingly
carry with them patriarchal undertones that subvert some of his aim. Finally, I will offer some
suggestions as to how we may redeem Mill's work within the contexts of Mill's own philosophy.
In analyzing the selections of Mill's The Subjection of Women I will want to avoid the error of
judging him outside of his historical reference point. Realizing that the status of women was much
more abysmal during Mill's era than it is today I will try to tamper a bit of my critique accordingly.
What Mill had to say at the time must have certainly been inflammatory as it unabashedly and
unequivocally claimed that the laws that bond women to men in a manner much like slaves – and in
some cases much worse as women did not enjoy the reprieve from servitude that slaves did – ought to
be done away with and replaced by law that promotes equality and liberty between the sexes. The laws,
Mill argued, are not bound by principles of justice but are carried over from early human society in
which woman was bonded to man on the basis of her importance attributed to her by man as well as her
lesser physical strength. The system of laws that subjugate women are not the product of empirical
evidence or public deliberation between the sexes, but is rather the product of a theory that benefits the
party of men (5351) For highlighting the lack of moral and empirical groundings on which the
subjugation of women exists Mill ought to be applauded.
I believe Mill was also wise to critically examine the ways in which the servitude of women to
men differs from that of those explicitly in slavery. Whereas slaves obey their master due to fear – be it
fear of the whip or society or religious sanction – men demand much more than mere obedience from
women. They also demand their sentiments – their emotional labor – and for this traditional forms of
control will not due. Mill highlights the way in which women are indoctrinated via education to accept
a gender role that has them submit their lives to men. It is only via this naturalization of gender roles by
means of education tailor made for women that they act in means desired by man. Mill correctly argues
that we should not make appeals to the nature of the two sexes since we may not know anything of the
nature of the two sexes so long as we are bound within the current paradigm of social relations (536).
This is another astute point made by Mill.
I also believe his argument is well rounded in that it does not make the appeal simply on the
basis of woman's interest, but on that of society as a whole. Society stands not only to benefit from
“doubling the mass of mental faculties available for the higher service of humanity...”, but also by the
propelling one another to greater heights within the institution of marriage as man and woman “can
have alternately the pleasure of leading and of being led in the path of development.” (541) In addition
to these more tangible effects man will also benefit from the “moral regeneration” that will commence
once this ill social arrangement has begun to be dealt with. These arguments are strong in so far as they
appeal to more than just the purportedly sole interested party of women and show the real benefits that
will go far beyond women themselves and benefit all of society.
Mills claims within this essay are strong, well made and certainly suggest a radical approach to
1 All citations from class selections from The Subjection of Women in Mill course reader, unless otherwise noted.
dealing with the issue in light of his time. However, whether we examine Mill in the context of 19th
century Europe or the 21st century globalized post-modern world there is still much room for critique.
While Mill makes claim against those who appeal to the nature of the sexes by arguing that such nature
is not nature at all but a product of education he himself falls into the very trap of naturalizing gender
roles that he writes against in chapters two and three. It is unfortunate that this occurs, but it also
illustrates just how formidable a tool naturalization is in the upholding of one's ideological assumptions
of the world. Via the process of naturalization we come to understand what is socially constructed as
simply 'the way things are', as basic facts about the world. As Marx succinctly defines ideology in
Capital: “they do not know it, but they are doing it”. Even in deconstructing how gender roles are
established Mill reverts back to ideological assumptions when making prescriptions for how society
ought to be ordered in light of his observations of how it already is.
In chapter two Mill opens by criticizing the laws of his time concerning marriage. “The two are
called 'one person in law', for the purpose of inferring whatever is hers is his...”, but this maxim is not a
universal one and grants the man chief custody of all possessions within a marriage – including
children (537). At this point, Mill is in the service of equality in so far as he critiques laws that favor
the male party in the arrangement of marriage. However, after the opening Mill seems to revert back to
old assumptions as to how marriage should be ordered.
In speaking of how domains of power ought to be decided Mill makes an appeal to naturalized
gender roles: ...the common arrangement, by which the man earns the income and the wife
superintends the domestic expenditure, seems to me in general the most suitable division of labor
between the two persons.” (538) Mill calls this the “natural arrangement”, and while this may have
been the most suitable arrangement in Mill's time given heavy bias against women being breadwinners
he nonetheless fails to question it as the social construction it is. Rather, he passively takes the
assumption as natural and thus passes it onto to his prescriptive claims of how to end gendered
inequality. In this fashion, although Mill's suggestions undoubtedly present a bettering of the situation,
they are nonetheless tainted by gendered expectations of what one's proper role in the household should
be2.
This is not the only instance in which Mill, unwittingly or not, allows gendered assumptions to
infiltrate his prescriptions. Later in chapter two Mill seems to restrict the activity that women may
undertake that conflicts with the role Mill sees fit for them when they marry. Mill claims that a woman,
like a man when he chooses a profession, chooses to take on the responsibilities of child rearing,
household management and so on while renouncing all objects “not consistent with the requirements of
this.” To be charitable to Mill he does insist that “the utmost latitude ought to exist for the adaptation
of general rules to individual suitabilities”(539). However, we must note that Mill's suggestion that
women should not take up tasks that explicitly interfere with their role of managing the household
follows only if we accept that that ought to be their role in the first place.
Finally, in chapter three Mill makes one last assumption on the role of women that has to do
with brain structures and capacities. Operating from the assumption that men have the larger brain and
women the greater activity of cerebral circulation he argues that women do tasks best that require
rapidity of a succession of thoughts as opposed to working on a singular complex problem (539-40). I
believe here, as well as in the other examples, Mill makes the error of buying into gender roles as if
they were natural and then moving forward with these assumptions as he makes prescriptions for how
to proceed into a state of gendered equity. While the claims that Mill makes do offer an improvement
over the condition of women that Mill identified in his time, I do not believe they are enough to wholly
undue a patriarchal system as the claims themselves carry with them unquestioned gendered
assumptions.
Fortunately, I do not believe the solutions to my critique of Mill lie wholly outside of the scope
of Mill's philosophy itself. Rather, by linking applying some of the suggestions Mill makes in his
2 And by extension society, as our conceptions of the household so often penetrate our conceptions of how we expect one
to function in the public sphere.
treatise on the status of women to his own assumptions about their status we may be able to push Mill's
philosophy further than its original limits. An answer to the problem of Mill's repeated naturalization of
gender norms resides in more resolutely heeding Mill's advice to critique the forms of education given
to woman (and men) that teach gender roles and relations between man and woman as a natural
phenomenon. Rather than passively accept such roles as natural and gender specific we should examine
them for ways in which they have been socially and culturally constructed to be gender specific. Once
this task has begun we may then ask the questions regarding how these constructions impact groups on
the basis of justice and equality. After putting these roles up to scrutiny in terms of the inequality they
perpetuate we may then move on to questioning whether such roles could be fulfilled by either man or
woman.
I believe this would be the true extent of Mill's critique of education if we were to fully draw
out its implications. A successful critique of education would not entail merely questioning it as Mill
does decently enough, but also putting into practice the lessons derived from that critique so as not to
fall into the same traps of gendered assumptions, albeit in a better condition, that we have before.
Additionally, this would also mean examining the education of boys so as to substantively deal with the
other half of the equation. This does not alter Mill's suggestions for what ought to be done, but merely
extends them in such a way as to realize the extent that assumptions play in our ideological
constructions of the world and in turn attempt to ethical examine these assumptions.
Finally, taking such a course of action to question and do away with strict gendered expectations
of what one's role ought to be in society would be wholly in line with Mill's view that holds
individuality to be of great value. Individuality makes one more valuable to both herself and the society
at large (On Liberty, 41), so to preclude the full development of one's individuality by casting them
within rigid gender roles to to prevent the development of society.