Possible Responses to the Open Question Argument
The argument claims that we can always ask in a meaningful way if a
particular natural property really is good. For example, we can ask,
‘Is pleasure good?’, or ,’Is happiness good?’, and these questions
seem reasonable, suggesting that these natural properties are not
really identical with moral ones. If they were identical then we
would find the question ‘closed’ – not in need of an answer. Here
are two responses which have been put to the open question
argument. Do you find them convincing? Why (not)?
1
A question may have the appearance of being legitimate, in
the sense of standing in need of an answer, but it actually
has an objectively correct answer of which many of us are
not consciously aware. It is possible that we act in ways
which suggest we all think happiness is good, but we can’t
necessarily understand this as a universally true
statement. One analogy is with grammar. Is the following
question one which has an obvious answer?
Is it the case that a gerund must always be preceded by
the possessive adjective? May I say ‘This is me being
difficult’, or must I say ‘This is my being difficult.’?
2
Another defence of naturalistic reductionism in the face
of Moore’s open question argument is that we can believe in
the reducibility of moral properties to natural ones, but we
needn’t think this will be reflected in our use of language.
For example, a competent user of the language can know
‘water = H20, but it is still a meaningful question to ask if
water is the same as H20. If a competent user of English
can doubt that water = H20, then why can’t she doubt that
pleasure is good. In each case the existence of doubt fails
to undermine the claim that her there is a correct answer.