Reproductive Technology and the Dignity of Human Life:
A Review of Paschal Nwaezeapu’s Books
Fr. Anthony A. Akinwale, O.P.
President and Professor of Theology
Dominican Institute
Ibadan
The task to which I have been assigned is to review, from the point of view of Catholic theology, two books written by Fr. Paschal Nwaezeapu.
The first is entitled When Does A Human Person Begin? Moral Status of
the Embryo and Technology, while the second is entitled Bioethics:
Childlessness and Artificial Reproduction!? I must admit that, to the credit of the author, his impressive clarity of thought and presentation have significantly reduced the burden imposed on me as reviewer.
These two books represent his understanding of and contribution to three issues. The first issue is treated in the first book. It is the morality or otherwise of abortion. The author addressed the issue by making an inquiry into the moral status of the human embryo. The second issue is that of childlessness, while the third is the issue of morality or otherwise of artificial reproduction as an antidote to childlessness. These two are treated in the second book.
My review of these two books is in two parts. First, I intend to state briefly what is discussed in each chapter. Then I shall discuss the quality of the contribution of the two books to the debate on reproductive technology.
I take When Does A Human Person Begin? as the first book because its conclusion actually prepare reader for Bioethics. The author began the first book on a brilliant note by leaving no one in doubt as to his understanding of the issue. He wrote: “the central issue in the debate on the foundation of the human person is to determine whether human personhood can be defined ontologically in terms of membership of a given species, such as the biological species homo sapiens, or should it be defined in terms of the functions a being is capable of performing.
Better still, should we view it from the perspective of the inherent and actual psychological or mental capacities a being possesses?” (When
Does a Human Person Begin?, 3). This introductory statement of the question leads the reader to the first chapter of the book where the author undertook a brief exploration into the concept of person. Two inseparable questions are raised and addressed: what is a person? And when does a person begin? The author believes that knowing what a

2 person is and at what point in the development of the human embryo one can begin to view it as a person worthy of a measure of respect and protection are of crucial importance in the debate on abortion.
The philosophical quest to know what is constitutive of the human person cannot be embarked upon intelligently by relying exclusively on the resources of philosophy. For while the quest may be philosophical, it would amount to methodological ineptitude to ignore the findings in other field and subject specializations necessary to bring the quest to fruition. The author, in the second chapter of the work, avoids such a futile exercise. Instead, he gathers and examines evidence from current biological sciences regarding the beginning of the human person.
The third chapter examines various philosophical and moral perspectives on the status of the embryo. The manner in which the author engages these different perspectives manifests an admirable grasp of issues. Here he categorizes the divergent philosophical positions on the inception of human personhood into two schools of thought, namely, the personalist and the personist. While the personalist locates the beginning of the human person at the moment of conception, the personist locates it at different stages in the development of the human being. The ontological view of the personalist school sees a fundamental convergence of identity between the human person and the human being at the conceptual and practical levels. On the strength of the definition of person proposed by Boethius and Thomas Aquinas, that is, an individual substance of rational nature, the personalist school would argue that human personhood begins at fertilization and continue until natural biological death when the soul is separated from the body.
Consequently, embryos, fetuses, mentally handicapped, newborn and comatose patients are persons. But personist opponents of this view argue that there is no moment of conception as evidence provided by modern biology point to the fact that fertilization in the human being is a process of 22 to 24 hours in duration from the penetration of the sperm into the outer layer of the ovum to syngamy. The personist argues that personhood begins sometime after birth and may actually end prior to natural biological death.
The fourth chapter provides a more detailed explanation of functionalist personist theories. These are theories that predicate the personhood of human beings and animals on the basis of their ability to perform certain functions. In other words, functions define the human person, instead of the human person defining his or her functions. A person becomes a person either at the point where he becomes capable of experiencing pain or pleasure, or when the brain begins to function, or when psychological traits of self-awareness, rationality and sociability become manifest. Some theorists are of the opinion that the embryo

3 becomes a person fully or partially when its first movement in the womb can be detected. Before then it may be aborted. Others are of the opinion that the human embryo may be aborted before it becomes sentient.
Moreover, the human embryo, a terminally suffering patient, or one who is permanently comatose, since they lack the traits of self-awareness, rationality and sociability would not be persons and their lives may be terminated.
The fifth chapter brings in contributions from three religious traditions, namely, Roman Catholicism, Islam and African traditional religions, as well as government commissions. According to the author,
Roman Catholicism attributes personhood at the moment of conception, not in the course of embryonic or human development. The “human being” and “human person” are interchangeable. Islam, for its part, sees the human being and the human person as identical and attributes personhood at the moment of conception. It is therefore understandable why, in Islam, abortion is prohibited as a morally unacceptable violation of human life. It is permissible only in some extreme cases which the author cites (cf. 87-88). The author points out that traditional African philosophies do not see personhood as an ontological attribute but the achievement of a moral agent. It is an acquired status. While this comes close to the theory of moral agency of some western philosophers,
Africans view conception as the beginning of human life that deserves celebration and not termination.
Chapter six explores the implications of the moral status of the human embryo for some technologies. The author is of the view that if the human embryo, the early developing organism of the biological species homo sapiens is a person deserving of moral respect and consideration, it would raise serious ethical questions for biomedicaltechnological procedures such as artificial reproductive technologies, prenatal diagnosis, cloning and the human embryonic stem cell and germ cell research. Fr. Nwaezeapu devotes greater attention to these and related issues in his second book But before reviewing this second book, the conclusion drawn in the first book must not be ignored.
Briefly reflecting on the moral status of the human embryo within the context of the problem raised by the position that the human embryo may be used for research prior to the 14 th day post-fertilization, Fr.
Nwaezeapu argued that it would amount to promoting or succumbing to a tyranny of biological sciences if the personhood of the human embryo were to be determined solely on the findings of these sciences. He identifies with the official position of the Roman Catholic Church that the present findings of science do not provide any substantial support to those who defend abortion since the same science points to the embryo as the presence of human life. Here, one might point out that even if

4 some theorists, like the personists, would not accept the identification of
“human person” and “human being”, an identification which the author sees in the statement of the Catholic position, none can deny the emergence of human life as that which begins to take place at the moment of conception. What has been conceived, even prior to the 14 th day, is not any of the other animals. And it would be unjust to destroy human life at any stage of its development.
This conclusion of the first book opens the way to a review of the second book, Bioethics. The debate is undertaken within the context of childlessness. The first chapter of the book attempts to provide an understanding of marriage which, I must confess, I consider to be too brief for such a vast topic. That chapter itself can be developed into another book. Perhaps because the book is about bioethics, the author seemed to have hastily passed over this issue. Moreover, weighty theological statements are attributed to early Church fathers through secondary sources instead of consulting the texts of the fathers. I believe the quality of that chapter would have been significantly improved upon by way of a more detailed research into such a vast area as theology of marriage. In future, if and when, perhaps, a new edition of the book would be written, his diachronic treatment of the theology of marriage would be in need of a synthesis.
The second chapter, devoted to causes of infertility and the problem of childlessness, shows that the author understands the biological, psychological and sociological issues surrounding childlessness in contemporary Nigeria. The high premium given to childbearing occasions trauma in women in the event of childlessness, and the desperation to employ any means possible.
In the third chapter of the work, one encounters in Fr. Nwaezeapu an author whose subject specialty is not reproductive technology but whose knowledge and description of the various techniques of artificial reproduction can make any expert in the area envious. Yet, this knowledge of the techniques of the science is well balanced by his excellent grasp of the ethical issues raised on both sides of the debate.
While those in support of artificial reproductive technology would anchor their position on its pragmatic use and on the autonomy of the individual, an autonomy understood as the right to control one’s reproductive capacities, those who are against its use would point at the deliberate destruction and manipulation of human embryos, the reduction of human beings to commodities, the separation of procreation from conjugal love, lack of certainty of the long-term effects on offspring, the exploitation of surrogate mothers, the absence of bonding between the child and the surrogate mother, and the openness of non-therapeutic pre-sex selection and design to sex discrimination.

5
In chapter four, the author examines the input of Roman
Catholicism, Islam and African Traditional Religions. What interests me here is what he makes of the Roman Catholic position. Roman
Catholicism’s evaluation of the morality of artificial reproductive technology uses two criteria, namely, the dignity of every human person, and the imperative of responsible procreation which respects the right of the child. Every human life is a gift from God. Created in the image and likeness of God, every human being is always an end, not a means. The dignity of the mother, of the spouses, and of the child must never be sacrificed on the altar of science and technology. The dignity of procreation, the spouses’ right to love and fidelity, and the child’s right to two parents living together in a community of love and life are at grave risk when procreation is separated from the sexual act engaged upon in the context of the marital covenant. The Catholic Church teaches that there should be no child without sex just as she says there should be no sex where is there is artificial inhibition of the procreative process. The procreative and unitive dimensions of the sexual act ought not to be separated simply because one wants to have a child. In any case, a child is a gift from God, not a right.
The author brings the book to a conclusion in chapter five with a number of recommendations: a curative technique for infertility, the use of natural procreative technologies, health education towards the prevention of infertility, to mention but these. The desirability, possibility and modality of each of these recommendations will surely generate a lively debate among scientists, moralists and ethicists.
What I have done so far is to examine the contents of the two books, and this examination provides only a sneak preview. But to really appreciate the immense value of the books, it is of utmost importance to make some observations on the issue that runs through the two books, and on the method deployed by the author.
From the Roman Catholic point of view, the author demonstrates a keen awareness that the central issue in the discussion is the nonnegotiable dignity of every human life from the womb to the tomb. The
Roman Catholic position is to be understood within the larger context of the social teachings of the Church. At the heart of this social doctrine is the consistent affirmation of the dignity of the human person. The author refers to how, in the course of his systematic explication of the
Christian doctrine of one God in three persons, Thomas Aquinas had adopted the definition of person provided by Boethius. Boethius had defined a person as “an individual substance of rational nature”. In other words, rationality is what distinguishes the person. Today, however, there is lack of unanimity as to what makes a person a person and as to the beginning of this distinguishing quality.

6
While the author did not explain this lack of conceptual unanimity.
It is sufficient to point out that it is traceable to modern philosophy’s collapse of the distinction between person and nature. Whereas “person” answers the question “who”, nature answers the question “what”.
French philosopher, René Descartes, reduced the human person to thinking. Other philosophers, such as the empiricists, reduced the human person to feeling. Even though there are variations of these two positions, it is clear that, in either case, the human person was reduced to just one of the functions of human nature. The human being is thus understood as a machine that functions or a mobile bundle of sensations. A machine that has ceased to function without any prospect of repairs is to be disposed off. In the same vein, a functionalist understanding of human life does not see anything human in an embryo.
Since the embryo does not function, and since the worth of a thing is calculated in terms of its ability to perform the function for which it is made, a technocratic view of functionalism does not see its value. If at all it has any value, it is the value it has as a biological specimen useful for reproductive technology and embryonic stem cell research. The dignity of the human person is calculated on the human being’s ability to function, more specifically, ability to maximize profit, pleasure and power. This technocratic and functionalist approach predicates the dignity of the human person on its utility for science, technology and the economy.
Experience shows that this functionalist anthropology is not alien to the traditional African mindset. By virtue of this homegrown functionalism, the personhood of the woman in traditional Africa is predicated on her reduction into a being who must perform three functions—that of a domestic slave, that of an object of sexual gratification, and that of a child producing machine. If she is not able to perform any of these functions, she is to be discarded. That is what we find when a childless woman is subjected to humiliation and trauma by society and by her husband and his family. In an attempt to avoid this humiliation, this trauma, artificial reproductive technologies are seen as the solution irrespective of the ethical issues they raise.
Now I must fulfill my second promise, to examine the method used in the two books. The value of the two books I have had the privilege of reviewing lies also in the way the author showcases the rich intellectual formation that the Catholic provides for her priests. The method used in
Fr. Nwaezeapu’s books make the reader encounter a worthy representative of a venerable intellectual tradition, of an institution that played an often forgotten role in pioneering university education, a role which many who formulate and execute education policies in our land have chosen to gloss over. At a time when we witness the reduction of university education into incarceration in the ghetto of specialization,

7 these two books enable the reader to participate in a rich fête
scientifique—a rich scientific banquet—in which an enlightened interdisciplinary conversation takes place with science and technology, philosophy, religion and anthropology as interlocutors. That this is in unflinching fidelity to Catholic idea of university education is seen when we go down memory lane.
In 1852, the famous English ecclesiastic, John Henry Newman, having received a mandate from the Catholic Bishops of Ireland to establish a Catholic university in that country, delivered a number of discourses on his vision of what such a university must be. The Bishops had themselves been inspired by Pope Pius IX to establish the university.
These discourses, jewels of English prose, are to be found in the book
The Idea of a University. In them, Newman painted the picture of the university as a vast field divided into three major fields of knowledge.
One part of this field concerns knowledge of nature. This would correspond to our faculty of natural sciences today. Another concerns knowledge of the human person, of the history of peoples, their writings, their philosophies etc. This is our faculty of humanities today. Then, there is the field that concerns knowledge of God and of divine realities.
This is the faculty of theology or divinity of today. A university, by the very fact of the name, is a universe of knowledge. No province of knowledge should be excluded from it lest its intellectual integrity be violated. Arguing for the right of the Catholic Church to be involved in university education, articulating his idea of a Catholic university, and writing principally to respond to the challenge of empiricist philosophers of the time, philosophers who would exclude the teaching of religion from the university curriculum, Newman made a robust case for the inclusion of theology in the curriculum, not just the study of religion as a phenomenon. Its exclusion would compromise the identity of the university. It is not a case of science alone, or the arts alone, or theology alone. It is a case of a holistic education.
If we are not to fall into the ditch of science without conscience, the point has to be made today, as Newman did in the 19 th century, that universities are not just meant for the teaching of science and technology and agriculture. They are not just for teaching young minds about money and machines, about techniques of maximizing power and profit.
It is not a matter of denigrating science and technology. It is a matter of avoiding their hegemony. Science and technology in general, reproductive technology in particular, must be at the service of human life, human life must not be placed at the service of science and technology. Science and technology must promote and not compromise the dignity of human life. Universities, for their part, play a major role in the development of peoples. Yet, authentic development is not just progress in science and technology. It is the fulfillment of the human

8 person within the attainment of the common good. An anthropology that reduces the human person to a thing, a machine or biological specimen, will take us out of the realm of meaning, out of the realm of I-Thou, that is, the realm of inter-personal relationship, into the realm of I-It where mutual manipulation and or manipulation of the speechless and defenseless towards depersonalization become the norm. Such an anthropology begets a moral philosophy in which the criteria of rightness or wrongness of our actions are possibility, profitability, pleasurability and expedience.
Fr. Nwaezeapu’s inter-disciplinary approach, manifest in his competent inclusion of science, religious and philosophical anthropologies in his research, challenges us to revise our notion of education in Nigeria, to come out of our tunnel vision of university education, so as to learn the whole objective truth about the human person. Then the human being does not become a victim of la
chosification, the reduction of the human person to a thing to be used, abused and discarded. These books will be of immense benefit to medical practitioners, jurists, ethicists, moralists, and theologians.
Reading these two books is a way of paying the author our debt of gratitude.