Unofficial translation
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE SITUATION IN THE AREA
OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
AND ITS DELIVERY VEHICLES: THREATS, ASSESSMENTS,
OBJECTIVES AND THE WAYS OF THEIR REALIZATION
PREFACE
The openness of any state in relation to its priorities in the area of
international security is the most important tool to strengthen trust, improve
predictability in international affairs and promote multilateral solutions to
problematic issues. The National Security Concept, Foreign Policy Concept,
and Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation are the fundamental program
documents which have established these priorities.
The present publication is devoted to one of the most important issues in
the area of international security - non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and their delivery vehicles. Lately this subject-matter has
gained even more urgency due to the threat of some WMD components being
used by terrorists. President of the Russian Federation V.V.Putin has designated
the non-proliferation problem as "the most important issue of the present".
The proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as
missile delivery vehicles is among the important factors which determine the
nature of the threats to the national security of the Russian Federation in view of
its geographical location and the length of its borders. This issue is in the focus
of attention of the Russian leadership, which is proved by the adoption last year
of the "Founding Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the
Area of Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Delivery
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Vehicles", "Integrated Program for Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Their Delivery Vehicles Up To 2010" and a number of
normative legal documents pertaining to the issues of non-proliferation and
export control.
The Russian Federation actively participates in the international efforts to
address the problems of non-proliferation of WMD and their delivery vehicles
and renders assistance in resolving these problems by political and diplomatic
means.
As the President of the G8 and the host of the Summit in St. Petersburg
on July 15-17, 2006, the Russian Federation pays due attention to the problems
of non-proliferation in the work of the forum and makes every effort to
implement in full the Action Plan on Non-Proliferation, adopted by the G8 at
Sea Island in 2004.
The objective of the present document is to demonstrate the Russian
vision of the key problems in this sphere, to highlight possible ways of
resolving them, to draw the attention of experts and the public to the steps that
Russia will continue to make to counteract proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery vehicles.
CHAPTER 1
Trends in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery vehicles on global and regional scales and related risks and threats
to the security of the Russian Federation and international community in
general
The adherence to the principle of non-proliferation is one of the
cornerstones of Russian foreign policy. In compliance with the Concept of
National Security of Russia, strengthening the regime of non-proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles is a state’s priority
objective, and proliferation of WMD is among the principle threats to national
security. Obviously, the increase in the number of countries which possess
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WMD, especially its acquisition by the states, which are located at the perimeter
of the Russian borders, is the highest threat to the security of Russia.
The increase in the number of WMD "club" members is dangerous from
the viewpoint of the erosion of the international regime of non-proliferation,
which took decades to establish, as well as that of initiating a "chain reaction" of
emergence of new states which possess the most lethal kinds of weapons.
Nuclear weapons are still deployed on the territories of some non-nuclear
states, which do not possess it formally, in particular in Europe. This cannot but
raise concern from the viewpoint of nuclear weapons proliferation.
It should be stressed that during the last 10-15 years the approaches to
non-proliferation have become more politicized. To a considerable extent the
assessment of proliferation threats depends on the geopolitical situation of a
state, its relations with the allies, its economic interests and historical
experience. Hence, depending on the interpretation of this term, some states
apply political, economic, diplomatic and, at times, even coercive methods to
achieve the goals of WMD non-proliferation.
The Russian Federation has been committed to resolving these issues
primarily by political and diplomatic means. The Russian Federation treats the
use of force as an extreme measure, which can be taken only upon the decision
of the UN Security Council.
For Russia and other states in the foreseeable future, the greatest threat in
the area of non-proliferation will be posed by the possibility of some WMD
elements being used by terrorists. While, in relation to the countries capable of
using WMD, the deterrence doctrine will retain its role, in relation to terrorists,
this doctrine will obviously fail. One should consider that non-state actors
(terrorists and their abettors) may procure WMD elements not only from
military and scientific establishments but acquire them through their own R&D
that will take use of the “black markets” of materials and technologies
employed in creating such weapons.
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1.1 Trends in the proliferation of WMD and their delivery vehicles
and the related risks and threats
The global geopolitical changes associated with the end of the Cold War
affected the whole system of international relations. The confrontation between
the blocs gave way to multiple crises and conflicts, caused inter alia by the
aspiration of some countries to act without consideration for the world
community and its universally recognized institutions. Simultaneously the threat
of international terrorism has sharply increased.
On a global scale obvious trends are emerging towards weakening the
guarantees of state sovereignty, and intervention, including intervention by
force, into the internal affairs of other countries, sometimes under the pretext of
resolving the problems of non-proliferation. Dangerous attempts to justify the
possible use of nuclear weapons in a "non-nuclear" conflict to hit "targets which
are well-fortified or located deep underground" are noted. In such situation
some countries start thinking about the nuclear option as a means of deterring
aggression as well as improving their international status, and as a tool to
achieve superiority over their neighbors and gain economic advantages. This
trend is acquiring particular significance in some states under the conditions of
the escalation of territorial disputes, and political, economic, ethnical and
religious problems.
A serious factor increasing the risk of emergence of new states possessing
WMD and their delivery vehicles is the lack of effective system of their
physical protection and of export control of dual use goods and technologies,
what results in a number of countries in the possibility of their proliferation and
acquisition by terrorists.
So far, insufficient attention has been paid to the consequences of
technological progress and the revolutionary development of information
technologies in the context of rapid dissemination of knowledge on WMD.
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1.1.1. Threats in the sphere of nuclear proliferation
At the stage of emergence of the international regime of nuclear nonproliferation (Non-Proliferation Treaty – NPT), one of its objectives was to
restrict the number of states possessing nuclear weapons (NW). This objective
was basically achieved. The Republic of South Africa, Argentina and Brazil
abandoned their national military nuclear programs. Belorussia, Kazakhstan and
Ukraine made their "non-nuclear" choice. At present, in addition to the official
nuclear "five", military nuclear programs have been implemented in India and
Pakistan. Israel neither confirms nor denies possessing nuclear weapons. DPRK
announced the possession of such weapons. According to the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), about 20 more countries have the potential to
acquire nuclear military capabilities, but they demonstrate restraint in gaining
nuclear status due to different reasons. For some of them the nuclear option is
just an issue of exercising political will in the context of the weakening of the
NPT regime: from a technological viewpoint they possess all the necessary
means and components to create a nuclear explosive device. Should their
national security and sovereignty be threatened these countries can create NW
relatively fast.
Therefore, there presently remain several major ways for the proliferation
of nuclear weapons:
-
unauthorized transfer of technologies and knowledge in the area
of NW to non-nuclear states (which is confirmed by A.K. Khan’s
network);
-
independent development through the establishment of the
required scientific and technical base using publicly available
information;
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-
the leakage of NW production technologies and other sensitive
information due to the weakness or absence of adequate national
control.
The above problems are supplemented with and aggravated by the
growing threat of nuclear terrorism.
Despite the fact that the probability of the independent creation of a
nuclear explosive device by terrorists is considered to be negligible due to the
technical difficulties involved, the development of radiological improvised
explosive devices (the so-called "dirty bomb") is possible.
1.1.2. Chemical proliferation
Despite the operation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
their Destruction – the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), states'
participation in it is not universal yet, and the implementation of its provisions
at the national level leaves much to be desired.
The factors facilitating chemical weapon (CW) proliferation are the
following:
-
the relative simplicity of technologies of manufacturing
poisonous substances in the context of the modern level of
chemical industry development;
-
the possibility of legally purchasing dual-use technologies,
equipment and materials, suitable for CW manufacturing;
-
the cost-effectiveness and relative simplicity of implementing
programs of CW development in comparison with other classes of
WMD, as well as the difficulty of detecting such programs.
New risks appear in connection with R&D works in the area of the socalled non-lethal chemical agents (NCA). Within the framework of the works
carried out, studies of the latest achievements in the pharmaceutical industry in
particular are performed for the purpose of their possible use in creating NCA;
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field trials are performed to determine the effective range of operation of such
chemical agents and delivery vehicles are being designed following the trials.
A manifestation of chemical terrorism is the activities of the sect Aum
Shinrikyo in Japan. Currently there is a real possibility of toxic chemicals being
used by non-state actors. The probability of the use of toxic chemicals for
terrorist purposes is considerably higher than of nuclear explosive devices.
There is a high risk of toxic industrial chemicals being used by terrorists,
as well as subversive activities against chemical facilities with consequences
comparable, for instance, to the man-made catastrophe at the Union Carbide
plant in the city of Bhopal (India). Collective efforts are required to ensure the
security of such facilities including anti-terrorist protection measures.
1.1.3. Proliferation of biological weapons and hazardous biological
agents
During the 30 years of existence of the Convention on the Prohibition of
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC), no state has declared
possession of such weapons. However, there is no credible data on the complete
cessation of activities to develop biological weapons (BW). In this connection,
as well as in view of the unwillingness of a considerable number of countries to
accede to the BWC, there is a real threat of states using BW in international
conflict.
Scientific and technological developments and the achievements of the
last years in the areas of biology, biotechnology, genomics, proteinomics and
bioinformatics have opened up broad opportunities for genetic modifications of
traditional BW agents and created preconditions for the development of new
types of BW. With the progress of knowledge on living substance, it became
possible not only to kill a living organism by biological methods but also to
manipulate it, to influence its development, vital functions, reproduction and
heredity. New achievements in biology and medicine in combination with
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modern computer and information technologies may be used for the
development of new types of weaponised biological agents.
The following reasons make BTWC non-members take an interest in
BW:
- the high economic cost-effectiveness and simplicity of implementing
military biological programs in comparison with other WMD programs;
- dual-use nature of technologies, equipment and materials suitable for
BW manufacturing (i.e. the possibility of using them for both peaceful and
military purposes), the difficulties in detecting the infrastructure;
- the possibility of the covert implementation of military programs in the
area of BW due to the lack of clear-cut differences between offensive and
defensive activities.
The risk of BW proliferation is basically determined by the lack of
control in a number of cases over the exchange of (trade, transfer) components
for its manufacture – cultures of hazardous pathogenic infectious agents, dualuse equipment, nutrient mediums, technological information.
Terrorism involving the use of hazardous biological agents is a growing
threat. There is evidence that some terrorist organizations (Al-Qaeda in
particular) are studying the possibility of purchasing the required materials.
The events of 2001 in the USA associated with the dissemination of
anthrax by mail confirm the real possibility of biological agents being used by
terrorists. The possible use of the virus of smallpox for biological attacks is no
less dangerous. In that case, given the cessation of vaccination against this
infectious disease in most countries may, it may lead to catastrophic
consequences.
1.1.4. Proliferation of missiles for WMD delivery
Currently more than 25 countries have at their disposal ballistic missile
(BM) systems, capable of delivering WMD or possess the scientific and
technological potential to create such systems. Simultaneously, many states feel
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a strong need for missile delivery vehicles to implement peaceful space
programs.
Unlike nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which are subject to
legally binding agreements (NPT, CWC, BWC) that restrict their proliferation
or completely ban them, there are no similar agreements in the area of missile
delivery vehicles. It is extremely hard to distinguish between WMD delivery
vehicles and permitted conventional weapons - ballistic and cruise missiles with
conventional warheads, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and space launch
vehicles. Conventional weapons (aircraft, missiles, UAVs, multiple launch
rocket systems, cannons) may also be used to deliver WMD.
At present, the main multilateral efforts in the non-proliferation of
missiles for WMD delivery are performed within the framework of the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Hague Code of Conduct against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCC). For the time being, they unite a limited
number of countries with missile potential and cannot completely prevent the
spread of missile delivery vehicles for WMD.
The absence of a clear-cut international legal regulation of missile
activities is a factor which facilitates the proliferation of technologies, including
those required for the creation of intercontinental ballistic missiles.
One should bear in mind that the construction of ballistic long-range
missiles may be carried out under the cover of developing or modernizing space
launch vehicles. Some states show their intention to acquire missile
technologies, finished subsystems and components (control systems, mixed
fuels, engine cases, electronic components), as well as to purchase outdated
missile items with a view to developing systems with improved performance
(primarily improved payload and maximum range) on their basis.
Serious concerns are caused by the so-called "secondary proliferation",
when some countries that previously obtained the relevant technologies and are
not bound by commitments in the area of missile non-proliferation, perform
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activities, including in cooperation with other states, aimed at upgrading missile
systems and developing new ones, and exporting them. Until recently such
activities were characteristic of the DPRK and a number of other countries.
Additionally, there are cases of export deliveries of missiles and missile
technologies from MTCR Member States, including deliveries in violation of
international agreements inter alia by the Ukraine.
The planned US research to develop space weapons, which may
encourage some states to gain access to cheaper counterweapons, including
WMD, also causes certain concern.
CHAPTER 2
International efforts in the area of non-proliferation of WMD and
their delivery vehicles
2.1.
International nuclear non-proliferation regime
NPT is the basis for the international regime of non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons. 189 states are parties to the Treaty.
India, Pakistan and Israel remain outside the treaty. Besides, in January
2003 DPRK announced its withdrawal from the NPT.
Over the 35 years of its operation NPT has ensured the consistent
progress of the international community towards preventing NW proliferation.
The new challenges to the non-proliferation regime which have appeared lately,
including the emergence of "black markets" of nuclear material and
technologies, may be and must be tackled on the basis of NPT. This was
confirmed by the VII Review Conference of the NPT held in May 2005 in New
York.
The Treaty envisages that states which do not possess nuclear weapons
should fulfill their commitment to maintain their non-nuclear status and
simultaneously ensures their rights for the peaceful use of atomic energy.
However, the examples of Libya and, to a certain extent, DPRK demonstrate
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that the creation of military nuclear potential is possible under the cover of
developing nuclear energy. So far, Iran has not clarified its past nuclear activity.
Control over fulfilling the NPT commitments from the viewpoint of using
atomic energy for peaceful purposes is performed by the IAEA. The disclosure
of undeclared nuclear activities in Iraq in the early 1990s demonstrated certain
drawbacks of IAEA safeguards in the detection of prohibited activities. This
prompted the Agency to adopt measures aimed at strengthening the efficiency
and effectiveness of the safeguards. In 1997 the Model Additional Protocol to
the IAEA Safeguards Agreement was developed envisaging considerable
expansion of opportunities to monitor nuclear activities. It has been signed by
104 states, including all nuclear states; in 69 states the Additional Protocol has
entered into force.
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is meant to
contribute considerably to strengthening nuclear weapons non-proliferation
regime. In 2006 it will be 10 years since the moment when the CTBT was
opened for signature, however the prospects of the Treaty's entering into force
are still unclear. Currently the Treaty has been signed by 176 states and ratified
by 132.
Out of the 44 states whose accession to the Treaty is obligatory for its
entry into force, the CTBT was not ratified by the USA, China, Egypt, Iran,
Israel, India, Pakistan, DPRK, Indonesia and Colombia. The US position on the
Treaty, refusing to ratify it, does not expedite the process of the CTBT’s entry
into force.
Measures to ensure control over the transfers of nuclear materials and
technologies, as well as of dual-use goods, which may be used for the creation
of NW, are carried out by multilateral regimes of export control – the Zanger
Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
The Zanger Committee (ZC) was established in 1971 (and currently
unites 35 states) for the technical interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Article III of
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the NPT, under which each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide
nuclear materials and equipment to any State, unless the latter are subject to the
IAEA safeguards. The list of such materials and equipment is compiled by
the ZC.
In 1974 the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was established, which has
uniting main exporters and manufacturers of nuclear materials, equipment and
technologies, and non-nuclear materials for reactors, that included the states
which at that time were not parties to the NPT. In 1992 within the framework of
the NSG, the regime of control on transfers of dual-use goods was established.
45 countries currently participate in the Group.
The most important element of the international regime of nuclear nonproliferation is the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ). At
the present time there are four such zones: in Latin America (Treaty of
Tlatelolco), in Southern Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga), in Africa (Treaty of
Pelindaba) and in South-East Asia (Treaty of Bangkok). The number of states
covered by NWFZ regime currently exceeds 100. The establishment of nuclearweapon-free-zone in Central Asia is being finalized. However, the efforts to
establish such a zone in the Middle East have not succeeded yet.
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)
entered into force on February 8, 1987. Currently 116 states participate in the
Convention. In July 2005 the Diplomatic Conference in Vienna adopted
amendments to the Convention considerably expanded its scope.
Now, storage, use and transportation of nuclear materials inside
participating countries, as well as the measures to protect nuclear materials and
nuclear facilities against sabotage (subversive activity) are covered by the
Convention. The provisions on international cooperation in the area of physical
protection inter alia regarding nuclear material theft, have been expanded while
issues of ensuring confidentiality of information on physical protection have
been addressed.
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Considerable international cooperation is carried out within the
framework of the IAEA Action Plan to combat nuclear terrorism. The plan has
been implemented since 2002 and envisages concrete measures to improve
IAEA activities in this sphere, in particular in such areas as strengthening
national systems of physical protection, accounting for and controlling of
nuclear materials, and counteracting the illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.
One of the directions within the framework of this plan is the
implementation by the Agency of the program for compiling and maintaining a
database on illicit trafficking in nuclear material. The database, which is
confidential, contains information on the incidents of illicit trafficking in
nuclear materials and radioactive substances. The program has been carried out
since 1996, and 82 countries are currently participating in it.
2.2.
International arrangements in the area of non-proliferation of
chemical, biological and toxin weapons
The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of June
17, 1925 (1925 Geneva Protocol) put up a legal barrier against the use of
chemical and bacteriological weapons, but did not prohibit their development,
manufacturing and stockpiling. When signing the document a number of states
(including the USSR in 1928) made reservations which envisaged the
possibility of using the above means in retaliation.
In 1992 Russia withdrew its reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol
concerning the use of BW in retaliation.
In 2000 Russia adopted the law on the withdrawal of all reservations to
the Geneva Protocol, made by the USSR in 1928.
CWC entered into force on April 29, 1997. This Convention is the first
global treaty which envisages the elimination of a whole class of weapons of
mass destruction under strict international control to prevent its re-emergence.
Russia was one of the sponsors of the development of this convention.
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As of January 1, 2006 five out of six states–possessors of chemical
weapons (Albania, India, Libya, the Russian Federation, the USA and one more
country, which has voluntarily declared its possession of chemical weapons and
is eliminating them) disposed of over 12 000 tons of poisonous substances (PS)
what amounts to 17 % of all declared stocks.
The increasing number of countries joining the CWC is an important
indicator of the effectiveness of the operation of the non-proliferation regime.
Currently 178 countries are parties to the Convention.
In 1997 the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW) was established with its headquarters at the Hague, the Netherlands, to
implement the subject and purpose of the Convention, ensure the
implementation of its provisions, including the provision on the international
verification of its observance, and provide a forum for consultations and
cooperation between member states.
Within the framework of the OPCW, measures are taken to increase the
universalization of the Convention. An Action Plan on Universalization has
been developed and is being implemented. It allowed 18 new countries to join
the OPCW in 2004-2005 alone.
The CWC has been signed, but not ratified, by 8 states with, Israel among
them. Eight more states, including Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and others have
yet to sign the Convention.
BWC was open for signature on April 10, 1972, and entered into force on
March 26, 1975. 155 states have deposited instruments of ratification or
accession to the Convention. Russia, the USA and the United Kingdom are
BWC depositaries. Conferences to review the operation of the Convention are
held every 5 years.
Since 1995, talks have been conducted in Geneva by the so-called Ad
Hoc Group of the States Parties to the BWC (established by the Special
Conference in 1994), which was charged with the task to develop a verification
15
mechanism for the BWC in the form of a legally binding document (Protocol).
In July 2001, the USA refused to support the Protocol to the Convention, which
had been practically finalized.
It is planned to discuss the issue of further strengthening the BWC at the
VI Review Conference late in 2006. It is expected that a concrete plan of further
action will be adopted by the Conference.
Based upon their international commitments, States Parties to the BWC
annually submit to the UN – within the framework of the agreed confidencebuilding measures – information on activities in the biological sphere promoting
openness and predictability in this area.
The Australia Group (AG), uniting 39 states, is an informal voluntary
export control regime. Its objective is to restrict the proliferation of chemical
and biological weapons by establishing control over the transfers of dual-use
chemical and biological products and related technologies.
Russia, though not member of the AG, applies is rules and control lists in
practice.
2.3. International mechanisms to prevent proliferation of WMD
means of delivery
The MTCR was established in 1987 and unites 34 countries. Russia
joined the Regime in 1995. Its principle objective is to counter the proliferation
of missile means of delivery of WMD by performing export control of transfers
of dual-use goods and technologies to non-member countries. The basic
documents of the Regime are the Guidelines and the Technical Annex (the list
of items subject to control). The member countries agreed to exercise restraint
in the transfers of any items listed in the Annex. In view of new challenges and
threats, the Guidelines have been supplemented with provisions accounting for
the possibility of controlled items being used by terrorists.
The HCC was opened for signing in November 2002. Russia joined the
Code the same year. 123 countries are participants in the Code.
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The Code is a compilation of the basic principles of conduct in the field
of missile non-proliferation. It declares the general intent to contain and prevent
the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering WMD. The Code
envisages some transparency measures: submitting to the Central Point of
Contact of the HCC (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria) annual declarations
on missile activities and notifications of missile launches.
Russia submits annual declarations in a timely manner, and submits prelaunch notifications since 2004. However, within the framework of the HCC not
all participating states, including some states playing an important role in the
missile area, implement the mechanism of launch notifications.
2.4. Measures taken by the UN to prevent the proliferation of WMD
and their means of delivery
The principle purpose of the UN, as stipulated in Article 1 of its Charter,
is to maintain international peace and security. The UN serves as the most
important forum to resolve global problems including the non-proliferation of
WMD and their means of delivery.
The UN Security Council (UN SC) plays a significant role in the matters
of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. The UN SC’s underlying
approaches in this field were stated in the relevant Declaration of January 31,
1992.
In April 2004 the UN SC adopted Resolution 1540, which encouraged the
international community to counter the proliferation of WMD and their means
of delivery, to prevent them from falling into the hands of non-state actors,
primarily terrorists. For the purposes of its implementation, the Special
Committee (Committee 1540) was established, which reports to the UN SC on
the progress made in the implementation of the resolution and furnishes it with
relevant recommendations if needed.
Within the framework of the annual sessions of the UN General
Assembly (UN GA) the issues related to international security and disarmament
17
are discussed by its First Committee. The Committee discusses annually more
than 50 draft resolutions and decisions devoted inter alia to the problems of
WMD proliferation, which are then brought for approval of the UN GA.
The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism was adopted by the UN GA in April, 2005 and was opened for
signature at the time of Summit-2005 on September 14, 2005. This is the first
universal agreement sponsored by Russia and aimed at the prevention of
terrorist acts involving nuclear material, which may result in mass casualties. Its
aim is to ensure anti-terrorist protection for both peaceful and military nuclear
facilities.
Over the last years the Panel of Governmental Experts has worked at the
UN to render assistance to the Secretary General in preparing a report on the
issue of missiles in all its aspects. The first such report was approved at the 57th
session of the UN GA. In 2004 the Panel resumed its activities, but the adoption
of the new report was blocked by some countries, which opposed active
involvement of the UN in resolving missile problems. The work of the Panel
will be continued in 2007.
2.5. G8 and WMD non-proliferation issues
WMD non-proliferation issues occupy an important place in the G8
activities. The Action Plan on non-proliferation was adopted at the summit of its
leaders at Sea Island in 2004. The G8 Statement on Non-Proliferation was
approved at the Summit in Gleneagles in 2005. These documents are aimed at
combating the proliferation of WMD and preventing such weapons from falling
into the hands of terrorists.
The G8 declares its determination to continue the efforts for the purpose
of maintaining and strengthening the NPT, and reaffirms its support for the
IAEA activities and the need of universal adherence to the Additional Protocol
to the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
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The commitment to strengthening chemical and biological nonproliferation has been confirmed.
2.6. Other international programs and initiatives to promote the nonproliferation regime of WMD and their means of delivery
Cooperation with CIS countries in the field of WMD non-proliferation
and their means of delivery plays an important role in ensuring the national
security of Russia.
In 2003 the President of the Russian Federation approved the Program for
long-term cooperation between Russia and CIS countries in the field of WMD
non-proliferation, which is presently being implemented. The Program
envisages a set of measures to render consultative and methodological
assistance to CIS countries in the field of improving national legislation on
WMD non-proliferation and export control. The program focuses on the
development of cooperation with a view to revealing and suppressing the illicit
trafficking in dual-use goods and technologies.
The active cooperation of the Russian Federation with CIS countries is
also pursued within the framework of international treaties and agreements, the
most important of which are the Collective Security Treaty, the Treaty on the
Establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community and the Agreement on the
Establishment of a Common Economic Space.
In the context of emergence of new threats in the field of WMD
proliferation and their means of delivery, as well as the networks of “black
markets” for sensitive materials, which remain and become more sophisticated,
the insufficiency of traditional non-proliferation tools has become obvious.
Multilateral agreements in the field of non-proliferation, which were developed
with an expectation that they will be implemented by states, at times
demonstrate their inefficiency in preventing access to WMD by nongovernmental actors and terrorists.
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The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), put forward by the USA in
May 2003, has become one of the new tools. Its declared goal is to intensify the
struggle against the proliferation of such weapons and their delivery means
through strengthening control over the transportation and prevention of
trafficking in WMD materials.
At present for the purposes of the PSI the Russian Federation plans to use
the
potential
of
the
Black
Sea
Naval
Cooperation
Task
Force
(BLACKSEAFOR). Simultaneously, efforts are being made to establish a
similar structure in the Caspian Region.
The NATO-Russia Council is becoming a complimentary mechanism of
facilitating the non-proliferation regime, within the framework of which the
views on global tendencies in the field of proliferation of WMD and their
delivery means are shared and the areas for possible joint political activities to
promote effective multilateral non-proliferation efforts are considered.
CHAPTER 3
State policy of the Russian Federation in the area of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles
3.1. The legal base for resolving WMD non-proliferation problems
The strategic goals of Russia in the issues involving WMD nonproliferation and their delivery means are consonant with the interests of the
majority of actors of the international community. The Russian Federation is
interested in maintaining and strengthening the image of a predictable and
reliable state, from the territory of which sensitive technologies are not
proliferated. It undertakes active efforts aimed at strengthening the regime of
non-proliferation of WMD by participating in the work of the relevant
international fora and organizations, primarily the UN, IAEA, Preparatory
Commission for the CTBTO, OPCW, and in activities within the framework of
the BWC, and HCC for the prevention of proliferation of ballistic missiles.
Russia participates in almost every international export control mechanism. So
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far, the Australia Group is the only exception. Broad international interaction
assists Russia to adopt and consider the experience of its partners for the
development and strengthening of the national system for WMD nonproliferation of and their delivery means.
The legal base of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the area of
WMD non-proliferation consists of international treaties and arrangements.
Russian national system of export control in relation to the dual-use goods and
technologies, which may be used for the creation of WMD and their delivery
means, fully corresponds to the requirements of multilateral export control
mechanisms, including legislation, licensing system, lists, etc.
The fundamentals of the policy of the Russian Federation in the area of
WMD non-proliferation and their delivery means are reflected in the Foreign
Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, the Principles of the State Policy in
the Area of WMD Non-Proliferation and Their Delivery Means, and the
Principles of State Policy in the Area of Ensuring Chemical and Biological
Safety and Security of the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2010 and
Beyond. In particular, the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation
includes the following main priorities: "Russia reaffirms the invariability of its
policy to participate jointly with other states in the prevention of the spread of
nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, their delivery means, as
well as any relevant materials and technologies. The Russian Federation is a
strong advocate of strengthening and development of relevant non-proliferation
regimes."
3.2. The main lines of the policy of the Russian Federation in the area
of nuclear non-proliferation
As an original sponsor of the NPT, Russia is committed to its
strengthening and universalization. The Russian Federation observes its
obligations arising from the Treaty, including the issues of nuclear
21
disarmament, and makes consistent steps to involve in the NPT the countries
which remain outside of its framework as non-nuclear states.
In 2000 the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin at the UN
Millennium Summit (New York) put forward a new initiative on energy supply
for the sustainable development of humankind, cardinal solution of the
problems of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and ecological
rehabilitation of the Earth. In the context of implementing this initiative, Russia
renders support to the IAEA International Project on Innovative Nuclear
Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO). By now, within the framework of this
project the methodology for the assessment of nuclear technologies by a number
of parameters has been worked out; the most important parameter is
proliferation security. Existing and future nuclear technologies are examined in
accordance with this methodology.
In January 2006 the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin
put forward an initiative on the development of cooperation in the peaceful use
of atomic energy. Its principle objective is to create a prototype of the
infrastructure which would provide access for all interested countries to the
peaceful use of nuclear energy while strengthening the non-proliferation regime.
This initiative inter alia envisages the establishment of international centers for
rendering fuel cycle services, primarily of the enrichment and chemical
processing of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) under IAEA control, as well as the
promotion of development of nuclear power engineering. It is open to all
countries observing their commitments in the sphere of non-proliferation.
Russia renders assistance in strengthening the system of IAEA
safeguards, including through the financing of the national program of scientific
and technological support for IAEA activities.
Russia supports the universalization of the Additional Protocol which is
one of the important instruments ensuring NW non-proliferation. Accession to
22
the Additional Protocol should become one of the factors to be considered in
taking a decision on the possibility of nuclear export supplies.
Russia supports the IAEA activities related to ensuring safe handling of
radioactive sources and harmonizes its national norms and regulations with
international principles.
The activities of Russia with participation of the IAEA related to the
return of fresh nuclear fuel (FNF) from highly enriched uranium from research
reactors of Russian design from third countries play an important role in
preventing highly enriched material from falling into the hands of terrorists.
Such fuel has been already been brought to Russia from Serbia and
Montenegro, Romania, Bulgaria, Libya, the Czech Republic and Latvia. SNF
additionally to FNF from the above-mentioned types of reactors is brought from
Uzbekistan.
Russia supports the IAEA program on reduction of the level of
enrichment of fuel for research reactors to below 20% in relation to reactors in
third countries. The implementation of the program will make it possible to
considerably reduce the risk of proliferation of highly enrichment uranium.
The establishment of nuclear weapons free zones in various regions of the
world is a credible measure to strengthen the international regime of nuclear
non-proliferation. Russia has supported the existing zonal arrangements, as well
as the draft Tashkent Treaty on NWFZ in Central Asia. It stands for the
establishment of a zone free from nuclear weapons and other types of WMD in
the Middle East.
In addition to strengthening the system of existing agreements in the
sphere of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, Russia consistently
supports the enhancement of the international legal base in this area. In
particular, among Russia's priorities is the prompt commencement of the
drafting of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty at the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva.
23
Russia supports the development of tougher but objective criteria to
regulate the transfer of the most sensitive nuclear technologies, such as uranium
enrichment and chemical reprocessing of nuclear fuel. The Russian Federation
does not transfer such technologies to non-nuclear states which do not possess
them.
3.3. The state policy of the Russian Federation in the area of the nonproliferation of chemical and biological weapons
The state policy of the Russian Federation in the area of the nonproliferation of chemical and biological weapons is formulated in the "Founding
principles of the state policy in the area of ensuring the chemical and biological
security of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2010 and beyond" and in
the "Founding principles of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the area
of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of
delivery".
The priorities of the foreign policy activities of Russia in this area are the
following:
-
to strengthen international institutions (organizations) competent
in the problems of the non-proliferation of chemical and
biological weapons, including by strengthening of established
regimes of export (import) of the products;
-
to completely eliminate the stocks of chemical weapons and the
industrial facilities for their manufacturing, as well as to exclude
the possibility of renewing such manufacturing;
-
to harmonize national legislation and approaches of all states with
the generally accepted standards of international law.
The Russian approach is based on active promotion of the participation of
all countries in international treaties, which would geographically expand the
scope of prohibitions and ensure their universal observance.
24
From the viewpoint of internal factors, excluding the possibility of the
proliferation of chemical weapons and biological materials, primary importance
belongs to the availability of the relevant legal and normative framework and its
harmonization with the international treaties on non-proliferation. The key role
in this context belongs to ensuring an effective criminal prosecution for the
prohibited deeds and the establishment of mechanisms and procedures required
to ensure comprehensive and efficient legal cooperation among the member
states.
The Russian Federation proceeds from an understanding that the fullscale fulfillment of the CWC and BWC requirements by all – without
exception – member states is an indispensable condition to achieve the goals of
non-proliferation of these kinds of WMD.
Russia consistently supports the strengthening of the BWC by resuming
the development of the mechanism for control of its implementation, which was
suspended in 2001.
Based upon its international commitments, Russia annually submits to the
UN – within the framework of the coordinated confidence-building measures information on the activities in its biological sphere, which promotes openness
and predictability in this sphere.
The following main activities are implemented in the Russian Federation
at the national level:
-
the practical disposal of chemical weapons is performed as a
matter of priority (to reduce the period of time during which the
chemical weapon remain potentially vulnerable to theft or attack);
-
in order to exclude the possibility of CW and biological materials
proliferation, their reliable physical protection is ensured; a
relevant normative legal framework has been established, is being
improved, and harmonized with international treaties;
25
-
criminal liability for the violation of CWC and BWC has been
established;
-
mechanisms and procedures to ensure comprehensive and
efficient legal cooperation among the states have been created;
-
export control of dual-use chemicals, biological materials,
equipment and technologies has been established; criminal and
administrative liability for violations in foreign trade thereof has
been introduced.
3.4. Russian approaches to resolving the issue of missile nonproliferation
Russian strategic goal is to establish a Global Regime of Missile NonProliferation (GRMN) on the basis of a legally binding arrangement. In this
context it is most important to ensure transparent activity in missile launches
and programs as well as to prevent unauthorized and uncontrolled transfers of
missile technologies from states which posses them to other countries. The
GRMN would be an independent mechanism complimentary to the existing
agreements (MTCR and HCOC). It is important to have all major missile
countries involved in it.
Based on such an approach, in 1999 Russia initiated the stage-by-stage
implementation of the GRMN ideas. As the first step it was proposed to create
the Global Control System for the Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile
Technology (GCS), which envisages the transparency of missile launches,
provision of security guarantees to states which abandon missile means of
delivery of WMD, economic incentives to and encouragement of such states, as
well as consultations. It is understood that the GCS will be developed and
operate on a multilateral basis and under the aegis of the UN. However this
Russian initiative has had no considerable practical development yet.
The HCOC is a useful tool. In order to ensure the participation in it of
major missile countries which are not members to the MTCR, Russia has put
26
forward a proposal to introduce amendments to it, which should take into
consideration the interests of other countries (voluntariness of commitments
under the Code, security guarantees and economic incentives to countries which
abandon their missile programs). Russia considers work in this direction as its
priorities under the HCOC.
In the MTCR Russia undertakes efforts aimed at increasing the
effectiveness of this mechanism primarily through the improvement of the
national systems of export control (updating the lists, licensing, law
enforcement, prevention of missile items falling into the hands of terrorists,
control over transit and trans-shipment points, "intangible" technology transfers,
etc.).
Russia intends to continue the implementation of its conceptual proposals
under the aegis of the UN which laid ground for the establishment of the Global
Regime of Missile Non-Proliferation.
CHAPTER 4
Export control – the most important practical instrument to prevent
proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery
4.1. State policy in the area of export control over the transfers of
goods and technologies, that can be used in the development of WMD and
their means of delivery
The State policy in the area of export control over the transfer of dual-use
items and technologies is the part of internal and foreign policy of the Russian
Federation. It is implemented for the purpose of ensuring security of the state,
its political, economic and military interests.
The basis for this policy are the Constitution of the Russian Federation,
Federal Law "On Export Control" (1999), other federal laws and normative
legal acts of the Russian Federation.
27
The President of the Russian Federation determines the main lines of the
state policy in the area of export control, ensures coordinated functioning and
cooperation of the state authorities.
The basic principles of the state policy in the area of control over the
transfers of dual-use goods and technologies are the following:
-
compliance with international commitments on non-proliferation
of WMD, their means of delivery, as well as export control of
export of military and dual-use items;
-
priority of the interests of state security;
-
legality, publicity and accessibility of information on the issues of
export control;
-
implementation of export control to the extent which is needed to
achieve its goals;
-
integrity of the customs territory of the Russian Federation;
-
harmonization of the procedures and rules of export control with
the universally recognized international rules and practice;
-
interaction with international organizations and foreign states on
export control issues to strengthen international security and
stability, prevent proliferation of WMD and their means of
delivery.
4.2. Main objectives and legal framework of export control in the
Russian Federation
The main objectives of Russian export control are as follows:
-
protection of the interests of the Russian Federation;
-
implementation of the requirements of international treaties of the
Russian Federation in the area of non-proliferation of the WMD
and their means of delivery and export control of military and
dual-use items;
28
-
creation of the conditions for further integration of the Russian
Federation into the world economy;
-
harmonization of the approaches and export regulation with CIS
countries.
To achieve the above objectives a national system of export control
complying with internationally accepted standards has been established in the
Russian Federation.
Export control is performed through procedures envisaged by existing
normative legal acts in accordance with the control lists of goods and services.
Six control lists approved by the decrees of the President of the Russian
Federation are currently in force:
1.
List of nuclear materials, equipment, special non-nuclear
materials and relevant technologies subject to export control;
2.
List of dual-use equipment and materials and relevant
technologies used for nuclear purposes subject to export control;
3.
List of goods and technologies, which may be used for the
development and production of weapons and military equipment
subject to export control;
4.
List of infectious agents (pathogens) of human beings, animals
and plants, genetically modified microorganisms, toxins,
equipment and technologies subject to export control;
5.
List of equipment, materials and technologies, which may be
used for the development and production of missile weapons
subject to export control;
6.
List of chemicals, equipment and technologies, which may be
used for the development and production of chemical weapons.
The control lists are harmonized with the restrictive lists of goods and
technologies which are implemented in industrialized countries, and are based
on the requirements of international export control regimes (Nuclear Suppliers
29
Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangements and
the Australia Group).
Coordination of the activities of federal executive authorities and
organizational and methodological guidance of the export control activities is
performed by the Commission for Export Control of the Russian Federation. It
is composed of the heads of federal executive departments responsible for
export control, the Administrative Office of the Government of the Russian
Federation and other governmental bodies.
National authority responsible for the implementation of integrated state
policy, regulation and of interdepartmental coordination in the area of export
control is performed by a specially designated federal executive export control
body – Federal Service of the Russian Federation for Technical and Export
Control.
The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (Articles 188 and 189)
envisages criminal liability for the violation of the established procedure of
performing foreign trade operations involving goods and technologies subject to
export control. The responsibility for investigations to detect and prosecute for
committing the above crimes is accordance with the existing legislation rests
with the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation and customs
authorities.
The Code of the Russian Federation on Administrative Offences (Article
14.20) envisages the possibility of application of administrative sanctions to
legal entities and individuals who have violated the established rules of foreign
trade involving items, information, works, services and intellectual property in
relation to which export control is established.
4.3 The status, lines of development and improvement of the system
of export control of the Russian Federation
The existence in the country of a considerable scientific, technological
and industrial potential in the sphere of development and manufacture of high-
30
tech military and dual-use items, sustainable trends of growth of export of
sensitive goods and technologies contributes to the fact, that in the Russian
Federation resolving the issues of export control acquires strategic importance.
Many federal executive bodies are involved in the national system of export
control. First of all, this is the Federal Service for Technical and Export Control
(coordination), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Ministry
of Defense of the Russian Federation, Russian Agency for Industry, Federal
Space Agency, Federal Agency for Atomic Energy, Federal Security Service of
the Russian Federation and other agencies.
Export control in the Russian Federation is based on the procedure of
issuing permissions for foreign trade in controlled goods and technologies,
which envisages licensing or other form of state approval of foreign trade
transactions involving such goods or technologies. The basis for granting a
license is the decision of the state commission of experts on a foreign trade
transaction. The so-called "intangible" transfers are also subject to export
control.
In case there is information on a possibility of using items and
technologies that are not in control lists for the development of WMD and their
delivery means, the national system of export control implements the principle
of catch-all control. In such case permission for foreign trade transaction is
issued by the Commission for Export Control of the Russian Federation.
One of the most important stages of exercising export control is to check
materials, equipment, scientific and technological information, works, services
and intellectual property, subject to foreign trade transactions, against control
lists, the so-called identification of controlled items and technologies.
The identification of controlled items and technologies in the Russian
Federation is the responsibility of exporter, who, however, may entrust it to an
organization, which received special license under the procedure established by
the Government of the Russian Federation. In this case the responsibility for the
31
accuracy and validity of the results of identification of the controlled items and
technologies rests with the expert organization.
The existence of an independent identification assessment system is an
important instrument of technical, legal and expert assistance of the activities of
customs and control authorities, which allows expanding the possibilities of
monitoring of foreign trade to prevent unauthorized of sensitive items and
technologies.
Significant attention is paid in the Russian Federation to the development
and improvement of this system.
Considerable role in the national system of export control is assigned to
effective management of foreign trade activities at company level. Such work is
performed through internal company programs of export control. In accordance
with Russian legislation the development of such programs is compulsory for
organizations performing scientific and/or production activities to meet federal
state requirements in the area of maintaining defense capacities and security of
the Russian Federation, and which regularly receive profit from foreign trade
transactions with controlled goods and technologies.
Great significance is attached in the Russian Federation to awarenessraising of the participants in foreign trade activities. First of all, it concerns the
representatives of industrial and scientific and research organizations,
responsible for export control, whose activities relate to the development and
sale of the dual-use items. The purpose of this work is to create such conditions,
when knowledge and practical application of export control rules, established in
the Russian Federation, will be the norm for all participants in foreign trade.
In addition, significant attention is paid in Russia to the law enforcement
in relation to those who violate legislation in the area of export control. For
instance, during the past several years more than 60 criminal investigations
were conducted into reports of unauthorized transfers abroad of the goods with
the characteristics of controlled items.
32
Besides, the Federal Security Service exposed and stopped activities of
over 30 foreign citizens and companies which illegally acquired with intention
to export goods and technologies that may be used for producing WMD and
their means of delivery.
For instance:
entry into the territory of the Russian Federation was denied to a US
citizen Nader Modanlo, president of Final Analysis Inc., who tried to obtain, in
circumvention of Russian export control legislation, missile and space-related
technical documentation for their further transfer to Iran;
entry into the territory of the Russian Federation was denied to a
Pakistani citizen Mohammad Aslam, who used his position at the Moscow
office of Tabani Corporation to cover his activities aimed at gaining access to
and acquire Russian weapons, strategic materials and dual-use items in the
interests of Pakistani missile and nuclear programs;
an attempt by the Iranian Sanam Industrial Group was suppressed to place
an order with NPO Trud to produce rocket engine components under the guise
of gas pumping machinery. The Sanam Group business in the Russian
Federation was suspended.
The principle of inevitability of punishment in parallel with the
strengthening of the measures to control foreign trade is currently one of the
cornerstones in the system of export control of the Russian Federation.
Together with a number of CIS countries Russia makes active efforts to
harmonize national legislation in the area of export regulation. First of all, such
activities are performed within the framework of member-states of Eurasian
Economic Community and Common Economic Space. For this purpose Russia
developed a model normative document on export control. Alongside with
further development of integration processes, one of the most important goals of
the work in progress is to improve the level of control over international
33
transfers of sensitive items including by arranging information sharing between
control authorities of states.
The main lines of the improvement of the national system of export
control are currently as follows:
- further development of the normative legal framework of export control
both in the area of regular implementation into the national legislation of the
decisions taken within the framework of international mechanisms of export
control; improvement of legislative framework of activities of federal executive
authorities in the field of export control including the task of countering
international terrorism;
- the enhancement of information and analytical support of the export
control, including more efficient use of the possibilities of receiving objective
information by the national authorities as well as the results of international data
exchange;
- further improvement of law enforcement in the area of export control by
eliminating shortcomings in legislation and development of coordination among
law enforcement agencies, customs and export control authorities;
- continuing efforts to introduce internal export control compliance
programs at company level;
- development and implementation of joint interdepartmental policy in
bilateral and multilateral cooperation with foreign states in non-proliferation
and export control based on Russian national interests and priorities;
- acceleration of cooperation with CIS countries in non-proliferation of
WMD and their means of delivery and rendering assistance in establishing
national export control systems meeting international standards.
CHAPTER 5
Practical steps of the Russian Federation to reduce and eliminate WMD
and ensure physical protection of nuclear hazardous facilities
34
5.1 Reduction of the strategic offensive arms
The effectiveness of non-proliferation efforts is objectively linked to the
situation in the sphere of nuclear disarmament.
The Russian Federation proceeds from the fact that the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons is possible only through gradual, step by step
progress based on integrated approach with all nuclear states involved and
strategic stability mantained. Russia strictly abides by its obligations in the field
of nuclear disarmament.
According to the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START, signed on July
31, 1991; entered into force on December 5, 1994), by December 5, 2001
Russia was obliged to reduce its SOA down to 6000 nuclear warheads deployed
on no more than 1600 deployed systems (intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers
(HBs)). Actually, as of the indicated date, Russia had 5518 nuclear warheads on
1136 delivery systems.
Further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms is presently
implemented with the use of funds allocated under the state defense
procurements as well as the assistance rendered by the United States under the
Cooperative Threat Reduction program.
By the end of 2005:
- removed from the fleets and eliminated: in 2002 - 91, in 2003 - 84, in
2004 - 48, in 2005 - 29 SLBMs, of different types (in total - 252);
- eliminated in 2002 - 48, in 2003 - 31, in 2004 - 47, in 2005 – 28 liquid
propellant ICBMs (in total - 154);
- eliminated in 2003 - 4, in 2004 - 15, in 2005 - 15 solid propellant
RS-22 ICBMs (in total - 34);
- eliminated 96 silo launchers of RS-20 ICBMs;
35
- eliminated in 2002 - 1, in 2003 - 9, in 2004 - 9, in 2005 - 9 rail-mobile
missile launchers (in total - 28);
- the modernization of industrial facilities intended for disposal of solid
propellant by burning (to be completed in 2007) is nearly finished. In 2004 the
burning started of solid propellant rocket motors of RS-22 and RS-12M ICBM;
- in 2005 a center for elimination of solid propellant RS-12M ICBM
(FSUE "Votkinsky Zavod") with a capacity of 48 ICBMs per year was
commissioned. Nineteen ICBMs have been eliminated by present;
- a storage complex constructed for ICBMs and solid propellant rocket
motors for 59 storage units, which ensures the established rate of ICBM
decommissioning, and extra storage units in case of suspension of operations of
the burning stands;
- a Russia’s Ministry of Defense facility for elimination of ground-mobile
launchers (GML) has been upgraded to provide capacity of 50 items per year,
according to the START Treaty requirements. The planned elimination of
GMLs and demilitarization of launch-related equipment has begun;
- the decommissioning of variously based strategic missile complexes and
the elimination of the special infrastructure of the Russian Ministry of Defense
facilities being decommissioned (in 2002 - 3, in 2003 - 5, in 2004 - 4, in
2005 - 5) is underway.
The work to decommission and eliminate SOA will be continued in
accordance with plans of reforming the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation.
It is planned to complete commissioning of the solid propellant rocket
motor
burning
stands
in
Perm
and
Krasnoarmeisk
and
continue
decommissioning and elimination of the deployment regions of the Strategic
Missile Forces (SMF) and elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs of different types.
According to the Treaty between the United States of America and
the Russian Federation On Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT, signed on
36
May 24, 2002; entered into force on June 1, 2003), a total number of strategic
nuclear warheads for each party should not exceed 1700-2200 by December 31,
2012.
The START Treaty expires on December 5, 2009. The American and
Russian parties are facing various problems associated with the necessity to
implement the SORT and START requirements within the set timeframes that
require joint decisions.
The Treaty of unlimited duration Between the USA and the USSR on the
Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (signed on
December 8, 1987; entered into force on June 1, 1988) remains in effect.
According to this Treaty, Russia completely eliminated two classes of nuclear
missiles – intermediate-range (1000 up to 5500 km) and shorter-range (500 up
to 1000 km) – during the first three years of operation of this Treaty. A total of
1846 missiles, 825 launchers, 1761 items of support equipment were eliminated;
74 operational missile bases and 31 auxiliary facilities terminated their activities
and ceased to exist.
After disintegration of the USSR all nuclear weapons located in the
territories of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan were transported to Russia for
elimination.
By 2005 the non-strategic nuclear weapons arsenal of the Russian
Federation was reduced by 75 per cent as compared to that of the USSR.
Therefore, by 2005 Russia reduced its nuclear arsenal by more than fivefold.
In 2002 at the Kananaskis Summit (Canada) the G8 Global Partnership
(GP) Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction has
been established. This Partnership envisaged allocations by the G8 countries of
up to 20 billion USD over ten years for cooperation in areas declared as priority
ones in Kananaskis: dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines,
disposal of chemical weapons, disposition of fissile materials and employment
of former weapons scientists.
37
Initially the GP will be focused on implementation of projects in our
country. For Russia the priority cooperative areas are dismantlement of nuclear
submarines decommissioned from Navy and elimination of the chemical
weapons stockpiles. At the same time, we are solving tasks associated with
fulfilling by Russia of its international commitments to eliminate the chemical
weapons stockpiles as well as with the environmental problems caused by
accumulation of a large number of nuclear submarines and nuclear-propelled
surface ships subject to disposal.
5.2.
Disposal of radioactive materials
Russia’s contribution to ensuring the irreversibility of nuclear
disarmament in the context of the NPT includes inter alia the implementation of
the program of conversion of 500 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU)
extracted from Russian nuclear weapons into fuel (low enriched uranium) for
nuclear power plants.
The Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and
the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Disposition of
Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons (HEU-LEU
Agreement, or “Megatons into Megawatts”) dated February 19, 1993 and
scheduled for 20 years has been successfully implemented over the past decade.
In fall 2005 it passed a quantitative “equator” by reprocessing 250 tons of
highly enriched uranium that equals nearly 10 000 nuclear warheads.
As a result, Russian LEU obtained from HEU now meets 50% of the U.S.
nuclear power plants requirement generating 10% of all electric energy
consumed in the USA.
5.3 Disposal of chemical weapons stockpiles in the Russian
Federation
The deadline established by the President of the Russian Federation for
the disposal of all stockpiles of chemical weapons is April 29, 2012, which
complies with the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
38
The Russian Chemical Weapons Stockpiles Disposal Program provides for the
construction and maintenance of seven facilities for the disposal of chemical
weapons: in Kambarka (the Udmurtian Republic) beginning from December
2005; Maradykovsky village (Kirov Region) beginning from the second half of
2006; Leonidovka village (Penza Region), Pochep (Bryansk Region),
Shchuch’ye (Kurgan Region) beginning from 2008; Kizner (the Udmurtian
Republic) beginning from 2009. The operations at the installation in Gorny
village (Saratov Region) were completed in December 2005.
Russia fulfills its international obligations under the CWC on the basis of
the appropriate federal law as well as the federal purpose-oriented program for
disposal of chemical weapons stockpiles (hereinafter the Program).
To coordinate activities for implementing the Program with the
authorities of Russian constituent entities and federal executive bodies the State
Commission on Chemical Disarmament has been established by decree of the
President of the Russian Federation.
The main sources of funding of activities to implement the Convention
are allocations from the federal budget.
The Russian Federation is committed to the Convention’s goals and is
determined to dispose of the available stockpiles of chemical weapons within
the established timeframe.
In 2000-2001 100% of Category 3 chemical weapons (CW) stockpiles
were disposed of (a total of 330 024 items of Category 3 CW were disposed of,
including 4 737 unarmed cases of airborne ammunition, 3 unarmed cases of
heads of missile, 85 324 propelling charges and 239 960 bursting charges).
In the period from April 2001 to March 2002 100% of Category 2 CW
stockpiles were disposed of (3 844 122mm artillery shells with a total amount of
phosgene of 10.6 tons).
39
The work to dispose of Category 1 CW stockpiles is planned taking into
account intermediate stages and aggregated requirements for the quantities of
chemical agents to be destroyed.
In 2001, taking into account its difficult financial situation, the Russian
Federation requested the OPCW to extend the timeframe for the elimination of
1% of Category 1 CW until April 29, 2003 and the deadline for the disposal of
all CW stockpiles until 2012 (a total extension by 5 years). In 2002 the VII
session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Convention approved the
deadline for the Russian Federation, May 31, 2003, to dispose of 1% of
Category 1 CW. In October 2003 the VIII session of the Conference of the
States Parties to the Convention approved the deadline, April 29, 2007, for the
implementation by Russia of the second stage of the disposal of Category 1 CW
(8 000 tons making up 20% of stockpiles of these weapons). The shift of the
deadlines for the implementation of the subsequent third and fourth stages (45%
and 100% of stockpiles of Category 1 CW, respectively) was approved in
general by the States Parties to the Convention.
In December 2002 the industrial-scale disposal of Category 1 CW was
started at Russia’s first disposal facility in Gorny village (Saratov Region). This
facility was established with the assistance of Germany, the European Union,
Finland, and the Netherlands. The bulk of expenditure, 77.7% of all costs, to
establish the facility was covered from the Russian budget.
In April 2003 the Russian Federation completed the first stage of the
disposal of Category 1 CW. At Gorny facility 400 tons of mustard gas (1% of
total Category 1 CW stockpiles) were destroyed. In December 2005 this facility
completed the disposal of 1143.2 tons of chemical agents or 100% of stored
Category 1 CW.
In December 2005 the disposal of CW was started at the disposal facility
in Kambarka (the Udmurtian Republic).
At the same time, 1.759 tons of
lewisite were destroyed in the course of integrated testing of the processing
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equipment of the first launching complex. On the third week of February 2006
the CW disposal was resumed. In March 2006 the second launching complex
was put into operation. The facility is gradually being brought up to the
designed capacity. As of April 21, 2006, more than 140 tons of lewisite were
disposed of.
The completion of CW destruction at the Gorny facility and the scheduled
putting into operation of the second CW destruction facility in Kambarka
clearly demonstrate the efforts the Russian Federation is making to strictly
comply with its international obligations confirming that Russia shows political
will gradually accelerating the process of chemical disarmament and making a
substantial contribution to fulfilling obligations under the CWC.
In mid 2006 the Russian Federation intends to start operations of the first
stage of the CW disposal facility in Maradykovsky village ( Kirov Region).
By April 29, 2007 it is planned to destroy a total of about 8 000 tons of
chemical agents pertaining to Category 1 CW (20% of the existing Russian
stockpiles of this CW) at the facilities in Kambarka (the Udmurtian Republic)
and Maradykovsky village (Kirov Region) during the operation of the facility’s
first stage.
Stage 3 providing for the disposal of 45% of existing Category 1 CW,
including the CW stockpiles disposed at the Gorny facility in Saratov Region, is
scheduled to be completed by December 31, 2009.
The following facilities will be involved in the destruction of 45% of
Category 1 CW: Kambarka (the Udmurtian Republic), Maradykovsky village
(Kirov Region), Leonidovka village (Penza Region), Pochep (Bryansk Region),
as well as the facilities in Shchuch’ye (Kurgan Region) and Kizner (the
Udmurtian Republic).
All remaining stockpiles of Category 1 CW are planned to be disposed by
April 29, 2012.
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The following facilities will be involved in Stage 4 of the disposal of
Category 1 CW: Maradykovsky village (Kirov Region), Leonidovka village
(Penza Region), Pochep (Bryansk Region), as well as the facilities in
Shchuch’ye (Kurgan Region) and Kizner (the Udmurtian Republic).
The toxic agents disposal process is conducted under control of the
OPCW international inspection teams.
The issues of safety, environment protection and favorable social climate
conducive to the implementation of this complex task remain a clear priority in
the context of chemical weapons destruction.
A broad-based international cooperation is an additional factor that helps
Russia to implement its plans to eliminate chemical weapons. At present the
cooperation is developed with the European Union, the USA, Germany, Great
Britain, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Canada, Switzerland, Sweden, France,
New Zealand, the Czech Republic, Poland and the Republic of Ireland. The
objective of the current stage is to fully enhance this cooperation to achieve a
level consonant to the global level of the problem. The cooperation’s expansion
is an evidence of the political support to the Russia’s efforts in this area.
5.4 Issues of physical protection of nuclear hazardous facilities
One of the main tasks of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the
field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is improvement of
physical protection and security of its storage, operation and destruction
facilities.
The work to reduce vulnerability and enhance physical protection of
facilities for operation and storage of nuclear weapons is carried out in
accordance with the Uniform Action Plan to Improve Physical Protection and
Secutiry at High Priority and Critical Facilities of the Armed Forces of the
Russian Federation.
This plan envisages annual delivery of integrated physical security
equipment complexes (IPSEC) and their deployment at 6 to 7 nuclear hazardous
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facilities operated by Russia’s Ministry of Defense. The improvement of the
existing facility security systems is carried out through gradual introduction of
modern IPSECs.
An important element of physical protection improvement measures at
nuclear hazardous facilities is the international cooperation carried out under the
Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the
Government of the United States of America Regarding Cooperation in the
Area of Nuclear Material Physical Protection, Control and Accounting and G-8
Global Partnership.
At present, Rosatom has established a practical interaction with the USA,
Germany, the U.K. and Canada. Consultations are held and relevant documents
are drawn up with the European Community, Italy, Sweden, Japan and other
states.
CONCLUSION
Solving the problem of non-proliferation of WMD and their delivery
vehicles directly affects the interests of ensuring national security of Russia and
maintaining strategic stability. This problem is among the priority areas of
activities of the Russian Federation.
An important line of foreign policy activity is strengthening and
enhancing of the system of international treaties and agreements on WMD nonproliferation, as well as arrangements in the sphere of export control. In the first
place this relates to the universalization of such treaties and agreements,
ensuring guaranteed fulfillment with no exceptions by all states of their
commitments in the area of non-proliferation. Multilateral regimes of export
control should not be used for unfair competition and forcing out competitors
from markets of weapons and high-tech products.
The Russian Federation has created and implements in practice the
normative legal framework which ensures the observance of international
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commitments in the area of non-proliferation of WMD and their means of
delivery. The legislation envisages the implementation of a package of
measures ensuing reliable accounting, control, physical protection of nuclear
weapons, hazardous radioactive, chemical and biological materials as well as
the prevention of unauthorized access to such materials and technologies.
The world standards compliant national system of export control over the
transfers of goods and technologies which may be used for the creation of
WMD, their delivery vehicles and of other kinds of weapons and military
equipment has been established and functions sustainably. This system is
regularly updated responding to new challenges and threats.
Recent development prove that some state and non-state actors do not
ease their efforts to purchase goods and technologies relating to the
development of WMD and their means of delivery. To achieve these goals,
alongside with concealing plans and programs for the development of WMD,
they try to find weaknesses in national legislation in the area of export control,
develop and implement in practice different by-pass schemes and options of
purchasing and delivery of goods and advanced technologies. In this context
existing international agreements and export control regimes are frequently
unable to fully ensure reliable barriers against such transfers.
Therefore, the tasks of enhancing international legal framework of nonproliferation and legislation of the Russian Federation in the area of export
control for more effective tackling the challenges of combating terrorism and
implementing the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 on WMD nonproliferation are still high-profile. In addition, regular, planned and in-depth
analysis of such activities is required as well as the elaboration of coordinated
measures at both national and international levels. Still relevant is permanent
monitoring of the trends in development of WMD and their means of delivery
as well as of the attempts by terrorist and extremist groups to gain access to
such weapons and its components.
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Significant opportunities to resolve, on the national level, WMD nonproliferation issues remain within the Global Partnership initiatives developed
and implemented by the G8. Despite a discrepancy between actually received
assistance and the amounts committed by the partners, the work on the priorities
set out by the President of the Russian Federation – dismantlement of nuclear
submarines decommissioned from the Russian Navy and destruction of
chemical weapons stockpiles – proceeds generally well.
The main component of ensuring national security of Russia is the
strengthening of relations with neighboring, primarily CIS, countries.
Significant role in this context belongs to deepening of trade and economic ties
and, as a follow-up, the development of cooperation in the area of export
control for the purposes of eliminating administrative barriers in mutual trade in
high-tech products by harmonizing legislation regulating foreign trade. It is
highly important to improve the effectiveness of control over export of sensitive
items at the external borders of the CIS. In this context a strategic task is to
consistently implement the program for long-term cooperation of the Russian
Federation with the CIS countries in the area of non-proliferation of WMD and
their means of delivery, approved by the President of the Russian Federation, as
well as further development of interaction with partners within the framework
of the Eurasian Economic Community and Common Economic Space.