49782031
魏逸昀
Simulated Case of the Senkaku Islands Dispute
[Background]
The Senkaku Islands are groups of islands controlled presently by Japan in the
East China Sea. They are located at east of mainland China, northeast of Taiwan, and
west of Okinawa Island.
[Beginning of the Dispute]
The Senkaku dispute started at the end of the 1960s when it was discovered that
there might be substantial oil resources beneath the islands. Taiwan and China began
to claim ownership in 1971, despite the rejection of the Japanese government, whose
jurisdiction had never been challenged since 1895. So the disputes started as an
energy-related territorial issue.
[Analysis of the Conflicts and the Reasons of Deadlock of the Simulated
Negotiation]
At beginning of the simulation, all parties focus on the issue of whether the
Senkaku Islands had been claimed by China ever or not. They respectively refer many
concerning information during the simulated negotiation. China claims that it had
already ruled the islands before Japan controlled them, while Japan claims that they
were no-man’s land.
China further claims that the Islands were within Ming's sea-defense area and
belonged to Taiwan. On the other hand, Japanese delegates say that in the History of
Ming, the official history book of the Ming Dynasty, classifies Taiwan and its
surrounding islands as "foreign countries". They also point to other official Chinese
records about Taiwan or Fujian that never mention these islands. In their view, it is
certain that no one effectively controlled them, and after the Meiji Restoration, the
Japanese Government conducted surveys of the Islands from 1885 that confirmed that
these uninhabited islands had no trace of having been under the control of China.
However, as the counter opinion, China does not approve Japan's formal
incorporation and claims that it is the Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895, in
which China yielded Taiwan to Japan, as well as the islands, although the treaty lacks
an explicit mention of them. Thus China claims that they should have been returned
together with Taiwan after World War II, under provisions of the Cairo
Declaration, Potsdam Declaration, and Article 2 of the San Francisco Treaty and
the Treaty of Taipei. Nonetheless, even the contents of the San Francisco Treaty itself
regarding Taiwan are sometimes disputed.
Actually, I think this simulated negotiation should incorporate the U.S
government to negotiate because they play a very important role in the later part of
this simulated negotiation.
Japan claims that after World War II the islands came under the U.S. occupation
as part of Okinawa. The U.S. and the Ryukyu Government under the U.S. occupation
explicitly ruled the island, and the U.S. navy used Kuba-jima and Taisho-jima as
maneuver areas. In 1972 the islands were returned from the U.S. to Japan as part of
Okinawa. Japanese delegates point out that it was not so difficult for Taiwan to
occupy these islands in 1945 because they had already incorporated Taiwan and the
surrounding islands two months before the U.S. military occupation extended to
Yaeyama Islands. Thus they claim that this proves Taiwan’s lack of willingness to
own these islands.
However, delegates from Taiwan reject Japan's claim, pointing out that the
Taiwan government does possess sovereignty over the Islands. When U.S. forces were
stationed on Taiwan during the Cold War, military maneuvers were periodically held
which required the use of the Islands as a bombing target. Each time, the U.S. military
applied to the Taiwan government for authorization, instead of the Japanese authority.
According to sources from Taiwan’s delegates, the 1954 ROC-U.S. Mutual
Defense Treaty contains wording implying that the Taiwan did control the Islands.
The Taiwan government and the U.S. agreed to place under the U.S. forces' patrol the
area some miles north of the Taiwan islands, meaning that the Taiwan had agreed to
U.S. forces patrolling the area around the Islands.
Later on, at the last part of the simulated negotiation, the delegates shift the focus
to the resources issue; however, under the very-tightened time limitation, all the three
parties cannot make consensus before the negotiation adjourned.
[Suggestions of the Best Solutions to the Simulated Negotiation]
We all know that sovereignty is a non-negotiable issue. So I suppose all the three
parties should less mention sovereignty but the resources, which are the only common
ground of the three parties. Just like mentioned in the textbook, “emphasize the
interests but don’t focus on the position”. Therefore, view the resources of the
Senkaku Islands as a usable economic issue seems to be more negotiable than
sovereignty.
[Conclusions]
However, the one among the three parties that may least agree this should be
Japan’s government. While Japan’s legal position seems to be strong thanks to the
Treaty of Shimonoseki, it is essential that whether the Japanese government can
accept the existence of the Senkaku Islands issue as a subject of dialogue. For
example, it is viable to build up a forum as platform for all parties to make proposals
on turn the resources to good account. With practical proposals and derived details
then, there should be agreements like ECFA or other economic compacts that can
resolve this issue. Ultimately, with long-term cooperation and bettered mutual
understanding, I suppose our “next generations” will finally find the wisdom to
resolve the sovereignty for good.
References
The Treaty of Shimonoseki
The Cairo Declaration
The Potsdam Declaration
The Article 2 of the San Francisco Treaty
The Treaty of Taipei
The ROC-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty
The JCP’s 1972 Statement
CNN i Report (http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-517305)
Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senkaku_Islands)
Global Security (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/senkaku.htm)
中國評論新聞網
(http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1006/7/4/5/100674590.html?coluid=7&kindid
=0&docid=100674590)
新台灣新聞週刊 第 640 期