Dred Scott v. Sandford
In 1846, Dred Scott, a slave, sued in a Missouri court for his freedom from his master. Scott
argued that his service for Dr. Emerson in Illinois, a state from which slavery has been excluded
by the Missouri Compromise, made him a free man. Eventually, the case reached the Supreme
Court made of nine judges who interpreted the Constitution in regards to cases. At that time the
court reflected the attitudes of the time and in a 7-2 decision ruled against Scott. The most
important point in this case was that blacks were not considered people but property and since
they were property they could not petition for rights. Chief Justice Taney wrote that it was "too
clear to dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended" by the men that signed the
Declaration of Independence in 1776 to be included as citizens of the nation they sought to
establish. Chief Justice Roger Taney (J. Taney) said Article III, Section: 2 of the Constitution
provide that the Judicial Power shall extend to “all cases . . . between Citizens of different
States.”
Brown v. Board of Education I & II
Brown was a black child who was denied admission to public schools in her community because
of her race. She was not denied access to schools for blacks set up under the “separate but equal”
doctrine of Plessy. The brown case signifies how Supreme court decisions could be a dilemma
for the future country. The board of education in Topeka, Kansas appealed the justices to
consider the Plessy v. Fergusson case before ruling on Brown. Of course, the judges did reflect
the choices made during Plessy but as a result the “separate but equal” was repealed. In this case,
Warren court’s decision was 9-0 unanimous that stated “separate educational facilities are
inherently equal”. The reasoning for this case was the racial segregation in this terms, was a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the court declared
state laws establishing separate public schools for black and white students unconstitutional. In
Brown II, the supreme court ruled that the country school board of Prince Edward County,
Virginia's decision to close all local, public schools and provide vouchers to attend private
schools were constitutionally impermissible as violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Plessy v. Ferguson
Homer Plessy was jailed for sitting in a railroad car designated for whites only. Plessy was in
fact seven-eighths white and one-eighth black which by Louisiana law meant he was treated as
an African-American and required to sit in the car designated for "colored" patrons. When Plessy
lost his initial court case, his appeal made it to the US Supreme Court. The Court ruled 7-1 that
the Louisiana law requiring that the races be separated did not violate the thirteenth or fourteenth
amendments to the Constitution as long as the facilities were deemed equal.
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
Bakke, a thirty five year old male white applicant to UC Davis Medical School, sued the
university for his denial of admission on racial grounds was a violation of the fourteenth
amendment. Under Justice Lewis Powell, the Supreme Court ruled that the University had
violated both the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, by discriminating by race alone to promote diversity. However, Powell closed that
“a properly tailored affirmative action program designed to promote diversity could survive strict
judicial scrutiny”. A majority of the Supreme Court – five justices -- held that while the UC
program was unconstitutional because it involved a quota, it was lawful to take race into account
in admissions.
Grutter v. Bollinger
In 1997, Barbara Grutter, a white resident of Michigan, applied for admission to the University
of Michigan Law School. Grutter applied with a 3.8 undergraduate GPA and an LSAT score of
161. She was denied admission. The Law School admits that it uses race as a factor in making
admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its
student body." The District Court concluded that the Law School's stated interest in achieving
diversity in the student body was not a compelling one and enjoined its use of race in the
admissions process. The question was does the UM violated 14th amendment while using race as
an admission factor? In 5-4 decision of Supreme Court it was ruled that the Equal Protection
Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions
to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse
student body. The Court reasoned that, because the Law School conducts highly individualized
review of each applicant, no acceptance or rejection is based automatically on a variable such as
race and that this process ensures that all factors that may contribute to diversity are
meaningfully considered alongside race.
Gratz v. Bollinger
In 1995, Jennifer Gratz applied to the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science
and the Arts with an adjusted GPA of 3.8 and ACT score of 25. In 1997, Patrick Hamacher
applied to the University with an adjusted GPA of 3.0, and an ACT score of 28. Both were
denied admission and attended other schools. The University admits that it uses race as a factor
in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity
among its student body." In addition, the University has a policy to admit virtually all qualified
applicants who are members of one of three select racial minority groups - African Americans,
Hispanics, and Native Americans - that are considered to be "underrepresented" on the campus.
The question was does the university’s use of race as a factor violated Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Supreme Court ruled in 6 votes for Gratz and 3 against, that the University of Michigan's
use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violates both the Equal Protection Clause
and Title VI. While rejecting the argument that diversity cannot constitute a compelling state
interest, the Court reasoned that the automatic distribution of 20 points, or one-fifth of the points
needed to guarantee admission, to every single "underrepresented minority" applicant solely
because of race was not narrowly tailored and did not provide the individualized consideration
Justice Powell contemplated in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (Gratz v.
Bollinger).