1410110423
Sonakshi Sharma
BA history
Every once in few years there emerges a technology that radically changes the dynamics of war,
like gunpowder that made cavalry warfare redundant, submarines that revised the face of naval
warfare likewise there has emerged a technology that has brought about a metamorphosis in all
three forms of combat naval, aerial and ‘boots on the ground’. This paper established the role of
drones in transforming the ethics of warfare and setting up new paralogisms.
A drone is an “a land, sea, or air vehicle that is remotely or automatically controlled.” 1 Drones
are of three kinds, terrestrial, marine/submarine and terranean. They can have robotic operators
or can have remote control access. These machines are an evolution of the ideology that the
Greeks first used called “telecheric machines”2 that functioned on the principle of “manipulation
at a distance”3. This technology enables the operator to sit thousands of miles away and shoot at
the target. The etymology of drones is misleading since their initial function was to draw fire in
order to specify targets, thus drawing a comparison to drone bees that make sound but are unable
to sting(in this case fire). The technology was further developed by the Israelis, who modified it
to the extent of equipping drones with the power of firing.
Carl von Clausewitz’s analysis of the alteration in warfare is made possible through the
technology of drones. He claims “The paradigm is quite different: a hunter advancing on a prey
that flees or hides from him.”4 The disparity in the wealth of different countries is manifested in
the form of technologies that they adopt in the event of war. When an advanced and a rich
country attacks a country with little resources and turbulent governments, it is unfair to even call
it war, it becomes a unilateral form of warfare that is unethical and immoral.
Chamayou claims that it was the Kosovo war in 1999 that marked the shift in war ethics which
had taken place over the years. The USA found itself in a predicament when media was
1
Chamayou; A theory of the drone; the new press; introduction;1
Chamayou; A theory of the drone; the new press;
3
Chamayou; A theory of the drone; the new press;
4
Chamayou; A theory of the drone; the new press; Pg. 33
2
polarizing public opinion by establishing that its fighter planes were being shot down by the
enemy. This affected public opinion so much that the “pilots were forbidden to fly below an
altitude of 15,000 feet, a security distance”5. This posed a dualism to the NATO, the flight at that
altitude ensured the safety of their pilots but it posed a grave threat to the civilians in Kosovo
since precision and accuracy were lost. The NATO decided to opt for the former hence
assigning greater value of life to their own pilots in comparison to that of the civilians in Kosovo.
Jean Bethke Elshtain elaborates that even “with combatants rather than non-combatants provided
immunity from the effects of fighting.”6 The lives of non-combatants was less important than
that of the combatants of one’s own country. This strange logic to pose a threat to the
unequipped and unarmed was wrong at so many levels yet it changed the implicit law that had
for so long governed warfare. This law was spelled out in an article written by Kashner and
Aviv. Asa Kashner, a professor at the Tel Aviv University along with major Amos Yadlin
worked together to co-author an article that aimed to remodel the ethical codes used during war
or armed conflicts. The most salient feature of this article comprised the “Principle of noncombatant immunity”7. It abolished the categorical distinction in a combat and non-combat
stating that, “A combatant is a citizen in uniform”8. The principle essentially assigned greater
importance to the lives of combatants of a one side in preference to the non-combatant’s life of
the opposing side. Saving the life of a civilian which risked the life of a combatant, fell in the list
of priorities and became the least.
This created a peculiar kind of dilemma and contradiction. While all lives were allotted
the value same in citizens of one nation state, (since the difference between combatant
and non-combatant was blurred out), a new concept was used to establish a new
difference. One that functioned on identification of the person as a subject of the nation
state. It meant giving paramount significance to the nationality of a person, which would
in turn widen the gap between “nationals and foreigners”9.Kasner and Aviv, elaborated
that the number of people dying on both sides would rest upon the crucial factor of their
nationality. The distinction of ‘our’ soldiers and ‘their’ civilians is the implicit
5
Chamayou; A theory of the drone; the new press; Pg. 28,
Chamayou; A theory of the drone; the new press; Pg. 130
7
Chamayou; A theory of the drone; the new press; Pg. 131
8
Chamayou; A theory of the drone; the new press;pg 131
9
Chamayou; A theory of the drone; the new press; Pg132
6
enforcement of nationalistic attitudes that are ingrained into the psyche of the subjects of
a nation state. Consequently, Micheal walzer and Avishai Margalit conclude that this
discrimination would lead to promotion of “ethnocentric and xenophobic attitudes”10
narrow mindedness and shallowness that are anti-universalistic and humanitarian. The
drone had not only changed the style of warfare but it had its implications in the psyche
of people too which were insidious in nature promoting nationalism. These implications
also extend to the creations of certain paralogisms that are created to provide moral
justifications to the drone. Two parologisms that do so are assigning the term
humanitarian to the drone as well as appreciating it for its precision. The stark irony lies
in calling the drone a ‘humanitarian weapon’. How can something that enables killing of
humans to take place be a humanitarian in nature? It is humanitarian in the sense that it
saves the lives of a few, but the process of killing or saving lives is based on the
distinction of the nation state they belong to, making the process even more immoral.
However, the distinction rests on more rudimentary elements than that of the appearance
of a person which is available on a screen thousands of miles away.
What labels a person as a combatant, rests upon two factors, his direct involvement in the war or
his presence an imminent threat to the nation state? The former, the more obvious and easier
method of classification is demolished by the very existence of drones. This strange paradox
which is appreciated for its precision to distinguish between combatant and non-combatant
disables the distinction to take place itself. “This weapon threatens the very applicability of the
principle of distinction.”11 A new unethical and imprecise method is devised that is established
on the study of networks, behavior and pattern. This insidious method has shifted war from
combatants to suspected militants.
A counter argument made is that if an idealistic setting was set up where not only one’s
combatants were safe but also the civilians of the opposite camp? This was dependent upon the
fundamental aspect of technology which would grant such a paradigm to shape up. It is argued
that the drone is that technology with its superior precision, it is very easy to differentiate
between combatant and non-combatant.
10
11
Chamayou; A theory of the drone; the new press; pg134
Chamayou; A theory of the drone; the new press; pg145
Drones create a façade that portray, killing as “a moral obligation”12 thus increasing their
socio-politico acceptability.
Also what comprises of ‘precision’ is also misapprehended. Precision is a relative term, but the
parameters against which it is measured plays a crucial role in its enabling. The drones are
always compared with other aerial combat technologies. One such example is of the planes used
in the Second World War for carpet bombing Hiroshima, however Chamayou argues that
although drones are relatively more precise, they functionalities differ, hence making them
incomparable. The criteria of comparison should be the functions thus setting up drones as
against ‘boots on the ground’ both used in targeted assassinations. In this comparison the
collateral damage cause is less in the case of a bullet as opposed to that in drones. Chamayou
supports his claim by dissecting the technical aspects of a drone strike. He describes what is
called a ‘kill radius’13 which encompasses the area which if occupied, would result in the death
of that person and a “wound radius” that would wound all those who occupy that area. A grenade
has a kill radius of only three meters and a bullet has none.
To conclude, drones have not only transformed the face of warfare but also brought
about a metamorphosis in the ethics of war which has more subtle implicit
implications that shall affect warfare more. The alarming aspect of these drones is
that they find shelter in fallacy created on the basis of ethicality and morality in the
name of killing. It is essential to question these notions created by the nation state to
justify their means of killing.
12
13
Chamayou; A theory of the drone; the new press; pg137
Chamayou; A theory of the drone; the new press; pg141