POSITIVIST APPROACHES (I.E., SCIENTIFIC METHODS) TO
STUDYING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
1. INTRODUCTION
International Relations is not methodologically specific in the sense of raising issues of
theories. The classical approaches to international relations were informed more by
history and law than by natural science. It seems that the initial stage of the study of
International Relations has seen too much of the conceptual dimensions rather than the
explanatory ones. Thus, it would be fair to claim that positivist approaches opened the
floodgate of scientific method of explanation in International Relations, where the
success or failure of predictions was the key to identifying the causal correlation
between variables. Here we may perforce encounter a question: is positivism the
legitimate method of explanation in International Relations?
On this basis, finding an answer for the foregoing question, this paper seeks to assess
the positivism to the field by examining its implications for scientific methodology of
International Relations. The structure of the argument is to assess both positive and
negative aspects of positivist approaches taking classical and normative approach into
account following brief elucidation of the notion of positivism. It would be cardinal to
note that positivism has enormously influenced the field primarily because it has
impinged upon what the discipline could talk about. However, my argument would be
that it is not less important to highlight the normative aspects of International Relations
that have been marginalized by positivism.
2. IMPLICATIONS OF POSITIVISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
What does positivism mean in international relations? For philosophers, the epitome of
positivism is logical positivism, which is the hardheaded empiricism to stress on
experience. Namely, observation and testing is the only way to justify claims to
knowledge of the world and therefore methods of verification are the key to the
meaning of scientific statements. In this paper, however, instead of accurately and
strictly defining the notion of positivism, I would like to extract some assumptions of
positivism in International Relations in a less philosophically conscious way.
First, there is a belief in the unity of science. It involves the view that the social sciences
can be built upon the same model as the natural sciences. Accordingly, many would
argue that the slow pace of development of international theory could be explained by
comparing it to the development of physics, which took centuries to create firm theories.
1
Second, there is a distinction between facts and values. It was thought that the positivist
should approach the facts in an unprejudiced frame of mind and that the facts would
present themselves to the viewer in an uncomplicated way. Third, there has been a
powerful belief in the existence of regularities in the social as well as the natural world.
Finally, there has been a reliance on the belief in empirical validation or falsification.
Thus, positivism in International Relations has tended to involve a commitment to a
natural science methodology, tied to an empiricist epistemology. In other words, it is a
methodological view that combines naturalism with a belief in regularities, just in
contrast with the classical approaches that see the subject as akin to history by taking
notice of the actor’s motivation or intention in the social and institutional framework.
3. EVALUATION OF POSITIVISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
How has positivism influenced the study of International Relations? Before assessing
the extent to which there has been a move away from a positivist international theory, it
would be necessary to acknowledge the roles that positivism has ever played in this
arena.
First, positivism is epistemologically important because its empiricism has determined
what kinds of things existed in international relations, by which it identified what could
be studied. Positivists’ reliance on an empiricist epistemology grounds our knowledge
of the world in justification by experience and observation and thereby licensing
methodology as far as it is empirically warranted. In other words, the vast majority of
international relations research has rested implicitly on positivist assumptions, in which
observation and experience are the central criteria to judge scientific methodologies.
Second, methodological significance of positivism should therefore be noted. Positivists
observe facts, i.e. international events, detect the regularities in nature of international
affairs, propose a generalization, deduce what it implies for the next case and to confirm
whether the prediction succeeds. This process would continue until a solid body of
generalization has been established to serve as a reliable source of explanation. In this
regard, International Relations theories are a set of propositions that must be testable by
observations. In the course of generalization, as a proposed hypothesis derived from an
International Relations theory ought to be tested against the evidence before being
accepted, one should reexamine the theory if the hypothesis proved wrong. Hence it can
be inferred that the positivist task is to provide a system of generalization which can be
used to make correct predictions about the consequences of any change in international
2
circumstances. In this sense, positivism provided International Relations with scientific
approaches that aimed to uncover general patterns of international affairs through
observation of facts and validation by the test. Third, this logical positivism has been
extended to some more moderate ways of approach in International Relations. Some
positivists also permit perceptions and other psychological states such as hostility that
are not directly observable. Especially in the field of International Relations, even
observation need interpreting before it can be counted on. On this view, positivist
approach requires that we specify and differentiate the sources of our explanation. In
other words, positivism in international relations has permitted some considerable
measure of interpretation into international events. Moreover, some would even argue
that “intuition” would convey a sense of the unobservable relations of the subject
matters. In either case, the essential process of validation and generalization as a
scientific method would be salient. Fourth, the positivist approach has cleared the way
for the development of International Relations theories. I assume that positivism has
possibility of universality to be applied any International Relations theory in some way
or another. Actually, positivist belief in generalization yielded quantification and
rational choice theory, which has been applied to strategic analysis such as the Game
theory framework or peace research. I also feel entitled to see neo-realism as being
based upon positivism in that it generalizes the pattern of state behavior.
4. Limitations of positivism in International Relations
While positivism has thus played an important part, my argument is that its limitations
should be more firmly noted. For, it can be maintained that positivism marginalized
some alternative perspectives.
Positivism characterized International Relations theories that saw the world as a set of
ready-made facts awaiting discovery through the application of scientific methodology.
Especially for the logical positivist, perception of the facts is quite independent of the
specific social framework in which it takes place. In other words, positivists normally
work within communities with common sets of premises, assumptions, criteria and
techniques. They are all premised on a strong distinction between facts and values. On
this view, scientific judgments are to be understood in contrast with value judgments
that are held to be subjective, relative or conventional. There is no possible verification
for value judgments for positivists. As is argued by critical theorists, however, facts in
International Relations are social and historical products partly determined by the
3
human actions and ideas and therefore cannot confirm or falsify our theories in the way
that positivism maintains. In this context, facts have to be interpreted. We have to
determine what is to count as a relevant fact in the light of the concepts we use.
In this context, positivists’ methodology cannot be wholly value-free. Of course, when
positivists argue in favor of a value-free, neutral and objective science, they do not
necessarily mean that values play no role in motivating research. What they mean is that
scientist should act as an impartial judge in terms of which specific theories and
explanations are accepted. In my view, however, value orientations might influence the
way in which the facts are perceived. Value helps to build structures that support some
lifestyles and kills other forms of life. For example, rational-choice analysis will depend
much on the extent to which people accept its rules to guide their behavior.
Then to what extent are value orientations important in International Relations? First of
all, what are dealing with in the first place in international relations are actions in the
arena of world politics. While actors’ perceptions are not completely determined, this
does not mean that perceptions are not caused. They would be best understood as
conditional to a large extent. Actors inhabit a world in which their interpretations and
assessments based on the language they use are largely socially constructed. Hence, the
investigator must understand the language of the actors. We experience the world only
through languages that are already theoretical. In order to do this, he must understand as
a whole the social practice within which the actions take place. This in turn requires that
he learn what would count as a mistake within the practice and therefore understand the
value systems of those actions in the practice. This values underlying the practice is
often highly contested. Hence, the investigator must become involved in substantive
normative approach.
A few words should be added about the positivists’ limitation. Since International
Relations theory is involved in deciding what the facts are, there is room for choice
when we decide whether the theory at stake is consistent with them. While positivist
believes in the possibility of generalization, its methodology does not necessarily
guarantee a coherent basis for theorization. In fact, the generalization about human
behavior may be unstable and the patterns of behavior may be fluid. Thus, if we
excessively persist in adopting positivist approaches, we may run the risk of fettering
our perspectives to analyze the international events.
4
5. Conclusion
Positivism, as a scientific approach in International Relations, contributed much in this
field in that it produced a way of generalization and prediction through theories. The
policy-making and its implementation require a form of positivist belief in the
underlying regularity of human affairs. Despite the regularities in human affairs,
however, I do not accept the idea that we can construct a completely neutral theory that
valid across time and space. It is too difficult to formulate the International Relations
theory that allows us to predict in the same way as takes place in the natural science. A
multitude of diversity and transition of the International Relations theories so far have
testified this difficulty. Hence, positivist attempt of “generalization” is effective only in
a limited sense that we can recognize a pattern within international relations and to
formulate a general proposition. The possibility of prediction of actual human behavior
by theories, which is a starting point in examining international relations, is fairly
limited, much less of control of the action. In this regard, I assume that classical
approaches are more suitable in raising a theory by adapting the complicated
international phenomena with flexibility and grasp the core factors of them.
In addition, positivism implies an image of the world in which some things are regarded
as central in relation to international events whereas others are seen as specific and as
such irrelevant. As a result, it becomes virtually impossible to think of a way in which
any International Relations paradigms could be tested against one another. It is not
simply because they have different views of the world but because they define what is
the evidence in a different way.
If it is not possible to provide an objective test against which explanations may be
verified or falsified, it is likely that we prefer one theory to another for other non-factual
reasons: normative considerations. The international system of states is related to one
another in terms of common practices, customs, norms, principles and rules. They
provide the basis for determining what is just or unjust on human behavior in the
context of international relations. Therefore, it is crucial to have a comprehensive
International Relations theory which incorporate the normative aspects with the
positivist approaches.
5
[Bibliography]
Booth, Ken and Smith, Steve eds, International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1995)
Hollis, Martin and Smith, Steve, Explaining and Understanding International Relations
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990)
Mark A. Neufeld, The restructuring of International Relations theory (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997)
Mervyn Frost, Ethics in international relations: A constitutive theory (Cambridge:
Cambridge Univeristy Press, 1996)
Smith, Steve, Booth, Ken, and Zalewski, Marysia eds., International theory: positivism
and beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)
Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.,
1979)
6