Husserl
Intentionality and Temporality
Last time we focused our attention on the two reductions which
reveal and explore the object of Husserlian phenomenology: sphere
of pure consciousness. Our consideration of the results of the
phenomenological epoché revealed a 'phenomenological residuum.'
This residuum was provisionally and inadequately characterized as
the 'halo of consciousness' which accompanies any intending.
Without phenomenologically clarifying the being of this residuum
(we'll talk about that today) Husserl draws a fundamental
distinction between the mediate, limited, adumbrative character of
our intuition of a 'transcendent' object and the immediate, absolute
and entire intuition of an act of consciousness. Giving this
distinction an epistemological spin, Husserl concludes that there is
an indubitability in the intuition of an act of consciousness that is
wholly lacking in the intuition of a transcendent thing. Truth,
"absolute actuality," is a feature of the intuition of immanent, rather
than transcendent, objects.
The eidetic reduction focuses on this 'absolute actuality' and in the
process highlights the "counter-sensical" (to the natural attitude)
implications of the reduction itself.
Fundamental to the natural attitude is a commitment to a dualistic
phenomenalism. But even in the natural attitude, there is no logical
impossibility in the idea that there is no 'deeper' reality beyond that
which we experience. We can go even further by noting that
whatever we have to say about this 'other world' it is nonetheless
true that "whatever physical things are…they are as experienceable
physical things." By implication, the essential feature of any
experience is precisely that it is experienced, i.e., that it refers back
to consciousness itself, that what is, is for consciousness per se.
Once again, the natural attitude is shown to suggest its own limits,
motivating the epoché. What is revealed in this instance is the being
of the phenomenological residuum: consciousness itself. It survives
the absolute annihilation of the epoché. As such its being is
absolute; all other beings refer necessarily to it and it refers to
nothing else. Pure consciousness is then an entirely self-contained
complex.
As the Heidegger quotation (IHP 89) highlights, one of the most
important dimensions revealed by the reductions is the theme of
intentionality: the fact that consciousness is always ‘consciousness
of.’ The key aspect of the theme as Husserl articulates it here is its
horizonality. Every actual intentive process is accompanied by a
horizon of potential processes. For example, when consciousness is
directed at a physical object, accompanying horizons include: the
intended but not directly perceived adumbrations of the thing, the
other possible objects of our perceptive attention that could become
actual objects of perception, temporal horizons, etc.
It is important to recognize that these horizons are not
indeterminate 'somethings.' They are what Husserl calls
"predelineated" potentialities, which means that they reveal a
conformity to type that can be reflectively revealed in eidetic
analysis. This opens up the possibility of what Husserl calls
"intentional analysis." This is not analysis of the psychological or
logical sort (which consists of breaking a phenomenon up into its
constitutive parts) but is rather, "…an uncovering of the
potentialities 'implicit' in actualities of consciousness…"
Noesis and Noema
In order to understand the structure of the intentionality of
consciousness, Husserl again points us to the "threshold of
phenomenology," but instead of attempting to motivate the epoché,
he is here concerned with a "wholly fundamental" distinction
between two moments of the intentional structure: there are those
elements of the structure which are part of the intentive process
and there are those elements which are part of the intentional
correlates of those intentive processes. The task of intentional
analysis, in its most rigorous form, is the elucidation of the
essential (eidetic) structures of the noetic and noematic moments of
the intention.
The really inherent moments of the intentive process are labeled by
Husserl Noetic. Their shared essence lies in the animation of a
sense or sense-complex, what the text characterizes as
“presenting…an objectivity” (IHP 91). Starting in the Logical
Investigations, Husserl typically distinguishes two dimensions of
this presentation, which together specify any intentional act’s
‘essence:’ quality and material. Quality refers to the mode of the
intention, for example, as being posited (the modes/qualities of
doubting, wishing, questioning). The material of the intentional act
refers to the internal structure of the act, which can be simple or
complex.
The really inherent moments of the correlates of the intentive
process are labled by Husserl Noematic. Their shared essence is
animation by Sinngebung (sense-giving or sense-bestowal).
Ex.: Remembering. The noetic moment is the animation of a
sense in the particular mode of "recollection;" the noematic
moment is the remembered as remembered.
Of the two, it is the Noematic moments of the intentional analysis
that are the most likely to cause confusion. This is because there is
a common tendency to confuse the noematic structures of a
meaning-giving act, with the object of the act itself. It is the
remembered as remembered, not the remembered itself which has
phenomenological significance.
Evidence
The theme of evidence is one of the most important in Husserl's
phenomenology. Remember that from the beginning (Kant) the
issues animating the transcendental turn have been truth and
skepticism. The analysis of what counts as evidence for an assertion
is Husserl's response to these issues.
Husserl definitively links truth/acutality with rational
showing/grounding. As we will see, Husserl thinks this connection
between reason and truth in terms of 'presence.'
There are a number of distinctions that recommend themselves
when we establish the link between truth and showing.
1. In the intending of a thing, the thing can be given to us
"originally," or it can be given to us "non-originally" (ex.,
apple tree, remembering the apple tree).
2. In the intending of a thing, the thing can be given to us
"adequately" or it can be given to us "inadequately" (ex.,
2+2=4, remembering the apple tree).
3. In the intending of a thing can be given to us "purely" or it
can be given to us "impurely" (ex., strata of sense 'material'
in perception of apple tree, apple tree).
The task we face is to determine what, in the relationship between
these distinctions, determine whether a given intentional structure
is adequately or inadequately evident. Husserl's analysis here
should be anticipated: physical presentation is never adequate, only
intellectual is. What may not be anticipated is the flexibility of the
criteria: each mode of givenness admits of a specific evidentiary
requirment. What connects them all is the primacy given to a
specific mode of presentation--a specific mode of the present.
Temporality
Though intentionality is the fundamental form of consciousness,
when we turn to consciousness itself, we find as its most
fundamental structure what Husserl calls “time consciousness” (IHP
101).