** 1AC**
Plan
Plan: The United States should legalize nearly all marihuana in the United States
through conditional federal policy waivers.
Marijuana Industry Adv: 1AC
Advantage 1 is the Marijuana Industry:
State-level legalization is inevitable and will lock us into an unregulated system
dominated by big marijuana—conditional policy waivers are key to solve
Kleiman 14 (Mark, professor of public policy at UCLA, March/April/May 2014, "How Not to Make a Hash Out of Cannabis
Legalization" Washington Monthly)
www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/march_april_may_2014/features/how_not_to_make_a_hash_out_of049291.php?page=all
Maybe you think the gains of legalizing marijuana will outweigh the costs; maybe you don’t. But
that’s quickly becoming a moot point. Like it or not, legalization is on its way , unless something occurs
to reverse the current trend in public opinion. In any case, it shouldn’t be controversial to say that, if we are to legalize
cannabis, the policy aim going forward should be to maximize the gains and minimize the
disadvantages. But the systems being put in place in Colorado and Washington aren’t well
designed for that purpose, because they create a cannabis industry whose commercial interest is
precisely opposite to the public interest. Cannabis consumption, like alcohol consumption, follows the
so-called 80/20 rule (sometimes called “Pareto’s Law”): 20 percent of the users account for 80 percent of
the volume. So from the perspective of cannabis vendors, drug abuse isn’t the problem; it’s the
target demographic. Since we can expect the legal cannabis industry to be financially dependent
on dependent consumers, we can also expect that the industry’s marketing practices and
lobbying agenda will be dedicated to creating and sustaining problem drug use patterns. The trick
to legalizing marijuana, then, is to keep at bay the logic of the market —its tendency to create and
exploit people with substance abuse disorders. So far, the state-by-state, initiative-driven process
doesn’t seem up to that challenge . Neither the taxes nor the regulations will prevent substantial decreases in retail
prices, which matter much more to very heavy users and to cash-constrained teenagers than they do to casual users. The
industry’s marketing efforts will be constrained only by rules against appealing explicitly to
minors (rules that haven’t kept the beer companies from sponsoring Extreme Fighting on television). And there’s no
guarantee that other states won’t create even looser systems. In Oregon, a proposition on the 2012 ballot that
was narrowly defeated (53 percent to 47 percent) would have mandated that five of the seven members of the commission to
regulate the cannabis industry be chosen by the growers—industry capture, in other words, was written into the proposed law. It
remains to be seen whether even the modest taxes and restrictions passed by the voters survive the inevitable industry pressure to
weaken them legislatively. There are three main policy levers that could check cannabis abuse while
making the drug legally available. The first and most obvious is price. Roughly speaking, high-potency pot
on the illegal market today costs about $10 to $15 per gram. (It’s cheaper in the medical outlets in Colorado and Washington.) A
joint, enough to get an occasional user stoned more than once, contains about four-tenths of a gram; that much cannabis costs
about $5 at current prices. The price in Amsterdam, where retailing is tolerated but growing is still seriously illegal, is about the
same, which helps explain why Dutch use hasn’t exploded under quasi-legalization. If we too want to avoid a vast increase in heavy
cannabis use under legalization, we should create policies to keep the price of the drug about where it is now. The difficulty is that
marijuana is both relatively cheap compared to other drugs and also easy to grow (thus the nickname “weed”), and will just get
cheaper and easier to grow under legalization. According to RAND, legal production costs would be a small fraction of the current
level, making the pre-tax value of the cannabis in a legally produced joint pennies rather than dollars. Taxes are one way to keep
prices up. But those taxes would have to be ferociously high, and they’d have to be determined by the ounce of pot or (better) by the
gram of THC, as alcohol taxes now are, not as a percentage of retail price like a sales tax. Both Colorado and Washington have
percentage-of-price taxes, which will fall along with market prices. In states where it was legal, cannabis taxes would have to be
more than $200 an ounce to keep prices at current levels; no ballot measure now under consideration has taxes nearly that high.
Collecting such taxes wouldn’t be easy in the face of interstate smuggling, as the tobacco markets illustrate. The total taxes on a
pack of cigarettes in New York City run about $8 more than the taxes on the same pack in Virginia. Lo and behold, there’s a
massive illicit industry smuggling cigarettes north, with more than a third of the cigarettes sold in New York escaping New York
taxes. Without federal intervention, interstate smuggling of cannabis would be even worse.
Whichever state had the lowest cannabis taxes would effectively set prices for the whole country ,
and the supposed state option to keep the drug illegal would fall victim to inflows from neighboring states. The other way to keep
legal pot prices up is to limit supply. Colorado and Washington both plan to impose production limits on growers. If those limits were
kept tight enough, scarcity would lead to a run-up in price. (That’s happening right now in Colorado; prices in the limited number of
commercial outlets open on January 1 were about 50 percent higher than prices in the medical outlets.) But those states are
handing out production rights for modest fixed licensing fees, so any gain from scarcity pricing will go to the industry and encourage
even more vigorous marketing. If, instead, production quotas were put up for auction, the gain could go to the taxpayers. Just as a
cap-and-trade system for carbon emissions can be made to mimic the effects of a carbon tax, production quotas with an auction
would be the equivalent of taxes. The second policy lever government has is information: it can require or
provide product labeling, point-of-sale communication, and outreach to prevent both drug abuse
and impaired driving. In principle, posting information about, say, the known chemical composition of one type of cannabis
versus another could help consumers use the drug more safely. How that plays out in practice depends on the details of policy
design. Colorado and Washington require testing and labeling for chemical content, but techniques for helping consumers translate
those numbers into safer consumption practices remain to be developed. The fact that more than 60 percent of cannabis user-days
involve people with no more than a high school education creates an additional challenge, one often ignored by the advanceddegree holders who dominate the debate. The government could also make sure consumers are able to get
high-quality information and advice from cannabis vendors. In Uruguay, for example, which is now legalizing
on the national level, the current proposal requires cannabis vendors to be registered pharmacists. Cannabis is, after all, a
somewhat dangerous drug, and both much more complex chemically and less familiar culturally than beer or wine. In Washington
and Colorado, by contrast, the person behind the counter will simply be a sales agent, with no required training about the
pharmacology of cannabis and no professional obligation to promote safe use. A more radical approach would be to enhance
consumers’ capacity to manage their own drug use with a program of user-determined periodic purchase limits. (See “A Nudge
Toward Temperance.”) All of these attempts by government to use information to limit abuse, however, could be overwhelmed by
the determined marketing efforts of a deep-pocketed marijuana industry. And the courts’ creation of a legal category called
“commercial free speech” radically limits attempts to rein in those marketing efforts (see Haley Sweetland Edwards, “The Corporate
‘Free Speech’ Racket”). The “commercial free speech” doctrine creates an absurd situation: both state governments and the federal
government can constitutionally put people in prison for growing and selling cannabis, but they’re constitutionally barred from
legalizing cannabis with any sort of marketing restriction designed to prevent problem use. Availability represents a third
policy lever. Where can marijuana be sold? During what hours? In what form? There’s a reason
why stores put candy in the front by the checkout counters; impulse buying is a powerful
phenomenon. The more restrictive the rules on marijuana, the fewer new people will start smoking
and the fewer new cases of abuse we’ll have. Colorado and Washington limit marijuana sales to governmentlicensed pot stores that have to abide by certain restrictions, such as not selling alcohol and not being located near schools. But
they’re free to advertise. And there’s nothing to keep other states, or Colorado and Washington a few years from now, from allowing
pot in any form to be sold in grocery stores or at the 7-Eleven. (Two years before legalizing cannabis, Washington’s voters approved
a Costco-sponsored initiative to break the state monopoly on sales of distilled spirits.) To avoid getting locked into bad
policies, lawmakers in Washington need to act, and quickly. I know it’s hard to imagine anything good coming
out of the current Congress, but there’s no real alternative. What’s needed is federal legislation requiring states
that legalize cannabis to structure their pot markets such that they won’t get captured by
commercial interests . There are any number of ways to do that, so the legislation wouldn’t have
to be overly prescriptive. States could, for instance, allow marijuana to be sold only through nonprofit outlets, or distributed
via small consumer-owned co-ops (see Jonathan P. Caulkins, “Nonprofit Motive”). The most effective way, however, would be
through a system of state-run retail stores. There’s plenty of precedent for this: states from Utah to Pennsylvania to Alabama restrict
hard liquor sales to stateoperated or state-controlled outlets. Such “ABC” (“alcoholic beverage control”) stores date back to the end
of Prohibition, and operationally they work fine. Similar “pot control” stores could work fine for marijuana, too. A “state store” system
would also allow the states to control the pot supply chain. By contracting with many small growers, rather than a few giant ones,
states could check the industry’s political power (concentrated industries are almost always more effective at lobbying than those
comprised of many small companies) and maintain consumer choice by avoiding a beer-like oligopoly offering virtually
interchangeable products. States could also insist that the private growers sign contracts forbidding them
from marketing to the public. Imposing that rule as part of a vendor agreement rather than as a regulation might avoid the
“commercial free speech” issue, thus eliminating the specter of manipulative marijuana advertising filling the airwaves and covering
highway billboards. To prevent interstate smuggling, the federal government should do what it has
failed to do with cigarettes: mandate a minimum retail price. Of course, there’s a danger that states
themselves, hungry for tax dollars, could abuse their monopoly power over pot, just as they have with state lotteries. To avert that
outcome, states should avoid the mistake they made with lotteries: housing them in state revenue departments, which focus on
maximizing state income. Instead, the new marijuana control programs should reside in state health
departments and be overseen by boards with a majority of health care and substance-abuse
professionals. Politicians eager for revenue might still press for higher pot sales than would be good for public health, but
they’d at least have to fight a resistant bureaucracy. How could the federal government get the states to
structure their pot markets in ways like these? By giving a new twist to a tried-and-true tool that the
Obama administration has wielded particularly effectively: the policy waiver. The federal government would
recognize the legal status of cannabis under a state system—making the activities permitted
under that system actually legal, not merely tolerated, under federal law—only if the state system
contained adequate controls to protect public health and safety, as determined by the attorney
general and the secretary of the department of health and human services. That would change the
politics of legalization at the state level, with legalization advocates and the cannabis industry
supporting tight controls in order to get, and keep, the all-important waiver. Then we would see
the laboratories of democracy doing some serious experimentation.
Scenario 1: Environmental Justice
Unregulated marijuana cultivation has a massive environmental impact—federal
legalization is key to enable regulatory oversight
Zuckerman 13 (Seth, journalist, 10-31-13, "Is Pot-Growing Bad for the Environment?" The Nation)
www.thenation.com/article/176955/pot-growing-bad-environment?page=0,2
As cannabis production has ramped up in Northern California to meet the demand for medical and blackmarket marijuana, the ecological impacts of its cultivation have ballooned . From shrunken, muddy
streams to rivers choked with algae and wild lands tainted with chemical poisons, large-scale
cannabis agriculture is emerging as a significant threat to the victories that have been won in the region to
protect wilderness, keep toxic chemicals out of the environment, and rebuild salmon runs that had once provided the
backbone of a coast-wide fishing industry. River advocate Scott Greacen has spent most of his career fighting dams and the
timber industry, but now he’s widened his focus to include the costs of reckless marijuana growing. Last year was a time of regionwide rebound for threatened salmon runs, but one of his colleagues walked his neighborhood creek and sent a downbeat report that
only a few spawning fish had returned. Even more alarming was the condition of the creek bed: coated with silt and mud, a sign that
the water quality in this stream was going downhill. “The problem with the weed industry is that its impacts are
severe, it’s not effectively regulated, and it’s growing so rapidly,” says Greacen, executive director of
lack of regulation sets marijuana’s
impacts apart from those that stem from legal farming or logging, yet the 76-year-old federal
prohibition on cannabis has thwarted attempts to hold its production to any kind of
environmental standard . As a result, the ecological impact of an ounce of pot varies
tremendously, depending on whether it was produced by squatters in national forests, hydroponic
operators in homes and warehouses, industrial-scale operations on private land, or conscientious
mom-and-pop farmers. Consumers could exert market power through their choices, if only they
had a reliable, widely accepted certification program, like the ones that guarantee the integrity of organic
agriculture. But thanks to the prohibition on pot, no such certification program exists for cannabis
products. To understand how raising some dried flowers—the prized part of the cannabis plant—can damage the
local ecosystem, you first have to grasp the skyrocketing scale of backwoods agriculture on the
redwood coast. Last fall, Scott Bauer of the California Department of Fish and Wildlife turned a
mapping crew loose on satellite photos of two adjoining creeks. In the Staten Island–sized area
that drains into those streams, his team identified more than 1,000 cannabis farms, estimated to
Friends of the Eel River, which runs through the heart of the marijuana belt. That
produce some 40,000 small-tree-sized plants annually. Bauer holds up the maps, where each greenhouse is marked in blue and
each outdoor marijuana garden in red, with dots that correspond to the size of the operation. It looks like the landscape has a severe
case of Technicolor acne. “In the last couple of years,
the increase has been exponential ,” Bauer says. “On the screen,
you can toggle back and forth between the 2010 aerial photo and the one from 2012. Where there had been one or two sites, now there are ten.” Each of those sites represents
industrial development in a mostly wild landscape, with the hilly terrain flattened and cleared. “When someone shaves off a mountaintop and sets a facility on it,” Bauer says,
“that’s never changing. The topsoil is gone.” The displaced soil is then spread by bulldozer to build up a larger flat pad for greenhouses and other farm buildings. But heavy
winter rains wash some of the soil into streams, Bauer explains, where it sullies the salmon’s spawning gravels and fills in the pools where salmon fry spend the summer.
Ironically, these are the very impacts that resulted from the worst logging practices of the last century. “We got logging to the point that the rules are pretty tight,” Bauer says,
“and now there’s this whole new industry where nobody has any idea what they’re doing. You see guys building roads who have never even used a Cat [Caterpillar tractor].
We’re going backwards.” Then there’s irrigation. A hefty cannabis plant needs several gallons of water per day in the rainless summer growing season, which doesn’t sound like
much until you multiply it by thousands of plants and consider that many of the streams in the area naturally dwindle each August and September. In the summer of 2012, the
two creeks that Bauer’s team mapped got so low that they turned into a series of disconnected pools with no water flowing between them, trapping the young fish in shrinking
ponds. “It’s a serious issue for the coho salmon,” Bauer says. “How is this species going to recover if there’s no water?” The effects extend beyond salmon. During several law
enforcement raids last year, Bauer surveyed the creeks supplying marijuana farms to document the environmental violations occurring there. Each time, he says, he found a
sensitive salamander species above the grower’s water intakes, but none below them, where the irrigation pipes had left little water in the creek. On one of these raids, he
chastised the grower, who was camped out onsite and hailed from the East Coast, new to the four- to six-month dry season that comes with California’s Mediterranean climate.
“I told him, ‘You’re taking most of the flow, man,’ ” Bauer recalls. “’It’s just a little tiny creek, and you’ve got three other growers downstream. If you’re all taking 20 or 30 percent,
pretty soon there’s nothing left for the fish.’ So he says, ‘I didn’t think about that.’ ” While some growers raise their pot organically, many do not. “Once you get to a certain scale,
it’s really hard to operate in a sustainable way,” Greacen says. “Among other things, you’ve got a monoculture, and monocultures invite pests.” Spider mites turn out to be a
particular challenge for greenhouse growers. Tony Silvaggio, a lecturer at Humboldt State University and a scholar at the campus’s year-old Humboldt Institute for
Interdisciplinary Marijuana Research, found that potent poisons such as Avid and Floramite are sold in small vials under the counter at grower supply stores, in defiance of a
state law that requires they be sold only to holders of a pesticide applicator’s license. Nor are just the workers at risk: the miticides have been tested for use on decorative
plants, but not for their impacts if smoked. Otherwise ecologically minded growers can be driven to spray with commercial pesticides, Silvaggio has found in his research. “After
you’ve worked for months, if you have an outbreak of mites in your last few weeks when the buds are going, you’ve got to do something—otherwise you lose everything,” he
says. Outdoor growers face another threat: rats, which are drawn to the aromatic, sticky foliage of the cannabis plant. Raids at growing sites typically find packages of the longacting rodent poison warfarin, which has begun making its way up the food chain to predators such as the rare, weasel-like fisher. A study last year in the online scientific journal
PLOS One found that more than 70 percent of fishers have rat poison in their bloodstream, and attributed four fisher deaths to internal bleeding triggered by the poison they
absorbed through their prey. Deep in the back-country, Silvaggio says, growers shoot or poison bears to keep them from raiding their encampments. The final blow to
environmental health from outdoor growing comes from fertilizers. Growers dump their used potting soil, enriched with unabsorbed fertilizers, in places where it washes into
nearby streams and is suspected of triggering blooms of toxic algae. The deaths of four dogs on Eel River tributaries have been linked to the algae, which the dogs ingest after
swimming in the river and then licking their fur. The cannabis industry—or what Silvaggio calls the “marijuana-industrial complex”—has been building toward this collision with
the environment ever since California voters approved Proposition 215 in 1996, legalizing the medicinal use of marijuana under state law. Seven years later, the legislature
passed Senate Bill 420, which allows patients growing pot with a doctor’s blessing to form collectives and sell their herbal remedy to fellow patients. Thus were born the
storefront dispensaries, which grew so common that they came to outnumber Starbucks outlets in Los Angeles. From the growers’ point of view, a 100-plant operation no longer
had to be hidden, because its existence couldn’t be presumed illegal under state law. So most growers stopped hiding their plants in discreet back-country clearings or buried
shipping containers and instead put them out in the open. As large grows became less risky, they proliferated—and so did their effects on the environment. Google Earth posted
satellite photos taken in August 2012, when most outdoor pot gardens were nearing their peak. Working with Silvaggio, a graduate student identified large growing sites in the
area, and posted a Google Earth flyover tour of the region that makes it clear that the two creeks Bauer’s team studied are representative of the situation across the region. With
all of the disturbance from burgeoning backwoods marijuana gardens, it might seem that raising cannabis indoors would be the answer. Indoor growers can tap into municipal
water supplies and don’t have to clear land or build roads to farms on hilltop hideaways. But indoor growing is responsible instead for a more insidious brand of damage: an
outsize carbon footprint to power the electric-intensive lights, fans and pumps that it takes to raise plants inside. A dining-table-size hydroponic unit yielding five one-pound
crops per year would consume as much electricity as the average US home, according to a 2012 paper in the peer-reviewed journal Energy Policy. All told, the carbon footprint
of a single gram of cannabis is the same as driving seventeen miles in a Honda Civic. In addition, says Kristin Nevedal, president of the Emerald Growers Association, “the
tendency indoors is to lean toward chemical fertilizers, pesticides and fungicides to stabilize the man-made environment, because you don’t have the natural beneficials that are
found outdoors.” Nevertheless, the appeal of indoor growing is strong, explains Sharon (not her real name), a single mother who used to raise marijuana in the sunshine but
moved her operation indoors after she split up with her husband. Under her 3,000 watts of electric light, she raises numerous smaller plants in a space the size of two sheets of
plywood, using far less physical effort than when she raised large plants outdoors. “It’s a very mommy-friendly business that provides a dependable, year-round income,” she
says. Sharon harvests small batches of marijuana year-round, which fetch a few hundred dollars more per pound than outdoor-grown cannabis because of consumers’
preferences. Sharon’s growing operation supports her and her teenage daughter in the rural area where she settled more than two decades ago. Add up the energy used by
indoor growers, from those on Sharon’s scale to the converted warehouses favored by urban dispensaries, and the impact is significant—estimated at 3 percent of the state’s
total power bill, or the electricity consumed by 1 million homes. On a local level, indoor cannabis production is blocking climate stabilization efforts in the coastal city of Arcata,
which aimed to cut its greenhouse gas emissions by 20 percent over twelve years. But during the first half of that period, while electricity consumption was flat or declining
slightly statewide, Arcata’s household electrical use grew by 25 percent. City staff traced the increase to more than 600 houses that were using at least triple the electricity of the
average home—a level consistent with a commercial cannabis operation. The city has borne other costs, too, besides simply missing its climate goals. Inexpertly wired grow
houses catch fire, and the conversion of residential units to indoor hothouses has cut into the city’s supply of affordable housing. Last November, city voters approved a stiff tax
on jumbo electricity consumers. Now the city council is working with other Humboldt County local governments to pass a similar tax so that growers can’t evade the fee simply
by fleeing the city limits, says City Councilman Michael Winkler. “We don’t want any place in Humboldt County to be a cheaper place to grow than any other. And since this is
the Silicon Valley of marijuana growing, there are a lot of reasons why people would want to stay here if they’re doing this,” he says. “My goal is to make it expensive enough to
get large-scale marijuana growing out of the neighborhoods.” A tax on excessive electricity use may seem like an indirect way of curbing household cannabis cultivation, but the
city had to back away from its more direct approach—a zoning ordinance—when the federal government threatened to prosecute local officials throughout the state if they
Attempts in neighboring Mendocino County to issue permits
to outdoor growers meeting environmental and public-safety standards were foiled when federal
attorneys slapped county officials with similar warning—illustrating, yet again, the way prohibition
sabotages efforts to reduce the industry’s environmental damage. Indeed, observers cite federal
cannabis prohibition as the biggest impediment to curbing the impacts of marijuana cultivation ,
which continues to expand despite a decades-long federal policy of zero tolerance. “We don’t have a set of best
management practices for this industry, partly because of federal prohibition,” says researcher
Silvaggio. “If a grower comes to the county agricultural commissioner and asks, ‘What are the
practices I can use that can limit my impact?’, the county ag guy says, ‘I can’t talk to you about
that because we get federal money.’ ”
sanctioned an activity that is categorically forbidden under US law.
Lack of industry regulation causes widespread use of banned pesticides
Gabriel et al 13 (Mourad, Greta Wengert, Mark Higley, Shane Krogan, Warren Sargent, and Deana Clifford, 4-11-13, "Silent
Forests? Rodenticides on Illegal Marijuana Crops Harm Wildlife" Wildlife Society News) news.wildlife.org/twp/2013-spring/silentforests/
Problem Spreading Like Weeds Illegal
marijuana growing is not just a problem for wildlife. The High Sierra
Volunteer Trail Crew is a nonprofit trail-maintenance crew that has spent the past seven years
maintaining and cleaning trails throughout the Sierra Nevadas’ national forests. In the mid-2000s,
the group realized that risks associated with large-scale marijuana production throughout most, if
not all, California national forests threatened backcountry use of public lands. Since then, the trail
crew’s Environmental Reclamation Team (ERT) has remediated more than 600 large-scale
marijuana cultivation sites on public lands. The numbers are daunting , especially when
considering that these 600 sites were in only two of California’s 17 national forests and may constitute only a
fraction of the actual marijuana cultivation sites that exist in these forests. Tommy Lanier, Director of the
National Marijuana Initiative, a White House supported program, states that “60 percent to 70 percent of the national marijuana
seizures come from California annually, and of those totals, about 60 percent comes from public lands.” Based on data from
ERT-remediated sites, at least 50 percent of them have SGARs. Beyond finding anticoagulant
rodenticides, the team and other remediation groups frequently find and remove restricted and banned
pesticides including organo- phosphates, organochlorines, and carbamates as well as thousands
of pounds of nitrogen-rich fertilizers. Many of the discovered pesticides have been banned for use
in the U.S., Canada, and the European Union, specifically certain carbamates, which gained notoriety
worldwide after an explosion of public awareness about their use to kill African wildlife. Unfortunately, these same malicious
uses are occurring in California, where marijuana cultivators place pourable carbamate pesticides
in opened tuna or sardine cans in order to kill black bears, gray foxes, raccoons, and other
carnivores that damage marijuana plants or raid food caches at grow-site encampments. In many cases, law enforcement
officers approaching grow sites observe wildlife exposed to what officers call “wildlife bombs” due to their high
potential for mass wildlife killing. For example, as federal and state officers approached a grow site in Northern
California, they discovered a black bear and her cubs seizing and convulsing as they slowly succumbed to the neurological effects
of these pesticides. Because toxicants are usually dispersed throughout cultivation sites, it is remarkably difficult to detect and
remove all pesticide threats.
Pesticides have a disproportionate impact on low-income communities,
communities of color, and farmworkers
CPR No Date (Californians for Pesticide Reform, "Environmental Justice") www.pesticidereform.org/section.php?id=10
Environmental Justice (EJ) concerns coincide with many pesticide issues throughout the state of
California. Low income communities and communities of color suffer the greatest risks and
impacts of pesticide use in California. Everyone in California is not affected equally by
pesticides: certain communities, especially farmworkers, bear the brunt of greater risk of and
greater illness from pesticide exposure. Farmworkers in California - over 700,000 and mainly
people of color - live and work on the front lines of a toxic barrage and experience more reported acute
pesticide poisoning cases than any other segment of California's population.
Scenario 2: Worker Exploitation
A. Women: Exploitation of and violence against women in the marijuana industry
is common now—legalization is key to eliminate the culture of secrecy that
facilitates abuse
Fendrick 13 (Sabrina, staff writer, 5-30-14, "Marijuana Prohibition Puts Industry Women at Risk" NORML)
blog.norml.org/2013/05/30/prohibition-puts-women-at-risk/
As more women are drawn to Humboldt County’s marijuana trade and off-grid lifestyle, a local batteredwomen’s shelter has noticed a growing trend of violent encounters . The Standard-Examiner reports that,
“The bulk of… cases involve single young women aged 18 to 26 , who may travel to the area and are lured to
farms by promises of work, money and, often, romance. The women are hired for trim work, which involves
cleaning freshly harvested pot and preparing it for sale.” Most women who survive violence are
hesitant to seek help in general. The women in the pot-growing business however, are under even
more pressure to keep quiet because they are part of a culture that promotes secrecy. There is no
doubt the pot-growing industry supports the local economy by pumping much-needed cash into the community. The problem is
however, that because farm owners and managers (most of whom are male) are running illegal
operations under federal law, standard employment regulations such as working conditions and
sexual harassment laws do not apply . The Director of W.I.S.H (Women’s Crisis Center of Southern Humboldt),
points out that, “Men managing the farms can be paranoid over the threat of raids or people
stealing the plants. Women’s cell phones may be taken away and they may not be allowed to leave
until season’s end. Some are forced off farms at gunpoint without being paid. Women may be
beaten or psychologically controlled…”. The cycle of violence is perpetuated by an underground ,
black market economy. This is just one more reason marijuana needs to be legalized and regulated.
Moving the entire marijuana industry above ground will protect workers’ rights , hold employers
accountable, and remove the culture of secrecy that continues to foster female exploitation.
B. Migrants: the marijuana’s quasi-legal status allows for the exploitation of
migrant works—full legalization solves
Burns 13 (Ryann, investigative reporter, 11-14-13, "Smoke Organic" North Coast Journal)
www.northcoastjournal.com/humboldt/smoke-organic/Content?oid=2421570
It's widely assumed that when Mexicans get arrested at a pot grow, they must be members of a drug cartel. That assumption is
often wrong. As with every other crop grown and harvested in California, you can't identify where the profits go based on the
ethnicity of the laborers in the fields. According to Bruce Hilbach-Barger, one of the volunteers who helped organize last week's
cleanup,
many of the men tending local grows are exploited migrant workers, men who get picked
up at the border — or maybe a Home Depot parking lot — and told that if they come do
"agricultural work" for a year, their families back home will get paid $10,000 up front. After a
year's work the workers may get paid another $15,000. In the meantime, they're captive. They can't
leave in search of a better gig because a) they're in the middle of nowhere, and b) their employers
know where their families live. And laborers aren't the only victims of exploitation in this system. Our public lands are
being dammed, graded and sprinkled with poisonous chemicals. On both fronts, marijuana's quasi-legal status
actively promotes exploitation. The threat of arrest and asset forfeiture drives grows onto remote public lands, where
there are no assets (beyond the crops) to be seized, and where the ultimate profiteers may rarely step foot. Obviously, law
enforcement busts haven't slowed the "green rush." Destructive outlaw grows won't go away until marijuana
is
fully legalized and regulated . But in the meantime, local tokers can at least make sure we're not contributing to the
problem. How? By doing what we do with food: Find out where it comes from, who's growing it and how. Support environmentally
responsible growers. They do exist.
Scenario 3: Racism
Despite state-level legalization, harsh federal penalties for marijuana remain on
the books that are disproportionately applied to people of color, causing
numerous negative impacts
Wegman 14 (Jesse, member of the NYT Editorial board, 7-28-14, "The Injustice of Marijuana Arrests" New York Times)
www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/opinion/high-time-the-injustice-of-marijuana-arrests.html?smid=fb-share&_r=0 **this card edited for
ableist language
America’s four-decade war on drugs is responsible for many casualties, but the criminalization of marijuana has been
perhaps the most destructive part of that war. The toll can be measured in dollars — billions of which are
thrown away each year in the aggressive enforcement of pointless laws. It can be measured in
years — whether wasted behind bars or stolen from a child who grows up fatherless. And it can
be measured in lives — those damaged if not destroyed by the shockingly harsh consequences
that can follow even the most minor offenses. In October 2010, Bernard Noble, a 45-year-old
trucker and father of seven with two previous nonviolent offenses, was stopped on a New Orleans
street with a small amount of marijuana in his pocket. His sentence: more than 13 years. At least
he will be released. Jeff Mizanskey, a Missouri man, was arrested in December 1993, for participating
(unknowingly, he said) in the purchase of a five-pound brick of marijuana. Because he had two
prior nonviolent marijuana convictions, he was sentenced to life without parole. Outrageously
long sentences are only part of the story. The hundreds of thousands of people who are arrested
each year but do not go to jail also suffer; their arrests stay on their records for years,
[destroying] crippling their prospects for jobs, loans, housing and benefits. These are
disproportionately people of color, with marijuana criminalization hitting black communities the
hardest. Meanwhile, police departments that presumably have far more important things to do waste an enormous amount of
time and taxpayer money chasing a drug that two states have already legalized and that a majority of Americans believe should be
legal everywhere. A Costly, Futile Strategy The absurdity starts on the street, with a cop and a pair of
handcuffs. As the war on drugs escalated through the 1980s and 1990s, so did the focus on
common, low-level offenses — what became known as “broken windows” policing. In New York
City, where the strategy was introduced and remains popular today, the police made fewer than 800
marijuana arrests in 1991. In 2010, they made more than 59,000. Nationwide, the numbers are
hardly better. From 2001 to 2010, the police made more than 8.2 million marijuana arrests; almost
nine in 10 were for possession alone. In 2011, there were more arrests for marijuana possession
than for all violent crimes put together. The costs of this national obsession, in both money and time,
are astonishing. Each year, enforcing laws on possession costs more than $3.6 billion , according to
the American Civil Liberties Union. It can take a police officer many hours to arrest and book a suspect.
That person will often spend a night or more in the local jail, and be in court multiple times to
resolve the case. The public-safety payoff for all this effort is meager at best : According to a 2012 Human
Rights Watch report that tracked 30,000 New Yorkers with no prior convictions when they were arrested for marijuana possession,
90 percent had no subsequent felony convictions. Only 3.1 percent committed a violent offense. Continue reading the main story
The strategy is also largely futile. After three decades, criminalization has not affected general
usage; about 30 million Americans use marijuana every year. Meanwhile, police forces across the country are
strapped for cash, and the more resources they devote to enforcing marijuana laws, the less they have to go after serious, violent
crime. According to F.B.I. data, more than half of all violent crimes nationwide, and four in five property crimes, went unsolved in
2012. The Racial Disparity The sheer volume of law enforcement resources devoted to marijuana is bad
enough. What makes the situation far worse is racial disparity. Whites and blacks use marijuana
at roughly the same rates; on average, however, blacks are 3.7 times more likely than whites to be
arrested for possession, according to a comprehensive 2013 report by the A.C.L.U. In Iowa, blacks
are 8.3 times more likely to be arrested, and in the worst-offending counties in the country, they
are up to 30 times more likely to be arrested. The war on drugs aims its firepower
overwhelmingly at African-Americans on the street, while white users smoke safely behind closed doors.
Only about 6 percent of marijuana cases lead to a felony conviction; the rest are often treated as misdemeanors resulting in fines or
probation, if the charges aren’t dismissed completely. Even so, every arrest ends up on a person’s record, whether
or not it leads to prosecution and conviction. Particularly in poorer minority neighborhoods, where young men are
more likely to be outside and repeatedly targeted by law enforcement, these arrests accumulate. Before long a person can
have an extensive “criminal history” that consists only of marijuana misdemeanors and
dismissed cases. That criminal history can then influence the severity of punishment for a future
offense, however insignificant. While the number of people behind bars solely for possessing or selling marijuana seems
relatively small — 20,000 to 30,000 by the most recent estimates, or roughly 1 percent of America’s 2.4 million inmates — that
means nothing to people, like Jeff Mizanskey, who are serving breathtakingly long terms because their records contained minor
previous offenses. Nor does it mean anything to the vast majority of these inmates who have no history of violence (about nine in
10, according to a 2006 study). And as with arrests, the racial disparity is vast: Blacks are more than 10
times as likely as whites to go to prison for drug offenses. For those on probation or parole for
any offense, a failed drug test on its own can lead to prison time — which means, again, that
people can be put behind bars for smoking marijuana. Even if a person never goes to prison, the
conviction itself is the tip of the iceberg. In a majority of states, marijuana convictions — including
those resulting from guilty pleas — can have lifelong consequences for employment, education,
immigration status and family life. A misdemeanor conviction can lead to, among many other things, the
revocation of a professional license; the suspension of a driver’s license; the inability to get
insurance, a mortgage or other bank loans; the denial of access to public housing; and the loss of
student financial aid. In some states, a felony conviction can result in a lifetime ban on voting,
jury service, or eligibility for public benefits like food stamps. People can be fired from their jobs
because of a marijuana arrest. Even if a judge eventually throws the case out, the arrest record is
often available online for a year, free for any employer to look up.
Legalizing marijuana will not end the drug war, but it is a step in the right
direction that has tangible positive effects and can build momentum for broader
movements
Franklin and Title 14 - Neill Franklin is the Executive Director at Leap, Law Enforcement Against Prohibition; Shaleen Title
is a social justice activist for marijuana legalization and author of “Ending the Drug War: A Dream Deferred” (Neill Franklin and
Shaleen Title, 3 Reasons Marijuana Legalization in Colorado Is Good for People of Color, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/neillfranklin/marijuana-legalization-race-racism-minorities_b_4651456.html)
As the president acknowledged, marijuana prohibition targets black and brown people (even though marijuana
users are equally or more likely to be white). Ending prohibition through passing legalization laws, as Colorado and
Washington have, will reduce this racial disparity. The war on drugs, as we all know, has led to mass
criminalization and incarceration for people of color. The legalization of marijuana, which took effect for
the first time in the country in Colorado on January 1, is
one step toward ending that war. While the new law
won't eradicate systemic racism in our criminal justice system completely, it is one of the most effective
things we can do to address it. Here are three concrete ways that Colorado's law is good for people of color. 1. The new
law means there will be no more arrests for marijuana possession in Colorado. Under Colorado's new law,
residents 21 or older can produce, possess, use and sell up to an ounce of marijuana at a time. This change will have a real and
measurable impact on people of color in Colorado, where the racial disparities in marijuana possession arrests
have been reprehensible. In the last ten years, Colorado police arrested blacks for marijuana possession at
more than three times the rate they arrested whites, even though whites used marijuana at higher rates. As noted by
the NAACP in its endorsement of the legalization law, it's particularly bad in Denver, where almost one-third of the people arrested
for private adult possession marijuana are black, though they make up only 11% of the population. These arrests can have
devastating and long-lasting consequences. An arrest record can affect the ability to get a job, housing, student loans and public
benefits. As law professor Michelle Alexander describes, people (largely black and brown) who acquire a criminal record simply for
being caught with marijuana are relegated to a permanent second-class status. When
we make marijuana legal, we
stop those arrests from happening. 2. Unlike under decriminalization, the new law means there will be
no more arrests for mere marijuana possession in Colorado, period. In the Jan. 6 article "#Breaking Black: Why
Colorado's weed laws may backfire for black Americans," Goldie Taylor mistakenly suggests that Colorado's new legalization law
may "further tip the scales in favor of a privileged class already largely safe from criminalization." Much of the stubborn "this-
changes-nothing" belief about the new law stems from confusion between decriminalization and
legalization . There is a profound difference between the hodgepodge of laws known collectively as "decriminalization" passed
in several states over the past 30 years, and Colorado's unprecedented legalization law. Decriminalization usually refers to a
change in the law which removes criminal but not civil penalties for marijuana possession, allowing police to issue civil fines (similar
to speeding tickets), or require drug education or expensive treatment programs in lieu of being arrested. Because of the
ambiguity in some states with decriminalization, cops still arrest users with small amounts of marijuana due to
technicalities, such as having illegal paraphernalia, or for having marijuana in "public view" after asking them to empty their pockets.
One only need look as far as the infamous stop-and-frisk law in New York, where marijuana is decriminalized, to
see how these ambiguities might be abused to the detriment of people of color. In Colorado, however, the marijuana
industry is now legal and above-ground. People therefore have a right to possess and use marijuana products,
although as with alcohol, there are restrictions relating to things like age, driving, and public use. Police won't be able to
racially profile by claiming they smelled marijuana or saw it in plain view . 3. We will reduce real problems
associated with the illicit market. As marijuana users shift to making purchases at regulated stores, we'll start to see
improvement in problems that were blamed on marijuana but are in fact consequences of its prohibition. The
violence related to the street-corner drug trade will begin to fall as the illicit market is slowly replaced by wellguarded stores with cameras and security systems. And consumers will now know what they're getting; instead of buying whatever's
in a baggie, they have the benefit of choosing from a wide variety of marijuana products at the price level and potency they desire.
Warming Adv: 1AC
Warming
Conflict between state and federal marijuana laws threatens cooperative
federalism—unpredictable shifts in federal enforcement antagonizes states and
destroys cooperation
Grabarsky 13 (Todd, J.D., Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; B.A., University of Pennsylvania. The author has previously
served as a law clerk to the Honorable Edward J. Davila of the United States District Court, Northern District of California,
“CONFLICTING FEDERAL AND STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA POLICIES: A THREAT TO COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM” West
Virginia Law Review, 116 W. Va. L. Rev. 1, Lexis)
IV. Shifting in Federal Executive Enforcement Policy: A Threat to Cooperative Federalism This Article now turns to the situation on
the ground, exploring the ways in which the federal executive - through efforts of the DEA and DOJ - has sought to enforce the
federal drugs ban on medical marijuana despite its limited legalization in California since the passage of the CUA in 1996. This Part
then argues that
these changes in federal enforcement policy threaten state autonomy and
federalism itself because they unfairly subject the states to the whims of the federal government.
This is especially true in an area - drug enforcement - with extremely limited federal resources,
and which, arguably, was envisioned as a joint state-federal cooperative enforcement scheme. In other
words, these federal executive fluctuations are a threat to cooperative federalism. A. Recent Changes in
Federal Enforcement of the CSA June 29, 2011, marks a mid-Obama Administration shift in the federal executive policy concerning
enforcement of federal drug laws against distributors and dispensaries operating in full compliance with state regulations. On that
date, the DOJ released the Cole Memo, which sought to clarify confusion among United States Attorneys regarding the Ogden
Memo. n75 Specifically, the Cole Memo revitalized the drug enforcement focus to prosecution of "commercial operations cultivating,
selling or distributing marijuana," making no distinction between the cultivation, sale, or distribution of marijuana for non-medical
purposes and that for medical purposes. n76 The memo also stated that the illegality of medical marijuana at the federal level - as
well as compliance with state laws - provides no defense from federal prosecution and punishment. n77 Finally, in a foreshadow of
the reality to come in the next months, the Memo noted that individuals as well as banking institutions "who engage in transactions
involving the proceeds of such activity may also be in violation of federal money laundering statutes and other federal financial
laws." n78 Since the Cole Memo, the federal government markedly shifted its policy and execution of drug laws in California, an
about-face which has resulted in a crackdown some commentators consider to be more severe than the pre- [*17] Ogden Bush
Administration policy. n79 The most pointed illustration of this new policy was a press conference on October 7, 2011, during which
four of the top United States Attorneys in California announced a series of new measures they were planning to undertake to
combat the spread of medical marijuana. n80 The group announced that distribution cooperatives have availed themselves of the
CUA and MMP in order to earn profits on the sale of medical marijuana. n81 They also iterated that compliance with state laws is
not a defense or justification for immunity from federal prosecution. n82 The measures the group outlined included filing civil
lawsuits against owners of property that allow the distributors to operate, in addition to filing criminal charges. n83 Right after the
press conference, federal law enforcement agents began to take increased action. Since October, federal agents have closed nearly
two-thirds of the more than 200 medical marijuana distributors in San Diego. n84 Within a month after the press conference, sixteen
California dispensaries received warning letters from federal prosecutors to stop sales or risk criminal charges or property seizure.
n85 The U.S. Attorney in San Diego announced that she would target media outlets that advertise for medical marijuana
dispensaries. n86 [*18] And most recently, federal authorities in Oakland raided four sites of Oaksterdam University - an
organization on the front lines of the movement to legalize, tax, and regulate medical and recreational marijuana. n87 Other
executive departments have come to the aid of the DEA and DOJ: The Treasury Department has pressured banks to close
accounts of medical marijuana businesses; the IRS has imposed additional taxes on dispensaries; and the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives has ruled that card-carrying patients who receive medical marijuana cannot purchase firearms.
n88 B. The Threat to Cooperative Federalism As was shown in Part III.A, the state medical marijuana laws are here
to stay. Due to the state-federal cooperative aspect of the CSA, it is unlikely that Congress will
attempt to preempt the state drug laws, and there have been no inklings that federal appellate
courts will find an implied preemption. n89 Moreover, it remains unlikely that the federal
government will be able to commandeer or coax the state executive agencies into increasing
enforcement or abandoning the state policies regarding medical marijuana. n90 With reconciliation
unlikely to come about via the federal legislature or judiciary, the federal executive has attempted
to subvert the state medical marijuana laws through increased federal enforcement. This attempt ,
however, is an unsustainable, short-term fix to reconcile the conflicting state-federal laws because
the federal government simply does not have enough resources to continue prosecuting all
medical marijuana dispensaries acting in compliance with California state law. Therefore, the Cole
Memo's federal policy shift and increased federal enforcement of the CSA can only be seen as an
attempt to disrupt state medical marijuana laws through the federal executive branch. The policy
of unpredictable, increased enforcement has resulted in antagonizing states like California which
were designated - under the CSA and comprehensive federal drug policy - as allies in fighting the War on Drugs.
Examples of this range from the idiosyncratic to the more serious. Pertaining to the former category, after an increase in raids on
California medical marijuana dispensaries in the early years of the Bush Administration, the mayor and several city council members
of [*19] Santa Cruz observed a medical marijuana giveaway, specifically in protest of a federal raid on a local cannabis collective.
n91 More seriously, though, in 2008, California state legislators introduced a bill that would bar state law enforcement officials from
assisting federal executive agents in executing the federal drug policy that diverges from state law. n92 And, as described, the
official policy of the California Department of Justice is also one of non-cooperation: In light of California's decision to remove the
use and cultivation of physician-recommended marijuana from the scope of the state's drug laws, this Office recommends that state
and local law enforcement officers not arrest individuals or seize marijuana under federal law when the officer determines from the
facts available that the cultivation, possession, or transportation is permitted under California's medical marijuana laws. n93 In
response to a statement by a spokesman for the Los Angeles U.S. Attorney General that "at the end of the day, California law
doesn't matter," the California State Attorney General expressed concern that "an overly broad federal enforcement campaign will
make it more difficult for legitimate patients to access physician-recommended medicine in California." n94 In the context of
the CSA and nationwide drug enforcement, cooperation between the state and federal
governments is crucial. Federalism in this sense, can be viewed as a cooperation between the states
and the federal government, or, as noted, what one scholar characterizes as a "state-federal partnership in
carrying out federal policy." n95 The term "cooperative federalism" is particularly apropos in this context, given the federal
government's dependency on state enforcement and regulatory efforts to carry out the CSA. n96 The federal executive's
disruption of the state drug enforcement and regulatory scheme abrogates the cooperative effort
whereby the state and federal government have a unity of interests - for example, enforcing the
marijuana prohibition against non-medical recreation users or users and distributors of other
drugs that remain [*20] prohibited on both the federal and state levels. In essence, the federal
executive's unpredicted and unrestrained shifts in enforcement policy - with their disruption of the
state regulatory scheme and antagonizing of the state governments - threaten cooperative
federalism . If federalism is to be viewed as a cooperation between dual-sovereigns, then increased federal enforcement
measures can even be viewed as a threat to federalism itself. Some scholars have even deemed this decriminalization and
regulation of medical marijuana an example of "uncooperative federalism," where states like California attempt to assert their
autonomy vis-a-vis the federal government despite the fact that the federal drug laws were set up as a state-federal cooperative
enforcement scheme. n97
This dispute over marijuana is the most important in a generation and has
broader implications for cooperative federalism
Grabarsky 13 (Todd, J.D., Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; B.A., University of Pennsylvania. The author has previously
served as a law clerk to the Honorable Edward J. Davila of the United States District Court, Northern District of California,
“CONFLICTING FEDERAL AND STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA POLICIES: A THREAT TO COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM” West
Virginia Law Review, 116 W. Va. L. Rev. 1, Lexis)
A looming problem with the changes in the federal executive policy involves the way in which the
federal drug prohibition is enforced. Essentially, federal enforcement agents rely on the
assistance, infrastructure, and know-how of the states; just one example of this is the estimate
that 99% of drug-related investigations and arrests are carried out by state agents . n10 As such,
the regulation of marijuana can be seen as a cooperation between the states and the federal
government - what this Article will refer to as " cooperative federalism ," a term that refers not just
to a state-federal cooperation, but also a collaboration where states preserve authority to make
policy and enforcement decisions. n11 However, conflicts and changes in marijuana laws and
enforcement policy - especially as blatant as the Ogden-Cole Memos' shift - pose a potential
disruption of this scheme of cooperation. The 2012 Election heightened the stakes for the way in which marijuana is
regulated. On November 6, 2012, voters in two states, Washington and Colorado, approved ballot initiatives, which essentially
legalized the limited cultivation, distribution, possession, and usage of marijuana for recreational - in contrast to medical - purposes.
n12 Since then, these two referenda were signed into law, making Washington and Colorado the only two states to have legalized
non-medical marijuana. But the legalization of recreational marijuana in Washington and Colorado is but one chapter in the history
of the drug in the United States. Novel [*5] about those ballot measures is that they legalize marijuana for recreational purposes;
medical marijuana has been legal in California since 1996, n13 and is now permitted in one form or another in twenty-one of the fifty
states as well as the District of Columbia. n14 As states began to take control of legislative policy with regard to medical marijuana
by passing laws permitting its limited usage, a gray area of legality precipitated. On the one hand, the cultivation,
distribution, and usage of medical marijuana is permitted and, arguably, encouraged, by many of
the states through their systems of taxation and regulation; yet on the other hand, it remains
categorically forbidden at the federal level. n15 This nebulous zone of legality has broader
implications for the United States' system of federalism. Indeed, one prominent scholar deemed
the state-federal conflict of marijuana laws to be " one of the most important federalism disputes
in a generation ." n16 This Article focuses on this nebulous zone of law enforcement, in which an activity remains both a
violation of federal law and one that is permitted and even, perhaps, encouraged by states and their regulatory schemes. The aboutface in federal executive policy as shown by the shift from the Ogden to Cole Memos suggests that state regulation of medical
marijuana can be de facto undermined by the federal government through prosecution of individuals who are otherwise following
state laws and guidelines. n17 This can be seen as a threat to cooperative federalism: at one moment, state legislative acts and the
voter referenda assure states that they will be permitted to regulate medical marijuana and implement the necessary bureaucracies
and infrastructure to do so; at the next, changes in federal law enforcement initiatives disrupt states' regulatory schemes.
Legalizing marijuana by allowing states to conditionally opt-out of the CSA
creates a robust framework for cooperative federalism
Erwin Chemerinsky et al, Jolene Forman, Allen Hopper and Sam Kamin March 19, 2014 "Cooperative Federalism and
Marijuana Regulation" http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2411707 Erwin Chemerinsky is a professor at the
University of California and Irvine School of Law. Jolene Forman works for the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California.
Allen Hopper works for the ACLU of Northern California. Sam Kamin is a professor at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law
We propose, below, an
amendment to the CSA that would allow states and the federal government to
cooperatively enforce and regulate marijuana. As with the CAA, CWA, and ACA, state law would be govern in
states that have legalized recreational or medical marijuana, and federal law would supplement state law only when states defer to
federal law or fail to satisfy federal requirements. 165 Just as the EPA works with states to enforce air and water pollution laws,
federal agencies could continue to cooperate with opt-out states and local governments to
enforce marijuana laws. However, state laws and regulations would control within those states’
borders, rather than the CSA. Much as AEDPA incentivizes states to adopt federal priorities related to state habeas
proceedings, amending the CSA to include a cooperative federalism framework for marijuana laws
would give the federal government influence over the enforcement and regulatory priorities of
those states that choose to ease prohibitions on marijuana. By requiring opt-out states to comply
with specific federal marijuana enforcement and regulatory priorities, such an approach would
incentivize states – which have much greater drug enforcement resources than the federal
government166 – to use local law enforcement resources to help enforce federal priorities. Simply
stated, the federal government can incentivize state marijuana enforcement and regulatory priorities
by requiring opt-out states to comply with enumerated guidelines in order to avoid CSA oversight
within their borders.
Cooperative federalism is key to solve climate change
Snyder and Binder 09 (Jared, Assistant Commissioner for Air Resources, Climate Change and Energy, and Jonathan,
Office of General Counsel, New York State Department of Environmental Conservation,"The Changing Climate of Cooperative
Federalism: The Dynamic Role of the States in a National Strategy to Combat Climate Change" UCLA Journal of Environmental
Law and Policy, 27 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 231, accessed 8-26-14, Lexis)
The Case for Federalism: Application to Global Climate Change The inactivity of the Bush Administration in the area of
climate change over the past eight years has led to a flowering of state actions, like those described above in
New York State, from
state r enewable p erformance s tandards and energy efficiency programs to the
development of RGGI and other emerging state cap-and-trade programs. These programs have had,
and will continue to have, tremendous value as they reduce GHG emissions , build a thriving
green energy economy , and serve as the laboratory for further efforts at the federal, international
or multi-state level. Once the federal government finally begins meaningful action - whether in the form
of federal cap-and-trade legislation, administrative regulation of GHG emissions, or otherwise - the role for continued state
and local efforts will be equally critical, or even more essential. A federal program should take advantage of the
progress that has been demonstrated at the state level. The recent history of climate regulation demonstrates that
many of the traditional economic incentives that have led to a so-called "race to the bottom" in
some areas of environmental policy are reversed in the case of climate change , as it is often in a
state's self-interest economically and otherwise to work towards additional GHG emission
reductions. Furthermore, there are collective benefits that will accrue to the nation as a whole from
allowing states to continue to operate unfettered in the climate change context, even after the federal
government finally establishes its climate change policy. Finally, there is no legitimate federal policy reason for
preventing a state or region from implementing additional climate change policies that impose
additional costs only on its own sources. Indeed, a state's interest in positioning its sources to compete effectively in
an interstate marketplace provides a sufficient constraint on state exuberance. When determining the appropriate roles for the
different levels of government in climate change policy, the question is not simply whether or not federal climate change legislation
should preempt state and local laws. Instead, the question is whether the federal government can enact policies that fully address
climate [*247] change in the most effective manner possible. Undoubtedly, the most efficient and effective method
of addressing climate change includes state and local governments continuing to operate in a
manner that is long-accepted under our system of federalism, wherein they are collaborative
partners with the federal government in working to address a complex and wide-ranging problem.
Without this kind of cooperative federalism, solving the climate change crisis may be further delayed or
even become impossible , and powers traditionally left to the states will be precluded by the federal government without any
resulting collective benefit. A. Climate Change and the Dynamics of Cooperative Federalism While the climate change crisis may
differ from other environmental problems in many ways, it is similar in that the best approach to mitigate and adapt to the
problem requires a comprehensive approach involving multiple levels of government. Over the past
several decades, many of the major success stories in environmental law contain some type of
cooperative federalism approach; restraining one or both levels of government in the overall equation often has negative
results. n24 Recognizing the value of state action, Congress has rarely enacted laws that preempt state and local action completely,
especially when that state and local action supplements the protection of public health and the environment provided by the federal
statute. n25 In the rare instances that Congress has preempted state action, its policy choice has been dictated by the interstate and
international nature of commerce at issue. n26 [*248] The fairly short history of environmental regulation in the United States has
been characterized by an ebb-and-flow of action at the state and federal levels. Prior to the enactment of the major federal
environmental laws starting in the 1960s, the states were the primary forces in protecting environmental quality, relying on nascent
state laws as well as the common law of public nuisance. After Congress passed a multitude of federal laws and created the
Environmental Protection Agency in the 1960s and 1970s, the space for states to act seemed less important. But times change, and
as Washington became gridlocked on environmental policy in the 1990s and continuing into this decade, the initiative returned to the
states, especially in the realm of climate policy. n27 Although it appears that we are moving into another period of federal action, the
pendulum will undoubtedly swing back again in the future. The recent history of climate change regulation has
defied the conventional wisdom that states, left to their own devices, will engage in a so-called
"race to the bottom," in which some states eschew environmental requirements in order to gain a competitive advantage
economically over the other states. Federal environmental laws have been seen as necessary to counter the "race to the bottom" by
the states. Under this scenario, a federal response to the environmental problem is often necessary to set a uniform regulatory
"floor" that requires each state to at least meet a minimum level of environmental protection. In fact, it is largely because of this
dynamic that the major federal environmental laws of the early 1970s, including the Clean Air Act, came to fruition. n28 Instead
of a "race to the bottom," climate change has engendered what may be called a "race to the top. "
n29 In many ways, the reasons for the "race to the top" are similar to the reasons for the "race to the
bottom," in that states are trying to gain an economic [*249] advantage. n30 In fact, states have seen
many policies that address climate change not as a burden on commerce, but as an economic
opportunity. Research, manufacturing and deployment of "green" technologies can generate
well-paying jobs in the short term and create new anchor industries in the long term. These
technologies can then be sold to the rest of the country and the world, providing additional
economic and environmental benefits. Part of the reason for a particular state to act even in the absence of federal
action is to be a leader in new and emerging markets. In the event Congress finally enacts some form of comprehensive climate
change legislation, states will still have many of the same motivations to engage in a "race to the top," with potential changes only in
terms of degree. With a properly designed piece of legislation, the continuing "race to the top" can have numerous positive effects,
in terms of national and state economic benefits, as well as national and state GHG emission reductions. B. Collective Benefits of
State and Local Government Action to Combat Climate Change State and local efforts to reduce GHG emissions
have already played a valuable role in reducing GHG emissions in the United States. Such efforts
have also helped in developing strategies for reducing GHG emissions that can serve as a model
for federal and international action, and in positioning the U nited S tates to join in and lead
international efforts to reduce GHG emissions . Even if the federal government finally implements real measures to
address climate change, state and local action will continue to have substantial benefits. 1. States as "Laboratories" and the Need
for Ongoing Innovation One of the primary benefits of state environmental action is that it enables states
to develop new and more effective or efficient models of environmental regulation. As Justice
Brandeis observed, while a state may incur additional expenses or decide to impose extra risk on itself, "it is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens [*250]
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country." n31 In this sense, allowing states the ability to develop their own strategies to
further reduce GHG emissions operates as a sort of insurance policy for the national economy.
This is because an innovation that fails at the state level will, of course, have less of an impact on the
national economy than a federal attempt at innovation that fails. State efforts to date are influencing the
development of a federal program profoundly. In particular, RGGI has provided an important template for
action by the federal government and other states in several ways. It is demonstrating the
mechanics of developing a cap-and-trade program for carbon dioxide. This is especially true in areas such
as offsets and the auctioning of CO(2) allowances. Prior to the development of RGGI, there was little discussion in Washington
about auctioning CO(2) allowances. Now, given RGGI's example of auctioning nearly 100 percent ofCO(2) allowances, the only
debate seems to be how quickly to move to 100 percent auctioning of allowances. n32 In fact, President Obama's recent budget
proposal makes clear the administration's intent for the forthcoming federal cap-and-trade program to include 100 percent
auctioning of allowances. n33 The actual process for conducting RGGI auctions will also serve as a detailed model for federal
legislation or regulation, particularly given the success of the RGGI auctions to date. Once comprehensive federal
climate change legislation is finally enacted, the need for ongoing innovation and additional
development of policy mechanisms will not just disappear. Continued improvements in policy will
likely be necessary to develop new means of further reducing GHG emissions. State and local
level action is often the most effective way to accomplish this continual policy enhancement. Even
if a particular state innovation does not result in net reductions within a federal cap, it [*251] could
provide a policy model for reducing emissions further into the future. 2. State and Local Programs Can
Reduce the Cost of Meeting a Federal Cap State and local programs can facilitate compliance with a federal
program by reducing the overall cost of a given level of nationwide emissions reduction. Even
advocates of preemption recognize the value of complementary policies at the sub-national level, including in areas such as
"appliance efficiency standards, building codes, land use decisions, performance standards,
public transit, and incentives to increase efficiency." n34 These policies address market imperfections
and barriers such as lack of consumer information about the financial benefits of efficient
products, disconnect between the buyers and users of equipment (e.g., rental housing), entrenched energy
systems, research and development spillover effects, and other related issues. By reducing the demand for carbonintensive energy, these state programs and policies reduce the pressure on achieving a given
federal GHG goal. Ignoring these barriers could potentially result in the federal program accruing
higher costs and higher allowance prices than necessary. State programs that reduce the demand
for carbon-containing energy through measures such as state efficiency programs and standards,
improved land use and transportation planning, renewables deployment and cap-and-trade n35
will reduce the cost of federal allowances by lowering the demand for such allowances . n36 Reduced
federal allowance prices will result in reduced consumer price impacts and reduced costs for other [*252] covered entities outside of
the state. Because costs of compliance and consumer price impacts are both significant political variables in policy design, these
effects could create the political opportunity for the federal government to further ratchet down the federal cap over time. In other
words, aggressive state action, even if it is more expensive for the state, can lead to additional benefits by facilitating more stringent
federal action. Certain redundancies that result from an overlapping cooperative federalism approach
are actually desirable. Many federal laws contain some form of redundancy in authority among the
different levels of government. Although such redundancy may not be perfectly efficient, it is
sometimes more effective than a less redundant approach. n37 Other approaches - including those that are
more purely federal, exclusively state-controlled or more precisely divided between the two levels - have certain benefits, but also
notable flaws. A cooperative and sometimes redundant approach still realizes these benefits - including a reduced overall cost of a
given level of national GHG emission reductions - while also avoiding most of the costs. n38 3. Enabling Further Action in the Future
Allowing for the possibility of continued state innovation also gives states the ability to
encourage and affect further federal action. With climate change, this has happened over the past
several years in an environment of federal inaction. Even if Congress finally does pass some form
of comprehensive GHG emission reduction legislation, additional efforts may become necessary
in the future. New technologies will likely be needed on an ongoing basis. Just as the auction of
allowances was a new [*253] policy innovation, so too might a new policy mechanism be developed by state or local governments
once a federal cap-and-trade program is in place. But if Congress decides to preclude ongoing progress by the
state and local governments, such necessary future innovation may be impossible. As explained
above, the history of environmental regulation has been characterized by an ebb-and-flow of action
between the federal and state governments. We appear to be entering an era of federal action on
climate change after a lengthy period in which states filled the vacuum left by federal inaction. But
the pendulum is sure to swing back in the future, and the possibility - even likelihood - of the
return of a period of federal gridlock a decade or two in the future dictates the need to keep all the
tools in the toolbox, including the ability to act at the state level. Furthermore, states are able to
respond more quickly than the federal government to new information and scientific and
technological developments. New information is always being developed in the climate change
area, including information regarding the scope and timing of the response needed, the technological options available for
mitigating climate change, and the economics of responding to climate change. In areas of environmental protection,
states are often able to act more quickly to adapt to new circumstances. n39 We must be mindful of
the possibility - indeed the likelihood - that a federal response will be inadequate from the outset. It is
virtually certain that any federal legislation will not be completely comprehensive; it will probably
not apply to 100 percent of the nation's GHG emissions. Additionally, a federal bill might not be
sufficiently stringent to avoid the most damaging effects of climate change in its first incarnation.
This could be due to a variety of factors including political compromise, poor policy design
choices, or lack of information. This is particularly relevant to the changing nature of climate
science. As we learn more about the earth's climate system and our impact upon it, it is possible
we will have to accelerate reductions beyond what is deemed to be "necessary" today. [*254] In this
regard, the reduction targets in all the major federal bills are based on the scientific consensus on the need to keep atmospheric
CO(2) concentrations below 450 parts per million, which requires emission reductions in the developed world of 80 percent by
midcentury. However, there is a growing minority view - led by Dr. James Hansen and the writer Bill McKibben - that contends that
we have already exceeded the safe level of 350 ppm, meaning that much more dramatic action is needed. n40 Five to ten years
from now, this minority view may become the majority view, sparking recognition of the need for more action. By then, however,
power in Washington may have returned to less progressive leadership, requiring states to fill the void once again. It is difficult
to predict exactly what further action, if any, may be necessary in the future. But this is precisely
the reason for allowing the states to take further action if it does become necessary. The dynamic
of the last eight years - in which states act in an environment of federal inaction - could very well
happen again. Ignoring this history will make it even more likely that this history will be repeated,
to the detriment of the nationwide environment and economy.
Warming is real, human caused, and causes extinction—acting now is key to
avoid catastrophic collapse
Dr. David McCoy et al., MD, Centre for International Health and Development, University College London, “Climate Change and
Human Survival,” BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL v. 348, 4—2—14, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.g2510, accessed 8-31-14.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has just published its report on the impacts of global warming. Building on
its recent update of the physical science of global warming [1], the
IPCC’s new report should leave the world in no
doubt about the scale and immediacy of the threat to human survival , health, and well-being. The IPCC
has already concluded that it is “ virtually certain that human influence has warmed the global climate
system” and that it is “ extremely likely that more than half of the observed increase in global average
surface temperature from 1951 to 2010” is anthropogenic [1]. Its new report outlines the future threats of
further global warming: increased scarcity of food and fresh water; extreme weather events; rise in sea
level; loss of biodiversity; areas becoming uninhabitable; and mass human migration, conflict and
violence. Leaked drafts talk of hundreds of millions displaced in a little over 80 years. This month, the American Association for
the Advancement of Science (AAAS) added its voice: “the well being of people of all nations [is] at risk.” [2] Such
comments reaffirm the conclusions of the Lancet/UCL Commission: that climate change is “the greatest threat to
human health of the 21st century.” [3] The changes seen so far—massive arctic ice loss and extreme weather events, for
example—have resulted from an estimated average temperature rise of 0.89°C since 1901. Further changes will depend
on how much we continue to heat the planet. The release of just another 275 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide would
probably commit us to a temperature rise of at least 2°C—an amount that could be emitted in less than eight years. [4]
“ Business as usual ” will increase carbon dioxide concentrations from the current level of 400 parts per
million (ppm), which is a 40% increase from 280 ppm 150 years ago, to 936 ppm by 2100, with a 50:50 chance that this will deliver
global mean temperature rises of more than 4°C. It is now widely understood that such a rise is “incompatible with an organised
global community.” [5]. The
IPCC warns of “ tipping points ” in the Earth’s system, which, if crossed, could lead
to a catastrophic collapse of interlinked human and natural systems. The AAAS concludes that there is
now a “real chance of abrupt, unpredictable and potentially irreversible changes with highly
damaging impacts on people around the globe.” [2] And this week a report from the World Meteorological Office (WMO)
confirmed that extreme weather events are accelerating. WMO secretary general Michel Jarraud said, “There is no standstill in
global warming . . . The laws of physics are non-negotiable.” [6]
**2AC**
Perm – 2AC
Only the perm embraces multiple possibilities key to empowerment and radically
expanding feminisms
Bobel, 10 -- University of Massachusetts women's studies professor and chair
[Chris, Third-Wave Feminism and the Politics of Menstruation, 2010, m.friendfeedmedia.com/3073db053b17daa66f22f6bbd91b994293e823d4, accessed 4-27-14]
Inclusion is a cornerstone of third-wave feminism. Indeed, third-wavers are committed to "debunk[ing] the myth that there is one
lifestyle or manifestation of feminist empowerment"• and to "defy[ing] stereotypes,"• while "creating a fem- inist movement that
speaks to and represents the experiences of all women."•"˜7 This inclusive feminism seeks to redefine both feminism and gender
roles to suit women's lives rather than mold women to lit a particular feminist ideal."• According to Pandora Leong, a contributor to
Colonize This! the feminist "tent holds scores of perspectives"• and not only accepts but also celebrates all forms of feminism."•
Anna Bondoc, a contributor to To Be Real, describes her aim of want- ing to "develop a politics of wholeness and threedimensionality"• so that she can be in the "real world with the rest of the sinners and fools where we can get down to some
serious work."• Bondoc explains that we have to be able to have faults and still be able to claim feminism .
In the down-to-earth prose characteristic of third-wavers, she writes: "If the small-waisted, big-chested, white-capped tooth
porcelain-skinned woman is the unattainable ideal of modeldom, then the progressive ideal is equally unattainable :
racist-free, classist-free, 100 percent anti-homophobic, angry and able to fully articulate every political issue."20 Inclusion
suggests an absence of restrictions on how or when to be a feminist. This is a feminism that does not judge or place
allowing for multiple
possibilities. Inclusion is essential to building movement strength and solidarity and appealing to would-be
activists
boundaries on movement participants, thus moving away from dichotomies and political rigidity and
for whom the feminist label felt too narrow and restrictive. Of course, issues of inclusion have always been a concern of feminists. From Sojourner Truth's "Ain't I a Woman?" speech at the 1851 Ohio Women's Rights Convention, which
exposed the double standards of femininity, to Rita Mae Brown's 1969 statement describing the homophobia within the National Organization f or Women, feminists have been challenging the women's move- ment to expand its borders."• Perhaps the most
impenetrable barrier to access to feminism is the privileg- ing of so-called academic feminism. In an attempt to shape a stronger, more inclusive movement, third-wavers reject the intellectual and professional elite that dominates much of feminist writing. For
example in her fat-positive essay "It's a Big Fat Revolution,"• Nomy Lamm carves out a space for a raw, real dis- course that breaks with what she calls "the universe of male intellect"• ostensibly adapted by feminist academics: "If there's one thing that feminism
has taught me, it's that the revolution is gonna be on my terms. The revolution will be incited through my voice, my words, not the words or the universe of male intel- lect that already exists. And I know that a hell of a lot of what I say is totally con- tradictory. My
contradictions can coexist, cuz they exist inside of me, and I'm not going to simplify them so that they lit into the linear, analytical pattern that I know they're supposed to."•'-I Although I challenge the conflation of "male"• with "academic,"• which denies the
tremendous amount of feminist scholarship by, for, and about women, as well as the plentiful numbers of public intellectu- als and scholar-activists who refuse to distinguish their academic from their activist labors, I appreciate Lamm's point. Since the establishment
of what is called the "intellectual arm of the women's movement"•-women's and gender studies-academic feminism's bid for legitimacy has rendered much of the dis- course inhospitable to all but the elite few. Feminism in some ways has become a specialized
discourse. However, rejecting "the universe of male intellect"• must not necessarily translate to anti-intellectualism. On this point, Catherine Orr accuses Lamm of "degrad[ing] anything that resembles intellectual labor,"• a crit- icism I've repeatedly heard leveled
against third-wave feminists."• In fact, some of my colleagues choose not to teach third-wave literature in their classes because much of it takes the form of personal narrative. As one colleague com- plained to me, "How rigorous is a bunch of essays written by a
bunch of young women gazing at their own navels?" While I will concede that there is some naval gazing and at times a dearth of analysis that adequately contextualizes individual experience, third-wave writing does express, in the aggregate, an earnest attempt to
construct a feminist movement that all people can imagine themselves a part o£ The writing expresses this value of inclusiveness through the use of personal stories expressed in candid, accessible, jargon-free language. This is a feminism that not only claims to
be inclusive, but also demonstrates this value through its discursive practices. MULTIPLICITY: BRINGING OUR WHOLE SELVES T0 THE TABLE A movement predicated on inclusion requires a reckoning with multiplicity that acknowledges human complexity.
Without attention to multiplicity, after all, inclusion is impossible. This theme of understanding, examining, and accepting diverse experiences and standpoints surfaces as integral to the movement. Third-wavers embrace and celebrate their differences and
acknowledge the multiple identities of each feminist or "fragmentation . _ . as a place of power"• through attention to the intersections of gender, race, class, and sexuality and all forms of oppression."• In this conceptualization, feminism is understood in the
broadest terms and predicated on an understanding ofthe interconnectedness of oppressions and domination. In "Virtual Identit y,"• a piece that explores the con- temporary feminist politics of identity, Mocha lean Herrup writes: "We realize that to fight AIDS we
must fight homophobia, and to iight homophobia, we must fight racism, and so on."""˜ For third-wavers, there is no single feminist issue, but a constellation of inter- related issues that must be addressed simultaneously. As Audre Lorde observed: "There is no such
thing as a single-issue struggle because we do not live single- issue lives."• In the same vein, Labaton and Martin point out that "to demand that people focus on one area of concern without recognizing the interconnection of multiple issues would be to demand a
level of self-abnegation that does not mir- ror the way these issues are experienced in our daily lives."• As women, we must be able to "bring our whole selves to the table,"• declares Sonja Curry-Iohnson, and to do that, it is essential to gain an understanding ofthe
connection to under- lying power structures. In another powerful essay that explores the complexity of identity politics, Danzy Senna explains how multiplicity is lived in her life: "I have come to understand that my multiplicity is inherent in my blackness, not opposed
to it, and that none of my "˜identities" are distinct from one another. To be a feminist is to be engaged actively in dismant ling all oppressive relationships. To be black is to contain all colors. I can no longer allow these parts of myself to be compartmentalized, for
when I do, I pass, and when I pass, I "˜cease to exist.' "•'"° These writers insist that class, race, gender, and sexuality are not singular entities and cannot be separated within individuals; therefore, one should not expect that they can or should be s eparated in
social justice work. They envision the "new"• women's movement as accessible and relevant to everyone committed to ending oppression. As even the casual observer of feminism could note, third-wave feminists cannot claim to have discovered intersectionality
and the inescapable intercon- nectedness of issues. Feminists of color, working-class feminists, lesbian femi- nists, and others have long recognized the absolute necessity of what Patricia Hill Collins famously termed "the matrix of domination."'7 And while women
who experience racism, classism, heterosexism, and other forms of oppression have always understood the impossibility of isolating gender-based discrimination from these, many white, middle-class, and straight women have been slow to make this connection;
the women's movement thus became, for many, a white middle-class thing."• Third-wave feminism outfaces the comfortable privilege that permits the luxury of working on what some call just women's issues, a forced separation premised on a myth that few women
believe: that women's experiences are standardized. Third-wavers, particularly feminists of color, express frustration with a women's movement that fails to attract racially and ethnically diverse women. A feminism will inevitably fail that asks women to align with
other women with whom they have less in common than they have with the men in their communities with whom they resist racism and ethnocen- trism. As the Combahee Black Feminist Collective in a 1974 "Black Feminist Statement"• asserted: Although we are
feminists and lesbians, we feel solidarity with progressive black men and do not advocate the fractionalization that white women who are separatists demand. Our situation as black people necessitates that we have solidarity around the fact of race, which white
women of course do not need to have with white men, unless it is their negative solidarity as racial oppres- sors. We struggle together with black men against racism, while we also struggle with black men about sexism."• In this tradition, third-wave feminism works
to foreground the intersec- tions that shape experience, thus fully acknowledging how a truly progressive women's movement cannot separate gender from other dimensions of identity in the light for social justice. CoNTnAmc'r|oN: AT GNCE COLONIZER AND
To embrace inclusion and multiplicity, one must be ready to reckon with the ensuing contradictions and potential
conflicts among and within individuals in the movement. "Contradiction,"• inevitable in an inclusive and diverse move- ment, is
arguably the most uttered word associated with third-wave feminism. Third-wavers want to accept and embrace the contradictions
and ambiguities that exist within society and within themselves as individuals. Cristina Tzintzun captures this idea when she states
in the lead essay of Colonize Thislr "I am mixed. I am the colonizer and the colonized, the exploiter and the exploited. I am conCOLONIZED
fused yet sure. I am a contradiction."• Rebecca Walker, whose very name is fused with third-wave feminism, claims that
by
embracing their contra- dictions and complexities and creating something new and
empowering from them,"• third-wave feminists move "away from dualism and divisiveness ."• This brings
"facing and
us closer to inclusion and multiplicity. Embracing contradiction means simultaneously acknowledging how we are, depending on
our varying social contexts, oppressed and oppressive. In her contribution to Listen Up! Christine Doza explains it this way: "I need
to know that every minute of every day I am being colonized, manipulated, and ignored, and that minute by minute I am doing this to
others who are not shining white and middle class. There is a sys- tem of abuse here. I need to know what part I'm playing in it."•
Honoring differ- ences and accepting the contradictions that exist are essential to maintaining inclusiveness and to
avoiding the divisiveness that thwarts the building of a cohesive movement."•
We should combine state-level efforts to slow climate change with the alternative
– answers Crist
Christian Parenti, Professor, Sustainable Development, School for International Training, Graduate Institute, “Climate Change:
What Role for Reform?” MONTHLY REVIEW v. 65 n. 11, 4—14, http://monthlyreview.org/2014/04/01/climate-change-role-reform,
accessed 4-24-14.
These measures could be realistic and effective in the short term. They are not my preferred version of social
change, nor do they solve all problems. And achieving even these modest emissions reducing reforms will require
robust grassroots pressure. If capitalism can transition off fossil fuels over the next several decades, that
will merely buy time to continue struggling on all other fronts; most importantly, on all other
fronts of the environmental crisis. The left needs to have credible proposals for dealing with the
short-term aspects of the climate crisis as well as having a systematic critique and vision of long-term
change. Both should be advocated simultaneously , not pitted against each other. We are compelled
by circumstances to operate with multiple timeframes and at multiple scales . Reforms and
reformism is an important part of that. Given the state of the left globally, which outside of Latin America is largely in
disarray, achieving socialism will take a very long time indeed. Thus, the struggle for climate mitigation and adaptation
cannot wait for revolution.
A2 Crist
Cooperative federalism is key to the environment
Sessions 13 (Jeff, U.S. senator, 10-31-13, "Neglecting a Cornerstone Principle of the Clean Air Act: President Obama’s EPA
Leaves States Behind" United States Senate Committee on Environment & Public Works Minority Report)
www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=6ceef5b2-07ef-4f68
Air quality has significantly
improved in the U nited S tates over the past 40 years, and the Clean Air Act’s cooperative
federalism arrangement deserves great credit for these improvements, as do the voluntary efforts of millions of
Americans and businesses. The States—not just EPA—desire that all citizens are able to breathe clean
air.
tants -- particles,
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM: A KEY STRATEGY FOR IMPROVING AIR QUALITY
ozone, lead, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide and sulfur dioxide -aggregate national emissions of the six common pollutants alone dropped an average of 68 percent while gross domestic product
grew by 212 percent. This progress reflects efforts by state, local and tribal governments; EPA; private sector companies;
air that we
breathe. Between 1980 and 2010, national concentrations of air pollutants improved 90 percent for lead, 82 percent for carbon
monoxide, 76 percent for sulfur dioxide (24-hour), 52 percent for nitrogen dioxide (annual), and 28 percent for ozone
State
emission control measures to implement the Act, as well as EPA’s national emissions standards,
have contributed to air quality improvements. The Heritage Foundation created a useful chart summarizing this
improving air quality data:28 Figure 2. Regional and state-by-state analyses also show how emissions are
dropping all over the U nited S tates.29 These advancements have come with a significant price tag: in the United States,
over $1 trillion is reported to have been spent on emissions controls and other air quality improvements.30 The success of
reduced emissions domestically contrasts starkly with conditions in countries employing a topdown, command-and-control approach to environmental protection such as China where air
quality remains dangerously poor.31 Equally important, a top-down, federally-controlled approach is
neither workable nor sustainable long-term in a nation that values the role of the States and local governments. The
Heritage Foundation’s “Eight Principles of the American Conservation Ethic” helps explain the reason for this: A site- and
situation-specific management approach also allows conservation efforts to reflect unique
environmental characteristics and variables as well as the needs and desires of local
populations . Rigid government mandates and standards lack this flexibility. Additionally, a site- and
situation-specific approach is more consistent with policies carried out at lower levels of government. Centralized
management is more likely to be arbitrary, ineffectual, or even counterproductive as it lacks the
insight of local populations. A site- and situation-specific approach avoids the institutional power
and ideological concerns that dominate politicized central planning. Where laws and regulations
to achieve environmental goals must be set, they should be meaningful, measurable, and
objective and should contain bright legal lines—rather than bureaucratic requirements—as to how such standards are to be
met.32
Security: Warming Reps Good
Climate apocalypticisism leads to activism that averts catastrophe—studies
prove robust correlation
Veldman 12 – doctoral candidate in the Religion and Nature program at the University of Florida (Robin Globus, “Narrating the
Environmental Apocalypse”, Volume 17, Number 1, Spring 2012, Ethics & the Environment, online, MCR)
Environmental Apocalypticism and Activism ¶ As we saw in the introduction, critics often argue that apocalyptic rhetoric induces
feelings of hopelessness or fatalism. While it certainly does for some people, in this section I will present evidence that
apocalypticism also often goes hand in hand with activism.¶ Some of the strongest evidence of a
connection between environmental apocalypticism and activism comes from a national survey that examined
whether Americans perceived climate change to be dangerous. As part of his analysis, Anthony
Leiserowitz identified several “interpretive communities,” which had consistent demographic
characteristics but varied in their levels of risk perception. The group who perceived the risk to be the
greatest, which he labeled “alarmists,” described climate change [End Page 5] using apocalyptic
language, such as “Bad…bad…bad…like after nuclear war…no vegetation,” “Heat waves, it’s gonna kill the world,” and “Death of
the planet” (2005, 1440). Given such language, this would seem to be a reasonable way to operationalize environmental
apocalypticism. If such apocalypticism encouraged fatalism, we would expect alarmists to be less
likely to have engaged in environmental behavior compared to groups with moderate or low levels
of concern. To the contrary, however, Leiserowitz found that alarmists “were significantly more
likely to have taken personal action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions ” (ibid.) than respondents
who perceived climate change to pose less of a threat. Interestingly, while one might expect such radical views to
appeal only to a tiny minority, Leiserowitz found that a respectable eleven percent of Americans fell into this group (ibid). ¶ Further
supporting Leiserowitz’s findings, in a separate national survey conducted in 2008, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, and Leiserowitz found
that a group they labeled “the Alarmed” (again, due to their high levels of concern about climate change) “are the
segment most engaged in the issue of global warming. They are very convinced it is happening,
human-caused, and a serious and urgent threat. The Alarmed are already making changes in their
own lives and support an aggressive national response” (2009, 3, emphasis added). This group was far more
likely than people with lower levels of concern over climate change to have engaged in consumer activism (by rewarding companies
that support action to reduce global warming with their business, for example) or to have contacted elected officials to express their
concern. Additionally, the authors found that “[w]hen asked which reason for action was most important to
them personally, the Alarmed were most likely to select preventing the destruction of most life on
the planet (31%)” (2009, 31)—a finding suggesting that for many in this group it is specifically the desire to avert
catastrophe, rather than some other motivation, that encourages pro-environmental behavior . Taken together,
these and other studies (cf. Semenza et al. 2008 and DerKarabetia, Stephenson, and Poggi 1996) provide important
evidence that many of those who think environmental problems pose a severe threat practice
some form of activism, rather than giving way to fatalistic resignation.
Focusing on the global, existential threat of climate change solves war
Vail et al ‘12
TOM PYSZCZYNSKI is Distinguished Professor of Psychology at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs. His research is
concerned with the role of existential concerns in human behavior, recently with particular focus on intergroup conflict, war,
terrorism, and morality. MATT MOTYL is a Doctoral Candidate in Social Psychology at the University of Virginia. His research
focuses on understanding and ameliorating intergroup conflicts when sacred values are at stake. He is also Co-Director of
CivilPolitics.org, a nonprofit academic website that brings together research and scholars from many disciplines to try to foster
improved communication between groups in conflict. JAMIE ARNDT received his PhD from the University of Arizona in 1999 and is
the Frederick A. Middlebush Professor of Psychological Sciences at the University of Missouri. His research explores motivational
and existential dynamics of the human condition, and how these interface with various forms of social and health behavior.
KENNETH E. VAIL, III is a PhD student at the University of Missouri who received his M.A. in 2010, and his BA from the University
of Colorado at Colorado Springs in 2008. His research has focused on such questions as how peoples’ management of existential
concerns influences geopolitical affairs, religion, and motivations for authenticity and self-determination. GILAD HIRSCHBERGER is
associate professor of psychology at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya, Israel. His main research interests are interpersonal
and intergroup conflict, prosocial motivation, and terror management theory. PELIN KESEBIR is a post-doctoral researcher at the
University of Colorado, Colorado Springs. Her research explores different aspects of existential motivation. CORRESPONDENCE
CONCERNING THIS ARTICLE should be addressed to Tom Pyszczynski, University of Colorado at Colorado Springs. E-mail:
tpyszczy@uccs.edu, “Drawing Attention to Global Climate Change Decreases Support for War,” AM
The vast majority of the scientific community agrees that the earth’s climate is changing, that
these changes have the potential to produce catastrophic consequences , and that humans have
been contributing to this phenomenon (e. g., Canadian Meteorological & Oceanographic Society,
2002; Joint Science Academies, 2005). Although the severity of the predicted effects of climate
change are disputed by some (Ball, 2007), many scientists have warned of the potential for
cataclysmic global disasters, including extinction of animal species, flooding of densely
populated coastal areas, forced evacuations and migrations in regions no longer able to support
agriculture, disruptions of weather patterns, drought, famine, and increased competition for
resources (Hileman, 1999; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 1996; Schneider,
1997). Building on research from psychology, sociology, political science, economics, history,
and geography, Anderson and DeLisi (2011) present evidence that global climate change might
intensify existing intergroup conflicts and create new ones. Both experimental and correlational
studies establish that uncomfortably warm temperatures increase physical aggression and
violence (e.g., Anderson & Anderson, 1998; Anderson, Anderson, Dorr, DeNeve, & Flanagan,
2000). In addition to the direct effects of global climate change on irritability and aggression, there
would likely also be indirect effects on populations whose livelihoods and survival are threatened
by the changes brought about by global climate change. As realistic group conflict theory (Sherif
et al., 1961) suggests, the inevitable decrease in resources precipitated by global climate change
could lead to more intergroup violence as groups try to secure the resources they need. In fact,
some argue that climate change already has exacerbated existing tensions and conflicts in the
Darfur region of Sudan and in Bangladesh (Anderson & DeLisi, 2011). Although the potential for
global catastrophe, including increased intergroup conflict, is great if the projected effects of
global climate change occur, research and theory (Allport, 1954; Gaertner et al., 1993) suggest
another possibility, at least before these consequences become too severe. Awareness of the
shared nature of this impending threat could encourage cooperation among those affected and
might even facilitate resolution of long-standing conflicts. This article presents three studies
examining the interactive effect of existential threat and contemplating the consequences of
global climate change. Based on TMT and classic theories and research on the impact of shared
goals and threats, we hypothesized that reminders of death would lead people focusing on the
shared global consequences of climate change to increase their support for peace and
reconciliation and decrease their support for war.
Fem K: 2AC
The institutions of the state are necessary in the fight against domestic abusethe alternative abandons women to endure intimate violence alone
Guzik, 9 -- Bloomfield College assistant sociology professor
[Keith,
Arresting Abuse: Mandatory Legal Interventions, Power, and Intimate Abusers, 2009, 187-188]
Of course, the major problem with this approach is that in Western industrialized countries the state alone possesses the legal
privilege to violence. And short of the state's cooperation, it is difficult to imagine how society could effectively disrupt
abusive relationships. Thus, it seems irresponsible to abandon the state as an ally in the fight against domestic violence. Without
abandoning the state is tantamount to
abandoning women to endure intimate violence alone. This is clearly not a step forward. In
an adequate security alternative to replace the police,
addition, the radical feminist position that the state is essentially masculinist or patriarchal too seems misguided. The very history of
the bartered women's movement seems to contradict the notion that the state is inherently anything, Prior to the adoption of
mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution, there was debate about whether the state could ever be brought to follow such radical,
pro-feminist policies (Ferraro & Pope 1993). However, this page in the history of the feminist movement
proved the
state to be malleable and open to change . Whereas the police did not arrest abusers at one time, they
now do. And whereas state's attorney's offices were once loath to prosecute abusers, they now do. The concerns of radical
feminists have been voiced by social justice feminists as well. This camp, however, considers the hard-fought gains that antiviolence
activists won from the state too important to give up. As Dasgupta (2003) reasons, "centralizing the ownership for ending violence
against women within communities is not the same as absolving government of its obligations to protect women" (19). Along the
same lines, many women, especially those looking for immediate relief from violence when calling the police, express high rates
of satisfaction with the criminal justice system (Hester 2006). From another angle, aggressive state action, in addition to the security
it provides women, sends a strong message to society as a whole that "domestic violence is morally wrong" (Coker 2004:1349).
Finally, because the state holds vital resources for survivors of violence, including income, housing, and child care assistance as
well as legal resources such as orders of protection, a retreat from the state is not in order.
State action key to disrupting patriarchy
Harrington, lawyer, 1992
(Mona, Gendered States, ed: Peterson, p. 66-68)
ln the face of such pressures, l believe that feminist
critics of the present state system should beware. The
very fact that the state creates, condenses, and focuses political power may make it the best
friend, not the enemy, of feminists-because the availability of real political power is essential to
real democratic control. Not sufficient, I know, but essential. My basic premise is that political power can
significantly disrupt patriarchal and class (which is to say, economic) power. It holds the potential, at least, for
disrupting the patriarchal/economic oppression of those in the lower reaches of class, sex, and
race hierarchies. It is indisputable that, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it has been the political power of states that
has confronted the massive economic power privately constructed out of industrial processes and has imposed obligations on
employers for the welfare of workers as well as providing additional social supports for the population at large. And the political
tempering of economic power has been the most responsive to broad public needs in liberal democracies, where goverments must
respond roughly to tIme interests of voters. Of course, this is not the whole story. The nation-states of this period have also
perpetrated horrors of torture and war, have aided the development of elite-controlled industrial wealth, and have not sufficiently
responded to the human needs of their less powerful constituents. But I believe it is better to try to restrain the horrors
and abuses than to give up on the limits that state organized political power can bring to bear on
the forms of class-based, race- based, sex-based power that constitute the greatest sources of
oppression we are likely to face. Here I think feminists should be particularly alarmed about the new structures of
interational economic power proliferating and forming linkages to the political internationalism just noted.
Only the perm solves—the alt falsely eschews the political
Kappeler 95 (Susanne, Associate Professor – Al-Akhawayn University, The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior,
p. 8)
Moreover, personal
behavior is no alternative to ‘political action’; there is no question of either/or.
My concern, on the contrary, is the connection between these recognized forms of violence and the
forms of everyday behavior which we consider ‘normal’ but which betray our own will to violence- the connection, in other words,
between our own actions and those acts of violence which are normally the focus of our political critiques. Precisely because there
is no choice between dedicating oneself either to ‘political issues’ or to ‘personal behavior’, the
question of the politics of personal behavior has (also) to be moved into the centre of our politics and our critique.
The state is not inherently patriarchal—reformism is a more effective way to
challenge patriarchy
Rhode ’94
(Deborah L., Professor of Law – Stanford, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1181, April, Lexis)
Neither can the state be understood solely as an instrument of men 's interests. As a threshold matter, what
constitutes those interests is not self-evident, as MacKinnon's own illustrations suggest. If, for example, policies liberalizing abortion
serve male objectives by enhancing access to female sexuality, policies curtailing abortion presumably also serve male objectives
by reducing female autonomy. n23 In effect, patriarchal frameworks verge on tautology. Almost any genderrelated policy can be seen as either directly serving men's immediate interests, or as compromising shortterm concerns in the service of broader, long-term goals, such as "normalizing" the system and stabilizing power relations.
A framework that can characterize all state interventions as directly or indirectly patriarchal offers little
practical guidance in challenging the conditions it condemns . And if women are not a homogenous group with
unitary concerns, surely the same is true of men. Moreover, if the state is best understood as a network of institutions with complex,
sometimes competing agendas, then the patriarchal model of single-minded instrumentalism seems highly implausible. It is difficult
to dismiss all the anti-discrimination initiatives of the last quarter century as purely counter-revolutionary strategies. And it is
precisely these initiatives, with their appeal to "male" norms of "objectivity and the impersonality of procedure, that [have created]
[*1186] leverage for the representation of women's interests." n24 Cross-cultural research also suggests that the
status of women is positively correlated with a strong state, which is scarcely the relationship that
patriarchal frameworks imply. n25 While the "tyrannies" of public and private dependence are plainly related, many
feminists challenge the claim that they are the same. As Carole Pateman notes, women do not "live with the state and are better
able to make collective struggle against institutions than individuals." n26 To advance that struggle, feminists need more concrete
and contextual accounts of state institutions than patriarchal frameworks have supplied. Lumping together police,
welfare workers, and Pentagon officials as agents of a unitary patriarchal structure does more to
obscure than to advance analysis. What seems necessary is a contextual approach that can account for greater
complexities in women's relationships with governing institutions. Yet despite their limitations, patriarchal theories underscore an
insight that generally informs feminist theorizing. As Part II reflects, governmental institutions are implicated in the most fundamental
structures of sex-based inequality and in the strategies necessary to address it. [Continues] These tensions within the women's
movement are, of course, by no means unique. For any subordinate group, the state is a primary source of
both repression and assistance in the struggle for equality. These constituencies cannot be "for" or "against" state
involvement in any categorical sense. The questions are always what forms of involvement, to what ends, and who makes these
decisions. From some feminist perspectives, liberalism has failed to respond adequately to those questions because of deeper
difficulties. In part, the problem stems from undue faith in formal rights. The priority granted to individual entitlements undermines
the public's sense of collective responsibility. This critique has attracted its own share of criticism from within as well as from outside
the feminist community. As many left feminists, including critical race theorists, have noted, rights-based claims have
played a crucial role in advancing group as well as individual interests. n32 Such claims can express
desires not only for autonomy, but also for participation in the struggles that shape women's collective
existence. The priority that state institutions place on rights is not in itself problematic. The central difficulty is the limited scope
and inadequate enforcement of currently recognized entitlements. Since rights-oriented campaigns can advance as well as restrict
political struggle, evaluation of their strategic value demands historically-situated contextual analysis.
Prior questions will never be fully settled—must take action even under
conditions of uncertainty
Molly Cochran 99, Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Georgia Institute for Technology, “Normative Theory in
International Relations”, 1999, pg. 272
To conclude this chapter, while modernist and postmodernist debates continue, while we are still unsure as
to what we can legitimately identify as a feminist ethical/political concern, while we still are unclear
about the relationship between discourse and experience , it is particularly important for feminists that
we proceed with analysis of both the material (institutional and structural) as well as the discursive. This holds
not only for feminists, but for all theorists oriented towards the goal of extending further moral inclusion
in the present social sciences climate of epistemological uncertainty. Important ethical/ political
concerns hang in the balance. We cannot afford to wait for the meta-theoretical questions to be
conclusively answered . Those answers may be unavailable. Nor can we wait for a credible vision
of an alt ernative institutional order to appear before an emancipatory agenda can be kicked into gear.
Nor do we have before us a chicken and egg question of which comes first: sorting out the
metatheoretical issues or working out which practices contribute to a credible institutional vision.
The two questions can and should be pursued together, and can be via moral imagination. Imagination can
help us think beyond discursive and material conditions which limit us, by pushing the boundaries of those limitations in thought and
examining what yields. In this respect, I believe international ethics as pragmatic critique can be a useful ally to feminist and
normative theorists generally.
Their patriarchy impacts are contrived, reductionist, essentialist, and
marginalizes and fractures resistance
Crenshaw 2 [Carrie Crenshaw PhD, Former President of CEDA, “Perspectives In Controversy: Selected Articles from
Contemporary Argumentation and Debate” 2002 p. 119-126]
Feminism is not dead. It is alive and well in intercollegiate debate. Increasingly, students rely on feminist authors
to inform their analysis of resolutions. While I applaud these initial efforts to explore feminist
thought, I am concerned that such arguments only exemplify the general absence of sound causal reasoning in debate
rounds. Poor causal reasoning results from a debate practice that privileges empirical proof over rhetorical proof, fostering
ignorance of the subject matter being debated. To illustrate my point, I claim that debate arguments
about feminists suffer from a reductionism that tends to marginalize the voices of significant
feminist authors. David Zarefsky made a persuasive case for the value of causal reasoning in intercollegiate debate as far
back as 1979. He argued that causal arguments are desirable for four reasons. First , causal analysis increases
the control of the arguer over events by promoting understanding of them. Second, the use of causal
reasoning increases rigor of analysis and fairness in the decision-making process. Third, causal arguments
promote understanding of the philosophical paradox that presumably good people tolerate the existence
of evil. Finally, causal reasoning supplies good reasons for “commitments to policy choices or to systems of
belief which transcend whim , caprice, or the non-reflexive “claims of immediacy” (117-9). Rhetorical proof plays an
important role in the analysis of causal relationships. This is true despite the common assumption that the identification of cause
and effect relies solely upon empirical investigation. For Zarefsky, there are three types of causal reasoning. The first type of causal
reasoning describes the application of a covering law to account for physical or material conditions that cause a resulting event This
type of causal reasoning requires empirical proof prominent in scientific investigation. A second type of causal reasoning requires
the assignment of responsibility. Responsible human beings as agents cause certain events to happen; that is, causation resides in
human beings (107-08). A third type of causal claim explains the existence of a causal relationship. It functions “to provide reasons
to justify a belief that a causal connection exists” (108). The second and third types of causal arguments rely on rhetorical
proof, the provision of “good reasons” to substantiate arguments about human responsibility or explanations
for the existence of a causal relationship (108). I contend that the practice of intercollegiate debate privileges the first type
of causal analysis. It reduces questions of human motivation and explanation to a level of
empiricism appropriate only for causal questions concerning physical or material conditions.
Arguments about feminism clearly illustrate this phenomenon. Substantive debates about feminism usually take
one of two forms. First, on the affirmative, debaters argue that some aspect of the resolution is a
manifestation of patriarchy. For example, given the spring 1992 resolution, “[rjesolved: That advertising degrades the
quality of life," many affirmatives argued that the portrayal of women as beautiful objects for men's consumption is a manifestation of
patriarchy that results in tangible harms to women such as rising rates of eating disorders. The fall 1992 topic, "(rjesolved: That the
welfare system exacerbates the problems of the urban poor in the United States," also had its share of patri- archy cases.
Affirmatives typically argued that women's dependence upon a patriarchal welfare system results in increasing rates of women's
poverty. In addition to these concrete harms to individual women, most affirmatives on both topics, desiring "big impacts," argued
that the effects of patriarchy include nightmarish totalitarianism and/or nuclear annihilation. On the negative, many debaters
countered with arguments that the some aspect of the resolution in some way sustains or energizes the feminist movement in
resistance to patriarchal harms. For example, some negatives argued that sexist advertising provides an impetus for the
reinvigoration of the feminist movement and/or feminist consciousness, ultimately solving the threat of patriarchal nuclear
annihilation. likewise, debaters negating the welfare topic argued that the state of the welfare system is the key issue
around which the feminist movement is mobilizing or that the consequence of the welfare system - breakup of the
patriarchal nuclear family -undermines patriarchy as a whole. Such arguments seem to have two
assumptions in common. First, there is a single feminism. As a result, feminists are transformed
into feminism. Debaters speak of feminism as a single, monolithic, theoretical and pragmatic entity
and feminists as women with identical motivations, methods, and goals. Second, these arguments
assume that patriarchy is the single or root cause of all forms of oppression. Patriarchy not only is
responsible for sexism and the consequent oppression of women, it also is the cause of totalitarianism, environmental degradation,
nuclear war, racism, and capitalist exploitation. These reductionist arguments reflect an unwillingness to
debate about the complexities of human motivation and explanation. They betray a reliance upon a framework
of proof that can explain only material conditions and physical realities through empirical quantification. The transformation of
feminists 'Mo feminism and the identification of patriarchy as the sole cause of all oppression is related in part to the current form of
intercollegiate debate practice. By "form," I refer to Kenneth Burke's notion of form, defined as the "creation of appetite in the mind
of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite" (Counter-Statement 31). Though the framework for this understanding of
form is found in literary and artistic criticism, it is appropriate in this context; as Burke notes, literature can be "equipment for living"
(Biilosophy 293). He also suggests that form "is an arousing and fulfillment of desires. A work has form in so far as one part of it
leads a reader to anticipate another part, to be gratified by the sequence" (Counter-Statement 124). Burke observes that there are
several aspects to the concept of form. One of these aspects, conventional form, involves to some degree the appeal of form as
form. Progressive, repetitive, and minor forms, may be effective even though the reader has no awareness of their formality. But
when a form appeals as form, we designate it as conventional form. Any form can become conventional, and be sought for itself whether it be as complex as the Greek tragedy or as compact as the sonnet (Counter-Statement 126). These concepts help to
explain debaters' continuing reluctance to employ rhetorical proof in arguments about causality. Debaters practice the convention of
poor causal reasoning as a result of judges' unexamined reliance upon conventional form. Convention is the practice of arguing
single-cause links to monolithic impacts that arises out of custom or usage. Conventional form is the expectation of judges that an
argument will take this form. Common practice or convention dictates that a case or disadvantage with nefarious impacts causally
related to a single link will "outweigh" opposing claims in the mind of the judge. In this sense, debate arguments themselves are
conventional. Debaters practice the convention of establishing single-cause relationships to large monolithic
impacts in order to conform to audience expectation. Debaters practice poor causal reasoning because they are
rewarded for it by judges. The convention of arguing single-cause links leadsthe judge to anticipate the certainty of the impact
and to be gratified by the sequence. I suspect that the sequence is gratifying for judges because it relieves us from the responsibility
and difficulties of evaluating rhetorical proofs. We are caught between our responsibility to evaluate rhetorical proofs and our
reluctance to succumb to complete relativism and subjectivity. To take responsibility for evaluating rhetorical proof is to admit that
not every question has an empirical answer. However, when we abandon our responsibility to rhetorical proofs, we sacrifice our
students' understanding of causal reasoning. The sacrifice has consequences for our students' knowledge of the subject matter they
are debating. For example, when feminism is defined as a single entity, not as a pluralized movement or theory, that
single entity results in the identification of patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression. The result is
ignorance of the subject position of the particular feminist author, for highlighting his or her subject
position might draw attention to the incompleteness of the causal relationship between link and impact
Consequently, debaters do not challenge the basic assumptions of such argumentation and
ignorance of feminists is perpetuated. Feminists are not feminism. The topics of feminist inquiry are many and
varied, as are the philosophical approaches to the study of these topics. Different authors have attempted categorization of various
feminists in distinctive ways. For example, Alison Jaggar argues that feminists can be divided into four categories: liberal feminism,
marxist feminism, radical feminism, and socialist feminism. While each of these feminists may share a common commitment to the
improvement of women's situations, they differ from each other in very important ways and reflect divergent philosophical
assumptions that make them each unique. Linda Alcoff presents an entirely different categorization of feminist theory based upon
distinct understandings of the concept "woman," including cultural feminism and post-structural feminism. Karen Offen utilizes a
comparative historical approach to examine two distinct modes of historical argumentation or discourse that have been used by
women and their male allies on behalf of women's emancipation from male control in Western societies. These include relational
feminism and individualist feminism. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron describe a whole category of French feminists that
contain many distinct versions of the feminist project by French authors. Women of color and third-world feminists have argued that
even these broad categorizations of the various feminism have neglected the contributions of nonwhite, non-Western feminists (see, for example, hooks; Hull; Joseph and Lewis; Lorde; Moraga; Omolade; and Smith). In
this literature, the very definition of feminism is contested. Some feminists argue that "all feminists are united by a
commitment to improving the situation of women" (Jaggar and Rothenberg xii), while others have resisted the notion of
a single definition of feminism, bell hooks observes, "a central problem within feminist discourse has been our
inability to either arrive at a consensus of opinion about what feminism is (or accept definitions) that could
serve as points of unification" (Feminist Theory 17). The controversy over the very definition of feminism has political
implications. The power to define is the power both to include and exclude people and ideas in and from that feminism. As a result,
[bjourgeois white women interested in women's rights issues have been satisfied with simple definitions for obvious reasons.
Rhetorically placing themselves in the same social category as oppressed women, they were not anxious to call attention to race
and class privilege (hooks. Feminist Wieory 18). Debate arguments that assume a singular conception of
feminism include and empower the voices of race- and class-privileged women while excluding
and silencing the voices of feminists marginalized by race and class status. This position becomes clearer
when we examine the second assumption of arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate - patriarchy is the sole cause of
oppression. Important feminist thought has resisted this assumption for good reason . Designating patriarchy as the sole
cause of oppression allows the subjugation of resistance to other forms of oppression like racism and
classism to the struggle against sexism. Such subjugation has the effect of denigrating the legitimacy of resistance to racism and
classism as struggles of equal importance. "Within feminist movement in the West, this led to the assumption that resisting
patriarchal domination is a more legitimate feminist action than resisting racism and other forms of domination" (hooks. Talking Back
19). The relegation of struggles against racism and class exploitation to offspring status is not the only implication of the "sole
cause" argument In addition, identifying patriarchy as the single source of oppression obscures women's
perpetration of other forms of subjugation and domination, bell hooks argues that we should not obscure the reality
that women can and do partici- pate in politics of domination, as perpetrators as well as victims - that we dominate, that we are
dominated. If focus on patriarchal domination masks this reality or becomes the means by which women deflect attention from the
real conditions and circumstances of our lives, then women cooperate in suppressing and promoting false consciousness, inhibiting
our capacity to assume responsibility for transforming ourselves and society (hooks. Talking Back 20 ). Characterizing
patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression allows mainstream feminists to abdicate responsibility
for the exercise of class and race privilege. It casts the struggle against class exploitation and racism
as secondary concerns. Current debate practice promotes ignorance of these issues because debaters appeal to conventional
form, the expectation of judges that they will isolate a single link to a large impact Feminists become feminism and patriarchy
becomes the sole cause of all evil. Poor causal arguments arouse and fulfill the expectation of judges by allowing us to surrender
our responsibility to evaluate rhetorical proof for complex causal relationships. The result is either the mar-ginalization
or colonization of certain feminist voices. Arguing feminism in debate rounds risks trivializing feminists. Privileging the act
of speaking about feminism over the content of speech "often turns the voices and beings of non-white women into commodity,
spectacle" (hooks, Talking Back 14). Teaching sophisticated causal reasoning enables our students to learn more concerning the
subject matter about which they argue. In this case, students would learn more about the multiplicity of feminists instead of
reproducing the marginalization of many feminist voices in the debate itself. The content of the speech of feminists must be
investigated to subvert the colonization of exploited women. To do so, we must explore alternatives to the formal
expectation of single-cause links to enormous impacts for appropriation of the marginal voice threatens
the very core of self-determination and free self-expression for exploited and oppressed peoples. If the
identified audience, those spoken to, is determined solely by ruling groups who control production and distribution, then it is easy for
the marginal voice striving for a hearing to allow what is said to be overdetermined by the needs of that majority group who appears
to be listening, to be tuned in (hooks, Talking Back 14).
The alt has no praxis—means it will fail to achieve change
Tara McCormack 10, Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester, PhD in IR from the University of
Westminster, “Critique, Security and Power: The Political Limits to Emancipatory Approaches,” p. 58, google books
Contemporary critical and emancipatory approaches reject the possibility of reaching an objective evaluation of the world or social
reality because they reject the possibility of differentiating between facts and values. For the contemporary critical theorists, theory
can only ever be for someone and for some purpose. As this is so then quite logically critical theorists elevate their own values to be
the most important aspect of critical theory. As a result of the rejection of the fact/value distinction we see within the work of
contemporary critical theorists a highly unreflective certainty about the power of their moral position. Critical theorists argue that all
theory is normative, they offer in its place better norms: ones, as we have seen, that will lead to emancipation and will help the
marginalised.¶ The claims made for the central role of the values of the theorist reveal the theoretical limits of critical and
critical theory has no agency, and only political action can lead
to change. Theory does of course play an important role in political change. This must be the first step towards a critical engagement with
emancipatory theory today. Yet even good or
contemporary power structures and discourses. In this sense, we can see that it is critical theory that really has the potential to solve
problems, unlike problem-solving theory which seeks only to ensure the smooth functioning of the existing order. Through
substantive analysis the critical theorist can transcend the narrow and conservative boundaries of problem-solving theory by
explaining how the problematic arises. Unlike problem-solving theory, critical theory makes claims to be able to explain why and
how the social world functions as it does, it can go beyond the ‘given framework for action’.¶ The critical theorist must therefore be
able to differentiate between facts (or social reality) and values, this ability is what marks the critical theorist apart from the traditional or
problem-solving theorists, who cannot, because of their values and commitment to the existing social world, go beyond the ‘given framework for
action’. If
we cannot differentiate between our desires or values or norms (or our perspective, to put it in Cox’s terms) and
actually occurring social and political and historical processes and relationships, it is hard to see
how we can have a critical perspective (Jahn, 1998: 614). Rather, through abolishing this division we
can no longer draw the line between what we would like and everything else, and thereby
contemporary critical theories are as much of a dogma as problem-solving theories. Contemporary
critical theorists are like modern-day alchemists, believing that they can transform the base metal
of the unjust international order into a golden realm of equality and justice through their own
words. For contemporary critical theorists, all that seems that the crucial step towards progress to a better
world order is for the theorist to state that their theory is for the purposes of emancipation and a just
world order.
The alt abdicates the bureaucracy—that ensures failure of all progressive politics
Chantal Mouffe, Professor of Political Theory at the Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, 09, "The
Importance of Engaging the State", What is Radical Politics Today?, Edited by Jonathan Pugh, pp. 233-7.
In both Hardt and Negri, and Virno, there is therefore emphasis upon ‘critique as withdrawal’. They all call for the
development of a non-state public sphere. They call for self-organisation, experimen-tation, non-representative and
extra-parliamentary politics. They seeforms of traditional representative politics as inherently oppressive. So they do not seek to
engage with them, in order to challenge them. They seek to get rid of them altogether. This disengagement is, fo rsuch influential
personalities in radical politics today, the key to every political position in the world. The Multitude must recognise imperial
sovereignty itself as the enemy and discover adequate means of sub-verting its power. Whereas in the disciplinary era I spoke
about earlier, sabotage was the fundamental form of political resistance, these authors claim that, today, it should be desertion. It is
indeed through desertion, through the evacuation of the places of power, that they think that bat-tles against Empire might be won.
Desertion and exodus are, for theseimportant thinkers, a powerful form of class struggle against imperialpostmodernity.According to
Hardt and Negri, and Virno, radical politics in the pastwas dominated by the notion of ‘the people’. This was, according tothem, a
unity, acting with one will. And this unity is linked to the exis-tence of the state. The Multitude, on the contrary, shuns political
unity.Itisnotrepresentablebecauseitisanactiveself-organisingagentthatcannever achieve the status of a juridical personage. It can
never convergein a general will, because the present globalisation of capital and work-ers’ struggles will not permit this. It is antistate and anti-popular. Hardtand Negri claim that the Multitude cannot be conceived any more interms of a sovereign authority that
is representative of the people. They therefore argue that new forms of politics, which are non-representative, are needed. They
advocate a withdrawal from existing institutions. This is something which characterises much of radical politics today. The emphasis
is not upon challenging the state. Radical politics today is often characterised by a mood, a sense and a feeling,
that the state itself is inherently the problem. I will now turn to presenting the way I envisage the form of social
criticism best suited to radical politics today. I agree with Hardt andNegri that it is important to understand the transition from
Fordism topost-Fordism. But I consider that the dynamics of this transition is bet-ter apprehended within the framework of the
approach outlined in the book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001).
What I want to stress is that many factors have contributed to this transition from Fordism to post-Fordism, and that it is necessary
to recognise its complex nature. My problem withHardt and Negri’s view is that, by putting so much emphasis on theworkers’
struggles, they tend to see this transition as if it was driven by one single logic: the workers’ resistance to the forces of capitalism in
the post-Fordist era. They put too much emphasis upon immaterial labour. In their view, capitalism can only be reactive and they
refuse to accept the creative role played both by capital and by labour. To put it another way, they deny the positive role
of political struggle. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics we use the word
‘hegemony’ to describe the way in which meaning is given to institutions or practices: for example, the way in which a
giveninstitution or practice is defined as ‘oppressive to women’, ‘racist’ or‘environmentally destructive’. We also point out that
every hegemonic order is therefore susceptible to being challenged by counter-hegemonic
practices – feminist, anti-racist, environmentalist, for example. This is illustrated by the plethora of new social
movements which presently exist in radical politics today (Christian, anti-war, counterglobalisation, Muslim, and so on). Clearly not all of these are workers’ struggles. In their various ways they have
nevertheless attempted to influence and have influenced a new hegemonic order. This means that when we talkabout
‘the political’, we do not lose sight of the ever present possibility of heterogeneity and antagonism within society. There are many
differ-ent ways of being antagonistic to a dominant order in a heterogeneous society – it need not only refer to the workers’
struggles. I submit that it is necessary to introduce this hegemonic dimension when one envisages the transition from Fordism to
post-Fordism. This means abandoning the view that a single logic (workers’ struggles) is at work in the evolu-tion of the work
process; as well as acknowledging the pro-active roleplayed by capital.In order to do this we can find interesting insights in the work
of Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello who, in their book The New Spirit of Capitalism (2005), bring to light the way in which capitalists
manage to use the demands for autonomy of the new movements that developed in the 1960s, harnessing them in the development
of the post-Fordist networked economy and transforming them into new forms of con-trol. They use the term ‘artistic critique’ to refer
to how the strategies of the counter-culture (the search for authenticity, the ideal of self-management and the anti-hierarchical
exigency) were used to promote the conditions required by the new mode of capitalist regulation, replac-ing the disciplinary
framework characteristic of the Fordist period. From my point of view, what is interesting in this approach is that it shows how an
important dimension of the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism involves rearticulating existing discourses and practices in new
ways. It allows us to visualise the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism in terms of a hegemonic intervention. To be sure,
Boltanski andChiapello never use this vocabulary, but their analysis is a clear example of what Gramsci called ‘hegemony through
neutralisation’ or ‘passive revolution’. This refers to a situation where demands which challenge the hegemonic order are
recuperated by the existing system, which is achieved by satisfying them in a way that neutralises their subversive potential. When
we apprehend the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism within such a framework, we can understand it as a hegemonic move by
capital to re-establish its leading role and restore its challenged legitimacy. We did not witness a revolution, in Marx’s sense of the
term. Rather, there have been many different interventions, challenging dominant hegemonic practices. It is clear that, once we
envisage social reality in terms of ‘hegemonic’ and ‘counter-hegemonic’ practices, radical politics is not about withdrawing completely from existing institutions. Rather, we have no other choice but to engage with
hegemonic practices, in order to challenge them. This is crucial; otherwise we will be faced with a chaotic situation.
Moreover, if we do not engage with and challenge the existing order, if we instead choose to simply
escape the state completely, we leave the door open for others to take control of systems of
authority and regula-tion. Indeed there are many historical (and not so historical) examples of this. When the Left shows
little interest, Right-wing and authoritarian groups are only too happy to take over the state. The
strategy of exodus could be seen as the reformulation of the idea of communism, as it was found in Marx. There are many points in
common between the two perspectives. To be sure, for Hardt and Negri it is nolonger the proletariat, but the Multitude which is the
privileged politicalsubject. But in both cases the state is seen as a monolithic apparatus of domination that cannot be transformed. It
has to ‘wither away’ in order to leave room for a reconciled society beyond law, power and sovereignty. In reality, as I’ve already
noted, others are often perfectly willing to take control. If my approach – supporting new social movements and counter-hegemonic
practices – has been called ‘post-Marxist’ by many, it is precisely because I have challenged the very possibility of such a reconciled society. To acknowledge the ever present possibility of antagonism to the existing order implies
recognising that heterogeneity cannot be eliminated . As far as politics is concerned, this means the need to
envisage it in terms of a hegemonic struggle between conflicting hegemonic projects attempting to incarnate the universal and to
define the symbolic parameters of social life. A successful hegemony fixes the meaning of institutions and
social practices and defines the ‘commonsense’ through which a given conception of reality is established.
However, such
a result is always contingent, precarious and susceptible to being challenged by
counter-hegemonic interventions. Politics always takes place in a field criss-crossed by antagonisms. A properly
political intervention is always one that engages with a certain aspect of the existing hegemony . It
can never be merely oppositional or conceived as desertion, because it aims to challenge the
existing order, so that it may reidentify and feel more comfortable with that order. Another important aspect of a
hegemonic politics lies in establishing linkages between various demands (such as environmentalists,
feminists, anti-racist groups), so as to transform them into claims that will chal-lenge the existing
structure of power relations. This is a further reason why critique involves engagement, rather
than disengagement. It is clear that the different demands that exist in our societies are often in con-flict with
each other. This is why they need to be articulated politically, which obviously involves the creation
of a collective will, a ‘we’. This, in turn, requires the determination of a ‘them’. This obvious and simple point is
missed by the various advocates of the Multitude. For they seem to believe that the Multitude possesses a natural unity
which does not need political articulation. Hardt and Negri see ‘the People’ as homo-geneous and expressed in a
unitary general will, rather than divided by different political conflicts. Counter-hegemonic
practices, by contrast, do not eliminate differences . Rather, they are what could be called an ‘ensemble
of differences’, all coming together, only at a given moment, against a common adversary. Such as when
different groups from many backgrounds come together to protest against a war perpetuated by a state, or when environmentalists,
feminists, anti-racists and others come together to challenge dominant models of development and progress. In these cases, the
adversary cannot be defined in broad general terms like ‘Empire’, or for that matter ‘Capitalism’. It is instead contingent upon the
particular circumstances in question – the specific states, interna-tional institutions or governmental practices that are to be
challenged. Put another way, the construction of political demands is dependent upon the specific relations of power that need to be
targeted and trans-formed, in order to create the conditions for a new hegemony. This is clearly not an exodus from politics. It is not
‘critique as withdrawal’, but ‘critique as engagement’. It is a ‘war of position’ that needs to be launched, often
across a range of sites, involving the coming together of a range of interests. This can only be
done by establishing links between social movements, political parties and trade unions , for
example. The aim is to create a common bond and collective will, engaging with a wide range of
sites, and often institutions, with the aim of transforming them. This, in my view, is how we should conceive
the nature of radical politics.
K Ans: Reform Good
Radical social movements alienate the public and cause backlash—empirics
prove only reformist legal appeals can solve
Kazin, Professor of History at Georgetown University, ‘11
[Michael, Has the US Left Made a Difference, Dissent Spring p. 52-54]
But when
political radicals made a big difference, they generally did so as decidedly junior partners in a
coalition driven by establishment reformers . Abolitionists did not achieve their goal until midway
through the Civil War, when Abraham Lincoln and his fellow Republicans realized that the promise
of emancipation could speed victory for the North. Militant unionists were not able to gain a measure
of power in mines, factories, and on the waterfront until Franklin Roosevelt needed labor votes during the New Deal.
Only when Lyndon Johnson and other liberal Democrats conquered their fears of disorder and
gave up on the white South could the black freedom movement celebrate passage of the civil
rights and voting rights acts. For a political movement to gain any major goal , it needs to win over
a section of the governing elite (it doesn’t hurt to gain support from some wealthy philanthropists as well). Only on a
handful of occasions has the Left achieved such a victory, and never under its own name. The divergence between political
marginality and cultural influence stems, in part, from the kinds of people who have been the mainstays of the American Left.
During just one period of about four decades—from the late 1870s to the end of the First World War— could
radicals authentically claim to represent more than a tiny number of Americans who belonged to
what was, and remains, the majority of the population: white Christians from the working and
lower-middle class. At the time, this group included Americans from various trades and regions who condemned growing
corporations for controlling the marketplace, corrupting politicians, and degrading civic morality. But this period ended after the First
World War—due partly to the epochal split in the international socialist movement. Radicals lost most of the constituency they had
gained among ordinary white Christians and have never been able to regain it. Thus, the wageearning masses who
voted for Socialist, Communist, and Labor parties elsewhere in the industrial world were almost entirely
lost to the American Left—and deeply skeptical about the vision of solidarity that inspired the great welfare states of
Europe. Both before and after this period, the public face and voice of the Left emanated from an uneasy
alliance: between men and women from elite backgrounds and those from such groups as Jewish
immigrant workers and plebeian blacks whom most Americans viewed as dangerous outsiders.
This was true in the abolitionist movement—when such New England brahmins as Wendell Phillips and Maria
Weston Chapman fought alongside Frederick Douglass and Sojourner Truth. And it was also the case in the
New Left of the 1960s, an unsustainable alliance of white students from elite colleges and black
people like Fannie Lou Hamer and Huey Newton from the ranks of the working poor. It has always been difficult for
these top and- bottom insurgencies to present themselves as plausible alternatives to the major parties, to convince more than a
small minority of voters to embrace their program for sweeping change. Radicals did help to catalyze mass movements. But furious
internal conflicts, a penchant for dogmatism, and hostility toward both nationalism and organized
religion helped make the political Left a taste few Americans cared to acquire. However, some of the
same qualities that alienated leftists from the electorate made them pioneers in generating an alluringly rebellious culture. Talented
orators, writers, artists, and academics associated with the Left put forth new ideas and lifestyles that stirred the imagination of
many Americans, particularly young ones, who felt stifled by orthodox values and social hierarchies. These ideological pioneers also
influenced forces around the world that adapted the culture of the U.S. Left to their own purposes—from the early sprouts of
socialism and feminism in the1830s to the subcultures of black power, radical feminism, and gay liberation in the 1960s and 1970s.
Radical ideas about race, gender, sexuality, and social justice did not need to win votes to become popular. They just required an
audience. And leftists who were able to articulate or represent their views in creative ways often found one. Arts created to serve
political ends are always vulnerable to criticism. Indeed, some radicals deliberately gave up their search for the sublime to
concentrate on the merely persuasive. But as George Orwell, no aesthetic slouch, observed, “the opinion that art should have
nothing to do with politics is itself a political attitude.” In a sense, the radicals who made the most difference in U.S.
history were not that radical at all . What most demanded, in essence, was the fulfillment of two
ideals their fellow Americans already cherished: individual freedom and communal responsibility.
In 1875, Robert Schilling, a German immigrant who was an official in the coopers, or caskmakers, union, reflected on why socialists
were making so little headway among the hard-working citizenry: ….everything that smacks in the least of a curtailment of personal
or individual liberty is most obnoxious to [Americans]. They believe that every individual should be permitted to do what and how it
pleases, as long as the rights and liberties of others are not injured or infringed upon. [But] this personal liberty must be surrendered
and placed under the control of the State, under a government such as proposed by the social Democracy. Most American
radicals grasped this simple truth. They demanded that the promise of individual rights be
realized in everyday life and encouraged suspicion of the words and power of all manner of
authorities—political, economic, and religious. Abolitionists, feminists, savvy Marxists all quoted
the words of the Declaration of Independence, the most popular document in the national canon. Of course, leftists
did not champion self-reliance, the notion that an individual is entirely responsible for his or her own fortunes. But they did uphold
the modernist vision that Americans should be free to pursue happiness unfettered by inherited hierarchies and identities. At the
same time, the U.S. Left—like its counterparts around the world—struggled to establish a new order animated by a desire for social
fraternity. The labor motto “An injury to one is an injury to all” rippled far beyond picket lines and marches of the unemployed. But
American leftists who articulated this credo successfully did so in a patriotic and often religious
key, rather than by preaching the grim inevitability of class struggle. Such radical social gospelers
as Harriet Beecher Stowe, Edward Bellamy, and Martin Luther King, Jr., gained more influence
than did those organizers who espoused secular, Marxian views. Particularly during times of economic
hardship and war, radicals promoted collectivist ends by appealing to the wisdom of “the people” at large. To gain a
sympathetic hearing , the Left always had to demand that the national faith apply equally to
everyone and oppose those who wanted to reserve its use for privileged groups and
undemocratic causes. But it was not always possible to wrap a movement’s destiny in the flag. “America is a trap,” writes the
critic Greil Marcus, “its promises and dreams…are too much to live up to and too much to escape.”
The alt abdicates the bureaucracy—that ensures failure of all progressive politics
Chantal Mouffe, Professor of Political Theory at the Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, 09, "The
Importance of Engaging the State", What is Radical Politics Today?, Edited by Jonathan Pugh, pp. 233-7.
In both Hardt and Negri, and Virno, there is therefore emphasis upon ‘critique as withdrawal’. They all call for the
development of a non-state public sphere. They call for self-organisation, experimen-tation, non-representative and
extra-parliamentary politics. They seeforms of traditional representative politics as inherently oppressive. So they do not seek to
engage with them, in order to challenge them. They seek to get rid of them altogether. This disengagement is, fo rsuch influential
personalities in radical politics today, the key to every political position in the world. The Multitude must recognise imperial
sovereignty itself as the enemy and discover adequate means of sub-verting its power. Whereas in the disciplinary era I spoke
about earlier, sabotage was the fundamental form of political resistance, these authors claim that, today, it should be desertion. It is
indeed through desertion, through the evacuation of the places of power, that they think that bat-tles against Empire might be won.
Desertion and exodus are, for theseimportant thinkers, a powerful form of class struggle against imperialpostmodernity.According to
Hardt and Negri, and Virno, radical politics in the pastwas dominated by the notion of ‘the people’. This was, according tothem, a
unity, acting with one will. And this unity is linked to the exis-tence of the state. The Multitude, on the contrary, shuns political
unity.Itisnotrepresentablebecauseitisanactiveself-organisingagentthatcannever achieve the status of a juridical personage. It can
never convergein a general will, because the present globalisation of capital and work-ers’ struggles will not permit this. It is antistate and anti-popular. Hardtand Negri claim that the Multitude cannot be conceived any more interms of a sovereign authority that
is representative of the people. They therefore argue that new forms of politics, which are non-representative, are needed. They
advocate a withdrawal from existing institutions. This is something which characterises much of radical politics today. The emphasis
is not upon challenging the state. Radical politics today is often characterised by a mood, a sense and a feeling,
that the state itself is inherently the problem. I will now turn to presenting the way I envisage the form of social
criticism best suited to radical politics today. I agree with Hardt andNegri that it is important to understand the transition from
Fordism topost-Fordism. But I consider that the dynamics of this transition is bet-ter apprehended within the framework of the
approach outlined in the book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001).
What I want to stress is that many factors have contributed to this transition from Fordism to post-Fordism, and that it is necessary
to recognise its complex nature. My problem withHardt and Negri’s view is that, by putting so much emphasis on theworkers’
struggles, they tend to see this transition as if it was driven by one single logic: the workers’ resistance to the forces of capitalism in
the post-Fordist era. They put too much emphasis upon immaterial labour. In their view, capitalism can only be reactive and they
refuse to accept the creative role played both by capital and by labour. To put it another way, they deny the positive role
of political struggle. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics we use the word
‘hegemony’ to describe the way in which meaning is given to institutions or practices: for example, the way in which a
giveninstitution or practice is defined as ‘oppressive to women’, ‘racist’ or‘environmentally destructive’. We also point out that
every hegemonic order is therefore susceptible to being challenged by counter-hegemonic
practices – feminist, anti-racist, environmentalist, for example. This is illustrated by the plethora of new social
movements which presently exist in radical politics today (Christian, anti-war, counterglobalisation, Muslim, and so on). Clearly not all of these are workers’ struggles. In their various ways they have
nevertheless attempted to influence and have influenced a new hegemonic order. This means that when we talkabout
‘the political’, we do not lose sight of the ever present possibility of heterogeneity and antagonism within society. There are many
differ-ent ways of being antagonistic to a dominant order in a heterogeneous society – it need not only refer to the workers’
struggles. I submit that it is necessary to introduce this hegemonic dimension when one envisages the transition from Fordism to
post-Fordism. This means abandoning the view that a single logic (workers’ struggles) is at work in the evolu-tion of the work
process; as well as acknowledging the pro-active roleplayed by capital.In order to do this we can find interesting insights in the work
of Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello who, in their book The New Spirit of Capitalism (2005), bring to light the way in which capitalists
manage to use the demands for autonomy of the new movements that developed in the 1960s, harnessing them in the development
of the post-Fordist networked economy and transforming them into new forms of con-trol. They use the term ‘artistic critique’ to refer
to how the strategies of the counter-culture (the search for authenticity, the ideal of self-management and the anti-hierarchical
exigency) were used to promote the conditions required by the new mode of capitalist regulation, replac-ing the disciplinary
framework characteristic of the Fordist period. From my point of view, what is interesting in this approach is that it shows how an
important dimension of the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism involves rearticulating existing discourses and practices in new
ways. It allows us to visualise the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism in terms of a hegemonic intervention. To be sure,
Boltanski andChiapello never use this vocabulary, but their analysis is a clear example of what Gramsci called ‘hegemony through
neutralisation’ or ‘passive revolution’. This refers to a situation where demands which challenge the hegemonic order are
recuperated by the existing system, which is achieved by satisfying them in a way that neutralises their subversive potential. When
we apprehend the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism within such a framework, we can understand it as a hegemonic move by
capital to re-establish its leading role and restore its challenged legitimacy. We did not witness a revolution, in Marx’s sense of the
term. Rather, there have been many different interventions, challenging dominant hegemonic practices. It is clear that, once we
envisage social reality in terms of ‘hegemonic’ and ‘counter-hegemonic’ practices, radical politics is not about withdrawing completely from existing institutions. Rather, we have no other choice but to engage with
hegemonic practices, in order to challenge them. This is crucial; otherwise we will be faced with a chaotic situation.
Moreover, if we do not engage with and challenge the existing order, if we instead choose to simply
escape the state completely, we leave the door open for others to take control of systems of
authority and regula-tion. Indeed there are many historical (and not so historical) examples of this. When the Left shows
little interest, Right-wing and authoritarian groups are only too happy to take over the state. The
strategy of exodus could be seen as the reformulation of the idea of communism, as it was found in Marx. There are many points in
common between the two perspectives. To be sure, for Hardt and Negri it is nolonger the proletariat, but the Multitude which is the
privileged politicalsubject. But in both cases the state is seen as a monolithic apparatus of domination that cannot be transformed. It
has to ‘wither away’ in order to leave room for a reconciled society beyond law, power and sovereignty. In reality, as I’ve already
noted, others are often perfectly willing to take control. If my approach – supporting new social movements and counter-hegemonic
practices – has been called ‘post-Marxist’ by many, it is precisely because I have challenged the very possibility of such a reconciled society. To acknowledge the ever present possibility of antagonism to the existing order implies
recognising that heterogeneity cannot be eliminated . As far as politics is concerned, this means the need to
envisage it in terms of a hegemonic struggle between conflicting hegemonic projects attempting to incarnate the universal and to
define the symbolic parameters of social life. A successful hegemony fixes the meaning of institutions and
social practices and defines the ‘commonsense’ through which a given conception of reality is established.
However, such
a result is always contingent, precarious and susceptible to being challenged by
counter-hegemonic interventions. Politics always takes place in a field criss-crossed by antagonisms. A properly
political intervention is always one that engages with a certain aspect of the existing hegemony . It
can never be merely oppositional or conceived as desertion, because it aims to challenge the
existing order, so that it may reidentify and feel more comfortable with that order. Another important aspect of a
hegemonic politics lies in establishing linkages between various demands (such as environmentalists,
feminists, anti-racist groups), so as to transform them into claims that will chal-lenge the existing
structure of power relations. This is a further reason why critique involves engagement, rather
than disengagement. It is clear that the different demands that exist in our societies are often in con-flict with
each other. This is why they need to be articulated politically, which obviously involves the creation
of a collective will, a ‘we’. This, in turn, requires the determination of a ‘them’. This obvious and simple point is
missed by the various advocates of the Multitude. For they seem to believe that the Multitude possesses a natural unity
which does not need political articulation. Hardt and Negri see ‘the People’ as homo-geneous and expressed in a
unitary general will, rather than divided by different political conflicts . Counter-hegemonic
practices, by contrast, do not eliminate differences . Rather, they are what could be called an ‘ensemble
of differences’, all coming together, only at a given moment, against a common adversary. Such as when
different groups from many backgrounds come together to protest against a war perpetuated by a state, or when environmentalists,
feminists, anti-racists and others come together to challenge dominant models of development and progress. In these cases, the
adversary cannot be defined in broad general terms like ‘Empire’, or for that matter ‘Capitalism’. It is instead contingent upon the
particular circumstances in question – the specific states, interna-tional institutions or governmental practices that are to be
challenged. Put another way, the construction of political demands is dependent upon the specific relations of power that need to be
targeted and trans-formed, in order to create the conditions for a new hegemony. This is clearly not an exodus from politics. It is not
‘critique as withdrawal’, but ‘critique as engagement’. It is a ‘war of position’ that needs to be launched, often
across a range of sites, involving the coming together of a range of interests. This can only be
done by establishing links between social movements, political parties and trade unions , for
example. The aim is to create a common bond and collective will, engaging with a wide range of
sites, and often institutions, with the aim of transforming them. This, in my view, is how we should conceive
the nature of radical politics.
Offense
Turn- feminist killjoy undermines subversive feminist humor- solves better AND
accesses rage better
Crawford, 95 – University of Connecticut Women’s Studies Program director and psychology prof
[Mary, PhD from University of Delaware, Talking Difference: On Gender and Language, 1995, p172]
The functions of humor were several. First, the story-teller gained respect and admiration as an inventive and entertaining user of
language. 'The ability to evoke laughter with bawdy material is important to these women's positive images of themselves' (1977:
33). Secondly, the sexual humor of these family gatherings is educational. Green sug gests that the sexual information children
gleaned from stories of lustful young married couples, cynical prostitutes, rowdy preachers, impotent drunks and wicked old ladies
was at least as accurate as a parental lecture on where babies come from, and much more creative and fun. Finally, women's
bawdy humor was educational in subversive ways. The bawdy tales 'debunk and defy' the cultural rules controlling women's
sexuality. 'The very telling defies the rules .. . Women are not supposed to know or repeat such stuff. But they do and when they do,
they speak ill of all that is sacred - men, the church, marriage, home, family, parents' (1977: 33). Green speculates that in their
humor the women vent their anger at men, offer alternative modes of understanding to their female hearers, and, by including the
ever-present children in the circle of listeners, perform 'tiny act(s) of revenge' on the men who have power over their lives. Just such
a 'tiny act of revenge' in a more public setting occurs in the story-telling of Bessie Eldreth. Eldreth is a renowned Appalachian storyteller in a tradition largely dominated by males. To succeed in this genre, Eldreth must negotiate norms that women should be
subordi nate and silent in public. Patricia Sawin, who has studied Eldreth and the functions of her stories, shows how Eldreth
manages her role incon gruity and achieves public acclaim and status within her community by positioning herself as the 'good
woman,' telling stories of'bad women' whose sins and transgressions wreak havoc. However, Eldreth also takes advantage of the
role of the story-teller to offer commentary on her own life, which included an oppressive marriage to a man who was unable or
unwilling to help provide for his large family. In the follow ing 'ghost story,' Eldreth describes to Sawin how she told the story of a
'haunting,' a popular form of Appalachian folktale, and simultane ously managed a public criticism of her late husband's
inadequacies. In the last line of this transcript ('I had them all laughing') Eldreth indi cates the positive effect of her own
transgression: ΒΕ.Ύοη know, I've thought about that, about / when my husband died, he / they was / about that light, you know, that
would flash up in my bedroom so much. Did I ever tell you about it? PS: I think so. BE: And, uh, it was / for a long time it would
kindly / it'd dashed me, you know. But I got 'til 1, when I'd turn the light off I'd close my eyes right tight. But now, honestly, that light
would go down in under the cover with me. I one time, and these people said, 'Well, you know, maybe,' said, 'maybe it was the
Good Lord watching over you.' I said, 'Well, I've thought of that, 'cause,' I said, 'it was / it was as bright a light as I ever saw.1 And, I
said, Ί / a few times I've thought, well, it might be my husband.' And I thought / and then I said, 'But he wasn't that protective over
me when he's living' [laughs]. I had them all laughing, those people, I said that. (Sawin, 1993) The Power of Humor What, then, do
people do with humor? The answer seems to be - virtually anything. Humor is a flexible conversational strategy. People collaborate
in creating and sustaining interaction in the humor mode. With it, they can introduce taboo topics, silence and subordinate indi
viduals, create group solidarity, express hostility, educate, save face, ingratiate, and express caring for others. The power and
flexibility of conversational humor is related to its indirectness. It allows the unspeakable to enter the discourse. Yet humor has been
characterized as conservative; that is, it may release tension but it does not disrupt the social hierarchy. Much of the research on
humor in hierarchical social settings confirms this view; humor moves largely down the hierarchy. Moreover, the degree of structure
in the social setting is an important determinant of the kind and amount of humor generated (Mulkay, 1988). Highly structured sit
uations generate less humor. Less formal settings lead to less obvious structural constraints on participants' discourse and therefore
more humor. (For example, joking during a wedding ceremony is extremely rare; joking during a wedding reception is common.)
While informal settings may generate more humor, it tends to be 'pure' humor, or play, unlikely to have the biting edge of
subversion. At best, it may permit 'tiny acts of revenge.' However, I suspect that much of women's selfaware humor in informal
social groups is critical and disruptive and does challenge social structures At this historical moment, women have arrived at a group
con- sciousness that had been absent since the dissipation of the last wave of feminism in the 19205 (Weisstein, I973). Gender is
both a highly salient and highly unstable social category. As women began to question received wisdom about gender roles and
relations in the conscious- ness-raising groups and political organizations ofthe l970s, they evolved a distinctive humor that is
expressed in public and private set~ tings and is a powerful tool of political activism. Humor as a Feminist Strategy Feminist
Humor Goes Public As I noted earlier, the stereotype of the humorless woman has long been a part of Western culture. There is an
interesting paradox in this stereotype. If we accept the argument that humor is a subordinate mode of discourse that rarely disrupts
social hierarchies, there seems to be no reason for the culture to represent women as lacking a sense of humor. Much as we enjoy
the wit or the clown, we award public power to those who can perform competently in the serious mode (with a few exceptions, of
course Dan Quayle leaps to mind). The general rule cross-culturally is that any behavior or task that is low status is assigned to
women (and any task assigned to women becomes low status). Humor should be the specialty of women. Just as women have
been allowed to specialize in the devalued forms of visual art (quilts, ceram ics, watercolors, lace making), writing (diaries and
domestic novels), and the low status, underpaid work of industrialized societies (caring for children, the ill, and the elderly; serving
food and cleaning up), women should get assigned that most trivial, low-status form of cre ativity, spontaneous humor. Racist
stereotypes of African-American people traditionally portrayed them as smiling and laughing, joking, and telling tales - as
exaggeratedly comic. Why, then, the cultural representation of women as humorless? The answer may lie in the subversive
potential of humor. Feminists have noted that women are the only subordinated group that is fully integrated with the dominant
group. Perhaps women's humor poses more of a threat than the humor of other subordinated groups because of the social proximity
of women and men. Humor can be used in ordinary social interaction to introduce and develop topics that would be taboo in the
serious mode, while protecting the speaker from the serious consequences of having broken a taboo. This provides a unique
opportunity for members of a subordinate group. Perhaps creating humor is culturally specified to be something that women cannot
and must not do precisely because women's humor undermines the social order. And perhaps this danger is the source of the even
more strongly made claim that feminists in particular lack a sense of humor. When a charge is directed against a political and social
movement, it is wise to examine the politics behind the charge (Weisstein, 1973). Mary Douglas (l975) offered the intriguing analysis that humor occurs when there
is "˜a joke in the social structure.' For women, there are very many jokes embedded in the social structure. The Big Joke is not only that women are second-class citizens but that their subordina- tion is culturally
represented as apolitieal, natural, or even as privilege. Thus, the fact that women are judged by a harsh standard of youth and beauty is presented as an opportunity for women to 'express their indi viduality'
through fashion, starvation dieting and cosmetic surgery (Wolf, 1991). The discourse of the romance novel represents male indif ference and brutality as evidence of love, and promises women that their
endurance in abusive relationships will be rewarded with their men's transformation (Unger and Crawford, 1992). Social conserva tives argue that women belong in the home in patriarchal marriages, and indeed
that they can find happiness and fulfillment in no other way (Faludi, 1991). Motherhood is idealized in ways that have changed lit tle in the past half-century (Silverstein, 1991; Unger and Crawford, 1992). Women
are asked to believe that arrangements of inequality are all for the best: women and men are just naturally different and one is lucky to be a woman. And, if women are unhappy, we are told that it is not current
social practices but feminism that is to blame (Faludi, 1991). Feminist humor exposes these jokes in the social structure (cf. Merrill, 1988). Much of women's humor subverts aspects of The Big Joke - for example,
the premise that women are less competent than men and cannot wield power. A feminist aphorism on T-shirts and lapel buttons in the 1970s stated that 'To be seen as equal, a woman has to be twice as good
as a man. Fortunately, that isn't difficult.' A more subtle mes sage about the ways women may wield power, even in constrained roles, is encoded in the following joke: The mayor and his wife were strolling down
Main Street when they came upon some men digging a ditch. One of the men gave a cheery hello to the mayor's wife, who replied, 'Why, hello, Frank, how are you?' They engaged in friendly talk for a few
minutes and then the couple moved on. After a while, the mayor asked his wife, 'How do you know that guy?' She replied, 'We went to high school together. In fact, we dated for a while before I met you.' The
couple walked on in silence. Then the mayor said, "Isn't fate strange. Just think - if you'd married Frank you'd be married to a ditchdigger instead of to a mayor.' His wife smiled and replied gently, "˜No dear. I'd still
be mar- ried to a mayor.' This is a curious and quite atypical joke. It was told to me by a woman. When I have told it in mixed-sex groups, men often fail to comprehend it. (The mayor's wife is implying that it is her
influence that has led to her husband's success.) lt violates formulaic joke patterns in which women appear only when they are to be the butt of aggression or sex- ual innuendo. Therefore, to men who hear and
tell many formulaic jokes, the married-couple-meets-other-man set-up in this joke may lead to false expectations (a revelation about the wit`e's sexual promiscuity, perhaps). While we cannot know whether it
originated with a woman, women seem not only quicker to comprehend it but more likely to appreciate it. An updated version of this joke, current in 1993 and cir- culated on a feminist electronic mail network, has
Bill and Hillary Clinton in place of the mayor and his unnamed wife. Just as the sexual humor of some men expresses the premise that all women are sexually available at all times even when they profess not to
be, feminist humor mocks the idea that women need men to fulfill their sexual and emotional needs and cannot survive without them. Another 1970s feminist aphorism is A woman without a man is like a fish
without a bicycle.' A current example of feminist humor that pokes fun at women`s presumed obsession with men is Nicole Hollander's two-panel cartoon seen on T-shirts and calendars. The first panel, titled
"˜What men hope women are saying when they go to the washroom together] depicts two women bragging about the skill of their lovers. The second, "˜What they`re really saying] shows the women's actual
conversation: "˜Do you think cake is better than sex?' "˜What kind of cake"˜?' (Hollander, I994). In an interview, Hollander noted that "˜Men are frightened by women's humor because they think that when women
are alone they're making fun of men. This is perfectly true, but they think we're making fun of their equipment when in fact there are so many more interesting things to make fun of such as their value systems'
(quoted in Barreca, 1991: 198). Feminist humor deconstructs the ideology that the roles and activities designated for women are fulfilling and sufficient. ln Walker's study of 150 years o1` women's written humor,
she concludes that a common theme is "˜how it feels to be a member of a subordinate group in a cul- ture that prides itself on equality, what it is like to try to meet standards for behavior that are based on
stereotypes rather than on human beings` (Walker, 1988: 10). ln a long tradition of domestic humor, middle-class white American women writers have catalogued the l` rus- trations and complexities of their
unpaid work: out~of`-control children, rampaging dogs, exploding appliances, dense husbands, boring tasks, crazy relatives. However, this writing is much more than a catalog of housewives' failures. Rather, the
writers manage to convey through wit and humor that the real failure is a social system that makes women solely responsible for the functioning ofthe household and sets impos- sibly high standards for their
performance. Comedian Rosanne Barr, as an independent-minded working-class housewile, talks back with "˜Hey, I figure if the kids are stil] alive when he gets home at night, l've done myjob' and "˜l'll do the
vacuuming when they invent a ride-on vacuum cleaner. As Mulkay noted, the silencing of women and the suppression of their views of the world is frequently played out in mcn's humor. In a comic postcard, a
man is depicted driving a car while a woman sits blank-eyed beside him with a large auto muffler protruding t`rom her mouth. The man is saying cheerfully, "˜New muffler really keeps the car quiet, eh honey?'
Even this sort of humor, in which men control the dis~ course of gender and can silence women, can be turned on the aggressor: a feminist friend sent me this postcard for my collection, with the note, "˜How
about the air bag in the driver's seat?' A great deal of feminist humor can be thought of as the humor of a muted group in that it acknowledges men's ability to define reality in ways that meet their needs. Yet, in
making that acknowledgment pub- lic, it subverts men's reality by exposing its social construction. As Florynce Kennedy said, "˜lf men could get pregnant, abortion would be a sacrament' Gloria Steinem's (1983)
essay, "˜lf Men could Menstruate' describes how "˜menstruation would become an enviable, boast-wor- thy, masculine event' and "˜sanitary supplies would be federally funded and free.' Women would. of course,
suffer from acute cases of "˜menses envy.' Another much-reprinted feminist classic applies the blame-the- victim logic of the dominant culture's assessment of rape victims to male robbery victims. An exchange
between the investigator and the robbery victim in "˜The Rape of Mr Smith' illustrates the absurdity of the questions posed to victims of rape: "˜Have you ever given money away'?' "˜Yes, of course-~ "˜And did you
do so willingly?' "˜What are you getting at?' "˜Well, let's put it like this, Mr Smith. You've given away money in the past in fact, you have quite a reputation for philanthropy. How can we be sure that you weren't
conzriving to have your money taken from you by force"˜?` "˜Listen, if I wanted--' "˜Never mind . . .' And later: "˜What were you wearing at the time, Mr Smith"˜?' "˜Let's see. A suit. Yes, a suit.' "˜An expensive
suit'?' "˜Well, - yes.' "˜ln other words, Mr Smith, you were walking around the streets late at night in a suit that practically adverzised the fact that you might be a good target for some easy money, isn't that so? 1
mean, if we didn't know better, Mr Smith, we might even think you were asking for this to happen, mightn't we?' (Unknown, l990) In the following joke, which was told to me in conversation, a man learns about the
social construction of women's reality the hard way: Joe used to spend many evenings at his neighborhood bar with his friends, having a beer and socializing. Then, inexplicably, he was absent for over a year.
One evening, a beautiful woman came into the bar, sat down, and said, "˜Hello everybody. Do you remember me? I used to be Joe, but I had a sex change operation, and now I'm Debbie' His/her friends were
astounded. They gathered around to hear the story. "˜What was it like? Did you have to take hormones?` `Yes, I took hormones for a year, but it wasn't too bad.' "˜Did you have to learn how to dress and walk like
a woman? And wear high heels?` "˜Yes, but that`s okay, I liked it actually' "˜But . . . the operation! You know _ . . Wasn"˜t it horrible? I mean, when they cut _ _ .' "˜Yes, l know what you mean. No, that part wasn`t
too bad, it was all done by medical experts' "˜Well, then, what was the imrsr par! about becoming a woman?' Joe/Debbie replied slowly and thoughtfully, "˜I guess it was when I woke up from the operation and
found out that they'd cut my paycheck by forty per- cent.’ With the re-emergence of a feminist sensibility and culture since the late 1960s, there has been increasing attention given to feminist humor. Several
anthologies have been published (Kaufman, 1991; Kaufman and Blakely, l98O; Stillman and Beatts, I976). Researchers in the empiricist tradition have measured appreciation of nonsexist and fem- inist jokes,
cartoons, and slogans in women and men with different degrees of allegiance to feminism. While they have been valuable in naming and claiming womens humor, anthologies of feminist humor should not be
taken as necessarily representative of feminist humor; nor should we assume that all feminists will find them funny. Moreover, research projects on humor appreciation do not analyze the functions of feminist
humor within a feminist culture. ln addition to studies and collections of mediated humor, there is a need to analyze feminist humor in natural settings among feminist participants (White, l988). Humor and
Feminist Identity There has been almost no research on women's humor in informal groups. However, there are compelling reasons for doing such studies. The work of Michael Mulkay, Rose Coser, and Franca
Pizzini all sug- gest that highly structured situations lead to humor that functions to maintain the structure. If humor tends to maintain social structures in formally structured settings, we might expect that less
formal situations, such as women`s groups, would generate more subversive humor. This might be especially true in those groupings where women are gathered as women - where the purpose of the group is
gender-related or femi- nist issues, such as in a consciousness-raising group. Cf course, it is important to attend to other aspects of subjectivity and context as well, to avoid the Generic Woman fallacy. In an early
study of discourse in feminist consciousness-raising groups, Susan Kalcik (l975) noted that humor was used supportively to increase group cohesion. The women in these groups frequently mocked themselves.
When one woman had dilliculty expressing herself, she apologized with, "˜Well, you know how we women are; our hor~ mones get up in our brains and fuck up our thinking."• This superficially self-denigrating
humor (also noted by Jenkins in her groups) seems to echo the strategies of the post-war domestic humor writers: by pointing out the stereotypes of women and their own fail- ures to meet patriarchal standards,
these women mock the norms and standards. Like Jenkins, Kalcik also observed a collaborative story- telling style in which "˜kernel stories' emerge, become part ofthe group repertoire, and are repeated or
mentioned to support another story with a similar point. Mary Jo Neitz (l980) reports an impressionistic study of humorous interaction in a group she describes as radical feminists tending toward separatism who
met on a college campus over a two-year period (l97l-72). According to Neitz, set-piece jokes were rare; most humor consisted of spontaneous witticisms. The two most common themes for conversational humor
were selfldenigration and hostility toward males. Like Jenkins and Kalcik, Neitz speculates that apparently self-deni- grating remarks (for example, a group of women climbed into a car and the driver remarked,
"˜Do you think you can be safe with a woman dri- ver"˜?') functioned to help women manage role incongruities and to affirm group values in opposition to the dominant culture. Remarks denigrating women and
their roles generated no laughter when they were contributed by outsiders.
Hostile humor, much of which consisted of castration themes, functioned to
overcome two taboos for women, sexuality and aggression. Moreover, " ˜These
jokes gloried in women's
strength rather than colluding to hide it' (l980: 221). The group used hostile humor in mixed-sex as well as same~sex settings, but used woman-denigrating humor only
among themselves. These studies are but first attempts to examine feminists' talk in context. Ka|cik's study focuses on narrative structures and styles, with little direct examination of humor. Neitz's report is
sketchy. and pro- vides no details of how the humor episodes were collected or analyzed There is a need for methods that permit connections between a dis- tinctive feminist culture and the specific humor
generated (White. 1988). What values are expressed in feminist humor? How do feminists dif- ferentiate themselves as feminists in and through their humor? And what functions docs humor serve in the creation
of a feminist culture? To address these questions, Cindy White (l988) asked self-identified feminists to keep diaries of feminist humor in mundane settings over an eight-week period. From an analysis of three
diaries, White concluded that the values expressed were generalized positive evaluation of women, celebration of womens experiences, affirmation of women's strengths and capabilities, and autonomy and selfdefinition for women.The rarity of anti-male humor suggested to White that these diary-writers also valued men, and that they made a distinction between men as individuals and patriarchal culture. One reported
witticism that reflects some of these values is the fol- lowing: At a staff meeting at a college health center, the clinic director told a story about Harvard University's struggle with their health fee. Men objected to
paying the same fee as women, since they couldn`t get a Pap smear. So Harvard went through all this rigmarole to figure out what part ofthe health fee was attributable to the Pap smear. Finally, they notified the
men that they could come pick up their 50-cent checks. K (. . . a feminist and therapist) says quietly, "˜Pap smear envy.` (White, l988: 82-3). This example uses word play to ridicule the Freudian-based belief that
women are more envious by nature than men due to penis envy. The feminists in the group were able to reverse the notion of penis envy to their own advantage. (Interestingly, the diary writer noted that the
feminists were the only ones who laughed at this joke.) Moreover, the feminist speaker takes a routine gynecological test as the norm and celebrates it. The Pap smear becomes an enviable experience, one that
men feel deprived of, and this explains their over-reaction to differen- tial health fees. The value ofautonomy and self~definition for feminists is suggested by the following diary entry quoting a woman who
presented a paper on lesbian sexuality at a conference: Politically correct sex lasts at least three hours, since everyone knows wc`re process-oriented and not goal-oriented. lf we do have orgasms, those
orgasms must be simultaneous. And we must lie side by side. Now I know that some people think that orgasms are patriarchal. But I "˜ve given up many things for feminism, and this isn`t going to be one ofthem.
(White, 1988: 83) White notes that, just as feminist humor subverts the inflexible gen- der roles of the dominant culture, it mocks inllexibility in feminism. ln the orgasm example, a teministjokes about how the
notion of political correctness can be coercive for women, and asserts her autonomy, plac- ing limits on the influence she will allow to feminist doctrine in her own life. White argues on the basis ofthe humor
diaries she analyzed that the most important role for humor in the creation ofa feminist culture is the articulation of common meanings. Feminists ditlercntiate them- selves as feminists through humor not by
adhering to a doctrinaire or monolithic notion of leminism. but by expressing shared, in-group meanings. When a diarist records that one woman has referred to another as "˜a witch in the patriarchal sense ofthe
word,' she is acknowl- edging that the speaker and her hearers share another, more positive definition of "˜witch' than the dominant group's. By creating and affirm- ing their own meanings, feminists create a
sense of community. When common meanings express in-group/out-group relationships, they help set the boundaries for feminist culture.
These factors allow women to self-identify as
feminists and re-create (enact) their feminism in every- day interaction. Feminist Humor as Political Action Kate Clinton (1982), a
lesbian comedian, has described feminist humor as not just a string of jokes but a "˜deeply radical analysis of the world and our
demands a commitment to joy
being in the world because it, like the erotic,
. Feminist humor is a radical
analysis because we are saying that we have the right to be happy, that we will not settle for less' (19821 40). Because feminist
humor allows its makers to enact their feminism in ongoing social interaction, it is readily used in the service of political activism.
Interaction among feminists disrupts rather than reproduces gender.
Instead of creating self-fulfilling prophecies in which women's "˜deficiencies' are confirmed, feminist interaction opens the way to
exposing gendered social structures. A core shared value of feminisms is the necessity for social change to benefit women, whether one identities as a liberal, radical, socialist, separatist or
any other variant. Indeed, there are many examples of feminists' use of humor and irony to gain a political voice. I will briefly describe four. Activism in the Art World: the Guerrilla Girls ln 1985, a series of
inflammatory posters began appearing in New York's SoHo art district. "˜Do Women Have to be Naked to Get into the Met Museum?' asked one, which featured a nude woman in a gorilla mask with statistics on
the Metropolitan Museum's modern artists (over 95 percent men) and depictions of nudes (85 percent women). Other posters listed galleries and critics that ignore women artists and proclaimed that only four
galleries in the entire city show the work of black women artists. The posters were signed "˜The Guerrilla Girls ~ Conscience of the Art World.' The Guerrilla Girls is an anonymous group of women involved in the
visual arts who have used ironic public humor so effectively that they have become national spokespersons for gender equity in the creative arts. Group members use the names of women artists of the past as
"˜covers,' and encourage supporters to sign gallery visitors' books "˜Guerrilla Girl' to increase their visibility. Anonymity protects them from reprisals, allows them to focus on issues rather than individual fame or
personality, and, most important, gets press coverage. In response to charges that anonymity is cowardly, they reply, "˜No one accuses the Lone Ranger or Batman of being cowardly.' I had heard about the
Guerrilla Girls but I did not expect to see their activism celebrated in Mirabellu, a large-circulation fashion magazine aimed at allluent midlife women (Carr, l992). It seems that the group's use of humor to highlight
the taboo topic of sexism made it palatable to a mass audience of women (who may or may not identify as femi- nists, but who are normally addressed largely as consumers of fashion in this magazine). The
appearance of this article is potentially quite subversive. It plants the idea that women as gallery visitors, buyers of art, arts administrators and volunteer workers ~- can and should engage in direct and indirect
political tactics to make sure that women get a fair share of the art world's rewards. The Guerrilla Girls were commissioned by Mirabel/a to design a new poster. ln this poster, and other recent work, they have
moved beyond arts equity to encompass other social issues. The Mirabella poster, Guerrilla Girls Explain the Concept ry"NaIural Law, is shown in Figure 5.1. "˜We wanted to have some fun with our anger. Then it
snow- balledf a founding member reported. After seven years and more than 40 posters, the Guerrilla Girls now travel the world for speaking engagements in which they appear in gorilla masks, often with lishnet
stockings and mini skirts. Their unique form of feminist humor has been a signilicant force for change in the New York art world. They see the need to continue their guerrilla act because "˜Making art is making the
culture. lf we aren't included in the culture-making process, all women are marginalized' (Carr, 1992: 34). Critical Street Theorizing: Ladies Against Women ln an interview for Socialist Review, "˜Virginia
Cholesterol' and "˜Edith Banks' talk about their political organization, the San Francisco Bay Area branch of Ladies Against Women: lnterviewerz I think I would like to start out by asking a rather basic question,
and that is: What do you see as the role of women in politics? Edith Banks: That's exactly thc problem, we don't believe that anyone should be women at all; our organization is Ladies Againsz Women. We
believe that ladies should be ladies; no one should be women, especially men. interviewer: Let me rephrase the question: What is the role of Ladies in politics? Virginia Cholesterol: Preparing coffee cake,
standing beside successful husband candidates on election night, giving fund raisers and bake sales. (Omi and Philipson, 1983: l()-I l) A feminist comedy troupe, LAW uses street theater to satirize reac- tionary
views of women. Wearing white gloves. fur coats, and ladylike hats, LAW members stage public demonstrations carrying signs such as "˜Roses not Raises] "˜Sperm are People Too,' and "˜Misterhood is Powerful]
At an appearance of arch-conservative Phyllis Schlafly, a LAW spokeswoman was quoted as saying, "˜It's so thrilling to have a visit from someone like Mrs Schlally, who represents everything that women should
stand for militarism, racism, true religion, and women's sub- mission.' In response to Schlal`ly's speech opposing the Equal Rights Amendment to the US Constitution, which she titled "˜Do We Want a GenderFree Society] a LAW member voiced her enthusiastic support: "˜We can't just hand out genders free to anyone who wants them. The only thing that should be free in America is the market' While President
Ronald Reagan held a prayer breakfast with con- servative clergyman Jerry Falwell, LAW simultaneously held a bake sale "˜for the (federal) deiicitf The group claimed wholehearted support for the 1984
Republican platform, except that they had hoped for a plank condemning the Democrats for nominating a "˜girl' for vice- President, on the grounds that "˜real ladies never run; they walk gracefully or are driven.'
Among the group's other political policy tac- tics were a "˜Reagan for Shah' campaign, the tbrmation of Students for an Apathetic Society ("˜How can we invade El Salvador if no one is apa- thetic"˜?') and a
proposed revision ofthe US Criminal Code to include a Dress Code banning the "˜feminist blight' of comfortable clothes and "˜female facial nudity' Who sponsors their demonstrations and press conferences?
"˜Another Mother for World Domination,' "˜Future Fetuses of America] and the "˜National Association for the Advancement of Rich White Straight Men,' of course. M. Nawal Lutfiyya (1992) (whose work provided
the examples above) analyzes their humor as "˜critical street theorizingf By conduct- ing "˜nonserious' demonstrations, LAW disrupts the serious context of public conservative politics. Humor and satire open an
avenue for ques- tioning the social construction of women's second-class status, whether in the claims of anti~teminist speakers or the alliance ofa US President and a right-wing evangelist. Lutliyya notes that the
binary opposition of left/right (in the political sense) is deconstructed when LAW parrot the rhetoric of the right in the protest style ofthe left. This tactic, which draws on the tolerance for ambiguity and incongruity
charac~ teristic of the humor mode., could only `work' within that mode. Moreover, ['I`]he purpose ofthe demonstrations is to critique by challenging and mak- ing a comment on explicit opposing standpoints. The
demonstrations not only make a comment on the debate, the lecture, or the breakfast in light of the contemporary situation of' women in the United States, but because of their fanciful essence which
recontextualizes they encompass the scene and therefore momentarily become the political situation of women in the United States. As this happens, the binary opposition of acting/real life is decon- structed.
(Lutiiyya, 1992: 38-9) Ladies Against Women "˜self-consciously and purposely demonstrate that the creation of meaning is a political activity occurring within language by historically situated actors' (Lutfiyya,
1992: 43). Their comedy is aimed at creating solidarity in a critical community of fem- inists and liberal activists and at educating people across the political spectrum. ln an interview, one member noted that
contradictions and inconsistencies about gender relations are part of most women's lives, and that humor which "˜pushes things to the extreme' can help raise awareness of unexamined assumptions: "˜l think it
helps to keep the edge on people's commitment to change, to take the other side and exaggerate it so badly that they see the absurdity of the hypocrisy in their own lives' (Omi and Philipson, 1983: 22). By
adopting the dress and stereotypical speech style of privileged white women, Ladies Against Women play at being those in power. This humorous play shows their hearers that "˜political policies and power
structures are people acting and creating, and as we act and create we all participate in the structure of power. Accordingly. if people act and create dqkrently, then different social and organiza- tional structures
will emerge' (Lutfiyya, l992: 26). The Politics of Labeling Feminists have analyzed the pervasive sexism in psychiatry in many of its guises (Unger and Crawford, 1992). One of the most obvious is in the politics of
diagnosis and labeling. Mental health practitioners rely on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), a 567-page tome that contains a list of diagnostic labels, descriptions of each disorder,
and criteria for their application. The DSM is the stan- dard diagnostic reference, and the "˜bible of many mental health professionals' (Pantony and Caplan. l99l). Its categories are used not only in diagnosis but in
much mental health research, and, in the US, to determine whether government agencies or private insurers pay for mental health services for a client. The DSM is periodically updated by a panel of experts
drawn pri- marily from among white male psychiatrists. When the most recent version of the manual was being revised, feminist therapists realized that several new and highly misogynistic categories of "˜mental
illness' were being considered for inclusion. Two of these, now termed "˜Self- defeating Personality Disorder' and "˜Late Luteal Phase Dysphoric Disorder,' correspond to popular notions of the masochistic
personal- ity and to premenstrual syndrome respectively. Feminist psychologists marshalled empirical and theoretical argu- ments against these new diagnostic categories, which they viewed as codifications
ofthe misogynistic opinions of privileged white men. They pointed out that the self-defeating personality classification pathologized women by ignoring sociocultural causes of` apparently self-defeating behaviors.
For example, the researchers who conducted the field trials in developing the self`-defeating personality category never questioned the participants about their experiences of` sexual, physical, or emotional
abuse, although abuse may precipitate appar- ently self-defeating behaviors (Brown, I986). Moreover, many of` the behaviors that define the category disappear when a victimized person is removed from the
abusive environment for even a short time (Committee on Women in Psychology, 1985). Instead of` recognizing the social consequences of` victimization, the self-defeating personality category essentializes
behavior by treating it as internally driven, fixed. and enduring. Ignoring a history of abuse, and the behavioral consequences of abuse, results in blaming the victim. The label sell`-defeating or masochistic allows
both mental health practitioners and the larger society to blame women for their `f`ailures' without requiring anyone to question the effects of cultural and situational contexts on psycholog- ical functioning (Brown,
l98f»). As for "˜late luteal phase disorder] this label establishes a mental dis- order purportedly caused by a normal process unique to women. By targeting women`s biology as the source of their problems, it
adds another layer of taint to an already maligned physiology. Although DSM categories are expected to be based on empirical research, there is no empirical validation of such a disorder. The arguments made
by feminist psychologists enlisted all the stan- dard rhetoric of the social sciences in discrediting the scientific basis of the sexist new categories. The lack of scientific justification for the new disorders, both
theoretical and empirical, was strongly and persua- sively presented (Caplan and Gans, l99l; Committee on Women in Psychology, l985). Despite what may seem to be a compelling case, both "˜disorders' were
added to the revised DSM in 1987 in an appendix of`labe|s deserving further study. Once a category is rendered official by DSM inclusion, it takes on a life of its own as a "˜proven, valid and legit- imate diagnostic
category with a firm scientific fbundation;` it becomes "˜an existing, legitimate, clinical construct' (Caplan and Gans, l99l: 267). The politics ol` the DSM illustrate yet again how masculine norms combined with
sociostructural power vested in males lead to viewing women as deficient and problematic to others. However clear this might be to feminists, others have remained unconvinced. Using a classic role-reversal
strategy, Paula Caplan and Margit Eichler (1989) exposed the social construction of female pathology by constructing another new diagnostic category, one they claimed is more character- istic of men: Delusional
Dominating Personality Disorder. Its taxonomy includes the following: The presence of any one of the following delusions: (a) the delusion of per- sonal entitlement to the services of (l) any woman with whom one
is personally associated, (2) females in general for males in general, (3) both of the above; (b) the delusion that women like to suffer and be ordered around; (c) the delusion that physical force is the best method
of solving interper- sonal problems; (d) the delusion that sexual and aggressive impulses are uncontrollable in (1) oneself. (2) males in general, (3) both of the above; (e) the delusion that pornography and erotica
are identical _ _ . A pathological need to affirm one's social importance by displaying one- self in the company of females who meet any three of the following criteria: (a) are conventionally physically attractive; (b)
are younger than oneself; (c) are shorter in stature than oneself; (d) weigh less than oneself; (e) appear to be lower on socioeconomic criteria than oneself; (f) are more submissive than oneself. A distorted
approach to sexuality, displaying itself in one or both of these ways: (a) a pathological need for flattery about one's sexual performance and/or the size of one's genitalia; (b) an infantile tendency to equate large
breasts on women with their sexual attractiveness. Caplan and Eichler have said that Delusional Dominating Personality Disorder began as a consciousness-raising exercise. By pathologizing stereotypically male
personality attributes they were able to show how judgments of "˜pathological' behavior depend on who is doing the observing and labeling. By adopting the dry, pompous style and authoritative stance with which
the North American psychiatric establishment presents its opinions in the DSM, they were able to ques- tion the fundamental authority of those opinions. When I talked with Paula Caplan about whether the
category was intended to be no more than a humorous rendering of "˜Macho Personality] she noted that when she gives professional talks about the DSM and Delusional Dominating Personality Disorder, the
audience's initial reaction is often laughter. However, this initial reaction changes to the recognition that they know people who meet the diagnostic criteria for DDPD. The new diagnostic category is now available
to professional audiences as a perfectly serious psychological problem that has its own research liter- ature, assessment instruments, and documented effects on those who interact with the disordered individual
(Pantony and Caplan, l99l). Perhaps it will eventually be listed in the DSM. The Ideology ofFemininity.' Making the Personal Political In my own study of people's accounts of humor, both women and men defined
an outstanding sense of humor as one that breaks social ten- sion, eases another's unhappiness, cheers rather than wounds, and is sharp, clever. and spontaneous, but ref`rains from hurting others. In short, they
viewed humor as "˜social lubrication,"• compassion, and connection. In a sense what my respondents told me was self- contradictory. Although they more likely thought of` a male, the definition of humor they
used -a nonhostile, contextually sensitive, emerging spontaneously from the fabric of" their lives ~ is much closer to the women's self"-reported humor than the men's. Can this sort of personal idiosyncratic humor
be turned to activism? I believe that it can, and as an example l will describe the humor of feminist psychologist Nancy Datan. I came to know Nancy only near the end of her life, when l asked her to speak at a
conference. At the time (1987) l was a visiting prof`essor in a small psychology department that had never tenured a woman in its long and distinguished history. In fact, no woman had ever been hired in a tenuretrack position until five years before. The first two women, both involved in studying women and gender, were about to come up for tenure. One of my goals in organizing the conference was to represent gender
studies to the senior members ofthe department as a legitimate, rigorous area with its own highly developed body of knowledge. and thus to facilitate the evaluation ofthese two women's credentials. To that end. I
invited only speakers with high national visibility and very distinguished reputa- tions ~ and Nancy Datan was perhaps the most distinguished of the group. I expected Datan to talk about her research. Instead, she
decided to make the personal political by talking about the nonconscious ideology of femininity underlying advice to breast cancer patients, with an n of one e herself Datan stood at the podium, pulled a large
foam rubber prosthesis out of her tote bag. and began to wave it around. The effect on the audience was stunning. The effect on me was similar. My thoughts were that the scientific credibility of my conference
was doomed ~ l had let a crazy woman into the room. But Datan pulled it off brilliantly. Her thesis was that Breast cancer is not a cosmetic disease, but it is embedded in a larger social and political context in
which the cosmetic industry is itself a social and political phenomenon. Thus, if one rejects the a priori assumption that a missing breast demands an all-out cover-up. one finds oneself at war with the very
material which is meant to promote healing. (Datan_ |9892 l78) Nancy took on this topic, so terrifying and so close to home for women, with grace and humor. She spoke ofthe problem of preventing one's breast
prosthesis from riding up on the body: The Reach to Recovery solution: fill the form with birdseed, rice, barley, small plastic beads . _ .drapery weights, fishing sinkers, gunshot or BBs. My first response to this
suggestion was the cognitive equivalent of wound shock. Surely this represented a merger of Frederick's of Hollywood, Ace Hardware, and the American Cancer Society. ( 1989: I79) She also spoke of the implied
identity that the breast cancer patient should strive for, which she labeled as "˜perpetual would-be cheerleaderz' "˜l've never been a cheerleader, and I couldn't see trying out for the part with falsiesf But her humor
was compassionate too. Because Nancy agreed with Audre Lorde (1980) that the cosmetic response to breast cancer leads to self-alienation, and scorned the life of perpetual disguise it implied, she refused
breast reconstruction surgery. But she respected the different choices made by other women: If a hospital room is no place fora crash course in Total Womanhood, nei- ther is it the place for retroactive
consciousness-raising. Breast cancer is a trauma. lf a woman feels she is entitled to jour silicone breasts after a mas- tectomy, l applaud her originality. (l989: l8l) This humor was strong stuff It achieved one ofthe
classic functions of interactional humor, facilitating talk about taboo topics. In this case, the focus on the unspeakable gained additional impact and poignancy because the events were so clearly part of the fabric
of the speaker's life. Datan's chemotherapy-induced baldness was covered by a scarf, and loose clothing softened but did not deny the physical evi- dence of mastectomy. Her personal, social, psychological and
political analysis of the workings of the gender system in cancer treatment was moving and unforgettable.
Twenty years or so before the Guerrilla Girls, Ladies Against
Women, Paula Caplan's DDPD and Nancy Datan's courageous humor, Naomi Weisstein wrote about the missing comic tradition of
women. She noted that other oppressed groups - Jews, African-Americans ~~ used humor as a survival strategy and a weapon
against oppression. She could point to no comparable tradition in women's humor: By women's humor, I don'ti mean women being
funny. I mean a humor which recognizes a common oppression, notices its source and the roles it requires, identities the agents of
that oppression . . . if such traditions existed or exist now, I have been denied them. I remember no redemptive or fight- ing humor
about my condition. (Weisstein, I973: 5) Weisstein acknowledged that this conclusion was a very painful one for her. At the same
time, she recognized that the seeds of change had already been planted with the re-emergence of the women's movement.
Recently, she articulated again the power of humor in an interview with Celia Kitzinger (I993: l9l): 1 think that the uses of comedy
and performance have not been explored enough by feminist academics. Comedy is a beautiful way of equalizing power in the most
intimidating of circumstances, and it should be deliberately and consciously used by us. I've always tried to make my scientific
presentations e-well, all my talks - funny. When you're doing insurgent science, that is, you are dissenting from the reigning theories,
you have to challenge them with more than just the truth of your findings if you're going to be heard. You have to challenge the
theater of science, its authoritarian grandeur and elitist majesty. Naomi Weisstein anticipated that women would reclaim humor. Her
visionary description of the processes taking place has been realized in the feminist political humor l have described: The women's
movement is taking back what has been taken from us. We are reclaiming our autonomy and our history, our rights to selfexpression and collective enjoyment. In this process, we are taking back our humor. The propitiating laughter, the fixed and
charming smiles are over. When we laugh, things are going to be funny. And when we don`t laugh, it`s because we have a keen
and clear sense of humor, and we know what`s not funny we are constructing a women`s culture with its own character, its fighting
humor, its defiant celebration of our worth, a women's culture that will help get us through to that better world, that just and generous
society. (I973: 9~l0)
Alt Slow
The alternative is too slow and may not solve—should engage in reformist
strategies
Christian Parenti, Professor, Sustainable Development, School for International Training, Graduate Institute, “A Radical
Approach to the Climate Crisis,” DISSENT, Summer 2013, www.dissentmagazine.org/article/a-radical-approach-to-the-climatecrisis, accessed 4-24-14.
Several strands of green thinking maintain that capitalism is incapable of a sustainable relationship with non-human nature because,
as an economic system, capitalism has a growth imperative while the earth is finite. One finds versions of this argument in the
literature of eco-socialism, deep ecology, eco-anarchism, and even among many mainstream greens who, though typically declining
to actually name the economic system, are fixated on the dangers of “growth.” All this may be true. Capitalism, a system in
which privately owned firms must continuously out-produce and out-sell their competitors, may be incapable of
accommodating itself to the limits of the natural world. However, that is not the same question as
whether capitalism can solve the more immediate climate crisis. Because of its magnitude, the
climate crisis can appear as the sum total of all environmental problems —deforestation, over-fishing,
freshwater depletion, soil erosion, loss of biodiversity, chemical contamination. But halting greenhouse gas emissions
is a much more specific problem, the most pressing subset of the larger apocalyptic panorama.
And the very bad news is, time has run out. As I write this, news arrives of an ice-free arctic summer by 2050.
Scientists once assumed that would not happen for hundreds of years. Dealing with climate
change by first achieving radical social transformation—be it a socialist or anarchist or deep-ecological/neoprimitive revolution, or a nostalgia-based localista conversion back to a mythical small-town capitalism—would be a very long
and drawn-out, maybe even multigenerational, struggle. It would be marked by years of mass
education and organizing of a scale and intensity not seen in most core capitalist states since the
1960s or even the 1930s. Nor is there any guarantee that the new system would not also degrade
the soil, lay waste to the forests, despoil bodies of water, and find itself still addicted to coal and
oil. Look at the history of “actually existing socialism” before its collapse in 1991. To put it mildly, the
economy was not at peace with nature. Or consider the vexing complexities facing the left social
democracies of Latin America. Bolivia, and Ecuador, states run by socialists who are beholden to
very powerful, autonomous grassroots movements, are still very dependent on petroleum
revenue. A more radical approach to the crisis of climate change begins not with a long-term
vision of an alternate society but with an honest engagement with the very compressed timeframe
that current climate science implies. In the age of climate change, these are the real parameters of
politics.