Universal Principle of Citizenship and Knowledge

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Universal Principle of Citizenship: Belief and Knowledge
Can any notion of citizenship risk negation? Can a contrary belief be sustained as such
knowledge? A fortress of principle within the rational that the bounds to protect the equality of any
notion against such risks, and define the bounds of such beliefs.
Defining equality which the term of citizenship is synonymous with fraternity, and brotherhood
within the bounds of sovereignty. Such bounds that are rationally defined in relationship as terms that
is the nature of such business of government.The essence and foundation (prescriptive) of how and why
such principles of the rational are kept to define (descriptive).1
The "justification problem" with what is argued as "Normative Ethics"2. When first the fight to
protect such fortress is the ephemeral virtues of egoism that pragmatics and utilitarian uses of equality
make for social democracy. Which "to suppose that the virtuous agent is motivated by emotion or
inclination", and that "Virtue ethicists draw a distinction between full or perfect virtue and continence,
or strength of will", that in the end to define our nature to solve such a problem with who we mean to
be "If one thinks"3.
Citizenship that the nature of such business of government to give people the freedom to
exercise the rational to themselves with dynamic scope of operations. Defined as a relationship with
citizenship that if risk then consequence as known by knowledge of the pragmatics and utilitarian. Or as
probability (decision making ignorance), or cause (egoism of the social democracy), or un-certainty
(nationality of person as citizen?) then risk is prescriptive. Citizenship is a determined risk of the
1
Westen, Peter, 1990, Speaking Equality, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Ch 3
Hursthouse, Rosalind. "Virtue Ethics".Stanford Encycolopedia of Philosophy.Pub. 2003, Rev. 2012
3
Hursthouse, Rosalind. Ibid
2
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business of government and the fortress has been undermined.4 The nature of the business of
government is to take such risk with what could be knowledge for citizenship then establishing founding
principles in Constitutional liberty for knowledge to be ascertained. Then only those who risk surrender
as prescribed virtue agents to the fortress which is to preserve them factually understand, and truly
comprehend why surrender is necessary. Thus, their beliefs are negated by free will to accept the
"normative ethics" of the natural foundations of government as knowledge from fact and realization of
the essence of citizenship in principle as free citizens.
-Wilkes, Kathleen. "The Good Man and the God for Man in Aristotle's ethics." In Essays on
Aristotle's Ethics, edKorty, Amelic. Berkeley: University of California Press, 341-357. reproduced from
Toner, Christopher.
"Exercise his rational capacities to their fullest extent to gain for himself the best life
possible...Aristotle's ethics is ultimately selfish"
-Irwin, Terence. Aristotle's First Principles. 1988, New York: Oxford University Press.
reproduced from Toner, Christopher.
"self-realization requires concern for the good of others, and in particular for the common good
of the community...Thus according to Irwin individual desires need not be egoistic; we still justify
morality"
The "meta-ethical problem" of those who believe that their knowledge is a moral consideration
above the government establishment.A "discriminating understanding of the virtues or rules in
4
Hansson, Sven Ove. "Risk".Standford Encyclopedia of PhilosophyPub.2007, Rev. 2011
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question, possessed only by those with practical wisdom" that their belief as knowledge should be
government in principle.The risk that they are willing to take to form their principles against the
prescriptive foundation and re-define what they should and ought to protect.A cause which the risks
make evident their practical wisdom, or Phronesis.5
The ethical concepts of why the free will should and ought to perform within the knowledge of
the rational fortress which the business of government has established are both rational and with a
commitment ( self-knowledge)6 "according to Kant, to allow someone else to dictate to one what one
should do or to take one's opinions wholesale from some other person or some institution is a
deplorable violation or betrayal of own human dignity".7 Thus, if one thinks as Hursthouse argues
"Normative Ethics" the "Action guiding rules" must lead to the "Right Action" when and "if one thinks".
In the bounds of the rational fortress to protect equality which these virtues exist as fact. Can
we, as fellow citizens, ensure by "mutatis mutandis" the cause for relative causation.8 That when the
virtues exist as fact the effect produces the principle that it has founded. That their causal relations
then are bound by laws of principle, that the causal relations by self-knowledge become determinate.
Thus, the empirical form are law Constitutional liberties.
-Dewy, John. To this effect causal determination asserts causation by causal law as a "synthesis"
in terms of John Dewy by the same deductive reasoning "A sense of duty-the meta-physical self, that is
out of space and time relations, and that is also out of specific situation which requires that doing of
some practical deed is simply a non-entity. It is simply a pure abstraction."
5
Hursthouse, Rosalind. Ibid
Gertler, Brie."Self Knowledge" Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Pub.2003, Rev. 2008.
7
Immannuel Kant. The Philosophy of Law, AnExpostition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence as the
Science of Right, trans. William Hastie (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1887)
6
8
Bunge, Mario. Causality and Modern Science.3rd Ed. New York, Dover Pub. 1979.
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"Human acts are imputable to man so as to involve his responsibility, for the very reason that he
puts them forth deliberatively and with self-determination. They are, moreover, not subject to physical
laws which necessitate the agent, but to a law which lays the will under obligation without interfering
with his freedom of choice. Besides, they are moral. For a moral act is one that is freely elicited with the
knowledge of its conformity with or deformity from, the law of practical reason proximately and the law
of God ultimately. But whenever an act is elicited with full deliberation, its relationship to the law of
reason is adverted to."9 Then I would argue more that the terms of government such as E-Pluribus
Unum is knowledge, as much as Alter Ipse Amicus (Latin: A Friend is a second self) is citizenship
(Equivocation-definition).
If the risk can be evident from some wisdom, what consideration of the tangible aspects of
government can counter and bring forth the desires to defend such business and establishment. The
intangible must then consider to answer why from within to desire to maintain such principles as fact.
Which founding legal documents, monuments, and symbols become a culture and identity, of the
national identity. The tangible forms that beg the duty of citizenship, to reason and understand the
principles as fact, to be honorable, as ipso facto.
9
Ming, John. "Human Acts".The Catholic Encyclopedia.Vol. 1. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1907. 11th
Oct. 2012
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Works Cited:
A.J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge (London, 1956). reproducedfrom Analytical Philosophy: An
Anthology 199-200.
Bunge, Mario. Causality and Modern Science.3rd Ed. New York, Dover Pub. 1979.
Dewey John, Kock F. Donald. Lectures on Psycological and Political Ethics: 1898. New York: Hafner Press
of Macmilllan Pub. Co., Inc. 1976 221-252.
Gettier, Edmund. "Is Justified True Belief Knowldege?" Analytical Philosophy: An AnthologyEditied by
A.P. Martinish and David Sosa University of Texas at Austin Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2001
Goodman Nelson. Analytic Philosophy.The New Riddle of Induction.reproduced from Analytical
Philosophy: An Anthology215-216.
Gertler, Brie."Self Knowledge" Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Pub.2003, Rev. 2008.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-knowledge/#2.4
Hawes, Worth. Hurley Patrick J., Lee Kamilah, Murphy Shelly, Stockstill Patrick.A Concise Introduction to
logic. 10th Ed. Canada: Nelson Education Ltd. 2008.
Hansson, Sven Ove. "Risk".Standford Encyclopedia of PhilosophyPub.2007, Rev. 2011
Hursthouse, Rosalind. "Virtue Ethics".Stanford Encycolopedia of Philosophy.Pub. 2003, Rev. 2012
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/
Immannuel Kant. The Philosophy of Law, AnExpostition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence
as the Science of Right, trans. William Hastie (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1887)
Ming, John. "Human Acts".The Catholic Encyclopedia.Vol. 1. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1907.
11th Oct. 2012 http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/01115a.htm
Slote, Michael. "Virtue Ethics and Democratic Values".
Journal of Social Philosophy.Vol. 24 No. 2 1993. 5-37
Toner, Christopher. "Virtue Ethics and the Nature and forms of Egoism". Journal of Philosophical
Research. Vol. 35 2010, 275-303.
Westen, Peter, 1990, Speaking Equality, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Ch 3
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/equality/#DefCon
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