Philosophy of Management Science (0LM05)
Exam preparation
Author
Student-id
M.A.J. Kusters
0557541
Exam date 23 June 2009
Version – 2.1
1. Fallacies and management fashions
1.0 Practicalities
Review and discussion question 1-5 + exercises sheet
Question 6-7 are introduction of the assignment
Baggini “basic tools for argument”
Godfrey Smith
Abrahamson “Management Fashions”.
1.1 The theory of argumentation
 Argument: premise i (i ∈ {1,..,n})  conclusion. An
argument can be evaluated by (a) evaluating its premises,
(b) evaluating the claim that its premises support the
conclusion, and (c) evaluating its conclusion.
 Types of arguments:
1)
deductive, conclusion follows necessarily,
2)
inductive, conclusion follows with probability and
3)
defeasible, conclusion follows with plausibility.
 Validity and soundness: argument is valid if whenever the
premises are true, so is the conclusion. Argument is
sound, if it has true premises and is valid (an argument
with false premises can be valid).
 Formal fallacy: an argument that seems but isn’t valid.
Subtypes: modus ponens (If A then B, A, thus B) = valid,
case of affirming the consequent (if A then B, B, thus A) =
invalid.
 Fallacy: argument that illicitly, but often convincingly, leads
to a conclusion. Types:
1) fallacies that rest on dubious premises,
2) fallacies of irrelevance (premises irrelevant to the
conclusion),
3) fallacies based on hasty conclusions or suppressed
evidence.
1. Begging the question/circular reasoning: if one or more
premises take a stand on an issue or claim that is in
dispute in the debate.
2. Straw man argument: an argument that presents an
attack on a weak position as an attack on another
more credible one.
3. Appeal to ignorance: argument for or against a
proposition on the basis of a lack of evidence against
or for it.
~ More fallacies: false dilemma (there are more options to
choose from than presented), appeal to authority / expert
opinion, overgeneralization (to conclude something about
a whole set on the basis of a subset), false causes (to
conclude to a cause where there is only statistical
covariance), slippery slope (to argue on the basis of
unproven consequences in the long term), suppressed or
selective evidence (to use evidence misleadingly, by no
citing counter-evidence), non-sequitur (invalidity of
argument, inference is wrong).
 Invalidity is about deductive arguments, f.i. a missing
premise which should be added. Fallacy is different, it is
about arguments that look right.
 DN mode of explanation: Deductive Nomologic: meaning
that explanation is logically deducted from nomothetic
premises; argument is based on general laws and
antecedent conditions. An DN explanation consists of
statements of two kinds: explanandum and explanans.
The explanans is a class of sentences. This indicates the
qualitative character of the DN mode of explanation.
However, it can be applied to natural and social science,
and therefore it should be possible for the event-to-beexplained (explanandum) to be a formula on a
relationship. The explanans are then the conditions on
which this relation or formula occur. Example of
quantitative explanation: general law: Y= MC2 , Antecedent
conditions: M=5, C= 2. Thus Y=20.
1.2 MS: paradigms or research programmes?
Does Management Science (MS) consists of fashions /
paradigms or of progressive research programs?
Use of scientific theories, models and hypotheses: lead to
more accurate descriptions, predictions and explanations
of reality.
Worries:
1) in management the goal is not just to understand reality,
but to improve it.
2) “social” reality is much harder to describe and explain,
and almost impossible to predict.
 Rationality: to claim that x is rational is to make an
evaluative or normative claim. It is to say something about
how things (our thought and actions) should be
(irrespective of how they are).
 Traditional view: science is a rational activity that slowly
progresses towards the truth (Lakatos’ programmes:
“science is rational”). Scientific thought is guided only by
evidence, experiment and its rational evaluation, not a
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matter of opinion or prejudice, not affected by emotion or
society.
 Research programme (RP): compromised of:
i) a hard core: basic theoretical assumptions,
ii) protective belt: auxiliary factual and theoretical
assumptions, and
iii) heuristics: rules that guide the modification of the
protective belt in order to protect the hard core from
anomalies (neg: don’t change the hard core / pos. how to
change protective belt so as to explain anomalies away).
 How science works (Lakatos): scientist work within RP,
there can be more than 1 programme within a given field
at a given time, programmes develop determined by its
pos. and neg. heuristics, one programme can outperform
another: thus possible to make an objective, rational
decision about which is preferable.
 Rationality of RP evaluation: RP A is rationally preferable
to RP B (A is and is more progressive than B), RP is
progressive when it continues to predict and explain new
phenomena.
 Alternative view: there is no progress towards the truth in
science, but just a sequence of hypes and fashions,
subject to social processes (Kuhn’s paradigms: “science
is irrational”). Kuhn’s view: scientific thought is not just a
matter of evidence and reason: which scientific framework
/ paradigm one accepts is (partly) irrational.
 Paradigm: is a scientific achievement (way of viewing and
investigating the world) that is:
i) sufficiently unprecedented so as to attract adherents
ii) open ended (by adoptions there remain unresolved
research problems),
iii) will involve some of special methods of inquiry /
instruments, characteristic types of explanation and
argument theories and laws, exemplars, normative or
prescriptive assumptions.
 Scientific (paradigm) lifecycle:
pre-scientific investigation (absence of paradigm, slow
progress) 
normal science (paradigm is adopted and researchers are
either converted to it or marginalized, activity of puzzle
solving, failure to resolve puzzle (anomalies) is blamed on
scientist not the paradigm) 
revolution (anomalies accumulate and change of paradigm
might occur, + something special, furthermore a paradigm
is not abandoned unless a competing paradigm is
available) 
normal science.
 Theory-laden nature of observation: Kuhn: what we report
depends on our standards and theories (paradigms), does
not allow comparison of paradigms: rational paradigm
evaluation is not possible.
 Incommensurability: “not comparable by use of a common
(not only different but also objective) standard or
measure”: competing paradigms have different stands of
justification and evidence, paradigms lead to incompatible
conclusions: no neutral or objective way of deciding which
is correct, proponents of different paradigms inevitably beg
the question against each other.
 The two aspects of the incommensurability problem
are:
M.A.J. Kusters (0557541)
i) people from different paradigms are not able to
communicate with each other. They use terms in different
ways.
ii) even when communication is possible, people in
different paradigms will use different standards of
evidence and argument. This second aspect of
incommensurability refers to theory ladenness. This
causes the phenomenon that when scientists work in a
paradigm, they cannot objectively assess another
paradigm. Because their paradigm shapes their world and
includes their own standards for what counts as a good
argument/research. Incommensurability refers to
comparisons between paradigms. Theory-ladenness
refers to something inside a paradigm. So the unit of
analysis is different. So theory-ladenness is one of the two
aspects of incommensurability. The communication aspect
can be solved, so theory-ladenness is the most important
aspect for Incommensurability. Theory-ladenness is
therefore a stronger argument for Kuhn’s view.
 Relativism and social constructivism: what is reasonable
or counts as known depends on one’s paradigm. Since the
choice for a paradigm cannot be rationalized; Irrationalism:
choosing basic assumptions cannot be reasoned.
 Kuhn is ambiguous about the one-paradigm-per-field issue.
But the number of paradigms it is not essential for his view
as long as they are all incommensurable. When they are,
there is no rational comparison possible.
 Abrahamson’s “Management Fashions” (1996) addresses
the question the rationality of MFs:
i) rationality plays a role in his definition of MF’s: “A MF is
a transitory collective belief, disseminated by management
fashion setters, that a management technique leads
rational management progress.”,
ii) Abrahamson studies MFs as social phenomena, but
examines the role of “norms of rationality” and of “techno
economic forces”. One tool to sell MFs is rhetoric:
advertise technique as increasing rationality by successful
examples, empirically validated theories.
 Popularity of MF is described by a bell shaped curve,
explanation:
i) social factors (need to seem cutting-edge, confirmation
of status, boredom), technical / economical factors
(change of economic or political situation).
 MF: not all fashions may possess the same ‘rationality’ to
adopt. To argue that a MF was adopted on an irrational
way, you have to come up with standards from the MF and
its predecessors. You also have to show that there is no
objective standards on which managers could base their
choice. To argue whether a MF is a RP (rational) you
should know the standards of it and its predecessors, the
anomalies that happened during the use of the
predecessors, and whether the MF is capable to deal with
these problems. You should be able to show objective
standards to compare the MF with its predecessors to
argue against incommensurability.
EXAM QUESTIONS:
MAR06
0LM05 – Exam preparation
3
1. Consider the following argument in a student paper. The
students argue that adopting the management technique
“total quality management” (TQM) cannot be rational:
“When we look to the evolvement of TQM we can see a
pattern similar to a paradigm shift. After World War II, US
manufacturers found themselves in heavy competition with
Japanese firms. At first, they thought that Japanese
success was price-related, and thus responded to
Japanese competition with strategies aimed at reducing
domestic production costs and restricting imports. This,
however, did nothing to improve American
competitiveness in terms of quality. As years passed, price
competition declined while quality competition continued to
increase. By the end of the 1970s, the American quality
crisis reached major proportions, attracting attracted
attention from national legislators, administrators and the
media. The chief executive officers of major U.S.
corporations stepped forward to provide personal
leadership in the quality movement, developing the
technique that became known as TQM. What we witness
here is the sudden change from the conventional
paradigm to the TQM paradigm. The American economy
suffered greatly from the “Japanese way of doing” without
really understanding why. The reason for this is that the
Americans lived in a completely different paradigm with
different values, beliefs, and rules of conduct which didn’t
resembled the Japanese paradigm. But when there
became more and more anomalies, which they couldn’t
resolve within their paradigm, the faith in the conventional
paradigm had declined so much that there was no other
way than embrace the new paradigm.”
Additional information should be given regarding
anomalies of earlier techniques and TQM’s (in-)capacity to
solve them; and about central standards of TQM and
predecessors, in order to argue for/against
incommensurability.
a) Briefly explain the Kuhnian notion of ‘paradigm shift’.
Use the notions ‘anomaly’, ‘crisis’ and ‘rationality’ in your
answer.
This comes straight from the Godfrey-Smith text in the
reader. Do not say that anomalies cause crises in some
rational way. There are always anomalies, and crises are
irrational phenomena. Sometimes, they lead to paradigm
shifts in which, of course, there is no rational transition
from one way of doing science to another.
b) Explain how the change from earlier management
techniques to TQM might involve a paradigm shift.
The change might be a paradigm shift, because TQM
might be incommensurable with earlier techniques. Only if
there is no rational way of comparing the techniques, there
is an irrational transition.
c) The argument given by the students is not sound.
Explain why, by arguing that the change from earlier
management techniques to TQM need not involve a
paradigm shift.
Follows more or less directly from previous answers. TQM
might be comparable with earlier techniques. Indeed, the
student description strongly suggests that it arose out of
problems experienced with the earlier techniques; if it
solved these problems (and did not suffer “Kuhn loss”, i.e.,
problems that earlier techniques solved suddenly without
solution), transition to TQM is management progress.
d) What kind of information would be needed, in addition
to that given by the students, to show that the transition to
TQM is not rational?
JAN07
1. in a paper written for this course, students argue that
“total quality management” (TQM) can be characterized as
a Lakatosian RP, and that its adoption can be explained
as a rational decision. First they offer the following
characterizations: “Hard core: the core of TQM is the
customer-supplier relationship where the processes must
be managed. The ‘soft’ outcomes of TQM – The culture,
communications, and commitment provide the foundations
of TQM. Protective belt: the Protective Belt of TQM
consists of the following factors: committed leadership,
adoption and communication of TQM, Closer customer
Relationships, Closer supplier relationships,
Benchmarking, Increased training, Open organization,
Employee empowerment, Zero-defects mentality, flexible
manufacturing, Process improvement, Measurement.”
In another paper, the following anti-Kuhnian argument is
given: “According to Kuhn, only one paradigm at a time is
right for a certain topic. But in management, several
mutually exclusive paradigms can co-exist in a continuing
state. For instance, at a particular time, in different
companies, different techniques for improving quality are
used. These co-existing techniques cannot be paradigms,
so Kuhn’s model makes no sense.
e) Explain why the first sentence in this quote seriously
misrepresents Kuhn’s views and rephrase the sentence in
a Kuhnian way.
The big mistake is that paradigms are not “right” for a field.
There is no absolute truth, but this statement says that
there is (but it changes over time?). One reformulation is:
“According to Kuhn, one paradigm dominates each field at
a certain time.”
f) A Kuhnian can easily respond to this argument. Show
how, and examine whether the argument can be
strengthened in such a way that this response is blocked.
Although critics like to point out that Kuhn often suggested
a one-paradigm-per-field view, he is at least ambiguous in
this respect. And it is not essential that there is only one
paradigm: as long as they are all incommensurable,
rational comparison is still impossible.
a) Briefly characterize a Lakatosian RP, including the
notions ‘hard core’ and ‘protective belt’. Use the phrase
‘succession of theories’ in your answer.
A RP is a historical entity; it evolves over time. It will
contain a succession of (related) theories. A RP has two
main components, in Lakatos’s view. First it contains a
hard core. This is a set of basic ideas that are essential to
the RP, and these ideas are similar in every theory that is
part of the program. Second, a RP contains a protective
belt. This is a set of less fundamental, auxiliary claims and
ideas that are used to apply the hard core to actual
phenomena and to keep it from being falsified. The
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protective belt may undergo changes in the development
of the RP.
b) Assume that the students list actual factors of TQM.
Have they succeeded in characterizing a hard core and
protective belt, according to your definition in 1.a?
As indicated in 1.a) both the hard core and the protective
belt consists of claims. A claim is a statement that is either
true or false, for instance: “there are seven planets in the
solar system”, or “managers ought to be committed”.
However, the things listed by the students are not claims,
only factors like “culture”, and therefore not appropriate
elements of a hard core or protective belt. Thus, the
student have not succeeded in characterizing a hard core
and protective belt.
The students also give some arguments for the rationality
of adopting TQM: “The proof of rationality in adoption of
TQM in Japan is straightforward. It was invented as a
result of their poor economy. American manufacturing
industry realized their competiveness became very weak
compared to Japanese manufacturing industry. They
began searching the reason for their decline. They
compared their traditional approach to management with
the Japanese approach. They found out that what TQM
had done for the Japanese, could also be done for them.
Therefore they have adopted TQM. Another argument for
the rationality of the adoption of TQM is the fact that it has
evolved after the implementation. First, only the
manufacturers adopted TQM, but later the nonmanufacturers followed.”
c) Evaluate the arguments in this short section. Do so
separately for each argument. If you think the arguments
are fallacious, characterize the fallacy involved.
1) “[…] adoption […] is strainghforward. It was invented as
a result of their poor economy.”: The clear cause for
invention (poor economy) does not make it a rational
decision (taking LSD may cause you to believe that you
can fly, but it does not make jumping off a building a
rational decision);
2) “[…] what TQM had done for the Japanese, could also
be done for them”: at best a very weak inductive claim; it is
reasonable to expect all kinds of dissimilarities;
3) “Another argument […] is the fact that is has evolved
after the implementation”: this is not rational; evolution is
just change, and it might be change for the worse.
In another paper students argue for the
incommensurability of TQM and another technique,
“Business Process Re-engineering” (BPR). One argument
they give is announced under the heading: “theoryladenness of observation”.
d) Describe the phenomenon of theory-ladenness of
observation, preferably with a small example. Why does
the phenomenon support the Kuhnian view of science?
Theory-ladenness of observation means that your
background beliefs or theory influence your perception of
reality. When you believe that Jupiter has moons, you are
prone to interpret a blurry image in this way. The
phenomenon supports the Kuhnian view because it means
that researchers in two paradigms literally see different
M.A.J. Kusters (0557541)
things when they look at the world, perform experiments,
etc. This makes resolving their debate far more difficult.
The students present the following argument: “The [two
techniques] have a different focus, TQM promotes
improvements in performance by statistical methods and
BPR promotes improvements in performance by applying
an IT structure. The common element in both approaches
is their focus on performance improvements through
improvements of processes across the whole company.
But the term ‘process’ is used differently in each approach,
because the focus and the manner of change are different.
In the TQM approach, the term ‘process’ refers to a way of
splitting the organization in order to improve quality, while
the BPR uses the term to implement workflow technology.
The concept ‘process’ is a good example why researchers
cannot rationally compare paradigms. When followers of
both paradigms discuss the term ‘process’, confusion will
arise because they give a different meaning to the same
world.”
e) How effective is this argument for the theory-ladenness
of observation?
The argument may be effective, but not for theoryladenness. TQM and BPR define a single notion in
different ways, but these different definitions may not
affect perceptions of reality at all.
f) The students conclude from their argument that “the
concept [of process] cannot be discussed rationally”. Write
a short response from a Lakatosian / Laudanian
perspective, defending rationality.
Since both definitions are (presumably) clear, the
opponents can at least consult each other’s results, and
interpret them in the light of the alternative definition.
Furthermore, they both aim at improving performance,
albeit by different means. Therefore, they have a shared
goal, which makes comparison possible: it is at least
conceivable that a neutral party investigates which of the
two means actually succeeds most in improving
performance.
JAN08
1. consider a a hypothetical management fashion, Punish
for Profit. Under a. to d., four arguments are offered in
favour of, or against, the introduction of Punish for Profit in
a specific organisation. Discuss the validity of each of
these arguments separately. Examine whether the
argument is valid or fallacious, and argue why.
a) "Introducing Punish for Profit is irrational, because it
would decrease job satisfaction among employees."
INVALID. There is no premise that states that it is irrational
to introduce any MF that decreases job satisfaction among
employees. Thus there is a missing premise. The missing
premise is: “it is never reasonable to decrease job
satisfaction”.
b) "Introducing Punish for Profit is irrational. All studies
that show its advantageous effects have been done by
consultants who make millions by helping organizations
introduce Punish for Profit."
INVALID. Ad hominem argument: appeal to the position of
the speaker “You are so stupid; your argument couldn’t
0LM05 – Exam preparation
possibly be true”. In case above, that the consultants are
making millions by helping organizations introducing
Punish for Profit does not mean that the results of their
studies are incorrect (and if they would be biased and
present advantageous effects for that reason, still these or
other advantageous effect could be really present). Thus
criticizing the authors of the article instead of their work
misinterpreting the situation.
c) "Introducing Punish for Profit is rational. It performs
better than our current management technique, which
does less to increase customer satisfaction." [NB: Analyze
this as a pragmatic argument]
INVALID. Form of pragmatic argument: i want A, doing M
is a means to bring about A, therefore I should do M. In
this case A would be the highest goal for on organization,
which is profit. To increase customer satisfaction could be
a (one possible) means of attaining profit. Introducing
Punish for Profit seems to be one possible mean of
attaining the intermediate goal of increased customer
satisfaction. Note first that these arguments are never
valid. The conclusion is normative, and the premises
descriptive, so it does not follow that I should do
something. I might also conclude that I will not satisfy my
desire, or that I abandon it altogether. Critical questions:
(1) What other goals do I have that might conflict with A?
(2) What alternatives to doing M would also bring about A?
(3) Are some of these alternatives more efficient ways of
bringing about A? (be better than Punish for Profit)
(4) Is it practically possible for me to do M? (possible
problems of implementations are unknown)
(5) Are there negative side effects of doing M? (may be
there, is also unknown)
d) "Introducing Punish for Profit is rational. It closely
resembles the technique that we are using now, so it may
be regarded as the next stage of a Lakatosian research
program."
INVALID. The fact that the technique closely resembles
the present technique does not support the conclusion that
the introduction of Punish for Profit is a rational next step.
e) Give a question-begging (circular) argument in favour of
Punish for Profit.
Premise: all other MFs underperform Punish for Profit.
Conclusion: Punish for Profit is the best MF.
f) Can an argument be valid without being sound? If not,
argue why. If so, give an example.
YES. An argument can be valid without being sound.
Validity: the argumentative structure can be correct, with
the conclusion necessarily following from the premises.
Not sound: one or more of the premises can be untrue
(also making the conclusion untrue). When both apply, the
argument is valid but not sound. Example: premise1: all
charismatic people are a (former) chairman of study
association Industria; premise2: Ronald is a charismatic
person; conclusion: Ronald is a (former) chairman of study
association Industria. In this example the argumentative
structure is correct, however one of its premises
(premise2) is untrue (Ronald is more like a dictator ;-),
therefore making it an argument which is not sound.
2. Rigour and relevance
2.0 Practicalities
5
Review and discussion question 1-4
Daft, Lewin, Shrivastava, van Aken, Bertrand & Fransoo,
Humpreys
2.1 The articles
Should we aim for scientific rigour or for practical
relevance in MS? Diagnosis of the controversy: multiplepersonality disorder.
 Case for rigour: “nothing is so practical as a good theory”.
“Knowledge is power”close tie between rigour and
relevance. “By definition science is rigorous, otherwise it is
just common sense”.
 Case for relevance: social phenomena are so complicated,
you cannot make predictions about them. People have a
perspective = interpretation, by formulating and framing
you lose that aims, ideas, etc: aim should be to improve
actual organizations to solve existing practical problems.
Because of the complexity issue this can only be
realistically done on a case-to-case basis. This calls for
open-mindedness about approaches: no straitjacket of
“normal science”.
 Issues at stake: five ideas / distinctions in the clusters: i)
law-based (general) vs. ideographic (specific), ii) formal
vs. informal, iii) theory-based vs. data-based, iv)
descriptive vs. prescriptive, and v) science (research) vs.
engineering (design).
 I) Laws (nomothetic): scientific explanation uses laws:
general, causal statement of a quantitative relationship
between variables. Laws don’t have to be exceptionless,
but can have ceteris paribus clauses (hold so long as no
interfering factors are present).
 I) Ideographic: looking for accurate descriptions, not for
general explanations. There could be a spectrum, ranging
from purely nomothetic, via hybrid to purely idiographic
sciences. Where to put management studies is not clear.
 II) Formalization: laws are quantitative, but not all
quantitative methods are law-based (optimization,
statistics). Non-laws based models: thought of as tools
which do not “show the system as it really is”.
 II) Problems with the use of models: every model of a
complex system involves idealizations (applicable to many
different cases): miss out (very important) factors
(abstraction), assumptions needed for mathematical
tractability, less controversial what “force” means than
what “wealth” or “performance” means. Real problem is
robustness: adding influencing factors (in social sciences)
will not get something that is approximately correct.
 II) Mathematical modeling (Humpreys): difficult in social
sciences: i) most traditional models consider the
individuals to be homogeneous, each individual in the
population is considered to have the same basic
properties as any other, and ii) from the start a model is
defined followed by altered behavior of individuals.
Individuals react differently to a proposed “fixed model”.
But not impossible: i) to effectively model traditional
models, it is required to utilize an essentially dynamic
approach, and ii) the employment of simple mechanisms is
acceptable if there is good reason to hold that these
“mechanisms” correspond to genuine features of the
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systems under investigations. Certainly, quite
sophisticated physical models employ radically simplified
physical mechanisms to construct descriptively accurate
computational models.
III) Theory or data-based: does theory or data comes first?
Models and data need to be related ((formal) models need
verification, otherwise empty explanation). Theory driven:
rigorous people want to do this on behave of set of
relations among well defined quantities. Using models is
using formal methods (some sort of rigour involvement),
there is a need, and freedom to engage in stipulation
(defining the terms in the model in a rather abstract way)
and abstraction. Problems: is only a computational
template (won’t give understanding), testability becomes
difficult. Data driven: start from data to find relations
between quantities. Problems: step from correlation to
cause is contentious (f.i. there could be hidden or
intervening variables), garbage data = garbage model.
Data trouble: scarcity, not reproducible (systems change),
not gathered for the model at hand, perhaps unreliable. So
theory-driven models might be too abstract and datadriven models too unreliable to be of any use.
IV) Science is not enough: we need description (how the
world is), but also how to handle the situation =
prescription (how the world should be (like normative
rules), and how you ought to behave). An accurate
analysis of the current situation and, if possible, an
explanation of the current crisis seems necessary to
change things for the better. So description without
prescription is sterile, but prescription without description
is blind.
V) Science and engineering: main goal in engineering
design is changing reality or maintaining some favorable
state of affair (prescription is thus essential). Design:
aimed at the artificial (to make), problem-oriented (goal is
to contribute to the solution of a practical problem),
typically involved sets of prescriptions or rules. Designing
often involves performing a fixed series of actions,
following a determinate set of rules: form of a rule: ‘if you
want to achieve Y in situation Z, then perform action X’. X
is the solution concept for a type of problem, the core of
the rule. The remainder of the rule specifies application
conditions and relevant goals.
Daft and Lewin – heretical research (departure of from
established beliefs): The point of heretical research
methods is to find new channels through which to obtain
organizational insights and to change the mix of research
methods. Although no method is truly heretical,
researchers should be encouraged to do whatever it takes
to learn about organizations.
Measuring the gap: there may be a gap, even if it is merely
one of degree. Shrivastava found and measured the gap
(criteria are clustered) in strategic management: three
criteria for rigour (conceptual adequacy, methodological
rigour, accumulated empirical evidence) and five for
relevance / usefulness (meaningfulness, goal relevance,
operational validity, innovativeness, cost of implication).
There are thus two sets of standards at work in strategic
management research: the field has a “dual orientation”.
Suggestion of Shrivastava: gap may be closed, and
interaction between rigour and relevance, not a clearer
distinction, would be a sign of real progress.
M.A.J. Kusters (0557541)
 Rigorous research vs. heritical research: i) conceptual
adequacy: doesn’t fit with heretical research: the
researcher gives an own interpretation of a study which is
not generally supported by the research field. I.e. the
research program is not well grounded in the initial base
discipline. The conceptual framework is not consistent any
more with the existing theories in the field, ii)
methodological rigor: this will remain unchanged although
the results are likely to interpret differently (think of using
the outliers in research instead of the main stream results),
and iii) accumulated empirical evidence: nothing will
change for the empirical evidence.
 Applicability of Shrivastava to research: Shrivastava’s
criteria are applicable to both nomothetic as ideographic
research, although it is far more difficult to reach rigour in
ideographic science. In contrast with nomothetic were
rigour is reached easily while being relevant (for example
physics in the construction industry). The same
explanation holds for research-like and design-like studies.
 Mutually independency of Shrivastava’s criteria: not for the
following criteria: A) Conceptual adequacy vs.
methodological rigor: conceptual adequacy also is about
the methods chosen for empirical examination of research
questions. B) Methodological rigor vs. Empirical Evidence:
when the methods to empirically examine research
questions are not right, the evidence cannot be empirical
accumulated. C) Meaningfulness vs. goal relevance: if the
goal is not relevant, how can the study be meaningful? D)
Negative correlation between the rigour criteria and goal
relevance and operational validity. (as stated in the text:
“the tendency of researchers to generate non-specific,
generalizable and broadly applicable knowledge reduces
the operational validity and goal relevance of research
results”). E) Innovativeness vs. meaningfulness: when a
result is obvious, the meaningfulness will be less.
 Shrivastava with respect to rationality of RP in MS:
Shrivastava is a Lakatosian: i) he considers more research
programs in one period, ii) he thinks the subject is open for
discussion: “these criteria reflect a synthesis of ongoing
debates in management literature on the issue of rigor
versus relevance in research “, iii) He gives objective
criteria to make a rational choice about whether a research
study is rigour or relevance. With these criteria research
studies can be compared and they can no longer be
considered incommensurable.
EXAM QUESTIONS:
MAR06
a) List Shrivastava’s criteria for evaluating the rigor of a
research project. Briefly describe each of these criteria.
Conceptual adequacy is the framework that guides the
research program and shows whether the project is guided
by a theoretical framework; a function of how well the
research program is grounded in theoretical frameworks
provided by underlying disciplines. It measures the extent
to which research programs apply the knowledge of
developed in their base discipline to generate theoretically
interesting issues and choose appropriate research
settings and methods for empirical examination of
research questions.
0LM05 – Exam preparation
Methodological rigor: refers to the extent to which
qualitative or descriptive data is used versus analytical
modeling methods and objective quantifiable data to
empirically examine research questions.
Accumulated empirical evidence: supporting the
theoretical structures. The accumulated evidence lends
credibility to research findings and legitimizes them to
other researchers and managers. It provides a basis for
accepting research findings as being empirically validated
and thereby grounded in objective or projected reality.
Meaningfulness: refers to the comprehensibility of
research results to users. It is a function of the extent to
which research findings capture and adequately describe
organizational reality and whether the findings actually
present what the problem-owners within the organization
wanted to be explored (Shrivastava, 1987).
Goal relevance: the extent to which primary variables are
relevant to organizational and managerial goals
Operational validity: or actionability, the extent to which
research results are operationalizable through concrete
actions (Shrivastava, 1987).
Innovativeness: or non-obviousness research results. New
and non-obvious research results provide the organization
with innovative knowledge which can be used to
differentiate themselves from competitors.
Cost of implementation: of research results.
b) Describe the distinction between a design-like and a
research-like project. Can a rigorous project be designlike?
Design-like projects aim at solving a practical problem;
research-like projects exclusively aim at prediction,
description and explanation. A rigorous project can be
design-like if it is also relevant. This may be difficult to
realize, but the second assignment was aimed at showing
that it is possible.
Now read the Appendix, which contains a short summary
of a Master project.
c) Evaluate the rigor of this project, using Shrivastava’s
criteria, and describe whether it is research-like, designlike or both. If you think data are lacking to “score” the
project, describe these relevant data (“If the summary
would have described X and Y, I would have been able to
apply criterion Z”).
- The conceptual adequacy of this project is mediocre at
best. No framework of generally accepted scientific
concepts is used, the researcher constructs his own. It is
also entirely unclear what the underlying theoretical
discipline is: this is almost phenomenological research.
- Methodological rigour: the researcher does use several
accepted methods for his (highly) qualitative research, so I
would charitably score it “high” on this criterion.
- Accumulated empirical evidence: this is a tough one. The
researcher did not gather many data, but perhaps this is
not necessary for qualitative research. I hesitate to score it
“high” here, but since this may just reflect my scepticism
regarding qualitative research, let’s say that I would like to
have more data. In questions such as this one, many
answers are defensible. We will look whether you
understand the criteria, and are able to apply them in a
well-argued way.
7
In their paper “Can Organization Science begin to break
out of the normal-science straitjacket?” (1990), Daft and
Weick argue that organization studies have “prematurely
settled into a normal-science mindset. This seems
inappropriate because organizations are complex,
variable-rich phenomena that can be studied from multiple
perspectives” (p.2). They promote the development of
“heretical” (ketterse) research programs, which search
new channels for insights into organizations rather than
build upon existing research (pp.6–7).
d) Discuss to what extent this emphasis on heretical
programs means that Daft and Weick reject rigorous
research, as defined by Shrivastava’s criteria.
The emphasis on heretical methods means that
conceptual adequacy and accumulated evidence might
well remain very low for all research in the field: there are
no generally accepted frameworks, and no method can
prove its merits in a sustained manner. Thus,
fragmentation of the field (or “pluralism”) at first glance
decreases rigour. Make sure you answer this question
referring to Shrivastava’s criteria, and not just with the aid
of common sense – there is nothing wrong with common
sense, but the question was about the criteria.
JAN07
Read summary of Master Thesis “The effect of national
culture on business-to-business relationships” (2005), by
Victor van den Broek.
a) Describe the distinction between nomothetic and
ideographic research. How can the project of van den
Broek be described in terms of this distinction?
Nomothetic research: aims at the formulation of laws (i.e.,
universal, explanatory statements); Ideographic research,
aims at descriptions of specific phenomena that are as
accurate as possible. Although van den Broek wants to
include differences between companies in his model, he
ultimately aims at a general model of the relation between
B2B relations and national culture. This may fall short of
formulating laws, but it is closer to the nomothetic ideal
than to ideography.
b) Describe the distinction between theory-based and
data-based modeling as introduced by Paul Humphreys. Is
the Master project of van den Broek theory-based or databased?
Theory-based modeling: starts from an existing theoretical
framework and derives a model from it, which is
subsequently confronted with data; Data-based modeling:
starts with collecting data, and constructs a model directly
from the data. Van den Broek uses Hofstede’s existing
model of national culture, and also constructs his own –
not from data, but from literature review (which,
presumably, does more than list data). Therefore, his
modeling is theory-based.
c) Evaluate the rigour and relevance of van den Broek’s
project, using Shrivastava’s criteria. If you think data are
lacking to “score” the project, describe these relevant data
(“If the summary would have described X and Y, I would
have been able to apply criterion Z”).
8
1) Conceptual adequacy: van den Broek uses Hofstede
and existing literature to construct his own model, and
therefore scores “high” on this criterion.
2) Methodological rigor: we do not get lots of information
on the construction of the model, so the “analytical
methods” remain unclear. The only data used come from
interviews, and are probably highly qualitative. At best a
“mediocre” score.
3) Accumulated empirical evidence: there is no evidence
whatsoever for van den Broek’s own model, but the
criterion is primarily about the program it is part of.
Presumably, there is evidence for Hofstede’s model and
the other literature used – van den Broek does not choose
an entirely new approach. Somewhat mildly, a “mediocre /
high” score.
4) Meaningfulness: the concepts used in the model, such
as “culture” and “trust” are probably meaningful and
understandable for decision-makers, but there is no
connection to a specific strategic problem facing these
people. So “mediocre” at best.
5) Goal relevance: there is probably some connection to
manager’s goal, but no performance indicators. So “low /
mediocre”.
6) Operational validity: the final sentence of the summary
is perhaps an action implication, but it is not very clear and
difficult to implement. “Low”.
7) Innovativenessh: there may be more information in the
full thesis, but the claim that B2B relations are influenced
to national culture and that it is important to realize this is
very trivial. “Low”.
8) Cost of implementation: because there are no action
implications, I would say that this criterion does not apply.
In sum, this thesis scores higher on rigor than on
relevance, but that says more about the lack of relevance
than about the excess of rigor.
d) Suppose van den Broek had been able to carry out his
quantitative project. How would this have affected his
“Shrivastava scores”?
Carrying out a quantitative project would imply that van
den Broek would have scored higher on “methodological
rigor”: there would be more quantitative data. Furthermore
“accumulated empirical evidence” might increase slightly,
and there might have been more material for performance
indicators and action implications; but the latter two are
speculative. In sum, rigour would have increased.
e) In the course, five “interpretive” phenomena were
examined that might affect research in the social sciences.
Describe for at least one of these phenomena how it
might have undermined van den Broek’s research into
interaction between national culture and business-tobusiness relationships.
The project provides ample opportunity for hermeneutic
circles. Van den Broek brings his own prior understanding
of important aspects of national culture (the Hofstede
dimensions) to the interviews. And although he does
eliminate some elements of his model after the case study,
nothing is added to it, meaning that the model is treated as
the correct framework for the interpretation of all further
cases…….
JAN08
M.A.J. Kusters (0557541)
Read summary of OPAC Master thesis “Recovery chain
planning: Allocating used products to the appropriate
recovery option” (2000), by Martin Muysers.
a) In their 2002 paper in the reader, Bertrand and Fransoo
follow Mitroff et al. in distinguishing four steps in the
operational research method: (1) conceptualization; (2)
modelling; (3) model solving; (4) implementation. Can
each of these steps be found in Muysers' thesis? If so,
point out where. If not, discuss whether the absence of this
step indicates a lack in scientific rigour.
1) conceptualization is found in the sections “background”
and “The Multis chain”, where Muysers attempts to make a
conceptual model of the problem and system he is
studying. Muysers makes decisions about the variables
that need to be included in the model, and the scope of the
problem and the model to be addressed. 2) modelling is
found in the sections: “value cost decision tool”, “recovery
chain planning”, and “information requirement”. However it
is not clear if Muysers has build a quantitative model.
Furthermore concerning step 3) model solving, there is no
information given about the mathematical structure and
the mathematics involved in Muysers’ model. Muysers’
thesis also lacks on implementation, the summary ends
only with some recommendations (which seem to indicate
that Muysers did derive results from his model).
The absence of how Muysers derived results from his
model, which is step 3) model solving, indicates a lack in
scientific rigour, especially in the criterion methodological
rigour. Furthermore the work done remains very
conceptual and abstract without step 4) implementation. It
is still unclear to what extend the model of Muysers is
working for Baan, which according Shrivastava indicates a
lack of relevance. Last concerning the implementation
step: testing the model supports the theoretical structure,
which supports its scientific rigour. Also on this point
Muysers’ Master Thesis seems lacking.
b) According to Van Aken (2005), also included in the
reader, management research should end in one or more
field-tested and grounded technological rules. Explain the
meaning of "technological rule", "field-tested" and
"grounded".
Technological rule: “a chunk of general knowledge linking
an intervention or artefact with a desired outcome or
performance in a certain field of application”. It has the
form: “if you want to achieve Y in situation Z, then perform
action X”.
A technological rule is field-tested if “it is tested in its
intended field of application”; this entails multiple tests or
cases in which the rule is tested.
A technological rule is grounded if “it is known why the
intervention or artefact gives the desired performance”;
grounding can be done with insight from the social
sciences.
c) Can (one of) Muysers' recommendations be regarded
as a field-tested, grounded technological rule in Van
Aken's sense? If so, show this. If not, discuss whether the
lack of technological rules shows that Muysers' study is
not design-oriented.
0LM05 – Exam preparation
Muysers’ recommendations vs. field-tested: no evidence of
testing is shown (see answer question a), thus also no
multiple tests are carried out.
Muysers’ recommendations vs. grounded: the concept of a
generative mechanism does not apply to Muysers’
recommendations: the question “why does this
intervention (in this context) produce this outcome”
remains unanswered. Despite the lack of technological
rules, Muysers’ study is a design-oriented study: about the
practical problems of one company and Muysers tries to
contribute to the solutions of these problems. However, to
what extend Muysers solves the practical problems is
unclear, but it is certain that his recommendations cannot
be regarded as technological rules.
3. Positivism and interpretationism
3.0 Practicalities
Review and discussion question 1, 2, 6 and 7.
Weick, “Organizing and the process of sensemaking”
Scherer, “Modes of explanation in Organization Theory”
Schutz, “Concept and theory formation in the social
sciences”
Nagel “Methodological problems of the social sciences”.
3.1 The articles
Is MS about the explanation or about understanding of
phenomena in industrial organizations.
 View of Social Sciences: there is a tangle of (probably)
related and (certainly) conflicting views according to which
social science cannot be as objective and disinterested as
the natural sciences.
 Suggestive view: social science is subjective because: i)
human beings study other human beings and their
organizations, ii) these are very complicated and dynamic,
iii) humans are conscious of themselves, of each other,
and of their environment. Electrons and anemones are
not, and iv) social sciences are always done “from the
inside”: social scientists are part of the societies they
study. BUT, does this justify thinking that social sciences
cannot be objective.
 Social positivism view: i) there is a causal structure that
underlies phenomena, ii) explanations point out such fixed
or dynamic structures, iii) idealizations are needed and
acceptable ways of constructing general explanations, and
iv) the social sciences should be modeled as much as
possible on the natural sciences. View: people’s thoughts
do not matter for the underlying causal structure of society,
social scientists should only study this underlying
structure. Aim: explanation, not understanding.
 Positivist position: People are constrained by “situational
imperatives”; they should increase an organization’s
efficiency or fail. What they think or want is irrelevant to
explaining what happens. So looking inside people’s
heads, or talking to them, let alone constructing meanings,
is a waste of research time.
9
 Interpretive view: “Human beings are different from dead
matter and even most animals because the world is
meaningful to them, and the social world is different from
the natural world because it is based on meaning.” Core:
when we want to describe social phenomena, we have to
grasp their meaning = “understanding” or “interpretation”.
The question lies around the interpretation of social
phenomena: it is not clear whether the social sciences
need their own method.
 Method for interpreting meaning: needed because
meaning is not perceived directly (= underlying).
Hermeneutics is the study of (the real) meaning.
 Constructing meaning: i) social sciences: use
hermeneutics to reveal the underlying meaning of social
phenomena, versus ii) natural sciences: use some other
method to reveal the underlying causes of natural
phenomena. Difference: meanings cannot be revealed like
causes. Via interpreting, you make something meaningful
to you, thus construction (based in presuppositions,
assumptions and prior knowledge) rather than revealing.
 Meaning and objectivity: If correct, this means that
objectivity is lost: the social sciences do not study some
fixed order, independent of the researcher. Instead, the
researcher interprets phenomena on the basis of his/her
own ideas. Even changing these ideas is a constructive
activity. There is at most intersubjectivity: a community of
researchers agreeing on an interpretation of phenomena.
This supposedly affects the methodology of scientific
research: there are no objective data, no independent
validations, no general explanations.
 Interpretive studies: interpretativists study how people
make sense of their circumstances (involves participating
in the observed processes).
 Interpretivism and rigorousness: Shrivastava considers
research to be rigour if it scores high on his criteria for
rigour, and low on the relevant criteria. For interpretative
research: 1) conceptual adequacy – low, 2)
methodological rigor – mostly qualitative data, so low, 3)
accumulated empirical evidence – single case studies,
low, 4) meaningfulness – high, 5) goal relevance – high, 6)
operational validity – quite high, 7) innovativeness –
uncertain, 8) cost of implementation – not applicable.
Concluding: interpretivist research is mostly not very
rigorous. Changes to the method, for example gather data
with the same approach in more situations, use common
methods to describe phenomena and so on can make it
more rigour.
 Interpretivism and qualitative data: interpretivist research
doesn’t necessarily have to be qualitative, although it is
hard to gather quantitative data for this approach because
it is concerned with the interpretation of social phenomena
and. Magnan associates interpretivism with only qualitative
data.
 Interpretivism with respect to rationality: according to Lin,
interpretivists and positivists live in a different paradigm.
They are incommensurable as she states, although she
doesn’t clearly speak of paradigms. To be a Lakatosian,
an interpretivist accepts more than one competing
research program to exist. Their hard core would consist
of the interpretive techniques by which they study
phenomena, and the way they gather data and draw
10
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conclusions about it. It seems that something about
rationality is missing.
Interpretivism and positivism with respect to paradigms:
The interpretivists and positivists each look in a very
different way at a certain phenomenon. The positivists
think that science can be objectively observed and general
laws can be derived from studies. The interpretivists on
the other hand consider social phenomena as meaningfull,
and that naturalistic techniques pass by the meaning. This
difference in believes leads to very different approaches in
research regarding data collection, and how the data is
interpreted. Both schools will ask very different questions
to study a problem, and thus observe different things. This
can be seen as theory-ladeness, causing
incommensurability. Either of the schools will not
understand the other one’s practices, given that they are in
their school. Therefore we can in fact see interpretivism
and positivism as paradigms. This also has some
implications for the discussion between the approaches.
There is incommensurability, so either of the two groups
will not accept or understand the way the other group does
their research.
Interpretive arguments against positivism: 1) people
respond to purported social laws, so these are violated, 2)
explanation (in terms of underlying causal structure) and
idealisation are just styles of interpretation, 3) Twoparadigm model: we have here two different paradigms, so
it is impossible rationally to decide between them, and 4)
interpretationists point out phenomena that positivists
cannot accommodate.
Schutz and Numagami’s arguments against positivist
research: Schultz: 1) if there is a theory predicting human
behavior, than it will not tell us anything about social reality
as experienced by men in everyday life, it will be highly
abstract and the concepts will be far from reality, and 2)
the object under study in the social science, (social reality)
has its own meaning: the actors in this reality have already
interpreted the world they experience as the reality. ->
inquiry can’t be objective because of double
hermeneutics. Numagami: 1) human conduct creates and
recreates lawlike regularities in social phenomena, so they
are not ‘out there’, 2) human beings have some capacity of
reflection on their own thinking and that of others , which
enables them not to behave as a lawlike regularity would
predict, and 3) methodological argument based on validity
of lawlike regularities as support for invariant laws.
Differences: main differences in arguments are that
Numagami uses a researcher point of view, and
elaborates on the mismatch of object under study and the
application of lawlike regularities, while Schulz argues
from a field perspective and indicates that human behavior
can’t be modeled or predicted, and therefore no lawlike
regularities or invariant laws can excist. He also argues
that a theory on social reality will be inconsistent in itself.
Phenomenon 1: enactment: the process of creating social
phenomena through action and preconceptions (e.g.
creating an emergency situation). As a result, researchers
participate in enactment, they participate in the
construction of their subject matter, whether they want to
or not (searching for information, selecting relevant
information, expressing uncertainty, publication of data,
etc.). Eg. Hawthorne effect. Problem: A researcher doesn't
M.A.J. Kusters (0557541)
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know how she'll affect what she is investigating, so her
explanatory endeavour is frustrated.
Phenomenon 2: priming: the impact that the activation of
previously activated representations have on subsequent
judgment and perception. Data gathering involves multiple
interpretations. The researcher always creates a
framework for data collection; comparable with Kuhn’s
theory-ladenness of observation. Problem: the aim of
investigating a researcher independent world, and thus of
uncovering objective findings, is undermined.
Phenomenon 3: the hermeneutic circle: the phenomenon
that in interpreting something (a text, a situation, an event)
we always bring 'prejudices' and preconceptions along that
guide our interpretation and influence our first impressions
of something. As a result, our interpretation tends to affirm
and reinforce our preconceptions; a specific variant is the
parts-whole variant, where our initial understanding of
something depends on our first impressions (influenced by
preconceptions) of some small part(s) of it, and we
continue to interpret the rest and the whole in terms of our
previous interpretations of its parts, and vice versa. The
circularity might be vicious: our faulty assumptions about
part and whole might reinforce each other. The circularity
might not be vicious: our assumptions might correct each
other endlessly. Problems: i) even when one’s
assumptions change, one still remains with assumptions,
ii) one cannot find out what a phenomenon “really means”,
and iii) testing becomes problematic as results depend on
interpretation.
Phenomenon 4: situatedness: all research is done in a
specific context or situation. This context includes f.i. a
background of interests, assumptions, and previous
experience. Situations always change, and actions and
knowledge change along with situations. Formal
representations are misleading in this respect: they look
fixed, but their meaning and use is situated and
changeable. Problem: this undermines the ideal of
general knowledge.
Phenomenon 5: sense-making and storytelling: most of
the time, people act unreflectively. Still, people often need
to and do make sense of their actions, e.g. when they
justify them to others or themselves (rationalizations).
They do so by telling stories (“narratives”): coherent sets
of statements, making their motives explicit and
comprehensible. These stories are constructed afterwards,
but they strongly determine our understanding of what
happened, the role we played, the measure of control we
had, etc. Claim: every representation of social events is
such a story. Problem: So much for objective explanations
of social phenomena!
 End of social science: concluding from the five
phenomena: i) there are no objective data ("data illustrate,
not validate"), ii) there are no objective tests of
hypotheses, iii) people act unpredictably, and iv) scientific
explanations of behaviour are just stories to influence
behaviour. If this is correct, research about social
phenomena would not be predictive, explanatory, objective
science. It would just be an ongoing, ever-changing
conversation between people. However, positivists argue
for the possibility of objective, explanatory research
0LM05 – Exam preparation
despite the problems raised by the interpretive
phenomena.
 Strategies for combining positivism and interpretivism:
LIN’s approach: Lin makes a distinction between
positivists, who’s research is focused on finding causal
relations across situations, and interpretivists, who focus
on describing causal mechanisms as accurate as possible.
Both types of research make the researchers ask different
questions, use different methods and draw different
conclusions. Lin says, that each of the streams, although
they may study the same phenomenon, can complement
the other. Positivists can find causal relations between two
variables and tell in what kind of other situations they can
be observed, but cannot tell how the one variable
influences the other. Interpretivists on the other hand can
tell this, because their goal is accurate description and
studying how and why two variables influence each other,
but they cannot tell in which other situations the
phenomenon can be found. Lin suggests four strategies:
1) literature reviews quickly narrow one’s scope into
method specific research. Better approach is to track down
literatures that have the same substantive focus as one’s
own question but use a different approach, 2) outline
studies from different approaches that would complement
their own work, 3) if researchers have a chance to
combine two types of research in their work, they should
start with an exploratory interpretivist study, and 4)
comparative case study makes it possible to incorporate
some of the best features of both streams in the same
study. MANGAN-LALWANI-GARDNER’s approach:
Mangan e.a. offer a different approach, that they call
triangulation. They distinguish four types of triangulation:
1) data: collect data from different times and different
sources, 2) investigator: different investigators
independently collect data, 3) methodological: quantitative
and qualitative techniques are employed, and 4) theory:
theory taken from one discipline and used to explain in
another. Conclusion about differences in both strategies: it
is clear that interpretivists and positivists perform their
research with very different approaches, Lin even calls it
incommensurable. Both approaches criticize each other’s
work in obvious ways. Lin’s approaches are centered on
the use of different studies from the other approach in
one’s study. This requires the researchers to let go their
skepticism about the other stream, which may be very
difficult. Mangan offers a more hand-on approach with his
triangulation. It doesn’t require researchers to take the
other approach seriously, but are small useful techniques
which can narrow the gap between both practices.
EXAM QUESTIONS:
JAN06
The debate between positivists and interpretivists is one of
the most fundamental controversies in the social sciences.
Many philosophers and scientists take one side or
another, and some present arguments for their view.
Another view is that both approaches can co-exist, more
or less peacefully. One way to support this view is by
arguing that positivism and interpretivism are different
paradigms. A very influential presentation of this argument
has been given by Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgan, in
11
their Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
(Heinemann, 1979). Take, for instance, the following
quote: “All social scientists approach their subject via
explicit or implicit assumptions about the nature of the
social world and the way in which it may be investigated.
First, there are ontological assumptions– assumptions
which concern the reality and nature of the phenomena
under investigation, [for instance] whether reality is a given
‘out there’ in the world, or the product of one’s mind.
Associated with these ontological issues, is a second set
of assumptions of an epistemological nature. These are
assumptions about the grounds of knowledge – about how
one might begin to understand the world and communicate
this as knowledge to fellow human beings.” (p.1)
a) Describe briefly these basic ontological and
epistemological assumptions of positivism and
interpretivism. In other words: what do these approaches
say about the reality and nature of organizations and
about our knowledge of them?
Ontology of positivism: there are underlying causal
structures. Mental attitudes do not feature in this structures
as causes (otherwise they should be studied).
Ontology of interpretationism: social reality is constituted
by mental attitudes and mutual understanding. People
jointly construct social phenomena and their meaning.
Epistemology of positivism: find out causal structures by
hypothesizing social laws, idealizing from particular
situations, and ignoring mental attitudes. As much like
natural science as possible.
Epistemology of interpretationism: impossible to find
general laws. Instead describe particular situation, your
own role and understanding of it, and participate in social
construction of phenomena. Not imitation of natural
science.
Burrell and Morgan go on to identify a basic distinction
between “nomothetic” and “ideographic” methods; they
associate the first method with positivism and the other
with interpretivism.
b) Explain the terms “nomothetic” and “ideographic”.
Should positivist research necessarily be nomothetic, and
interpretivist research ideographic? Explain why (not).
Nomothetic methods look for laws; idiographic methods
give detailed descriptions of particular situations. These
methods fit positivism and interpretivism, respectively,
quite well, but not one-on-one. Positivists might use
idiographic explanations as a substitute for laws (like in
parts of biology and chemistry). Interpretationists, on the
other hand, seem “stuck” with idiography.
In their final chapter, Burrell and Morgan discuss the
relation between the two approaches. They start by noting
how easy it is to launch “destructive critiques” of each: “By
assuming a posture in a rival paradigm, it would have
been possible to demolish the contribution of any
individual paper or theoretical perspective, by providing a
comprehensive critique in terms of its underlying
assumptions.” (p.395) It is, indeed, not difficult to criticize
positivism from a interpretivist perspective, and vice versa.
12
c) Write a short interpretivist critique of positivist research,
and a positivist critique of interpretivist research. Use a
concrete example (e.g., try to criticize interpretive research
into re-organizations, as in the paper by Isabella in the
reader, from a positivist point of view).
This is fun. There are many slanderous descriptions to be
given. Some things that you might mention:
Int on pos: overgeneralization, neglect crucial details and
“human” factors. Pos on int: mere anecdotes, no validation
of hypotheses, bankruptcy of social science.
Yet Burrell and Morgan note that these criticisms only
show how different both approaches are. They then argue
for peaceful co-existence, at least for the time being:
“Each paradigm needs to be developed in its own terms.
What we are advocating amounts to a form of isolationism.
(...) Contrary to the widely held belief that synthesis and
mediation between paradigms is what is required, we
argue that the real need is for paradigmatic closure
(afsluiting). The paradigms reflect alternative realities.
They stand as mutually exclusive ways of seeing the
world.” (pp.397–398)
d) Discuss whether this is a good way to resolve the
positivism-interpretivism debate. Give at least one
argument why it is good, and one why it is not – and then
make a final judgment.
What is nice about this “solution” is that it prevents
counterproductive controversy and polemics. If there is
some truth in both views, this truce (wapenstilstand) at
least allows both parties to find it; otherwise they waste
time trying to convince or slander each other. [What if,
e.g., Lex Donaldson would have done positivist research
instead of defending and promoting it against rival views?]
What is, of course, awful about this solution is that it is
cowardly. It assumes that there is no truth of the matter,
and allows possibly mistaken views to continue. If
positivism would be wrong, all research in it would be a
waste of time, and finding the correct anti-positivist
argument is, in a way, cost-efficient.
JAN07
In the best-selling Freakonomics Steven Levitt describes
an explanation for the dramatic decrease in crime rates in
the USA in the 1990’s. first, he discusses several
candidates explanations and finds them either incomplete
or irrelevant. Then, he presents his own – controversial –
alternative: crime rates dropped in the 1990’s because
abortion had been legalized in 1973, with the Roe vs.
Wade decision, made by the US Supreme Court.
According to Levitt, this decision explains the decrease in
crime rates in the following way: “What kind of woman
would have benefited most from the Roe vs. Wade
decision? She would be unmarried, under twenty years, or
poor, and sometimes all of these. What kind of future
would the child have had? One investigation shows that
children that were not born in the first years after
legalization of abortion would have had a 50% greater
chance of living in poverty, and a 60% greater chance of
being raised by a single parent. These two factors –
poverty and single-parenthood – are among those that
most strongly contribute to a criminal future for the child.
M.A.J. Kusters (0557541)
Being raised by a single parent almost doubles the chance
that the child will later commit crimes; the same goes for
children of teenage mothers. Another investigation has
shown that having a relatively uneducated mother is the
factor that contributes most strongly to criminality. In other
words: exactly those factors that made millions of
American woman decide to have an abortion appear to
determine that their children, if they would have been born,
would have had an unhappy and possible criminal life.”
a) Describe briefly the distinction between positivist and
interpretationist research. Of which type of research is
Levitt’s explanation an example?
Positivist research: looks for general statements about
social reality, and for explanations of social phenomena,
preferably stated in lawlike form. Their explanations refer
to causal mechanisms.
Interpretationist research: looks for understanding of
specific phenomena in social reality; they interpret the
actions of (groups of) people and try to find out/construct
the meaning of these actions. These descriptions are
specific to the situation.
Levitt’s explanation: is positivist research: Levitt makes a
general statement about a causal relation between two
variables – abortion rates since the 1970’s and crime rates
in the 1990’s.
b) Describe the DN-model of explanation, as presented by
Scherer in the reader. Does Levitt’s explanation fit the DNmodel?
DN-model: every explanation has the form of a deductively
valid argument, which has as its premises one or more
universal (lawlike) statements and one or more statements
about boundary and/or initial conditions. Levitt’s model
does not, strictly speaking, fit the DN-model, because
there is no logically necessary relation between abortion
and crime rates: there are only probable relations.
However, his explanation does fit the IS-model, which is a
close variant of the DN-model (and also mentioned by
Scherer).
c) In her paper in the reader, Ann Chih Lin describes a
way to combine positivist and interpretationist research.
Briefly describe this combination strategy, and then apply
it to Levitt’s research: if it is positivist, describe how it can
be extended with interpretationist elements; if it is
interpretationist, describe how it can be extended with
positivist elements.
Lin argues that it is possible to combine positivism and
interpretationism in the following way: positivists discover
general causal relations between variables, and
interpretationists add to these relations an understanding
of specific mechanisms. Thus, one general explanatory
schema can be extended with several more detailed
interpretations of specific instances. For the Levitt case,
the general explanation of rising abortion rate and (later)
dropping crime rate can be supplemented with a detailed
understanding of what led pregnant women to their
decision, and which aspects of this situation might have
brought their future children to a life of crime – the text in
the exam already indicates ways of providing such a
detailed understanding.
d) In another paper in the reader, Tsuyoshi Numagami
argues that it is difficult, or even impossible, to find
0LM05 – Exam preparation
invariant laws in management studies – because of “the
reflective capacity of the agents involved”. Briefly desrive
Numagami’s argument, and discuss whether it also affects
Levitt’s explanation.
Numagami’s argument against general laws in
management studies is that agents will always have the
capacity to respond to their knowledge of this “general”
law – and that they might respond by violating it.
Therefore, no law describing the behaviour of these
knowing agents can be general. It is hard to see how this
might undermine Levitt’s analysis, however. It seems that
pregnant women who are in the situation that he describes
(low income, low education, etc) have little choice but to
have an abortion, or to see their children predisposed
towards a life of crime. The only way to violate Levitt’s
statistical law would be to have a group of these women
consciously refusing to have an abortion and raise their
children, against the odds, to be responsible citizens.
JAN08
In one of the student papers that defended positivism
against the interpretive phenomena, an argument was
given that can be read as follows: "Interpretivists criticize
positivist research, because it encounters various
complicating phenomena – such as the hermeneutic circle
and storytelling. However, these phenomena are also
found in interpretivist research. Therefore, the presence of
these phenomena does not count against the possibility of
doing positivist research."
a) Discuss the validity of this argument.
INVALID. That these phenomena are also found in
interpretivist research bears no relation to the
(im)possibility of positivist research; it does not make the
problems positivists (may) have with these phenomena
any less that others also encounter them.
In many of his works, including Personal Knowledge
(1964), Michael Polanyi discusses the notion of 'tacit
knowledge'. One characterization of this notion is the
following: "The concept of 'tacit knowledge' refers to the
fact that 'we can know more than we can tell'. For
instance, we know people's faces and recognize them
among a million, but we cannot make explicit how we do
this. Any description of (what we know about) a face will
also fit other faces. The same goes for a scientist who
uses all kinds of instruments. He has mastered the skill to
deal with these instruments, but as with riding a bike, it is
impossible for him to make explicit all the knowledge he
relies on in using the instruments. In short: people rely on
tacit knowledge all the time. We rely on knowledge we
CANNOT make explicit to acquire knowledge that IS
explicit. So behind every bit of explicit knowledge, there is
an unspecifiable amount of tacit knowledge."
b) Discuss to what extent tacit knowledge presents an
obstacle for positivist research. Start your answer with a
short characterization of positivism.
Positivism: is a “paradigm” or a way of thinking in the
social science, that aims to model social science as in the
natural science. Thus positivists look for general (invariant)
laws to explain social phenomena. How people interpret
13
the world is irrelevant to positivists, as they are looking for
underlying patterns. Tacit knowledge cannot be shared,
because it cannot be made explicit. Therefore in research,
where also tacit knowledge plays are role, not all factors
involved are replicable and controllable. This implies that
tests cannot be replicated in exactly the same way, under
exactly the same conditions. Tacit knowledge thus
presents an obstacle for positivist research, to the extend
the scientist use certain research methods (like
questionnaires), because these, like the scientist, rely on
tacit knowledge. Furthermore, by considering tacit
knowledge, also generalization of research results to
social laws is problematic (because of uncontrollable and
research that cannot be replicated).
c) Discuss the similarities and differences between tacit
knowledge and the phenomena of priming, sensemaking
and situatedness. Start your answer by giving short
characterizations of the three phenomena.
Priming: literally refers to laying a ground layer of paint. In
the present context, the ground layer is applied to
someone’s mind, influencing this person's subsequent
perceptions. It makes use of the selectiveness of our
attention, guiding our attention to particular things, and
influencing our evaluation of what we perceive. The
person who is primed is normally not aware of this; thus,
his attention is guided and his perception influenced by a
‘hidden’ factor. Versus tacit knowledge: priming can be
caused by tacit knowledge (but priming is influence by
others, and tacit knowledge is inherent and necessary thus
not a distortion of perception)???
Sensemaking: refer to the interpretive process in which
people are constantly engaged. We try to make sense of
what has happened, is happening, and will happen, while
acting at the same time. We often have to make sense of
things of which we have only limited knowledge, or events
that are unfinished. So we try to frame coherent
interpretations that are in constant need of revision. These
interpretations tend to involve rationalization, especially
(though certainly not exclusively) when it comes to our
own role in events. Versus tacit knowledge: in
sensemaking one relies on tacit knowledge, making it
explicit.. (but sensemaking is a process, while tacit
knowledge is only an element in certain processes)???
Situatedness: refers to the characteristic of, e.g., research
that it is always done in a particular context and against a
particular background, and is necessarily influenced (or
partly determined) by this. It implies that the results of one
research cannot simply be transposed into another
context. Versus tacit knowledge: it is impossible to make
explicit all aspects of the situation in which research is
conducted, just as it is impossible to make explicit all the
tacit knowledge one relies on in acquiring explicit
knowledge (situatedness is a characteristic of research
and can be made explicit, while tacit knowledge is
something possessed by people which by definition is
impossible to make explicit)???
d) Is the hermeneutic circle equivalent to the theoryladenness of observation? If not, how are both
phenomena related? Discuss, starting with a
characterization of both the hermeneutic circle and theoryladenness.
14
Hermeneutic circle: In short: our interpretation of the whole
depends on our interpretation of the parts and the other
way around. Theory-ladenness: the term Kuhn used to
denote the fact that all scientific observation depends on
and is shaped by the theoretical background of the
scientists, more specifically, on the paradigm within which
they are working. Not equivalent, hermeneutic circle is
broader than theories and observations. Furthermore
theory ladenness is only about the meaning about the
observations taken (only about the direction). Not about
what the meaning is, and this does count for the
hermeneutic circle.
M.A.J. Kusters (0557541)