Just War theory and the Challenges of Asymmetrical Warfare
1.
Introduction
Just War theory is as old as our Western European culture, shaping the strategies
and ways of warfare for millennia. Its origins can be traced back to the
Peloponnesian War, when unwritten rules forbade invading armies to burn olive
trees as a method of warfare in the knowledge that the recovery of these slowgrowing trees would mainly affect civilians.1
It was Cicero who first articulated Just War theory in his writings2 which were
further developed by St Augustine, St Thomas Aquinas and the legal school of
Salamanca. And it is the same theory that became part of secular international
law, first introduced by Hugo Grotius.
The long history of Just War theory and its constant application to international
affairs throughout the ages cannot prevent it from facing severe challenges in
modern times which might even cause the theory to be irrelevant if substantial
efforts are not made to adapt Just War Theory to modern threats and
developments in contemporary politics.
However, the emergence of new terrorist organisations and tactics pose serious
questions about whether a theory which is mainly based on warfare between
states will have any future in times of asymmetric conflicts. All the main
characteristics of Just War theory like proportionality of force and the
discrimination expected of combatants strongly depend on clearly organised
warring parties both being of the same kind, namely states. (Note: given the
many interpretations of terrorism this paper opts for the Concise Oxford
English Dictionary (2006): ‘the unofficial or unauthorized use of violence and
intimidation in the pursuit of political aims’.)
2.
Islamist terrorism – new wine in old wineskin
The famous image taken from the Gospels of the wineskin and the new wine
might at first seem inappropriate for a new development in international affairs
like Islamist terrorism, knowing that the “new wine” in the Gospels is considered
to be something positive and a great improvement on previous times. However,
apart from the positive and life-changing quality of the new wine, a totally
different significance can be attached to this image: the revolutionary character of
the new wine that is going to destroy the old system which is supposed to contain
it.
It is very much the same with Islamist terrorism (while putting aside the question
of improvement as it is described in the Gospels). I shall argue that Islamist
terrorism is not primarily based on economic circumstances like poverty or social
immobility but rather on a fundamental ideological choice of the individual
terrorist.
This is not to say that everyone who is part of a terrorist network does so because
of ideological reasons alone, since joining such movements can indeed result
from better economic prospects and an improvement of the personal social
status. However, the decision to commit a suicide attack, with its absolute selfsacrifice, will ultimately be based on a firm belief that what one is doing is right.
Political philosopher professor Jean Bethke Elshtain correctly says: “the key lies
in the word ’exploit’. Terrorists exploit certain conditions which are part of the
matrix out of which terrorism grows. It does not follow that terrorism is caused
by these conditions.”3 Professor of political theory, Tilman Mayer, also points out
that terrorism generally aims to create certain “legends” as a means of selfjustification, using “the cultural affront related to the humiliation of the Arab
world”4 as “a quasi-justification of terror”5.
However, Mayer does not consider this to be a valid justification, stating that
“such cultural affronts did exist in many different countries during the process of
imperialism and colonialism, without such a strategy [like the strategy of Islamist
terrorism] being used in these countries at the end of twentieth century.”6
This is why Islamist terrorism should not be considered a liberation movement7,
but rather an ideological movement that does everything to spread its ideology of
a politicised Islam whatever the motives, whether political, economic or religious,
to form the basis for this political engagement.
To understand how Islamist terrorism works - and indeed religiously-motivated
terrorism in general - it is useful to consider some ideas expressed by the famous
German professor of law and political theorist Carl Schmitt, who delineated the
two types of irregular fighters: the partisan and the revolutionary.
2.1
Carl Schmitt and his Theorie des Partisanen (Theory of the
Partisan)
Although Carl Schmitt’s Theorie des Partisanen dates back to 1962 and was
strongly influenced by the original Spanish partisans it still provides two very
useful distinctions: firstly, between the regular soldier and the irregular partisan;
and secondly between the classical partisan, who Schmitt describes as a
resistance fighter8, and the degenerated partisan which he calls a “revolutionary
fighter”9.
Schmitt had four criteria for the partisan:
(1): their irregular nature. They lack a controlling superior, nor wear fixed or
visible military emblems, and carry their guns secretly and disregard the rules of
war such as the Hague Conventions.1 In accordance with Schmitt’s historical
analysis 1808 marks the starting-point of irregular activity, following the clash
between the regular French troops under Napoleon’s command and the irregular
Spanish partisans.
(2): their intense political commitment. This distinguishes the partisan from any
domestic criminal. This is very important as from a legal point of view both
partisans and domestic criminals act as civilians committing crimes against the
legal authority. While a domestic criminal seeks personal benefits when stealing
or murdering, the partisan may do the same but for political reasons, and in most
cases is ready to sacrifice their life for the political ideas they stand for as opposed
to personal enrichment.
To show the difference, Schmitt contrasts the buccaneer with the partisan,
arguing that the former fights in an “animus furendi” (intent to steal)11, whereas
the partisan fights “on a political front and it is the political character of his
action which emphasises the original sense of the expression partisan, deriving
from the word party.”12 It is this political commitment that enables the partisan
to fully engage.
(3): the partisan is flexible, not being part of any organised military structure.
They are able to attack and withdraw at maximum speed in compared to regular
army formations.13
(4): of great importance to Schmitt’s concept of the partisan, which is borrowed
from the political writing of Jover Zamora, is the telluric character of the
partisan. Schmitt argues that partisans act in a defensive way, aiming to defend
their home country or to liberate it from alien influences. Therefore partisans “
locate their identity with a particular place14, being a type of combatant that will
last as long as anti-colonial wars occur on our planet”15.
Soon the differences between Schmitt’s partisan and today’s Islamist terrorist
become very evident: the latter is not defending their homeland or religious
community (umma), although they might try to legitimize their “political
engagement” by creating a legitimising legend, but instead they usually go onto
the offensive and mobilize fighters and weapons against third countries which
they consider to be threatening their religion and/or cultural identity. All the
attacks like on the World Trade Centre in 1993 and 2001 were carried out on
foreign soil and therefore do not fulfill what Schmitt considers to be telluric.
Another fact that underlines the offensive structure of Islamist terror movements
are their organisational structure. Manfred Klink, a First Director of the German
Bundeskriminalamt (the German CID), considered al-Qaida to have three strata:
the first located in their homeland, the second being the Mudjaheddin who wait
to be called to commit serious terrorist attacks, and the third being the
Mudjaheddin responsible for the financing of the terrorist networks through nonpolitical criminal activity and located abroad or operating across the globe.16
Some terrorist organizations in the past have emphasised Schmitt’s concept by
the inclusion of liberation motives in their names: the Basque country based ETA
translates as liberty for the Basque homeland; the Algerian FLN translates as the
National Liberation Front; the Lehi translates as liberation fighters for Israel,
better-known as ‘The Stern Gang’; and LTTE as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam.
However, recent terrorist organizations focus on ideological expressions: AlQaida (Foundation), Hezbollah (Party of God), while the Red Army Faction
(RAF) in Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy used the colour red as an
ideological connection to communism.
Carl Schmitt makes an important observation by pointing out the closeness of the
terrorist’s strategy to the sleeper agent: “such a mobilized17 partisan loses his
telluric character and becomes a transportable and replaceable instrument of a
global political machine, switching him on and off as matters arise.”18
Apart from a new outline of the degenerated partisan, in his theory of the
partisan Schmitt focuses on the consequences that terrorism has on the
traditional legal system and its classification of regular warfare. In Schmitt’s view
the law is “the unity of order and orientation”19.Therefore, any partisan lacking
telluric character is also affected in his legal status which is why Schmitt defines
terrorist activity as the creation of “a new, more complex space of activity,
because the partisan does not fight on an open battlefield or on the same level of
front-defined warfare.”2
However, this extension of the space of activity is not necessarily linked to being a
partisan but rather a more general phenomenon in the history of war. Schmitt
refers to the use of U-boats in World War One as an example of spontaneously
extended spaces in the conduct of war. This extension of war to under the sea led
Schmitt to believe that a complete destruction of maritime law had occurred, and
resulted in the condemnation of submarine warfare by Germany’s surprised
opponents as “immoral warfare”.
Now that submarine warfare is accepted questions arise as to whether this
condemnation of submarine warfare in World War One was based on moral
issues or caused by the surprise and evident helplessness to cope with a new
innovation in warfare. In Schmitt’s view it was the element of surprise that
caused the condemnation: “the gentlemen on the surface of the sea at that time
tried to disparage this way of fighting as irregular, even criminal and pirate-like.
Today, in the era of submarines armed with Polaris missiles, everybody is aware
of the fact that both Napoleon’s indignation about the Spanish guerrilla and
England’s indignation about the German U-boat were of the same kind, making
their judgments about the pace of change from a sense of embarrassment.”21
Schmitt is very clear that a mere extension of space does not per se affect the
legitimacy of new military tactics, which should be remembered when a moral
classification of terrorism is called for and be a warning against committing the
same fallacy as hundred years ago.
The mere novelty of military tactics does not immediately lead to their becoming
illegal, which would mean that any development in the art of war would become
impossible. We must therefore ask whether there are criteria Schmitt would have
used to declare modern terrorism illegitimate and evil from the moral standpoint: there are a good number of reasons to believe Schmitt would have
disapproved of terrorism.
As we have already seen, Schmitt distinguishes between the classic partisan and
revolutionaries through the telluric concept, but there should be no doubt that
both categories of fighters are irregular and therefore not to be accepted as a
combatant in the regular sense. It is only from a failure of the state to determine
its enemy - which in Schmitt’s concept is the fundamental requirement for a
totality of people to be called “state” or “political”22 – that the partisan arises and
takes this decision on behalf of the state.
Nevertheless, in Schmitt’s thinking the partisan acts legitimately, whereas the
revolutionary or terrorist does not as they “become a manipulated instrument of
global revolutionary aggressiveness. They are just sent to be slaughtered and
deceived in everything they took up the fight for, deceived in everything their
telluric character, their partisan irregularity, was rooted in.”23
The parallel to modern Islamist terrorism becomes clearly evident, thus giving a
huge significance to Schmitt’s political writings even today.24 From where does
Schmitt decide the partisan derives their legitimacy?
Schmitt distinguishes within the irregular status of both the partisan and terrorist
two different ways of fighting which lead to two different concepts of enmity:
absolute and relative. The partisan, although fighting irregularly by planning
ambushes and killing soldiers in brutal and devious ways, accepts their enemy as
the enemy but does not offend the enemy’s honour or dignity since they kill for a
political reason, namely the liberation of their homeland.
The enemy’s right to exist and their dignity as a human being are not denied for a
moment. This is why Schmitt considers even partisan warfare to be a
containment of war, by which “European mankind succeeded in something very
rare: giving up the criminalisation of the enemy in war, causing a relativisation of
enmity, the denial of absolute enmity. It is something extremely rare, something
incredibly human indeed, to persuade men to abstain from any discrimination
and defamation of the enemy.”25 This is why partisans can be seen as heroes,
“defending native soil against alien conquerors”26.
As an example for this attitude towards the enemy Schmitt quotes Joan of Arc;
when asked whether she agrees with the statement that God hated the English,
she answered: “Whether God loves or hates the English, I cannot say; the only
thing I do know is that they have to be driven out of France.”27
The statement shows very clearly that it was the military and political facts that
mattered to Joan of Arc and not the defamation of her enemies; this is something
completely disregarded by terrorist propaganda, aiming to lead fighters to an
indiscriminate extermination of the enemy, classifying them as unworthy in every
regard, without any right of further existence.
This is why Carl Schmitt considers the Just War theory as problematic,
presupposing that a just war automatically contains a moral defamation of the
enemy, and even more specifically a declaration of the enemy’s injustice28,
leading to a disparagement that Schmitt wants to avoid when introducing the
concept of “legitimate war”.29
As an example Schmitt draws a comparison with Leninism; Lenin “as a
professional revolutionary of global civil war went further and made the real
enemy an absolute one. Clausewitz has spoken about the absolute enemy, but had
still assumed the regularity of an existing state order. He could not imagine the
state to be an instrument of a party and that there could ever be a party being in
command of a state. By making a party absolute, the partisan as well was made
bearer of an absolute enmity.”3
Schmitt should be praised for the far-sightedness of his general outlines since
they preview modern thinking about terrorism, especially with their religious - or
often pseudo-religious - foundations: “destruction then becomes very abstract
and absolute. It is not directed anymore against an enemy but does only serve as
an alleged objective implementation of supreme values, for which everything is
done. It is the denial of real enmity that paves the way for the destructiveness of
absolute enmity.”31
The development and the availability of weapons of mass destruction, says
Schmitt, dramatically speeds up this tendency to absolute enmity since not only
does the effectiveness of terrorism disproportionately increase but also the
concept of absolute enmity is presupposed as weapons of mass destruction.
These are considered to be weaponry that kill indiscriminately and absolutely and
whose use therefore requires a previous negation of the enemy’s dignity in
general: “those men, using such weaponry against other men, are confronted with
the necessity to exterminate these men, their victims and objects, morally, too.
They have to declare the opposing side as a whole to be criminal and inhuman, a
total Unwert (worthlessness). The logic of dignity and the denying of dignity
develop its totally destructive character and requires ever new, ever more intense
discrimination, criminalisation and denial
extermination of every worthless life.”32
of
dignity,
leading
to
the
With Carl Schmitt’s explanations in mind there will follow an investigation into
the distinction between partisans and revolutionaries/partisans that can be
applied to new terrorist movements as well. There will also be a focus on religious
terrorism and a description of its peculiarities and a focus on the differences
between modern Western societies and such movements.
2.2
Religious terrorism and Western societies
The emergence of new terrorist movements, especially Islamist ones, go along
with a development that would never have been anticipated by Western societies
and therefore still causes political paralysis: a new disapproval of the secular state
under the rule of law which is considered by Western societies to be a symbol of
political and social achievement.
The idea of a secular constitutional state has been implemented in many societies
which was influenced by the Enlightenment and the concept of the separation of
powers, and has become a stabilising factor in many countries. For background
the separation of powers has been expressed by Locke and Montesquieu, and
even more importantly has been the fundamental distinction between law and
truth, as the key element of the secular constitutional state.
This fundamental distinction, however, raises objections in many countries,
mainly those influenced by Islam. This is understandable as the cultural and
political development of Western and Islam countries vary in many different
aspects, most prominently in the lack in Islamic countries of an era equivalent to
the Enlightenment. In many of these countries the distinction between law and
truth has not been implemented, with a number of states organised as religious
republics which consider the state as an instrument for mainly religious
purposes.
Otto Depenheuer, the German professor of constitutional law, summarises this
development: “the struggle for liberty and democracy, for a constitutional state
and human rights across the world, does not only cause incomprehension and a
refusal of those to be convinced in non-western societies, a refusal that could be
cured by intense explanation, generous development or good-governance and
state-building concepts.
However these pagans of constitutionalism and individual liberty start a
culturally self-confident counter-attack, having a firm religious credo.”33 This
certainly causes problems as both understandings of the state claim to be correct
and tend to expand their jurisdiction, the first because of its absolute religious
foundation, and the other because of human rights such as personal liberty, by
claiming the universal application independent of religion, culture or
geographical location of a state.34
This difference is of an absolute character and occasionally causes the emergence
of religiously inspired terrorist movements. “They [the terrorists] do not care
about relativist rationality, compared to firm religious belief; not about the idea
of human rights, compared to fear of God; not about equality, compared to divine
law; not about democracy and the constitutional state, compared to religious
truth.”35
Depenheuer has been criticised in Germany for his pointed criticism of Musliminfluenced societies and their attitude to Western democracies and political
systems. Be that as it may, there can be no doubt about Depenheuer’s
contribution to highlight the fundamental and qualitative difference between the
two different mentalities of political thinking.
It is telling that religiously motivated terrorists do separate themselves from
societies they live in by fabricating an artificial gap. “While secular terrorists
consider violence to be a means to change a society or correct a system they
believe to be in principle good and worth being preserved, religiously motivated
terrorists do not consider themselves to be a part of the system worth being
preserved, but ‘outsiders’ [...].”36
It is this exclusion from society which makes possible an absolute terrorism and
an absolute enmity as outlined by Carl Schmitt; this dualism is absolute and
cannot be cured by economic, social or cultural improvement of living standards.
This dualism is perfectly summarised in a video claiming the responsibility for
terrorist attacks in Madrid 2004: “you love life, we love death.” Regarding this
attitude the seventeenth century German philosopher, Samuel von Pufendorf,
once commented: “He, who does not fear death, does not fear anything. He, who
is able to scorn death, can take any liberty he wants towards every authority.”37
2.3
Can religion be a substitute for the telluric?
It is important to bear in mind Carl Schmitt’s concept of the telluricautochthonous which distinguishes a partisan from a terrorist and provides a
strong and unique motivation to fight for their homeland against occupying
forces, even if they are far outnumbered.
Modern religiously influenced terrorists, however, lack this telluric moment as
they are part of an international network, often operating not in the terrorist’s
homeland but across the world. These operations not only involve deployment on
foreign soil as part of a sleeping cell strategy but also contain the use of globalised
communications, overriding former obstacles like time and space. Although there
may be different locations where terrorist cells act, they become part of one
single, informationally homogenous space. As a consequence of the globalisation
of terrorism the telluric motivation does not exist anymore and requires a
replacement to maintain propaganda and the motivation of the singular terrorist.
This substitute has to be of absolute value, as terrorism aims to fight an absolute
war and pursues a policy of absolute enmity – for which an exceptional
motivation is required as terrorist attacks often include the sacrifice of one’s own
life. Besides patriotic resistance as a telluric component and the protection of
one’s family (with the first becoming obsolete and the latter depending too much
on individual circumstances and is strongly linked to the former) there are not
many other motivations for extreme action.
Religion as a basic and natural constituent of human life and culture is one of
these exceptional motivations and can easily be exploited for political reasons if it
fails to refrain from the political sphere. Some religions are therefore more prone
to political instrumentalisation while others are less, depending on their doctrine.
The following fatwa is one example of the exploitation of religion as a substitute
for the telluric and was published on February 23, 1998, titled “Declaration of the
Global Islamist Front”: “The atrocities and sins committed by the Americans are
a clear declaration of war against God, his prophet and the Muslims. And ulema38
throughout Islamic history have taught that every single Muslim is obliged by
Islam, if the enemy devastates Islamic countries . . . . to kill Americans and their
allies, both civilians and soldiers, is an individual duty of all Muslims when able
to do so and wherever possible, in order to free the al-Aqsa-Mosque and the Holy
Mosque (Mekka) from their occupation and to drive out their armies of all
countries of the Islam, so defeated and unable to threaten Muslims. This is in
accordance to the words of the Almighty God: ‘and fight mercilessly against the
heathen as they fight against you ’.”39
Religiously motivated terrorism is not a new phenomenon given that a strong
Assassin movement fought against the Crusaders centuries ago. These
movements, however, concentrated on defined areas and were the result of a
rather consistent symbiosis of religious and telluric motives, whereas more recent
terrorist groups entirely lack the telluric component, a development which began
with the emergence of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) as an
organisation with international links such as with the Red Army Faction (RAF) in
Germany.
3.
A new Just War theory?
Further thought is required about considering that in times of economic
globalisation and the decline of national and cultural borders there is a shift in
the concept of space as Schmitt imagined it, leaving behind the geographical
connections to be replaced by a universally religious identity. The relationship
between space and ideology regarding modern terrorist phenomena has to be
started afresh.
Having examined Carl Schmitt’s Theorie des Partisanen and its implications for
modern terrorist movement, especially those that are religiously influenced, we
should now proceed to the consequences and necessary adjustments which
follow. After some opening remarks I will return to the traditional distinctions
between ius ad bellum, ius in bello and ius post bellum.
3.1
Proportionality and the requirement of being a state
Classic Just War theory is based on several highly important principles, of which
proportionality of force and the requirement of being a state are highly
important. The necessity to be a state in order both to declare war and to be a
legitimate target of Just War has been a huge achievement in the limiting of
warfare and is most clearly summed up in Hugo Grotius’ De jure belli ac pacis
libri tres: “Only he is considered to be a legitimate target in war, who has a state,
a guildhall, a treasury, the assent and consensus of the citizens and with whom, if
circumstances allow it, one can make peace and form an alliance.”4
The list can be considered as a conclusive enumeration of a state’s characteristics
not only in ancient but for modern times too, as the state represents the territory,
the guildhall stands for the executive, and the treasury for the fiscal
administration. The fact that a political leader needs some kind of authority – be
it hereditary or democratic – and is supposed to act in his people’s interest is
symbolised by the consensus and the assent of the citizens. All that makes sure
that war is not started by individuals who abuse a state and its army in order to
pursue egoistic aims like economic benefit or private feud.
The requirement of states fighting exclusively against states has a second
implication as it ensured that warfare as the most excessive type of force is used
in a proportional way. This was a logical conclusion from the assumed correlation
between size and military power. Therefore a war being waged against an entity
which is not a state was principally to be considered not proportional and
therefore illicit.
This correlation of size and military harmfulness however has ceased to be valid
as small organizations such as terrorist movements are able to cause
disproportionately high damage compared to their relatively low economic and
military force by using their restricted resources for selective attacks that cause
psychological panic and mistrust towards the state which does not seem to be
able to fill its guarantor’s obligations.
The supposed interdependency between elements of an entity (such as size,
organisational level and economic strength) and its intensity (potential of damage
or threat) is to be replaced by a similarly objective criterion: the intended
consequences of an attack. This includes not only quantitative damage (e.g. of life
or infrastructure), but also psychological and ideological threats that put an
entire state at the terrorists’ ideological disposal with the purpose of destroying it.
Aims of this kind legitimize a reaction of the state, in the view of this author, to
put an end to the terroristic threat even if that means starting a war against an
entity which is quantitatively smaller.
One might argue that the requirement of war should be fought between two
similar states is to ensure that peace treaties can be signed, as only states can
technically be a counter-party of a treaty with another state since this is required
by international law. This objection can be ignored in relation to terrorist
movements who will never agree to a peace treaty until they win, while states are
not allowed to make any compromise with movements aiming to destroy their
constitutions and their citizens’ safety. In such a case, a state would have
abrogated the rule that it has to guarantee the security of its citizens.
3.2
Ius post bello
Before concentrating on ius ad bellum questions it is worth mentioning the
necessity of the ius post bello as part of modern Just War thinking because it
seems to be a fundamental necessity - a meta criterion - if we want to call modern
wars ‘just’.
This is because warfare against terrorist movements and their harbouring states
aims not only to avert imminent dangers caused by asymmetric warfare but to
attack terrorism at its roots. This clearly implies that states attacking a country
which is supposed to harbour terrorist networks must not only destroy the
military threat of the enemy (which nevertheless remains a legitimate goal), but
have to provide the political, military and financial aid to enable the stabilisation
of the respective country, be it by means of a regime change or good governance
programmes.
Military intervention by itself will only be able to cure imminent threats, but not
the social background which is exploited by terrorists for their recruitment of
fighters. On the other hand an exclusive good governance approach does
underestimate the fact that poor social circumstances are not the only motivation
to join terrorist movements.
Ius ad bellum
Introduction:
To complete the considerations of how the Just War theory has to be adapted to
modern challenges a closer look at ius ad bellum criteria is necessary since most
of the preconditions have changed within the last decades. This is not the place to
comment on every single aspect of the ius ad bellum but instead the focus will be
on the consequences which follow from the introduction of a type of war into the
sphere of home policy. For this purpose there follows an examination of the so-
called Luftsicherheitsgesetz (LuftSiG) as a prominent part of recent German antiterrorist legislation followed by Otto Depenheuer’s concept of the Bürgeropfer
(self-sacrifice of the citizen) as a solution to dilemmas concerning counterterrorism strategy in which the breach of constitutional rights cannot be avoided
even by states under the rule of law.
The invasion of the concept of war into the internal affairs of a country:
Due to the asymmetrical character of modern terrorism a change between the
Normallage (normal state of affairs) and the Ausnahmelage (state of emergency)
can emerge extremely quickly and without giving time to prepare. Classical
warfare was begun by a formal declaration of war which enabled the respective
states to mobilise armed force and to switch peacetime industrial production to
armaments as well as to communicate the change to martial law to its citizens.
However terrorist attacks emerge in the blink of an eye to challenge the state, and
it is the hidden omnipresence of a substantial, potentially absolute, threat that
has to become a part of modern Just War thinking. Of even greater importance is
the paradigmatic change of the place where terrorism battles are fought: while in
the past the political and geographical borders of those engaged in warfare made
it possible to distinguish between non-martial home affairs and the front-line
engaged in warfare, this distinction becomes obsolete in our days. Terrorism
occurs in the heart of states, their battle-ground can be anywhere.
Under normal circumstances conflicts which occur inside the states are
successfully dealt with using police law, especially as the use of the armed forces
is not allowed by the German Grundgesetz41 (the German constitution, although
technically not a constitution but rather a basic set of laws). This has proved very
successful in containing state crime because the use of military force inside
Germany has not been necessary.
However, the relevance of the constitutionally guaranteed denial of using the
Bundeswehr within German borders, unless the country should have been
attacked by another state, becomes doubtful in cases where the German political
system has to react to threats which cannot be classified as Verteidigungsfall
(state of defence) as defined by the German Grundgesetz: these threats could be
attacks such as on buildings like the World Trade Centre in New York (2001), on
railways in Madrid (2004) or hotels such as in Bombay (2008). As a reaction to
these incidents, the German government has passed a law for the protection of
airspace (LuftSiG42) which shall be examined below.
3.3.3
The Luftsicherheitsgesetz (LuftSiG) and its origin
The catalyst for the adoption of the LuftSiG was an incident above the centre of
Frankfurt Main. On January 5, 2003 a man hijacked a sports-plane and circled
over the business district of Frankfurt, threatening to crash into the European
Central Bank if he was not allowed to speak to the President of the United States
on the telephone.
One police helicopter and two jet fighters of the Bundeswehr circled the sportsplane; the police went on ‘red alert’ while the business district of Frankfurt was
evacuated and sky-scrapers across the city were emptied. Half an hour after the
plane had been hijacked police ascertained that the offender acted not as part of a
terrorist movement but was mentally disturbed. However, given that only the
army had the planes able to force down the hijacked aircraft, police had to ask for
help.
This deficiency in security infrastructure and the practical use of the armed forces
inside the country led all the major parties to pass an act of parliament that was
enacted on January 15, 2005. It allowed the security authorities to employ the
armed forces inside Germany without the necessity to declare a state of national
defence: “ if it is clear that an extremely grievous attack as defined by article 35,
paragraph 2, number 2, or paragraph 3 GG, is approaching, the armed forces can
be employed in airspace to support the federal police to prevent the accident and
as far as is necessary to effectively fight the threat “.43
In cases where a plane is used to threaten innocent lives the Bundeswehr is
allowed to prevent the hijacker from carrying out the threat with every means at
its disposal so long as there are no other means to stop the attack.44
Discussion about the constitutionality of the Luftsicherheitsgesetz.
A number of opinions doubting the constitutionality of the Luftsicherheitsgesetz
arose immediately after the law had passed the German Federal Assembly. The
President of the Federal Republic, Horst Köhler, gave his approval only because
of pressure from the executive branch, though he did demand that the act of
parliament should be presented to the Federal Constitutional Court for further
scrutiny.
The Federal Assembly also passed another law which was highly controversial as
it not only addressed the use of the armed forces within German territory without
having being attacked by a foreign state, but also the possibility of innocent
passengers being killed by the armed forces to prevent a hijacked plane from
hitting its target. On the other hand, the law provided German administration
with the only possible procedure to defend the country against terrorist attacks
using hijacked planes.
On February 15, 2011, the Federal Constitutional Court decided that the relevant
act of parliament (the Luftsicherheitsgesetz) did not conform to the German
constitution and therefore was null and void.45 The court legitimized its decision
by pointing out that the state and its executive branch were never allowed to kill
innocent citizens as such an action would be diametrically opposed to Article 1 of
the German Grundgesetz, even in those cases where protection against terrorist
attacks would necessarily involve the killing of innocents.
In its decision the court explained: “Article 1, paragraph 1, protects the individual
not only from humiliation, stigmatisation, ostracism and similar actions caused
by third parties or the state itself . . . . plainly forbidden therefore is the treatment
of a human being by public authority which could question the individual’s
qualities and their status as a legal subject caused by a lack of respect for the
dignity that is owed to everybody due to their being a person.”46
The fact that innocent passengers in a hijacked plane would die anyway, and
therefore it would not matter if the state and its armed forces killed innocent
passengers collaterally, did not change the court’s decision which used the
explanation that “human life and human dignity enjoy the same protection of the
public authorities regardless of the length of physical existence”47.
This decision of the Federal Constitutional Court not only left the state
unprotected from the threat of terrorism that included hostage-taking, but could
encourage terrorist networks to focus on Germany, knowing that there was no
constitutionally approved procedure to prevent terrorist attacks from being
carried out.
The dilemma is evident: whatever the state does it will nolens volens violate
certain universal rights: on one hand innocent passengers should not to be
harmed or killed by the state while on the other hand the lives of citizens must be
protected at all costs.
The dilemma here compared to dilemmas in regular war, becomes additionally
acute: firstly, because on both cases innocent civilians are affected, and secondly
because the killing of innocents here cannot be considered to be collateral
damage within armed conflicts, as a single terrorist attack does not necessarily
create a classical armed conflict. A new Just War theory has to provide
regulations for incidents as described above, which will unquestionably increase
in future and take place in everyday life.
Otto Depenheuer has therefore rediscovered the concept of the citizen’s selfsacrifice as a possible solution to dilemmas as described above, ensuring that
states, when attacked by terrorist networks, will remain capable of acting without
getting into a legal grey area.
Otto Depenheuer and the Concept of the Citizen’s Self-Sacrifice (CCS)
(a)
Evaluation of terms:
Before talking about the concept of Citizen’s Self-Sacrifice (CSS) as outlined by
Otto Depenheuer it is useful to examine the wording which is even more
important in Germany where the word ‘sacrifice’ is strongly compromised
because of the National-Socialist abuse of the concept, which Depenheuer
describes as an “obsession”48.
Firstly, the concept of the CSS is concerned only with the citizens of the country
as distinguished from other people living in a country as non-nationals or tourists
etc. In order to be asked to give up one’s life in order to safeguard a large number
of fellow citizens, usually a strong link between the individual citizen and the
state is necessary; and the purest and strongest type of such a mutual relationship
within the constitutional state can only be citizenship. Therefore, citizenship is
not to be considered as a mere residence permit, but instead as a relation which
creates a certain common destiny between the individual citizen and the state.
Secondly, we have to distinguish the different concepts of sacrifice, as there are
three different connotations: the religious is the first, based on ancient culture
and social structures, and could be both an object or a human being, which is
offered to please the gods and part of a magical world view, expecting the gods to
give something in return for the sacrifice they received, as expressed in the
ancient Roman religious system of do ut des.
A second type of sacrifice is linked to the concept of renunciation, which is not
necessarily part of a religious or magical world view, but can be practised in fully
secularized societies. It implies the rational renunciation of what is good which is
available to that person.
Here the renunciation as a moral disposition is to be distinguished from goodness
itself and the reasoning to renounce something is not part of an individual costbenefit calculation, but rather a rational decision to do what has to be done in a
certain situation: a sense of duty.
The personal sacrifice can vary: in times of economic stagnation employees
renounce excessive wage increases to assist the general economy; a police officer
gives up having normal security by putting himself at a considerably higher risk
than most of his fellow citizens while fulfilling his duties to maintain public
order; and then there is the situation when the ‘voluntary sacrifice of
life can be required’49.
Whereas the first two types could be summarised as “sacrifice”, the last one is
more accurately called ‘victim’. This is evident for anybody who speaks Romanic
languages as there is a distinction between ‘victim’ and ‘sacrifice’, and here the
English language follows the Romanic distinction of the two concepts, whereas in
languages such as German this distinction does not exist where all the concepts
are called Opfer. Its Latin origin pati shows the passive character of this word, as
someone has to be suffering in certain unfavourable conditions.
There are many possible examples such as ‘victim of crime’ 5; the implication
being principally negative, especially because it is not possible to give any
meaning or sense to the disaster being suffered. Being a victim therefore has
neither a religious or mystical background, nor is it a rational decision, but
instead is pure irrationality – an irrationality most people struggle to accept in all
its manifestations.
The last type, the sacrifice as a renunciation or a duty, is often present in public
debate and the media and therefore discredits the principally positive and heroic
meaning of the first two concepts, especially of the second. After 1945 and the
time of permanent misuse of the concept of sacrifice there was a change in the
connotation of the term: ‘ until 1945 the notion of sacrifice was that of an active
sacrifice in favour of something […], but a subtle change can be registered in the
German use of the term. The notion of sacrifice becomes passive and this
transformation proceeded without any conscious influence of politicians or any
notice of scientists.’51 It is because of the highly deficient scientific understanding
of the notion of the sacrifice that Depenheuer sees the need for a new Theory of
the Sacrifice.52
Below, I will focus on the explanations given by Depenheuer, who introduced the
Theory of the Sacrifice into the debate on security politics, as an indispensable
component of effective counter-terrorism legislation and it is the second type of
self-sacrifice that will be referred to.
A non-definitive outline the citizen’s self-sacrifice is as follows: a citizen as a
member of a certain state (be it by social contract or a natural inclination of the
human being to social bonding) has to be prepared to sacrifice major personal
goods, and even their life, when the state is in acute danger and if through
sacrifice the state’s chances of survival will be greatly increased, as citizenship
always implies the sharing of a common fate with the state and his fellow citizens.
The CSS is in this sense not only an individual possibility that may be offered as
an expression of loyalty, but also a duty that may be required by the state without
explicit permission of the individual citizen.
(b):
CSS and cultural individualism:
The concept of sacrifice is directly connected with warfare. War causes wounding
and death; during the war on terror in Afghanistan twenty seven soldiers of the
German Bundeswehr lost their life in open battle, IEDs or suicide attacks (
registered up to October 2010).53 In classical, symmetrical warfare, casualties
were expected but were usually limited to the regular armies of the belligerent
parties. In civil society, casualties only occurred as collateral damage and
therefore should not to be considered as self-sacrifice but rather as a victim in the
sense discussed above.
Due to recent conceptual changes in combat, such as asymmetrical warfare and
the invasion of warfare into everyday life, a similar change becomes evident in
how civilians are affected by this. In modern, asymmetrical warfare, which
includes not only the official army’s fighting against an asymmetrical enemy but
also terrorist suicide attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, it is not
only soldiers who may have to sacrifice individual goods or their life in battle but
also citizens in their everyday life as the battleground has changed from the
country’s frontier to its interior.
Therefore, the circumstances in which a state may require sacrifices are
broadened and from now on does not only include the borders of the country or
abroad, or the parts exclusively controlled by soldiers during a conflict with
another state, but also every other part of a country in which both soldiers and
civilians inhabit.
The German concept of the “civilian citizen in uniform”, formerly described as the
army’s approach to recruit soldiers from all social classes and backgrounds and
thereby avoiding the army becoming a state within a state, has a second
connotation: the fact that in asymmetrical warfare every civilian, too, may be
involved in new types of warfare, possibly requiring the readiness to sacrifice
goods or even one’s life, if the further existence of the state depends on it.
Such situations might be similar to the one described regarding the LuftSiG. It
should be remembered that the state has two options with a hijacked plane that is
aiming to destroy civilian infrastructure and possibly killing a large number of
civilians: firstly, the state may stop the hijacked plane by destroying it before
reaching its destination even if it kills all the innocent passengers inside the
plane; and secondly, not to react and thereby not only allowing the terrorists to
destroy civilian infrastructure and causing the death of a huge number of
innocent people, but also to intimidate the whole society and weaken the citizens’
confidence in the state.
Of the two it is the latter option which is the most dangerous because although
the death of innocent people from a terrorist attack is a terrible event, it is the
general fear of the citizens that public authority is unable to maintain security
which causes an even greater problem which relates to the dissolution of the
contract between citizen and state that was only agreed on condition that the
state would carry out its guarantor’s obligation and maintain law and order.
This is why the question should be asked as to whether “the free state under the
rule of law should not only expect its citizens to be ready to sacrifice their lives in
such a situation, but also be able to actively demand it from its citizens and in the
last consequence even to execute the sacrifice itself.”54
This question is highly controversial as it strongly opposes the set of
constitutional rights prevailing in Western societies, especially the understanding
of constitutional rights as a guarantee against the intrusion of the state against a
person’s freedom. Depenheuer adds that German society has forgotten that a
constitutional order and a working democracy had to be developed over many
years and required numerous sacrifices, whether by revolutions or under
dictatorships, from those who tried to implement or defend a free and just
order.55
(c):
Application of the CSS in counter terrorism activity:
That self-sacrifice is demanded from soldiers while fighting is obvious; however
what are the implications of CSS in respect to civilians when caught up in
asymmetrical war or insurgency attacks, always bearing in mind that from a
psychological point of view these small attacks are very powerful in destroying
citizens’ confidence in the state and its ability to protect them?
It is only this type of emergency that can ever legitimate the state’s demand of the
CSS: ‘in a state where this a fundamental threat against the common good the
solid structure of the stately community becomes visible and the CSS can be
demanded.’56 This state of emergency is not a recent phenomenon because in the
Sixties and Seventies a similar danger arose in Germany from the radical Leftwing Red Army Faction (RAF).
Depenheuer sees a parallel in the kidnapping by the RAF of Hans-Martin
Schleyer, president of an industrial association, since Schleyer was the first
civilian in recent times who was deemed to have been sacrificed when murdered
by the RAF because of the government’s refusal to negotiate with terrorists.57
The government had to decide between two absolutes: the life of the innocent
citizen Hans-Martin Schleyer or the integrity of the country and its government,
in the end choosing the latter. As a result of this decision other leading politicians
and representatives of business and industry declared that they did not want to
be rescued from a terrorist kidnapping if it involved negotiations that could
damage the state’s integrity.
A similar recent example would the LuftSiG; in this case, too, there were two
fundamental rights being questioned which are not much different from each
other and follow the classical maxim of the philosophy of law that fundamental
rights are not quantifiable. The state and its public authority had to decide
whether the life of the passengers or the lives of civilians on the ground should be
fully protected as both are not possible; therefore, nolens volens, a breach of one
group’s fundamental rights has to occur.
From this writer’s perspective it is unimportant whether the state
remains passive by accepting a breach of fundamental rights of both
groups, or actively breaks fundamental rights of the passengers by
destroying the hijacked plane and stopping it from harming innocent
people and destroying infrastructure.
From a moral point of view the state’s passiveness in the first case would mean an
active breaking of fundamental rights as it is unwilling (although in a position to
take positive action) to fulfill its guarantor’s obligations and would therefore be
failing to protect its citizens. The state is confronted with an unsolvable dilemma,
constitutionally speaking, where it is completely impossible to avoid a violation of
fundamental rights.
In this writer’s view it seems therefore tolerable to accept the death of innocent
passengers in order to protect the state’s integrity against illegitimate attacks.
Utilitarian considerations are not necessarily connected to this decision 58, as the
state does not primarily calculate costs and benefits, but rather acts – to lend a
mediaeval-scholastic expression – according to its nature, which is fulfilling its
guarantor’s obligation and protecting itself against illegitimate destruction.
In destroying the plane and killing all its passengers, both the innocent and
terrorists, “the state does not at all ignore the fundamental law and dignity they
have as human beings, as it does not reduce the passengers to their mere bodily
materiality, but decides a tragic conflict: defence or destruction of the common
good”59. Depenheuer argues that human dignity is far more in danger where the
state remains passive and allows terrorist attacks, practising a “constitutional
autism”6: “The principal refusal of defence in the name of human dignity leads
directly of the practical loss of the same.”61
Whether there are further reasons to stop a terrorist attack, apart from the main
reason to defend the common good and the state’s integrity, should be discussed
on a case by case basis. Depenheuer argues that the innocent passenger, by being
sacrificed for the common good, remains not a mere victim (which they would
have been if terrorists succeeded in their attack on a state) but becomes a
sacrifice and thereby makes sense of an otherwise useless death: “indeed a
member of the society, who in a case of extreme danger is ready to sacrifice his
life for his community, might be able to find self-fulfillment in his action.”62
Concerning the decision of the German Constitutional Court which declared the
LuftSiG as “constitutionally not correct” Depenheuer remarks: “to forbid the
destruction of the plane by arguing with the innocent passengers’ dignity, [is]
ethically questionable, too: the court takes away the last bit of the passengers’
dignity which is to sacrifice their life for the community in a situation of extreme
and tragic danger.”63
4.
Conclusion
I have tried to highlight certain problems which arise from new forms of warfare
and the necessary adjustments to be made to Just War theory. These
improvements to Just War theory should not only be made out of practical
necessity, since the principal moral background of this theory would be
threatened by a realpolitik approach that would be contrary to the morality of
war.
Therefore, a philosophical foundation is essential, which I aimed to deliver with
some relevant examples. The purpose of this article should not be considered as a
manual to change the theory of Just War like an engineer changes defect parts of
a car, but rather as an encouragement for further scrutiny about how Just War
thinking can be adapted to modern developments in warfare and international
affairs. There is only one stark alternative to a careful modernisation of the
theory: to leave alone with the result that its influence on warfare and politics will
fade away.
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VEREINTE NATIONEN: Charta der Vereinten Nationen. Übersetzt von
Hartmut Krüger. Ditzingen : Reclam, 1986.
-
VEREINTE NATIONEN: United Nations Security Council Official Records,
1348th meeting, 6. Juni 1967 : UN Doc. no. S/PV.1348.
-
VERLAGE, Christopher: Responsibility to protect : Ein neuer Ansatz im
Völkerrecht zur Verhinderung von Völkermord, Kriegsverbrechen und
Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit. Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, 2009.
-
VITORIA, Francisco de: De Indis recenter inventis et de jure belli
Hispanorum in barbaros, relectiones. Herausgegeben von Walter
Schätzel. Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, 1952.
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WALZER, Michael: Gibt es den gerechten Krieg? Aus dem Amerikanischen
übersetzt von Christiane Ferdinand. Stuttgart : Klett-Cotta, 1982.
NENNINGER, Marcus: Die Römer und der Wald : Untersuchungen zum Umgang
mit einem Naturraum am Beispiel der römischen Nordwestprovinzen. Stuttgart
: Steiner, 2001, 111f.
1
CICERO: De Officiis.
2
ELSHTAIN, Jean Bethke: Terrorism. In: REED, Charles ; RYALL, David: The Price
of Peace : Just War in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge : Cambridge
University Press, 22008, 124.
3
MAYER, Tilman: Der arabische totalitäre Islamismus. In: RAUSCHER, Anton
(Hrsg.): Nationale und kulturelle Identität im Zeitalter der Globalisierung.
Berlin : Duncker & Humblot, 11. Translated by the author like all the following
quotations originally published in German.
4
5
Ibd.
6
Ibd.
Although this is part of creating the legend, saying that terrorist attacks are to be
considered as a defence of the Muslim culture and world (umma).
7
SCHMITT, Carl: Theory of the partisan : intermediate commentary on the
concept of the political. Translated by G. L. Ulmen. New York : Telos Press Pub.,
2007, 18.
8
9
SCHMITT, Carl: Theory, l.c., 30.
1
SCHMITT, Carl: Theory, l.c.,37.
11
Schmitt, 21.
12
Schmitt, 21.
13
Schmitt, 23.
From my point of view, the concept of a terrain warrior is to be equated to the
defence of the home country, as Schmitt distinguishes this type of warfare from
the maritime one. The latter one, according to Schmitt, ignores per definitionem
the defence of the homeland and is primarily engaged in expansive warfare. See
also: Schmitt, Carl: Land and Sea. Translated and with a foreword by Simona
Draghici. Corvallis : Plutarch Press, 2001.
14
15
Dt. Schmitt, 27.
See KLINK, Manfred: Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus im
Zusammenhang mit den
Anschlägen am 11.09.2001 in den USA - aus Sicht des Bundes. In: Die
Kriminalpolizei, März 2002.
16
In this context Carl Schmitt uses the expression “motorisation” as a way to
describe a global and offensive way of fighting as e.g. in Cold War when partisan
training was meant to be a part of offensive warfare and not telluric defence. See
Dt. Schmitt, 27.
17
18
Dt. Schmitt, 28.
19
Dt. Schmitt, 72.
2
Dt. Schmitt, 72.
21
Dt. Schmitt, 74.
For a full account of Schmitt’s distinction between friend and enemy,
considered by him as the first and most fundamental requirement of any political,
see: Schmitt, Carl: The concept of the political. Translation, introduction, and
notes by George Schwab ; with "The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations"
(1929) translated by Matthias Konzen and John P. McCormick ; with Leo Strauss'
notes on Schmitt's essay, translated by J. Harvey Lomax ; foreword by Tracy B.
Strong. Chicago ; London : University of Chicago Press, 2007.
22
23
Dt. Schmitt, 77.
The importance of religious legitimation offered by Islam is not to be
underestimated, as Islam lacks a clear distinction between the concepts of
defence and offensive expansion, ass Wilfried Röhrich remarks: RÖHRICH,
Wilfried: Die Politisierung des Islam : Islamismus und islamistischer
Terrorismus. In: SIMON, Dieter ; GRAULICH, Kurt (edd.): Terrorismus und
Rechtsstaatlichkeit : Analysen, Handlungsoptionen, Perspektiven. Berlin :
Akademie Verlag, 2007, 29 f.
24
25
Dt. Schmitt, 92.
26
Dt. Schmitt, 91.
27
Dt. Schmitt, 93.
Cf. SIMON, Rupert: Die Begriffe des Politischen bei Carl Schmitt und Jacques
Derrida. In: EUROPÄISCHE HOCHSCHULSCHRIFTEN (Hrsg.), Reihe XXXI,
Politikwissenschaft, Bd. 552. Frankfurt am Main u.a. : Peter Lang, 2008, 197.
28
29
3
Ibid.
Dt. Schmitt, 94.
31
Dt. Schmitt, 96.
32
Dt. Schmitt, 95.
Depenheuer, Otto: Selbstbehauptung des Rechtsstaats. Translated by the
author. Paderborn : Schöningh, 2007, 12 et seq.
33
Concerning the discussion whether human rights do intrinsically claim to be
universal, see: NOOKE, Günter ; LOHMANN, Georg ; WAHLERS, Gerhard (Hrsgg.):
Gelten Menschenrechte universal? : Begründungen und Infragestellungen.
Freiburg im Breisgau : Herder, 2007.
34
35
Depenheuer, Selbstbehauptung, 13.
HOFFMAN, Bruce: Der unerklärte Kriege. New York : Columbia University
Press, 2006, 64 f.
36
PUFENDORF, Samuel von: Über die Pflicht des Menschen und des Bürgers nach
dem Gesetz der Natur. Edited and translated by Klaus Luig. Frankfurt am Main ;
Leipzig : Insel-Verlag, 1994, 56.
37
38
i.e. scholars of Islamic law
ALEXANDER, Jonah ; SWETNAM, Michael S.: Usama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaida :
Profile of a Terrorist Network. Ardsley : Transnational Publishers, 2001, 61f.
Religious content has been set in italics by the author.
39
GROTIUS, Hugo: De jure belli ac pacis libri tres : Drei Bücher vom Recht des
Krieges und des Friedens. Berlin : Heimann, 1869.
4
41
Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Art. 87 a GG.
Luftsicherheitsgesetz vom 11. Januar 2005 (Bundesgesetzblatt BGBl. I S.78),
das zuletzt durch Artikel 7 des Gesetzes vom 29. Juli 2009 (BGBl. I S. 2424)
geändert worden ist.
42
43
Ibid. Abschnitt 3 § 13 Abs. 1.
44
Ibid. § 14 Abs. 1.
45
BVerfGE v. 15.2.2006 I 466 - 1 BvR 357/05.
46
BVerfGE v. 15.2.2006 I 466 - 1 BvR 357/05, 121.
47
Ibid., 132.
DEPENHEUER, Selbstbehauptung des Rechtsstaats. Paderborn : Schöningh,
2007, 82.
48
49
Ibid.
MÜNKLER, Herfried ; FISCHER, Carsten: Nothing to kill or die for... In: Leviathan
28 (2000), 345.
5
KOSELLECK, Reinhart: Die Diskontinuität der Erinnerung. In: Deutsche
Zeitschrift für Philosophie 47 (1999), 213-222.
51
52
DEPENHEUER, Selbstbehauptung, 77.
BUNDESWEHR: Bei Auslandseinsätzen verstorbene und verwundete Soldaten.
Elektronische Ressource: www.bundeswehr.de. Berlin, Stand: Oktober 2010.
53
DEPENHEUER, Otto: Das Bürgeropfer im Rechtsstaat. In: DERS. (Hrsg.): Staat
im Wort : Festschrift für Josef Isensee. Heidelberg : Müller, 2007, 44.
54
55
Ibid., 46.
DEPENHEUER, Otto: Das Bürgeropfer im Rechtsstaat. In: DEPENHEUER (Hrsg.)
Staat im Wort : Festschrift für Josef Isensee. Heidelberg : Müller, 2007, 55.
56
57
Ibid., 54
Against: BEESTERMÖLLER, Gerhard: Flugzeuge als Terrorwaffen : Stefan Husters
Vorschlag zum „Abschuß“. In: Die Neue Ordnung 61 (2007), 144 ff.
58
59
6
DEPENHEUER, Selbstbehauptung, 97.
Ibid., 98.
61
DEPENHEUER, Bürgeropfer, 57.
62
DEPENHEUER, Selbstbehauptung, 100.
63
Ibid.