Meaning, Context and Cognition, Uniwersytet Łódzki, 24-26 March 2011
Context: From Intentions
to Two-Dimensional Semantics
K. M. Jaszczolt
University of Cambridge
1
Paul Grice: Intentions
‘A meantNN something by x’: A uttered x with the
intention of inducing a belief by means of the
recognition of this intention.
Grice 1957 in 1989, p. 219
2
‘U meant something by uttering x’ is true iff, for some
audience A, U uttered x intending:
(1) A to produce a particular response r
(2) A to think (recognize) that U intends (1)
(3) A to fulfil (1) on the basis of his fulfilment of (2).
Grice 1969 in 1989, p.92
3
Questions and objectives:
? Aspects end extent of compatibility of Gricean intentionbased pragmatics with the ‘formal pragmatics’ in twodimensional semantics (advocated by Stalnaker, e.g. 1999)
4
Questions and objectives:
?Aspects and extent of compatibility of Gricean intentionbased pragmatics with the ‘formal pragmatics’ in twodimensional semantics (advocated by Stalnaker, e.g. 1999)
?Compatibility of the notions of context, semantic
content, role of intentions
5
Questions and objectives:
?Aspects and extent of compatibility of Gricean intention-based
pragmatics with the ‘formal pragmatics’ in two-dimensional
semantics (advocated by Stalnaker, e.g. 1999)
?Compatibility of the notions of context, semantic
content, role of intentions
?Lessons for contextualism
6
• possible worlds
• truth conditions
• Sentence meaning determines content relative to context.
• Content determines truth value relative to a possible world.
7
Kaplan’s character and content (1989a, b)
8
Kaplan’s character and content (1989a, b)
Stalnaker’s propositional concept (1978, 2011)
9
Conclusions for contextualism:
Truth-Conditional Pragmatics (Recanati, e.g. 2004, 2010)
Default Semantics (Jaszczolt, e.g. 2005, 2010)
10
Context
Kaplan (1989a): context = occasions of use
Context (index) provides the necessary parameters for
semantics: an agent, time, location, and world.
Character/content theory: a speaker utters a sentence in a
context, indexical expressions are associated with referents,
and then the sentence is evaluated in circumstances of
evaluation.
11
Contexts vs. circumstances of evaluation:
An indexical expression (I, he, now, that) may have different
referents in different contexts but the same referent when
evaluated in circumstances of evaluation (counterfactual
situations)
= direct reference
12
Indexicals (he) have context-sensitive character; content
varies with context.
Non-indexicals (dog) have fixed character, the same content in
all contexts but the content varies with circumstances of
evaluation.
13
A proposition comprises a set of circumstances of evaluation
(possible worlds) and determines a set of possible contexts.
14
Proper names:
Proper names can be ambiguous (unlike indexicals) 
pre-semantic role of context (‘Aristotle’)
Contextual feature of ‘the causal history of a particular proper
name expression in the agent’s idiolect’ (1989a: 562)
= determining what word was used (pre-semantic)
15
Kaplan’s context – summary:
Three roles of context:
(i) pre-semantic (disambiguation);
(ii) assigning denotation to a character;
(iii) counterfactual situations
i= (w,t,l,a,…)
16
Context is a metaphysical rather than a cognitive notion
17
Stalnaker’s context
‘To understand what a speaker is doing when she says how
things are, we need to understand how she is distinguishing
between different ways that things might be. … one should be
able to say something general about the kind of thing we are
talking about when we talk about possibilities, counterfactual
situations, or possible worlds.’
Stalnaker (1999: 2)
18
Assertion
• Assertions (speech acts) are sayings which have some effect
on the hearer
• Assertion expresses the speaker’s belief and the intention that
he hearer adopt/hold this belief.
(cf. Brown and Cappelen 2011)
19
Propositional concept
(i) Enumerating the truth values of a sentence in different
possible worlds;
(ii) Enumerating the referents assigned to the indexical
expression.
(1) ‘You are to blame.’
20
Propositional concept
T
F
T
‘you’ according
to S (‘you’ = A)
T
F
T
‘you’ according
to A (’you’= A)
F
T
F
S’s beliefs
A’s beliefs
‘you’ according
to B (‘you’ = B)
B’s beliefs
21
Propositional concept
T
F
T
‘you’ according
to S (‘you’ = A)
T
F
T
‘you’ according
to A (’you’= A)
F
S’s beliefs
T
A’s beliefs
F
‘you’ according
to B (‘you’ = B)
B’s beliefs
22
Propositional concept
• Horizontal dimension = what is said in different contexts
• Vertical dimension = possible worlds as contexts
• Diagonal = the proposition that is true at a world and context
iff what is expressed in this context and world is true there.
(‘Whatever is said by S is true’)
23
From metaphysics to intentions
Propositions as sets of possible worlds 
Centered possible worlds (pairs: possible world + time and
person in the world)
(Stalnaker e.g. 1979, 2011)
24
Context in two-dimensional semantics
Context is understood as common background, represented
by a context-set, meaning a set of possible worlds that are
compatible with what is presupposed by the speaker in a
situation of discourse. When all the presuppositions in the
speaker’s context-set coincide with those in the addressee’s
context-set , the context is nondefective.
25
Two-dimensional semantics and Gricean intentions
Context is understood as common background, represented
by a context-set, meaning a set of possible worlds that are
compatible with what is presupposed by the speaker in a
situation of discourse. When all the presuppositions in the
speaker’s context-set coincide with those in the addressee’s
context-set , the context is nondefective.
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Towards intentions
Stalnaker: what is said differs on the horizontal dimension;
intention recognition/ascription by the addressee
cf. speaker’s meaning – addressee’s meaning debate
27
Towards intentions
• Context as intention ascription
 there is no restriction against going beyond slots in the logical
form (resolving indexicals), to top-down processing in twodimensional semantics:
(2) Everyone […] has seen King’s Speech.
(3) Tom is a fine friend. 
28
Kaplan and intentions
Afterthoughts (1989b) ‘directing intention’
The character of an indexical expression (its ‘linguistic
meaning’, say, contextually salient male as the meaning of
‘he’) can be associated with different contents thanks to the
directing intention to refer.
29
This intention creates the ‘potential’ for distinct referents. The
intention operates, according to Kaplan, on the ‘preformal’
level (1989b: 588) and hence is not part of semantics.
The next step, the evaluation of an occurrence of an
expression in circumstances of evaluation, i.e. the theory of
content, should ideally belong, according to Kaplan (p. 575),
to pragmatics.
30
‘The same demonstrative can be repeated, with a distinct
directing intention for each repetition of the demonstrative.
This can occur in the single sentence, “You, you , you and you
can leave, but you stay”, or in a single discourse, “You can
leave. You must stay.”’
Kaplan (1989b: 587)
(cf. a repetition of ‘today’ refers to a different day only when
the context has changed)
31
‘The directing intention is the element that differentiates the
“meaning” of one syntactic occurrence of a demonstrative
from another, creating the potential for distinct referents…’
(p. 588).
32
Directing intention vs. intended meaning:
One can mistakenly refer to B intending to refer to A. Directing
intention is then the intention to refer to B.
= ‘forensic element to our ordinary concept of what is said’,
Perry (2009: 191):
33
‘Saying something is often a social act, which has effects on
others in virtue of the words used, their meanings, and other
publicly observable indications of the speaker’s intentions
(“perlocutionary effects”).’
 What is said in the case of a mistaken demonstration will
differ form audience to audience.
34
 we need instead a concept of locutionary content that is
arrived at through directing intentions.
?No limit to pragmatic contribution to
locutionary content and no clear delimitation:
35
‘…the primary reason we think it is worth developing a semitechnical concept, locutionary content, as an explication of
what is said, is that the latter concept has a heavy forensic
aspect, that is tied to its daily use in not only describing
utterances but assigning responsibility for their effects, but
isn’t helpful for theoretical purposes.’
Korta and Perry (2007: 105)
36
A synthesis:
Kaplanesque context and post-Gricean contextualism
‘If we think of the formal role played by context within the
model-theoretic semantics, then we should say that context
provides whatever parameters are needed.’
Kaplan (1989b: 591)
(cf. top-down processing, e.g. Recanati 2004)
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The state of the art
‘… a theoretically useful concept of what is said, explicated as
locutionary content, can be developed’ and it ‘will play more
or less the roles contemplated by both Grice and the new
theorists of reference.’
Korta and Perry (2007: 110)
38
Lessons for contextualism:
Use the two-dimensional matrix for ‘non-indexicals’ 
overcoming the speaker’s meaning/hearer’s meaning
dilemma
e.g.
(4)
(5)
The piglet has finished his porridge.
The mice are asking you to forgive them. (Thai)
39
Reason for modelling what is said
on locutionary content:
‘…in general (i.e. not only in the special case of indexicals),
the propositional contribution of an expression is not fully
determined by the invariant meaning conventionally
associated with the expression type but depends upon the
context.’
Recanati (2010: 17)
40
Locutionary content and Default Semantics
(Jaszczolt 2005, 2009, 2010)
Pragmatic compositionality
Primary meaning (cf. locutionary content?) is orthogonal to
the what is said/what is implicated distinction
41
The logical form of the sentence can not only be extended but
also replaced by a new semantic representation when the
primary, intended meaning demands it. Such extensions or
substitutions are primary meanings and their representations
are merger representations in Default Semantics. There is no
syntactic constraint on merger representations.
42
(6)
Child to mother: Everybody has a bike.
(6a) All of the child’s friends have bikes.
(6b) Many/most of the child’s classmates have bikes.
(6c) The mother should consider buying her son a bike.
(6d) Cycling is a popular form of exercise among children.
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(6)
Child to mother: Everybody has a bike.
(6a) All of the child’s friends have bikes.
(6b) Many/most of the child’s classmates have bikes.
(6c) The mother should consider buying her son a bike.
(6d) Cycling is a popular form of exercise among children.
44
Primary meaning:
combination of word meaning
and sentence structure (WS)
merger representation Σ
social, cultural and
cognitive defaults (CD)
world-knowledge defaultspm (SCWDpm)
conscious pragmatic inference pm
(from situation of discourse, social and
cultural assumptions, and world
knowledge) (CPIpm)
Secondary meanings:
 Social, cultural and world-knowledge defaultssm (SCWDsm)
 conscious pragmatic inferencesm (CPIsm)
Fig. 1: Utterance interpretation according to the processing model of the revised
version of Default Semantics
• Two-dimensional perspective allows for the formalization of
pragmatic additions (effects of ‘modulation’, ‘enrichment’,…)
as sets of alternatives.
• The main content () resembles locutionary content: there
may not be a principle differentiating it from secondary
contents (unlike what is said/implicated), but is easily
identifiable in conversation.
• The ‘pre-formal’ use of context in two-dimensional semantics
is better conceived of as built into a contextualist semantic
theory, as a contributor to .
46
Indexicals vis-à-vis top-down modulation:
An experiment and a hypothesis
NCEs (necessary contextual elements, Larson et al. 2009: 80)
(7)
Irene: What shoes are you wearing to dinner?
Sam: I’m going to wear these shoes.
FACT: Sam has decided to wear the shoes in the upstairs
closet, not the ones he is currently putting on.
47
• Rate of ‘false’ responses: 86-92%
• Cf. contradiction control items: 98-99%
The difference is significant; subjects distinguish between
linguistically supplied and contextually supplied information,
even when there is no/little doubt concerning the referent.
48
?hypothesis: if bottom-up processing pairs with top-down
processing, then the two-dimensional analysis can be applied
equally to cases of modulation, including concept
construction.
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?hypothesis: if bottom-up processing pairs with top-down
processing, then the two-dimensional analysis can be applied
equally to cases of modulation, including concept
construction.
Questions arising: implications for the term ‘indexical’,
‘hidden-indexical theory’, the role of sense/mode of
presentation
vis-á-vis meaning eliminativism, late Wittgenstein
and evidence from neuropragmatics, e.g. Pulvermüller 2010)
50
Select references:
Brown, J. and H. Cappelen. 2011. ‘Assertion: An introduction and overview’.
In: Brown, J. and H. Cappelen (eds). Assertion: New Philosophical Essays.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-17.
Jaszczolt, K. M. 2005: Default Semantics: Foundations of a Compositional
Theory of Acts of Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jaszczolt, K. M. 2009. Representing Time: An Essay on Temporality as
Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jaszczolt, K. M. 2010. ‘Default Semantics’. In: B. Heine and H. Narrog (eds.)
The Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 193-221.
Kaplan, D. 1989a. ‘Demonstratives’. In: J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein
(eds). Themes from Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press, 481-563.
Kaplan, D. 1989b. ‘Afterthoughts’. In: J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds).
Themes from Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press, 565-614.
Korta, K. and J. Perry. 2007. ‘Radical minimalism, moderate contextualism’. In:
G. Preyer and G. Peter (eds). Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism:
New Essays on Semantics and Pragmatics. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
94-111.
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Larson, M. et al. 2009. ‘Distinguishing the Said from the Implicated using a
novel experimental paradigm’. In: U. Sauerland and K. Yatsushiro (eds).
Semantics and Pragmatics: From Experiment to Theory. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.74-93.
Perry, J. 2009. ‘Directing intentions’. In: J. Almog andP Leonardi (eds). The
Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 187-201.
Predelli, S. 2005. Contexts: Meaning, Truth, and the Use of Language. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Pulvermüller, F. 2010. ‘Brain-language research: Where is the progress?’.
Biolinguistics 4. 255-88.
Recanati, F. 2004. Literal Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Recanati, F. 2010. Truth-Conditional Pragmatics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Stalnaker, R. 1978. ‘Assertion’. Syntax and Semantics 9. New York: Academic
Press. Reprinted in R. Stalnaker, 1999, Context and Content, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 78-95.
Stalnaker, R. 2011. ‘The essential contextual’. In: Brown, J. and H. Cappelen
(eds). Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 137-150.
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