LECTURE 13
VARIETIES OF ANTI-REALISM
AND VAN INWAGEN’S EXAMPLE
WHAT’S WRONG WITH WEAK
VERIFICATIONISM?
CONSIDER AGAIN THE CLAIMS OF SCIENCE. THE CONFIRMATION OF A
STATEMENT (SAY, EINSTEIN’S GENERAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY)
INVOLVES ALSO ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT MEASUREMENT AND THE
ACCEPTED CONSEQUENCES OF OTHER THEORIES. A STATEMENT IS
NEVER JUST CONFIRMED BY ITSELF, BUT ONLY AS IT IS EMBEDDED IN A
(SOMETIMES ELABORATE) THEORY.
IT IS WORTH NOTICING THAT MORAL CLAIMS DO NOT HAVE THE
APPROPRIATE KIND OF TESTABLE CONSEQUENCES. VERIFICATIONISTS
(CONSISTENTLY) CONCLUDED THAT SUCH SENTENCES ARE
“COGNITIVELY” MEANINGLESS.
WHEN WEAK VERIFICATIONISTS TRIED TO EXPLAIN
“CONFIRMATION AS PART OF A THEORY,” THEY
FOUND THAT ANY SENTENCE COULD BE
CONFIRMED AS PART OF A THEORY
FOR EXAMPLE, LET GENERAL RELATIVITY PLUS (NN) “THE NOTHING
NOTHINGS” BE CALLED “HEIDIGGERIAN GENERAL RELATIVITY”. THIS
THEORY IS CONFIRMED BY ITS CONSEQUENCES JUST LIKE GENERAL
RELATIVITY. “WELL, YOU DON’T NEED THAT WEIRD PART TO GET THE
CONSEQUENCES!” TRUE, BUT THE SAME HOLDS FOR OTHER
SENTENCES OF THE THEORY. ANYWAY, WE CAN PERVERSELY HIDE (NN)
IN THE THEORY IS SUCH A WAY THAT YOU WOULD HAVE TO USE
SOMETHING CONTAINING IT TO GET TESTABLE CONSEQUENCES.
WE OMIT HISTORICAL DETAILS OF THE
ATTEMPTS TO REPAIR (WV)
THE UPSHOT WAS THAT ALL THE ATTEMPTS TO EXPLAIN
CONFIRMATION AS USED IN (WV) EITHER RULED OUT LARGE PARTS OF
SCIENCE OR LET IN LARGE PARTS OF METAPHYSICS (SOME OF WHICH
REALLY DOES SEEM MEANINGLESS). VERIFICATIONISTS CERTAINLY
WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE CLAIM THAT SCIENCE IS MEANINGLESS.
THEY WANTED TO RULE OUT ALL (OR LARGE PARTS) OF METAPHYSICS.
BUT THE BABY SEEMED TO GO OUT WITH THE BATH WATER.
THE MOST PROMINANT PHILOSOPHICAL MOVEMENT IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY THAT PURSUED THIS IDEA WAS THE LOGICAL
POSITIVISTS (A.K.A. “LOGICAL EMPIRICISTS.”)
MAYBE THIS IS JUST A TECHNICAL
GLITCH
MAYBE SO, BUT WEAK VERIFICATIONISM DOES NOT YIELD A PLAUSIBLE
THEORY OF MEANING (AND TRUTH) IN ANY CASE. THERE ARE MANY
OTHER PROBLEMS. “CONFIRMABLE BY WHOM?” “IS WV ITSELF
CONFIRMABLE (AND SO MEANINGFUL BY ITS OWN LIGHTS)?” “THERE
IS A CERTAIN PIECE OF SPACE DUST OUT BEYOND ANDROMEDA
GALAXY THAT HAS SUCH AND SUCH A MASS.” IS THIS CONFIRMABLE?
THE STORY IS NOT OVER. THERE ARE MODERN VERSIONS OF
VERIFICATIONISM THAT ARE STILL ALIVE (AND, MAYBE, WELL).
SOME FELLOW TRAVELERS
RICHARD RORTY SAYS THE TWO OPTIONS ABOUT TRUTH ARE:
(1) “TRUTH IS …WHAT OUR PEERS WILL LET US GET AWAY
WITH SAYING.”
(PRAGMATIC-RORTY CONCEPTION)
(2) “TRUTH IS CONTACT WITH REALITY.” (REALIST
CONCEPTION)
ONE OUGHT TO CHOOSE BETWEEN THESE TWO
CONCEPTIONS. THE FORMER TAKES TRUTH TO BE “WHAT IS
GOOD FOR US TO BELIEVE”(?)
SOME OBJECTIONS TO
“RORTY - TRUTH”
(1) ALSTON THINKS THAT (AT BOTTOM) RORTY IS APPEALING TO THE
“VEIL OF PERCEPTION” ARGUMENT BASED ON A KIND OF
VERIFICATIONISM. (THIS PART OF RORTY’S ARGUMENT IS NOT
INCLUDED IN OUR READING)
(2) WE MIGHT ADD: PEOPLE HAVE DIFFERENT PEERS. MY PEERS
WOULD LET ME GET AWAY WITH SAYING “GOD DOES NOT EXIST” BUT
THE PEERS OF MANY PEOPLE, SAY IN THE RURAL MIDWEST, WOULD
NOT LET THEM GET AWAY WITH SAYING THAT. SO IS IT BOTH “RORTYTRUE” AND “RORTY-FALSE”? IS THIS REALLY A KIND OF TRUTH?
(3) RORTY’S PEERS HAVE NOT LET HIM GET AWAY WITH SAYING THAT
TRUTH IS WHAT YOUR PEERS WILL LET YOU GET AWAY WITH SAYING.
WITTGENSTEIN AND THE “LANGUAGE-GAME
THEORY” OF JUSTIFICATION
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN
1889-1951
WITTGENSTEIN HELD THAT DIFFERENT
“LANGUAGE-GAMES” OR “FORMS OF
LIFE”HAVE DIFFERENT STANDARDS OF
JUSTIFICATION
SCIENTIFIC THEORIZING, RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE, EXPERIENTIAL
REPORTS, … CONSTITUTE DIFFERENT ‘LANGUAGE GAMES’ AND THEY
HAVE DIFFERENT STANDARDS OF JUSTIFICATION.
QUICK RESPONSE: EVEN SO, UNLESS WE IDENTIFY JUSTIFICATION
WITH TRUTH (A KIND OF VERIFICATIONISM), IT DOESN’T FOLLOW THAT
THERE ARE DIFFERENT ‘KINDS’ OF TRUTH. MANY RELIGIOUS PEOPLE
THINK THAT ‘GOD EXISTS’ IS JUST, WELL, TRUE IN THE OBJECTIVE
SENSE (WHATEVER THEY MAY THINK OF THE STANDARDS OF
JUSTIFICATION OF SUCH A STATEMENT).
ALSTON’S POSITIVE ARGUMENT FOR REALISM
WITH RESPECT TO TRUTH
ALSTON THINKS THAT OUR ORDINARY UNDERSTANDING OF THE
CONTENT OF A (MEANINGFUL, DECLARATIVE) SENTENCE ALREADY
ENTAILS A COMMITMENT TO A REALISTIC ACCOUNT OF TRUTH. THIS
MEANS THAT THE ANTI-REALIST MUST FIND A DIFFERENT WAY TO
INTERPRET SUCH SENTENCES.
SEMANTIC PRINCIPLE: IN A SUBJECT-PREDICATE SENTENCE, ‘S IS P’,
THE SUBJECT TERM ‘S’ PICKS OUT SOMETHING OR OTHER AND THE
PREDICATE ‘P’ EXPRESSES A PROPERTY THAT IS ATTRIBUTED TO WHAT
THE SUBJECT TERM PICKS OUT.
IT SEEMS INEVITABLE THAT SUCH A SENTENCE IS
TRUE IF AND ONLY IF THE THING PICKED OUT HAS
THE ATTRIBUTE ATTRIBUTED.
ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS OF TRUTH MUST HOLD THAT THE SENTENCE
DOES NOT HAVE THE CONTENT REQUIRED BY THE SEMANTIC
PRINCIPLE. ALSTON GOES ON TO EXAMINE SOME OF THE ATTEMPTS
TO RE-INTERPRET (ACCORDING TO ALSTON) ORDINARY DECLARATIVE
SENTENCES. WE WON’T GO INTO THESE. TO ALSTON, THEY ALL SEEM
TO MIS-INTERPRET THE SENTENCES.
VAN INWAGEN’S “MOUNTAIN
EXAMPLE”
VAN INWAGEN GIVES AN EXAMPLE OF SOMETHING HE
CLAIMS IS JUST OBJECTIVELY TRUE AND CONSIDERS
ANTI-REALIST OBJECTIONS. TO SIMPLIFY, LET’S USE
(PRETEND OR READ AS “AT LEAST”):
“MT. EVEREST IS 8000 METERS HIGH”
THIS IS JUST A GEOLOGICAL TRUTH, HAVING NOTHING
TO DO WITH HUMAN KNOWLEDGE, SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTS, PEER AGREEMENT, AGREEMENT IN
THE LONG RUN, VALIDATION, OR… ANY ANTI-REALIST
SUBSTITUTES FOR OBJECTIVE TRUTH.
OF COURSE, THE INTENTION IS THAT ONE
TAKE THIS AS JUST PLAIN TRUE
ACCORDING TO THE SEMANTIC PRINCIPLE, THIS IS
TRUE IF THE MOUNTAIN REFERRED TO BY THE
SUBJECT HAS THE PROPERTY EXPRESSED BY THE
PREDICATE.
ANTI-REALIST OBJECTION: “ IT IS A HUMAN
CONVENTION THAT THIS NAME IS USED AND THAT A
CERTAIN (ARBITRARY) STANDARD OF MEASUREMENT
IS BEING USED. THESE ARE HUMAN CONSTRUCTIONS
OR CONVENTIONS.”
REALIST REPLY
IT IS OF COURSE CONVENTIONAL THAT THE NAME REFERS TO A
CERTAIN MOUNTAIN AND THAT THE OTHER WORDS MEAN WHAT
THEY DO IN ENGLISH. BUT THE FACT EXPRESSED IS NOT THEREBY
MADE CONVENTIONALLY TRUE.
“EL MONTE EVEREST ES OCHO MIL METROS DE ALTURA.”
“MOUNT EVEREST YN WYTH MILIWN METR UCHEL.”
EXPRESS THE SAME FACT AND WHAT (ALL THREE OF) THESE
SENTENCES SAY WOULD BE TRUE EVEN IF IT IS NOT SAID IN ANY
LANGUAGE: A CERTAIN MOUNTAIN HAS A CERTAIN OBJECTIVE
HEIGHT.
ALTHOUGH THE ANTI-REALIST WILL NOT AGREE,
ALSTON SEEMS CORRECT IN SAYING WE ALWAYS
PUT FORWARD SUCH CLAIMS AS OBJECTIVELY
TRUE.
SOME ANTI-REALISTS HAVE TRIED TO
CONSTRUCT A DIFFERENT KIND OF
SEMANTICS, CLAIMING THAT THE NONREALIST SEMANTICS IS REALLY WHAT IS
MEANT. THE STRUGGLE IS NOT OVER
BETWEEN REALISTS AND ANTI-REALISTS