LAGUA-Proportionate-Regulatory-Policies-for-the-MSME

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Proportionate Regulatory Policies for the MSME Sector

BENEL P. LAGUA

President and COO

Small Business Corporation

Philippines

Version as of 24-06-2011.

Presentation Outline

1.

Importance of MSME Sector

2.

Role of Government

3.

General Practices on Proportionate

Regulatory Policies

4.

The Philippine Response

5.

Policy Execution

6.

Conclusion

*The views expressed herein are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Small Business Corporation.

Importance of MSME Sector

 The economic impact of MSMEs:

 MSMEs make up 99.6% of total Philippine establishments and makes the following contributions to the Philippine economy

 61% of employment

 32% of value-added

 60% of exports

 MSMEs are largely dependent on the banking system for financing

 MSMEs are disadvantaged due to size, higher unit transaction cost, perceived risks, and financial infrastructure distortions

The Role of Government in MSME

Development

 Facilitate MSMEs’ access to credit from formal institutions by:

 Crafting policies that will allow for a borderless credit access by MSMEs and ensuring effective implementation of such policies

 Creating a regulatory environment for banks conducive to MSME lending

 Capacitating both banks and MSMEs

 Absorbing some costs of programs aimed at increasing MSMEs’ access to credit

 Addressing market failure, leveling the playing field

Proportionate Policies

 “One size does not fit all”

 Regulation and supervision can be expensive to implement, and costly when it fails

 Need for affirmative action and tiered regulation—

 Differing regulatory requirements based on market capitalization

 Reduce discrimination

 Scale regulatory treatment

General Practices on Proportionate Policies

[World Bank, CSBFA, RBI, SBA, CRA, CGAP]

 Guarantee Schemes (more than half of all counties in the world have a guarantee program)

 Directed Credit Programs

 Interest Rate Subsidies

 Regulatory Subsidies, e.g. lower provisioning

 Regulations Concerning Documentation

 Establishment of Credit Registries to address information asymmetry

 Priority Sector Lending, e.g. mandatory credit laws, PSL in India,

Community Reinvestment Act in the USA

The Philippine Response

1.

Magna Carta for MSMEs or RA 9501 (2008)

 Required that banks allot at least 8% for micro and small and 2% for medium enterprise in their total loan portfolio

 Strengthened the Small Business Corporation, a specialized financing and guarantee institution for

MSMEs

2.

Barangay Micro Business Enterprise (BMBE) Law (2002)

 Provides income tax exemption, minimum wage exemption, and other benefits such as special credit window and other forms of assistance programs for micro enterprises

The Philippine Response

3.

Credit Information System Act or CISA (2008) or RA 9510

 Mandates the creation of a credit information bureau that will serve as a central registry of repository of credit information including credit history and financial condition of borrowers

 Promotes an efficient credit information system that will address financial institutions’ concerns on all their credit-related activities

4.

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Regulations and Circulars on SME

Lending

 Capital requirements, loan documentation, risk weights

5.

BSP Regulatory Framework on Microfinance:

 Encouraged the establishment of microfinance-oriented banks and has a specialized microfinance regulatory unit. This allowed non-collateralized lending to the sector based on cash flow.

In theory, the Philippines is adopting the menu of proportionate regulatory policies.

What is the problem?

Policy Execution

1.

a) Magna Carta for MSMEs or RA 9501 (2008)

 On the mandatory credit allocation

 Compliance report too broad / Not transparent

 Overall, banking sector appear to be compliant with the requirements of the law, but at the margin especially in micro and small—8.5% vs. mandated 8.0%

 Individual performance of banks reveal, however, that many big banks remain under-complied

 Some banks cover for the deficiency of other financial institutions

 Lending figures to micro and small business sector is flat over the past 10 years—Negative real growth is observed.

 Moral Hazard problem; Penalty structure for non-compliance is cheap/uniform and biased against smaller banks

Policy Execution

1.

b) Magna Carta for MSMEs or RA 9501 (2008)

On SB Corporation

Self-sustaining. No government infusion in the past 19 years. Declares Dividends.

No sovereign guarantee. Another GFI whose main mandate is guarantee for (large) export firms has a sovereign guarantee feature.

 Limited capitalization when benchmarked against guarantee corporations in Asia; multiple objectives.

Recent increased capitalization remains in paper

 Supervision not much different from “standard” prudential supervision of banks

Policy Execution

1.

b) Magna Carta for MSMEs or RA 9501 (2008)

On SB Corporation

 No clear appreciation of nature of guarantee corporation

 Costs incurred by the government in implementing MSME financing programs (e.g credit guarantees) may not be directly recoverable using revenues per se as a measure

 Full cost recovery could not be achieved without compromising the objective of facility finance to small business.

 Cost-recovery can be measured through the underlying economic impact of MSME programs (i.e taxes for government, productivity, employment, income, economic growth, etc.)…[Canada SBFA Report]

Policy Execution

2.

Barangay Micro Business Enterprise (BMBE) Law

(2002)

 Reluctance from executing agencies (i.e DOF and LGUs concerned about losses due to tax exemption granted to BMBEs)

3.

Credit Information System Act or CISA (2008) or RA

9510

 Still awaiting full implementation after almost 3 years that the law has been signed

 Lack of funds to support the mandate, including the creation of the credit information corporation

Policy Execution

4.

a) Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Regulations and

Circulars on SME Lending

 On Loan Documentation:

 Requires the submission of BIR-submitted Income Tax

Return (ITR) upon loan application, including its waiver of confidentiality and its annual submission

 Moratorium on submission granted for MSMEs, but to expire in December 2011

 After 2011, small business loans without documents to be classified as “especially mentioned”

 ITRs rarely reflect true condition of an enterprise. Should the exemption be extended?

Policy Execution

4.

b) Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Regulations and

Circulars on SME Lending

 On loan classification

 Reduced risk weight of MSME portfolio from 100% to

75%

 Subject to conditions like meeting certain prudential norms, including PDR of not more than 5% and a highly diversified portfolio with not less than 500 accounts

 Questions on appropriateness of conditional prudential standards to enjoy risk weight reduction benefit

Policy Execution

4.

c) Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)

Regulations and Circulars on SME Lending

 On loan classification

 Loans to exports to the extent guaranteed by SBC with 20% risk weight

 Loans to exporters to the extent guaranteed by

GFSME with 0% risk weight so long as these are outstanding upon merger

 Loans to exporters guaranteed by SBC in postmerger as 20% risk weight though these may be renewals

 Is the reduced risk weight sufficient incentive to banks utilizing the guarantee?

Policy Execution

4.

d) Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Regulations and Circulars on SME Lending

 On unsecured loans

 In theory, no technical prohibition for granting of loans without collateral except for DOSRI limits

 However, an unsecured loan for banks’ risk-based

CAR is a 100% risk weight on capital

 Also, in the event the loan turns past due, loan loss provisioning is immediately high

 Not eligible for rediscounting

 Effectively, there is disincentive to lending without collateral

Policy Execution

4.

e) Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)

Regulations and Circulars on SME Lending

 Supported the creation of independent Credit

Surety Fund (CSF) set aside by LGUs

 Provides guarantee which secures the loan of

MSMEs with local banks and facilitates lending without collateral

 CSFs are too small and without muscle; model is not cognizant of how guarantee programs work

Policy Execution

4.

f) Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Regulations and

Circulars on SME Lending

 Reserve Requirements

 PFIs of SB Corp are exempted from reserve requirements by BSP under SBC Wholesale Lending

Program, encouraging banks to expand their MSME loan portfolio

 However, BSP also runs its rediscounting window, sometimes at concessionary/subsidized rates, in competition with GFIs’ wholesale lending programs

Policy Execution

5.

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Regulatory

Framework on Microfinance

 Issuance of circulars governing the practice of microfinance in the banking sector—rediscounting, recognition of microfinance (no collateral, loan documentation), allow branching, etc.

 Modified Manual of Examination

 Promotion and Advocacy

 Philippines cited by EIU as having the best overall regulatory environment for microfinance on banks.

However, BSP does not cover NGOs and cooperatives.

Conclusion

 Execution is opaque

 Implementing rules not following the spirit of basic law

 Under-funded and undersized programs—not commensurate to mandate; unwillingness to make the investment

 Inter-agency conflict—apparent weakness in coordination

 Business model inconsistent with program objectives

 Costs and benefits of some proportionate regulatory schemes not well-measured

 Objectives are at cross-purpose

 Major changes in Microfinance; Uneven policy execution in SME Finance.

Conclusion

Government intervention by way of proportionate regulatory action must:

 Focus on reducing risks and transaction costs associated with MSME lending

 Balance the benefits of regulation/supervision against the costs and risks of no regulation/supervision

 Aim for consistency across stakeholders and institutions

Conclusion

 Government intervention by way of proportionate regulatory action must:

 Serve as co-investor, thus, a source of risk capital

 Educate private capital on how to lend to SME

(capacity building)

 Channel capital in strategic directions

 Be designed for effective implementation, execution, and enforcement

 Be “enlightened”

References

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

ADB (2000), “The Role of Central Banks in Asia and the Pacific: Overview”

( http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Central_Banks_Microfinance/Overview/chap_

05.pdf

)

Canada Small Business Financing Act (2009), “Comprehensive Review Report 2004-

2009),” [ http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/collections/collection_2010/ic/Iu188-1-2009eng.pdf

]

CGAP (2011), “Recommendations for Proportionate Regulation and Supervision of

Microfinance,” INCITRAL Colloquium on Microfinance

Clinton, Lindsay (2010), “India Journal: What’s Policy Got to Do With Social

Enterprise?” ( http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2010/12/06/india-journal-whatspolicy-got-to-do-with-social-enterprise/ )

Fan, Qimiao (The World Bank), Presentation during the “Workshop on Improving

Access to Finance for SMEs in Asia-Pacific Region, June 16-17, 2008 http://blogs.worldbank.org/allaboutfinance http://dnb.com.au/Header/News/Banking_on_SMEs/indexdl_7334.aspx

http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?publicationSubCategoryId=66&articleId=697537

6.

7.

8.

9.

Sibold, S. (2005), “Addressing the Burden of Regulation in Canada—The Case for

Proportionate Regulation,”

( http://www.tfmsl.ca/Documents/StephenSiboldPropReg.pdf

)

10.

Thornley, B. et al (2011), “Case 12: Priority Sector Lending,” in Impact Investing, A

Framework for Policy Design and Analysis

( http://www.pacificcommunityventures.org/insight/impactinvesting/report/12-

Priority_Sector_Lending.pdf

)

11.

Wikipedia, Community Reinvestment Act

( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Community_Reinvestment_Act )

END.

THANK YOU!!!

blagua@sbgfc.org.ph

www.sbgfc.org.ph

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