The Future of the Navy-Coast Guard
Relationship in Canada
Atlantic Council of Canada Roundtable
13 September 2012
[email protected] 902-494-6444
Halifax MARINE RESEARCH Institute
Aim
• To conduct a ‘blue sky’ vision session
• To discuss five questions in open forum
CFPS Research Project
CFPS Research Workshop
“Western Hemisphere
Perspectives and
Approaches to Future
Maritime Security
Challenges”
Published: 22 June 2010
Conducted: 27-29 October 2011
Five Questions
1. How does the Canadian Navy-Coast Guard
Relationship compare internationally?
2. Should the Canadian Coast Guard be armed?
3. What should the role of the Canadian Coast Guard be
in time of conflict or war?
4. Should the Royal Canadian Navy do more or less in
support of Canadian law enforcement?
5. How will the relationship between the RCN and CCG
evolve in arctic patrolling operations?
Outline
•
•
•
•
•
•
The geographic context
The CCG-Navy by the Numbers (Q1)
A Typology Analysis of Ships (Q2)
The Relationship in Conflict and War (Q3)
The Roles of the Sea Services (Q4)
Navy-Coast Guard in the Arctic (Q5)
Present Size of Canada’s Offshore
Rank
Country
Size of EEZ
1
USA
11,351,000 km²
7
Indonesia
6,100,000 km²
8
Canada
5,599,077 km²
9
Japan
4,500,000 km²
Future Size of Canada’s Offshore
Rank
Country
Size of EEZ
1
USA
11,351,000 km²
4
Russia
7,500,000 km²
5
Canada
7,499,151 km²
6
U.K.
6,800,000 km²
+33.9%
CFPS Research Project
Coast Guard-Navy Functions and Organizational Overlaps
150 states have coastlines – 72 have coast guards
Home
Civil
Reactive
Para-Military
Away
Military
Proactive
Source: J Matthew Gillis, The Global Navy/Coast Guard Relationship, CFPS, 2010
Navy Only 28
Coast Guard & Navy 63
USCG
Military Coast Guard & Navy 9
USN
Para Military Coast Guard & Navy 53
CCG Coast Guard 2
Civil
RCMP
?
Coast Guard Only 9
Navy 2 RCN
CFPS Research Workshop
Strategy Begins with Awareness – Similarities & Differences
Language
Free Societies
Allied
Economies
Democracies
Borders
Arts
Sports
Families
Republic
Currency
History
Policies
Strategy Driven
9/11
United States
Landmass = 1: 1.01
Coastline = 1: 10.29
Monarchy
Currency
History
Policies
Management Driven
Canada
Pop., Economy, Capacity = 10: 1
Context, Context, Context is Key
Source: Hansen – Rutgers University, “Institutional Misalignment,” 8 November 2011
‘Average’ Coast Guard(s) by Pop.
Avg. civilian model is 27.2% of the manpower
strength of the regular force naval strength = 2,998
people;
Average paramilitary model is 20.9% of naval
strength = 2,304 people; or
Average military model runs is 12.2% of naval
strength = 1,345 people.
In Canada, the CCG is 84.2% of naval strength =
9,350 people.
Source: J Matthew Gillis, The Global Navy/Coast Guard Relationship, CFPS, 2010
Question #1
How does the Canadian Navy-Coast Guard
Relationship compare internationally?
Typology of Vessels
Civil
Military
Source: NATO Standardization Agreement 1166MT “Standard Ship Designator System,” 2 Oct. 2000
Combatants
• Naval, Coastguard and Government-owned vessels/craft which
possess some sort of inherent armed or combat capability
primarily intended for offensive use. The general rationale
behind the groupings for combatant vessels is as follows:
• SS - Submarines
• DD - Principle Surface Combatants
• PB - [Coastal] Patrol Vessels
• PC - River/Roadstead Patrol Vessels
• MM - Mine Warfare Vessels
• LL - Amphibious Warfare Vessels
• WW - Coastguard: All vessels or craft owned or operated by a
Coastguard service
V – Police vessel or craft
Z – Government vessel or craft
Source: NATO Standardization Agreement 1166MT “Standard Ship Designator System,” 2 Oct. 2000
Non-Combatants
• Auxiliary, Service Support or Merchant/Recreational Vessel
types, which tend to be role specific. They may possess an
armed or combat capability intended primarily for self defence
purposes. The general groupings follow:
• AA - Auxiliary Vessels (General)
• YY - Service Craft
• VJ – Police Hovercraft
• ZS – Government Submersibles
• TM – Merchant (General)
• TU – Fishing (General)
• YAC – Pleasure Craft (Yacht)
Source: NATO Standardization Agreement 1166MT “Standard Ship Designator System,” 2 Oct. 2000
Typology of Vessels (I)
Military
Civil
Non-Combatants
Combatants
7 types
5 types
YAC
TM/U
VJ/ZS
YY
?
AA
WDD
Coast
Guard
Armed - Defensive
MM
PC
PB
DD
SS
Navy
Naval
?
?
LL
Coast
Guard
Armed - Offensive
Source: NATO Standardization Agreement 1166MT “Standard Ship Designator System,” 2 Oct. 2000
Non-Combatants
• Auxiliary, Service Support or Merchant/Recreational Vessel
types, which tend to be role specific. They may possess an
armed or combat capability intended primarily for self defence
purposes. The general groupings follow:
• AA - Auxiliary Vessels (General)
Service and Support
• YY - Service Craft
Government Owned
• VJ – Police Hovercraft
• ZS – Government Submersibles
Merchant
• TM – Merchant (General)
• TU – Fishing (General)
Recreational
• YAC – Pleasure Craft (Yacht)
Source: NATO Standardization Agreement 1166MT “Standard Ship Designator System,” 2 Oct. 2000
Typology of Vessels (II)
Military
Civil
Non-Combatants
Combatants
7 types
5 types
Civil
YAC
TM/U
Unarmed
Government-owned
Service Support Auxiliary
VJ/ZS
YY
AA
Armed - Defensive
WDD
Coast
Guard
LL
MM
PC
PB
DD
SS
Navy
Armed - Offensive
Source: NATO Standardization Agreement 1166MT “Standard Ship Designator System,” 2 Oct. 2000
[Canadian] Typology of Vessels
Military
Civil
Non-Combatants
Combatants
5 types
6 types
Civil
YAC
Government-owned
Service Support
Auxiliary
TM/U WPGB
VJ/ZS
YY
AOR
Naval
LL
MM
PC
PB
DD
‘Sustain’
AD/AS/AR
‘Support’
AE/AF/AO
‘Supply’
Unarmed
Armed - Defensive
Armed - Offensive
Source: Hansen, “Canadian Naval Operational Logistics: Lessons Learned, Lost, and Relearned?” The
Northern Mariner, Vol. XX, No. 4 (October 2010): 361-383.
SS
Hybridized Vessels Problems
Military
Civil
Non-Combatants
Combatants
5 types
6 types
Civil
YAC
Government-owned
Service Support
Auxiliary
TM/U WPGB
Cdn Coast Guard
T-AGB
US Military Sealift
T-AKE
T-AFS
Unarmed
VJ/ZS
YY
AOR
Naval
LL
MM
PC
PB
DD
SS
‘Sustain’
AOPS?
Armed - Defensive
JSS?
Armed - Offensive
Source: NATO Standardization Agreement 1166MT “Standard Ship Designator System,” 2 Oct. 2000
Cross-Border Crime
• Two-way problem
• Criminal organizations seek
vulnerabilities in geography and
enforcement
• Organized crime is the most
prevalent threat encountered
• Over 100 crime groups and 90
criminal entrepreneurs involved in
cross-border crime
Link: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ibet-eipf/reportsrapports/2010-threat-menace-eng.htm
“Crime moves swiftly to exploit ‘gap’ areas”
Source: CSupt. Joe Oliver, RCMP, Maritime Security Workshop, 29 October 2011
Institutional
National
A National Alignment Plan?
Culture
Gov’t
Cmtte
Dept
Dept
Panel
Tactical
Manager
?
Conflict Coexist Coordinate
?
Cooperate
?
Collaborate
Degree of Alignment
Conglomerate
Source: Hansen – CJSOE Security Conf., “Institutional Change,” 4 June 2012
Question #2
Should the Canadian Coast Guard be armed?
National Shipbuilding Strategy
28 Large Vessels
• Combat Ships:
–Arctic & Offshore Patrol Ships (6+2)
–Canadian Surface Combatants (15)
• Non-Combat Ships:
–CCG Science Vessels (4)
–DND Joint Support Ships (2+1)
–CCG Polar Icebreaker (1)
Source: NSPS Media Tech Briefing, 18 Oct 2011
The Peace-Conflict Continuum
Source: WT. Johnsen, Redefining Land Power for the 21st Century, US Army War College, Strategic
Studies Institute, 1998
Coast Guard in Conflict or War?
Far from emphasizing the extreme case of amphibious
assault against defended beachheads, traditional naval
support roles in expeditionary warfare most
commonly involve cover, administrative support, and
supply operations. These are not departures from
history. Rather, they are the usual, but nonetheless
essential, roles of naval forces in expeditionary
warfare.
Source: Milan Vego, Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas
(London: Frank Cass, 2003), 269.
Questions #3
What should the role of the Canadian
Coast Guard be in time of conflict or
war?
The Three Functional Roles of ‘Maritime Security Forces’
Use of
the Sea
Military Role
Ken Booth’s Triangle - Navies and Foreign Policies, 1977, 15-16.
Adapted from: Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontier, 2005, 18.
A “Tri-Modal” Force Structure
• Military Role (How will Canada fight?)
- High-end combat capabilities
- Sustainment of Operations
• Constabulary Role (When to use naval force?)
- Low-end combat capabilities
- Support to OGDs
• Diplomatic Role (What do Canadians expect?)
- Support to Humanitarian Support & Disaster
Relief
- Supply to Capacity Building and Assistance
Efforts
Adapted from: Hughes, “A Bi-Modal Force Structure for National Maritime Strategy,”
Naval War College Review, Spring 2007, 29-47.
The Three Roles of ‘Maritime Security Forces’
Use of
the Sea
Military Role
In the presence of a recognized military threat.
Ken Booth’s Triangle - Navies and Foreign Policies, 1977, 15-16.
Source: Hansen, POLI 3591, Issues in Contemporary Maritime Security, Lecture 8.
Where is the Navy Going? Future Surface Combatants?
Image:http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/images/future_surface_combatant3.jpg
Ken Booth’s Triangle - Navies and Foreign Policies, 1977, 15-16.
Use of
the Sea
Constabulary Role
When criminal activity impedes or restricts legitimate activity.
The Three Roles of ‘Maritime Security Forces’
Source: Hansen, POLI 3591, Issues in Contemporary Maritime Security, Lecture 8.
Where is the navy going? Naval Arctic & Offshore Patrol Ship?
Source: http://www.forces.gc.ca/admmat-smamat/documents/Big%20AOPS%20pics/AOaftstbd2.jpg
Where is the coast guard going? Mid-shore Patrol Cutters?
Specifications for the new Mid-Shore Patrol Vessel / Damen Stan Patrol 4207:
Length overall: 42.80 m
Speed range: 23.0 - 30.0 knots (42.6 - 55.5 km/h)
Ship's Boat: RHIB (rigid hull inflatable boat)
Source: http://www.casr.ca/doc-news-mid-shore-patrol-vessel-2009.htm
Image: http://www.damen.nl/PRODUCTS/Damen_Stan_Patrol_4207.aspx?mId=8643&rId=150&Big=1
Ken Booth’s Triangle - Navies and Foreign Policies, 1977, 15-16.
Use of
the Sea
Diplomatic Role
When foreign policy goals/national interest are at stake.
The Three Roles of ‘Maritime Security Forces’
Source: Hansen, POLI 3591, Issues in Contemporary Maritime Security, Lecture 8.
Where is the navy going? JSS or Oiler-Replenisher?
Left - Berlin-class
(Germany)
Right - Mistral-class
amphibious assault,
command and force
projection ship (France)
Images: German and French navies.
Ken Booth’s Triangle – Adapted for the ‘New Security Environment’.
Reputation
Response
Compassion
Respect
Military Role
Peace
The Three Roles of ‘Maritime Security Forces’
Source: Hansen, POLI 3591, Issues in Contemporary Maritime Security, Lecture 8.
Questions #4
Should the Royal Canadian Navy do more or
less in support of Canadian law
enforcement?
Canada’s 18 Icebreakers
Type
Number
Notes
Built
Not same class
1968, ‘83
Medium 4 (–1)
Amundsen: scientific
1979-‘87
Light
High Endurance &
Multi-purpose
Medium Endurance &
Multi-purpose
Air Cushion Vehicles
1970,
1986-‘87
1968,
1985-‘86
Heavy
2
Arctic/Gulf Icebreakers
7 (1+6)
River Icebreakers
Light
3 (1+2)
Light
2
2009
Source: Hansen – Sino-Canadian Conf., “Practical Arctic Security,” 26 June 2012
CCGS Louis St. Laurent
‘Heavy’ [Arctic] Icebreaker
Image: shipspotting.net
CCGS Amundsen
T1200-class ‘Medium’ [Gulf] Icebreaker
Image: Marc Tawil Arctic Net
CCGS Sir William Alexander
T1100-class ‘Light’ [River] Icebreaker
Image: shipspotter.com
AOPS Deficiencies?
• “Endurance: 6,800 nm at 14 knots transit speed
– 6,800 nm ‘not enough’ according to CCG;
– Should be able to increase range with speed of
10 knots (+/-10,000 nm).”
• AOPS is “slow and dumb” according to Senator
Colin Kenny; it is a “slushbreaker.”
Source: AOPS Briefing, Project Manager, Dalhousie University, 5 Oct 2011.
Where Does AOPS ‘fit’ as an Icebreaker?
Class
Displace’t
Length
Beam
Draught
Engines
Motors
Speed
Range
Endurance
Bunkers
St. Laurent
11,345 t.
119.6 m.
24.4 m.
9.9 m.
29,400 kw
20,142 kw
20 kts
23,000 nm
205 days
3,500 m³
T1200
6,097
98.2
19.8
7.4
17,700
12,174
16.5
15,000
192
2,200
T1100
3,809
83.0
16.2
5.8
8,847
5,250
16.5
6,500
120
785
AOPS
5,730
97.5
19.0
5.7
13,200
9,000
17
6,800
120
690
25
CCG Class Comparisons (I)
20
15
St Laurent
10
T1200
5
T1100
.5
1.0
KNM
1.5
2.0
Range
2.5
3.0
3.5
25
CCG Class Comparisons (II)
St Laurent
20
15
T1200
10
T1100
5
.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Bunkers
3.0
Km³
3.5
AOPS Class Analysis
25
St Laurent
20
15
T1200
St Laurent
10
AOPS
5
T1100
AOPS
T1200
T1100
.5
1.0
KNM
1.5
2.0
Range
2.5
Bunkers
3.0
Km³
3.5
AOPS V1 versus V2
Class
Displace’t
Length
Beam
Draught
Engines
Motors
Speed
Range
Endurance
Bunkers
T1200
6,097 t
98.2 m
19.8 m
7.4 m
17,700 kw
12,174 kw
16.5 kts
15,000 nm
192 days
2,200 m³
AOPS V1
6,940
109.6
18.2
7.0
18,000
15,000
20
8000 e
120
810 e
Note: e = estimated using change in displacement.
AOPS V2
5,730
97.5
19.0
5.7
13,200
9,000
17
6,800
120
690
Change
-17.4%
-11.0%
+4.4%
-18.6%
-27%
-40%
-15%
-17.4 e
NC
-17.4 e
AOPS Class Analysis (II)
25
St Laurent
20
AOPS1
15
T1200
St Laurent
10
AOPS2
5
T1100
AOPS2
AOPS1
T1200
T1100
.5
1.0
KNM
1.5
2.0
Range
2.5
Bunkers
3.0
Km³
3.5
Naval Bias Against Fuel Capacity
Class
St. Laurent
Displacem’t 11,345 t
Bunkers*
3500 m³
Ratio (D)
.31 m³/t
T1200 T1100 AOPS V2
6,097 3,809 5,730
2,200 785
690
.36
.21
V2 = .120
V1 = .117
Halifax-class frigates: ratio = .10 per tonne of displacement
Note*: Assumes 10% of total fuel capacity unusable/not loaded.
CCGS Radisson refuelling HMCS Toronto, Operation Nanook, 2008
Image: Canadian Naval Review, Vol. 7, No.4 (Winter 2012): 18.
CCG Fuel Consumption
Class
St. Laurent
T1200
T1100
Endurance
Bunkers
‘Min.’ Rate*
‘Normal’ Rate
‘High’ Rate
205 days
3500 m³
15.4 m³/day
30 m³/day e
75 m³/day e
192
2,200
10.3
20.0
50.0
120
785
5.9
10 e
25 e
[+/-1000 m³/day]
Note*: Assumes 10% of total fuel capacity unusable/not loaded.
Source: Mr. N. Hawksworth – C. Eng. CCG, Atlantic Region
RCN Sustainment of CCG Operations
Class
T1200
Gain
T1100 Gain
Bunkers
Min. Rate
‘Normal’ Rate
‘High’ Rate
2,200 m³
10.3 m³/day
20.0 m³/day
50.0 m³/day
9.1%
19.4 days
10 days
4 days
785
5.9
11.8 e
29.5 e
25.5
33.9
16.9
6.8
Note: e = estimated equating rate increase from T1200 class.
Assumes approximately 200 cubic metres of fuel (one-third of AOPS’s useable
fuel capacity of 620 cubic metres) is available for transfer to CCG ship.
Estimated gain for St. Laurent is 5.7% of total bunker capacity, and 13 days (min.,
15.4 cum/day), 6.5 days (normal, 30.8 cum/day) or 2.6 days (high, 77 cum/day) of
operation (using same equating rate from T1200 class).
A RCN Sustainment ‘Train’ (I)
• Assuming 10-knot transit speed and 6 hours for
reloading, 1XAOPS could deliver 200 tonnes of fuel
at a distance of:
- 3,800 nm to a T1100 CCG icebreaker operating a
‘low’ rate;
- 1,170 nm to a T1200 CCG icebreaker operating at a
‘normal’ rate; or
- 280 nm to CCG Louis St. Laurent operating at a
‘high’ rate of fuel consumption.
• Adding a second AOPS doubles the rate of delivery or the range
at which they can sustain a CCG ship.
RCN Sustainment ‘Train’ (II)
• A ‘cold weather capable’ RCN sustainment ship
(AOR), could deliver approximately 7,000 m³ of
fuel to the ice-edge or a suitable anchorage near the
ice-edge.
• The AOR could:
- act as a ‘station tanker’;
- replenish shore or barge tanks; or
- employ AOPSs (or CCG ships) as ‘shuttles’.
Comment from CCG Chief Engineer, CCGS Louis St. Laurent:
“This could change everything.”
Image: BMT Aegir 18R-class commercial AOR
Question #5
How will the relationship between the RCN and
the CCG evolve in arctic patrolling
operations?
Read More Here
• Canadian Naval Review at:
http://www.navalreview.ca/
• The Global Navy/Coast Guard Relationship: A
Mandate-Based Typology, J. Matthew Gillis, CFPS 2010
at: http://centreforforeignpolicystudies.dal.ca/pdf/GillisOutputsAndProducts.pdf
• “Broadsides,” the on-line discussion forum of Canadian
Naval Review, at:
http://www.navalreview.ca/broadsides-discussionforum/
Download

The Future of the Navy-Coast Guard Relationship in Canada