Does Proportional Representation Foster Closer Congruence

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Does Proportional Representation Foster
Closer Congruence Between Citizens and
Policy Makers?
André Blais
Marc André Bodet
Composition of Presentation
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What is our ‘research substance’?
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Research Background/Why is PR interesting to observe?
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Research Methodology/How did the authors approach the
problem?
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Conclusion/Remarks/Discussion Teasers
What is our ‘research substance’?
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Electoral system, proportional representation (PR)
The influence of PR on the relationship between citizens and
policy makers (‘voters and governments’)
Does PR foster closer congruence between the views of the
citizens and the positions of the government?
QUESTION
Is PR indeed more likely to induce governments to adopt
positions that are close to those of the median voter?
OR
Does PR with ‘its way of being’ encourage harmony between
voters and the governments / legislatures?
ANSWER (1)
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Strong electoral system, low proportionality:
the party might deviate from the median voter position if there
are more than two parties (in that case ‘there is no clear optimal
position for the parties to take’ and ‘parties strive to distinguish
themselves ideologically from each other’) (Cox, 1997,
Osborne; 1993);
in case there are only two parties, each party will maximize its
votes by converging to the median voter (Downs, 1957).
ANSWER (2)
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Weak electoral system, high proportionality:
because there are more parties and each of them wants to
distinguish itself from another, there is no move towards a
median voter position;
parties move away from the center and the overall distance
between parties and voters is not minimized  smaller
congruence  but centripetal process do take place does take
place at the government formation stage  paradox
CSES Dataset
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21 countries and 31 elections (1996-2003)
direct information about the distance between the voter’s
positions and those of governing parties
48.675 respondents (excluding missing values)
questionnaire (respondents were asked to place themselves
on 0-10 L-R scale and also place 6 major parties on the same
scale  locating respondents and parties)
Research Methodology
FIVE HYPOTHESIS
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H1: PR produces less centrist parties and thus greater
diversity
H2: PR increases the number of parties in government
H3: The greater the diversity in the party system, the weaker
the congruence between government and voters
H4: The more parties in government the stronger the
congruence between government and voters
H5: PR has no net effect on the congruence between the
government and voters
Hypothesis 1
PR Produces Less Centrist Parties and Greater Diversity
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The choice of an electoral system has a major impact on the
survival of small parties
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Disproportional system: fewer parties which converge to the
center in order to maximize their share of votes
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Proportional system: more parties, less centralized, large range
of options for the voter
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What is the ‘position’ of the parties in PR?
H1:Part I
(Less or More Centrist?)
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Median voter as a starting point (a way how parties can min.
the distance between themselves and voters  table 1)
DEPENDANT VARIABLE: centrifugal strength of the party system
Goal: to characterize how centrist parties are in a given
country
Formula: voter’s median placement of each party; compute
the average absolute distance of each party from the median
voter’s position  the higher the distance the less centrist
parties (table 1)
Interpretation: small average distance  more centrist
parties, bigger average distance  more dispersed parties
Hypothesis (part I) confirmed
H1: Part 2
(Greater Diversity?)
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Indicator of diversity: inverse of Alvarez and Nagler’s party
system compactness indicator
the numerator corresponds to the relative dispersion of party
locations on the L and R scale  great dispersion, great
diversity (choice); small dispersion, smaller diversity (choice);
the denominator is voter’s dispersion on the same scale
correlation (disproportionality/range of choice/centrifugal
strength) tested with least squares regressions (Gallagher’s
index) 
findings: older democracy produce less centripetal party
system, less choice  more proportional systems provide
greater range of ideological options, less centrist parties
Hypothesis confirmed
Hypothesis 2
PR Increases the Number of Parties in Government
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in our model  the most crucial centripetal moment in a PR
system occurs at the time of formation of the cabinet  why?
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PR facilitates a big amount of parties to enter (and survive),
also small parties can obtain seats, seldom one party has
enough seats to form the government  often coalitions
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outcome: more proportional systems produce more parties
and less proportional produce fewer parties
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hypothesis confirmed (Table 3)
Hypothesis 3 and 4
Diversity Hinders Congruence
More Parties in Government Fosters Congruence
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after elections (congruence between voter’s views and the
government’s position)
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author’s approach assumes that a party’s relative share of
cabinet seats is an indicator of its relative influence and that
the weighted location of the parties forming the government
is a valid appx. of the governments overall ideological
orientation
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the cabinets are not always centrist (table 1)  distance
between voters and cabinets
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hypothesis confirmed (table 4)
Hypothesis 5
PR has no Net Effect on Distance
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Contradiction:
1. PR leads to more parties and to less centralist parties,
smaller convergence BUT
2. PR increases the number of the parties in the government
and tends to produce more centralist government and more
convergence.
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Authors conclude that these two effects wash out: effect is nil
(table 5)
Conclusion
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In PR voters can choose among parties that are more
ideologically dispersed and offer a greater range of choice BUT
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they are not automatically closer or further from the
government.
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No electoral system is superior when it comes down to
convergence towards the median voter to minimize the average
distance between the voter and itself.
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The moment of convergence is different in other electoral
systems but ‘the result is the same’.
Remarks
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Measuring average distance / what is ‘small’, what is ‘big’
more responsive government / the most responsive
government?
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