The Political Economy of Religion in Local China
Some Initial Findings
Juan Wang
Johns Hopkins University
March 27, Philadelphia AAS
Revival of Religion or Commercialization of Religion?
-On January 7, 2010, The State Administration for Religious Affairs issued
regulations on financial supervision of religious operations., which was enacted on
March 1, 2010.
Business Week, Jan 2008
On the first day of every
lunar month, Buddhists
crowd the Yonghe Temple to
burn incense, Beijing.
Two Research Goals
No. 1: Demonstrate different roles of local state in religious market.
No. 2: Explain such differences
No. 1: Three types of local state-religion-market relations:
(1) state-supported commercialization of religion in northeastern China
(2) state-sponsored commercialization of religion in central China
(3) Separation between the state and religion in southern China (?)
What’s puzzling about this?
We anticipate variations in central policies towards different religions. But there is
great variation among local China in terms of the extent to which and ways in
which local states interact with religious activities in market sphere.
So what?
(1) The development of religious market in China is an arena where central-local
relations, state-society relations, state-religion relations, and state-market
relations are intertwined.
(2) Different state roles in religious market may change local power structure and
new economic and political opportunities for new actors.
No.1: Three Cases
(1) Fengguo Temple (Buddhist temple), Yi County in Liaoning (Northeast China):
state-supported development of religious market
(2) Taihao Ling (Taoist Temple), HY County in Henan (Central China):
state-sponsored development of religious market
(3) Yunfeng Temple (Buddhist temple), SH County in Fujian ( Southern China):
separation between local state and religion
Fengguo Temple (奉国寺) in Yi County, Liaoning Province
•
http://www.yxfgs.cn/newEbiz1/EbizPortalFG/portal/html/fgsjj.htm
State-Religion-Market Relations in Yi County
County government supports religious market to collective fiscal revenue:
(state-supported commercialization of religion)
Revenue Sources:
-Sales Tax from Small Businesses and Street Venders
(including meat balls and BBQs)
-Certain share of donation
Taihao Ling (太昊陵) in HY County, Henan Province
http://www.taihaoling.gov.cn/INDEX1.ASP
State-Religion-Market Relations in HY County
•
County government invests in and develops tourist Industry
(State-sponsored commercialization of religion)
-Acquisition of land (131,000 square meters = 3.2 acre =13.1 hectare)
-Construction and reconstruction of buildings (an investment of 2.35 million Yuan
between 1997 and 2003, 25 million Yuan in 2004)
Yunfeng Temple (云峰寺) in SH County, Fujian Province
•
•
No website
county government’s separation from religious activities
Research Goal No. 2: Potential Explanations
While China’s central government has different policies towards different religious activities,
how can great local variations of state-religion-market relations be explained?
State Factors: (Top-Down perspective)
IV 1: Levels of Local Government Revenue
Hypothesis: the higher level of government revenue, the less likely for the local government to
engage in religious market.
IV 2: Levels of Government Regulations on Religious Activities
Hypothesis: the more comprehensive regulations there are on religious activities from upper
levels of authorities (e.g. provincial level), the less likely for lower levels of government (e.g.
county level) to participate in religious market. [indeterminate cause]
Social Factors: (Bottom-Up Perspective)
IV 3: Levels of activeness of Religious institutions.
Hypothesis: the more active local religious institutions have been, the less likely the local
government get involved in religious activities.
Research Goal No. 2: Comparisons and Potential Explanations
•
Potential IV 1: Levels of Local Government Revenue (Unit 100 million Yuan)
7
6
5
4
Yi County
HY County
3
SH County
2
1
0
199719981999200020012002200320042005200620072008
Research Goal No. 2: Potential Explanations
Potential IV 2: Levels of regulations from the provincial government
Jilin: Ethic and Religions Affairs Committee
Research Goal No. 2: Potential Explanations
Potential IV 2: Levels of regulations from the provincial government
Henan: Ethic and Religion Affairs Committee
Research Goal No. 2: Potential Explanations
Potential IV 2: Levels of regulations from the provincial government
Fujian: Ethic and Religions Affairs Committee
Research Goal No. 2: Potential Explanations
Potential IV 3: Activeness of Religious Institutions
-possible indicators:
1. total number of religious institutions
2. percentage of private religious institutions.
3. timing and location (cluster) of establishment of new religious sites (GIS)
By 2000,
Liaoning: 62% of 834 religious institutions are churches.
92% are private.
Henan: 69% of 2344 cases are churches.
96% are private.
Fujian: 51% of 2436 cases are Buddhist temples.
98% are private.
Comparisons and Potential Explanations
While China’s central government has different policies towards different religious activities,
how can great local variations in state’s roles in religious market be explained?
Yi County
(Liaoning)
HY County
(Henan)
SH County
(Fujian)
DV: Levels of Local State’s role
in commercialization of religion
medium
high
low
IV 1: Levels of Local
Government Revenue
low
Low
High
IV 2: Levels of comprehensive
regulations on religious
activities
low
low
high
IV 3: Levels of activeness of
religious institutions
Low
low
high
Further Notes
(1) Different Phenomenon in Southern China:
-Xiamen: In November, 2007, the chamber of commerce in coastal Xiamen sponsored
the second annual Buddhist Items & Crafts fair. More than 40,000 entrepreneurs
descended on the vast Xiamen International Conference & Exhibition Center and
loaded up on statuary, prayer beads, incense burners, and other goods.
(2) The case of HY County in Henan province had significant political reasons:
(developed as political project or political performance of the county government
supported by the provincial government.): (1) -this is a long-term investment while
local officials have short-term rationality; (2) -such large-volume project can be
politically risky.
• Its implementation shows (1) central official’s support (2) provincial-level officials’
support
• -this is a state-designated poorest county, where rationally subsidies are assigned.