From Moderates to Secessionists: A Who's Who of the Punjab Crisis
Author(s): Andrew Major
Source: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Spring, 1987), pp. 42-58
Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2758829
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POLITICS IN THE PUNJAB
From Moderates to Secessionists:
A Who's Who of the Punjab Crisis
Andrew Major
S INCE I LAST VISITED AMRITSAR in May 1984, I have been following-and
trying to understand-the ever more complex and ever more intense
"crisis" in the Indian Punjab. Political conditions and an emotionally
surcharged atmosphere in Punjab have often made that a difficult task. For
more than a year-from the launching of the Federal government's attack
on the Golden Temple on 4 June 1984 until the signing of the "Rajiv-
Longowal accord" (between the federal and state governments) on 24 July
1985-the whole of Punjab was isolated from the outside world by a rigid
press censorship and the presence of an army of occupation. As a conse-
quence, reliable news of developments in Punjab became hard to come by.
Much of the "official" Punjab news-especially that reported by the Indian
Government-controlled broadcasting media-was highly distorted and
quite anti-Sikh in nature.' On the other hand, the "unofficial" news, in the
form of rumours, underground pamphlets, and reported statements of
various Sikh individuals and organizations, frequently contained claims
and accusations that seemed exaggerated, to say the least.2 Since July 1985,
there has been some relaxation of press censorship in Punjab and some
realization of the enormity of news distortion that had previously occurred.
Yet, the quality of much of the reporting and commentary on the Punjab
crisis is still far from ideal.
This essay focuses on one particular problem of recent Punjab reporting and commentary, the imprecision and confusion that often surround
the use of certain labels to categorize those Sikhs who are, in some way or
another, in opposition to the Congress (I) party and the government of
India. The essay opens with a brief examination of different types of misuse
of labels, and of the confused or distorted perceptions that may arise as a
I For a preliminary analysis of distortion in AIR (All-India Radio) and Doordarshan
(Indian state-run television) news programmes, see Pritam Singh, "AIR and Doordarshan
Coverage of Punjab after Army Action," Economic and Political Weekly, 8 September 1984.
2 I am thinking here of much of the gossip, and many of the underground pamphlets,
which circulated-and still circulate-around the gurdwaras (Sikh temples) of South-East
Asia.
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From Moderates to Secessionists in the Punjab
result of that misuse. It then looks at each of these labels and asks the
following questions. What would a political scientist take this label to
mean? To which Sikh individuals and organizations can this label therefore validly be said to apply? The essay concludes with some comments on
the advantages and disadvantages of using universal concepts in attempting to make sense of something like the Punjab crisis.
THE USE AND MISUSE OF LABELS
Anyone who has followed the Punjab crisis from its inception in the
late 1970s will be familiar with such labels as "moderates," "extremists"
(sometimes "radicals"), "fundamentalists" (sometimes "fanatics"), "ter-
rorists," and "secessionists," all of which are generally prefixed by the
word, "Sikh." Yet it is my impression that many people-both Indian and
non-Indian, both Sikh and non-Sikh-have little more than a hazy idea of
what these labels mean, and to whom the labels are meant to apply. To be
fair, part of the confusion springs directly from the bewildering complexity
and fluidity of the Punjab situation itself: a situation wherein Sikh factional alignments are continually forming and dissolving, and yesterday's
"moderate" is sometimes today's "extremist" (and, possibly, tomorrow's
"terrorist"). But the confusion over labels is also the result of their misuseaccidentally or willfully-by some reporters and commentators on the
Punjab situation.
Often, the misuse of labels involves little more than ordinary journalistic licence: the practise of employing, for dramatic effect, labels whose
validity in specific instances remains unproven. For example, early in 1986
The Tribune (Chandigarh) carried a report under the headline, "Extremist
dies in police custody." Yet the report itself was of the death of a man
described only as "an alleged extremist."3 Two weeks later, another Trib-
une headline announced, "Two shot dead by terrorists." And yet the report
itself referred to a shooting by persons described only as "suspected terrorists."4 Newspaper readers around the world are familiar with this sort of
"limited sensationalism." Yet it seems to me, from my reading of the
Indian English-language dailies, that this is an unusually common-and
undesirable-feature of reporting on the Punjab crisis. It is one thing for
the Punjab police to suspect (or claim that they do) that certain criminals
are "extremists" or "terrorists." But misleading newspaper headlines
which convert these suspicions into apparent facts may foster, among the
public at large, a mental association between ordinary criminality and
''extremism" or "terrorism" that is not warranted.
Then there is the slipshod journalism that employs two or more labels
interchangeably, as though they are merely different ways of describing the
3The Tribune, 26 January 1986.
4The Tribune, 10 February 1986.
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Pacific Affairs
same kind of people. An example of this type of misuse comes, curiously
enough, from a newspaper article which purports to be an investigation of
the role of the Indian media in reporting political disturbances. The author
advocates responsible, objective journalism; yet he himself uses the labels
"secessionists" and "terrorists" interchangeably throughout his article,
without ever actually establishing any congruency. Indeed, having sug-
gested that the media should "frankly discuss the objectives of the terrorists," he makes oblique references to the Anandpur Sahib Resolution (the
basic platform of those Sikhs whom other commentators might want to
recognize as the "moderates") and the concept of "Khalistan" (the demand
for a separate state by the "secessionists", but not necessarily the "terror-
ists"). He thereby implies that "moderates," "secessionists," and "terrorists" are essentially similar, if not identical. Finally, he pronounces: "The
basic demand is not rational but emotive and terrorists are known to be
people who are irrationally motivated. "5
This leads us to the most serious type of misuse of labels: their employ-
ment in a manner that is so politically or emotionally subjective that they
are effectively robbed of any heuristic value. For example, in May 1985 the
Punjab governor, whilst explaining that the Government of India could
take peace initiatives only with "political elements" in Punjab, asserted:
"Extremists and terrorists by no stretch of imagination are political forces.
They are a pure law and order menace and they have to be dealt with
accordingly."6 This assertion suggests that-in the Punjab context, at
least-the concepts of "extremist" and "terrorist" are without any meaning, other than that they are synonyms for "criminal".
However, this type of misuse is by no means restricted to the pronouncements of Indian politicians. In a recent review article in a quasi-
academic British journal, the late Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale is
described as having been a "fanatic . .. whose personality combined
elements of Rasputin, Adolf Hitler and the Ayatollah Khomeini," and later
as "the most extreme fundamentalist.' '7 Prior to his death in June 1984,
Bhindranwale was, without doubt, the key-as well as the most enigmaticSikh figure in the Punjab crisis; and until today his name excites both
immense pride amongst many Sikhs and loathing amongst most Hindus.
A sober, non-partisan assessment of Bhindranwale, and of the "fundamentalist" movement which he spearheaded, has yet to emerge. Its delay, it
seems to me, will only be prolonged if writers who have access to a wide
audience persist in suggesting that the "fundamentalists" are little more
than personifications of evil.
5 N.L. Chowla, "The media is also an intelligence agency," Times of India, 9 June 1985.
6 Hindustan Times, 27 May 1985.
7 John Grigg, "Mrs. Gandhi and the Sikhs," The Listener, 12 December 1985.
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From Moderates to Secessionists in the Pun jab
MODERATES
Obviously, there is a need for a hard look at how these labels ought to be
defined, and then at how they might more properly be used in the Punjab
context. In seeking a clear and generally acceptable definition of the following labels, I have drawn upon Roger Scruton's Dictionary of Political
Thought8 where he suggests that political opinions which merit the label
"moderate"-and, by extension, politicians who merit the label "moder-
ates"-display the following five characteristics: (1) a desire for conciliation rather than confrontation; (2) a preference for reform over revolution;
(3) a belief that political change should be gradual and involve no great
violence to institutions; (4) a belief that there exists a consensus amongst
right-minded people, and that the process of politics involves translating
this consensus into law; and (5) tolerance towards views which do not
match the consensus, provided that they are expressed in accordance with
principles (1) to (3), all other views being disliked as instances of
extremism.
In the Punjab context, the label "moderates" is usually applied primarily to the Shiromani Akali Dal (Central Army of the Immortals), which is
the self-proclaimed sole representative of the Sikh community's political
interests. Following an impressive victory in the September 1985 state
assembly election, it formed a Punjab government under the chief ministership of Surjit Singh Barnala, who was then elected president of the party.
The label is also generally applied to the Akali Dal's two political wingsthe Youth Akali Dal9 and the Istri Akali Dal10-to the Punjab Sikh Intellectuals Council, which is the Akali Dal's "think tank,"'" to the Shiromani
Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee organization12 (SGPC), which is the
closest thing to a Sikh church organization, and to certain other Sikh
organizations, such as the Council of Sikh Affairs and the Sikh Forum,13
which are sympathetic to the demands of the Akalis.
Although the Akali Dal is a Sikh party, which in Sikh eyes derives much
of its legitimacy from its intimate relationship with, and control of, the
"religious" political system represented by the SGPC, it also has to com8 Roger Scruton, A Dictionary of Political Thought (London: Pan Books, 1982), p. 302. I
have reproduced Scruton's definitions more or less verbatim in several instances but have
omitted quotation marks.
9 The president is Prem Singh Chandumajra.
0 The women's wing of the Akali Dal; its president is Bibi Rajinder Kaur.
11 Established February 1983, with fifteen district units and twenty-five hundred members:
for details, see The Tribune, 6 February 1984. The president is Baldev Singh Balluna.
12 The SGPC is the elected central gurdwara management committee, which oversees the
daily affairs of more than seven hundred important gurdwaras in Punjab and functions as a
sort of Sikh "Parliament." Since it has an enormous annual budget (Rs 126 million in
1985-86) at its disposal, the SGPC possesses great powers of patronage within the Sikh
community.
13 Maj. Gen. Mohinder Singh is secretary of the Council of Sikh Affairs; Lt. Gen. (retd.) J.S.
Aurora is president of the Sikh Forum.
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Pacific Affairs
pete in the larger "secular" political system represented by the Punjab state
assembly.'4 And, since not all Sikhs traditionally vote for the Akali Dal in
state assembly elections (whereas the overwhelming majority does vote for
Akali candidates in the SGPC elections), the Akali Dal is obliged to base its
political programme on issues that transcend narrow, communal concerns.
Thus, since 1977, the Akali Dal's chief demands-as enshrined in the
famous Anandpur Sahib Resolution-have been: firstly, the recasting of
India's constitution to allow for greater State autonomy; secondly, the
transference to Punjab of Chandigarh and certain Punjabi-speaking territories lying outside Punjab; and, thirdly, the adoption of an industrialization policy for Punjab.'5 Each of these basic demands is consensusoriented. The first appeals to the consensus amongst most non-Congress (I)
national and regional political parties on the need for a more equitable
distribution of powers between the Union and the States'6. The second and
third appeal to the consensus amongst most Punjabis that Punjab has, for
too long, been denied its territorial claims and been treated by the central
government as a food-producing region only.'7 It was only after the raising
of the Khalistan slogan by certain non-Akali Sikhs in 1981, and the
sudden deterioration of Sikh-Hindu relations produced by the murder of
the Punjabi Hindu press baron, Lala Jagat Narain, later that year, that the
Akali Dal began to adopt such narrow demands as the constitutional
recognition of Sikhs as a separate "nation" and the declaration of Amritsar
as a "holy" city.
Furthermore, since 1977 the Akali Dal's top leadership has always
preferred the politics of negotiation to the politics of confrontation. This is
because of its need to retain the support of influential Sikh industrialists,
businessmen, professionals, and landowners who rely upon India-wide
political, economic, and social connections and cannot afford to cut them-
selves adrift by throwing their weight behind a regional movement that has
separatist overtones. And when, by August 1982, it did appear that negotiations with the central government had all but broken down, and the Akali
leadership decided to launch a morcha (agitation) under the name of a
"dharam yudh" (holy war) for the fulfilment of their demands, there was to
be no departure from the Akali Dal's longstanding commitment to nonviolent agitational tactics. In May 1984 the president of the Akali Dal and
"dictator" of the morcha, Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, had this to say:
1' Paul Wallace, "Religious and Secular Politics in Punjab: The Sikh Dilemma in Competing Political Systems," in Paul Wallace and Surendra Chopra, eds., Political Dynamics of
Punjab (Amritsar: Department of Political Science, Guru Nanak Dev. University, 1981), pp.
1-32.
15 The Draft of The New Policy Programme of The Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar:
Secretary, SAD, 1977).
16 In May 1983 the Akali Dal participated in a meeting with five other non-Congress (I)
parties to campaign for greater state autonomy. Earlier, in 1977, the Janata Party had
supported this demand.
17 Interview with Dalbir Singh (a prominent Sikh industrialist), Amritsar, 25 May 1984.
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From Moderates to Secessionists in the Punjab
In a democracy, peaceful means are the best means of solving problems. The
constitution of India recognises this, and gives everyone a chance to air his grievances. This means that violence, if it ever is used, should only be used as a last resort
... the Shiromani Akali Dal, at the start of the current agitation, took a pledge
before the Akal Takht [throne of the Immortal God, inside the Golden Temple
complex] to remain peaceful. Peace is the best method."8
However, there are grounds for exercising caution when applying the
label "moderates" to the Akalis. In the first place, the attitude of the Akali
leadership towards the Indian state has always, since 1950, been conditioned by the fact that the Akali Dal has yet formally to approve the constitution; this means that Akali leaders see themselves as being, in the words of
one Sikh scholar, "in a state of perpetual protest." 19 Moreover, the modern
Akali leadership shares, and skillfully manipulates, certain symbolic
beliefs which are deeply embedded in the collective Sikh consciousness and
which, ipso facto, place the Sikhs in a position of potential confrontation
with the Indian state. One such belief is that the Khalsa (the "orthodox"
Sikh brotherhood) represents the chosen of God and is destined to rule;
another is that the Khalsa must always be ready to fight injustice and
persecution; another is that bravery and martyrdom are the hallmarks of a
true Sikh; and another is that, since Mughal days, the "throne" of Delhi has
been the main source of "treachery" against the Sikhs.20 The Akali leaders
may "moderate" such beliefs when talking to the outside world, but they
give them free rein when addressing the Panth (the Sikh community). In
the end, their stand is highly ambiguous.
Secondly, it must be recognized that, while the dominant factions
within the Akali Dal-those led by Sant Longowal (and, after his assassina-
tion, Barnala) and Prakash Singh Badal (who was twice Punjab chief
minister)-have persistently advocated non-violence and continued SikhHindu social relations, the subordinate, rival factions have frequently
flirted with radical politics and with the separatist tendency which seeks a
more rigid social and religious demarcation between Sikhs and Hindus.2'
This is particularly true of the subordinate factions led by Gurcharan
Singh Tohra (until early 1986 the president of the SGPC), Jagdev Singh
Talwandi (former president of the Akali Dal), and Sukhjinder Singh (who,
prior to June 1984, headed a pro-Khalistan splinter group). Thus, the label,
"moderates" strictly applies only to the Akali factions which have held the
upper hand in the party's internal power struggle.
18 Interview with Longowal, Amritsar, 24 May 1984.
19 Interview with Devinder Singh Duggal (head, Sikh History Research Board, SGPC
Amritsar, 22 May 1984.
20 For another discussion of this, see Harish K. Puri, "Akali Dal and State Autonomy: Some
Observations," Punjab History Conference: 14th Session Proceedings (Patiala: Punjab Historical Studies Department, Punjab University, 1980), pp. 252-53.
21 Pritam Singh, "Growing Separatist Trend," Economic and Political Weekly, 4 February
1984. For instance, in August 1982 the Talwandi faction of the Akali Dal refused to condemn
actions such as plane hijackings and bomb attacks, even though the faction was "against
violence" (The Statesman, 23 August 1982).
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Thirdly, it must be noted that, prior to June 1984, the "moderate" Akali
leaders had close links with certain Sikh groups whose commitment to
non-violence was questionable. For example, the Youth Akali Dal-whose
leaders were in the habit of wearing revolvers as well as the customary
kirpan (the sword which is one of the five personal Sikh symbols)-had as
one of its main tasks the provision of protection to the senior Akali leaders
against the rival youth groups associated with Bhindranwale. The Youth
Akali Dal also believed that in certain circumstances armed struggle
against the state would be necessary and legitimate-if, for example, an
election were to be forced upon Punjab before the conceding of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution demands.22 The Akhand Kirtani Jatha23 and its
radical offshoot, the Babbar Khalsa group,24 also believed in the use of
violence, and they, too, were aligned with Longowal against Bhindran-
wale. The alliance of the "moderate" Akalis with such groups may have
been a practical response to the threats they faced at that time; but it also
undermined the credibility of their claims to have benign goals and strategies.
EXTREMISTS
According to Scruton, "extremism" is a vague term, which can mean
any of the following:25 (1) taking a political idea to its limits, regardless of
"unfortunate" repercussions, impracticalities, arguments, and feelings to
the contrary, and with the intention not only to confront, but also to
eliminate, opposition; (2) intolerance towards all views other than one's
own; or (3) adoption of means to political ends which disregard accepted
standards of conduct, in particular which show disregard for the life,
liberty, and human rights of others.
In the Punjab context, this definition of "extremism" is too broad to be
of much use, particularly because it describes the political ideology and
actions of people who might be labelled not just as "extremists" but also as
"terrorists"-and we are asserting that the two terms are not the same.
Leaving aside for a moment the question as to what is a "terrorist," we may
say that the "extremists" are those Sikhs who support the Akali Dal's
22 Interview with Indarjit Singh Baghi (secretary-general of Youth Akali Dal), Amritsar, 23
May 1984.
23 An organization of about twenty members. Members mostly organized kirtans (singing
of sacred hymns) or voluntary service inside the Golden Temple. In 1984 the Jatha ("band")
was led by Bibi Amarjit Kaur, whose husband, an agricultural inspector, was killed in an
Akali clash with Nirankaris (a quasi-heretical Sikh sect) at Amritsar in April 1978.
24 A small group of intensely anti-Nirankari activists, who took their name from the
Babbar Akalis (an anti-imperialist terrorist group in Punjab in the early 1920s). The Babbar
Khalsa group was described in 1984 as "the most fearless and fanatic of the armed Sikh zealots
who prowl the Golden Temple" (The Sunday Observer, 22 April 1984). Recently, the group
has come out in support of the creation of Khalistan (The Tribune, 11 March 1986).
25 Scruton, A Dictionary, p. 164.
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From Moderates to Secessionists in the Punjab
charter of demands, yet differ from the "moderate" Akalis in the following
ways. (1) They place greater emphasis on specifically Sikh (as opposed to
merely Punjabi) grievances. (2) They advocate a more confrontationist (as
opposed to negotiatory) stance via-a-vis the central government. (3) They
have fewer inhibitions about the use of violence to achieve political ends.
(4) They reject any proposed solution to the Punjab crisis which does not
restore the full "honour" of the Panth, and punish those who have "hurt"
the Sikhs and their religion.
Sikh "extremism" may therefore be regarded as a reaction to the perceived inability of the "moderate" Akalis to provide the Panth with adequate political leadership, and as an attempt at providing an alternative
leadership. As has already been noted, "extremism" exists as a fringe
tendency within the Akali Dal, in some of its subordinate factions which
are constantly vying for leadership of the party. But "extremism" is essen-
tially a youth phenomenon-which explains its high emotional contentand its real strongholds are, in part, the Youth Akali Dal and, in particular,
the All-India Sikh Students' Federation (AISSF).
It was the AISSF which blazed the trail for Sikh "extremism." Prior to
1978, it was an organization of extreme-left elements, committed to countering the sway of the established Communist parties over the landless Sikh
peasantry and the underemployed and disenchanted Sikh youth, particularly in the Malwa26 region of Punjab. At that time, it had the strong
backing of the Akali Dal, which also wished to see the influence of the
communists reduced. But in 1978 the AISSF-under its president, Bhai
Amrik Singh27-aligned itself with Bhindranwale and began fighting the
"repression" and "victimization" of the Sikhs.28 This switch in strategy
brought an immediate response from the disoriented Sikh youth, amongst
whom the notion of anti-Sikh discrimination was fast becoming an idee
fixe. The response was especially strong amongst Jats (the dominant,
peasant caste in Punjab), whose cultural traditions make them highly
susceptible to suggestions that their economic difficulties were due essentially to governmental discrimination against them because of their religion. As one commentator has observed: "A Sikh Jat is nothing if he is not
proud, whatever his status in economic and educational terms. For him
power and honour are interchangeable terms. "29 So great was the appeal of
the new message that in 1981 the Akali Dal had to float the Youth Akali Dal
26 Malwa refers to the Punjab territories lying to the south of the Sutlej river.
27 Bhai Amrik Singh (killed in "Operation Bluestar") was the son of Sant Kartar Singh, t
custodian of the Damdami Taksal before Bhindranwale. Bhai Amrik Singh was Bhindran
wale's dharm bhai (blood brother) and intellectual adviser. After "Operation Bluestar" h
brother, Manjit Singh, became AISSF President.
28 Such terms became a common feature of the vocabulary of AISSF pronouncements.
They were, for instance, contained in telegrams sent to important Commonwealth leaders in
1983 (AISSF Press Release, Amritsar, 24 November 1983).
29 Girilal Jain, "Roots of Punjab Problem: the Jat Sikh's Dilemma," Times of India, 1 May
1984.
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in a bid to check the growing influence of the AISSF amongst the Sikh
youth.
By May 1981 the now-banned AISSF had a claimed membership of three
hundred thousand (compared to the Youth Akali Dal's membership of
thirty-five thousand)30 and links with the more important "terrorist"
groups in Punjab and militant Sikh organizations outside India.31 Its
ideological position was roughly midway between that of the "moderates"
and that of the "secessionists": it endorsed the Anandpur Sahib Resolution
on state autonomy, and yet it disliked the "meek and mild" strategies of the
Akali Dal; it disassociated itself from the demand for an independent
Khalistan, and yet it refused to condemn that demand outright. It was
concerned mainly about insults to the Panth. As one of the top AISSF
leaders put it in May 1984:
The fight is essentially for Sikh identity. It is a mixture of political, economic and
religious issues. The aim is to reverse the attacks on Sikhs over the past 37 years since
independence .... Sikhs have lost most of their army positions. In the radio, T.V.
documentaries, films, and government-patronised media in general, Sikhs have
been ignored or their contribution has been distorted.32
At the time of the army assault on the Golden Temple in early June 1984
("Operation Bluestar"), and the subsequent action to clear the rest of
Punjab of dissident Sikhs ("Operation Munda"), a number of AISSF
leaders were either killed or arrested. The bulk of the rank and file, how-
ever, simply went underground, later to emerge as a powerful nucleus of
opposition to the central government and-later-the Akali Dal. Such was
the general indignation and dismay amongst the Panth over the desecra-
tion of the Golden Temple and the savage anti-Sikh riots in November 1984
following the assassination of Indira Gandhi, that support for "extremist"
organizations like the AISSF seems to have increased, and the AISSF, in
turn, has become more radical. The AISSF denounced the July 1985
"Rajiv-Longowal accord" as a sell-out, noting that it ignored such funda-
mental issues as the treatment of Sikh army deserters, the plight of the
thousands of Sikh youths under detention, the abuse of powers granted to
the army and police under the notorious "Black Laws," and the question of
punishing the instigators of the November 1984 riots. At about this time,
the AISSF also forged close links with the "United" Akali Dal, a breakaway
organization of "extremist" Akalis, who came together under the tenuous
leadership of Baba Joginder Singh, the nonagenarian father of the slain
Bhindranwale. The AISSF and "United" Akali Dal campaigned strenu-
ously for a Sikh boycott of the September 1985 Punjab election, but they
30 See fn. 22.
31 Interview with Harminder Singh Sandhu (secretary-general AISSF), Amritsar, 22 May
1984.
32 Ibid.
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From Moderates to Secessionists in the Punjab
were unable to prevent the Akali Dal, led by Barnala, from sweeping to
power.
Since September 1985 the AISSF-"United" Akali Dal combine has
concentrated on building up opposition to the Barnala government, especially in the Majha region,33 which has never been as strong a support-base
for the Akali Dal as the Malwa and Doaba regions.34 In January 1986 an
Akali leader admitted that the Barnala government was losing touch with
the rural Sikh masses in the Majha region: "Our support in the Majha
region," he said, "has eroded during the past four months."35 Since September 1985 the AISSF-"United" Akali Dal combine has also entered into
an alliance with the "fundamentalists," with a view to wresting control of
the premier Sikh institutions-the Golden Temple complex and the
SGPC-from the "moderate" Akalis.
FUNDAMENTALISTS
Scruton defines "fundamentalism" as a movement within any religion
towards the fundamental doctrine out of which the religion has grown, and
a refusal to depart from it in order to accommodate extraneous social or
moral requirements.36
Within Sikhism, there are any number of sects, missionary orders,
religious instituions, and even political organizations, that could, according to this definition, be called "fundamentalist". The SGPC, for example,
is a "fundamentalist" institution by Scruton's criteria; so, too, is the Akali
Dal, whose stated first purpose is "Propagation of Sikhism and its code of
conduct; denunciation of atheism."37 Yet no one would seriously suggest
that the label "fundamentalist" applies to the SGPC and the Akali Dal.
The problem with Scruton's definition is that it is, in the modern Sikh
context at any rate, too broad: in particular, it fails to convey the impression
of a revivalist movement attempting to win over (or, failing that, take over)
the authority of the established institutions of that religion. In other words,
"fundamentalism" has to be seen in terms of a revolt against the internal
status quo, as well as a rejection of extraneous influences on the religion. If
this qualified definition is accepted, then there is really only one modern
Sikh organization that can be labelled "fundamentalist" and can be said to
have played a prominent role in the Punjab crisis; that is the Damdami
Taksal, headed-until his death in June 1984-by Sant Bhindranwale.
The history of the Damdami Taksal actually stretches back for two
33The Majha region lies to the west of the Sutlej and Beas rivers.
34 The Doaba region-the Jullundur Doab-lies between the Sutlej and Beas rivers. For
Majha voting patterns in the September 1985 election, see The Tribune, 16 September and 21
September 1985.
3 P.D. Mohindra, "Dal, Government in a dilemma," The Tribune, 29 January 1986.
36 Scruton, A Dictionary, p. 184.
37 Draft of The New Policy Programme of The Shiromani Akali Dal, p. 16.
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hundred and eighty years, to the baptising of Baba Deep Singh Shaheed
(the first head of the taksal-a "mint" devoted to the pure, unalloyed
teachings of the Gurus) by Guru Gobind Singh at Damdama Sahib in
1706.38 During the decades that followed its establishment, the Taksal
slowly gained a limited reputation as a centre of religious scholarship and
missionary activity, with particular emphasis on baptism, the taking of
amrit (the baptismal nectar), and the vows which admit a person into the
order of the Khalsa. By the time that Bhindranwale inherited the headship
of the organization in 1977, the Taksal had shifted its headquarters to
Chowk Mehta, near Amritsar, and was becoming increasingly militant.
Bhindranwale not only took up the message of his predecessors-that Sikhs
should follow a life of the strictest purity and piety (to the point that even
the consumption of tea and coffee is prohibited)-but also added the
injunction that Sikhs should carry weapons in defence of the faith. The
stage was thus set for the rise to prominence of the Damdami Taksal, and
the onset of the Punjab crisis.
In April 1978, following a series of rousing sermons by Bhindranwale, a
group of "orthodox" (Amritdhari) Akali Sikhs clashed with a group of
"heretical" Nirankari Sikhs39 at Amritsar, and more than a dozen of the
former were killed. At about this time, according to popular belief, Bhindranwale began to be promoted by the Congress (I) party organization,
with a view to embarrassing the Akali-Janata coalition government in
Punjab. That strategy-if, indeed, there was one (for the evidence is mainly
circumstantial)-clearly boomeranged when, in 1981, Bhindranwale was
implicated by the police in the murder of Lala Jagat Narain, and the Akali
Dal (then out of power) invited him to take up residence in the Golden
Temple and carry on propagating Sikhism from there.
Inside the Golden Temple, however, Bhindranwale soon established
himself as a rival to the "moderate" leaders of the Akali Dal and the SGPC.
His fiery rhetoric, especially all his talk about the need to "end the slavery
which has been put around the necks of the Sikhs,"40 brought him an
ever-increasing following, and many Akalis defected to his camp. His
shadowy association with various "terrorist" groups-which he was
reportedly incapable of fully controlling4"-and his practice of dispensing
"justice" and settling civil and religious disputes within his sangat (congregation) gradually made him a law unto himself, beyond even the
supreme authority of the Akal Takht. This was symbolized by his move
into the Akal Takht building shortly before "Operation Bluestar."
38 Dona Suri, "The Evolution of Damdami Taksal," The Tribune, 9 February 1986.
39 The Nirankaris are a sect with an urban ("bhappa") Sikh leadership and a certain
following amongst Punjabi Hindus. Since they believe in a human guru (and regard the Guru
Granth Sahib--the Sikh holy scripture-as no more than an ordinary book), most Sikhs view
them as heretics.
40 Interview with Bhindranwale, Amritsar, 24 May 1984.
41 Hindustan Times, 25 August 1982.
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From Moderates to Secessionists in the Punijab
Since Bhindranwale's death, the Damdami Taksal has stepped up its
efforts at taking control of the premier Sikh institutions. In December 1985,
the Taksal-with the backing of the AISSF and the "United" Akali Dalannounced its decision to undertake kar seva (voluntary labour) to re-build
the damaged and defiled Akal Takht, thus disassociating itself from the
SGPC's own kar seva plans. By January 1986 the Taksal-AISSF-"United"
Akali Dal combine had taken over the Golden Temple complex and had
"installed" a new Jathedar (leader) of the Akal Takht and a new head priest
of the Darbar Sahib (the Golden Temple). The combine organized a Sarbat
Khalsa (or general assembly of Sikhs) at Amritsar late in January to seek
the Panth's approval of these actions (the Akalis and the SGPC subse-
quently thought it prudent to organize their own Sarbat Khalsa at Anandpur Sahib three weeks later).42 Finally, in March 1986 the combine forced
the resignation of the SGPC president, Gurcharan Singh Tohra, and called
for fresh elections for the SGPC's 160-seat general house. In these elections,
the Taksal-AISSF-"United" Akali Dal combine hoped to break the "moderate" Akali Dal's stranglehold on the SGPC.43
TERRORISTS
Scruton defines "terrorism" as the intentional creation of widespread
fear and dismay by violence, in particular by violence of a random and
arbitrary kind." The government of India, however, has adopted a more
precise definition of a "terrorist". The Terrorist-Affected Areas (Special
Courts) Ordinance, which was promulgated in July 1984, defines a "terrorist" as "a person who indulges in wanton killing of persons or in violence
or in the disruption of services or means of communications essential to the
community or in damaging property with a view to: . .. putting the public
or any section of the public in fear; or . .. affecting adversely the harmony
between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or
communities; or. . . coercing or overthrowing the government established
by law; or . .. endangering the sovereignty or integrity of India."45
This second definition, it has frequently been asserted, was adopted to
facilitate the speedy operation of the thirteen Special Courts and Additional Special Courts which were set up in June 1984 (and were abolished
in September 1985) to try people seized in Operations "Bluestar" and
"Munda," and it was therefore phrased so as to include "just about
42 The Tribune, 17 February 1986.
43 Ibid., 24 March 1986. On 23 March, Kabul Singh was elected-with the blessings of the
"moderate" Barnala government-as the SGPC's twenty-fourth president, succeeding Tohra
who had held that office since 1973.
44 Scruton, A Dictionary, pp. 460-61.
45 Cited in "Black Laws in Punjab: Report of an Enquiry" Economic and Political Weekly,
11 May 1985.
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anyone."46 It is not hard to see how people who might more properly be
labelled "revolutionaries," "communalists," or even "strikers" could be
categorized as "terrorists" under this definition. We are therefore obligedit seems to me-to fall back upon Scruton's more general definition.
Who, then, are to be identified as the Sikh "terrorists"-as people who
have intentionally created general fear and dismay by resorting to violence,
particularly random and arbitrary violence?47 Our answer to this question
is bound to be more speculative than precise, because "terrorism" and the
suppression of "terrorism" are by nature highly secretive undertakings:
"terrorists" do not usually provide details about themselves, about their
organizations and strategies, while the police do not usually like to reveal
to the public more than a bare minimum of what they know about "terrorists". It does seem, however, that the number of "terrorists" is not large-in
May 1984 official estimates placed their number in the Punjab at no more
than three hundred and fifty.48 It also seems clear that, both before "Opera-
tion Bluestar" and afterwards, they have functioned as a number of separ-
ate, and more or less autonomous, groups, rather than as units linked to a
single, centralized command (the Bhindranwale and, more recently, the
Taksal-AISSF-"United" Akali Dal combine would appear to have provided no more than inspirational leadership of the "terrorists").
Provisionally, we may divide the "terrorists" into three broad groups:
formal organizations, informal associations, and individuals operating
singly or in ad hoc combinations. In all probability, there is a good deal of
movement of people among the three groups. Prior to June 1984, the main
formal organizations that were involved in "terrorism" were the Akhand
Kirtani Jatha and the Babbar Khalsa group, both of which were aligned
with the Akali Dal,49 and the Dal Khalsa,50 Akal Federation,5' and Dashmesh Regiment,52 which were aligned with Bhindranwale. Recently, a new
46Ibid. See also A.G. Noorani, "The Terrorist Ordinance," Economic and Political
Weekly, 28 July 1984; Citizens for Democracy, Report to the Nation: Oppression in Punjab
(Delhi: Hind Mazoor Kisan Panchayat Publications, 1985).
47 I am leaving aside the question as to whether certain Hindu organizations in Punjabe.g., the Hindu Suraksha Samiti, the Hindu Shiv Sena, the Hindu Rashtriya Sangathan, the
Brahman Sabha, and the Hindu Front-should also be labelled as "terrorist."
48 Sitanshu Das, "Sten Guns in Political Debate," Hindustan Times, 18 May 1984. Earlier
it had been reported that 135 "terrorists" had thus far been captured in Punjab (ibid., 13 April
1984).
49 See fns. 23 and 24.
50 A small organization, drawing support mainly from the urban Sikh youth, which was
led by Harsimran Singh, set up in 1978, only to be banned in 1982, following an unsuccessful
attempt at hijacking an Indian Airlines plane to Pakistan. It established offices in Britain and
West Germany in 1983, and it is pro- Khalistan.
51 Another small group (possibly with no more than a dozen members), led by Bhai Kanwar
Singh.
52 Founded in 1984, reportedly under the guidance of former army generals, in order to
provide Bhindranwale with protection against the Babbar Khalsa group. Throughout 1984
and 1985, the Dashmesh Regiment claimed responsibility for attacks on railway stations and
post offices, for the murders of at least five prominent Punjabis (journalists, politicians, etc.)
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From Moderates to Secessionists in the Punjab
group, calling itself the Khalistan Commando Force, has appeared on the
scene.53
Three points are worth noting about these organizations and their
activities. First, they would appear to have had within their ranks a large
number of former Naxalites (Maoist-inspired revolutionaries).54 This suggests a certain continuity between the radical youth struggle of the early
1970s and the Sikh "terrorism" of the early 1980s; but we cannot be sure
whether or not there is a basis to the often-heard assertion that some
"terrorists" are merely revolutionaries masquerading as super-committed
Sikhs. Second, many of the victims of Sikh "terrorist" attacks would appear
to have been selectively, rather than randomly, chosen. It is true, of course,
that people have died or been injured as utterly innocent victims of bombattacks or indiscriminate shootings by "terrorists", while others have been
attacked simply because they were Hindus, Nirankaris, or government
servants. But many victims would seem to have been singled out for precise
reasons: Nirankari leaders, "moderate" Sikh priests, or prominent Hinduslike Jagat Narain and his son, Ramesh Chander-all on ideologicalgrounds; Congress (I) leaders and top Punjab Police and Central Reserve
Police Force personnel, on grounds of revenge; and "moderate" Sikh
politicians, like Sant Longowal, on the grounds that they were "selling
out" to the enemy. This selectivity of "terrorist" attacks helps explain why
killings by persons armed with sophisticated weapons, like machine carbines, have not been that numerous (relative to, for example, the Lebanese
or Sri Lankan situations), and why they have not been as religiously
determined as might have been expected.55 Third, most of these "terrorist"
organizations have resorted to violence only intermittently and sporadi-
cally. So far as I can tell, only the Dashmesh Regiment has a history of
sustained and systematic use, or threat of use, of violence.56 It is possible,
therefore, that only the Dashmesh Regiment and the recently emerged
Khalistan Commando Force can be labelled as genuine Sikh "terrorist"
organizations.
The second broad group of Sikh "terrorists" consists of informal gangs
of smugglers and ordinary criminals, who have, it would appear, joined
forces with other Sikh militants, but in what capacity, and whether for
ideological reasons or out of a desire to exploit the unsettled political
and numerous security personnel, and for the symbolic destruction of the monument of Sardar
Bahadur Sir Arur Singh (a pro-British Sikh leader of the early 1920s) as a warning to all
"traitors" to the Panth. For details, see Times of India, 16 April 1984; Hindustan Times
Weekly, 13 May 1984; Hindustan Times, 18 May 1984; The Tribune, 25 December 1985.
53 The Sunday Tribune, 30 March 1986.
5 Hindustan Times, 13 April 1984; Kuldip Nayar, "Dark Clouds Over Punjab," The
Tribune, 10 April 1986.
55 In May 1985 it was reported that, since 1981, "terrorist" attacks in Punjab had claimed
three hundred and sixty-five lives. Roughly half of these victims were Hindus, and half were
Sikhs (Hindustan Times, 26 May 1985).
56 See fn. 52.
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situation in Punjab, it is not altogether clear. Early in 1984 it was reported
that "hardened criminals" were engaging in murder and sabotage "at the
behest" of Bhindranwale and other militant Sikh leaders inside the Golden
Temple.57 At the same time, it was reported that "terrorism" was most
serious in the frontier districts of Gurdaspur, Amritsar, and Firozpur where
dacoity (gang robbery) and the smuggling of arms and narcotics from
Pakistan have long been a normal economic mainstay of a good number of
the local population.58 According to the police, Sikh "terrorism" has been
funded, in large measure, by the smuggling of arms and the peddling of
narcotics (although it must be doubted whether ultra-pious leaders like
Bhindranwale would have had anything to do with narcotics). Recently,
the police have claimed that the flow of narcotics through the frontier
districts has risen alarmingly, while other authorities have reported an
increase in narcotics consumption (in particular, the consumption of the
hypnotic "mandrax") in these districts.59
The third broad group of "terrorists" consists of individuals who have
not belonged to any organization or gang, but yet have engaged in "terror-
ist" attacks, either by themselves or with accomplices. How many such
individuals there have been is not clear. Nor is it known how many
"terrorist" attacks they have been responsible for. But there is now a
growing body of evidence to suggest that many-perhaps most-of these
individuals have been ordinary Sikh youths from the villages who have
been driven to "'terrorism" by army and police misuse of powers granted
under the "Black Laws." Between October 1983 and May 1985 Punjab was
subjected to no fewer than eight new laws which provided the security
forces and the courts with extraordinary powers to deal with "terrorism"
and other forms of public disorder. The powers conferred by these new laws
effectively meant by-passing all the safeguards incorporated in the ordinary
criminal law to ensure that the citizen who is arrested is treated fairly and
given a fair trial.60 As a consequence, some army and police units-and, in
particular, the dreaded CIA (Criminal Investigation Agency)-felt free to
hound and harass the village people in their pursuit of "terrorists" and
even to subject "suspects" to torture.6' The villagers became alienated from
the authorities, and many young men, fearing elimination in police
'encounters," simply went underground.
In May 1985 it was reported that there were villages in the frontier
57 Hindustan Times, 18 April 1984.
58 Ibid., 13 April 1984.
59 The Tribune, 24 March 1986 (two articles).
60 For a report on a Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights inquiry into the functioning of
these laws, see Indian Express, 23 April 1985.
61 Harji Malik, "A Punjab Report," Economic and Political Weekly, 15 September 1984;
A.G. Noorani, "Ill-treatment of Punjab Detenus," Economic and Political Weekly, 20 April
1985; and Citizens for Democracy, Report to the Nation, part 3.
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From Moderates to Secessionists in the Punjab
districts of Gurdaspur, Amritsar, and Firozpur in which it was impossible
to find a young man aged between fifteen and thirty: they had either been
taken into custody or gone underground. Some of those in custody reportedly said, "We have no parents or country, all we want now is revenge.' '62
Another report, from Gurdaspur, spoke of five hundred "missing" village
youths in that district. The authorities feared that many of them had
crossed into Pakistan, to be trained there as "terrorists" before returning to
India. One police officer had this to say about them: "The 400 [sic] or so
innocent youngsters who have fled did so out of fear for their lives. As a
consequence they have become active terrorists, but are without a record,
making it difficult to trace them.' '63
SECESSIONISTS
Scruton presents a straightforward definition of "secession": it is the
voluntary removal of a state (or some other unit) from the polity of which it
forms a part, exemplified in the withdrawal of the eleven southern states of
the U.S.A (1860-61) to form the Confederacy.64 In the Punjab context, the
"secessionists" are therefore those Sikhs who advocate the withdrawal of
Punjab from the Indian Union to permit the creation of a new state,
"Khalistan" ("land of the pure").
Before June 1984 the appeal of the Khalistan slogan among the Sikh
community was exceedingly limited: none of the important Sikh leaders
(however they might be labelled) endorsed the idea, and the majority of
ordinary Sikhs regarded it as fanciful. Most of what little support there was
for the Khalistan idea came from the members and supporters of the
National Council of Khalistan65-many of whom resided abroad.66 Since
"Operation Bluestar," Sikh enthusiasm, at least at an emotional level, for
the idea of Khalistan has probably increased. Today, Khalistan flags fly
defiantly from the tops of many gurdwaras, including the Golden Temple
complex. But genuine commitment to the creation of a separate Sikh state
62 Amrita Abraham, "Feeding Terrorism," The Sunday Observer, 26 May 1985.
63 Indian Express, 29 May 1985.
64 Scruton, A Dictionary, p. 420.
65 Dr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan (president) and Balbir Singh Sandhu (secretary-general)
up this organization in 1980. (In 1970 they had established an International Council of
Khalistan.) In 1984, by which time it was a banned organization, the National Council had
fifty-two members. It had also drawn up a "constitution" for Khalistan and issued "passports" and "currency" (interviews with Sandhu, Amritsar, 23 May 1984).
66 Prominent overseas Sikh supporters of the National Council included Didar Singh
Bains and Ganga Singh Dhillon, both U.S. citizens. Bains was president of the World Sikh
Organization, which has recently (March 1986) announced its intention to shift its headquarters from Washington to Ottawa. Dhillon was president of the Sikh Commonwealth Foundation (which has offices in Washington, London, and Nairobi) and chairman of the World
Sikh Organization's foreign affairs committee.
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is still rare within the Punjabi Sikh community; it is, in fact, strongest
among overseas Sikhs.67
CONCLUSION
I have attempted to demonstrate that there are problems arising from
the use of certain labels to categorize the Sikh participants in the recent and
ongoing Punjab crisis. Not only have these labels frequently been misused
by people who ought to know better, but even when they are defined
precisely and objectively, they do not always adequately encapsulate the
ideologies and actions of the people to whom they might best be applied.
How, then, might these problems be overcome? We are, it seems, stuck
with these labels, and stuck with their imperfections (which are inherent in
most labels and concepts used by historians and political scientists). It does
not seem likely that an alternative, indigenous set of Punjabi labels will
emerge. Nor, it should be said, would that necessarily be desirable, for the
whole point of using labels is surely to assist in making any historical or
contemporary political situation intelligible to as wide a public as possible, and English labels-it could be argued-best serve that purpose.
In the end, there are probably only two recommendations that can be
made. First, when labels like the ones discussed above are used, it should be
with the knowledge that-strictly speaking-they are separate labels, with
discrete meanings. To use them interchangeably, or to use them with
subjective motives, is to render them virtually useless. Second, when these
labels are used in the Punjab context, it must be remembered that they are
merely heuristic devices: they are not, in themselves, shorthand descriptions of reality. Wherever possible, therefore, they should be used as adjectival prefixes to the names of particular Sikh parties, factions, or organizations. In that way, too, some of the confused thinking and bias in reporting
on the Punjab can be eliminated.
National University of Singapore, November 1986
67 For a series of reports on the sentiments of Sikhs living in Canada and the United States,
see The Statesman, 27 March-6 April 1985. See also The Tribune, 21 January 1986.
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