PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS:
HOW DO WE KNOW THEY WORK?
Carter Malkasian
Gerald Meyerle
Visit our website for other free publication
downloads
http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/
To rate this publication click here.
March 2009
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department
of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications enjoy
full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified
information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent
official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to
offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest
of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public
release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code,
Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be
copyrighted.
*****
This report could not have been completed without the
contributions of Dr. Whitney Raas and Dr. Frederick Thompson.
They were both integral members of the CNA team that went to
Afghanistan to work with the provincial reconstruction teams
(PRTs). Their research and insight into analytical methods
underpinned many of the team’s findings. We merely present
those findings here. We are grateful for the contributions of Dr.
Daryl Liskey as well. We would also like to thank the U.S. Navy,
which funded the field work in Afghanistan. The conclusions and
recommendations presented here, though, remain our own and
do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Navy. Finally, we
would like to thank the members of the PRTs who hosted us—
Kunar, Khost, Ghazni, and Nuristan—as well as the members
of the U.S. combat units working alongside the PRTs. It was an
honor to have spent time with them. We are forever in the debt
of the soldiers who protected us on many a mission among the
people of Afghanistan.
*****
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be
forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.
*****
All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications are available
on the SSI homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies
of this report also may be ordered from our homepage. SSI’s
homepage address is: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.
*****
The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail
newsletter to update the national security community on the
research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and
upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter
also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research
analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please
subscribe on our homepage at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.
mil/newsletter/.
ISBN 1-58487-383-3
ii
FOREWORD
Over the past six years, provincial reconstruction teams
(PRTs) have played a growing role in the U.S. counterinsurgency
effort in Afghanistan. PRTs are one of several organizations
working on reconstruction there, along with the U.S. Agency
for International Development, numerous nongovernmental
organizations, and the Afghan government’s National
Solidarity Program. Perhaps unsurprisingly, something of a
debate has emerged over whether PRTs are needed.
This monograph, by Dr. Carter Malkasian and Dr. Gerald
Meyerle of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), argues
that civilian reconstruction agencies cannot do the same job
as the PRTs. While these agencies remain essential for longterm economic and political development, the PRTs conduct
reconstruction in ways that help create stability in the short
term. Absent the PRTs, the “build” in clear-hold-build efforts
deemed essential to effective counterinsurgency would fall
flat. Accordingly, the authors recommend that the United
States give the PRTs the lead role in reconstruction activities
that accompany any surge of military forces into Afghanistan.
These findings are based on over two months of field research in 2007 and two months in 2008 by a CNA team with four
different PRTs—Khost, Kunar, Ghazni, and Nuristan—plus
interviews with the leadership of ten others. The CNA team
divided up to work with each of the four PRTs and was able
to directly observe PRT missions, interview Afghan leaders,
and interact with officials from civilian development organizations.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this
monograph as a contribution to the national security debate
on this important subject.
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
iii
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
CARTER MALKASIAN leads the Stability and Development Program at the Center for Naval Analyses
(CNA). In late 2007 and again in early 2008, he led a
team that advised Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRT) in eastern Afghanistan. Previously assigned to
the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) as an advisor
on counterinsurgency, he deployed for the war in Iraq
from February to May 2003, February 2004 to February
2005, and February 2006 to August 2006. Most of that
time was spent in Al Anbar province. Dr. Malkasian’s
most recent publication is a co-edited book (with
Daniel Marston of Royal Military Academy Sandhurst),
Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare. His other books
include: A History of Modern Wars of Attrition (2002)
and The Korean War, 1950-1953 (2001). His journal
publications include: “Did the Coalition Need More
Forces in Iraq? Evidence from Al Anbar,” Joint Force
Quarterly; “A Thin Blue Line in the Sand,” Democracy:
A Journal of Ideas; “Signaling Resolve, Democratization,
and the First Battle of Fallujah,” Journal of Strategic
Studies; “The Role of Perceptions and Political Reform
in Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars & Insurgencies; and
“Toward a Better Understanding of Attrition,” Journal
of Military History. Dr. Malkasian holds a doctorate in
the history of war from Oxford University.
GERALD MEYERLE is a Research Analyst in CNA’s
Stability and Development Program. He has published
articles on the insurgency in Kashmir, the Pakistan
military, and the Pakistan-Afghan border areas. He
worked with a U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team
in northeastern Afghanistan in early 2008 where he
studied insurgent infiltration over the border with
v
Pakistan, among other things. Before coming to CNA,
Dr. Meyerle was an adjunct professor at the University
of Virginia where he taught courses on terrorism and
guerrilla warfare. He has done over a year’s worth of
fieldwork in India, Pakistan, and Kashmir, and speaks
Urdu, Pakistan’s national language. Dr. Meyerle holds
a Ph.D. in political science from the University of
Virginia.
vi
SUMMARY
The first provincial reconstruction team (PRT)
stood up in January 2003 in the city of Gardez. A novel
concept, PRTs combined civilian and military personnel
into a single entity with the purpose of improving
security, governance, and economic development.
The idea was that PRTs would be able to get into areas
where there was little or no presence on the part of the
Afghan government or the development community
and jumpstart reconstruction. In short order, the PRTs
blossomed: seven more were established in 2003 and
11 were added to the list in 2004. Today there are 26
in Afghanistan: 12 under U.S. commanders and 14
under commanders from another country within the
Coalition.
In the meantime, the PRTs evolved into much more
than an agency with guns that could go to areas too
dangerous for civilians and jumpstart development.
No longer do they simply pave the way for civilian
agencies to step in and do the real reconstruction work.
Instead, the PRTs have become America’s primary
tool for using large-scale reconstruction to improve
security in Afghanistan; the executors of the softer side
of counterinsurgency.
Yet questions remain. It is not clear that PRTs
should be filling such a large role. Do they really make
a difference, particularly in terms of improving security
or the capacity of the Afghan government to govern?
Even if they do, could not another organization, like the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
or the Afghan government itself, do the job just as well,
if not better?
The PRTs hardly stand alone. In addition, USAID,
the Afghan government, and even U.S. battalions
vii
do reconstruction work in Afghanistan’s provinces.
USAID has been conducting projects in Afghanistan
since 2002. Few provinces have not benefited from
their work. The Afghan government has the National
Solidarity Program, which attempts to connect local
villages and shuras with the central government. These
are just the most prominent development players.
Numerous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
plus the United Nations (UN) do a wide range of
reconstruction work as well.
The answers to the questions about the usefulness
of PRTs affect U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Any surge
of U.S. forces could be accompanied by an increase in
reconstruction funding. If the PRTs make a difference
and are unique, then arguably a large share of new
reconstruction activities should be handled by them.
If, on the other hand, PRTs do not make a difference
and are not unique, then new reconstruction should be
handled by other organizations.
We conducted field research for over two months
in 2007 and two months in 2008 with four different
PRTs—Khost, Kunar, Ghazni, and Nuristan. We then
augmented that field research with interviews with the
leadership of 10 other PRTs. That research suggests
PRTs do make a difference, at least in three provinces—
Khost, Kunar, and Ghazni. In Khost, an aggressive
project “blitz” corresponded with fewer attacks and
the emergence of a real partnership between tribes and
the government. In Kunar, road projects in two major
river valleys led to a rise in local community political
participation and local resistance to insurgent activity.
Tribes in at least five different districts responded to
attacks on projects—roads, bridges, and schools—by
coming out of their homes and shooting at insurgents.
In Ghazni, PRT projects appear to have helped counter
viii
rising violence, and the PRT’s focus on reducing
corruption and improving Afghan public health
capacity can be said to have improved governance.
Though we have not reviewed the history of the other
PRTs in detail, our interviews with commanders and
civilian representatives from PRTs in the east, south,
and west do not disprove what we found and, in some
cases, even support it.
Furthermore, our research suggests no other
organization can fill the PRTs’ shoes. Civilian
development agencies—USAID, NGOs, the UN, the
Afghan government’s National Solidarity Program—
cannot do the same job as the PRTs. Each plays a
role in reconstruction, but none match the PRTs’
capacity to complete projects in contested areas. This
is something PRTs do regularly, working side by
side with U.S. combat units in the field. While other
agencies remain needed for long-term economic and
political development, the PRTs are best suited to
conduct reconstruction in ways that create stability in
the short term.
This is not to disregard other organizations. They
are needed. USAID’s large-scale reconstruction projects
and training programs build up the economy and
governance in a manner and scale far beyond the PRTs’
capabilities. And the National Solidarity Program is
an ingenious tool for strengthening local governance
and expanding the reach of the Afghan government.
Both the National Solidarity Program and USAID are
better for nation-building and long-term economic
development than the PRTs. A strong argument can
be made that PRT projects are not needed in safe areas
like Jalalabad, Panjshir, or Kabul. USAID, NGOs, and
the National Solidarity Program can do the work in
these secured areas.
ix
For counterinsurgency operations in dangerous
areas, though, PRTs are the name of the game.
Accordingly, the United States should give the PRTs a
major role in reconstruction activities that accompany
any surge of military forces into Afghanistan. As
much as possible, new funds meant to back up the
counterinsurgency campaign should be funneled
through the PRTs.
That is not all. Counterinsurgency objectives can
be better met if decisionmaking for all U.S. projects in
contested areas is delegated to the PRTs. The USAID
representative at the PRT should be in charge of
approval and monitoring for USAID projects in their
province (excluding large cross-province projects). To
do so, Congress will need to lessen the accountability
required for USAID funds, and the USAID billets in all
PRTs will need to be filled.
Additionally, to complete the added duty of
monitoring and executing a greater number of projects,
each PRT should be given additional security personnel
and additional civil engineers.
These recommendations may not be the best over
the long term. Over that period, it would be better for
USAID, with its proven expertise and bags of money, to
handle the softer side of counterinsurgency. By giving
the PRTs, and hence the U.S. military, the lead in surge
reconstruction, the United States would be foregoing
the creation of a real counterinsurgency capability in
USAID. Unfortunately, doing otherwise would take
time. With a surge around the corner, the United States
has little choice but to reinforce what has worked best
to this point—the PRTs.
x
PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS:
HOW DO WE KNOW THEY WORK?
INTRODUCTION
Over the past 6 years, the U.S. counterinsurgency
effort in Afghanistan has become dependent upon
provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). Originally
conceived as the vanguard of reconstruction efforts—an
agency with guns that could go to areas too dangerous
for civilian agencies and jumpstart development—
PRTs have evolved into much more. No longer do
they simply pave the way for civilian agencies to step
in and do the real reconstruction work. The PRTs have
become America’s primary tool for using large-scale
reconstruction to improve security in Afghanistan; the
executors of the softer side of counterinsurgency.
Yet questions remain. Do the PRTs really make
a difference? Do they help improve security or the
capacity of the Afghan government to govern? Even if
they do, could not another organization, like the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) or the
Afghan government itself, do the job just as well, if not
better?
Civilian development agencies, such as USAID and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), tend to take
exception to the military-staffed PRTs.1 Many civilian
aid workers argue that the PRTs’ military personnel
know little about development, reconstruction, or
Afghan culture. They say that as a result, PRTs build a
lot of physical infrastructure but neglect the human side
of development, leaving in their wake schools without
teachers and clinics without doctors. Nor do many aid
workers believe that reconstruction should be tied to a
1
counterinsurgency strategy. In their view, development
should be conducted for development’s sake, not as a
means of defeating the insurgency.2 Winning hearts
and minds smacks of a Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) plot. The anti-military lobbying efforts of civilian
development agencies have been so strong that the
Coalition headquarters in Afghanistan recently issued
new civil military guidelines that state: “Humanitarian
assistance must not be used for the purpose of political
gain, relationship-building, or winning hearts and
minds.”3
The answers to questions about the value of PRTs
affect U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Any surge of
U.S. forces could be accompanied with an increase
in funding for reconstruction. If the PRTs make a
difference and are unique, then arguably a large share
of new reconstruction activities should be handled
by them. If, on the other hand, PRTs do not make a
difference and are not unique, then new reconstruction
should be handled by civilian development agencies.
Field research over two months in 2007 and two
months in 2008 with four different PRTs—Khost,
Kunar, Ghazni, and Nuristan—plus interviews with
the leadership of 10 others, suggests that PRTs do
make a difference. They strengthen governance
and contribute to security.4 Civilian development
agencies—USAID, NGOs, the United Nations (UN),
the Afghan government’s National Solidarity Program—cannot do the same job as the PRTs. Each plays
a role in reconstruction, but none match the PRTs’
capacity to complete projects in contested areas. This
is something PRTs do regularly, working side by side
with U.S. combat units in the field. While other agencies
remain needed for long-term economic and political
development, the PRTs are best suited to conduct
2
reconstruction in ways that create stability in the short
term. Absent the PRTs, the “build” in clear-hold-build
efforts deemed essential to effective counterinsurgency
would fall flat.
This monograph is divided into four sections. The
first reviews the structure of PRTs and what they do;
the second examines whether the PRTs have made a
difference in counterinsurgency, particularly in terms
of improving security and strengthening governance;
the third assesses whether the PRTs’ contribution
is unique; and the fourth summarizes what we have
learned and suggests how to use PRTs in Afghanistan
in the future.
WHAT ARE PRTs AND WHAT DO THEY DO?
When the United States invaded Afghanistan in late
2001, there was little infrastructure to speak of. Most
schools, hospitals, and government buildings had been
destroyed by over 20 years of civil war. There were
almost no paved roads, and few towns had electricity
or running water. The country had no functioning civil
administration, police force, or professional military—
either in the capital or the provinces. To coordinate
reconstruction efforts, the Coalition created provincial
reconstruction teams (PRTs).
Afghanistan has 34 provinces. The first PRT stood
up in January 2003 in the eastern city of Gardez, in
Paktia province. Seven more followed by the end of
the year—Kunduz, Bamiyan, Mazar-i-Sharif, Parwan,
Herat, Nangarhar, and Kandahar. Eleven were added
to the list in 2004, many in contested provinces such as
Kunar, Paktika, and Ghazni.5 Today there are 26 PRTs
in Afghanistan: 12 under U.S. commanders and 14
under commanders from another country within the
3
4
Map 1. Afghanistan.
Coalition. All the PRTs are connected to the Coalition
headquarters—the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF).
U.S.-led PRTs field 60–100 personnel. U.S. Army or
Marine officers commanded the first PRTs. This was an
added burden upon these overly committed services.
Consequently, today, commanders come from the U.S.
Navy or Air Force. These are not throwaways. For the
Navy, they are the cream of the crop: post-command or
command-selected officers who have already or who
will go on to command a ship or squadron of aircraft;
the peers of the Army and Marine Corps battalion
commanders. In addition to a skeleton military staff
(intelligence officer, operations officer, supply officer,
etc.), most PRTs have two engineers, three to eight U.S.
Army civil affairs officers, and a platoon of about 40 U.S.
Army National Guardsmen. The Navy and Air Force
commanders arrived in 2006 as did the two engineers,
leading to better-led and more capable PRTs. Finally,
a civilian representative from the Department of State,
USAID, and the Department of Agriculture (USDA) are
assigned to every PRT, though oftentimes all three will
not be present. They are co-equal to the commander,
rather than his subordinates.
Ten of the 12 U.S. PRTs fall under the command
of a U.S. brigade commander. The brigade, in turn,
falls under Regional Command East, a U.S. divisional
command. Today that division is the 101st Airborne;
in 2007–08 it was the 82nd Airborne; and in 2006–07
it was the 10th Mountain Division. Thus, most U.S.
PRTs are firmly embedded in the U.S. military chain
of command. Two U.S. PRTs—Zabul and Farah—fall
under ISAF regional commands (Regional Command
South and Regional Command West).
5
The 14 non-U.S. PRTs vary in structure and
personnel. The Italian, German, Canadian, and British
PRTs all boast over 100 personnel.6 The Germans have
nearly 500 in Kunduz. The non-U.S. PRTs tend to
have more civilians than their U.S. counterparts. The
German and Canadian PRTs have 20. The British PRT in
Helmand has 30, divided into different functional cells
(stability, development, rule of law, and governance).
The Helmand PRT is led by a civilian who outranks (but
does not command) the brigadier in charge of British
military forces in the province. Representatives from
USAID or the U.S. State Department work on many
non-U.S. PRTs, most notably Helmand and Kandahar.
The PRTs’ original mandate was to assist the
Afghan government in extending its authority in
order to facilitate security, security sector reform, and
reconstruction. In particular, the PRTs would jumpstart reconstruction in areas where there was little
or no presence on the part of the government or the
development community through small-scale quick
impact projects.7 The PRT Handbook, drafted in 2006
to summarize the purpose and history of PRTs, reads:
A PRT is a civil-military institution that is able to
penetrate the most unstable and insecure areas because of
its military component and is able to stabilize these areas
because of the capabilities brought by its diplomacy,
defense, and development components.8
Thus, PRTs do not conduct development for
development’s sake. For the PRTs, development is a
means of turning Afghans away from the insurgency
and thereby creating a stable environment in which
the Afghan government can exert its authority. This
mandate largely still stands today.9
6
PRTs have two primary means of fulfilling their
mandate. The first is executing reconstruction projects.
Most funding since 2004 for U.S. PRT activities has
come from the Commanders Emergency Response
Program (CERP), a fund designed to give U.S. military
commanders the ability to spend money quickly on
small projects without much bureaucratic processing.
It does not have the checks of other U.S. funding
streams. The PRT commander can apply $100,000 per
month as he or she sees fit. Larger projects require
approval of the PRTs’ higher headquarters, but this is
not a problem. Higher headquarters, anxious to back
up soldiers fighting on the ground, generally try to
expedite approval. Non-U.S. PRTs also have access
to CERP, but their major sources of funding come
from their respective governments. Some of their
governments do not fund PRT projects but funnel their
money through the UN or Afghan government.10
Besides CERP, PRTs have access to the USAID
local governance and community development fund
through their USAID representative. This money
does not compare to CERP in size, though, and the
approval process can be lengthy. The local governance
and community development fund comprised but 7
percent of all USAID project money in Afghanistan
in 2007. The rest of the USAID money cannot be
accessed by the PRT. The vast majority of the spending
decisions for it are made in Kabul rather than by the
USAID representatives on the PRTs.11 This is because
Congress enforces more stringent accountability
upon USAID funds than CERP funds. Under current
practice, USAID representatives on the PRTs lack the
certification to contract all but a handful of low cost
projects. The certified contracting officers reside in
Kabul.12
7
The second means for the PRTs to fulfill their mandate is by meeting with village, district, and provincial
Afghan leaders. The team’s commander, civil affairs
officers, and civilian representatives interact regularly
with provincial and district officials—especially the
provincial governor and district governors (every
province is divided into districts). The subject is
generally ongoing PRT programs and major issues
facing the province or district, such as the blowback
from U.S. military operations, tribal disputes, and
future activities of the Afghan provincial and district
government. There has also been an extended process
of developing the organization of the provincial
government. The most notable improvement in
this regard has been the institution of provincial
development councils, which coordinate the activities
of government line directors (such as education, public
health, and rural development), the PRT, the UN, and
other development agencies in the province.
Research Background.
Research for this monograph came from a variety of
sources. The ISAF Country Stability Picture database
was the source of most of the numbers. This database
compiles information on project location, start date,
type, and value from 2004 to the present. There are
many holes in the data. Consequently, we updated
and corrected it to the best of our ability. Through
speaking with PRT members and going through
project files, we checked the project information of
the PRTs and U.S. military units operating in the area.
Plus, we acquired project information from the Afghan
government’s National Solidarity Program. The biggest
gaps remained for information on projects conducted
8
by USAID, the UN, and NGOs working outside the
National Solidarity Program. We relied heavily upon
USAID fact sheets and briefs for information on their
projects and expenditures.
Besides examining project data, we conducted
extensive interviews with the members of the PRTs.
The focus was obviously on the provinces where we
worked, but we interviewed members of PRTs in
other provinces as well. We tried to learn as much as
we could about the history of PRT activities. In the
course of our work, we were also able to talk to the
officers and soldiers of nearby U.S. military units, often
staying with them for several days. These included
battalion commanders, company commanders, platoon
commanders, and advisors embedded with the Afghan
National Army and Afghan National Police.
Nor did we talk only to PRT members and U.S.
military personnel. We also spoke with civilian officials
from ISAF, the UN, and USAID.13 Most importantly, we
spoke to Afghans. This included provincial governors,
district governors, provincial directors (such as public
health, education, irrigation, and rural rehabilitation
and development), development officials, tribal elders,
contractors, journalists, members of NGOs, and the
local population.
Finally, we directly observed PRT activities and
military operations. On a day-to-day basis, we were
able to see how the PRTs operate. We observed
discussions and meetings involving the provincial
governors, NGOs, tribal elders, contractors, and the
PRTs’ own staffs.
DO PRTs MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
Do PRTs make a positive contribution toward
stability and development in Afghanistan? What is
9
the proof that they are making a difference? Lack of
rigorous assessment of their effectiveness has been a
common criticism of the PRTs.14 We take a stab at these
questions by looking at their effect on security and
governance.
Security is the immediate objective of U.S. forces
in Afghanistan and also one of the three objectives
within the PRTs’ mission. PRT projects are thought to
reduce insurgent activity by providing jobs to young
men, giving tribal elders a means of buying back the
allegiance of locals from insurgents; and creating an
atmosphere of economic development that makes
insurgent violence appear unneeded.
Good governance is widely regarded as essential
to effective counterinsurgency. The first chapter of the
new counterinsurgency manual reads: “The primary
objective of any counterinsurgency operation is to foster
development of effective governance by a legitimate
government.”15 We assessed governance by examining
the level of participation in political institutions, the
amount of goods and services flowing from the central
government into the districts of each province, and the
prevalence of corruption.16
Wide participation in political institutions is
particularly important in Afghanistan and in Pashtun
society. Traditionally, Pashtuns deem no one leader
to have authority over the rest. Decisions are made
by a “shura” (council) of elders. Also known as
“jirgas,” shuras convene across Pashtun society to
resolve disputes, deliver goods and services, and unite
communities against threats. The participation of key
tribal elders enhances the authority of any shura.17
Provincial and district governors hold shuras, trying to
draw as many elders as possible as a means of ensuring
that no tribe is insulted by a government decision and
driven toward violence. For all intents and purposes,
10
shuras are the key political institution in the Pashtun
provinces, if not Afghanistan as a whole.18 Over and
over Afghan leaders told the United States that unity,
not military action, was the key to peace. Shuras created
that unity.19 In the words of Haji Mohammed Zalmay,
one of the better district governors in Kunar province,
“The key to success is getting tribes to come to shuras
and keeping them united.”20
We assess the impact of the PRTs on security and
governance by examining the accomplishments of three
specific PRTs—Khost, Kunar, and Ghazni, three of the
four PRTs we visited. These provinces were not chosen
at random. They were chosen because they were led
by U.S. Navy commanders, and because CJTF-82 and
these commanders wanted analytical assistance. Our
sponsor was the U.S. Navy, and our immediate task
was to provide analytical support to their PRTs. This
broader study was secondary. We excluded Nuristan
(where we sent one analyst) because that PRT had
only been in existence for 1 year, and the mountainous
terrain made it difficult for it to do much outside the
single district where it was headquartered. All three
provinces lie in the east of the country, are largely
Pashtun, and have U.S.-led PRTs.
To be clear, there is no evidence that PRTs on their
own have quelled violence. We expended many hours
examining the relationship between PRT projects
and the numbers of insurgent attacks, comparing the
amount of money spent in each province and district
to the number of attacks. This data is classified and
cannot be displayed here. What we can say is that we
found nothing to suggest the PRTs are turning the
tide of violence. Attacks in general have increased in
Afghanistan over the past 2 years, including in the
provinces we visited.21 At the same time, PRT spending
11
has been increasing dramatically.22 The effect of this
spending has not been enough to overcome the other
factors driving violence levels upwards. Nevertheless,
if not reversing rising violence levels, PRTs have
played a helpful role counteracting them according to
our evidence, which is laid out below.
Khost.
Khost is a small province (roughly the size of Rhode
Island), with a relatively flat interior surrounded
by mountains. The population is 300,000. Economic
and political conditions tilt in the province’s favor.
Temperate climate and access to water endow Khost
with year-round agricultural activity. The governor,
Arsallah Jamal, who is experienced, intelligent, active,
and seen as trustworthy by both the people and coalition
forces, promotes good governance. A thriving civil
society further helps good governance. Khost boasts a
university, an active media, poet and law societies, and
a relatively high literacy rate.23
Khost’s biggest problem has been its long
mountainous border with Pakistan, which contributes
to unrest. Insurgents are thought to operate out of
Miram Shah, which is less than a 30-minute drive across
the border. In 2005 and early 2006, insurgent violence
was relatively low, but attacks did occur, improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) in particular. Insurgent
activity increased in 2006 when the Pakistani military
stopped fighting in the federally administered tribal
areas. It spiked in February 2007, with large numbers
of IEDs and suicide car bombs going off.24
Colonel Marty Schweitzer (commander of the brigade responsible for Khost and the surrounding provinces), Lieutenant Colonel Scott Custer (commander of
12
the battalion in Khost), and Commander Dave Adams
(commander of the PRT) responded with a new
strategy hailed as a counterinsurgency success story;
in the words of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “a
model of a concerted counterinsurgency effort.”25
Custer’s battalion oil spotted out from its large forward operating base (FOB Salerno) near the provincial
capital (Khost City) to multiple smaller district centers
throughout the province. Fortified, these district centers
housed 20–30 soldiers, the district governor, 50–100
Afghan National Police, and sometimes an Afghan
National Army detachment.26 Nor were Custer’s men
the only U.S. presence. Adams placed civil affairs
officers and NCOs in the district centers alongside
Custer’s men. By living in these district centers, U.S.
forces co-located themselves with all aspects of the
Afghan government and made themselves available
to the people of the province, while simultaneously
providing security for the immediate area.27
Adams further backed up Custer’s security
operations with a project “blitz” of over $22 million in
large-scale projects. It entailed roughly 50 schools, 300
wells, 30 dams, and over 50 kilometers of road. The PRT
concentrated these projects in outlying (less secure)
districts. Roads received the largest percentage of
funding, followed by education, irrigation, governance,
and water. Custer and Adams wanted to connect all of
the districts to the capital. One road was built into the
most dangerous district in the province.28 To execute
these projects, the PRT worked with the governor,
district governors, and line directors to hold fair and
open bidding processes, conduct groundbreaking and
opening ceremonies, and ensure the people knew of the
involvement of their government in the reconstruction
process. The idea was to show Afghans and even
13
insurgents in Pakistan that the quality of life was
improving. Particular attention was paid to bringing in
the Afghan media for all groundbreaking and opening
ceremonies. This helped create a “buzz” around all of
the reconstruction.29
Projects helped strengthen governance. By
allowing projects to be discussed at shuras with the
district governor or the provincial governor, the PRT
empowered the Afghan government. It gave them a
carrot with which to increase political participation.30
Kael Weston, the Department of State representative
on the PRT, pressed tribal leaders and village elders
to cooperate with the Afghan police and the Afghan
government on security matters in return for projects.
A real security partnership emerged between tribes
and the government in many places.31 According to
Weston, the number of tribal elders working with the
governor and district governor increased between the
beginning of 2007 and mid-2008.32
The new strategy affected security as well. In the
words of the chairman of the Khost Provincial Council,
“The Taliban have lost, they have been unable to
separate the people from the government.”33 The quote
contains a bit of hyperbole, but other evidence suggests
that the strategy inflicted at least modest damage on
the insurgency. A positive shift in attitude among
the population accompanied the project blitz, which
undercut support for the insurgency.34 Insurgents going
though Afghanistan’s amnesty program told Weston
that the extent of PRT projects in Khost caused them to
question Taliban propaganda and encouraged them to
stop fighting.35 The situation improved enough for U.S.
soldiers to hand over defense of one district center to
an Afghan army detachment.36
Furthermore, we found a statistically significant
relationship between improvements in district security
14
ratings (assessed by the U.S. military) and high levels of
PRT spending in those districts. We ran a Spearman’s
Rank correlation that compared improvements in
the security ratings of the districts of Ghazni, Khost,
Kunar, and Nuristan to the amount of PRT spending in
each of those districts. Security assessments are made
by the local battalion commander in coordination with
the brigade commander—in this case, Custer and
Schweitzer. Districts are rated green for safe, yellow
for fairly safe, orange for fairly dangerous, and red for
dangerous. We quantified how much change occurred
in the ratings, say from red to yellow or orange to green,
and then compared it to the amount of PRT spending
in a district. To test for a relationship, we ranked the
districts first by size of the security change, and, second,
by the amount of spending. Then we ran a Spearman’s
Rank correlation.37 Generally speaking, districts where
the PRT allotted the most spending witnessed the
greatest improvement in security ratings.
All that said, in 2008 Khost still experienced violence,
especially because of incursions from Pakistan. In some
respects it actually got worse. The “model” could not
bring peace and security or prevent a rise in insurgent
activity. There were multiple suicide bombings, more
IED attacks, and five attempts on the governor’s life.38
What the PRT did was help prevent a difficult situation
from becoming even worse.
Kunar.
Kunar lies north of Jalalabad along the border
with Pakistan. Mountains cut by narrow river valleys
dominate the terrain. The two largest rivers are the
Kunar, running north to south, and the Pech, running
west to east. Numerous tributary valleys intersect
both these valleys. The population numbers roughly
15
380,000, distributed in small villages throughout the
various valleys.
Kunar is one of the most violent provinces in
Afghanistan. In 2007, the number of attacks there
tripled those in Khost.39 Attacks, particularly ambushes,
were well-organized, often combining heavy machine
guns and mortars with ground maneuver. Sometimes
over 100 insurgents took part. Insurgents controlled
several remote valleys and received support from the
Northwest Frontier Province or Federally Administered Tribal Areas across the border in Pakistan.
In early 2006, Colonel “Mick” Nicholson, the brigade
commander in the area, positioned two U.S. battalions,
1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment (750 men) and
1st Squadron, 35th Cavalry Regiment (500 men), in
Kunar and neighboring Nuristan. Both dispersed into
company- and platoon-size detachments along the
rivers and in a few of the remote mountain valleys.40
The PRT, then under Commander Ryan “Doc” Scholl,
backed up the military operations with projects. The
PRT effort centered on road construction.
The first major road, completed in November 2006,
ran through the Kunar River Valley from Jalalabad,
the largest city in eastern Afghanistan, to Asadabad,
Kunar’s provincial capital. USAID funded the road, but
the PRT managed its execution—resolving disputes
over land and labor, conducting quality control
missions, and holding shuras to build community
support.41 Violence fell as the road was paved. IED
incidents dropped from a high of 17 in 2006 to 7 in
2007 following the road’s completion. Other positive
effects in 2007 were that the UN reopened its office in
Asadabad, and the Kabul and Azizi banks established
branches there.42
The road went a long way toward improving
governance in Kunar by opening an avenue for the
16
delivery of goods and services. Provincial line directors,
such as the director of education, director of irrigation,
and director of agriculture, could now send workers
to rural districts to interact with local communities
and observe projects. In 2006, Afghanistan’s National
Solidarity Program, which handles rural development,
directed project funding into Asadabad. No National
Solidarity Program projects had ever been committed
to Asadabad before. As one of its largest programs,
the National Solidarity Program is a primary way that
the Afghan government delivers goods and services
to the people—an important component of good
governance.43 From then until the end of 2007, over $1
million of the $2.5 million total in funding for Kunar
went to Asadabad.44
The next road was built in the Pech River Valley,
funded entirely by the PRT.45 The river cuts through
three districts—Chapadara, Pech, and Watapur—and
contains roughly 100,000 people in numerous small
villages. The valley was known as a hotbed of insurgent
activity, frequently witnessing large-scale firefights.
The battalion posted there (1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry
Regiment) took 120 casualties in firefights during its
15-month deployment from January 2006 to May
2007.
Governance faired no better than security. Few
village shuras existed, let alone shuras with the district
governors. Police forces were small and did not get
out much.46 Infighting plagued the dominant tribe (the
Safis) as powerful elders competed with one another.
As a means of undercutting the insurgency, the
battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Chris
Cavoli, advocated paving the dirt road through the
valley. From his perspective, doing so would increase
trade and economic activity, providing the people
17
with an alternative to violence. At the same time, a
paved road would make it harder for insurgents to
lay roadside bombs.47 After several false starts, paving
started in earnest in early 2007, under the guidance of
the PRT, now led by Commander Scholl’s successor,
Commander Larry LeGree.48
As road construction began, the PRT and
Lieutenant Colonel Cavoli’s officers worked with the
valley’s district governors to reach out to tribal elders.
The district governors established shuras at their
district centers and went out to the villages to draw
communities together into their own shuras. The tribal
elders came forward. What drew them? The possibility
of securing jobs for their tribesmen as road workers
or roadside guards; the need to resolve disputes that
arose as the road passed through people’s land; and
the opportunity to consult on the location and nature
of additional small-scale side projects offered by the
PRT. The road was thus a vehicle for building political
institutions—shuras—and increasing participation in
them.49
LeGree’s PRT completed the road in March 2008.
By then, the Watapur and Pech district governors were
holding monthly shuras that drew more than 30 tribal
elders apiece. At least five village shuras had formed
that met regularly with the district governors.50 Elders
provided 140 additional men for the Afghan National
Police.51 The police stood and fought, repeatedly
dueling with insurgents in the mountains. Sometimes
they reinforced U.S. soldiers on their own initiative.
The local population even began helping the police
man checkpoints.52
Security improved at the same time. In early 2008,
Americans and Afghans alike said that the number
and scale of attacks on the valley floor had dropped.53
18
An informal USAID survey in late 2007 found that
people in the Pech River Valley believed that the road
had increased security and economic opportunity.54 As
hoped, IED attacks fell off, going from a high of 21 in
the first 6 months of 2006 to 2 during the first 6 months
of 2008. Insurgents could not easily dig a hole through
the pavement to lay an IED, especially considering that
the necessary tools to do so are hard to find in rural
Afghanistan. Equally important, though, was that the
shuras had brought the Safis together to police the
road and to provide intelligence on insurgents and the
location of IEDs.55
Like the road from Jalalabad to Asadabad, the
Pech road brought goods and services. The National
Solidarity Program started projects in the Pech Valley,
which it had never done before. Even before the road
neared completion in late 2007, the National Solidarity
Program had committed roughly $1 million to projects
in the Pech district (out of $2.5 million total for
Kunar).56
Following the success of the Pech and Asadabad
to Jalalabad roads, the PRT started new roads in the
Korengal, Shuryek, Deywagul, and Nawa valleys. All
of these roads remain under construction but one—the
Deywagul road—especially appears to have hurt the
insurgents.
The Deywagul valley feeds into the southern Kunar
valley. Known to be an insurgent operating area, the
PRT contracted a road into the valley in late 2007.
As with the previous roads, tribal elders (following
fairly tough negotiations) came forth and provided
road workers and security guards. The insurgents
were not going to back down without a fight though,
and throughout 2008 they attacked the workers and
security guards relentlessly. The security guards and
19
their elders, backed by the PRT and U.S. combat forces,
persevered, outposting the length of the road, training,
and even patrolling to find IEDs. Their morale grew
stronger and stronger as they endured battle after
battle. The insurgents could not overwhelm them and
found laying IEDs increasingly difficult. By November
2008, the road had been paved deep into the valley.
Whether the road will be completed or violence will
taper off in 2009 is an open question, but clearly the road
helped motivate locals to fight against the insurgents
in 2008.57
Other large-scale projects had a similar impact
elsewhere in Kunar, particularly in terms of
strengthening political participation and turning locals
against insurgents. We spoke to 25 different Afghan
leaders in Kunar province—district governors, police
chiefs, mullahs, two governors, and (most importantly)
tribal elders. In the course of these discussions, we tried
to learn why tribal elders participate in government in
their respective districts. For 7 out of 15 districts, leaders
mentioned a PRT project as the reason (other prominent
reasons were dispute resolution and the charisma of
the district governor).58 Participation in the district
government enabled tribal elders to bring projects and
jobs to their tribesmen. While to some extent the PRT
was simply buying off participation, the end result
was still a more participatory Afghan government that
had a better ability to resolve disputes and marshal the
support of key leaders toward its policies.59
This trend was not unrelated to fighting insurgents.
As in the Pech, participation in shuras often translated
into resistance to the insurgency. In the words
of Governor Wahidi, “A big shura will show our
confidence. It will signal strength to the enemy.”60
Local tribes in at least five different districts responded
20
to attacks on other projects—roads, bridges, and
schools—by coming out of their homes and shooting
at insurgents.61 New road projects into other mountain
valleys in Kunar have even driven wedges into the
insurgency by compelling insurgents, who want to see
their communities receive the benefits of development,
to clash with other insurgents, who want to prevent
the government from expanding its power into their
territory.62
In 2008, after all the efforts of the PRT, Kunar
still ranks as one of the most violent provinces in
Afghanistan. Yet clearly the PRT helped reduce violence
and strengthen governance in two locales—the Kunar
River Valley and in the Pech River Valley—where the
strategy of out posting and road building brought
security, revitalized local political institutions, and
enabled the Afghan government to deliver goods and
services to the people for the first time. No mean feat,
even if the insurgency remained formidable elsewhere
in the province.
Ghazni.
Roughly five times the size of Khost with three
times the population (931,000 people), Ghazni sits
south of Kabul on Afghanistan’s ring road. From 2006
to 2008, insurgent activity was greater than in Khost
but less than in Kunar. Pashtuns are the largest ethnic
group, though Hazaras comprise a sizeable minority
(42 percent). Insurgent activity occurred primarily in
the Pashtun areas. Violence was not Ghazni’s only
problem. Poor governance afflicted the province as
well. Between the summer of 2006 and the summer
of 2008, four governors held office; two were corrupt,
the third was replaced for poor performance, and the
21
jury is out on the fourth. Nine of 19 district governors
were replaced during this period as well. Corruption
pervaded all levels of government.
The PRT in Ghazni started addressing governance
in 2006. U.S. officers were assigned as “mentors” to key
provincial officials and important government bodies
(the provincial council and the provincial development
committee). Commander Scott Cooledge, who led the
PRT in 2007–08, expanded mentorship to the district
governors and placed a new emphasis on countering
corruption. Competitive bidding processes and quality
control measures were instituted for all PRT projects to
prevent the government from skimming off contracts.
These efforts made a difference. Frequent interaction with the PRT across the government hierarchy
compelled officials to do the right thing. It turned officials into more effective administrators. The importance
of mentorship is underlined by a statistically significant
correlation between improvements in U.S. assessments
of governance in districts and the number of PRT
visits. The more the PRT visited a district, the more
that governance improved.63
The most vivid improvement in governance
regarded the delivery of goods and services. The
PRT instituted a multilevel plan to improve public
health in the province.64 It started with the mentors,
who held regular meetings with the provincial public
health director and the NGOs to identify the right PRT
projects. Then, those projects—improvements to clinics
and the provincial hospital, and the construction of
radio communication nodes—were executed. Next,
the PRT provided health care training to Afghans. The
PRT held seminars and workshops for Afghan health
care professionals nearly every week, augmented by
two large multi-day conferences. The centerpiece was
bimonthly village medical outreach operations in
22
which the PRT traveled to outlying districts and set up
temporary treatment facilities as a means of training
local health care professionals.
By early 2008, there were clear signs that the public
health strategy had enabled the government to better
deliver goods and services: the number trauma cases
referred to the field hospital on the PRT’s base dropped
to zero as patients now went to the new PRT-funded
emergency room in the provincial hospital; and the
public health directorate began to run village medical
operations on its own.
Large numbers of projects accompanied the PRT’s
mentorship strategy. They represented the PRT’s major
weapon against insurgent activity. As in Khost and
Kunar, project spending in 2007–08 was unprecedented;
the total nearly doubled that of 2006–07. The PRT
focused on large-scale construction projects. Fifty-five
percent of spending went to roads.
Five dangerous districts received the greatest
concentration of PRT spending. Roads were paved
in four of these districts. Like mentorship and anticorruption efforts, projects made a difference. According to the 82nd Airborne Division’s assessments, security in all five dangerous districts improved between
2007 and 2008. To test for the role of projects in security, as in the Khost case, we compared the district security ratings between 2007 and 2008 to PRT spending.
And as in Khost, we found a statistically significant
relationship, suggesting that PRT projects may be
helping to improve security.65
Thus, by early 2008, the PRT had helped improved
governance through mentorship, anti-corruption
efforts, and a coordinated public health strategy. At
the same time, large-scale projects had helped counter
violence in certain districts. As in Kunar and Khost,
though, the PRT did not reverse violence throughout
23
the province, and overall security in Ghazni has
worsened over the past year. Traveling along parts of
the ring road has become dangerous, and the Taliban
operates freely in certain districts. A PRT alone cannot
bring victory.66
What These Three Cases Tell Us.
The three cases above illustrate how the PRTs have
made a difference. For the past 3 years, each PRT has
been trying to fight rising violence. They have not
reversed the tide—indeed, absolute numbers of attacks
have risen in each province—but they have helped
prevent the violence from reaching even higher levels
and, in some discrete locales, actually stemmed it.
Similarly, the PRTs have helped strengthen
governance through improving the delivery of goods
and services, countering corruption, and increasing
political participation, though there is nothing to
suggest that they create good governance on their
own. Other factors—particularly good Afghan provincial governors, district govenors, and line directors—
played a role as well. Thus, both in respect to security and governance, PRTs seem to make a contribution, just not a decisive one; neither stability nor good
governance is going to appear on account of the PRTs.
Does the evidence from these three cases say
anything about the usefulness of PRTs overall? We
have not reviewed the history of the other PRTs in
detail. Nevertheless, our interviews with commanders
and civilian representatives from other PRTs in the
east, south, and west mostly confirm the conclusions
so far, particularly in regard to governance.
Governance improved with the implementation of
PRT projects in several other cases. According to U.S.
24
military officers, projects encouraged tribal elders to
participate in political institutions not only in Kunar
and Khost but also in Nuristan, Parwan, Farah, Zabul,
Paktia, Paktika, and Helmand.67 In many provinces,
PRTs have organized shuras to support reconstruction
and resolve disputes. In Farah in 2006, it was common
for local leaders to meet in large shuras to secure local
support for the PRT’s activities.68 The PRT negotiated
several important settlements among warring tribes.69
In Paktika, the PRT sought to help the tribal elders
regain a position of strength within society in order
to counter insurgent activity. The PRT organized
local shuras and empowered the elders by conducting
projects in their areas under the auspices of the Afghan
government.70
The PRT commanders always insisted that proposals for reconstruction projects go through government
officials and district-level shuras. The PRT retained
ultimate control over these funds, but the practice
gave district and provincial officials power they would
not have otherwise had. The types of projects were
similar, too. Large road projects often paved the way
to political participation. In nearly every province,
the PRT has built roads linking provincial capitals to
district centers, helping farmers bring their produce to
market.
As in Khost and Kunar, political participation
could translate into security. For instance, in Zabul
province in the fall of 2004, tribal leaders from several
particularly dangerous areas came together and agreed
to protect the PRT and its contractors in exchange for
irrigation projects. The PRT secured similar agreements
in eastern Paktia in 2005.71
25
COULD ANOTHER ORGANIZATION FILL THE
PRTs’ SHOES?
We have argued that, by contributing to security
and strengthening governance, PRTs make a difference. A question remains, though. Why PRTs? Could
not another development agency have the same
effects? The PRTs hardly stand alone. USAID, the
Afghan government, and even U.S. battalions all do
reconstruction work in Afghanistan’s provinces.
USAID has been conducting projects in Afghanistan
since 2002. It enjoys a depth of experience and
understanding of how development works that the PRT,
with its military staff on a 9-month or 1-year rotation,
cannot match. Indeed, PRTs depend on USAID for
programs to train Afghans in essential skills, without
which the capacity of government will not improve,
no matter how many clinics and schools go up. What
is a clinic without nurses or a school without teachers?
Few provinces have not benefited from USAID’s
work. Moreover, USAID is the most powerful U.S.
reconstruction organization in Afghanistan. USAID
expenditures in Afghanistan in 2007 totaled $1.5 billion
compared to $.2 billion for all CERP expenditures.72
Many projects are nationwide efforts that span several
provinces. Other projects focus on building the capacity
of the central government. In the violent provinces,
though, the PRTs do most of the work. In all but two
of the 14 provinces where the U.S. military operates,
CERP spending exceeded USAID spending in 2007.
For example, USAID spent $2 million and $8 million
in Khost and Kunar, respectively, compared to $18
million and $11 million by the PRTs.73
The Afghan government has its own development
programs, the largest being the National Solidarity
Program (NSP). Set up in 2003 and funded by the World
26
Bank, the National Solidarity Program falls under the
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
(MRRD). The ministry controls the implementation
of economic assistance projects. MRRD runs five
programs, including the National Solidarity Program.
The program is designed to connect local villages and
shuras with the central government. Local communities
are given small grants ($200 per family in 2007 for
villages with more than 100 residents) to contract
projects in their villages. In each village, a community
development council is formed, which decides what
kind of project should be implemented. An NGO (such
as Oxfam, Madera, or Relief International) supervises
the process.74
The idea is that choosing and implementing a
project will bring local communities together and
facilitate good governance (largely by drawing people
to participate in community development councils)
while at the same time connecting those communities
directly to the central government. The number of
projects per province ranges from 270 to 1,400. No
province has been excluded. In Khost, Kunar, and
Ghazni, $8 to $10 million was spent to the end of 2007.75
According to local Afghan leaders, political institutions
have indeed become stronger as new councils form to
take part in the program, often with the participation
of key local leaders.76
The PRT is not the only U.S. military body
conducting projects. In almost every province, U.S.
PRTs operate alongside a U.S. battalion (in Afghanistan
the U.S. military refers to these battalions as “maneuver
forces”). Each has a civil affairs team that conducts
projects in order to help the soldiers on the ground win
hearts and minds. Like the PRTs, their funding comes
from CERP. Spending by battalions varies by province.
27
For example, $2 million has been spent by battalions
in Ghazni since 2004, compared to $15 million in
Kunar.77
These are just the most prominent development
players. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and CSTC-A
(the training command for the Afghan security forces)
also conduct projects. And, of course, numerous NGOs
plus the UN do a wide range of reconstruction work
in Afghanistan. Time limitations prevented us from
examining the work of the UN in detail.
Yet none of these organizations can fill the shoes of
the PRTs, which have a unique capability to complete
large-scale projects in dangerous areas (see Table 1). The
U.S. military rates the security in the districts of each
province on a scale of red (dangerous), orange (fairly
dangerous), yellow (fairly safe), and green (safe). In our
four provinces, the PRTs conducted projects regularly
in “red” districts. So did the resident U.S. battalion,
with which the PRT always worked side by side. The
National Guard security force platoon attached to each
PRT enabled it to go to dangerous areas. According to
interviews, the same occurred in most other provinces,
especially where there were no conventional combat
forces to back up the PRT.78
Red Districts Where Projects Are Conducted
Districts
with PRT
Projects
Districts
with
Maneuver
Projects
Districts
with NSP
Projects
Districts
with USAID
Projects
Khost
2
2
2
NA
Kunar
5
2
3
0
Ghazni
3
7
0
NA
Nuristan
3
2
3
NA
Table 1. PRT, “Maneuver,” and NSP Projects Per
“Red” District in 2007.79
28
USAID and NSP could not match the PRTs. Our
field work could not identify any USAID projects in
red districts, though available records of their projects
were largely incomplete. We were told that USAID
focused their efforts on Jalalabad rather than Kunar
and Nuristan.80 In other provinces, USAID certainly
has faced challenges operating in dangerous areas.
The PRT is better suited to protect its people. Ahmed
Rashid’s Descent Into Chaos cites one report that over
100 Afghans working with USAID were killed in unrest
from 2001 to 2006. In Helmand, violence forced a major
agriculture project to be canceled in 2004. Other work
suffered the same fate in later years. In 2006, USAID,
the British Department for International Development,
and the Canadian International Development Agency
allotted millions to Helmand and Kandahar, but
violence prevented aid workers from dedicating much
of it.81 In the south, USAID has been compelled to go
out with its own security.
We did find that the National Solidarity Program
works in red districts. Indeed, the program has
completed 22 projects in Nuristan’s Waygul valley
where nine U.S. soldiers were killed in a massive
attack on a military outpost during the summer of
2008.82 For security, workers rely upon the protection
of villagers and tribal elders.83 However, the program
did not go to red districts in every province (Ghazni, for
example). Furthermore, often the PRT opened the door
into red districts for the National Solidarity Program.
For instance, in Kunar, the construction of the Pech
road and the Jalalabad to Asadabad road allowed the
National Solidarity Program to enter dangerous areas.
Even so, the PRT tended to handle the most dangerous
(“reddest”) areas.84
29
One very dangerous area is the infamous Korengal
Valley. Featured in Elizabeth Rubin’s painfully honest
New York Times Magazine piece, “Battle Company is Out
There,” the Korengal resembles the front lines of the
Korean War more than a three-block war.85 From 2006 to
2008, insurgents there mounted attacks from prepared
positions involving as many as 100 fighters. Soldiers
knew that patrolling past certain gridlines guaranteed
an attack.86 As part of a U.S. military plan to convince
Korengalis to stop fighting, Commander LeGree
funded the construction of a road into the Korengal.
Hoping to mirror the success of the Pech road, the
idea was that the jobs and economic opportunity the
road provided would draw men away from violence
and give tribal elders a means of countering insurgent
influence. The road has pressed forward slowly since
the end of 2007, accompanied by a variety of side
projects. Whether it will be completed is an open
question, but there is no question that the PRT is
operating in a dangerous area.87
Many NGOs avoid violent districts. In some cases,
their workers have been targeted and killed entering
such areas.88 For example, when the Taliban killed two
German civilians in Paktia in 2003, most of the NGOs
left the province. Many did not return for over a year.
The PRT, however, stayed.89 The same happened in the
southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand in 2005.
Had no PRTs been in these provinces, reconstruction
would have slowed to a trickle or stopped altogether.90
And in Farah, the UN labeled the entire province
“nonpermissible,” in part because bandits regularly
targeted unarmed aid workers.91 Now there are
only a handful of NGOs and a few USAID projects
administered from Kabul through local subcontractors.92 By comparison, over 100 NGOs operate to the
north in Herat where security is better.93
30
PRTs also work in less dangerous areas (those rated
orange, yellow, and green). Indeed, the majority of
spending goes to areas where insurgents cannot move
freely or control territory but that are still contested
(i.e., orange and yellow areas). Work has also been
done in safe areas, although the trend is to hand them
over to NGOs, USAID, and other civilian development
agencies.94 For example, the Nangarhar PRT left
Jalalabad, a relatively safe area, to NGOs and civilian
aid agencies doing large infrastructure projects in
order to focus on more dangerous outlying areas that
had seen little development aid.95
Whether in red, orange, yellow, or green areas,
PRTs have a different focus than the U.S. battalions or
the National Solidarity Program. That focus is largescale reconstruction—roads, bridges, schools. In their
early days, most PRT teams focused on small, quickimpact projects designed to win hearts and minds.96 As
time went on, funding streams increased and so did
spending. For instance, PRT spending went from $2
million in Khost in 2005 to over $22 million in 2007.
The change was even more dramatic in Kunar, where
spending went from $2 million in 2004 to $13 million in
2007, and finally $80 million in 2008.97
With greater funding came larger projects. The
average PRT project in Kunar, Khost, and Ghazni in
2007 cost $218,000–$387,000 compared to $13,000–
$15,000 for the National Solidarity Program and
$18,000–$72,000 for U.S. battalions (see Table 2).98 Of
each PRT’s spending, 30 to 60 percent went to roads
and bridges. Lacking dedicated engineers and civil
affairs personnel, the National Solidarity Program and
U.S. battalions simply cannot manage such large-scale
programs.
31
Table 2. Average PRT, NSP, and “Maneuver” Cost
Per Project
(in Thousands of U.S. dollars).99
USAID is a different story. Major national level
infrastructure projects—such as the Kajaki Dam, the
Gardez to Khost Road, large portions of the Ring Road,
and the Jalalabad to Asadabad Road—have been
funded by USAID, in addition to many other types of
projects. In 2007, according to information provided in
PRT briefings, 30 percent of their $1.5 billion budget for
Afghanistan went to roads and bridges.100 However,
USAID is less likely to go to dangerous areas than
the PRTs and also cannot fund large-scale projects as
quickly as the PRTs. USAID money has a long approval
process, and getting a major project funded can take
the better part of a year.101 Over $300 million of the
funds programmed for provinces in 2007 was never
expended.
One might ask what makes large-scale projects
special? Cannot smaller projects have the same
effect? To some extent, we assume large-scale projects
contribute to security and governance in a way that
small-scale projects do not. What can be said is that
this assumption is fed by the impact of large-scale
projects in Kunar, Khost, and Ghazni. Still, we have
not rigorously compared the impact of small- versus
large-scale projects. In our field work, no small-scale
projects stood out as having similar effects in drawing
32
communities together against violence and paving the
way for the Afghan government to deliver goods and
services—but that hardly means that no such cases
exist.
The PRTs have one other advantage over other
development organizations: hands-on monitoring.
Most PRTs have disciplined processes for competitive
bidding, enforcement of contract clauses, and regular
on-site inspections (known as quality control missions).
The two engineers on the PRT staff and the organic
National Guard platoon provide the know-how and
force protection to make this possible.
Even though they sound mundane, fair bidding processes, contract enforcement, and quality control missions are critical to U.S. counterinsurgency objectives.
From 2003 to 2006, several PRTs had experienced
problems in completing projects. Many that were
completed were not structurally sound.102 When
the first group of U.S. Navy and Air Force PRT
commanders arrived in early 2006, Lieutenant General
Karl Eikenberry, then commander of the majority of
the U.S. military forces in Afghanistan, told them to
clean up the contracting process and the projects.103
Over the next 2 years, the PRT commanders and their
staffs worked to do so.104 The addition of engineers
to the PRT staff helped in this regard. Fair bidding
processes were instituted to cut down on contractor
corruption. Regular quality control missions were run
to ensure projects met contract specifications. When
they did not, there were consequences. The PRTs fired
contractors, tore down inadequate work, and withheld
money. Commander LeGree had large sections of
road torn up to send the message that projects must
be completed according to contract specifications.
Commander Cooledge scrapped nine dams worth
33
millions because they were inadequately designed or
illogically sited (one dam held no water). Such actions
put real teeth into quality control and got the attention
of contractors and government officials.
All problems have not been eliminated, but the
situation has improved. It is not just an issue of project
completion. Quality control missions serve as a check
on corruption. They allow the PRT to monitor whether
the money laid out in the contract on labor and materials
has actually been spent and has not been pocketed
by the contractor, government officials, tribal elders,
or—of most concern to the United States—insurgents.
Quality control is the best way to keep U.S. dollars out
of insurgent hands.
Other organizations lack a similar capacity for
hands-on monitoring. The maneuver battalions have a
small civil affairs team of four to six men and no dedicated engineers. The team is too small to run regular
quality control missions. Battalions focus on combat and
are reluctant to commit assets to inspecting a project.
Even managing a competitive bidding process can be
taxing. The result has been that issues have arisen with
project completion (contractors claim a project has been
completed when it has not) and contractors and tribal
elders have skimmed money from contracts. Some
units explicitly skip quality control.105 In fact, battalion
civil affairs personnel often ride with the PRTs to look
at their projects.106
The ability of USAID personnel to enforce
standards and limit corruption is indirect.107 USAID
rarely conducts on-site inspections of its projects using
its own personnel. Instead, it pays Afghan nationals
to visit project sites and write reports.108 Some PRT
members and officers in U.S. battalions insist that
USAID’s practice of subcontracting quality control
34
results in poor construction and corruption by local
contractors.109 At best, because of their reliance on
third parties, USAID lacks a full picture of the status,
quality, and location of projects. While perhaps
acceptable for low-cost projects, indirect monitoring
for highly technical and high-cost projects (such as
roads and bridges) risks both the completion of the
project and the loss of large sums of contract money to
the insurgents or corrupt officials. The problem has not
escaped USAID. Indeed, in Farah, Kandahar, Paktia,
and Kunar, USAID addressed it by delegating handson monitoring for certain projects to the local PRT.110
The National Solidarity Program sends its own
engineers to inspect projects or charges its NGO
facilitating partners to do so. We have interviewed
NSP and NGO personnel, and there are areas of Kunar,
Khost, Ghazni, and Nuristan where they simply will
not go. Discussions with U.S. officers and civilians
on PRTs suggest the same is true in Helmand, Farah,
and Kandahar. Consequently quality control is spotty
at best. Widespread anecdotal accounts describe
large-scale corruption. The most common are tales of
tribal elders absconding with money meant for the
community’s project. In some cases, money is suspected
to have gone to insurgents.111
So, to answer the question posed at the beginning
of this section, the PRTs seem to be unique. No other
organization can complete large projects in dangerous
areas and conduct hands-on monitoring.
Unfortunately, we have not been able to address
two other criticisms of PRTs. First, USAID and NGOs
argue, with good justification, that they have a better
understanding of Afghan culture and society than
the PRTs because they have years of development
experience and employ so many Afghans. From
35
their perspective, their projects are better attuned
to community needs than those of the PRT and are
hence more likely to be used by the community. This
criticism has started something of a debate. Afghan and
various U.S. officials level similar criticism in return,
citing stories of uncompleted projects, corruption, and
projects rejected by the local community.112
The problem in discerning who has the better
projects is that the existing records of projects do not
list when projects were completed and to what extent
they were used by the local community. Moreover,
the records we encountered did not have all USAID
and NGO projects. Thus, no comparison can be made
among the effectiveness of PRT, USAID, National
Solidarity Program, and battalion projects.
The other criticism we have not addressed is
whether PRTs “crowd out the humanitarian space.”
This refers to the possibility that PRT development
activities taint all development activities as part of the
Coalition military effort. From the viewpoint of many
in civilian development agencies, because the military
effort has become connected to the reconstruction
effort, NGOs no longer appear neutral and insurgents
are more likely to attack them.113 We did not examine
this criticism. It is not easy to determine whether PRTs
made insurgent leaders decide that attacks on civilian
aid workers are legitimate, especially without resorting
to classified information.
CONCLUSION
This paper started out with two questions. Do
the PRTs make a difference? And could another
organization fill their shoes?
36
The answer to the first is yes, at least in some cases.
While we cannot show that PRTs make a difference
across the board, we do have evidence that they improve
security and strengthen governance in three provinces.
These results may pertain to other provinces.
The answer to the second question is no. PRTs
provide a unique contribution to U.S. counterinsurgency strategy. Without the PRT, the U.S. military
would lose the “build” in its clear, hold, and build operations. Reconstruction tied into U.S. military operations
would fall on the small civil affairs teams assigned to
each battalion. They are not structured for the task.
Dangerous areas—where American soldiers are fighting and dying—would have no major reconstruction
projects, just small-scale affairs, such as wells and
humanitarian assistance drops. Perhaps this would be
enough but the successes of road construction in Kunar
and elsewhere suggest otherwise. Furthermore, the
U.S. Government as a whole would have less ability
to monitor projects being funded, whether conducted
by the U.S. military or USAID, since the PRT stands
as our number one mechanism for quality control.
Corruption would increase, fewer projects would be
completed, and insurgents could siphon off contract
money undetected.
This is not to disregard other organizations. They are
needed. The small-scale projects of battalion civil affairs
teams help win hearts and minds as soldiers operate
among the people. USAID’s large-scale reconstruction
projects and training programs build up the economy
and governance in a manner and scale far beyond
the PRTs’ capabilities. And the National Solidarity
Program is an ingenious tool for strengthening local
governance and expanding the reach of the Afghan
government. Both the National Solidarity Program
37
and USAID are better for nation-building and longterm economic development than the PRTs. There is a
strong argument to be made that PRT projects are not
needed in safe (“green”) areas like Jalalabad, Panjshir,
or Kabul. USAID, NGOs, and the National Solidarity
Program can do the work in these secured areas.
For counterinsurgency operations, though, PRTs are
the name of the game. Accordingly, the United States
should give the PRTs a major role in reconstruction
activities that accompany any surge of military forces
into Afghanistan. As much as possible, new funds
meant to back up the counterinsurgency campaign
should go to CERP. The PRTs have proven themselves
able to use CERP effectively to improve the security
situation in contested areas.
That is not all. Counterinsurgency objectives can
be better met if decisionmaking for all U.S. projects
in contested areas is delegated to the PRTs. The
USAID representative at the PRT should be in charge
of approval and monitoring for USAID projects in
that province (excluding large cross-province or
regional projects that naturally fall under the Kabul
headquarter’s purview). To do so, Congress will need
to lessen the accountability required for USAID funds,
and the USAID billets in all PRTs will need to be
filled. Since the USAID representative has a co-equal
relationship with the PRT commander, USAID would
not be losing any authority. Its actions would simply
be better coordinated with the military. There is no
reason for USAID decisions on projects to be made
in Kabul, possibly hundreds of miles away from the
project location.
Also, to complete the added duty of monitoring
USAID projects and executing a greater number of
CERP projects, each PRT should be given a National
Guard platoon and additional civil engineers.
38
These recommendations may not be the best over
the long term. One better option would be for USAID,
with its proven expertise and large amounts of money,
to handle the softer side of counterinsurgency. By
giving the PRTs, and hence the U.S. military, the lead
in surge reconstruction, the United States would be
foregoing the creation of a real counterinsurgency
capability in USAID. Unfortunately, USAID currently
lacks the personnel and ability to get into dangerous
places to fill this role. Consequently, this option would
require significant restructuring of USAID to give it a
real counterinsurgency capability. In addition to fewer
restrictions on contracting, USAID would need more
personnel to cover all the provinces, many of whom
would need to be senior enough to take on the role
of the PRT commander managing large numbers of
personnel. One junior civilian per province would be
insufficient. Furthermore, USAID would either need
to be assigned military forces for protection or hire
cadres of private contractors if their personnel were
to venture into dangerous areas. USAID’s Office of
Transition Initiatives, which has fewer restrictions on
expending funds and is experienced in working in
dangerous areas, might need to be placed in charge of
such an effort. Even it would probably need additional
resources.
An even better long-term option, from the perspective of empowering the Afghans, would be for the
Afghan government itself to take over reconstruction
efforts. Thereby, the legitimacy of the government
would be built up as goods and services went directly
from the center to the periphery.
To do so, the United States could funnel more
money into the National Solidarity Program so that it
could play a larger role in province-wide reconstruc-
39
tion. For larger projects, the United States and the international community could train and provide grants for
the Ministry of Public Works or the Ministry of Rural
Rehabilitation and Development to take over the role of
the PRTs. Thereby, the Afghans could start sponsoring
road and bridge projects instead of the PRTs. Such
projects could be coordinated with Afghan National
Army operations and, through the PRTs, U.S. military
operations. Detachments of Afghan National Army
could be trained to take on one of the critical roles of
the PRTs: going into dangerous areas with officials and
engineers to meet with local leaders and do hands-on
monitoring. The PRTs themselves would fall back into
an oversight and advisory role.
The problem is that these alternatives, while
better for long-term development, are not practical
in the short term. Perhaps with significant reforms
USAID or the Afghan government could take over all
reconstruction activities. But right now, they cannot.
With a surge around the corner, the United States has
little choice but to reinforce what has worked best to
this point—the PRTs.
ENDNOTES
1. “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An
Interagency Assessment,” Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), June 2006, p. 9.
2. Nima Abbaszadeh, Mark Crow, Marianne El-Khoury,
Jonathan Gandomi, David Kuwayama, Christopher MacPherson,
Meghan Nutting, Nealin Parker, and Taya Weiss, “Provincial
Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations,”
Research Paper, Princeton, NJ: Woodrow Wilson School of Public
& International Affairs, January 2008, p. 12.
40
3. “NATO-led Forces, Air Agencies Agree New Modus
Operandi,” New York: UN Integrated Regional Information
Networks (IRIN), August 5, 2008.
4. The interviews were conducted with the leadership of
the PRTs in Paktia (2005–06 and 2006–07), Laghman (2006–07),
Panjshir (2007–08), Parwan (2006–07), Farah (2004–05, 2005–
06, 2006–07, and 2007–08), Nangarhar (2004–05 and 2006–07),
Kandahar (2005 and 2007–08), Helmand (2004–05), Zabul (2004–
05), and Paktika (2006–07). We also spoke to the PRT commanders
of Ghazni (2006–07) and Khost (2006–07) who had served prior to
our own work at those PRTs.
5. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) PRT
Handbook, Kabul, Afghanistan, July 2006, pp. 2, 4.
6. Abbaszadeh et al., “Provincial Reconstruction Teams:
Lessons and Recommendations,” p. 24.
7. Terms of Reference for CFC and ISAF PRTs in Afghanistan,
January 27, 2005.
8. ISAF PRT Handbook, p. 39.
9. Ibid., p. 36. Security sector reform, largely embodied in the
disarmament of militias, has ceased to be a major focus of most
PRTs.
10. Ibid., p. 4.
11. Discussion with Michelle Parker, RAND Corporation,
September 2007. USAID Brief to PRT Conference, Kabul, Afghanistan, August 2007.
12. Discussion with USAID officials, USAID headquarters,
Washington, DC, October 9, 2008.
13. We spoke to USAID officials who were both working at
the PRTs and who were working outside the PRT.
14. “Agency Stovepipes vs Strategic Agility: Lessons We
Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq
41
and Afghanistan,” U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on
Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
April 2008, pp. 24, 26–28; Nima Abbaszadeh et al., “Provincial
Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations,” p. 4;
Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure
of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, New
York: Viking, 2008, p. 198.
15. Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2007, p. 37.
16. Foreign Aid in the National Interest, Washington, DC: USAID,
2002, p. 6; Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies,
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006, pp. 1, 34–35, info.
worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/faq.htm#10, accessed December
31, 2007. Many scholars and organizations (particularly the
World Bank and USAID) have examined what constitutes “good
governance.” The answers have been fairly consistent:
• A high degree of popular participation in political
institutions;
• Strong and coherent political institutions;
• The existence of the rule of law, to include police and a
judicial system;
• The delivery of public goods and services;
• A meritocratic bureaucracy;
• The absence of corruption throughout the government;
• Regulations that promote a free market.
For a work based partly on Afghanistan, see Clare Lockhart and
Ashraf Ghani, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a
Fractured World, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 17. Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 2nd Ed.,
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 22–24,
35; Steven Caton, “Anthropological Theories of Tribe and State
Formation in the Middle East: Ideology and the Semiotics of
Power,” Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, eds., Tribes and State
Formation in the Middle East, Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1990, pp. 96–97.
18. Jennifer Brick, “The Political Economy of Customary
Organizations in Rural Afghanistan,” Paper for American Political
Science Association Conference, August 15, 2008, pp. 7–9, 26–28.
42
19. Discussion with Dangam tribal elders, Dangam District
Center, October 29, 2007; Pech-Chapadara shura, Pech District
Center, Nangalam, March 27, 2008; discussion with Chowkay
District Governor, Chowkay District Center, April 9, 2008;
discussion with District Governor Mohammed Rahman, Shigal
District Center, November 5, 2007.
20. Discussion with Haji Mohammed Zalmay, Watapur
District Center, April 20, 2008.
21. Major General Jeffrey Schloesser, Press Briefing, September
5, 2008.
22. ISAF Country Stability Picture, 2007. This is the database of
all projects that have been recorded as contracted in Afghanistan.
23. Discussion with Commander John Wade, CNA headquarters, January 11, 2008.
24. Ibid.
25. Thom Shanker, “Top Officials Greet Gates in Kabul with
Pleas,” New York Times, December 5, 2007.
26. Discussions with Task Force Professional, Forward
Operating Base (FOB) Salerno, Italy, October 15, 2007; Ann
Marlowe, “A Counterinsurgency Grows in Khost,” Weekly
Standard, May 19, 2008.
27. Discussions with PRT civil affairs officers, Bak District
Center, October 16–18, 2008; Commander Dave Adams, Presentation to CNA, May 21, 2008.
28. Discussions with Khost PRT, FOB Chapman, October 3,
2007. Commander Dave Adams, Presentation to CNA, May 21,
2008. Marlowe, “A Counterinsurgency Grows in Khost.”
29. Observations of PRT Khost by Frederick Thompson and
Whitney Raas, October 2007; meeting with Governor Jamal,
Khost Provincial Government Center, October 19, 2007; school
groundbreaking, Musa Khel, October 9, 2007; discussion with
43
Commander Dave Adams, FOB Chapman, October 15, 2007;
meeting with Khost Director of Education, Khost Provincial
Government Center, October 9, 2007.
30. Discussion with Commander John Wade, CNA headquarters, January 11, 2008.
31. Khost Synchronization Meeting, FOB Chapman, October
22, 2007.
32. Discussions with Kael Weston, State Department
Representative to Khost PRT, April 2007–September 2008,
Arlington, VA, October 17, 2008. Commander Dave Adams,
Presentation to CNA, May 21, 2008.
33. Discussion with Khost Provincial Council Chairman,
Khost, October 2007.
34. “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in
Afghanistan,” Report to Congress, June 2008, p. 11.
35. Discussion with Kael Weston, Arlington, VA, October 17,
2008.
36. Casey Ware, “ANSF assumes control of Bak District
Center,” CJTF-101 Press Release, August 22, 2008.
37. The Spearman’s Rank correlation was chosen because of
the small number of cases (7–15 districts in each province). The
ranks were positively correlated at the .05 level in Khost and
(shown later) Ghazni. Thus there is weak statistical evidence that
PRT spending may be positively affecting security. The results for
Kunar and Nuristan were not significant.
38. These include a major attack on FOB Salerno in August
2008; Commander Dave Adams, Presentation to CNA, May 2008;
Major General Jeffrey Schloesser, Press Briefing, September 5,
2008.
39. “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in
Afghanistan,” Report to Congress, June 2008, p. 11.
44
40. Michael Coss, “Operation Mountain Lion: CJTF-76 in
Afghanistan, Spring 2006,” Military Review, January–February
2008, pp. 22–29.
41. Discussion with Master Chief Slothower, Kunar PRT,
Camp Asadabad, September 29, 2007; discussion with Commander
Larry LeGree, Alexandria, VA, August 2008.
42. Discussion with Captain Jay Coughenour, Kunar Provincial
Government Center, March 15, 2008.
43. Discussion with Afghanistan Embassy to the United States,
Afghanistan Embassy, Washington, DC, February 3, 2008; Rashid,
Descent into Chaos, p. 194.
44. National Solidarity Program records of projects in Kunar
Province, November 2007.
45. For a detailed analysis of the Pech road, see David
Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst
of a Big One, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
46. Discussion with Lieutenant Colonel Dale Alford, Marine
Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, January 2008.
Alford commanded a U.S. Marine battalion that had a company
in the Pech Valley in 2004.
47. Discussion with TF Bayonet staff, Jalalabad Airfield,
September 25, 2007; Michael Phillips, “Close Contact,” Wall Street
Journal, April 9, 2007.
48. There had been two earlier attempts to pave the road.
Both never got off the ground. discussion with Commander
Larry LeGree, Camp Asadabad, October 20, 2007; discussion with
Master Chief Slothower, Kunar PRT, Camp Asadabad, September
29, 2007. Master Chief Slothower had two back-to-back tours in
Kunar. He was there from early 2006 until early 2008.
49. Discussion with District Governor Mohammed Rahman,
Asadabad, March 22, 2008.
50. Discussion with District Governor Mohammed Zalmay,
Camp Asadabad, March 13, 2008; discussion with District
45
Governor Mohammed Rahman, Kunar Provincial Government
Center, Asadabad, February 13, 2008, March 22, 2008; discussion
with shop-owners, Nangalam, October 31, 2007.
51. Discussion with Kandogal Police Chief, Kandogal,
November 12, 2007.
52. Meeting with Governor Deedar, Provincial Government
Center, Asadabad, October 2, 2007; brief to Brigadier General
Crane, UNAMA, Camp Wright, November 7, 2007; Kunar
Provincial Security Meeting, Kunar Provincial Government
Center, March 26, 2008; discussions with Task Force Bayonet,
Jalalabad Airfield, September 26, 2007; discussion with District
Governor Mohammed Zalmay, Camp Combat Main, February
18, 2008; discussion with Captain Lou Frketic, Able Company,
2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, Camp Combat Main,
February 18, 2008.
53. Comments by Safi tribal elders, Pech Road opening
ceremony, March 3, 2008.
54. USAID briefing, Camp Asadabad, November 2, 2007.
55. Kunar Provincial Security Meeting, Kunar Provincial
Government Center, March 26, 2008.
56. List of National Solidarity Projects in Kunar, November
2007. Discussion with the Director of the Ministry of Rural
Rehabilitation and Development, Asadabad, October 28, 2007.
57. Discussion with Lieutenant Matthew Myers, PRT Engineer,
Washington, DC, January 2, 2009.
58. Discussion with District Governor Mohammed Rahman,
Shigal District Center, November 5, 2007; discussion with Eastern
Shuryek Valley elders, Kunar Provincial Government Center,
March 23, 2008; shura with Shuryek Valley elders, Tantil, February
28, 2008; discussion with Mamund tribal elder, Marawara bridge
opening, March 3, 2008; Pech-Chapadara shura, Pech District
Center, Nangalam, March 27, 2008; shura with Chopadara district
elders, Chopadara District Center, November 6, 2007; discussion
with Haji Mohammed Zalmay, Korengal Outpost, November
46
6, 2007; conversation with Haji Mohammed Zalmay, Camp
Asadabad, March 13, 2008; discussion with Shigal tribal elder,
Camp Asadabad, February 27, 2008; shura with Shigal tribal elders,
Shigal District Center, November 5, 2007; discussion with Dangam
tribal elders, Dangam District Center, October 29, 2007; discussion
with Chowkay District Governor, Chowkay district center, April
9, 2008; discussion with Naray reporter, FOB Naray, October
16, 2007; discussion with Ghaziabad police officer, Nishagam,
October 17, 2007; shura in Pech Valley, November 12, 2007;
meeting with Omar Village elders, Omar, Pech Valley, October
31, 2007; discussion with Governor Deedar’s staff, provincial
government center, October 23, 2007; notes on Mamund tribal
meeting, Asadabad, November 5, 2007; discussion with Korengali
tribal elders, Korengal Outpost, April 3, 2008; discussion with
Kunar Provincial Council, Provincial Government Center, April
10, 2008; discussion with Governor Wahidi, Asadabad, March
26, 2008; discussion with Marble Jon Dodd, Kunar Provincial
Government Center, February 20, 2008; messages sent from Haji
Jon Dodd via UBCC Construction Company, April 2008.
59. Discussion with Governor Wahidi, Kunar Provincial
Government Center, March 25, 2008.
60. Discussion with Governor Wahidi, Asadabad, March 26,
2008.
61. Discussion with Shigal tribal elder, Camp Asadabad,
February 27, 2008; discussion with Civil Affairs Team North
Leader, Camp Asadabad, February 25 2008; discussion with
Shuryek tribal elders, Pech River Valley, April 2008; discussion
with UBCC construction firm, Camp Asadabad, April 2008;
discussion with Chowkay District Governor, Chowkay district
center, April 9, 2008; discussion with Kunar PRT civil affairs team
leaders, Camp Asadabad, February 2008.
62. Discussion with District Governor Mohammed Rahman,
Kunar Provincial Government Center, March 25, 2008; Kunar
Provincial Security Meeting, Kunar Provincial Government
Center, March 26, 2008; Pech-Chapadara shura, Pech District
Center, Nangalam, March 27, 2008.
47
63. Districts were ranked according to the degree governance
improved and the average number of PRT visits per month. We
then ran a Spearman’s Rank correlation, which was positive and
significant at the .05 level. This test provided some evidence that
PRT engagement had a positive influence on governance.
64. The Kunar PRT instituted a similar plan in coordination
with the provincial director of public health and NGOs. It was just
underway when we left so it could not be evaluated. Kunar PRT
Effects Meeting, Camp Asadabad, October 31, 2007.
65. See explanation for Spearman’s Rank correlation in
endnote 37.
66. See Nir Rosen, “How We Lost the War We Won,” Rolling
Stone, www.rollingstone.com/news/story/23612315/how_we_lost_the_
war_we_won, accessed November 10, 2008.
67. Phone interview with PRT Lashkar Gah commanding
officer, August 6, 2008; discussion with Lieutenant Colonel Chris
Kolenda, FOB Naray, October 13, 2007; Bill Anderson, Kapisa and
Parwan Provincial Reconstruction Team Brief, September 9, 2008;
discussion with Commander Michael Varney, CNA Headquarters,
June 2007.
68. Discussion with Commander of PRT Farah in 2004-05.
69. Discussion with State Department Representative for PRT
Farah in 2005-06, August 1, 2008.
70. Discussion with Commander Michael Varney, CNA
Headquarters, June 2007.
71. Discussion with Civil Affairs Team Leader for PRT Gardez
(Paktia province) in 2005-06.
72. Expenditures totaled $1.6 billion in 2008. USAID
Afghanistan Budget Presentation, November 13, 2008; USAID
Afghanistan Budget Presentation given at PRT Conference,
June 2007; “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in
Afghanistan,” Report to Congress, June 2008, p. 62.
48
73. For the calendar year in 2007, the Khost PRT spent $22
million, and the Kunar PRT spent $13 million. “Report on Progress
toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” Report to Congress,
June 2008, p. 62; ISAF Project Database, 2007; CNA field research,
Kunar, Khost, and Ghazni, September to November 2007; USAID
province factsheets for Kunar and Khost, 2007; USAID province
factsheets for Kunar and Khost, 2008.
74. Discussion with National Solidarity Program Provincial
Director, Asadabad, October 27, 2007; discussion with Ministry
of Rural Rehabilitation and Development officials, Asadabad,
October 28, 2007.
75. ISAF Country Stability Picture, 2007; discussion
with provincial NSP Director, Asadabad, October 27, 2007;
discussion with the Provincial Director of Rural Rehabilitation
and Development, Asadabad, October 28, 2007; discussion with
Asmar reporter, Camp Monti, October 29, 2007.
76. Discussions with 25 local Afghan leaders, October 2007 to
April 2008.
77. ISAF Country Stability picture database; CNA research
at 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, Camp Blessing,
November 2007; CNA research at 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry
Regiment, Camp Naray, October 2007.
78. CNA interview with 2006-07 Paktia PRT commander, July
25, 2008; CNA interview with 2005-06 Farah PRT State Department
representative, August 10, 2008; CNA interview with 2007-08
Farah PRT commander, July 29, 2008; CNA interview with 200405 Zabul PRT commander, September 2, 2008; CNA interview
with 2004-05 Helmand PRT commander, August 6, 2008.
79. Data taken from CJTF-82 Assessment Briefs from April
2007 to April 2008; and ISAF Country Stability Picture database,
2007.
80. Discussion with USAID representative, TF Bayonet
headquarters, FOB Jalalabad, September 29, 2007.
49
81. Rashid, Descent Into Chaos, pp. 174, 323, 373.
82. National Solidarity Program Implementation Process as of
30th Qaws 1386, December 21, 2007.
83. Discussion with Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and
Development office in Kunar, Asadabad, October 28, 2007.
84. Discussion with Kunar National Solidarity Program
Director, Asadabad, October 27, 2007.
85. Elizabeth Rubin, “Battle Company is Out There,” New
York Times Magazine, February 24, 2008.
86. Discussion with Battle Company, 2nd Battalion, 503rd
Infantry Regiment, Korengal Outpost, April 2, 2008.
87. Commander Larry LeGree, Korengal-Chowkay Road
Strategy, October 2007; discussion with Korengali tribal elders,
Korengal Outpost, April 3, 2008. The Khost PRT started a road
into Sebari district, a similarly dangerous area. Conversation with
Kael Weston, Washington, DC, October 13, 2008.
88. From August 2003 to November 2004, attacks on aid
workers in Afghanistan went from 0 to 145. USAID weekly
activity report, November 12–December 1, 2004.
89. CNA interview with 2005–06 Paktia PRT commander, July
31, 2008.
90. Rashid, Descent Into Chaos, p. 247.
91. CNA interview with 2005-06 Farah PRT commander, July
31, 2008.
92. National Solidarity Program Implementation Progress as
of December 21, 2007, Fact Sheet; CNA interview with 2006-07
Farah PRT commander, July 23, 2008.
93. CNA interview with 2007-08 Farah PRT commander, July
29, 2008.
50
94. CNA interview with 2006-07 Paktia PRT commander, July
25, 2008; CNA interview with 2007-08 Panjshir PRT commander,
August 4, 2008.
95. CNA interview with 2006-07 Nangarhar PRT commander,
July 28, 2008.
96. CNA interview with 2004-05 Kandahar PRT commander,
August 6, 2008; Michelle Parker, “Programming Development
Funds to Support a Counterinsurgency: A Case Study of
Nangarhar, Afghanistan in 2006,” Case Studies in National
Security Transformation, No. 10, 2007, p. 10.
97. ISAF Country Stability Picture database, 2007.
98. Ibid.
99. All numbers are for calendar year 2007, not fiscal year
2007.
100. The percentage fell to roughly 20 percent in 2008, but
the total sum was still an impressive $300 million. USAID Budget
Presentation, November 13, 2008.
101. Discussion with USAID officers, USAID Headquarters,
Washington, DC, October 10, 2008; CNA interview with 200607 Laghman PRT commander, August 1, 2008; discussions with
PRT Kunar, Camp Asadabad, October 2007; “Agency Stovepipes
vs Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial
Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan,” U.S. House of
Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigations, April 2008, p. 22.
102. Discussion with Provincial Administrator Fazl Akbar,
Kunar Provincial Government Center, Asadabad, October 27,
2007; USIP interview #6, Afghanistan Experience Project, April
19, 2005, www.usip.org/library/oh/afghanistan_prt.html, accessed
August 15, 2008; discussion with Lieutenant Colonel Dale Alford,
Marine Corps Command and Staff College, January 2008; CNA
interview with 2005–06 Farah PRT commander, July 31, 2008;
discussion with Master Chief Slothower, Kunar PRT, Camp
Asadabad, September 29, 2007.
51
103. Discussion with Commander John Wade, CNA headquarters, January 11, 2008.
104. Tamara Gabbard, “New Bidding Process Creating
Standards Afghanistan Can Grow With,” Combined Joint Task
Force– 101 News Release, August 18, 2008.
105. Discussions with 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment,
1-91 CAV, Camp Naray, October 15, 2007; discussions with C
Troop, 1-91 CAV, Camp Monti, October 18, 2007; discussions
with civil affairs officers, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment,
February 2008.
106. Discussions with civil affairs officers, 2nd Battalion, 503rd
Infantry Regiment, February 2008.
107. Michelle Parker, “Programming Development Funds
to Support a Counterinsurgency: A Case Study of Nangarhar,
Afghanistan in 2006,” Case Studies in National Security
Transformation, No. 10, 2007, p. 10.
108. Discussion with USAID representative, TF Bayonet
headquarters, FOB Jalalabad, September 29, 2007; brief to USAID,
USAID headquarters, Washington, DC, October 10, 2008.
109. Discussion with 1-91 CAV, Camp Naray, October 15,
2007; discussions with Kunar PRT, Camp Asadabad, September
2007.
110. CNA interview with 2004-05 Kandahar PRT commander,
August 6, 2008; CNA interview with 2006–07 Paktia PRT
commander, July 25, 2008; CNA interview with 2005–06 Paktia
PRT civil affairs team leader.
111. Discussion with Soraya Nelson, NPR Correspondent,
Camp Asadabad, March 22, 2008; discussion with Narang locals,
Camp Asadabad, March 7, 2008; discussion with Chowkay District
Governor, Chowkay district center, April 9, 2008; discussion
with Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development officials,
Asadabad, October 28, 2007; discussion with National Solidarity
Program inspector, Kunar Provincial Government Center,
Asadabad, February 13, 2008.
52
112. Discussion with USAID representative, TF Bayonet
headquarters, FOB Jalalabad, September 29, 2007; discussion with
Lieutenant Colonel Chris Kolenda, FOB Naray, October 14, 2007;
meeting with Governor Jamal, Khost Provincial Government
Center, October 19, 2007; meeting with Governor Wahidi, Kunar
Provincial Government Center, March 10, 2008; meeting with the
United Nations, Khost Provincial Government Center, October 25,
2007; discussion with Afghanistan Embassy to the United States,
Afghanistan Embassy, Washington, DC, February 3, 2008.
113. “Policing a Whirlwind,” The Economist, December 15,
2007; interview with Commander, Regional Command West,
USIP Afghan Experience Project, Interview #43, August 11, 2005.
53