Foreign Policy
Ali Carroll, Alex Melanson, Eric Sweeney
The Great White Fleet:
The American Navy’s World Cruise
Strengthening the Navy
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From the beginning of his presidency, Roosevelt
articulated the country’s responsibility in foreign affairs
First Annual Message (1901): “Whether we desire it or
not, we must henceforth recognize that we have
international duties, … American people must either
build and maintain an adequate navy or else make up
their minds definitely to accept a secondary position in
international affairs.”
Strengthening the Navy

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Roosevelt fought legislative resistance from
congress as he wanted to build the navy during a
time of peace
Roosevelt believed a stronger navy was needed:
To protect America’s economic livelihood
 To project America’s technological and martial
prowess abroad
 To establish America as an advanced peacekeeping
force abroad

Strengthening the Navy

To counter legislative resistance, Roosevelt
staged a huge media event – announcing in the
summer of 1907 that he would send 16
American battleships out in December 1907 to
tour the world
Foreign Policy and the Rhetorical
Challenge

Presidents face the rhetorical challenge of
dealing with foreign policy during times of
peace
How does a president call for standard
improvements in military capabilities without
creating images of war in public’s consciousness?
 How does a president promote improvement of
military capabilities during a time of peace?


Roosevelt engaged the media to mythologize the
world cruise, in order to conceal the martial
nature of the battleship fleet
The Media and the Myth

Roosevelt provided the media with three
traditional themes:
A world demanding that America uphold its
international responsibility
 The navy seamen who represented the type of
American to fulfill that responsibility
 The battleship fleet represented the culmination of
American ingenuity and determination

The World in Need of a Savior

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The media’s (and Roosevelt’s) constructed
universe featured a world comprised of simple
cultures that respected American power
Focused on the nation’s supposed moral and
martial duty as a responsible member of the
global community, without addressing the issue
of whether world peace was being threatened
and needed America to play a great part
Declared that America had no enemies in the
present universe
The Navy Hero

Rather than focusing on the traditional picture
of a warrior, the press exhibited the sailors’
more benign, heroic traits –
Willingness to work
 Superhuman endurance
 Civility


Roosevelt declared that “sea-man of our
warships… are unsurpassed in daring, in
resolution, in readiness, in thorough knowledge
of their profession” (Second Annual Message,
1902).
The Navy Hero

“Fighting Bob” – a symbolic hero comprised of characteristics
from Rear Admiral Robley Evans and Rear Admiral Charles
Sperry, two commanders in the battleship fleet
The Battleship Fleet

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Instead of highlighting the destructive power of the
fleet, the press praised the battleships as mythical
symbols of American industrial power and cultural
superiority
Contextualized in an inactive fashion, likening the fleet
to the insurance that the average American purchased
in preparation for dangers in the distant future
Romanticized by media, who transformed the
battleships into rich cultural centers
What Made Roosevelt Successful?

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He realized the power of the public influence
He employed the mass media to get past
Congress on the issue of building up the navy
He promoted the idea that the world was in
need of a defender, and that the American navy
could be that champion while the battleship
would be the tool used to fulfill America’s duty
Roosevelt’s Rhetorical Influence

Later presidents followed Roosevelt’s example,
using myths to redefine armed conflicts as
peacekeeping missions in the quest for
international stability
Eisenhower
 G.W. Bush

Rhetorical Compact
•When
giving a speech, the President must
remember that he is speaking to both the
immediate audience and other rhetorical
players who will respond with public
statements or actions of their own
•With issues of foreign policy, leaders form a
rhetorical compact, or an effort to balance
rhetorical objectives across multiple
audiences

To have compacts, there must be baseline rules,
but the speakers also must avoid falling into a
pattern
They generally do things slowly, but once they have
established an understanding with others they can
become creative
 To get the rules, early they try to declare an identity
 To keep the compact, one may maintain policy, other
rhetorical pattern

Eisenhower & Khrushchev


In the 1950’s, Americans were concerned with
the missile gap with Russia and that we were
behind in the Arms race
Eisenhower mentioned the gap early in his
career and was then peppered with questions
concerning this for his time in office
Eisenhower & Khrushchev


Due to internal pressure, Khrushchev’s rhetoric
was powerful and forceful, declaring Soviet
power as “absolute and strong”
Eisenhower had information that there was not
in fact a gap and that America was actually more
powerful than the Soviets

He chose not to mention this in public due to his
compact with Khrushchev and his foreign policy
Eisenhower & Khrushchev


In this compact, Eisenhower allowed for Khrushchev’s
rhetoric to involve the power of Russia even though it
was false
Llewellyn Thompson was ambassador to Soviet Union,
very influential in the Foreign policy issue – he helped
the president understand the issue


Khrushchev’s fanatical rhetoric was from internal political
pressure
Thompson saw Khrushchev’ style as a resolve to avoid future
war, not aggression
Eisenhower & Khrushchev


During the time, Cold War rhetoric was
powerful in America and the Soviet Union
Eisenhower’s war hero image enabled him to
have more credibility with nation defense, and
so he could avoid this rhetoric in his foreign
policy

Khrushchev lacked this reputation and made up for
it in his speeches of power and fanaticism
Khrushchev

“We stick firmly to the Lenin precept—don't be
stubborn if you see you are wrong, but don't
give in if you are right. About the capitalist
states, it doesn't depend on you whether or not
we exist. If you don't like us, don't accept our
invitations, and don't invite us to come to see
you. Whether you like it or not, history is on our
side. We will bury you!"
Khrushchev


Khrushchev’s “We will bury you” speech this
rhetoric was not to be taken seriously, but a way
to appease his hard-line critics in the USSR
He hoped that his rhetoric would force the US
to see them as an equal, even though he played
from a point of militaristic inferiority
Khrushchev


Regardless of his fanatical speeches,
Khrushchev’s main goal was for peace with
America
He successfully substituted militaristic rhetoric
for an actual militaristic defense policy


His rhetoric was powerful in establishing their power,
while reducing military spending - troops reduced by 1.2
million
“My secret weapon is my tounge
Eisenhower

In foreign policy, both sides must understand
the immediate rhetorical situation of the other.
Thompson was crucial during this period in
letting Eisenhower know the pressure put on
Khrushchev


Eisenhower’s foreign policy was to remain quiet
about this situation
In doing so, he avoided future risk of the Soviets
actually making more missiles
Eisenhower’s State of the Union

“But we must remember that these imposing
armaments are purchased at great cost… Modern
weapons are exceedingly expensive… We are buying
certain bombers that cost their weight in gold. These
sums are tremendous, even when compared with the
marvelous resiliency and capacity of our economy. We
must guard against our feverish building of vast
armaments to meet glibly predicted moments of socalled maximum peril… I am equally sure that the
nation will thus avoid useless expenditures which, in the
name of security, might tend to undermine the
economy and, therefore, the nations safety.”
Eisenhower

“In the councils of government, we must guard against
the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether
sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.
The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced
power exists and will persist. We must never let the
weight of this combination endanger our liberties or
democratic processes. We should take nothing for
granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can
compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and
military machinery of defense with our peaceful
methods and goals, so that security and liberty may
prosper together.”
The Compact
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By remaining quiet about the missile gap, Eisenhower
slowed missile creation and may have increased the
safety of Americans
He had the ability to destroy the Soviet military bravado
and humiliate them but chose not to
In a conversation with Khrushchev, Eisenhower
offered his insight into the arms race:

“You know, we really should come to some sort of
agreement in order to stop this fruitless, really wasteful
rivalry”
The Compact

If Eisenhower was not credited as being smart
and strong in national security, would he have
been able to keep this foreign policy?
GOING PUBLIC, CRISIS AFTER CRISIS:
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND THE
PRESS FROM SEPTEMBER 11 TO SADDAM
Sue Lockett John, David Domke, Kevin Coe,
Erica S. Graham
Mass Media as a Political Resource

Extension of the September 11 crisis:
Internal “homeland security”
 External “war on terror”

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Allowed President Bush to:
Significantly shape U.S. news coverage
 Help Republicans gain control of Congress
 Propel the U.S. toward war with Iraq

2002 State of the Union Address

President Bush emphasized two related goals:

Protection of Americans at home

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“…do everything possible to protect our citizens and
strengthen our nation against the ongoing threat of
another attack.”
Preemptive strategy against terrorism abroad

“…prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons from threatening the
United States and the world.”
2002 State of the Union Address

Two major goals of this
speech:


To define the parameters
of U.S. public discourse
about terrorism
To highlight matters upon
which the administration
could politically capitalize
Strategic Communication

The administration began to communicate
decisively so as to foster public confidence


“Either you are with us, or you are with the
terrorists.”
Two major initiatives in 2002:
The Homeland Security Act
 War against Saddam Hussein and Iraq

Strategic Communication

Three central themes:
Frequently invoked the events of September 11
 Emphasized the presence of external threats that
required U.S. governmental action
 Emphasized a struggle against the “axis of evil”

News Coverage

The U.S. news media emphasized the
administration as sources and highlighted the
president’s themes
Most journalists were American citizens who looked
to the president for leadership in times of crisis
 Most journalists rely upon government leaders to
index the range of viewpoints in news coverage – to
set the parameters of debate

Categories of Discourse

Content analysis of three discursive categories:

Reference to September 11
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Presence of external threats

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“September 11,” “the eventful day in September,” etc.
“Iraq,” “Saddam,” “terrorists,” etc.
“Evil” discourse
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“Axis of evil,” “cold-blooded,” “wicked,” etc.
Presidential Discourse Analysis


Shift in focus from homeland security to Iraq
Before September 12

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More than 75% of the president’s communications
focused solely on homeland security
After September 12
70% focused on homeland security and Iraq
 30% focused on Iraq alone


President Bush consistently emphasized the
same three themes throughout this time period
Linking 9/11 to Iraq

“Threat” discourse

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“The war on terror is more than just al Qaeda. The
war on terror is to deal with nations who have
terrorized their own people and have the intention to
terrorize us…” (10/3/02)
“Evil” terminology

“Terror cells and outlaw regimes building weapons
of mass destruction are different faces of the same
evil.” (10/7/02)
Results


In a 2003 poll: 70% of Americans believed
Saddam had a role in the 9/11 attacks, and 80%
thought it likely that he helped al Qaeda
Further implications:
Initial political advantage for the Republicans
 Misinformed public
 Political discourse that pushed toward war with Iraq

Bibliography
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Dorsey, L. G. (1997). Sailing into the "Wondrous Now": The Myth of the
American Navy’s world cruise. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 83, 447-465.
Eisenhower, D. D. Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People.
Retrieved Nov 5, 2007, from
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/mediaplay.php?id=12086&admin=34
Lockett, S., Domke, J. D., Coe, K., & Graham, E. S. (2007). Going public, crisis
after crisis: The Bush administration and the press from September 11 to Saddam,
Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 10, 195–220.
Roosevelt, T. (1901). First Annual Message. Retrieved Nov 5, 2007, from
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29542&st=&st1=
Roosevelt, T. (1902). Second Annual Message. Retrieved Nov 5, 2007, from
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29543&st=&st1=
Scott, D. K. (2003). The Eisenhower/Khrushchev rhetorical compact: Toward a
model of cooperative public discourse. Southern Communication Journal, 68, 287-306.